# 1NC v Westwood PM

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#### Commercial space stations are the future of tourism and commerce---NASA and countries is transitioning to private stations.

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Private Space Stations: The Future Portals for Private Space Commerce and Tourism

The future of space research and development is tied to private enterprise – specifically private space stations. Now that government-funded programs have proven basic concepts about getting to and living/working in space, NASA and agencies from other countries will continue to turn many aspects of space station work over to private companies.

The International Space Station (ISS) will be unusable by the end of this decade and at that point NASA and other countries will resort to renting space on privately owned, earth orbiting stations.

NASA is hedging its bets and providing grants to several private companies in hopes of jump starting and accelerating their development of private space stations. No doubt any of these companies will be honored to have NASA as a primary tenant, but they’re setting their sights even higher – literally.

Space Flight Tourism Has Begun

We’ve already broken the public-private barrier with tourist excursions for low-earth, brief or multi-day orbital flights. The Russians have been making their Soyuz vehicle available for ferrying private citizens to the ISS for more than a decade.

Now, in addition to ferrying crews to the ISS for NASA, SpaceX also is using its equipment to provide multi-day orbital flights for private citizens. Late last year, SpaceX hosted four space tourists for a three-day orbiting tour.

Space Destination Tourism

Axiom Space, one of the companies supported by NASA, is planning to rent out the SpaceX vehicle from Elon Musk’s team to transport company clients to an eight-day literal “around the world” orbital flight cruise aboard the ISS. This represents the second phase of the space tourism industry – to deliver space tourists to orbiting modules and stations. We’re there already of course, but these programs are in their infancy.

When the ISS goes out of commission, we’ll see private space stations take up the slack – both for NASA’s important work and for wealthy space tourists’ once-in-a-lifetime experiences. Axiom has a leg up on this venture, as it’s planning to attach a module to the ISS for several years before detaching it to form the basis of its own private space station.

Orbital Vacations

Over time, space station tourists won’t be content to live even for a few days in a lab-like environment – the kind we’re used to seeing on videos from the ISS.

Private, orbiting space stations will be upgraded. They won’t be luxurious at first, but they’ll have slightly upgraded sleeping pods and small common areas for lounging instead of working.

NASA will still have its labs and astronaut quarters on board. The tourists will need to stay in their own area, although some will want to do more than look out the window for days at a time and will volunteer to participate in research after receiving some on-the-ground training before liftoff.

The Next Frontier

The next step in the space tourism progression is to break beyond the Earth orbit and place space facilities in other locations – orbiting the Earth’s moon or on the moon itself.

We’ll also see space vacations and research destinations in non-planet orbiting space.

Supporting Space Commerce

Down the road even further, space workers for commercial ventures will become another category of private citizen astronauts. These workers will be hopping from one private space station to the next as space station entrepreneurs place facilities at ever-more distant waypoints in space. Tasks like asteroid mining will be done by robots, of course, but in some cases, human intervention at the mining location may be needed to keep things progressing. These private space stations will serve as staging areas, regional offices, and warehouses.

Space Highways

It’s not too hard to imagine that eventually, along well-established routes to commercial areas in space and to other planets, we’ll see the emergence of additional space structures – hardly space “stations” anymore – with specific functions. Passing vehicles will dock to resupply, make deliveries, make repairs, refresh crews and passengers, and provide almost the same variety of services you’d expect to see along a U.S. interstate highway.

Even further into the future, we’ll see scheduled flights from earth to the larger space communities and then between those locations, similar to the familiar hub and spoke arrangements used by the world’s airlines today. As we scale these operations, space recreation and tourism will be open to far more of Earth’s citizens.

These flights will be even more necessary when people (originally workers on those remote outposts) choose to remain in space-based facilities indefinitely, purchasing or renting accommodations – maybe as retirement destinations.

Will Space Remain International?

At this time, the U.S., China, India, Russia, the UK, Japan, the UAE and maybe a few other nations have or conceivably could develop the capability to push into space for tourism or commerce.

But who owns space? Will we see any borders or territorial claims? Back in 1960, the United Nations determined that space was truly wide open. No country could lay claim to any areas or create any borders.

Will today and tomorrow’s nations abide by that? This neutrality principle might be tested as structures emerge on the moon and Mars and as we’re able to easily reach areas of space with valuable resource-laden asteroids. We may also come across some entities that come from other parts of the universe who would beg to differ about that jurisdiction of the UN!

Baby Steps So Far Are an Exciting Promise of What’s to Come

With these kinds of futuristic images in mind, it’s easy to see that what’s happened in the past decade and what will take place in the next few years are important steps, but they’re still just baby steps.

What needs to and will happen, though, is that as more and more tourist space flights occur on private vehicles and more and more private residents spend a few days at a time on the ISS and later the private space stations, people and investors will be convinced that futuristic, recreational space travel and residency is no longer science fiction but a legitimate, future personal and business opportunity. The Jetsons won’t seem as far fetched as they did 60 years ago.

In 2022, we’ll see a remarkable surge in this direction with more visitors going to space and to the ISS, along with breakthroughs in how to build and integrate structures in space. As long as we don’t see any major catastrophes (unfortunately, they’re almost inevitable and it’s important we keep them in perspective and learn from them when they happen), we’ll see growing confidence in the viability of recreational space travel.

Ten years from now, even if you’re not ready to book a hotel stay near Mars, you should buy a ticket for an Earth orbit trip or make reservations for a once-in-a-lifetime space station vacation. That’s where you’re going to see the greatest shows off Earth.

#### Tourism makes low-gravity research accessible which results in critical physiological science innovation.

Caplan and Lindsay 17 Nick Caplan and Kirsty Lindsay 7-29-2017 "Space Tourism Could Help Boost Science and Health Research — Here's How" <https://www.space.com/37503-space-tourism-could-help-boost-science-health-research.html> (Nick graduated from the University of Birmingham with a PhD in Biomechanics)//Elmer

Perhaps one day we will see research teams launching groups of participants to spend a few weeks or months aboard a space hotel in order to study medical interventions that would slow the ageing process on Earth, and to help the human species colonise the Moon or even Mars. Research dating back to the early years of the space race has led to technologies that benefit us all. Many scientific discoveries have come since the arrival of inhabitable space stations that act as orbital laboratories. NASA’s first space station Skylab helped understand the effects on the human body of spending months in space and paved the way for the International Space Station. A huge number of research studies have been completed on the ISS since the year 2000 in the areas of human physiology, biology, biotechnology, physical science and earth and space science. These studies have led to discoveries such as enhanced protein crystal growth for drug development, efficient combustion of fuel droplets, and an understanding of the effects of long duration exposure to microgravity on the human body, revealing that spaceflight has effects similar to ageing on Earth. Despite much human physiological research being carried out in space, it has one major limitation – there are simply not enough humans currently going to space to act as research participants, leading to difficulties in research design. In fact, only 550 or so humans have ever been into space since Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin first orbited the Earth in 1961. Human physiological experiments in space tend to have very small participant numbers (for example, the NASA twins study) or they have to take place over many years. Could the boom in commercial human spaceflight accelerate the speed of human physiological discoveries in space? We certainly think so.

