#### JCPOA passes now, but it’s tentative and the window is closing

Norman 3/15 [(Laurence, deputy bureau chief at Dow Jones Newswires and The Wall Street Journal based in London) “Russia Softens Iran Demands, Re-Opening Way for Nuclear Deal,” The Wall Street Journal, 3/15/2022] JL

Russia walked back recently made demands on Washington related to the Iran nuclear deal, clearing the way for Tehran and Washington to revive the 2015 agreement, senior western diplomats said.

On Tuesday, after Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met in Moscow with his Iranian counterpart, both Mr. Lavrov and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said Russia wasn’t standing in the way of the accord.

Russia earlier this month had demanded guarantees from Washington that its economic ties with Iran wouldn’t be affected by the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow over Ukraine. The last-minute move was the driving factor that prevented a deal to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement over the past 10 days, western diplomats have said.

The European Union, which coordinates the talks, announced a break in the negotiations on Friday, blaming “external factors” for preventing a deal that is “essentially ready.”

A senior Western diplomat said Tuesday evening that Russia’s chief negotiator at the talks, Mikhail Ulyanov, had informed the EU that Russia would accept narrower guarantees ensuring that Russia could carry out the nuclear work it is mandated to do under the 2015 nuclear deal. That includes a uranium swap with Iran, the redesign of the Fordow nuclear facility and the provision of nuclear fuel to Iranian reactors.

“Russia says happy with guarantees on nuclear projects and not asking for anything else,” said the diplomat, who asked to remain unidentified because of the sensitive nature of the talks. “So we can go ahead with negotiations that are now exclusively US-Iran.”

State Department spokesman Ned Price said Tuesday evening that “we are not going to sanction Russia for undertaking, for participating in nuclear projects that are part of the” nuclear deal.

The negotiations, which have taken place for almost a year now, aim to reach agreement on the steps Washington and Tehran will take to return into compliance with the 2015 agreement, which lifted most international sanctions on Tehran in exchange for tight but temporary restrictions on Iran’s nuclear work.

After the Trump administration took the U.S. out of the accord and reimposed sweeping sanctions on Iran, saying the accord was too weak, Tehran expanded its nuclear work and has now gathered almost enough nuclear high-grade enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, according to the United Nations nuclear agency.

Iran says its nuclear program is purely peaceful and U.S. officials have said there is no evidence Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon.

Over the weekend, a senior U.S. official told The Wall Street Journal that only “a handful of issues left” remained between the U.S. and Iran to reach an accord, mainly on the issue of the scope of sanctions relief Iran would receive from Washington. The official said the U.S. side felt the resolution of these issues was “within reach.”

The U.S. official and senior European diplomats said they wouldn’t negotiate broad carve-outs from Western sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with Moscow to save the nuclear deal. They warned that if Russia didn’t back off its demands, they would seek to complete an agreement with Iran, bypassing Russia.

Mr. Ulyanov said Tuesday evening on Twitter it was a lie that Russia had stood in the way of the accord with its demands for guarantees. He added that “some demands were accepted.” Iran, which has friendly ties with Moscow, has also continued to blame Washington for not completing the deal.

Negotiations between the U.S. and Iran could resume without negotiators returning to Vienna, where the talks have been held since April 2021, the senior western diplomat said. Iran so far has refused to talk directly with the Americans and instead have negotiated through the European powers at the talks. With so few issues still to be resolved, negotiators could work from capitals to resolve the remaining differences.

Time is pressing. U.S. and European officials say that Iran’s nuclear work has expanded close to a point that the deal’s main benefit to the West—keeping Iran months away from amassing enough nuclear fuel for a nuclear weapon—would be impossible.

European diplomats in particular have warned that with the war in Ukraine becoming ever-deadlier, the diplomatic window for concluding the deal is closing.

