# 1NC vs Westwood AG

### 1NC – Fairness

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division of affirmative and negative ground and offense. It was *negotiated* and *announced in advance*, providing both sides with a reasonable opportunity to prepare to engage one another’s arguments.

#### ‘Resolved’ preceding a colon indicates a legislative forum.

Blanche Ellsworth 81, English professor at SFSU and M.A. in English from UC Berkeley, 1/1/1981, *English Simplified*, 4th Edition, cc

A colon is also used to separate 3. THE SALUTATION OF A BUSINESS LETTER FROM THE BODY, Dear Sir Dear Ms. Weiner NOTE: In an informal letter, a comma follows the salutation: Dear Mary, Dear Uncle Jack 4. PARTS OF TITLES, REFERENCES, AND NUMERALS. TITLE: Principles of Mathematics: An Introduction REFERENCE: Luke 3:4—13 NUMERALS: 8:15 PM 5. PLACE OF PUBLICATION FROM PUBLISHER Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 6. THE WORD RESOLVED FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION. Resolved: That this committee go on record as favoring new legislation.

#### Ought means should

Merriam Webster, No Date – Merriam Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary, “ought”, <http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/ought>  
ought /ˈɑːt/ verb  
Learner's definition of OUGHT [modal verb] 1 ◊ Ought is almost always followed by to and the infinitive form of a verb. The phrase ought to has the same meaning as should and is used in the same ways, but it is less common and somewhat more formal. The negative forms ought not and oughtn't are often used without a following to. — used to indicate what is expected They ought to be here by now. You ought to be able to read this book. There ought to be a gas station on the way. 2 — used to say or suggest what should be done You ought to get some rest. That leak ought to be fixed. You ought to do your homework.

#### Should requires legal effect

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling *in praesenti*.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record. [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] [13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) *In praesenti* means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is *presently* or *immediately effective*, as opposed to something that *will* or *would* become effective *in the future [in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### Governments are bodies of power who enforce law in a country, land area, people or organization

Your Dictionary ND[(Your Dictionary, Definitions, grammar tips, word game help and more from 16 authoritative sources) “ Government” https://www.yourdictionary.com/government] SS

The body with the power to make and/or enforce laws to control a country, land area, people or organization.

#### Recognize means to acknowledge legally

Dictionary.com ND [(Dictionary.com, Dictionary.com is an online dictionary whose domain was first registered on May 14, 1995. The content for Dictionary.com is based on the latest version of Random House Unabridged Dictionary, with editors for the site providing new and updated definitions.),”Recognize”, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/recognize>] SS

to acknowledge formally as entitled to treatment as a political unit:

The United States promptly recognized Israel.

to acknowledge or accept formally a specified factual or legal situation:

to recognize a successful revolutionary regime as the de facto government of the country.

#### Unconditional rights means to surrender limitations on what people are allowed

Reverso Dictionary ND [(Reverso Dictionary, Reverso dictionaries feature millions of words and expressions, including specialized vocabulary, slang terms, neologisms, idiomatic phrases, with their translations and definitions. Translate in English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, and many other languages or look for a word's definition and synonyms to better understand its meaning. Our dictionaries are enriched with words and idiomatic expressions added by Reverso users and examples of translations in context.)https://mobile-dictionary.reverso.net/en/english-definition/Unconditional+rights] SS

Unconditional rights definition, Unconditional rights meaning | [English dictionary](https://mobile-dictionary.reverso.net/en/english-definition/)

unconditional    
    adj

1  without conditions or limitations; total    
unconditional surrender

2    (Maths)  (of an equality) true for all values of the variable    
(x+1)<rab>x is an unconditional equality

-   unconditionally    adv    
-  unconditionalness, unconditionality    n

[rights activist](https://mobile-dictionary.reverso.net/en/english-definition/rights+activist)  n. an activist fighting for civil rights

[rights](https://mobile-dictionary.reverso.net/en/english-definition/rights)  n. rules concerning what people are owed to or allowed of, according to ethical principles of freedom and applied in society

#### Workers are persons who are employed for wages

Your Dictionary ND[(Your Dictionary, Definitions, grammar tips, word game help and more from 16 authoritative sources) “Worker meaning” https://www.yourdictionary.com/worker] SS

A person, animal, or thing that works; specif., a person who is employed to do physical or mental work for wages, esp. in order to earn a living, as in a trade, industry, business, office, etc. or on a farm, ranch, etc.