#### Physiology key to manage new Diseases.

APS 20 5-21-2020 "How Physiologists Are Helping Patients Recover from COVID-19" <https://ispyphysiology.com/2020/05/21/how-physiologists-are-helping-patients-recover-from-covid-19/> (American Physiology Society)//Elmer

Understanding Physiology Is Critical to Fighting COVID-19 For each of the new treatments and devices created to combat COVID-19, it is critical to make sure they are safe to use in people. This is where understanding of human physiology is very important. For instance, treatment with remdesivir can reduce the amount of the virus in your body and has helped people who are severely ill with COVID-19 recover faster. But the drug is known to damage the liver and the immune system, so it is very important to know how well a patient’s liver and immune system are functioning before using it as a treatment. Even as I write this, there are new findings that COVID-19 directly affects not only the lungs but also the brain, kidneys, blood vessels and blood cells. This makes treatment of COVID-19 very difficult. Scientists and bioengineers need to take into consideration how the different organs of the body coordinate to keep you alive and healthy—the knowledge of how all the organs, tissues and cell work together in health and disease is the basis of physiological study. The trouble with finding the best treatment for COVID-19 is that the symptoms are so different from one person to the next. Children seem to be less vulnerable to COVID-19, older people are more vulnerable and some young adults are dying from strokes caused by the coronavirus rather than respiratory issues. As we find out more about how COVID-19 affects the body, it is clear that there will be more than one best way to fight it. In my eyes, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the value of scientific research, especially research that helps us understand human physiology. In a few short months, scientists have sequenced the genome of the virus, discovered how SARS-CoV-2 infects cells by attaching its “spikes” to a protein on cells and developed new potential treatments. It will be the research physiologist’s job to study and understand how to best use these medicines and devices to treat COVID-19 patients.

#### Disease causes Extinction.

Bar-Yam 16 Yaneer Bar-Yam 7-3-2016 “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world” <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition> (Professor and President, New England Complex System Institute; PhD in Physics, MIT)//Elmer

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

## Case

### Multilat

#### 1.Presumption – replace is one for one – private companies will circumvent the plan by saying that their space stations aren’t direct ISS replacements

Mirrium Webster n.d. [(Online dictionary) “replace” mirrium webster, No date. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/replace>] RR

to take the place of especially as a substitute or successor

#### 2. No p3 link— this assumes other countries investing like england and france, which isn’t the aff.

#### 3.No internal link to multilat – their evidence isn’t reverse causal – even if space station has historically enabled multilat, no reason why its absence would break relations between countries

#### 4.Space militarization is happening now – 1AC Cronk and Elvevold prove decades of cooperation over the ISS haven’t been able to deter Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities – they don’t solve

#### 5. Uniqueness for space militarization definitely overwhelms the link – 1AC Mason proves space coop is impossible – inserted in yellow – international talks have accomplished zero and the aff does nothing to demilitarize space – make them explain why the aff is different

Could space be demilitarised? Not a chance, say the experts, who point out that – in contrast to the space exploration of the popular imagination, where it is still seen as a benign, trans-national endeavour – the entire history of space technology, from the Nazi V2 rocket to the recent Russian anti-satellite strike, has been driven by the military. Yet military activity in space could be made more orderly and transparent. The two most authoritative annual reports on military space capabilities are both reliant on open-source information and acknowledge that there are huge gaps in what even the experts know. We know how many satellites are up there: we do not know much about what weapons they might carry. This stands in contrast to the way the rival superpowers have managed both nuclear and conventional deterrence since the onset of the Cold War, with a series of treaties signed by Russia and the West to minimise or regulate aggression – for example, limiting the possession of nuclear weapons or the deployment of armoured vehicles. But there is almost no such framework for regulating the space arms race, or for achieving basic transparency about who’s doing what, still less for avoiding conflict. US and Russian space commanders convened in Vienna last July, agreeing to “enhance communications between the two countries about space-related operational issues in order to reduce the risks of misunderstanding, help prevent or manage space-related incidents, and prevent inadvertent escalation”. This did not stop Russia’s surprise launch of an anti-satellite missile on 15 November, nor did it avert the war of words that followed it. In truth the US-Russia space dialogue, a hangover from the Cold War, is a long way from the multilateral and comprehensive framework needed to bring China, India, Israel and Iran around the table. Lacking any formal international treaty beyond the anti-nuclear one, space has, in effect, become a demonstration zone for geopolitical realism. Those who have real power on Earth have untrammelled power in space. They will zap their own satellites at will, buzz the satellites of others, launch “projectiles” from existing satellites – as Russia allegedly did last year – and unleash spoofing attacks to disorient civilian shipping, all without acknowledgement or explanation. The emerging field of space war looks, in other words, exactly like terrestrial conflict would if there were no treaties and deployment patterns, or journalists and NGOs to observe them. This year the UK launched its own space command, with military chiefs acknowledging space as a domain of conflict co-equal with air, land, sea and cyber. Britain is late to the space war game and, after years of offshoring and outsourcing, lacks the expertise and resources to compete with the big four space powers: it doesn’t figure in either of the monitoring reports on space militarisation documenting significant offensive capabilities. As a medium-sized power, self-excluded from large parts of the EU’s space programmes, it is in Britain’s interest to promote order, multilateralism and transparency in space, and to resist its further militarisation. And, to an extent, haltingly, it has done so, promoting the first real debate at the UN over a new space treaty.

#### 6. Answering Private Stations Bad – 1] We flip U/Q for “Unproven” since we obviously haven’t built one BUT the ISS is falling so there isn’t an alternative and 2] “Decades away” is power-tagged – it says “years” which matters because we have 6 years until the ISS is ending meaning this isn’t offense.

#### 7. ISS fails to spur Global Cooperation – it excluded China, link turns multilat & mason— its about why china is needed.

Young 19 (Makena Young, research associate with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Young worked for the Federal Aviation Administration as an aerospace engineer, focusing on automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast certification and integration in small aircraft.)(“Bad Idea: The Wolf Amendment (Limiting Collaboration with China in Space)”, December 4, 2019, https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-the-wolf-amendment-limiting-collaboration-with-china-in-space/)//ASMITH

In 2011, Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) introduced what is now commonly referred to as the Wolf Amendment into the annual commerce, justice, and science (CJS) appropriations bill. This amendment limits U.S. government agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), from working with Chinese commercial or government agencies. Although Rep Wolf retired in 2014, the amendment has perpetuated and continues to be [included](https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/FY2020%20CJS%20Sub%20Markup%20Draft.pdf) in the annual CJS appropriations bill. Though the amendment does not prohibit all collaboration between the two countries, the result has proven to be a significant hindrance to bilateral civil space projects. Keeping the Wolf Amendment language is in every sense a bad idea: it does nothing to promote human rights and it hands China an opportunity to challenge NASA’s leadership in civil space exploration.

