# 1nc v Harker DV

## 1NC - Off

#### Interpretation: the affirmative may not spec a government

#### 1] The letter “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” – the resolution must be proven true in all instances, not one particular instance

CCC ND Capital Community College [a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation], “Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles AG

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### 2] Government is an indefinite singular– the aff may not defend a specific set of governments

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 Sept 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a *definite singular* since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with *bare singulars* (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### It applies to government:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that China ought to have the unconditional right to strike does not entail that those governments ought to have the unconditional right to strike.

#### Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because a recognition is universal and permanent

#### Violation – they only defend the EU

#### Vote neg:

#### Semantics outweigh:

#### T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here

#### Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution

#### It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it

#### Standards:

#### Limits – there are 195 affs accounting for hundreds of governments— unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs.

Banerjee 4/12 [(Vasabjit Banerjee, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mississippi State University),”How many states and provinces are in the world?” , The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/how-many-states-and-provinces-are-in-the-world-157847>, April 12, 2021] SS

There are 195 national governments recognized by the United Nations, but there are as many as nine other places with nationlike governments, including Taiwan and Kosovo, though they are not recognized by the U.N.

Most of these countries are divided into smaller sections, the way the U.S. is broken up into 50 states along with territories, like Puerto Rico and Guam, and a federal district, Washington, D.C.

They are not all called “states,” though: Switzerland has cantons, Bangladesh has divisions, Cameroon has regions, Germany has lander, Jordan has governorates, Montserrat has parishes, Zambia has provinces, and Japan has prefectures – among many other names.

#### Ground – spec guts core generics like the econ DA which rely on all governments having the unconditional right to strike because individual governments don’t have an impact on the global economy as a whole – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs

#### TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

## Case

### Nato

#### Russia is a defensive realist not revisionist – they will only become aggressive when they feel threatened by EU expansion in military capabilities

Kerrane 9/23 [(Evan, PhD candidate, Swansea University, UK; Major, U.S. Army.) “Russian Insecurities: How Fear Drives Perception in the Near Abroad” Journal on Baltic Security, 9/23/2020] BC

Through a focus on the logical fear of other states, the perception of Russian actions within the Near Abroad changes significantly. Placing Moscow’s decisions within the context of fear, fear of Western relative gains, calls into question the Western perception of Russia as a revisionist state with the aim of overturning the international order. This, of course, may not be the case as within a defensive realist framework determining whether a state is a status quo or revisionist power is inherently difficult due to misperceptions of motives. Essential within this argument is simply the understanding that the ability of the West to discern between offensive and defensive actions of Moscow is clouded by the fear of Russian actions to the West.

Within this defensive realist framework, Russia’s motivations during the Ukraine Crisis were to halt the Western expansion, from NATO through the EU, to maintain strategic depth from the military alliance. Although within a defensive realist paradigm, it is difficult to truly know whether a state is a revisionist power, Moscow’s actions still fit within the understanding of a defensively minded state, fearing the relative gains of a rival. This clearly runs counter to the current U.S. assessment of an offensively driven, power maximising state. States seek security and grow concerned over the relative gains of a rival. The expansion of NATO and potential loss of the Black Sea Fleet’s port all point to a significant relative gain over Moscow, specifically in terms of a zero-sum loss. In other words, NATO would have an alliance with Kyiv at the expense of Russia. Moscow seeks security, which involved strategic depth from the West, while the West does not perceive the advancement of NATO and the promotion of democracy as threatening to Moscow. Theoretically, if both sides actually possessed benign intentions, this tragic spiral of fear and misperception results in less security for both sides and increases the chances of a conflict.

Within this paradigm, most states simply pursue survival while defending their vital interests. In this framework, greater NATO expansion or a significant increase in Western capabilities in Europe will drive Moscow to perceive an increased threat as it pays close attention to relative power gains from the rival alliance. Relative gains in the form of an increased alliance, closer to Moscow, as well as potential offensive capabilities in the region, make the Kremlin question the motivations of the West, and in accordance with defensive realist theory, may drive increased military build-ups. The risk of conflict over misperceptions on motivations grows as a potential security dilemma develops between both Moscow and Washington. Within this context, it behooves the states to question their bias towards perceiving adversaries’ actions only in terms of aggression by one without placing the conflict into a larger balance of power context.

#### Russian aggression is a direct response to NATO expansion and enlargement

Frix 16 [(Noëlie Frix - Managing Editor for International Interactions, PhD Candidate at Kansas State University) “NATO, Russia, and the Ukraine Crisis” Indiana University, October 2016] FP

