
# 1NC vs Plano East RP

## 1NC

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose new affirmatives on the wiki 30 minutes before they are read in round.

#### Violation: You didn’t



#### Net benefits -

#### 1 - Testing: There are hundreds of potential aff positions, disclosure of the aff directs pre-round prep which ensures the debate is about the substance of the position as opposed to generics, which is key to nuanced clash and in depth debate. Their interpretation forces the negative to read frivolous theory or kritiks with overly broad points of disagreement with the aff.

#### 2 - New does not mean better: Your interp encourages debaters to try to win rounds with surprise strategies as opposed to well researched positions, which kills predictability and iterative content mastery.

#### Vote on fairness because it is axiomatically necessary to determine the better debater over the better cheater

#### Vote on education because it is the reason why schools fund debate

#### Use competing interps:

#### Reasonability is arbitrary which invites judge intervention or random unjustified thresholds.

#### Competing interpretations deters future abuse by creating consistent norms that debaters can be held to in the future.

#### Drop the debater:

#### Dropping the arg is the equivalent of severance because it allows them to shift to a different position in the 1ar, which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense.

#### Deters future abuse the greatest incentive in debate is competitive success so debaters won’t read positions if they can’t win on them.

## 1NC – Shell

#### Interpretation: outer space consists of regions outside the atmospheres of celestial bodies

Tanabe 19 [(Rosie, updater and writer at NWE) “Outer space,” New World Encyclopedia, 1/8/2019] JL

Outer space (often called space) consists of the relatively empty regions of the universe outside the [atmospheres](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Atmosphere) of celestial bodies. *Outer* space is used to distinguish it from airspace and terrestrial locations. There is no clear boundary between [Earth's atmosphere](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Earth%27s_atmosphere) and space, as the [density](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Density) of the atmosphere gradually decreases as the altitude increases.


#### The moon has an atmosphere—

Siegal 21[(Ethan, a Ph.D. astrophysicist and author of "Starts with a Bang!" He is a science communicator, who professes physics and astronomy at various colleges. He has won numerous awards for science writing since 2008 for his blog, including the award for best science blog by the Institute of Physics.) “The “airless” Moon really does have an atmosphere, after all,” Big Think, November 17, 2021. <https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/airless-moon-atmosphere/>] RR

And yet, the Moon actually does have an atmosphere: one that’s measurable and detectable. In addition, it has something even better than an atmosphere: an atmospheric “tail” made of sodium atoms. Here’s the fascinating science behind our lunar companion’s tenuous, but nonnegligible, atmosphere, which we mustn’t ignore any longer.

#### Violation: Lunar Heritage Sites are located on the moon, not in outer space.

Nasa 13 [(Nasa, The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is America’s civil space program and the global leader in space exploration. The agency has a diverse workforce of just under 18,000 civil servants, and works with many more U.S. contractors, academia, and international and commercial partners to explore, discover, and expand knowledge for the benefit of humanity. With an annual budget of $23.2 billion in Fiscal Year 2021, which is less than 0.5% of the overall U.S. federal budget, NASA supports more than 312,000 jobs across the United States, generating more than $64.3 billion in total economic output (Fiscal Year 2019).) “Lunar Heritage Sites,” NASA, 12/13/13. <https://moon.nasa.gov/resources/53/lunar-heritage-sites/>] RR

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This graphic highlights locations on the moon NASA considers "lunar heritage sites" and the path NASA's Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory spacecraft will take on their final flight.

Navigators on the GRAIL team have designed an end of mission plan that rules out the extremely remote possibility of either of the two GRAIL spacecraft impacting near any of these historic locations. The Apollo 11, 12, 14, 16 and 17 landing sites are indicated with green circles. The Surveyor sites are indicated with yellow squares. The Soviet Union's Luna and Lunakhod landing sites are indicated with red diamonds and red triangles, respectively.

The ground tracks for the Ebb and Flow spacecraft during their final half-orbits are shown in blue and red.