The [language](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ55/html/PLAW-112publ55.htm) of the Wolf Amendment says that no government funding for NASA, the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), or the National Space Council can be used to collaborate with, host, or coordinate bilaterally with China or Chinese-owned companies without certification from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The FBI must certify that there is no risk of information sharing and that none of the Chinese officials involved have been determined by the United States to have direct involvement with violations of human rights. In a [2013 letter](https://www.theepochtimes.com/frank-wolfs-letter-on-nasa-controversy_312410.html) to former NASA Administrator Charles Bolden, Representative Wolf stated his “efforts to limit new collaboration with China until we see improvements in its human rights records.”

However, in the eight years since the first iteration of this amendment, the U.S. has not seen the desired changes in Chinese human rights policies that the Wolf Amendment was intended to spur. And during that time, China’s economy, global influence, and space capabilities have continued to grow. Being left out of U.S.-led international missions has not deterred China in space, but instead has pushed China to develop parallel capabilities on its own. Without a way to contribute to the International Space Station (ISS), China began development and testing its own modular space station. China launched the Tiangong-1 and Tiangong-2 [space laboratories](https://chinapower.csis.org/chinese-space-station/) in 2011 and 2016, respectively, as testbeds for a permanent space station. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) has announced that the permanent Chinese Space Station (CSS) should be fully operational by the year 2022.

With the ISS slated for retirement in 2024, other countries that want a long-term human presence in low Earth orbit may be lured into partnering with China on the CSS. Combined with a growing commercial space sector in China that promises to offer [frequent launches](https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612595/china-launched-more-rockets-into-orbit-in-2018-than-any-other-country/) at lucrative prices to foreign entities, China is positioning itself to be the partner nation of choice for future space exploration missions. As NASA enters into a new era of exploration with its Moon-to-Mars projects, it is [touting](https://twitter.com/JimBridenstine/status/1049063320668573696) international collaboration as an integral part of its plans. The [Artemis](https://www.nasa.gov/feature/nasa-gains-broad-international-support-for-artemis-program-at-iac) and [Lunar Gateway](https://www.geekwire.com/2019/worlds-space-agencies-focus-roles-gateway-moon-missions/) programs are working to establish partnerships with Canada, Australia, the European Space Agency, Japan, and possibly Russia. Closing China off from cooperating in these projects could be a strategic mistake.

Both NASA and CNSA share a common goal of exploring the moon for scientific purposes—as is evident by China’s Chang’e 4 rover that landed on the far side of the moon this year. NASA cooperated with CNSA to monitor the landing of the Chinese rover—the first major act of cooperation between the two space agencies in eight years. CNSA provided the planned location and time of the landing, and NASA observed the lander and shared the images that were produced. NASA was able to cooperate on this mission because it certified to Congress that this activity “[did not](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/farside-politics-the-west-eyes-moon-cooperation-with-china/) pose a risk of resulting in the transfer of technology, data or other information…with China; and [did] not involve knowing interactions with officials who have been determined by the U.S. to have direct involvement with violations of human rights”. To ensure no private data sharing between the two nations, they agreed that any significant findings would be shared globally. This cooperation was a benefit for both space agencies, and although conducted as a one-time informal agreement, it could set precedent for continued cooperation between these two major space powers. Information sharing, even in small instances, can start to build confidence and trust and ultimately could be a tool used to prevent or de-escalate future conflicts in space.

Collaborating with non-allied countries in space is not a foreign concept for NASA. In the height of the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet space agencies agreed to work together. President Eisenhower pursued these cooperative initiatives in early [letters](https://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/coldWarCoOp.html) to Soviet leadership to showcase the peaceful uses of space. Collaborating on missions like the [Apollo-Soyuz](https://www.nasa.gov/apollo-soyuz/overview) test project and later the [Shuttle-Mir](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle-mir/) program helped propel human space exploration and established a mutually beneficial area of cooperation and communication between the two rivals. This collaboration proved invaluable for both countries in understanding the capabilities and organization of each other’s civil space agencies, and it continues today on the ISS.

As China grows as a space power, U.S. cooperation in selected civil space projects could be one of the best ways to understand the goals and capabilities of the Chinese space agency. Moreover, it would establish avenues of communication and trust between the two nations that could be mutually beneficial in the future. The Wolf Amendment’s statutory exclusion of U.S. – Chinese bilateral cooperation in space has only incentivized China to accelerate its space development programs, creating a serious challenger to U.S. leadership in this vital domain of exploration. History has shown that when the U.S. cooperates with foreign competitors in civil space projects, it enhances NASA’s leadership role. The Wolf Amendment has neither discouraged Chinese space ambitions or altered China’s behavior on human rights—it has only muddled our relationship with China and created an opening for a challenger to NASA’s leadership role in space exploration. The provisions of the Wolf Amendment are not needed to protect technology transfer and only serve to stifle mutually beneficial cooperation for science and exploration. It is time to stop howling at the thought of cooperating with China for exploration missions to the Moon and revise the Wolf Amendment.

**No ‘space war’ – Insurmountable barriers and everyone has an interest in keeping space peaceful**

**Dobos 19** [(Bohumil Doboš, scholar at the Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic, and a coordinator of the Geopolitical Studies Research Centre) “Geopolitics of the Outer Space, Chapter 3: Outer Space as a Military-Diplomatic Field,” Pgs. 48-49] TDI