Realists offer a wide set of counterarguments which dispute liberals’ optimistic predictions about the effects and benefits of NATO expansion. Reiter offers but one antienlargement argument when he writes that “The weakness of the democratization argument, coupled with the costs and risks of further enlargement, caution against pursuit of this policy in the near or medium term. Instead,” he suggests, “the West should rely on the European Union (EU) to spread democracy, an approach that is more likely to foster democratization yet less likely to alienate Russia” (Reiter 2001, 42)7 . Moreover, realists are skeptical, at best, about the veracity of Democratic Peace Theory, making the democratization argument all but worthless in their eyes. Particularly, realists insist on debunking what they view as the erroneous assumption that NATO deters Russian aggression, rather, they contend, the alliance’s expansion stokes it. Notably, there is a prevalent worry that “expansion may jeopardize relations between Russia and the West, pushing Russia away from cooperating on issues such as strategic arms control and peacekeeping in the Balkans, and perhaps turning it back toward belligerence and even ultranationalism” (Reiter 2001, 42). There are scholars who would argue this has already happened, or that this trend is currently underway. But even if one were to dismiss these arguments, the real financial costs associated with NATO expansion are significant, and it was unlikely (and some would argue this has largely proven true) that new members would contribute much to the alliance. Additionally, having more members complicates the decision-making process and renders reaching a consensus more difficult. The cultural aspects of the problem should not be underestimated either. Although they may not be as significant a hurdle nor a pressing potential problem, the desire to socialize prospective and actual member countries—their population, but their militaries especially—into Western norms might be both naïve and, in a sense, dangerous. Waterman writes, enlargement can “contribute to regional political order, and co-opt younger generations into Western norms and perspectives” (Waterman et al. 2001, 227). This can lead to clashes between the old and young generations of a country or region.8 There are many cautionary historical tales of the problems (attempted) westernization of cultures may entail, 9 and these ought to be considered, even in Eastern Europe, despite the apparent will of some, perhaps even many, to adopt western norms. While some analysts still worry about a revival of Russian nationalism and, along with it, a rebuilding of its military power, “this prospect does not justify NATO enlargement;” especially since “NATO enlargement is likely to increase the chances of renewed Russian belligerence, rather than provide a useful insurance policy against it…enlargement will jeopardize the West’s relationship with Russia” (Reiter 2001, 47- 48). Despite popular opinion, realists do not favor aggressive and belligerent policies, rather they emphasize caution, often referred to as prudence. This means that restraint should be exercised by world leaders, and that idealism needs to be put aside at times (Mazarr 2003, 505). Ideologically, pushing NATO’s borders eastward would represent the strength and unity of democracy, and establish long-lasting peace through the spread of western values against Russian authoritarianism and repression. Practically speaking, however, it is prudent to halt the Organization’s eastward push, because it aggravates the Russian government and anti-Western sentiments in the country, heightening tensions and therefore the risk of conflict. Although many “see NATO as an insurance policy against future Russian expansion westward,” others “argue that NATO’s eastward thrust will more likely produce a nationalistic response in Russia and rekindle its interests in eastern Europe” (Leonard 2000, 535). In the twenty-first century, it is often forgotten that “Expansion eastward also violated promises made in 1990 to Mikhail Gorbachev;” but the insult to Russia did not stop there, “At the Madrid summit, the Ukraine signed a [charter with NATO which] provided for the establishment of information offices in Brussels and Kiev and for the consultation on a variety of issues including civil emergency planning and nuclear safety” (Leonard 2000, 524). Predictably, this stirred renewed rumblings of discontent in Russia. John J. Mearsheimer, the quintessential realist, summarizes Russia’s position on the matter, highlighting the fact that “Russia was deeply opposed to NATO expansion, which it viewed as a serious threat to Russian security” (Mearsheimer 2014, 50). Reiter similarly cautions that further enlargement is likely to cause greater damage to RussiaWest relations than previous rounds of expansion. Indeed, in 2000, President Putin declared that “‘the expansion of military alliances’ poses a threat to Russia’s borders,” meaning enlargement might push “Russian leaders away from the belief that the West is a trustworthy partner in cooperation” (Reiter 2001, 49). While liberals firmly believe that “Should [U.S.] intervention [in Europe] be called for again, a prior commitment to NATO can be expected to facilitate cooperation by the countries of the region” (Waterman et al. 2001, 226), realists would argue this intervention might only become necessary because of NATO and the perceived threat it poses to Russia. But warnings were not heeded and NATO expanded. This potentially dangerous move was decried by some in American politics. Indeed, in June 1997, fifty U.S. officials and experts stated in an open letter to President Clinton, “their belief that ‘the current USled effort to expand NATO…is a policy error of historic importance’” (MccGwire 2008, 1282). They believed that, in Russia, it would “strengthen the nondemocratic opposition [as] NATO expansion continued to be opposed across the whole political spectrum in Russia” (MccGwire 2008, 1282). Gregory O. Hall corroborates this, writing that, “From the outset, Russian leaders and commentators from across the country’s political and ideological spectrum have stood in strong opposition to the prospect of NATO expanding its membership eastward, especially into the former USSR” (Hall 1999, 23). Furthermore, expansion “would draw a new line of division” in Europe, “would degrade the alliance’s ability to carry out its primary mission,” and in the U.S. there would be debate over the costs such an expansion would entail (MccGwire 2008, 1282). Other officials expressed concerns that this policy risked endangering the long-term viability of NATO, significantly exacerbating the instability that [existed] in the zone that lies between Germany and Russia, and convincing most Russians that the United States and the West [were] attempting to isolate, encircle, and subordinate them, rather than integrating them into a new European system of collective security (MccGwire 2008, 1283). The “extension of NATO,” some found, was “an illogical business” (MccGwire 2008, 1284). Not only were Russians wary of such a move by the West—“it is generally acknowledged that Moscow is very worried by the hostile implications of NATO expansion and that Russia has ‘legitimate concerns’ about this development”—but additionally, “in 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev was given top-level assurances that the West would not enlarge NATO, ensuring a non-aligned buffer zone between NATO’s eastern border and Russia” (MccGwire 2008, 1285). The Soviet leader, “Gorbachev and [former Chancellor of Germany, Helmut] Kohl had essentially already reached a gentleman’s agreement on February 10 [1990],” whereby “Kohl told Gorbachev that NATO would not expand eastward, and the Soviet leader agreed to internal German economic and monetary union, a process that had already begun” (Sarotte 2010, 120). Gorbachev even called “for a new post–Cold War pan-European security structure. He hoped for an organization that, while yet ill-defined, would stretch from the shores of the Atlantic to his country” (Sarotte 2010, 111). These hopes and assurances were, in the end, all for naught.

#### Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons against NATO members if threatened— causes nuclear war.

Bowman and Gabel 6/14 [(Bradley Bowman is senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Andrew Gabel is a research analyst.) “The US must deploy a sub-launched low-yield nuke” 6/14/2019] BC  
Sometimes characterized as “escalate to de-escalate,” Moscow has developed a war-fighting strategy and doctrine that emphasize the first use (or threat of use) of low-yield tactical nuclear strikes against conventional military targets. Such an approach would aim to coerce the U.S. and its NATO partners into backing down and accepting Moscow’s new gains achieved through aggression. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review assessed that this Russian nuclear strategy increases the chances of “dangerous miscalculation and escalation.”

The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission specifically addressed a scenario in which Moscow used false reports of atrocities against Russian populations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to justify an invasion of these NATO member countries under the guise of a “peacekeeping” mission. In this scenario envisioned by the commission, “As U.S. and NATO forces prepare to respond, Russia declares that strikes against Russian forces in those states will be treated as attacks on Russia itself — implying a potential nuclear response.”

Would Moscow actually use a low-yield nuclear weapon against NATO conventional forces responding to Russian aggression in the Baltics? Facts and prudence do not permit ruling that out. NATO leaders would be forced to decide whether Moscow was engaging in a nuclear bluff. If the fear of Russia’s potential use of a low-yield nuclear weapon prevented a NATO response, Russian President Vladimir Putin would achieve his leading grand strategic goal — the effective end of NATO as a collective-defense alliance.

Yet, if NATO did honor Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and responded by sending conventional forces to push Russian forces out of NATO territory, Moscow might be tempted to employ low-yield nuclear weapons if it thought it could get away with it. It seems certain that some Russian military planners would assess that the U.S. would not risk global nuclear war by responding to Moscow’s tactical nuclear strike with a high-yield nuclear weapon, thereby increasing the chances Moscow might employ a low-yield attack in the first place.

Such a scenario may seem far-fetched and too horrible to contemplate for many Americans, but a review of Russian nuclear strategy and doctrine makes clear that the Kremlin views nuclear weapons differently. As the Nuclear Posture Review confirms, “Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use.”

In short, assuming Moscow would not employ low-yield nuclear weapons in this manner — and making defense policy decisions based on that assumption — would be both dangerous and unwarranted.