#### Standards:

#### Limits – their interpretation means that they allow for the elimination of private appropriation on earth, asteroids, galaxies, comets, mars etc. This explodes neg prep burdens since outer space activity is so vague – no generics exist to answer both the earth and the moon aff, so affs would just win with a tiny impact every round

#### Ground – allowing debates about celestial bodies denies the neg links to core generics like space democracy bad, space colonization good, the moon pic, the property rights NC, etc. – that kills clash by forcing negatives to the fringes of argumentation that disagree with everything and kills fairness by giving the aff a major prep advantage since they only need to frontline the few negative arguments that link to their aff.

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game, and fairness is necessary to determine the winner of the game, and education is the reason why schools fund debate.

#### Drop the debater – dropping the argument doesn’t rectify abuse since winning T proves why we don’t have the burden of rejoinder against their aff.

#### Use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since there’s no consensus as to what’s reasonable.

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are logical litmus tests and they incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which turns substance crowdout

## 1NC

#### The transhumanist dream ignores the physical reality of labor

HS 13 [(HumanStrike Blog, blog on neoliberalism, capitalism, and critical theory; cites Giorgio Agamben, prof of philosophy at Univ of Vienna, and Christian Mazzari, Director of Socio-Economic Research at the Scuola Universitaria della Svizzera Italiana) “bare life, immaterial labour, foxconn. first draft” Human Strike Blog, July 24, 2013] AT

Jon Seltin makes a similar argument about transhumanists, those who dream of a post-human future in which we transcend the boundaries of our physical bodies and use technology to become immortal. They, too, ignore the physical reality of the machines they use, and the hidden labor that produces them. As he puts it: “The supposed fluidity, transcendence and liberation associated with digital technologies and hyperbolic post-human futures are structurally contingent on the cheap labour and dehumanisation of these other post-humans” (Seltin 2009, 53). Likewise, the fact that post-operaists can argue for a living wage and make the claim that we have almost approached communism, and need only rid ourselves of the parasitic phantom of financial capitalism, is predicated on ignoring the processes that produce the cognitive worker’s means of production: the bare life of the assembly-line worker making their iphones, and the bare life of the migrant domestic worker ensuring their reproduction. Seltin reminds us of “…those assembly workers whose integration with technologies and machines is marked not by liberation and transcendence but their absolute antitheses: by ~~crippling~~ poverty, an absolute lack of economic and personal security, and a complete alienation from the symbolic spaces that their labor produces. While many electronics assembly workers may have no access to the internet, their cheap labour provides the material basis upon which the dreams of digital disembodiment of transhumanists are based.” (2009, 53).

#### The aff’s vision of technological paradise where people are able to modify their is based in the narrow experiences of the first world consumer. *Where does your technology come from?* This is the fatal flaw in the affirmative’s logic that perpetuates hyper-exploitation and dehumanization along racial lines. This exraction is key to the funtioning of capitalism.

HS 13 [(HumanStrike Blog, blog on neoliberalism, capitalism, and critical theory; cites Giorgio Agamben, prof of philosophy at Univ of Vienna, and Christian Mazzari, Director of Socio-Economic Research at the Scuola Universitaria della Svizzera Italiana) “Neoliberalism, Suzhi, and Bare Life” Human Strike Blog, MAY 21, 2013] AT