Despite the theorized potential for the achievement of the terrestrial dominance throughout the utilization of the ultimate high ground and the ease of destruction of space-based assets by the potential space weaponry, the utilization of space weapons is with current technology and no effective means to protect them far from fulfilling this potential (Steinberg 2012, p. 255). In current global international political and technological setting, the utility of space weapons is very limited, even if we accept that the ultimate high ground presents the potential to get a decisive tangible military advantage (which is unclear). This stands among the reasons for the lack of their utilization so far. Last but not the least, it must be pointed out that the states also develop passive defense systems designed to protect the satellites on orbit or critical capabilities they provide. These further decrease the utility of space weapons. These systems include larger maneuvering capacities, launching of decoys, preparation of spare satellites that are ready for launch in case of ASAT attack on its twin on orbit, or attempts to decrease the visibility of satellites using paint or materials less visible from radars (Moltz 2014, p. 31). Finally, we must look at the main obstacles of connection of the outer space and warfare. The first set of barriers is comprised of physical obstructions. As has been presented in the previous chapter, the outer space is very challenging domain to operate in. Environmental factors still present the largest threat to any space military capabilities if compared to any man-made threats (Rendleman 2013, p. 79). A following issue that hinders military operations in the outer space is the predictability of orbital movement. If the reconnaissance satellite's orbit is known, the terrestrial actor might attempt to hide some critical capabilities-an option that is countered by new surveillance techniques (spectrometers, etc.) (Norris 2010, p. 196)-but the hide-and-seek game is on. This same principle is, however, in place for any other space asset-any nation with basic tracking capabilities may quickly detect whether the military asset or weapon is located above its territory or on the other side of the planet and thus mitigate the possible strategic impact of space weapons not aiming at mass destruction. Another possibility is to attempt to destroy the weapon in orbit. Given the level of development for the ASAT technology, it seems that they will prevail over any possible weapon system for the time to come. Next issue, directly connected to the first one, is the utilization of weak physical protection of space objects that need to be as light as possible to reach the orbit and to be able to withstand harsh conditions of the domain. This means that their protection against ASAT weapons is very limited, and, whereas some avoidance techniques are being discussed, they are of limited use in case of ASAT attack. We can thus add to the issue of predictability also the issue of easy destructibility of space weapons and other military hardware (Dolman 2005, p. 40; Anantatmula 2013, p. 137; Steinberg 2012, p. 255). Even if the high ground was effectively achieved and other nations could not attack the space assets directly, there is still a need for communication with those assets from Earth. There are also ground facilities that support and control such weapons located on the surface. Electromagnetic communication with satellites might be jammed or hacked and the ground facilities infiltrated or destroyed thus rendering the possible space weapons useless (Klein 2006, p. 105; Rendleman 2013, p. 81). This issue might be overcome by the establishment of a base controlling these assets outside the Earth-on Moon or lunar orbit, at lunar L-points, etc.-but this perspective remains, for now, unrealistic. Furthermore, no contemporary actor will risk full space weaponization in the face of possible competition and the possibility of rendering the outer space useless. No actor is dominant enough to prevent others to challenge any possible attempts to dominate the domain by military means. To quote 2016 Stratfor analysis, "(a) war in space would be devastating to all, and preventing it, rather than finding ways to fight it, will likely remain the goal" (Larnrani 20 16). This stands true unless some space actor finds a utility in disrupting the arena for others.

### heg

#### Toplevel—

#### a. Empirics go neg – most qualified studies disprove hegemonic stability theories.

Fettweis 17 –Christopher J. Fettweis is an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace, Security Studies” 26:3, 423-451; EG)

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, **but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.** Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not**. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. **US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse.** In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. **In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.** In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended Table 1. Post-Cold War US intervention and violence by region. High Violence Low Violence High US Intervention Middle East Europe South and Central Asia Pacific Rim North America Low US Intervention Africa South America Former Soviet Union in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### b. US hegemony is dead and gone with Trump – treaty exits, Trump foreign policy, and rising power prove

* Russia and China emergence
* Treaty exits
* Response to 9/11 and Iraq War
* Trump FP

Fareed Zakaria 06/11/19 (Host of CNN’s GPS, Harvard Ph. D in Government, served on Council on Foreign Relations Board) "The Self-Destruction of American Power," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-11/self-destruction-american-power EE

Sometime in the last two years, American hegemony died. The age of U.S. dominance was a brief, heady era, about three decades marked by two moments, each a breakdown of sorts. It was born amid the collapse of the Berlin Wall, in 1989. The end, or really the beginning of the end, was another collapse, that of Iraq in 2003, and the slow unraveling since. But was the death of the United States’ extraordinary status a result of external causes, or did Washington accelerate its own demise through bad habits and bad behavior? That is a question that will be debated by historians for years to come. But at this point, we have enough time and perspective to make some preliminary observations.

As with most deaths, many factors contributed to this one. There were deep structural forces in the international system that inexorably worked against any one nation that accumulated so much power. In the American case, however, one is struck by the ways in which Washington—from an unprecedented position—mishandled its hegemony and abused its power, losing allies and emboldening enemies. And now, under the Trump administration, the United States seems to have lost interest, indeed lost faith, in the ideas and purpose that animated its international presence for three-quarters of a century.

U.S. hegemony in the post–Cold War era was like nothing the world had seen since the Roman Empire. Writers are fond of dating the dawn of “the American century” to 1945, not long after the publisher Henry Luce coined the term. But the post–World War II era was quite different from the post-1989 one. Even after 1945, in large stretches of the globe, France and the United Kingdom still had formal empires and thus deep influence. Soon, the Soviet Union presented itself as a superpower rival, contesting Washington’s influence in every corner of the planet. Remember that the phrase “Third World” derived from the tripartite division of the globe, the First World being the United States and Western Europe, and the Second World, the communist countries. The Third World was everywhere else, where each country was choosing between U.S. and Soviet influence. For much of the world’s population, from Poland to China, the century hardly looked American.

The United States’ post–Cold War supremacy was initially hard to detect. As I pointed out in The New Yorker in 2002, most participants missed it. In 1990, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that the world was dividing into three political spheres, dominated by the dollar, the yen, and the deutsche mark. Henry Kissinger’s 1994 book, Diplomacy, predicted the dawn of a new multipolar age. Certainly in the United States, there was little triumphalism. The 1992 presidential campaign was marked by a sense of weakness and weariness. “The Cold War is over; Japan and Germany won,” the Democratic hopeful Paul Tsongas said again and again. Asia hands had already begun to speak of “the Pacific century.”

U.S. hegemony in the post–Cold War era was like nothing the world had seen since the Roman Empire.

There was one exception to this analysis, a prescient essay in the pages of this magazine by the conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer: “The Unipolar Moment,” which was published in 1990. But even this triumphalist take was limited in its expansiveness, as its title suggests. “The unipolar moment will be brief,” Krauthammer admitted, predicting in a Washington Post column that within a very short time, Germany and Japan, the two emerging “regional superpowers,” would be pursuing foreign policies independent of the United States.

Policymakers welcomed the waning of unipolarity, which they assumed was imminent. In 1991, as the Balkan wars began, Jacques Poos, the president of the Council of the European Union, declared, “This is the hour of Europe.” He explained: “If one problem can be solved by Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country, and it is not up to the Americans.” But it turned out that only the United States had the combined power and influence to intervene effectively and tackle the crisis.

Similarly, toward the end of the 1990s, when a series of economic panics sent East Asian economies into tailspins, only the United States could stabilize the global financial system. It organized a $120 billion international bailout for the worst-hit countries, resolving the crisis. Time magazine put three Americans, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, and Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, on its cover with the headline “The Committee to Save the World.”

