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### Innovation DA

#### Biotech industry strong now.

Cancherini et al. 4/30 [(Laura, Engagement Manager @ McKinsey & Company, Joseph Lydon, Associate Partner @ McKinsey & Company, Jorge Santos Da Silva, Senior Partner at McKinsey & Company, and Alexandra Zemp, Partner at McKinsey & Company), “What’s ahead for biotech: Another wave or low tide?“, McKinsey & Company, 4-30-2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/whats-ahead-for-biotech-another-wave-or-low-tide] TDI

As the pandemic spread across the globe in early 2020, biotech leaders were initially pessimistic, reassessing their cash position and financing constraints. When McKinsey and BioCentury interviewed representatives from 106 biotech companies in May 2020,4 half of those interviewed were expecting delays in financing, and about 80 percent were tight on cash for the next two years and considering trade-offs such as deferring IPOs and acquisitions. Executives feared that valuations would decline because of lower revenue projections and concerns about clinical-trial delays, salesforce-effectiveness gaps, and other operational issues.

Belying this downbeat mood, biotech has in fact had one of its best years so far. By January 2021, venture capitalists had invested some 60 percent more than they had in January 2020, with more than $3 billion invested worldwide in January 2021 alone.5 IPO activity grew strongly: there were 19 more closures than in the same period in 2020, with an average of $150 million per raise, 17 percent more than in 2020. Other deals have also had a bumper start to 2021, with the average deal size reaching more than $500 million, up by more than 66 percent on the 2020 average (Exhibit 3).6

What about SPACs?

The analysis above does not include special-purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), which have recently become significant in IPOs in several industries. Some biotech investors we interviewed believe that SPACs represent a route to an IPO. How SPACs will evolve remains to be seen, but biotechs may be part of their story.

Fundamentals continue strong

When we asked executives and investors why the biotech sector had stayed so resilient during the worst economic crisis in decades, they cited innovation as the main reason. The number of assets transitioning to clinical phases is still rising, and further waves of innovation are on the horizon, driven by the convergence of biological and technological advances.

In the present day, many biotechs, along with the wider pharmaceutical industry, are taking steps to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Together, biotechs and pharma companies have more than 250 vaccine candidates in their pipelines, along with a similar number of therapeutics. What’s more, the crisis has shone a spotlight on pharma as the public seeks to understand the roadblocks involved in delivering a vaccine at speed and the measures needed to maintain safety and efficacy standards. To that extent, the world has been living through a time of mass education in science research and development.

Biotech has also benefited from its innate financial resilience. Healthcare as a whole is less dependent on economic cycles than most other industries. Biotech is an innovator, actively identifying and addressing patients’ unmet needs. In addition, biotechs’ top-line revenues have been less affected by lockdowns than is the case in most other industries.

Another factor acting in the sector’s favor is that larger pharmaceutical companies still rely on biotechs as a source of innovation. With the top dozen pharma companies having more than $170 billion in excess reserves that could be available for spending on M&A, the prospects for further financing and deal making look promising.

For these and other reasons, many investors regard biotech as a safe haven. One interviewee felt it had benefited from a halo effect during the pandemic.

More innovation on the horizon

The investors and executives we interviewed agreed that biotech innovation continues to increase in quality and quantity despite the macroeconomic environment. Evidence can be seen in the accelerating pace of assets transitioning across the development lifecycle. When we tracked the number of assets transitioning to Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III clinical trials, we found that Phase I and Phase II assets have transitioned 50 percent faster since 2018 than between 2013 and 2018, whereas Phase III assets have maintained much the same pace. There could be many reasons for this, but it is worth noting that biotechs with Phase I and Phase II assets as their lead assets have accounted for more than half of biotech IPOs. Having an early IPO gives a biotech earlier access to capital and leaves it with more scope to concentrate on science.

Looking forward, the combination of advances in biological science and accelerating developments in technology and artificial intelligence has the potential to take innovation to a new level. A recent report from the McKinsey Global Institute analyzed the profound economic and social impact of biological innovation and found that biomolecules, biosystems, biomachines, and biocomputing could collectively produce up to 60 percent of the physical inputs to the global economy. The applications of this “Bio Revolution” range from agriculture (such as the production of nonanimal meat) to energy and materials, and from consumer goods (such as multi-omics tailored diets) to a multitude of health applications.