So, this value that is imbued in urban middle-class children in China or in well-off children in the United States who are groomed from a young age to be competitive, flexible, desirable, is derived from the reproductive labor of a highly regulated, super-exploited flexible class of migrant domestic workers. While this labor is paid, unlike the reproductive labor of the wife or mother in Fortunati’s formulation, I believe that the relation between obscured domestic work and the productive, “high-quality” bodies of cognitive laborers is the same. The former are portrayed as unskilled or, in Endnotes’ formulation, as merely a result of high income-differentials, and not productive of value, while the latter are seen as the true workers of our immaterial age. This ~~blindness~~ [ignorance] to the value-producing nature of racialized, gendered domestic work is comparable to the refusal to see women’s work as ‘real work’ by Marxists in the mid-twentieth century, and is, as I shall argue later, necessary to post-operaist discourses about immaterial labor and their subsequent arguments for social democracy. One last note before returning to the main current of this piece: Hairong tells us that employers see the malleability of domestic laborers as a ‘blank slate’ that can be shaped according to their own needs, while Anagost tells us that she observed in discourses of suzhi “nothing less than a substitution of bodies in which the extraction of value from one body was being accumulated in the other (2004, 191). She argues that the bare life of migrant workers, their pure potentiality–or in Hairong’s formulation the ‘blank slate’ of their subjectivity–is appropriated in order to form the ‘qualified life’ of middle-class, intellectual workers (Anagost 2004, 193). Here we can begin to see the relation between bare life and qualified life as sources of value, one hidden and obscured and one privileged through attention both from middle-class intellectual workers and supposedly critical anti-capitalists. In the next section, I will address more fully this notion of bare life and qualified life in domestic labor, industrial production, and cognitive labor, the omission of these nuances among contemporary post-operaists, and the effect of this lacuna on their analyses and political strategies. Bare Life and Qualified Life: Factories and Cognitive Labor According to Agamben, classical Greeks used two different terms to describe life: “zoē, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or group….what was at issue [in using bios] for both thinkers was not at all simple natural life but rather a qualified life, a particular way of life” (Agamben 1998, 1). He then offers us a framework for understanding both the historical and contemporary logic of sovereignty and biopolitics: “The fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion” (1998, 9). While I find Agamben’s framework extraordinarily important overall, I would like to focus particularly on the production of bare life and qualified life, zoē and bios, in the realms of production. The extraction of value from bare life is fundamental to contemporary capitalism, but there remains an important distinction between the extraction of value from bare life and from qualified life, even as those distinctions may be experienced by the same bodies. Thus while for the Western or urban cognitive worker value is extracted from their bare life, it is additionally extracted from their qualified life: they are subjectivized as both zoe and bios, in line with Agamben’s formulation of the inseparability of the two under contemporary sovereignty. However, the Chinese factory worker or the migrant domestic worker are subjected purely as zoē, as a source of bare life existing outside of the law and functioning only to produce value. I argue for this distinction in contrast to Marazzi, who sees bare life as interchangeable with the proletariat (Marazzi 2011, 41-42), even while unwittingly focusing on those forms of labor that are most qualified. What I take issue with is not the argument that the body is an exploited source of value for all subjects under contemporary capitalism, but the failure to recognize the dramatic differences in how that exploitation functions and is distributed according to race, gender, and geographical location. Christian Marazzi tells us, in his critique of financial capitalism, that “bio-capitalism produces value by extracting it not only from the body functioning as the material instrument of work, but also from the body understood as a whole.” (2011, 49). This may be correct, but let us examine the arenas in which this value extraction takes place in his work. Echoing our earlier discussion of the birth of neoliberalism, he tells us of “the emergence of atypical labor and of second generation autonomous labor, former employees who become self-employed” (2011, 50), and then of the massive value produced by our cooperative labor in the form of co-production: “These crowdsourcing strategies, leaching vital resources from the multitudes, represent the new organic composition of capital, the relationship between constant capital dispersed throughout society and variable capital as the whole of sociality, emotions, desires, relational capacities and a lot of ‘free labor’ (unpaid labor) dispersed in the sphere of the consumption and reproduction in the forms of life, of individual and collective imaginary” (2011, 115). Who are the “multitudes” in this formulation? Who are the productive workers, and is this value that is extracted from them extracted from their bare life or from qualified life? By seeing value as produced only through the collective intellectual work of those people who are plugged into the internet, into culture, into crowdsourcing, Marazzi casts those workers from excluded populations as irrelevant, as always already not part of the multitudes. From where does the productive capacity of these “multitudes” come? Are these creative subjects produced only through their own self-work? Do the physical tools that they use spring into