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Just as American hegemony grew in the early 1990s while no one was noticing, so in the late 1990s did the forces that would undermine it, even as people had begun to speak of the United States as “the indispensable nation” and “the world’s sole superpower.” First and foremost, there was the rise of China. It is easy to see in retrospect that Beijing would become the only serious rival to Washington, but it was not as apparent a quarter century ago. Although China had grown speedily since the 1980s, it had done so from a very low base. Few countries had been able to continue that process for more than a couple of decades. China’s strange mixture of capitalism and Leninism seemed fragile, as the Tiananmen Square uprising had revealed.

But China’s rise persisted, and the country became the new great power on the block, one with the might and the ambition to match the United States. Russia, for its part, went from being both weak and quiescent in the early 1990s to being a revanchist power, a spoiler with enough capability and cunning to be disruptive. With two major global players outside the U.S.-constructed international system, the world had entered a post-American phase. Today, the United States is still the most powerful country on the planet, but it exists in a world of global and regional powers that can—and frequently do—push back.

The 9/11 attacks and the rise of Islamic terrorism played a dual role in the decline of U.S. hegemony. At first, the attacks seemed to galvanize Washington and mobilize its power. In 2001, the United States, still larger economically than the next five countries put together, chose to ramp up its annual defense spending by an amount—almost $50 billion—that was larger than the United Kingdom’s entire yearly defense budget. When Washington intervened in Afghanistan, it was able to get overwhelming support for the campaign, including from Russia. Two years later, despite many objections, it was still able to put together a large international coalition for an invasion of Iraq. The early years of this century marked the high point of the American imperium, as Washington tried to remake wholly alien nations—Afghanistan and Iraq—thousands of miles away, despite the rest of the world’s reluctant acquiescence or active opposition.

Iraq in particular marked a turning point. The United States embarked on a war of choice despite misgivings expressed in the rest of world. It tried to get the UN to rubber-stamp its mission, and when that proved arduous, it dispensed with the organization altogether. It ignored the Powell Doctrine—the idea, promulgated by General Colin Powell while he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War, that a war was worth entering only if vital national interests were at stake and overwhelming victory assured. The Bush administration insisted that the vast challenge of occupying Iraq could be undertaken with a small number of troops and a light touch. Iraq, it was said, would pay for itself. And once in Baghdad, Washington decided to destroy the Iraqi state, disbanding the army and purging the bureaucracy, which produced chaos and helped fuel an insurgency. Any one of these mistakes might have been overcome. But together they ensured that Iraq became a costly fiasco.

After 9/11, Washington made major, consequential decisions that continue to haunt it, but it made all of them hastily and in fear. It saw itself as in mortal danger, needing to do whatever it took to defend itself—from invading Iraq to spending untold sums on homeland security to employing torture. The rest of the world saw a country that was experiencing a kind of terrorism that many had lived with for years and yet was thrashing around like a wounded lion, tearing down international alliances and norms. In its first two years, the George W. Bush administration walked away from more international agreements than any previous administration had. (Undoubtedly, that record has now been surpassed under President Donald Trump.) American behavior abroad during the Bush administration shattered the moral and political authority of the United States, as long-standing allies such as Canada and France found themselves at odds with it on the substance, morality, and style of its foreign policy.

So which was it that eroded American hegemony—the rise of new challengers or imperial overreach? As with any large and complex historical phenomenon, it was probably all of the above. China’s rise was one of those tectonic shifts in international life that would have eroded any hegemon’s unrivaled power, no matter how skillful its diplomacy. The return of Russia, however, was a more complex affair. It’s easy to forget now, but in the early 1990s, leaders in Moscow were determined to turn their country into a liberal democracy, a European nation, and an ally of sorts of the West. Eduard Shevardnadze, who was foreign minister during the final years of the Soviet Union, supported the United States’ 1990–91 war against Iraq. And after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, was an even more ardent liberal, an internationalist, and a vigorous supporter of human rights.

The greatest error the United States committed during its unipolar moment was to simply stop paying attention.

Who lost Russia is a question for another article. But it is worth noting that although Washington gave Moscow some status and respect—expanding the G-7 into the G-8, for example—it never truly took Russia’s security concerns seriously. It enlarged NATO fast and furiously, a process that might have been necessary for countries such as Poland, historically insecure and threatened by Russia, but one that has continued on unthinkingly, with little concern for Russian sensitivities, and now even extends to Macedonia. Today, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive behavior makes every action taken against his country seem justified, but it’s worth asking, What forces produced the rise of Putin and his foreign policy in the first place? Undoubtedly, they were mostly internal to Russia, but to the extent that U.S. actions had an effect, they appear to have been damaging, helping stoke the forces of revenge and revanchism in Russia.

The greatest error the United States committed during its unipolar moment, with Russia and more generally, was to simply stop paying attention. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Americans wanted to go home, and they did. During the Cold War, the United States had stayed deeply interested in events in Central America, Southeast Asia, the Taiwan Strait, and even Angola and Namibia. By the mid-1990s, it had lost all interest in the world. Foreign-bureau broadcasts by NBC fell from 1,013 minutes in 1988 to 327 minutes in 1996. (Today, the three main networks combined devote roughly the same amount of time to foreign-bureau stories as each individual network did in 1988.) Both the White House and Congress during the George H. W. Bush administration had no appetite for an ambitious effort to transform Russia, no interest in rolling out a new version of the Marshall Plan or becoming deeply engaged in the country. Even amid the foreign economic crises that hit during the Clinton administration, U.S. policymakers had to scramble and improvise, knowing that Congress would appropriate no funds to rescue Mexico or Thailand or Indonesia. They offered advice, most of it designed to require little assistance from Washington, but their attitude was one of a distant well-wisher, not an engaged superpower.

Ever since the end of World War I, the United States has wanted to transform the world. In the 1990s, that seemed more possible than ever before. Countries across the planet were moving toward the American way. The Gulf War seemed to mark a new milestone for world order, in that it was prosecuted to uphold a norm, limited in its scope, endorsed by major powers and legitimized by international law. But right at the time of all these positive developments, the United States lost interest. U.S. policymakers still wanted to transform the world in the 1990s, but on the cheap. They did not have the political capital or resources to throw themselves into the effort. That was one reason Washington’s advice to foreign countries was always the same: economic shock therapy and instant democracy. Anything slower or more complex—anything, in other words, that resembled the manner in which the West itself had liberalized its economy and democratized its politics—was unacceptable. Before 9/11, when confronting challenges, the American tactic was mostly to attack from afar, hence the twin approaches of economic sanctions and precision air strikes. Both of these, as the political scientist Eliot Cohen wrote of airpower, had the characteristics of modern courtship: “gratification without commitment.”

Of course, these limits on the United States’ willingness to pay prices and bear burdens never changed its rhetoric, which is why, in an essay for The New York Times Magazine in 1998, I pointed out that U.S. foreign policy was defined by “the rhetoric of transformation but the reality of accommodation.” The result, I said, was “a hollow hegemony.” That hollowness has persisted ever since.