Critics argue that the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons on submarines would spark or exacerbate a nuclear arms race. Moscow has already taken tangible steps toward an arms race: The Kremlin began a comprehensive and aggressive modernization of its nuclear arsenal years ago. Today, Russia already possesses a stockpile of up to 2,000 active nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

### Eu Collapse

#### EU collapse is inevitable – econ, COVID

Bet 8-22 [Martina Bet, 8-22-2020, "EU at risk of collapse? Gisela Stuart unravels Brussels' key to survival ", Express.co.uk, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1325865/eu-news-eurozone-euro-coronavirus-recovery-fund-gisela-stuart-two-tier-spt, Accessed 10-1-2020] HWL recut LHSSN

EU at risk of collapse? Gisela Stuart unravels Brussels' key to survival THE EUROPEAN UNION will have to go through deep restructuring if it wants to survive in the long-term, former Labour MP Gisela Stuart exclusively told Express.co.uk. The eurozone’s economic rebound from the coronavirus pandemic is losing steam after a few months of improvement, according to a survey of business activity. The IHS Markit flash composite purchasing managers’ index for the euro area fell to 51.6 in August, down from 54.9 in July. According to a Reuters poll, even if a reading above the 50 mark indicates that a majority of businesses reported an expansion in activity, the reading undershot the expectations of most economists, who on average had expected activity to plateau. The disappointing data hit the euro in early trading on Friday and called into question the strength of Europe’s third-quarter economic recovery. The recent resurgence of coronavirus infections in many European countries to levels not seen since May has triggered fresh quarantine requirements and localised lockdowns, raising doubts over the sustainability of the recovery. The discouraging data comes a month after EU leaders struck a deal on a huge coronavirus recovery package. The €750billion (£677billionn) coronavirus fund will be used as loans and grants to the countries hit hardest by the virus. The remaining money represents the EU budget for the next seven years. As many wonder whether the measures will ultimately deepen the bloc’s economic integration or cause its demise, in an exclusive interview with Express.co.uk, former Labour MP and prominent Brexiteer Gisela Stuart claimed the package was a necessary step for the future of the bloc.

#### Econ and Brexit

Bradley 20 [Charlie Bradley, 1-22-2020, "End of the EU? How economist predicted bloc ‘may not survive’ after Brexit", Express.co.uk, https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1232032/eu-news-economist-eu-may-not-survive-after-Brexit-spt, Accessed 10-1-2020] HWL Recut LHSSN

The worrying assessment of the state of the EU was made by leading American economist, Stephen Roach. The senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs claimed in March 2019 that the bloc is “imperfect” and the EU may not survive. Mr Roach argued the 2008 financial crisis, economic turmoil in southern Europe, and now, Brexit is taking a huge toll on the bloc.

#### The EU can’t recover – only breaking it up solves

Bootle 14 [Roger (economist for the Daily Telegraph. He is currently the Managing Director of Capital Economics), The Trouble with Europe; Nicholas Brealey Publishing; p. 63-7; kdf Recut LHSSN]

By contrast with early apparent success, over the last couple of decades the growth of most EU members has been disappointing. Not only has the growth rate fallen back in comparison to their own past histories, but economic growth has also been low relative to the US and even low relative to their fellow EU member the UK, never mind the rapidly growing countries of Asia. (Some EU members have done well, though: Sweden is a notable example.) Between 1980 (Thatcher's first full year in power) and 2007 (just before the financial crash), the average annual growth rate was 2.1% for France, 1.6% for Germany, 2-4% for the Netherlands and 1.8% for Italy. These figures compare with 2.4% for the UK and 2.9% for the US. If the period is extended to 2012 to include the full impact of the Great Recession (which affected the UK particularly badly), although the UK's lead over the EU average is reduced, it is still there. Over the period 198o--2012, the EU Six, the original signatories to the Treaty of Rome, grew at an annual average of 1.6%, compared with 2% for the UK. And by the end of 2013, both the US and the UK were continuing to recover, while most of the eurozone was struggling to emerge from recession. Admittedly, headline growth numbers have to be adjusted for changes in the number of people and the number of hours they work, adjustments that have the effect of making the EU look better compared to the US, although they don't close the gap entirely. Now it is the EU that is losing ground to the US and the UK. Moreover, as I shall detail in a moment, quite apart from weak economic growth, the EU has become one of the world's unemployment hotspots; hardly the hallmark of an economic success story. At least by the start of 2014, some sort of economic recovery seemed to be underway across Europe, including the eurozone, and on some indicators it seemed as though the peripheral countries were making some much needed adjustments, prompting some observers to believe that the crisis of the euro was over. However, this was only the superficial picture. In the peripheral countries unemployment remained at appalling levels and GDP was still falling. Since these countries were continuing to run government budget deficits, this meant that the all important debt-to-GDP ratio was still rising. The eurozone crisis was not dead, but merely sleeping. (I take up this subject in more detail in Chapter 4.) Moreover, the fundamental economic problems besetting Europe remain as serious as ever. Even the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, recognizes their seriousness. In an interview with the Financial Times on 11 December 2012 she said: If Europe today accounts for just over 7 per cent of the world's population, produces around 25 per cent of global GDP and has to finance 50 per cent of global social spending, then it's obvious that it will have to work very hard to maintain its prosperity and way of life . Admittedly, the EU is by far the world's most popular destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Over the past decade, though, the share of global FDI going to the EU (including intra-EU investments) has declined substantially from 45% in 2001 to 23% in 2010, as the share going to emerging markets has risen. Interestingly, two European countries that are not members of the EU, namely Norway and Switzerland, have been just as successful at attracting FDI as most EU members and much more successful than some, such as Italy. Excuses for economic failure So much for the facts of relative economic performance. What about the reasons? One excuse for comparatively poor economic performance is the idea that the countries of the EU, or at least many of them, are caught in the equivalent of the so-called middle income trap. Many countries in Latin America are experiencing a growth slowdown and they are not only the only ones. All of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have recently experienced decidedly slower growth. Yet this is wholly inadequate as an excuse for disappointing growth in the EU. For a start, EU growth has not slowed down recently but has been poor for a good while. Moreover, when the countries of the EU began to struggle, they were not in a 'middle income' position. Indeed, sometimes poor European performance is put down to the rather different idea that Europe's standard of living is so high that further advances from this level are not easy to achieve and/or are not avidly desired by the people. In my view this does not stack up either. Living standards are as high as, or higher than, the EU average in Switzerland and Norway and yet GDP there is still increasing at faster rates than in the EU. Singapore has a level of GDP per head that is higher than in the UK, France and Germany, yet over the last four years its economy has still grown by about s% per annum, well above the average- or even the best- EU rate. The argument is also sometimes put forward that it is inappropriate to judge the EU by its economic performance because, from the start, European integration has been an overtly political project, designed to achieve peace and stability in Europe. What is more, in that respect it can be regarded as a success. In Chapter 1, I have already given due weight to the political origins of the EU and to the strength of the political forces holding it together. However, this does not mean that economic performance does not matter. To believe that would be to let the leaders of the EU off much too lightly. Although the original driving force behind the foundation of the EU was political, it was always envisaged that there would be economic advantages too. That was the whole point about market size and the reduction of trade barriers. There was also a belief that central EU authorities would be bound to make better decisions for Europe as a whole than were competing nation states. The prevailing ethos was that competition between nation states, or at least European nation states, was wasteful. There was never a time at which the leaders of Europe said to the European people: 'This is a political project that is necessary to preserve peace in Europe, but it will cost you a great deal of money.' On the contrary, they trumpeted the idea of economic advantage - which was easy to sell in the early years because economic growth was so strong. And that was the whole point about being able to stand tall on the world stage, able to look America in the eye. This would not be possible simply by cobbling together a group of European states. No, the idea was that European integration would make Europe more prosperous and hence able to face America as an equal. Only in recent years has the idea that there was a price to be paid for European unity come to be widely argued and partly accepted. That case has been argued specifically in relation to the euro, especially in Germany. The idea has been advanced by the elite that preserving the euro may cost money- particularly if you are German - but that the euro is necessary for the survival of the EU itself. Yet that idea was not present before the foundation of the euro, or even in the euro's early years. It has emerged only during the euro crisis of the last few years. Poor EU economic performance is not the result of a rational choice made by rich, well-provided-for Europeans who have a different set of values from mere material advancement, including the funding of inefficient EU institutions for political reasons. Nor is it the well-anticipated price to be paid for integration and security. It is, quite simply, the result of relative economic failure, brought on by bad policies. Still, there is massive resistance to acknowledging this, not least among the European elites. It is often argued, for instance, that if laws governing employee protection and macro policies including quantitative easing (QE) are the keys to success, then it is puzzling why the UK has only recently started to recover and why its performance since the crisis of 2008 has been so poor. This view puts the cart before the horse. No one is suggesting that UK economic policy has been a paragon of virtue. Indeed, the weaknesses of the UK economy are substantial, particularly regarding the poor level of education and skills attainment. By contrast, in much of continental Europe these aspects of economic policy are more robustly addressed by public policy. But these aspects of economic performance are deep-seated and difficult to shift. If they cannot be easily shifted, then a critical issue surrounds how economic policy is conducted despite these shortcomings. The point is that despite its huge supply-side inadequacies, the UK has been able to put in a decent macro performance. That is largely due to policy. By contrast, in spite of substantial initial endowments of human and physical capital, the macro performance of much of continental Europe has been disappointing, mainly because of bad policy.