#### **Strike means refusal employees under unperformable conditions**

Britannica ND [ (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, In the absence of those authorities' names, Britannica's editors, who have played a key role in the development and maintenance of such articles, have been designated as the contributor),, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/strike-industrial-relations>] SS

Strike, collective refusal by employees to work under the conditions required by employers. Strikes arise for a number of reasons, though principally in response to economic conditions (defined as an economic strike and meant to improve wages and benefits) or labour practices (intended to improve work conditions). Other strikes can stem from sympathy with other striking unions or from jurisdictional disputes between two unions. Illegal strikes include sit-down strikes, wildcat strikes, and partial strikes (such as slowdowns or sick-ins). Strikes may also be called for purely political reasons (as in the general strike).

#### Vote negative to preserve limits and equitable division of ground – the resolution is the most predictable stasis point for debates, anything outside of that ruins prep and clash by allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for debate. That greenlights a race away from the core topic controversies that allow for robust contestation, which favors the aff by making neg ground inapplicable, susceptible to the perm, and concessionary. Two additional impacts:

#### Accessibility – Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### Link turns their education offense – getting to the third and fourth level of tactical engagement is only possible with refined and well-researched positions connected to the resolutional mechanism. Repeated debates over core issues incentivize innovative argument production and improved advocacy based on feedback and nuanced responses from opponents.

#### Prefer our impact: they’ve skewed the game which necessarily comes first because it makes evaluating the aff impossible. The role of individual debate rounds on broader subject formation is white noise – *can you remember what happened in doubles of the Loyola tournament your junior year?* – individual rounds don’t affect our subjectivity, so fairness is the only impact your ballot can resolve. You should presume all their truth claims false because they have not been properly tested

#### They can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time.

### T-Nebel

#### Interpretation: workers are a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that A just government should recognize an unconditional right to strike for a subset of workers.

Nebel 19 Jake Nebel [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs.] , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.1 “Colleges and Universities” “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. Fourth, it is extremely unlikely that the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some.” No such addition would be necessary or expected for the generic interpretation since generics lack explicit quantifiers by default. The topic committee’s likely intentions are not decisive, but they strongly suggest that the generic interpretation is correct, since it’s prima facie unlikely that a committee charged with writing a sentence to be debated would be so badly mistaken about what their sentence means (which they would be if they intended the existential interpretation). The committee, moreover, does not write resolutions for the 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the national circuit; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic with respect to “colleges and universities,” given its face-value meaning and standard expectations about what LD resolutions tend to mean.

#### It applies to workers:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that governments ought to recognize a right for one type of workers does not entail that those governments ought to recognize the right for all workers

#### Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because a recognition is universal and permanent

#### Vote neg:

#### Semantics outweigh:

#### T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here

#### Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution

#### It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it

#### Limits – there are countless affs accounting for thousands of types of workers– unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs

#### Ground – spec guts core generics like the cap K or the econ DA that rely on recognizing rights for all workers because individual jobs don’t affect the economy broadly – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs

#### TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

## Off

#### Rob is the vote for the better debate— anything else is arbitrary and self serving.

**The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing**

**First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues**.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values**.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable**.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes**:** “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**Moreover, *only* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, **I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable.** Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, **there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values** that counts in hedonism’s favor**: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain.** To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, **wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly.** **Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after.** To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if **the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain** (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), **then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts.** **The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists.** The challenge can be phrased as the following question: **If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?**27

**Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.  
Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]  
These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

**Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one.   
Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.], Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.  Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdfEven if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the   possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential   catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**.  **This implies that the expected value of   reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the   value of a million human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10  54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10  52  lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even   more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a   technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected   value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth   a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an   expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct   benefit of saving 1 billion lives.**  And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1  billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost   certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

## Case

#### Vote neg on presumption— the aff literally does nothing and the plantext can’t solvve, none of your ev is in the context of right to striek meanst htat the aff is too big of an instance for you to solve with the right to strke.