#### IP protections are key to innovation – recouping startup costs and high risk of failure

Grabowski et al 15 [(Henry, Professor of Economics, member of the faculty for the Health Sector Management Program, and Director of the Program in Pharmaceuticals and Health Economics at Duke University) “The Roles of Patents and Research And Development Incentives In Biopharmaceutical Innovation,” Health Affairs, 2/2015] JL

The essential rationale for patent protection for biopharmaceuticals is that long-term benefits in the form of continued future innovation by pioneer or brand-name drug manufacturers outweigh the relatively short-term restrictions on imitative cost competition associated with market exclusivity. Regardless, the entry of other branded agents remains an important source of therapeutic competition during the patent term.

Several economic characteristics make patents and intellectual property protection particularly important to innovation incentives for the biopharmaceutical industry. **5** The R&D process often takes more than a decade to complete, and according to a recent analysis by Joseph DiMasi and colleagues, per new drug approval (including failed attempts), it involves more than a billion dollars in out-of-pocket costs. **6** Only approximately one in eight drug candidates survive clinical testing. **6**

As a result of the high risks of failure and the high costs, research and development must be funded by the few successful, on-market products (the top quintile of marketed products provide the dominant share of R&D returns). **7**,**8** Once a new drug’s patent term and any regulatory exclusivity provisions have expired, competing manufacturers are allowed to sell generic equivalents that require the investment of only several million dollars and that have a high likelihood of commercial success. Absent intellectual property protections that allow marketing exclusivity, innovative firms would be unlikely to make the costly and risky investments needed to bring a new drug to market.

Patents confer the right to exclude competitors for a limited time within a given scope, as defined by patent claims. However, they do not guarantee demand, nor do they prevent competition from nonidentical drugs that treat the same diseases and fall outside the protection of the patents.

New products may enter the same therapeutic class with common mechanisms of action but different molecular structures (for example, different statins) or with differing mechanisms of action (such as calcium channel blockers and angiotensin receptor blockers). 9 Joseph DiMasi and Laura Faden have found that the time between a first-in-class new drug and subsequent new drugs in the same therapeutic class has been dramatically reduced, from a median of 10.2 years in the 1970s to 2.5 years in the early 2000s. 10 Drugs in the same class compete through quality and price for preferred placement on drug formularies and physicians’ choices for patient treatment.

Patents play an essential role in the economic “ecosystem” of discovery and investment that has developed since the 1980s. Hundreds of start-up firms, often backed by venture capital, have been launched, and a robust innovation market has emerged. **11** The value of these development-stage firms is largely determined by their proprietary technologies and the candidate drugs they have in development. As a result, the strength of intellectual property protection plays a key role in funding and partnership opportunities for such firms.

#### Biopharmaceutical innovation is key to prevent future pandemics and bioterror.

Marjanovic and Feijao 20 [(Sonja Marjanovic, Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitative biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon.) "How to Best Enable Pharma Innovation Beyond the COVID-19 Crisis," RAND Corporation, 05-2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA407-1.html] TDI

As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sciences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a bioterrorism context.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by antimicrobial resistance is also well-recognised as an area in need of pharmaceutical innovation. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and competition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an indispensable partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceutical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is essential for socially responsible companies in the sector. 2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing industry-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing compounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating trials for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accelerate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to benefit patients and wider population health. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be relatively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pressure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing combination product that is being tested for therapeutic potential against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other infectious diseases, bioterrorism agents and antimicrobial resistance) are urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation, even if their impacts are not as visible to society as COVID-19 is in the immediate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infectious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contributions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still low.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innovation conditions.

#### Extinction – defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

#### Jordan’s economy is strong now

Khan 4/13 [(Sarmad, Company & Markets Editor of The National, with more than 25 years of experience working in Pakistan and the UAE, has reported on global and regional economic developments, equity markets, banking, energy, finance, property and technology sectors) “Jordan makes 'strong progress' on economic reforms despite Covid-19 headwinds, IMF says,” National News, 4/13/2021] JL

Jordan responded “quickly and decisively” to support its economy despite significant challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic and the kingdom continues to make progress on its economic and fiscal reform agenda, the International Monetary Fund's managing director said.

The Washington-based lender is committed to helping Jordanian authorities contain the economic and financial impact of the pandemic and build a stronger and more resilient economy, Kristalina Georgieva said in a statement on Monday to mark the kingdom's centenary.

“Timely and targeted fiscal measures have helped protect jobs and the vulnerable, while equitable tax reforms – aimed at tackling evasion, closing loopholes, and broadening the tax base – have helped maintain debt sustainability,” Ms Georgieva said.

“At the same time, a sizable monetary stimulus has supported the recovery, while financial stability and adequate reserve buffers have been preserved.”