#### The continued existence of the EU makes war inevitable

Sandbrook 13 [Dominic (previously a lecturer in history at the University of Sheffield, senior fellow of the Rothermere American Institute at Oxford University; now visiting professor at King's College London); Could Germany spark another war? I fear it's all too possible; Mar 13; www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2292401/Could-Germany-spark-war-I-fear-possible-says-Dominic-Sandbrook.html; kdf recut LHSSN]

Thanks to this seemingly endless political crisis, Germany is increasingly being seen not as Europe’s economic saviour but its oppressor. Of course, back in 1913, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s German Empire had more nakedly militaristic ambitions. Frustrated that his newly unified country had missed out on colonising Africa and Asia, he had embarked on a vastly expensive arms race with Britain, symbolised by the production of vast naval dreadnoughts. Even at the time, many people warned that war was coming. As early as 1906, the Daily Mail — then just ten years old — had serialised a bestselling book by William Le Queux, who predicted that the inevitable war with Germany might lead to a Teutonic invasion of southern England. Far-sighted observers of the global situation could see that behind all the domestic arguments about female suffrage, the popularity of gramophones and bicycles and all the celebrity gossip about high-society hostesses, the world was entering a new and extremely dangerous phase. On the edge of Europe, the Ottoman Empire was breaking up, destabilising the alliances that had hitherto kept the Continent at peace. In the First Balkan War of 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro had defeated the Ottomans and were busily carving up the Balkans for themselves. In June 1913, the victors fell out over the spoils, with the Bulgarians fighting the rest for the disputed territory of Macedonia. And even now, a century on, that conflict is a reminder of the potential of ethnic passions and national resentments to unleash devastating violence on the peoples of Europe. Superficially, of course, our own situation looks very different. Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has even declared that the very existence of the euro is a guarantee the Continent will never again descend into bloodshed. Only by such means, she said, could we be sure to enjoy ‘another half century of peace in Europe’. Yet the truth is that lashing together the economies of nations as disparate as Portugal, Greece, France, Italy and Germany has served only to inflame old enmities. Bloodiest And if keeping the euro project alive means condemning the more impoverished nations to years of penury, with the Mediterranean economies in ruins, neo-Nazis marching on the streets of Athens and resentment building against Berlin and Brussels, it would take a brave man to predict that violence will never return to the cities of Europe. So could war again haunt the cities of the Continent? Alas, it is never easy to draw simple lessons from history. In 1913, few people in Britain realised that the bloodiest war in human history was just around the corner. Like most of us, they had known nothing but peace and prosperity, and assumed the golden age would continue for ever. Abroad, too, few could imagine the storm that was coming. Without realising it, Europe had been dancing on the edge of a precipice. We, too, have been living the high life, enjoying comforts our predecessors could never have imagined. And if the story of 1913 does offer a lesson, it is that, even in these financially straitened times, we should count our blessings. We often imagine that things can only get better. But as the events of a century ago so tragically and devastatingly proved, they can, in fact, get an awful lot worse.

#### The EU is the root cause of European crisis – only collapse solves and allows for a transition to individual governments

Bootle 14 [Roger (economist for the Daily Telegraph. He is currently the Managing Director of Capital Economics); The Trouble with Europe; Nicholas Brealey Publishing; p. 199-201; kdf recut LHSSN]