#### You link tio our impact rturn— your result in the dissolutionment of western hegemony. Heg is good—

#### Primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by *Yale University Press*; //GrRv)  
Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profited far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fictional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how significantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacific, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

The threats today are compelling and urgent, and there may someday come a time when the balance of power has shifted so markedly that the postwar international system cannot be sustained. Yet that moment of failure has not yet arrived, and so the goal of U.S. strategy should be not to hasten it by giving up prematurely, but to push it off as far into the future as possible. Rather than simply acquiescing in the decline of a world it spent generations building, America should aggressively bolster its defenses, with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.

#### Retrenchment causes nationalism, war, and protectionism – optimists falsely assume current cooperative trends will continue without the US security guarantee

Matthew Fay 17, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ The Niskanen Center, 11/16/17, “America Unrestrained?: Engagement, Retrenchment, and Libertarian Foreign Policy,” https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/America-Unrestrained.pdf

A number of the arguments libertarians make in favor of retrenchment have merit, but the cost-benefit analysis derived from them is based on a deterministic view of international politics. Libertarian retrenchers assume that international politics would remain more or less the same absent American engagement and that America’s domestic politics would remain the same even if the international system become more conflict-prone. Given the inherent uncertainty of forecasting, the costs and benefits of engagement and retrenchment need to be considered in a more probabilistic fashion.86 This section begins by exploring a number of scenarios that could occur should the United States adopt a grand strategy of retrenchment. It then reassesses the costs and benefits of retrenchment for a free society.

In a system with more independent states balancing against one another, is war more or less likely? Libertarians are placing a bet that all else would remain equal in international politics if the United States retrenches. While they assume a world where an increased number of states are balancing against one another would remain peaceful, the reality is not entirely clear. Using basic realist premises about state behavior under international anarchy, it is easy to identify a number of scenarios less rosy than the one libertarians assume would occur should the United States retrench. These scenarios might include a world of increased nationalism, eroding norms against military aggression, increased economic autarky, and the further spread of nuclear weapons as states look to produce security for themselves. Some states may also fail to balance against threats in the wake of American retrenchment, increasing the likelihood the United States will be drawn into a major war.

Libertarians assume that in the absence of an alliance with the United States, other countries would simply increase their defense spending if they felt threatened. However, internal balancing is not a mechanical process. According to John Mearsheimer, leaders of states facing security competition are likely to use nationalism to garner support from their populations for the necessary regeneration of military capabilities.87

Writing at the end of the Cold War, Mearsheimer suggested that Europe would revert to a pattern of recurrent warfare. The absence of the United States and the Soviet Union would leave Europe, once again, an anarchic multipolar system. The structure of the system would force the states to compete with one another, as they had prior to the Cold War. Mearsheimer argued that pre-1945 “hypernationalism” was a product of “security competition among the European states, which compelled elites to mobilize public support for national defense efforts.”88

American retrenchment could similarly lead to an anarchic, multipolar Europe—thus increasing the chances of war on the continent. Such a system could engender nationalist sentiments among the populations of Europe, heightening animosities between national groups. These heightened animosities could help erode norms against military aggression that have facilitated the decline in interstate war. Nationalist groups within a country can seize on these sentiments to pursue confrontational and expansionist policies.89 Encouraging support for increased military capabilities through nationalism might lead populations to see war as once again a means to national glory or maintaining national honor. Matters of national prestige and honor can lead to the initiation of wars when bound up in territorial claims, while at the same time increasing the intensity and duration of a conflict.90

Nationalism and security competition might also erode the pacifying effects of economic openness. Realism suggests states are concerned about relative gains.91 States in security competition might be wary of trading with one another due to concerns about how a potential rival’s economic gains might provide it with an advantage if translated into military power. They may also adopt autarkic policies for fear of undermining their economic and military self-sufficiency.92 Territorial conquest has become increasing anachronistic in international politics. However, the proliferation of protectionist policies might once again make aggression and preventive war seem like strategically sensible ways for states to secure the resources necessary to reduce the ability of potential rivals to cut them off economically.