THE FINAL BLOW

The Trump administration has hollowed out U.S. foreign policy even further. Trump’s instincts are Jacksonian, in that he is largely uninterested in the world except insofar as he believes that most countries are screwing the United States. He is a nationalist, a protectionist, and a populist, determined to put “America first.” But truthfully, more than anything else, he has abandoned the field. Under Trump, the United States has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and from engaging with Asia more generally. It is uncoupling itself from its 70-year partnership with Europe. It has dealt with Latin America through the prism of either keeping immigrants out or winning votes in Florida. It has even managed to alienate Canadians (no mean feat). And it has subcontracted Middle East policy to Israel and Saudi Arabia. With a few impulsive exceptions—such as the narcissistic desire to win a Nobel Prize by trying to make peace with North Korea—what is most notable about Trump’s foreign policy is its absence.

When the United Kingdom was the superpower of its day, its hegemony eroded because of many large structural forces—the rise of Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union. But it also lost control of its empire through overreach and hubris. In 1900, with a quarter of the world’s population under British rule, most of the United Kingdom’s major colonies were asking only for limited autonomy—“dominion status” or “home rule,” in the terms of the day. Had the country quickly granted that to all its colonies, who knows whether it would have been able to extend its imperial life for decades? But it didn’t, insisting on its narrow, selfish interests rather than accommodating itself to the interests of the broader empire.

There is an analogy here with the United States. Had the country acted more consistently in the pursuit of broader interests and ideas, it could have continued its influence for decades (albeit in a different form). The rule for extending liberal hegemony seems simple: be more liberal and less hegemonic. But too often and too obviously, Washington pursued its narrow self-interests, alienating its allies and emboldening its foes. Unlike the United Kingdom at the end of its reign, the United States is not bankrupt or imperially overextended. It remains the single most powerful country on the planet. It will continue to wield immense influence, more than any other nation. But it will no longer define and dominate the international system the way it did for almost three decades.

What remains, then, are American ideas. The United States has been a unique hegemon in that it expanded its influence to establish a new world order, one dreamed of by President Woodrow Wilson and most fully conceived of by President Franklin Roosevelt. It is the world that was half-created after 1945, sometimes called “the liberal international order,” from which the Soviet Union soon defected to build its own sphere. But the free world persisted through the Cold War, and after 1991, it expanded to encompass much of the globe. The ideas behind it have produced stability and prosperity over the last three-quarters of a century. The question now is whether, as American power wanes, the international system it sponsored—the rules, norms, and values—will survive. Or will America also watch the decline of its empire of ideas?

#### c. Every offensive argument they make is a self-fulfilling prophecy created by their project of primacy.

Ashford, PhD, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

#### Heg is bad

#### Terror –

#### U.S intervention creates the very thing it sought to destroy – extremists and insurgents have *more* reasons to rebel

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America’s recent loss in Afghanistan has drawn comparisons to its massive debacle 50 years ago in Vietnam – where US leadership also failed to grasp the power of morale, the role of culture, or the reality on the ground. If one were to assess US foreign policy since the end of the Second World War, it would be hard to avoid the conclusion that most of its military interventions have ended catastrophically in more or less the same manner. These interventions rarely, if ever, positively contribute to improving the political environments that generated the crises in the first place – and nowhere is this clearer than in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

The contextual similarities between Vietnam and Afghanistan are harrowingly indistinguishable. In both wars, a technically advanced army invaded a third-world country. Both were countries still reeling from other attempts at conquest by outsiders when they were invaded. Both were fed up with foreign domination by the time the Americans arrived – Afghanistan from the Soviets, and Vietnam from the French, not to mention all of those who came before. Fear of communism in Southeast Asia forced President Lyndon B. Johnson to fight in Vietnam, while fear of terrorism convinced President Bush to initiate America’s longest war in Afghanistan. Just like in Vietnam, many local soldiers of Afghanistan’s national army, which the US invested billions into training, do not understand why they are fighting their fellow countrymen. Successful nation-building cannot be achieved without morale, and this is what the US failed to understand when both the Taliban and North Vietnam’s moral strength and desire for national unity ultimately proved triumphant.

While Vietnam and Afghanistan certainly differ somewhat from one another – not to mention how the conflicts occurred half a century apart – their common failure by the US to achieve the desired stability, accountable governance, and its ultimate loss to the opposing side beg for a serious rethink about how interventions are conducted. Before World War II, the United States won nearly all the major wars that it fought. And since then, America has barely won any major wars – Korea was a difficult stalemate, Vietnam and Iraq failed miserably, and other conflicts the US was involved in such as Libya and Somalia were not all too successful either. The Gulf War in 1991 was arguably a success, although far from the clean and decisive triumph some remembered it to be.

Since 9/11, Washington has been significantly active militarily around the world, invading two nations, bombing and droning several others, deploying special operations forces in an ever-increasing number of countries, and applying sanctions to a whole load of others. Its military strategy has been uniquely counterproductive – rather than taking steps to minimize hostility towards America, Washington adopted a hawkish stance that killed countless numbers of civilians while ravaging societies along its path. Such is guaranteed to create enemies, exacerbate radicalism, and spread terrorism, altogether reflecting on a great irony that haunts the very policies designed to prevent such. As far back as the early days of America rising to become a global hegemon following the Second World War, its military interventions can be distinguished by a constant inability to understand the enemy, and a failure to comprehend larger grand narratives that often dictate the conflict. Whether combating Islamist-inspired fighters or communist guerrillas, American policymakers often view the conflict of these “host” countries through the prism of broader ideological struggles. While these interpretations often contain parts of the truth, they can obscure more than they reveal about the character and motivations of civil war dynamics, particularly in its local dimensions. American policymakers on the other side of the world would conduct flawed analyses of the politics of violence in these intervened countries with little knowledge of the actual conflict motivators, but rather purely through the same ideological lens that has obstinately stayed put for the past century. This has often led to intervention strategies that are badly suited to the realities on the ground, leading to their ultimate failure.

During the Vietnam War, American policymakers minimized the role that Saigon’s corruption, repression, and bad governance played in fueling the Viet Cong insurgency. Instead, an obsessive focus on suppressing global communism and maintaining American credibility led to massive support for the South Vietnamese regime, a socially destructive counterinsurgency policy, and futile efforts to apply pressure on North Vietnam. This logic also led to American support for a large number of other distasteful regimes – such as that of many right-wing dictatorships in Latin America through Operation Condor – in order to prevent the spread of communism. Despite this belief, most socialist-leaning armed groups in the Third World were not directed by China or the USSR, even though they did receive some backing from Beijing or Moscow. The ideologies of these groups were often informed and inspired by socialist worldviews, but their politics were strictly local or national.