Political delusions Different countries have different national obsessions that, among other things, affect their attitudes to the EU. In the UK, the policy establishment is in the grip of three serious economic delusions that appear to dictate continued membership of the EU: top table syndrome, sizism and proximity fetishism. Yet the success of the world economy over the last 20 years, and especially the successful development of so many of the emerging markets, stands out against these pretensions to economic wisdom. If the euro manages to survive, it will surely be because some sort of fiscal and political union is cobbled together to save the currency union, leaving the UK marginalized. This union would tax, harmonize and regulate until the (much subsidized) cows come home. All the indications are that without fundamental reform, such a union would make decisions profoundly inimical to the growth of the EU economy. The formation of the euro, with its awful economic effects, is a ghastly warning of what may be yet to come. Of course, it would be right to try to reform the EU radically from within and the UK should make a major effort in this regard. Nevertheless, fundamental reform remains a very tall order. The EU would have to shrink back in both power and ambition. In particular, the goal of 'ever closer union' would have to be abandoned. If such fundamental reform cannot be achieved, the UK should be prepared to withdraw from the EU. Far from being an economic catastrophe, this could be the foundation for renewed self-confidence and prosperity. The same goes for other EU members that have reached the limits of their tolerance for integration. This issue is about more than economics: it is about democracy and the quality of governance. But, as I have argued in this book, economic consequences follow from bad governance. On the basis of experience so far and of the diverse nature of the countries that would need to be forced into some sort of political union, it is surely right to expect the worst from the EU. It has already given us Esperanto money (the euro) and it looks to be about to give us Esperanto government (political union). Admittedly, the euro is not the sum total of the EU's ills and even the EU is not the source of everything that has gone wrong in Europe. In that regard, extreme eurosceptics overstate their case. But European leaders have been focused on utterly the wrong things. Their dreams have been about building unity when they should have been about creating excellence, even if that means diversity, which it has throughout most of European history. Knowing little or nothing of economics, these European elites have acted almost precisely against the interests of Europe, being obsessed with treaties, agreements and restrictions in pursuit of commonality. They little understand that the prosperity of nations is built on the seemingly humdrum actions of ordinary people in factories, shops or service businesses; large and small - if only they are able to pursue their business interests relatively unrestricted by bureaucratic encumbrance. Meanwhile, in following the integrationist agenda and their social model, Europe's national governments have been pursuing a chimera. These governments are big, but that does not make them effective. On the contrary, they are hopelessly ineffective at doing what governments have traditionally been there to do: defend citizens against internal and external danger. Whether it is immigration or defence, the modern European state is a pathetic failure - big, dithery, expensive, but incompetent. That is the critique from the right. Meanwhile, from the left now comes the complaint that the state is failing in its role as provider of 'social security', under the onslaught of globalization and market pressures. Both critiques have cogency. But without the EU hanging over them as a mixture of shield, excuse and threat, even European national governments might start to wake up to what needs to be done. The decline of Europe is the result of the interaction of economics and politics. Economic prosperity has allowed indulgence in self-destructive habits. Degenerate politics have perpetuated the sources of decline,

#### The Euro makes continual economic crisis inevitable -- free migration, failures of local banking, and fiscal competition make a common currency unsustainable

Stiglitz 17 -- Joseph E. Stiglitz (Nobel Prize winning American economist, public policy analyst, and a professor at Columbia University. Recipient of the Economics Nobel Prize and the John Bates Clark Medal), The Fundamental Flaws in the Euro Zone Framework, https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/sites/jstiglitz/files/The%20Fundamental%20Flaws%20in%20the%20Euro%20Zone%20Framework.pdf WJ

In the remainder of this section, I describe several of the underlying structural properties of the Euro Zone that, if they do not make crises inevitable, certainly make them more likely to occur. (What is required is not so much the structural adjustment of the individual countries, but the structural adjustment of the euro framework.) Many of these were rules that reflected the neoclassical model, with the associated neoliberal policy prescriptions, which were fashionable (in some circles) at the time of the creation of the euro. Europe made two fundamental mistakes: first, it enshrined in its “constitution” these fads and fashions, the concerns of the time, without providing enough flexibility in responding to changing circumstances and understandings. And secondly, even at the time, the limits of the neoclassical model had been widely exposed—the problems posed, for instance, by imperfect competition, information, and markets to which I alluded earlier. The neoclassical model failed to recognize the many market failures that require government intervention, or in which government intervention would improve the performance of the economy. Thus, most importantly from a macroeconomic perspective, there was the belief that so long as the government maintained a stable macro-economy—typically interpreted as maintaining price stability—overall economic performance would be assured. By the same token, if the government kept budgets in line (kept deficits and debts within the limit set by Maastricht Convention) the economies would “converge,” so that the single currency system would work. The founders of the Euro Zone seemed to think that these budgetary/macroconditions were necessary and essentially sufficient for the countries to converge, that is, to have sufficient “similarity” that a common currency would work. They were wrong. The founders of the Euro Zone were also focused on government failure, rather than market failure, and thus they circumscribed governments, setting the stage four the market failures that would bring on the euro crisis. Much of the framework built into the Euro Zone would have enhanced efficiency, if Europe had gotten the details right and if the neoclassical model were correct. But the devil is in the detail, and some of the provisions, even within the neoliberal framework, led to inefficiency and instability. Free mobility of factors without a common debt leads to the inefficient and unstable allocation of factors. The principle of free mobility is to ensure that factors move to where (marginal) returns are highest, and if factor prices are equal to marginal productivity, that should happen. But what individuals care about, for instance, is the after-tax returns to labor, and this depends not only on the marginal productivity of labor (in the neoclassical model) but also on taxes and the provision of public goods. Taxes, in turn, depend in part on the burden imposed by inherited debt. Ireland, Greece and Spain face high levels of inherited debt. In these countries, the incentive for outmigration, and is especially so, because that debt did not increase to its current levels as a result of investments in education, technology, or infrastructure that is, through the acquisition of assets, but rather as a result of financial and macro-economic mismanagement. This implies migration away from these highly indebted countries to those with less indebtedness, even when marginal productivities are the same; and the more individuals move out, the greater the “equilibrium” tax burden on the remainder, accelerating the movement of labor away from an efficient allocation.2 (Of course, in the short run, migration may have positive benefits to the crisis country, both because it reduces the burden of unemployment insurance, and as the remittances back home provide enhanced domestic purchasing power. Whether in the short run these “benefits” to migration out-weight the adverse effects noted above is an empirical question. The migration also hides the severity of the underlying downturn, since it means that the unemployment rate is less, possibly far less, than it otherwise would be.)3 Free mobility of capital and goods without tax harmonization can lead to an inefficient allocation of capital and/or reduce the potential for redistributive taxation, leading to high levels of after-tax and transfer inequality. Competition among jurisdictions can be healthy, but there can also be a race to the bottom. Capital goes to the jurisdiction which taxes it at the lowest rate, not where its marginal productivity is the highest. To compete, other jurisdictions must lower the taxes they impose on capital, and since capital is more unequally distributed than labor, this reduces the scope for redistributive taxation. (A similar argument goes for the allocation of skilled labor.) Inequality, it is increasingly recognized, is not just a moral issue: it also affects the performance of the economy in numerous ways (Stiglitz 2012). Free migration might result in politically unacceptable patterns of location of economic activity. The general theory of migration/local public goods has shown that decentralized patterns of migration may well result in inefficient and socially undesirable patterns of location of economic activity and concentrations of population. There can be congestion and agglomeration externalities (both positive and negative) that arise from free migration. That is why many countries have an explicit policy for regional development, attempting to offset the inefficient and/or socially unacceptable patterns emerging from unfettered markets. In the context of Europe, free migration (especially that arising from debt obligations inherited from the past) may result in a depopulation not only of certain regions within countries but also of certain countries. One of the important adjustment mechanisms in the United States (which shares a common currency) is migration; and if such migration leads to the depopulation of an entire state, there is limited concern.4 But Greece or Ireland are, and should be, concerned about the depopulation of their countries. The single market principle for financial institutions and capital too can lead to a regulatory race to the bottom, with at least some of the costs of the failures borne by other jurisdictions. The failure of a financial institution imposes costs on others (evidenced so clearly in the crisis of 2008), and governments will not typically take into account these cross-border costs. That is why either there has to be regulation by the host country (Stiglitz et al. 2010), or there has to be strong regulation at the European level. Worse still, confidence in any country’s banking system rests partially in the confidence of the ability and willingness of the bank’s government to bail it out (and/or to the existence of institutional frameworks that reduce the likelihood that a bailout will be necessary, that there are funds set aside should a bailout be necessary, and that there are procedures in place to ensure that depositors will be made whole). Typically, there is an implicit subsidy, from which banks in jurisdictions with governments with greater bailout capacity benefit. Thus, money flowed into the United States after the 2008 global crisis, which failures in the United States had brought about, simply because there was more confidence that the United States had the willingness and ability to bail out its banks. Similarly, today in Europe: what Spaniard or Greek would rationally keep his money in a local bank, when there is (almost) equal convenience and greater safety in putting it in a German bank?5 Only by paying much higher interest rates can banks in those countries compete, but such an action would put them at a competitive disadvantage; and the increase in interest rates that is required may be too great— the bank would quickly appear to be non-viable. What happens typically is capital flight (or, in the current case, what has been described as a capital jog: the surprise is not that capital is leaving, but that it is not leaving faster). But that sets into motion a downward spiral: as capital leaves, the country’s banks restrict lending, the economy weakens, the perceived ability of the country to bail out its banks weakens, and capital is further incentivized to leave. There are two more fallacies that are related to the current (and inevitable) failures of the Euro Zone. The first is the belief that there are natural forces for convergence in productivity, without government intervention. There can be increasing returns (reflected in clustering), the consequence of which is that countries with technological advantages maintain those advantages, unless there are countervailing forces brought about by government (industrial) policies. But European competition laws prevented, or at least inhibited, such policies.6 The second is the belief that necessary, and almost sufficient, for good macroeconomic performance is that the monetary authorities maintain low and stable inflation. This led to the mandate of the European Central Bank to focus on inflation, in contrast to that of the Federal Reserve, whose mandate includes growth, employment, and (now) financial stability. The contrasting mandates can lead to an especially counterproductive response to a crisis, especially one which is accompanied by cost-push inflation arising from high energy or food prices. While the Fed lowered interest rates in response to the crisis, the continuing inflationary concerns in Europe did not lead to matching reductions there. The consequence was an appreciating euro, with adverse effects on European output. Had the ECB taken actions to weaken the euro, it would have stimulated the economy, partially offsetting the effects of austerity. As it was, it allowed the US to engage in competitive devaluation against it. It also meant that the ECB (and central banks within each of the member countries) studiously avoided doing anything about the real estate bubbles that were mounting in several of the countries. This was in spite of the fact that the East Asian crisis had shown that private sector misconduct—even when there is misconduct in government—could lead to an economic crisis. Europe similarly paid no attention to mounting current account balances in several of the countries. Ex post, many policymakers admit that it was a mistake to ignore these current account imbalances or financial market excesses. But the underlying ideology then (and still) provides no framework for identifying good “imbalances,” when capital is flowing into the country because markets have rationally identified good investment opportunities, and those that are attributable to market excesses.