If the risk of territorial aggression increases, the possession of nuclear weapons would become an attractive option for some states whose security was previously guaranteed by the United States. Nuclear weapons are most useful for deterring major territorial aggression, meaning their potential utility increases as the potential for war does.93 A number of U.S. allies have either previously pursued nuclear weapons or have the capability to do so. They might choose to obtain a nuclear arsenal once responsible for their own security.

#### **Russia and China are *definitely* revisionist – joint militarization and interventionism**

Stent 20 [(Angela, Director of the Center for Russian, Russian, and East European Studies and a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University - she is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and co-chairs its Hewett Forum on post-Soviet affairs) “RUSSIA AND CHINA: AXIS OF REVISIONISTS?” Brookings Institution, February 2020]  
The United States faces three challenges from the China-Russia relationship, which has developed over the past decade into a robust, pragmatic partnership. Washington has to deal individually with both Moscow and Beijing but also increasingly with their combined activities that make it more difficult for the United States to pursue its interests domestically and internationally. As Washington confronts these two, difficult interlocutors, it must understand the stakes involved for both sides. The Sino-Russian partnership has enabled Russia to re-emerge as an independent center of international power. It has also allowed Moscow to elevate its stature by associating with a rising China as relations with the United States have soured. China’s support for Russia has served to legitimize Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and Syria by supporting Russia in the United Nations Security Council and not formally joining the Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia. In return, Russia is a valuable partner for China because it supplies China with hydrocarbons and advanced military hardware and supports China on all major domestic and foreign policy issues.

The major drivers of U.S. policy toward Russia and China differ from each other considerably. The key driver of U.S.-Russian relations is that they are the world’s two nuclear superpowers, which possess over 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons between them. The U.S. and Russia have a limited economic relationship, since the United States does not need Russia’s two major exports — hydrocarbons and military hardware. The key driver of the U.S.-Chinese relationship, by contrast, is the fact that they are the world’s two economic superpowers. Security issues have traditionally taken a secondary role to trade and investment questions, although they are becoming more salient as China becomes competitive in advanced technologies, its nuclear arsenal grows, and it asserts its sovereign claims to islands in the East and South China Seas and aims for unification with Taiwan. The stakes in the U.S.-Russian relationship are, therefore of a different order of magnitude than those involved in the U.S.- Chinese relationship.

China supports Russia on the major foreign policy issues which dominate the U.S.-Russian relationship. It has backed Russia’s policies in the Syrian civil war, occasionally abstaining on UNSC votes which Russia has vetoed. Beijing has also backed Russia’s actions in Ukraine, although it abstained in the U.N. General Assembly vote condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea and it does not recognize Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, it has criticized the sanctions on Russia, has given Moscow cover for its actions in Ukraine and ensured that the West was unable to isolate Russia after the Ukraine events. Moscow in turn backs Beijing on North Korean issues, and shares Beijing’s conviction that a united Korea under Western domination would be worse than a nuclear-armed North Korea. Counterterrorism is one area where the United States and Russia have cooperated, but both Russia and China remain preoccupied with home-grown terrorism as opposed to global terrorism. Indeed, there are no major issues of contention between the United States and Russia where China is likely to take the U.S. side, and the same is equally true for U.S.-China relations.

Regardless of the asymmetries and strains in the Chinese-Russian relationship, the two countries have compelling reasons to strengthen their partnership. Their shared suspicion of the United States and commitment to creating a global order that will enable them to maintain their authoritarian regimes will continue to bind them together. What remains unknown is the extent to which both countries might join forces in the cyber area to undermine U.S. interests in the future.