In this sense, one cannot understand the dynamics of groups like the Taliban, Boko Haram, or ISIS without referencing the very local politics that both drive their success and limit their possibilities for action. With a powerful determination to chase out foreign aggressors and assert their sovereignty over Afghanistan, the Taliban succeeded in what national Afghan forces could not have achieved – despite having 20 years of American military support.

American military interventions have suffered from a deep legitimacy problem among locals in these host countries. Building the legitimacy of host states represents one of the essential problems in achieving sustainable stability, as this requires such processes that cannot primarily come from outside. External interventions tend to impede the legitimacy of the host state’s government by highlighting its inability to fulfill essential governance responsibilities. If a national leader cannot guarantee the safety and security of their own people, chances are citizens will turn towards the next group that can provide such needs – often guerrillas and insurgent forces promising stability under their rule. Even when years and billions are spent to consolidate their presence and earn the trust of locals, foreign troops are unlikely to win the “hearts and minds” of citizens in host countries to an extent as that of these local forces. Negative perceptions of foreign domination are commonplace among the citizenry of host countries due to their history with Western imperialism, and such has often been cited as an important reason for why America has never been fully able to capture the trust of locals.

In Vietnam, Afghanistan, and many other cases, the idea of a Western superpower attempting to bring forward liberal democracy in a land where no such form of rule has ever existed was unsurprisingly unpopular. It may be attractive for policymakers to think that promoting democracy in occupied foreign countries is a morally justified and effective way to restore security and stability. However, political reform is more successful when it comes directly from the local societies and political cultures in these host countries. For example, in Tunisia – the lone success story of the Arab Spring – local political movements were able to transform their government into a democracy, a success due in part to a lack of foreign involvement.

Taking a closer look at Afghanistan, it was America’s shift of focus from conducting a purely military operation into nation-building that sealed the fate of its success in the “graveyard of empires.” Washington became convinced that the only way to stop Afghanistan from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism was to transform it into a modern state with democratic institutions that ruled constitutionally. Being a fractured tribal society that has historically resisted centralization, political and military consolidation in Afghanistan has proceeded along ethnic and clan lines, resembling a feudal structure with informal alliances between regional forces rather than a centralized government ruling over all. In an op-ed for The Economist, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argued that any successful modern state needs a certain degree of centralization of authority and a sense of common obligation among the citizenry, both of which Afghanistan lacks owing to its history.

As such, the United States’ goal of turning it into a modern Westphalian state in less than 20 years through military intervention is simply unattainable – and yet it took four administrations to realize this reality on the ground. Afghanistan’s national military organizations are not equipped nor trained to engage effectively in nation-building missions such as forming political institutions, fostering national identity, or installing democratic functions to ensure accountability. Even if this was achieved, citizens are likely to prefer security and stability over any form of democracy if they had to choose, meaning that the levels of perceived legitimacy and support for such nation-building operations among locals remain low. In addition, the history of military interventions across the Middle East – such as in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, and Iraq – shows that when local leaders are dependent on foreign military forces to maintain power, it is harder to build popular legitimacy, govern effectively and build a shared national identity.

#### Unipolarity is specifically responsible for the globalization of extremism – that makes heg unsustainable.

Ibrahimi 18 (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, [researcher and instructor of political science. PhD @ Carleton University] “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)>

* JSG = Jihadi-Salafi Groups

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.

#### Terrorism causes global nuclear war—collapses internal AND external stability

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But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

#### 2. Counterbalancing

#### a. Pursuit of hegemony leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.

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(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### b. A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — goes nuclear

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In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

#### EU fills in after decline – proves decline is peaceful and an EU-led order is comparatively better for multilat

Medinilla et al. 19 [(Alfonso Medinilla, a Policy Officer in ECDPM’s Economic and Agricultural Transformation and European External Affairs programmes and the Institutional Relations team. He has worked on the implementation of the EU’s engagement with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in its external action and was part of the core team of ECDPM which conducted a political economy analysis of EU-African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) relations. Before joining ECDPM, Alfonso worked briefly at the European Commission’s DG EuropeAid and UNDP’s Brussels office.) (Pauline Veron, a Junior Policy Officer for the European External Affairs programme and Migration programme . She formerly worked as an intern on the Conflict, Security and Resilience Programme. Pauline previously worked at the European Union Delegation to the International Organisations based in Vienna (including UNIDO). In 2015, she completed an internship at the Directorate of External Relations of the Council of Europe where she worked on the participation of international organisations (EU, OSCE, United Nations) and non-member states in Council of Europe bodies and researched democracy, human rights, rule of law situations in specific countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.) (Vera Mazzara, the European Think Tanks Group coordinator. In this role, she strategizes how ETTG can put its knowledge and expertise at the service of effective outreach and engagement with policy-makers and policy processes. She organises ETTG presence in Brussels and its network activities, coordinates research and policies on EU international development for the European Commission. Vera comes from the international development and humanitarian sector. She worked for the European Commission in Brussels, United Nations in New York, London School of Economics in London and Italian NGOs in Rome. Her expertise includes advising a range of issues including informing EU external action policies through research with a specific focus on the humanitarian/development nexus and civil military relations. ) “EU-UN cooperation: confronting change in the multilateral system” ECDPM, 9/2019] BC

1. The EU as a global player: Old power in transition

With every year of Donald Trump’s presidency of the United States, the end of multilateralism as we know it gets reannounced. While American withdrawal from key agreements and partnerships has shaken up the international arena, focusing on the US alone fails to acknowledge a broader dynamic of profound structural transformation in international affairs that has been going on for much longer.

Following the Lisbon treaty (2009), the EU came into a global arena that was going through a major shift in power from West to East. By the late 2000s, the post-Cold War unipolar world order, marked by the military and economic hegemony of the United States, was fading (Tocci 2018). At the start of the global financial crisis, the rise of China and other emerging powers in world politics and trade heralded a new multipolar world order, which also called into question the post-Cold War system of global rules, responsibilities and institutions.

Today, there is little doubt that the years to come will witness a further decline of US hegemony, coupled with a further expansion of the global role and reach of China. In fact, Natalie Tocci (2018) classifies both the Obama and Trump administrations as post-imperial presidencies. While Obama’s foreign policy called for a redistribution of global responsibility, Donald Trump’s approach is an open rejection of global public goods, and expresses an inability and unwillingness to support the international liberal order.

China, in turn, has completely overhauled its foreign relations in the past ten years. Under the leadership of Xi Jingping, it has spelled out a clear ambition for an infrastructure- and investment-driven global commercial expansion, commonly known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Goodman et al. 2018). China’s soft power approach to “economic globalization” (Goodman 2017) goes hand in hand with increasing influence in global regimes and institutions.1 As a major power, however, China does not necessarily promote a distinctive ‘Chinese model’ or an alternative vision of the world order. The larger pattern is that it tends to be a more conservative global power, which will resist changes in all areas ranging from human rights to maritime law that could be unfavourable to China and its partners (Nathan 2018: 17).