#### Econ decline results in nuclear war.

Tønnesson 15 [Tønnesson is a research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in Norway and the leader of the East Asia Peace program at Uppsala University in Sweden.] “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace.” International Area Studies Review, volume 18, number 3, pgs. 297-311. 2015.

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

### Democracy

#### No LAWS impact— the card is in the context of the US, means that the EU alone can’t solve for it. Turns O/w bc there’s no terminal impact.

#### No populism impact— referring to the EU returned to ww2 times, not in the context of relations now.

#### **Democracy fails – short-termism, perverse incentives, and lack of accountability wreck infrastructure, widen domestic inequality, and kill collective global action**

Moyo 18 [(Dambisa, International Economist, Author of *Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It*, *How the West Was Lost: Fifty Years of Economic Folly – And the Stark Choices that Lie Ahead*, and *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*, Board Member of Barclays Bank and Chevron) “Why Democracy Doesn’t Deliver” Foreign Policy, April 26, 2018] MCM

Only 19 percent of Americans today say they can trust their government to do what is right. Meanwhile, citizens in developing countries see authoritarian leaders as more trustworthy than democratic politicians. Increasingly, it seems that people across the globe are skeptical of the ability of democratic governments to act effectively — including as good custodians of the economy. Indeed, the liberal democratic system is unwittingly undermining the economic growth that is necessary for its continued survival.

At the root of the problem is a predilection for short-​termism that has become embedded in the political and business culture of modern democracies. By design, Western politicians have relatively short political horizons; they are often in office for terms of less than five years. So they find their duties regularly interrupted by elections that distract from the job of addressing long-​term policy challenges. As a result, politicians are naturally and rationally drawn to focus their efforts on seducing their electorates with short-​term sweeteners — including economic policies designed to quickly produce favorable monthly inflation, unemployment, and GDP numbers.

Voters generally favor policies that enhance their own well-​being with little consideration for that of future generations or for long-​term outcomes. Politicians are rewarded for pandering to voters’ immediate demands and desires, to the detriment of growth over the long term. Because democratic systems encourage such short-​termism, it will be difficult to solve many of the seemingly intractable structural problems slowing global growth without an overhaul of democracy.

One of the most fundamental obstacles to effective governance is the short electoral cycle embedded in many democratic systems. Frequent elections taint policymaking, as politicians, driven by the rational desire to win elections, opt for quick fixes that have a tendency to undermine long-term growth. Meanwhile, they neglect to address more entrenched, longer-​term economic challenges, such as worsening education standards, the imminent pension crisis, and deteriorating physical infrastructure,

that don’t promise immediate political rewards.

America’s failing infrastructure encapsulates the problem of both public and private myopia. A 2017 report by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) gave the country a grade of D+ for overall infrastructure, citing 2,170 high-​hazard dams, 56,007 structurally deficient bridges (9.1 percent of the nation’s total), and $1 trillion in needed upgrades to drinking water systems over the next 25 years.

At a minimum, the ASCE suggests that a $2 trillion investment is needed by 2020 to address the significant backlog of overdue maintenance and the pressing need for modernization. The effects of increased infrastructure investment on the prospects of low-​skilled labor could be substantial. Investing in infrastructure would have all sorts of other benefits, but the prevailing democratic political system discourages the sort of long-​term thinking necessary to do so.