#### **America has strong bones – it is the only resilient nation**

Ikenberry 18 [(John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University) reviewing book by Beckley (Michael, Fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) “Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2018]

It has become conventional wisdom that the United States is in decline, the uni-polar era is ending, and China is on the rise. In this smart and sophisticated book, Beckley tackles this thesis head-on. He does not dispute that the United States has its problems or that misguided leaders often squander its advantages. But he points out that the United States’ deep geographic, demographic, and institutional reserves give the country unique resilience. The United States is the only great power without regional rivals. Its companies and universities dominate the world. And most important, Beckley argues that it has by far the best fundamentals for future economic growth, thanks to its abundant natural resources, favorable demographics, secure property rights, and lasting political institutions. China’s growth prospects, in contrast, are “dismal.” Beckley also thinks the declinists use the wrong measures of power. GDP, for example, exaggerates the influence of populous but poor countries, such as China, while overlooking problems that drain those countries’ economic and military resources. He does not argue that the United States can—or should—try to preserve the unipolar era, but he does think that it will long remain the world’s leading power.

#### Pursuit inevitable – decline causes global war

Beckley 15 (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904\_pp007-048.pdf)

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.

For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

#### Psychoanalysis has no empirical basis.

Paris 17 [Dr Paris is Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, and Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital. "Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?" https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5459228/]

The proposal to establish a discipline of neuropsychoanalysis also met with a mixed reception from traditional psychoanalysts, who did not want to dilute Freud’s wine with neuroscientific water.42 Neuroscientists, who are more likely to see links to psychology as lying in cognitive science,43 have ignored this idea. In summary, neuropsychoanalysis is being used a way to justify long-standing models, without attempting to find something new or to develop an integration of perspectives on psychology.

However, Eric Kandel,44 influential in the light of his Nobel Prize for the study of the neurochemistry of memory, has taken a sympathetic view of the use of biological methods to study psychoanalytic theory. Kandel had wanted to be an analyst before becoming a neuroscientist.45 But Kandel, who does not actively practice psychiatry, may be caught in a time warp, unaware that psychoanalysis has been overtaken by competitors in the field of psychotherapy.

Another attempt to reconcile psychoanalysis with science has come from the literature on neuroplasticity.46 It is now known that neurogenesis occurs in some brain regions (particularly the hippocampus) during adulthood and that neural connections undergo modification in all parts of the brain. There is also evidence that CBT can produce brain changes that are visible using imaging.47 These findings have not been confirmed in psychoanalytic therapies. However, Norman Doidge, a Canadian psychoanalyst, has argued that psychoanalysis can change the brain.48 This may be the case for all psychotherapies. However, more recently, Doidge49 has claimed that mental exercises can reverse the course of severe neurological and psychiatric problems, including chronic pain, stroke, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, and autism. While these books have been best-sellers, most of their ideas in the second volume,49 based on anecdotes rather than on clinical trials, have had little impact in medicine. This story underscores the difficulty of reconciling the perspectives and methods of psychoanalysis with scientific methods based on empirical testing.

Psychoanalysis and the Humanities

Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods, or to remove constructs that failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities.

This trend is related to a hermeneutic mode of thought,50 which focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Since the time of Freud, the typical psychoanalytic paper has consisted of speculations backed up with illustrations, similar to the methods of literary theory and criticism.

One model currently popular in the humanities is “critical theory.”51 This postmodernist approach uses Marxist concepts to explain phenomena ranging from literature to politics. It proposes that truth is entirely relative and often governed by hidden social forces. In its most radical form, in the work of Michel Foucault,52 critical theory and postmodernism take an antiscience position, denying the existence of objective truth and viewing scientific findings as ways of defending the “hegemony” of those in power.

Some humanist scholars have adopted the ideas of Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst who created his own movement and whose eccentric clinical practice resembled that of a cult leader.53 Moreover, recruitment of professionals and academics with no training in science could lead to an increasing isolation of the discipline. While only a few contemporary psychoanalysts have embraced postmodernism, the humanities have made use of psychoanalytical concepts for their own purposes as a way of understanding literature and history.