#### 1AC Saleh proves we’re right about uniqueness ­– says the industry is thriving – doesn’t say generics key to Jordan pharma just says they used to produce a lot of them

#### IP is key to Jordan’s pharmaceutical industry:

#### Investment and acquisition opportunities

WIPO 8/25 [(World Intellectual Property Organization, one of the 15 specialized agencies of the United Nations) “Evolving Towards IP-Fueled Innovation,” 8/25/2021] JL

Ever since its inception, the Jordanian pharmaceutical industry has steadily grown into the country’s highest value-added export industry. By 2010, sixteen pharmaceutical companies were exporting 81% of their production per year to over sixty countries, with high quality products and affordable pricing driving demand. In 2008, sales of the top ten pharmaceutical companies exceeded US$ 500 million. For much of its history, Jordan’s pharmaceutical industry has focused on producing affordable generic drugs. Jordan’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000 and a free trade agreement with the United States in 2001 strengthened its intellectual property (IP) system, and the Jordanian pharmaceutical industry has been evolving as a result. Leading this evolution is Al Hikma Pharmaceuticals (Hikma), the largest pharmaceutical company in Jordan.

Founded in the capital of Amman in 1978 by Mr. Samih Darwazah, Hikma’s initial focus was to develop a branded pharmaceuticals business across the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), which it did by manufacturing patented pharmaceutical products under license. In 1991, the company’s success led it to establish a presence in the United States through the acquisition of West-Ward Pharmaceuticals (West-Ward). In only three years Hikma became compliant with United States Federal Drug Administration (USFDA) regulations, and in 1996 it became the first Arab company to receive USFDA approval. Shortly after its early successes in the United States, Hikma established an innovative injectable pharmaceutical manufacturing venture in Portugal targeting the MENA and Portugal markets. By the late 1990s, Hikma’s organic innovation and presence in Europe, MENA and North America led to significant expansion of the company.

Hikma’s early success came through the manufacturing and marketing of branded generic drugs. While this continues to be an important part of the company’s overall strategy, Jordan’s comprehensive economic reforms, its accession to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and the country’s increased level of IP protection brought many new opportunities for Hikma. The greatest of these was the increased confidence of international partners, which brought even more licensing and partnership opportunities. Prior to Jordan’s IP reforms, companies in the country would use slightly different formulas to manufacture a patented product for the generic market. While this was not considered to be IP infringement, it proved difficult to attract foreign investment in the industry. Under the new IP laws, Jordanian companies seeking to make generic versions of patented products cannot use different formulas or ingredients; they must use the exact, patented formula. To do so would require licensing and partnership agreements with the patent holder, and this change brought an opportunity that Hikma was quick to seize upon.

Obtaining products under license has always been a part of Hikma’s strategy, and the new IP laws helped the company capitalize on the increased appeal of the country’s pharmaceutical industry generated for foreign investors. The company’s strong market position and established infrastructure made it a clear partner for multinational pharmaceutical companies seeking access to fast growing MENA markets. By the time IP laws in Jordan changed, Hikma already had a proven track record of working with global licensing partners, and its USFDA approved facilities combined with its highly skilled workforce and existing production capabilities made the company even more attractive to multinational partners. In 2007, the company’s successful utilization of new domestic IP laws through increased licensing agreements and partnerships yielded profits of US$ 198 million. As of 2010, it manufactured and marketed 40 licensed branded products through partnerships with multinational corporations such as LG Life Sciences of the Republic of Korea, Sinclair of the United Kingdom and MonoSolRx of the United States.

Licensing deals and partnerships have also given Hikma unique acquisition opportunities, which in turn have brought the company access to new markets. In 2007, Hikma acquired Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing (APM), which was the third largest pharmaceutical company in Jordan, through which it significantly increased its presence in Saudi Arabia, as APM gets over one third of its revenue from Saudi Arabia. That same year, it entered the Egyptian market through the acquisition of Alkan Pharma, which became Hikma Egypt, and also entered Germany through acquiring two well known pharmaceutical companies in the injectable oncology market: Ribosepharm and Thymoorgan. These acquisitions, along with new licensing agreements, allowed the company to launch 28 new products, receive 167 approvals and submit 74 regulatory filings in Europe, Jordan and the United States in 2007.