Clearly there have been periods in the past when governments have chosen to undertake large infrastructure projects without succumbing to political myopia. In the United States, for example, the federal government drove the rollout of the Work Projects Administration (WPA) in the 1930s. Launched under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal to help address America’s chronic unemployment, the WPA was America’s largest and most ambitious project dedicated to constructing public buildings, roads, bridges, schools, and courthouses. It was possible because the short-​term political incentive of reducing mass unemployment through the rapid creation of jobs aligned with a long-​term agenda.

Today, when it comes to infrastructure, China and India present a useful study in contrasts. Both countries needed roads to increase productivity. China built them, but India’s infrastructure programs got bogged down in red tape and political wrangling born of political fissures in its democratic system. Because vested interests in India have a stranglehold on policymaking and implementation, India’s democratic processes stifled decisions that could have helped drive economic growth. In the 2016-2017 World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report, India was ranked 68th of 138 countries for overall infrastructure, well behind China, which was ranked 42nd. The effects of underinvestment in infrastructure on the economy are real: For India, spending 1 percent of GDP on infrastructure is likely to boost the country’s GDP by 2 percent and create as many as 1.4 million jobs.

A second major obstacle to effective democratic governance is interest group lobbying, a feature in many liberal democracies that tends to interfere with the proper allocation of assets. In 2016, more than $3.15 billion was spent lobbying the U.S. Congress, roughly double the amount spent in 2000. Across sectors, lobbying by special interest groups has a discernible impact on public policy decisions in ways that negatively affect trade, infrastructure, and ultimately economic growth. For example, environmental groups oppose pipelines and new oil exploration projects, agricultural interests lobby for farm subsidies, and American trucking interest groups oppose additional tolls earmarked for road maintenance.

Political cycles too often keep politicians beholden to the individuals and corporate interests that help fund their campaigns and to the vagaries of public opinion polling. And because democratic politics rests on political contributions, it widens the inequality between rich and poor. It is the use of wealth to influence political outcomes that helps inequality take root. Until democracies push back on the use of wealth to influence elections and policies, initiatives to address inequality will be blunted.

When democracy works, it delivers economic growth and fundamental freedoms in a way that no other system can. And when it fails, it is rarely, if ever, replaced by a system that can do a better job of delivering for its population. Democracies must therefore adapt or they will further decay. Eradicating political myopia is essential, but even more radical reforms will be necessary.

First, policymakers should bind current governments and their successors more firmly to policies once laws have been passed. At the moment, policies committed to and enacted by an incumbent are routinely unwound, thereby creating policy uncertainty, which in turn hurts investment and ultimately impedes economic growth.

#### EU infrastructure is key to fighting climate change.

Genieser 8/31 [(Rob, the Manager Partner at ETF Partners. He has served as the Chairman of the Sustainability Chapter and Board Member of the International Venture Club, the leading advocacy group for venture capital in Europe.) “Climate crisis: Who is leading the green revolution in Europe?”Euronews.next, 8/31/21. <https://www.euronews.com/next/2021/08/31/climate-crisis-who-is-leading-the-green-revolution-in-europe>] RR

Governments around the world are beginning to make substantial moves in the right direction.

President Biden has recommitted the US to the Green New Deal and pledged to reduce emissions 50 per cent by 2030. Europe will go carbon neutral by 2050 by investing in renewables and green infrastructure. Just this past week, the EU published several proposals on how to get there while also committing substantial funds. At least 30 per cent of the EU's €1.8 trillion (£1.64 trillion) long-term budget will be spent on climate-related measures.

In 2020, the UK introduced a Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution, investing in various promising technologies from green hydrogen and electric vehicles to carbon capture and storage projects. At the most recent G7 summit, Boris Johnson emphasised the potential of G7 nations to “bounce back strongly from the virus” in a way that also achieves long-term societal goals.

**Warming causes extinction – any reduction should be prioritized above every other impact**

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**Climate change is becoming an existential threat with warming in excess of 2°C within the next three decades and 4°C to 6°C within the next several decades. Warming of such magnitudes will expose as many as 75% of the world’s population to deadly heat stress in addition to disrupting the climate and weather worldwide. Climate change is an urgent problem requiring urgent solutions**. This paper lays out urgent and **practical solutions that are ready for implementation now, will deliver benefits in the next few critical decades**, and places the world on a path to achieving the longterm targets of the Paris Agreement and near-term sustainable development goals. The approach consists of four building blocks and 3 levers to implement ten scalable solutions described in this report by a team of climate scientists, policy makers, social and behavioral scientists, political scientists, legal experts, diplomats, and military experts from around the world. These solutions will enable society to decarbonize the global energy system by 2050 through efficiency and renewables, drastically reduce short-lived climate pollutants, and stabilize the climate well below 2°C both in the near term (before 2050) and in the long term (post 2050). It will also reduce premature mortalities by tens of millions by 2050. As an insurance against policy lapses, mitigation delays and faster than projected climate changes, the solutions include an Atmospheric Carbon Extraction lever to remove CO2 from the air. The amount of CO2 that must be removed ranges from negligible, if the emissions of CO2 from the energy system and SLCPs start to decrease by 2020 and carbon neutrality is achieved by 2050, to a staggering one trillion tons if the carbon lever is not pulled and emissions of climate pollutants continue to increase until 2030.

There are numerous living laboratories including 53 cities, many universities around the world, the state of California, and the nation of Sweden, who have embarked on a carbon neutral pathway. These laboratories have already created 8 million jobs in the clean energy industry; they have also shown that **emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollutants can be decoupled from economic growth**. Another favorable sign is that **growth rates of worldwide carbon emissions have reduced from 2.9% per year during the first decade of this century to 1.3% from 2011 to 2014 and near zero growth rates during the last few years. The carbon emission curve is bending, but we have a long way to go and very little time for achieving carbon neutrality**. We need institutions and enterprises that can accelerate this bending by scaling-up the solutions that are being proven in the living laboratories. We have less than a decade to put these solutions in place around the world to preserve nature and our quality of life for generations to come. The time is now.

The Paris Agreement is an historic achievement. For the first time, effectively all nations have committed to limiting their greenhouse gas emissions and taking other actions to limit global temperature change. Specifically, 197 nations agreed to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,” and achieve carbon neutrality in the second half of this century.