#### Space diplomacy directly trades off with nonproliferation agreements – finite manpower, money, and political will within the AVC

Johnson-Freeze 16 [(Joan, Professor and former Chair of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island) “Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens,” Cass Military Studies, 11/8/2016] JL

 \*The plan is legislated in the AVC (same bureau of the State Department that’s concerned with the JCPOA)

Proactive policymaking takes commitment, manpower, and money. A quick look at the money and manpower devoted to diplomacy in the US State and Defense departments compared to the resources available for the hardwareproducing military–industrial complex efforts described in Chapter 5 is enlightening. The Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC) leads space-related diplomacy in the State Department. The AVC Bureau is responsible for “all matters related to the implementation of certain international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments; this includes staffing and managing treaty implementation commissions.”34 The AVC arms control portfolio includes nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and all related issues. The AVC section charged with space issues is the Office of Emerging Security Challenges; this office also handles missile defense issues and the promotion of transparency, cooperation, and building confidence regarding cybersecurity. As of financial year 2013, AVC had a budget of $31.2 million and 141 employees35 to be active participants and leaders in all of these issues.

By way of comparison, the Space Security and Defense Program, a joint program of the DoD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was programmed for a similar budget amount in financial year 2015: $32.3 million. That program is described as a “center of excellence for options and strategies (materiel, non-materiel, cross-Title, cross-domain) leading to a more resilient and enduring National Security Space (NSS) Enterprise.”36 A majority of SSDP funding is allocated to the development of offensive space control strategies. So basically, the same budget is allocated for all US global space diplomacy efforts as for an in-house Pentagon think tank to devise counterspace strategies.

Within the Pentagon, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy is charged with all issues related to space policy, including diplomacy. The responsibilities of the Space Policy office are to:

• Develop policy and strategy for a domain that is increasingly congested, competitive, and contested

• Implement across DoD — plans, programs, doctrine, operations — and with the IC and other agencies

• Engage with allies and other space-faring countries in establishing norms and augmenting our capabilities.37

The breadth of those responsibilities, which includes reviewing space acquisitions, means that there may be only a handful of individuals actually engaged in multilateral diplomatic efforts, acting, for example, as advisors to diplomatic discussions such as those through the United Nations. Additionally, the expanse of the Pentagon results in a chain of command that makes organizational competition for attention to subject matter challenging at best. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, who then reports to the Principle Deputy Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, who then reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Defense Policy. There are also a multitude of space players in other governmental organizations to coordinate and contend with, particularly within the Air Force and intelligence communities. Personnel are spread thin.

US government-wide space diplomacy needs a mandate, manpower, and a supporting budget. Diplomacy, especially multilateral diplomacy, can be timeconsuming, manpower-intensive, and frustrating; and patience is not a strong American virtue. The recent experience in the UN LTS Working Group is emblematic of everything that causes the United States to shun multilateralism. Under the auspices of this group, countries had worked in good faith over the past five years to develop technical guidelines as reciprocal constraints, as insisted upon by the developing countries when they rejected the ICOC. Yet group success appeared thwarted at the February 2016 meeting of the LTS Working Group by one country, Russia.

#### The plan kills Iranian support for JCPOA – private space capabilities are a key focus for Raisi

Larson and Lewis 21 [(Jim, Senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterrey)(Jeffery, Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and a staff member at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies) “IRANIAN PRESIDENT RAISI’S RENEWED EMPHASIS ON SPACE IS LIKELY TO CREATE NEW TENSIONS”, War on the Rocks, 12/20/2021]  
Western press reporting on the first 100 days of Iran’s new hardline president, Ebrahim Raisi, has naturally focused on his impact on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. But in Iran, officials refer to three, not two, “power-creating” (eghtedar-saz) industries: nuclear, missiles, and space. And it is space, more so than either nuclear or missiles, where Raisi has focused his early public efforts. And it is Iran’s moves in space that will probably present President Joe Biden with the first challenge of the post-nuclear deal era.

In his first 100 days, Raisi has moved to place his imprint by reinvigorating Iran’s space program, the results of which will be visible in the coming months and years. Raisi has now set in motion a process that will result in Iran launching more satellites in the coming year, unveiling new space launch vehicles, and breaking ground on a new space launch facility in southern Iran. These developments will understandably be interpreted by Western media in the context of Iran’s missile programs and the broader security situation. But it is important to understand that Iran is also deeply committed to the economic, military, and security uses of outer space.

The Biden administration will have to choose how to respond to Iran’s growing presence in space. Will the United States try to balance its legitimate concerns about proliferation with Iran’s right to access space? Or will it treat Iran as a pariah, hoping that vocal opposition to Iran’s space launches will somehow produce a different result than the same approach did with North Korea?