#### Innovation, FDI, and quality control

Nawafleh 10 [(Abdullah, Senior Lecturer in Law at Staffordshire University, former Legal Research Team Lead at CUBE Global, London, and Assistant Professor of Law at Al Ain University of Science and Technology, PhD in Law from the University of Westminster ) “Development of Intellectual Property Laws and Foreign Direct Investment in Jordan,” Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, 2010] JL

Oxfam International claims in their Briefing Paper no. 102 “All Costs, No Benefits” that the legal reforms made by Jordan to meet the US-Jordan FTA obligations “has not encouraged FDI into Jordan’s local drug industry,…[that] there was hardly any investment in Jordanian pharmaceutical manufacturing, [and] …furthermore, local generic companies complain that multinational pharmaceutical companies neither signed more licensing agreements nor transferred technology to local manufacturers.”48 This claim has been contradicted by Ryan a director of the Creative and Innovative Economy Center at the George Washington University Law School. He stated that “unfortunately, Oxfam does not explain that the paucity of pharmaceutical manufacturing investment owes to the nature of the product—high-value but small and inexpensive to ship, which means that drug companies are not in general big global manufacturing investors. Second, Jordan is a small pharmaceutical market in a region riddled with pharmaceutical import barriers, so there is little business reason to invest in manufacturing capacity in the country.”49 Moreover Ryan shows that pharmaceutical innovator-company FDI is taking place in all links in the valuechain: Clinical Research and Development (R&D) went from zero to substantial; licenses to manufacture, package, and distribute have been granted to four major local companies; 78 innovative drugs entered the market after reforms with an associated nearly $4 million in medical education.50 This study also reported that by 2004 medical tourism in Jordan had grown to about $650 million. By 2005 medical tourism exceeded $1.3 billion and represented a substantial proportion of all Jordanian tourism.51 The study also revealed that Multinational clinical R&D introduces the newest drugs and cutting-edge medical knowledge to Jordanian doctors and health administrators. In addition, local company good manufacturing practice production contributes and assures that quality drugs are supplied in Jordan, a condition that does not exist in many developing countries around the world.52 He has also noted that during the Jordanian IPRs post-reform, Jordanian pharmaceutical exports have grown from about $49 million to more than $280 million, making Jordan now the leading Arab drug exporter.

#### Data exclusivity is key

Grabowski 09 [(Henry, Professor of Economics, member of the faculty for the Health Sector Management Program, and Director of the Program in Pharmaceuticals and Health Economics at Duke University) “Data Exclusivity for Biologics: What Is the Appropriate Period of Protection?” American Enterprise Institute, 9/8/2009] JL

Patents are awarded for inventions that satisfy the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s criteria for novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness. Data exclusivity recognizes the long, costly, and risky process involved in generating the clinical trial and other data necessary to gain FDA approval after patents are filed. Both forms of protection address the need for innovators to have some period of returns before imitators can enter the market with an abbreviated filing. The life of a patent begins at the date of patent filing (generally prior to the beginning of clinical testing), while data exclusivity begins at the date of FDA marketing approval. From the date of approval, data exclusivity runs concurrently with patent protection and only provides additional market exclusivity (defined as the period of time before a biosimilar enters the market) when development was particularly long, resulting in little remaining patent life by the time the product reaches the market, or when biosimilar manufacturers are able to overturn or “work around” the innovator’s patents successfully prior to their expiration.

Patents may provide less clear and less predictable intellectual property protection for biologics than for small molecule drugs. Biologics rely on multiple patents, including narrower product patents and process patents that may be more vulnerable to inventing around than small molecule product patents.[7] This is particularly so given that an abbreviated approval for biologics will be based on “similarity” rather than the sameness criterion used for small molecule drugs. Hence, it is possible that biosimilars may be different enough not to infringe on patents, but similar enough to qualify for an abbreviated approval pathway.

Data exclusivity provisions are therefore designed to reduce uncertainty and provide some stability and predictability for developers and investors against costly litigation and early patent disruption. They also provide an important incentive for products that spend a long time in basic research or clinical development after their core patents are filed. Novel products with new modes of action in particular often have lengthy discovery and development periods. Data exclusivity also encourages innovators to continue research and development (R&D) for new indications. This postapproval research is an important pathway in biologics for enhancing patient health and welfare.

#### Econ decline doesn’t cause war

Clary ’15 (Christopher; 4/25/15; Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, M.A. in National Security Affairs, Postdoctoral fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University; MIT Political Science Department Research Paper, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns **encourage austerity and economizing behavior** in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on **data** from 109 **distinct rival** dyads **since 1950**, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may **result from economic troubles**. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to **downplay** **the seriousness** of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to **consider** threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international **economic** cooperation. Leaders **seek foreign aid**, **enhanced trade**, and **increased investment** from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as **capable of** resolving **economic** difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it **much more likely** that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this **causal logic** in greater detail, while also providing **historical examples** that these mechanisms recur in practice. Economic Crisis Leads to **Austerity** Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish. Planning almost **invariably assumes growth** rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be sizable. When growth slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are **felt** most **acutely** in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit expenditures. This is **especially the case** when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however, intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes called “expansionary austerity”—generates incentives to curtail expenditure. These incentives to cut occur precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,” where people are **very reluctant** to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their availability.6 As Paul Pierson has argued, “The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes **tangible losses** on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”7

### T WTO

#### Interpretation: member nations of the World Trade Organization is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that a subset of member nations ought to reduce IP protections for medicines.