existence from the general intellect? From where do their computers, their iphones, their network routers and servers come? I would like to return here to Anagost’s formulation of bare life and suzhi, and the notion of the qualified life, bios. The neoliberal subject is precisely not bare life, it is in fact an extraordinarily qualified life, imbued with values, qualities, and skills that make it so productive in Marazzi’s view. I do not think it entirely coincidental that suzhi translates into quality, and that Anagost and Hairong perceive the presence of migrant domestic workers in urban families as part of a process of investing in and increasing the suzhi of the children. This value that is extracted from domestic workers, the value that is transferred to children who will become cognitive laborers, computer programmers, entrepreneurs–Marazzi’s multitudes–is an accumulation of quality: the future entrepreneur becomes ‘qualified’ precisely by an extraction of value from the unqualified, bare life of the domestic worker. Anagost still sees bare life as fundamental to the experience of both: “it would seem that the body–or if not the body as such, then Agamben’s ‘bare life’–provides a common substrate that underlies both the Chinese state’s strategies for developing the latent potentialities of the masses and the absorption of the individual in technologies of the self, in which care of the body becomes an obsessive focus of bourgeois consumption–an intensification of the body as a site of investment” (2004, 200). However, even if the bare life of Marazzi’s multitude is extracted for value, they still exist as bios as well. The domestic workers, and, as we shall soon see, the industrial workers producing the very digital devices needed for co-production, exist entirely as excluded bare life, in a state of exception much more brutal than that which extracts value from our qualified life. Citing Agamben, Nicholas De Genova defines bare life as “what remains when human existence, while yet alive, is nonetheless stripped of all the encumbrances of social location and juridical identity, and thus bereft of all of the qualifications for properly political inclusion and belonging” (De Genova 2012, 133). It is hard to imagine describing the cognitive worker of the post-operaists’ multitudes as “stripped of…social location and juridical identity.” Indeed, it is precisely their social existence that makes them productive of value. Not so with the workers in China’s Foxconn factories or the Export Processing Zones of Southeast Asia. These workers exist in conditions of super-exploitation, working 12 hours daily and up to a month straight without time off during periods of high demand (China Labor Watch). They are the hands that assemble the ideas of Marazzi’s multitudes. Like the blank slate of the domestic worker, they are pure potentiality, desired for their malleability and their dexterity, performing repetitive actions as quickly as possible. Here there is no need for them to improve themselves; there is no entrepreneurship of the self, only a massive reserve army of labor that can be used and discarded as needed. Here is where value is truly extracted from bare life, from bodies “stripped of…social location and juridical identity.” Anagost again: In neoliberal economic logics, this latent potentiality of the body as a body for exploitation is unleashed by the positioning of the subject at the edge of a precipice, through the threat of a failure to be recognized as a body of value or even annihilation of the body’s very existence due to unsafe labor conditions. In other words, not only does potentiality define capacities that are expressed in the usual sense of being the product of education and training, but there is a superexploitation of the body through an expansion of what it can be made to tolerate in terms of work discipline and stress. (2004, 201, emphasis mine). De Genova agrees with this characterization of the migrant laborer as bare life: “to the extent that migrant labor commonly confronts territorially-defined ‘national’ states with the raw force and vital energies of human life—as labor-power–with no juridical sanction, we may recognize anew the figure of bare life, the negative, abject counterpart to human universality and pure potentiality, which sovereign power can only seek to banish” (De Genova 2012, 145). With this foundation, I would like to turn now to the concentration camp, to Agamben’s argument that the camp contains the logic of modern sovereignty, is the “nomos of the modern.” Specifically, I argue that those sites of production most ignored by theorists of cognitive labor–sweatshops in LA, Export Processing Zones in SE Asia, industrial centers in China–are camps in Agamben’s sense, states of exception where workers are reduced entirely to bare life. In describing the concentration camps of Nazi Germany and the subsequent extension of their logic into the heart of sovereign power in democracy, Agamben tells us that “[i]nsofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation” (1998, 169). Later: “if the essence of the camp consists in the materialization of the state of exception and in the subsequent creation of a space in which bare life and the juridical rule enter into a threshold of indistinction, then we must admit that we find ourselves virtually in the presence of a camp every time such a structure is created, independent of the kinds of crimes that are committed there and whatever its denomination and specific topography” (Agamben 1998, 174). Thus the Nazi concentration camps, the refugee camps into which refugees without political status are herded and held in a zone of indistinction, or, as I argue following Jon Seltin, the Export Processing Zones that exist specifically in a state of exception, are all part of the same logic of sovereignty and reduction of life to bare life. As Seltin tells us: “The EPZ is by its very definition a ‘state of exception’, the logic of which establishes the conditions for the production of instrumentalized bare life. The definitional