Raisi Moves to Revive Iran’s Space Programs

Raisi is very publicly attempting to reinvigorate an Iranian space program that has been struggling in recent years. His new communications minister has criticized the state of the space program left by his predecessor — he called it “sorrowful” and “backwards” and sacked the head of the Iranian Space Agency. Raisi chaired a meeting of the Supreme Space Council — the country’s highest-level space policymaking organization — which had not met for more than a decade. At that meeting, Raisi committed Iran to launching more satellites into low earth orbit and reaching geostationary orbit by 2026.

Iran has two space programs: a state space program and a parallel program run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The state space program is under Iran’s president, who chairs the Supreme Space Council. The council, in turn, oversees the Iranian Space Agency, which contracts with entities under the communications, defense, and science ministries — and increasingly, Iran’s private sector. We use the phrase “state” space program rather than “civilian” because Iran’s military is fully integrated into this program.

#### Iranian proliferation goes nuclear – causes regional war and spurs proliferation cascades across the Middle East

Chilton and Hoshovsky 20 – [(Kevin, led U.S. Strategic Command and has participated in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s Generals and Admirals Program; Harry, policy analyst at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy) "Avoiding a nuclear arms race in the Middle East," Defense News, 2-13-2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/13/avoiding-a-nuclear-arms-race-in-the-middle-east/] TDI

This raises two immediate concerns. First, **should Iran race for the bomb, it is** almost inevitable that the United States and/or Israel will take preventative military action **to stop it from crossing that fateful threshold**. This could easily spiral into a regional war as Iran activates its various proxy forces against the United States and its allies.

Second, **an Iranian nuclear breakout attempt could** spur a proliferation cascade throughout the Middle East, **beginning with Saudi Arabia.**

Mohammed bin Salman, **the Saudi crown prince, openly stated in 2018 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons**, Riyadh would quickly “follow suit.” **One suggested approach would see Saudi Arabia purchase a nuclear power reactor from a major supplier like South Korea and then build a reprocessing plant that would yield enough weapons-grade plutonium in five years**.

A half-decade delay isn’t optimal, however, when the goal is achieving nuclear deterrence quickly. Thus, there is the so-called Islamabad option.

This refers to Riyadh’s role in financing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and an alleged commitment from Islamabad that it would repay the favor. While Pakistani and Saudi officials have denied any such understanding, **there is the possibility that the two could work out an arrangement where Islamabad could deploy some of its nuclear arsenal on Saudi soil following a successful Iranian breakout.**

Although this maneuver would draw sharp, international criticism, in theory, it would allow Riyadh to remain in good standing vis-a-vis the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Nevertheless, Pakistan might not be willing to play spoiler against a nuclearized Iran. If it is, Middle Eastern geopolitics would become extremely unstable.

**If Saudi Arabia acquires nuclear weapons**, many believe Turkey would follow suit. Last September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip **Erdogan declared that he “cannot accept” the argument from Western nations that Turkey should not be allowed to attain nuclear weapons.** In 1958, Charles de Gaulle proclaimed that a nation without nuclear weapons “does not command its own destiny”; two years later, France tested its first bomb. Erdogan’s comments echo those earlier remarks and raise the possibility that Ankara could become the second NATO member to leave the alliance’s nuclear umbrella in favor of its own independent arsenal.

#### Prolif cascades undermine deterrence and cause nuclear war – this is predictive of what a multi-nuclear Middle East would look like

Krepinevich 13 – [(Dr. Andrew F, the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) “Critical Mass: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East,” 2013, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Nuclear-Proliferation-in-the-Middle-East.pdf] TDI

As more countries over time develop nuclear capabilities and build up their nuclear arsenals, the competition will evolve from an Israeli-Iranian affair to a multi-state rivalry. For illustrative purposes **we will assume that** in the 2025-2030 timeframe, **Iran**, **Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and perhaps Egypt** and/or Iraq **have nuclear arsenals** in the low double-digit range (i.e., ten to forty weapons). What form might a nuclear competition among these powers and Israel assume? The remainder of this chapter attempts to shed some light on this issue, and its potential implications, with emphasis on those affecting regional stability.