This reconfiguration of global power dynamics has led to largely premature eulogies of the liberal international order (Haas 2018, Switzer 2018), often fuelled by the common misconception that international regimes are a stable system that fully depends on the Western conception of liberal world order (Nathan 2018: 3). The diffusion of power and influence however means that the current system will need to evolve in order to stay relevant. Three tentative trends can be noted that could mark the evolution of global politics in the years to come (Tocci 2018):

1. Less normative uniformity: the rise of illiberal powers and nationalist and populist movements within liberal democracies means that the future international system will see less normative uniformity. This will open the door to more conflict, but greater diversity of views also makes global politics more inclusive.

2. Less institutionalised global governance: fixed intergovernmental institutions including the United Nations will remain important, yet we are likely to see more flexible alliances in global governance comprising both state and non-state actors. Regional and cross-regional frameworks will also become more important.

3. Less stable coalitions: greater diversity of views within global regimes implies more conflict and contestation within the world order. This is not only essential for its resilience, it also means that traditional ideological and geopolitical coalitions are likely to lose ground, and that new alliances may become more ad-hoc and issue-driven.

All three of these dynamics also shape the EU’s current role in global governance and the UN. The EU is generally seen as one of the strongest defenders of the liberal global order. In its policies and discourse, the EU indeed somewhat reflexively supports multilateral institutions, trade liberalisation, cooperative security and human rights and democratic values, as part of its core identity as a global player. In recent years, however, there have also been clear signs of a more selective and pragmatic approach to international challenges and the global order (Smith & Youngs 2018). The 2016 EU Global Strategy, while it unambiguously commits to a ‘rules-based order’, also opens the door to a more flexible ‘principled pragmatism’.2 While there is much confusion on the precise meaning of ‘principled pragmatism’, the term does illustrate the composite global role of the EU today. The EU’s historical identity as a benevolent normative power in the world – coupled with significant financial support through multilateral institutions and bilaterally – is now complemented by a drive towards a more strategic, autonomous and interest-driven engagement as a group.

#### EU legitimacy key to disease prevention.

Laya 20 [(Arancha González, Executive Director of the International Trade Centre and Co-chair of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on the Future of International Trade and Investment. Before joining ITC, González served as Chief of Staff to World Trade Organization Director-General Pascal Lamy from 2005 to 2013. Prior to working at the WTO, she held several positions at the European Commission, conducting negotiations of trade agreements and assisting developing countries in trade-development efforts.) “Coronavirus: Could the pandemic revive multilateralism?” World Economic Forum, 4/20/2020] BC

As the world struggles to contain COVID-19 and mitigate its impact on our lives and livelihoods, it should be clear to everyone that international cooperation is the only effective way to win the battle. National responses are vital, but in the medium term, multilateralism will be our best weapon in this fight – and our best defense against future global threats.

My country, Spain, is on the front lines of the pandemic. The coronavirus hit us earlier and harder than most other countries. We are mourning thousands of deaths. Our health system has been put to an extreme test. The public is enduring long confinement with exemplary civic duty. And we have had to take unprecedented measures to safeguard our economy.

As governments, our primary responsibility is toward our nationals. But we know that no country will be completely safe until all control the pandemic and, eventually, eradicate it. Our initial international disunion has only strengthened our enemy, moving us further away from our shared goal.

Drawing on some of the lessons we are still learning, we urgently need to devise a more effective approach to global public health that integrates new international, European, and national policies and initiatives.

First, at the international level, we need a more effective framework to prevent, detect, and respond to diseases and pandemics, rooted in reinforced institutions and new mechanisms designed to prevent some of the failures we have witnessed. The new institutional arrangements should be based on a revitalized and reformed World Health Organization, with wider mandates and greater enforcement authority. The WHO ought to have the capacity to design and impose better protocols for preparedness and reaction, compel data sharing, and mobilize whatever resources are needed.

A global health framework with teeth must also be agile enough to cover the whole chain of public-health interventions, from scientific research and early warning to policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. That’s why, aside from necessary reforms of the WHO’s decision-making process and its Emergency Committee, the potential of other international platforms and organizations to contribute to the global health system we need should not be overlooked.

For example, the G20 and the G7 can help marshal the necessary political will. The World Bank and other regional development banks are uniquely well positioned to mobilize resources toward health-care reform. And organizations like the OECD have the analytical firepower to distill best health policies and practices. Overall, we need to advance a “one health approach” that brings together the environmental, economic, social, and security dimensions of public health.

Second, the European Union should provide a model of preparedness and crisis management that other regions might emulate, by pooling resources and devising new mechanisms for joint action. Besides leading in the establishment of a new and stronger global health framework, the EU can and should improve its own internal coordination. After all, it was sectoral collaboration on coal and steel that gave birth to the EU, the most innovative global governance mechanism that the world has seen. A similar level of ambition is now needed to combat the health challenges we share.

Deeper European integration in this area would yield several significant benefits. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control should gain greater autonomy and resources. A real European Crisis Management Unit could be established, with the means to ensure a rapid response to an emergency. Systematic stress tests on national health systems should also be conducted to assess EU members states’ resilience against shocks. Like the rigorous stress tests conducted on our financial sectors, the process should allow for shortcomings to be addressed, best practices to be shared, and coordination tools to be developed.

Moreover, the EU should invest in joint databases, medical reserves, and stockpiles. Likewise, it should harmonize protocols and foster scientific collaboration on developing treatments and vaccines. In the immediate term, European countries should cooperate on a coordinated transition strategy to restart the economy without triggering a new outbreak.

Finally, at the domestic level, we all have much to do – as a duty not only to ourselves and our countries’ inhabitants, but also to our neighbors and the international community at large. In Spain, we will establish a commission to assess the state of our health-care system and fix its weaknesses and shortcomings. But, because we know that pandemics affect the world’s most vulnerable people the hardest, we will also reinforce our health diplomacy. Strengthening national health systems requires sharing our experience with other countries and learning from theirs, as well as placing a higher priority on health-sector reforms in our development cooperation.

If we take steps like those proposed here, this pandemic will leave us better prepared for the next one. But we should seek a bigger silver lining. International cooperation on health issues should be extended to other global “public bads” that we have failed to address effectively: climate change, armed conflicts, poverty, rising inequality, international migration, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and more. The urgency of these challenges may seem less pressing now, but the threats they pose to all of us persist.

In our interconnected world, we need to revive multilateralism by making it more coherent and fit for purpose. That means reinforcing the institutions and mechanisms that work, reforming or eliminating those that don’t, and creating those we need. This crisis reminds us of our fragility and the importance of international unity. It leaves no doubt that we are in this together. And it makes clear why we should view closer cooperation on global public health as a catalyst for the multilateralism we need.