feature of an EPZ is that the laws and policy framework governing its operations are ‘distinct from what applies elsewhere” (2009, 54). EPZs are granted exemptions from the labor laws of the countries in which they reside, tax breaks, and tariff relaxations; they are, literally, camps designed according to the needs of capital, in which the citizens of the countries of their geographical location are stripped of their juridical existence. We can see this logic at play in maquiladoras, in the EPZs of SE Asia, in the use of undocumented migrants in sweatshops in LA, and in the use of interns in Foxconn’s factories to circumvent minimum wage standards (Friends of Gongchao, 2013). The conditions of these camps, or industrial centers, are likewise characterized by their role as “the most biopolitical space to ever have been realized.” Seltin again: “The workers in EPZs are often subject to strict biopolitical regimes of control, regulation and observation….Wright [in an ethnographical study of Mexican electronics maquiladoras workers] describes how the female employees are expected to, very literally, ‘embody the very concept of flexibility’ in that they are regarded as incomplete subjects, as untrainable bare life whose bodies serve “merely a conduit for the supervisor’s knowledge.’ Thus the maquiladora floor-worker is produced through the utter differentiation of zoē and bios, that is, as a body which is governed and operated through what Wright describes as a ‘prosthetics of supervision” (2009, 54). If these industrial centers are the fundamental biopolitical space where bare life is put to work, it seems disingenuous to view the labor of cognitive workers in the United States and Western Europe through the same lens. While the logic of availability, total mobilization of one’s potentiality, and total subsumption under capital may be the same, the practical application is extraordinarily different. It is no coincidence that these divisions of labor are separated along racialized, gendered, and geographic lines; capitalism has depended on and continues to depend on an uneven population and uneven geographical development. It is also no coincidence, I believe, that those theorists of cognitive labor and the general intellect, those so concerned about the ways our affects are put to work and our creativity exploited, cast labor as universal and homogenous, with an enormous blindspot hovering over superexploited portions of the proletariat: migrants, workers in post-colonial or post-socialist countries, those cast as inferior by white supremacy and patriarchy. The social democrats and orthodox Marxists of yesteryear focused only on the formal industrial working class, dismissing domestic labor, reproductive work, or agricultural labor as unimportant, and dismissing the struggles of people of color or women as superfluous to the primary contradiction of labor and capital. Likewise, the social democrats of today, the self-appointed theorists of the multitude and global insurgency, see only that type of work that they themselves perform, and not the underlying labor that props them up. Jon Seltin makes a similar argument about transhumanists, those who dream of a post-human future in which we transcend the boundaries of our physical bodies and use technology to become immortal. They, too, ignore the physical reality of the machines they use, and the hidden labor that produces them. As he puts it: “The supposed fluidity, transcendence and liberation associated with digital technologies and hyperbolic post-human futures are structurally contingent on the cheap labour and dehumanisation of these other post-humans” (Seltin 2009, 53). Likewise, the fact that post-operaists can argue for a living wage and make the claim that we have almost approached communism, and need only rid ourselves of the parasitic phantom of financial capitalism, is predicated on ignor ing the processes that produce the cognitive worker’s means of production: the bare life of the assembly-line worker making their iphones, and the bare life of the migrant domestic worker ensuring their reproduction. Seltin reminds us of “…those assembly workers whose integration with technologies and machines is marked not by liberation and transcendence but their absolute antitheses: by crippling poverty, an absolute lack of economic and personal security, and a complete alienation from the symbolic spaces that their labor produces. While many electronics assembly workers may have no access to the internet, their cheap labour provides the material basis upon which the dreams of digital disembodiment of transhumanists are based.” (2009, 53) Anagost tells us, citing Spivak, that “capital ‘must provide itself with the mind of one class of human beings and the body of the other.’ The mind of the capitalist class is appropriated as the conscious bearer of the movement of capital–’capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will’ (Marx). The body of the working class is appropriated for its superadequation, the surplus value it produces” (2004, 205). The general intellect of the post-operaists, the collective intelligence created by a global network of cognitive workers that they bemoan as a commons which is enclosed by capital, is perhaps instead the mind of capital, putting to work the bodies of migrants in China, migrant domestic workers, and women of color. We must be aware of the role that biopolitics plays in crafting us as subjects and extracting value from us, but we must also be aware that the global proletariat, or the ‘multitude’, is not a homogeneous mass that experiences exploitation in the same way, but a highly differentiated series of populations, some few of which are granted massive privileges at the expense of many others. Remembering this reminds us that a simple shift in government policies or a return to the welfare state won’t deliver us to communism, nor will individual practices of revolt and refusal through a solitary ‘human strike,’ but only a complete destruction of the current world and its subsequent re-imagining.