The challenge of preserving stability when confronted with military competition among five nuclear-armed states within the Middle East and with other powers external to the region engaged in a Great Game for influence is formidable. At first blush, one thing seems apparent: **many** Cold War-era metrics **for assessing the competition and gauging where it might be headed** appear to be of little utility; in fact, **they may actually prove misleading and dangerous**. The same can be said of those looking to apply Cold War-era arms control metrics as a way of keeping the peace in general and avoiding nuclear use in particular.

**During the Cold War, many nuclear strategists came to view nuclear parity** (the possession of roughly equivalent arsenals capable of inflicting roughly equivalent levels of destruction) **between the United States and the Soviet Union as stabilizing**. The perception of these strategists is that the rough equivalence contributed to the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons, and was thus desirable. Parity enabled both sides to avoid the perception of being inferior to their rival, and perceptions are critical to deterrence and to preserving the confidence of one’s allies and security partners. If accepted by both sides, parity could enable them to avoid the cost and instability associated with “racing” toward ever-larger arsenals. Accordingly, maintaining parity was a major objective of U.S.-Soviet (and later U.S.-Russian) arms control negotiations. Yet irrespective of its merits, parity is not an option for states engaged in an n-player competition. Each competitor cannot have a nuclear force equivalent to all the others. Even if the competition should solidify into two coalitions so as to mimic the two-player Cold War competition, questions would almost certainly arise regarding the willingness of a coalition partner that has not been attacked to risk its own destruction by using its nuclear weapons in response to an attack on its ally. Indeed, these concerns were raised during the Cold War, and formed a major justification for France pursuing its own force de frappe. 93

**In a Middle Eastern “n-player” competition, all nuclear powers would be** challenged to establish an “assured destruction” capability **against all the other regional nuclear powers**, another Cold War desideratum, **given their relatively modest economies. An “assured destruction” capability in an n-state competition would require that each state have weapons sufficient to survive an initial attack by all potential rivals and still be able to devastate the countries of all attackers**. It would also require that the source of the attack be reliably identified. As noted earlier, this may prove difficult given likely limitations on these states’ ability to field advanced early warning systems. For example, would Israel be able to determine with confidence the owner of a ballistic missile launched from a location along the Iranian-Turkish border? The origin of any cruise missile launched from a sea-based platform? Even assuming a state could identify the source (or sources) of an attack, could its command and control systems survive the attack sufficiently intact to execute a retaliatory strike? **A decapitation strike could preclude an “assured destruction” retaliatory strike even if sufficient weapons survive to execute one.**

**This, in turn,** raises the possibility of a “catalytic” war**—one that is initiated between two states by a third party. Given a proliferated Middle East as described above, the chances that a regime would incorrectly attribute the source of an attack cannot be easily dismissed. To the extent** cyber weapons can introduce false information **into a state’s decision-making process, the risks of catalytic war only increase.**

Further complicating matters, **the early warning requirement following a proliferation cascade could be multidirectional, and at some point perhaps 360 degrees**, especially if nuclear rivals begin deploying a portion of their nuclear forces at sea. **Early warning requirements would be stressed even further** (and the costs of such a system increase correspondingly) **if a neighboring state** (e.g., Iran in the case of Turkey or Iraq; Turkey in the case of Israel; etc.) **were to acquire nuclear weapons**. In this case warning times would be even more compressed than in an Israeli-Iranian competition. Owing to its proximity to Iran, **Saudi Arabia**, for example, **could have less than five minutes to react to an Iranian ballistic missile attack no matter how advanced its early warning and command and control systems are.**

As noted earlier in this assessment, regardless of what assumptions are made regarding a regional nuclear power’s early warning system, given the short ballistic missile flight times it seems likely that preserving command and control of the state’s nuclear forces while under attack will prove challenging. **States might be tempted to adopt a launch-on-warning posture**, but this requires both early warning and a highly responsive command and control system. Should a state determine that it will not be able to launch-on-warning and instead attempt to “ride-out” a nuclear first strike and retaliate, it would still need its command and control system to function effectively in the wake of the nuclear attack. **Absent a highly resilient command and control system,** a state’s ability to launch a retaliatory **nuclear strike** may require nuclear release authority to be diffused to lower-level commanders. But again, absent an effective early warning system it may not be possible to determine the attack source with confidence in a region with multiple nuclear powers.