**The climate has already warmed by 1°C. The problem is running ahead of us, and under current trends we will likely reach 1.5°C in the next fifteen years and surpass the 2°C guardrail by mid-century with a 50% probability of reaching 4°C by end of century**. Warming in excess of 3°C is likely to be a global catastrophe for three major reasons:

• **Warming in the range of 3°C to 5°C is suggested as the threshold for several tipping points in the physical and geochemical systems; a warming of about 3°C has a probability of over 40% to cross over multiple tipping points, while a warming close to 5°C increases it to nearly 90%, compared with a baseline warming of less than 1.5°C, which has only just over a 10% probability of exceeding any tipping point.**

**• Health effects of such warming are emerging as a major if not dominant source of concern. Warming of 4°C or more will expose more than 70% of the population, i.e. about 7 billion by the end of the century, to deadly heat stress and expose about 2.4 billion to vector borne diseases such as Dengue, Chikengunya, and Zika virus among others**. Ecologists and paleontologists have proposed that warming in excess of 3°C, accompanied by increased acidity of the oceans by the buildup of CO2 , can become a major causal factor for exposing more than 50% of all species to extinction. 20% of species are in danger of extinction now due to population, habitat destruction, and climate change.

The good news is that **there may still be time to avert such catastrophic changes**. The Paris Agreement and **supporting climate policies must be strengthened substantially within the next five years to bend the emissions curve down faster, stabilize climate, and prevent catastrophic warming**. To the extent those efforts fall short, societies and **ecosystems will be forced to contend with substantial needs for adaptation—a burden that will fall disproportionately on the poorest three billion who are least responsible for causing the climate change problem.**

Here we propose a policy roadmap with a realistic and reasonable chance of limiting global temperature to safe levels and preventing unmanageable climate change—an outline of specific science-based policy pathways that serve as the building blocks for a three-lever strategy that could limit warming to well under 2°C. The projections and the emission pathways proposed in this summary are based on a combination of published recommendations and new model simulations conducted by the authors of this study (see Figure 2). We have framed the plan in terms of four building blocks and three levers, which are implemented through 10 solutions. The first building block would be fully implementing the nationally determined mitigation pledges under the Paris Agreement of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In addition, several sister agreements that provide targeted and efficient mitigation must be strengthened. Sister agreements include the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down HFCs, efforts to address aviation emissions through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), maritime black carbon emissions through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the commitment by the eight countries of the Arctic Council to reduce black carbon emissions by up to 33%. There are many other complementary processes that have drawn attention to specific actions on climate change, such as the Group of 20 (G20), which has emphasized reform of fossil fuel subsidies, and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC). HFC measures, for example, can avoid as much as 0.5°C of warming by 2100 through the mandatory global phasedown of HFC refrigerants within the next few decades, and substantially more through parallel efforts to improve energy efficiency of air conditioners and other cooling equipment potentially doubling this climate benefit.

For the second building block, numerous subnational and city scale climate action plans have to be scaled up. One prominent example is California’s Under 2 Coalition signed by over 177 jurisdictions from 37 countries in six continents covering a third of world economy. The goal of this Memorandum of Understanding is to catalyze efforts in many jurisdictions that are comparable with California’s target of 40% reductions in CO2 emissions by 2030 and 80% reductions by 2050—emission cuts that, if achieved globally, would be consistent with stopping warming at about 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Another prominent example is the climate action plans by over 52 cities and 65 businesses around the world aiming to cut emissions by 30% by 2030 and 80% to 100% by 2050. There are concerns that the carbon neutral goal will hinder economic progress; however, real world examples from California and Sweden since 2005 offer evidence that economic growth can be decoupled from carbon emissions and the data for CO2 emissions and GDP reveal that growth in fact prospers with a green economy.

The third building block consists of two levers that we need to pull as hard as we can: one for drastically reducing emissions of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) beginning now and completing by 2030, and the other for decarbonizing the global energy system by 2050 through efficiency and renewables. Pulling both levers simultaneously can keep global temperature rise below 2°C through the end of the century. If we bend the CO2 emissions curve through decarbonization of the energy system such that global emissions peak in 2020 and decrease steadily thereafter until reaching zero in 2050, there is less than a 20% probability of exceeding 2°C. This call for bending the CO2 curve by 2020 is one key way in which this report’s proposal differs from the Paris Agreement and it is perhaps the most difficult task of all those envisioned here. Many cities and jurisdictions are already on this pathway, thus demonstrating its scalability. Achieving carbon neutrality and reducing emissions of SLCPs would also drastically reduce air pollution globally, including all major cities, thus saving millions of lives and over 100 million tons of crops lost to air pollution each year. In addition, these steps would provide clean energy access to the world’s poorest three billion who are still forced to resort to 18th century technologies to meet basic needs such as cooking. For the fourth and the final building block, we are adding a third lever, ACE (Atmospheric Carbon Extraction, also known as Carbon Dioxide Removal, or “CDR”). This lever is added as an insurance against surprises (due to policy lapses, mitigation delays, or non-linear climate changes) and would require development of scalable measures for removing the CO2 already in the atmosphere. The amount of CO2 that must be removed will range from negligible, if the emissions of CO2 from the energy system and SLCPs start to decrease by 2020 and carbon neutrality is achieved by 2050, to a staggering one trillion tons, if CO2 emissions continue to increase until 2030, and the carbon lever is not pulled until after 2030. This issue is raised because the NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) accompanying the Paris Agreement would allow CO2 emissions to increase until 2030. We call on economists and experts in political and administrative systems to assess the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of reducing carbon and SLCPs emissions beginning in 2020 compared with delaying it by ten years and then being forced to pull the third lever to extract one trillion tons of CO2

The fast mitigation plan of requiring emissions reductions to begin by 2020, which means that many countries need to cut now, is urgently needed to limit the warming to well under 2°C. Climate change is not a linear problem. Instead, we are facing non-linear climate tipping points that can lead to self-reinforcing and cascading climate change impacts. Tipping points and selfreinforcing feedbacks are wild cards that are more likely with increased temperatures, and many of the potential abrupt climate shifts could happen as warming goes from 1.5°C in 15 years to 2°C by 2050, with the potential to push us well beyond the Paris Agreement goals.

Where Do We Go from Here?

**A massive effort will be needed to stop warming at 2°C, and time is of the essence. With unchecked business-as-usual emissions, global warming has a 50% likelihood of exceeding 4ºC and a 5% probability of exceeding 6ºC in this century, raising existential questions for most, but especially the poorest three billion people. A 4ºC warming is likely to expose as many as 75% of the global population to deadly heat.** Dangerous to catastrophic impacts on the health of people including generations yet to be born, on the health of ecosystems, and on species extinction have emerged as major justifications for mitigating climate change well below 2ºC, although we must recognize that the uncertainties intrinsic in climate and social systems make it hard to pin down exactly the level of warming that will trigger possibly catastrophic impacts. To avoid these consequences, we must act now, and we must act fast and effectively. This report sets out a specific plan for reducing climate change in both the near- and long-term. With aggressive urgent actions, we can protect ourselves. Acting quickly to prevent catastrophic climate change by decarbonization will save millions of lives, trillions of dollars in economic costs, and massive suffering and dislocation to people around the world. This is a global security imperative, as it can avoid the migration and destabilization of entire societies and countries and reduce the likelihood of environmentally driven civil wars and other conflicts.