#### Capitalism is unsustainable and causes extinction – resource scarcity, environmental degradation, war

Trainer ’16 (Ted; 5/10/16; Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, leading proponent of de-growth and sustainability issues; Resilience; “Sustainability – The Simpler Way perspective”; <http://www.resilience.org/articles/General/2016/07_July/Sustainability%20The%20Simpler%20Way%20Perspective.pdf>; DOA: 7/15/17)

Firstly let’s set the scene; The deteriorating state of the planet. The resource base and environmental conditions on which the present levels of global production and consumption are built are obviously deteriorating at an alarming rate. Few if any would not be aware of this but it is important to briefly remind ourselves before focusing on how impossible it would be for this base to sustain affluence and growth for all. A glance at the situation reveals that resources are becoming more scarce and costly, including energy, productive land, minerals, food, fish, wood and water, and ecosystems are being severely damaged. We are losing species, forests, land, coral reefs, grasslands and fisheries at accelerating rates. A sixth era of massive biodiversity loss appears to have begun. We are polluting the planet with excess carbon dioxide, nitrogen and many toxic chemicals. The mass of big animals on the planet has declined sharply in recent decades, probably down by 90% in the sea. The World Wildlife Fund says that in general the quality of global ecosystems has deteriorated 30% since about 1970, and its “Footprint” measure indicates that we are now taking biological resources at a rate that would take 1.5 planets to provide in a sustainable way. (2014.) The reason for all this massive resource depletion and damage to the environment is simply that there is far too much producing and consuming going on. This is causing too many resources to be taken from nature and too many wastes to be dumped back into nature. Now consider the limits case: Could everyone live as we do? The 10-15% of the world’s people living in regions such as North America, Australia and Europe have per capita levels of resource use that are around 20 times the average for the poorest half of people. How likely is it that all the 9.7 billion people expected by 2050 could rise to the present rich world level of resource use? If they did live as we do then world annual resource production and consumption, and ecological damage, would be approaching 6 times as great as at present. Yet present levels of resource use and environmental impact are far from sustainable. The World Wildlife Fund’s ”Footprint” analysis yields an even higher multiple. They estimate that it takes about 8 ha of productive land to provide water, energy settlement area and food for one person living in Australia. So if 9 billion people were to live as we do we would need about 72 billion ha of productive land. But that is about 9 times all the available productive land on the planet. Now add the absurdly impossible implications of economic growth. But the foregoing argument has only been that the present levels of production and consumption are quite unsustainable. **Yet** we are determined to increase present living standards and levels of output and consumption, as much as possible and **without any end** in sight. In other words, our supreme national goal is economic growth. Few people seem to recognise the absurdly impossible consequences of pursing economic growth. If we rich countries have a 3% p.a. increase in economic activity until 2050 then our output, **resource use and environmental impact will be** around **4 times as great** as it is now, **and doubling every 23 years** thereafter. Now what if by 2050 all the expected 9.7 billion people expected to be living on earth had risen to the “living standards” we in rich countries would then have given 3% economic growth. Total world output, resource, use and environmental impact would be approaching 15 times as great as they are now … unless technical advance and efficiency gains could greatly reduce them. (See below.) These multiplies must be the focal point in discussions of sustainability. **Grasping the magnitude of** the **overshoot and** of the **unsustainability is crucial** here. The numbers show that present, let alone probable **2050** rich world **levels of consumption, are grossly unsustainable** and could never be extended to all people. But can’t technical advance solve the problems? Most people hold the "technical fix faith", believing that technical advance will solve the resource and environmental problems and thereby make it unnecessary for us to question the commitment to affluence and growth. When considering the following evidence keep in mind that what we need is not just to stop increases in impacts as growth goes on -- we need to reduce impacts dramatically before sustainable levels are reached. There is a very strong case that technical advance is nowhere near capable of solving the sustainability problems facing us. Note that many miraculous technical developments, e.g., in physics, astronomy, genetics, and medicine, are not so relevant here where the focus is on the possibility of making big improvements in the efficiency and energy costs of producing energy and materials, and of cutting ecological impacts. Following are some of the main elements in the case. 1. Efficiency gains to date. It is not the case that technical achievements in the relevant areas have been very encouraging. Ayres and Vouroudis (2009) note that for many decades the efficiency of production of electricity and fuels, electric motors, ammonia and iron and steel has more or less plateaued. In many crucial areas such as producing energy and minerals (below) the trend is towards worse efficiency, i.e., the need is for increasing inputs per unit of output. 2. The deteriorating productivity growth rate. **Technical advance** is regarded as a major determinant of productivity growth and that **has been in long term decline since the 1970s**. Even the advent of computerisation has had a surprisingly small effect, a phenomenon now labelled the “Productivity Paradox.” In fact the UK productivity growth rate has recently has gone below zero; i.e., productivity has actually deteriorated. (Weldon, 2016.) 3. Little or no “decoupling” is occurring for materials or energy use. This is the most important issue; does recent history indicate that economic output has been or can be separated from materials and energy use, so that growth can continue while resource demand falls? The “Tech-Fix faith” is fundamentally dependent on the assumption that massive decoupling is possible. But all the evidence seems to say that the amount of materials or energy needed to produce a unit of GDP in rich countries has not improved much if at all in recent years. The box below refers to some of the evidence. Weidmann et al. (2014) say “…for the past two decades global amounts of iron ore and bauxite extractions have risen faster than global GDP.” “… resource productivity…has fallen in developed nations.” “There has been no improvement whatsoever with respect to improving the economic efficiency of metal ore use.” Giljum et al. (2014, p. 324) report in the world as a whole only a 0.9% p.a. improvement in the dollar value extracted from the use of each unit of minerals between 1980 and 2009, and that over the 10 years before the GFC there was no improvement. “…not even a relative decoupling was achieved on the global level.” They point out that the picture would have been worse had they included the many materials in rich world imports. **Diederan’s account** (2009) **of** the **productivity** of minerals discovery effort **is even more pessimistic**. **Between 1980 and 2008 the** annual major **deposit discovery rate fell from 13 to less than 1, while discovery expenditure went from** about **$1.5 billion** p.a. **to $7 billion** p.a., **meaning** the **productivity** of expenditure **fell by a factor** in the vicinity **of** around **100, which is an annual decline of** around **40%** p.a. Recent **petroleum figures are similar**; in the last decade or so **the discovery rate has not increased but discovery expenditure** more or less **trebled**. (Johnson, 2010.) **Schandl** et al. (2015) **say “ …** there is a very high coupling of energy use to economic growth, meaning that an increase in GDP drives a proportional increase in energy use.” “Our results show that while relative **decoupling can** be achieved in some scenarios, **no**ne would **lead to an absolute reduction in energy or materials footprint**.” **In all three** of their **scenarios** “… **energy use continues to be strongly coupled with economic activity**...” **Alvarez found that for Europe, Spain and the US, GDP increased 74% in 20 years, but materials use actually increased 85%**. (Latouche, 2014.) **Similar conclusions** re stagnant or declining materials use productivity etc. **are arrived** at **by Aadrianse**, 1997, **Dittrich** et al., (2014), **Schutz**, **Bringezu and Moll**, (2004), **Warr**, (2004), **Berndt**, (1990), **Smil**, (2014) **and Victor** (2008, pp. 55-56). (Note that economists often claim that the “energy intensity” of rich world economies is improving, but this is only because they fail to take into account the huge amounts of energy used overseas to produce imports, and “fuel switching”; see Kaufman, 2004.) 4. There is ecological deterioration in almost all domains. Technical advance has obviously not slowed, halted or reversed overall damage to the planet’s ecosystems. The “Environmental Kuznets Curve” thesis is an application of the decoupling claim to environmental impacts, asserting that as countries become richer impacts increase for a time but then plateau and fall. There is little doubt now that the thesis is not valid. Rich countries are in general not solving their most serious environmental problems. Alexander’s review (2014) concludes that for the world as a whole, ”… decades of extraordinary technological development have resulted in increased, not reduced, environmental impacts.” These many sources and figures show the extreme implausibility of the tech-fix faith that in future technical advances will enable us to stop worrying about limits and any need to dramatically reduce consumption or the obsession with economic growth. Conclusions on the limits to growth case. In view of these lines of argument it is difficult to see how anyone could disagree with the basic limits to growth case. Present ways are so grossly unsustainable there is no possibility of all people rising to the living standards we take for granted today in rich countries, let alone those we are seeking. Again the most important point is the magnitude of the overshoot. Most people have no idea of how far beyond sustainable levels of consumption we are or how big the reductions should be. For decades many scientists and agencies are have been emphasizing the validity and importance of the basic limits case. Sustainable ways that all could share appear to require us to go down to per capita rates of resource consumption around 10% of those we have now. It follows from the above discussion that the only solution is to shift to some kind of Simpler Way, i.e., to lifestyles, settlements and systems that make it possible for us to live well on a small fraction of our present rich world levels, with no economic growth.

#### The alt is to understand anti-capitalist revolution through a lens that accounts for positionality – this solves

Hs 13 [(HumanStrike Blog, blog on neoliberalism, capitalism, and critical theory; cites Giorgio Agamben, prof of philosophy at Univ of Vienna, and Christian Mazzari, Director of Socio-Economic Research at the Scuola Universitaria della Svizzera Italiana) “introduction” Human Strike Blog, April 24, 2013] AT

Finally, I will look at contemporary forms of struggle and resistance that are popularly cited by both anarchists and post-Operaists, from the banlieue riots of Paris in 2005 to the Arab Spring, the London lootings of 2011, and the turn in China towards rioting and destruction in labor conflicts in place of unionization or conventional strikes. I will suggest that there are fundamental similarities in biopolitical control, constant availability, and precarity that inform all of these forms of resistance, even while the manifestations of these forms of control and value extraction are applied very differently based on specific conditions After all, “global civil war still has its local specificities”. I will argue that it is no accident that certain characteristics of demandlessness, looting, and a lack of programmatism are found in common around the globe. However, I will also argue that both the post-Operaists’ fetishization of ‘democractic practices’ found in Occupy, the Arab Spring, and elsewhere, and the nihilists’ fixation on destruction without demands, are both based in limited perceptions of contemporary revolt. I will argue for a more nuanced, diverse, and specific understanding of contemporary global revolts against control, empire, and capital, and argue for the importance of considering material differences based on identity and positionality even while I find affinity for a rejection of identity and processes of subjectification. This is an ambitious project. It is, in fact, extraordinarily incomplete and fragmentary. I hope it will serve as a starting point for future conversations, as a way to work out some thoughts and ask more questions, and as a way to take the best of the post-Operaists and the nihilists while remaining critical of both of them. I hope to prioritize specificity and contemporaneity, and to remain critical and skeptical while rejecting both outright nihilism and fuzzy social democracy.