Nebel 19 Jake Nebel [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs.] , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.1 “Colleges and Universities” “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. Fourth, it is extremely unlikely that the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some.” No such addition would be necessary or expected for the generic interpretation since generics lack explicit quantifiers by default. The topic committee’s likely intentions are not decisive, but they strongly suggest that the generic interpretation is correct, since it’s prima facie unlikely that a committee charged with writing a sentence to be debated would be so badly mistaken about what their sentence means (which they would be if they intended the existential interpretation). The committee, moreover, does not write resolutions for the 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the national circuit; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic with respect to “colleges and universities,” given its face-value meaning and standard expectations about what LD resolutions tend to mean.

#### It applies to member nations:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying “US ought to reduce IPP for medicines” doesn’t entail that all nations ought to

#### Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning

#### Vote neg:

#### Semantics outweigh:

#### Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament

#### Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution

#### It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it

#### Limits – there are countless affs accounting for any permutation of 164 member nations that are home to vastly different pharmaceutical industries and illnesses – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs

#### Ground – spec guts core generics like WTO bad and the health multilateralism DA that rely on all nations reducing IP and shifts away from the core topic lit of WTO patent waivers – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs

#### TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical A] If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

## Case

### Jordan

#### They have read zero internal links between Jordan pharma and its economy writ large

#### No impact uniqueness and alt causes to econ

Kardoosh 19 [(Marwan A., development economist with 22 years of experience working in the Middle East and North Africa) “Jordan Struggles to Reverse Decades of Poor Economic Management,” Haaretz, 9/6/2019] JL

Situated in a highly unstable neighborhood and suffering decades of bad policy, Jordan is struggling to find solutions for its ailing economy. Since 2009, the rate of economic growth has slowed down dramatically. This year it has hovered at around 2.2 percent, significantly lower than the government’s goal of 5 percent, and the prospects for the rest of 2019 are not promising at all. Per capita GDP, which is more relevant to people’s lives, hasn’t grown at all due to Jordan’s swelling population. The overhang of the tax law passed last year has taken its toll on Jordan’s stock market, reducing consumer confidence and purchasing power in the process.

Complicating matters are the high levels of debt and unemployment, which are still acting as a drag on the economy. There’s been a 24 percent drop in the value of real estate transactions and a 40 percent free-fall in new construction activity. Car imports are down 60 percent, mainly due to poor policy making that saw the government recently increase customs on electric vehicles. Rising public debt, together with sinking foreign investment, complete the bleak picture. Ordinary Jordanians have responded to the dismal state of affairs with hundreds of protests nationwide.

For all the talk of Amman harnessing youth and escaping the middle-income trap, hundreds of thousands of Jordanians still cannot find a decent job. One of Jordan’s daily newspapers earlier this summer reported that almost a third of those surveyed expressed interest in leaving the country. With the rate of joblessness ranging from almost one in five for the general working population to as high as 38.5 percent for the youngest demographic (20-24), the search for better work opportunities continues to be the most significant driver for emigration.

Emigration also remains an option for Jordan’s Christian minority. While they enjoy a high degree of tolerance from the Hashemite monarchy, as well security and political power, they have always sought a second passport as an insurance policy against a sudden change. Yet a sagging economy has convinced scores more to want to leave, something the state should look at seriously and critically.

Sworn in during June 2018, with a mandate for a program of positive change, the government of Omar Razzaz, a competent ex-World Bank civil servant, has so far failed to produce any tangible results. Mind you, the problems he has to deal with are grave, real and long-standing.

At the same time, mounting fiscal pressures have meant that governments in Jordan are no longer able to attract competent technocrats from the private sector, where remuneration is significantly higher. This has resulted in a big gap in the state apparatus. On the one hand, there are the decision makers – senior public officers with the skills to exercise sophisticated economic judgment, manage multi-faceted projects and operate in complex political environments. On the other hand, there are the lower-ranking government officials, the majority of whom are incapable of comprehending the complex realities of globalization and its impact on public policy. Thus the capacity of senior government bureaucrats to implement decisions on issues such as trade, investment and planning has been limited.

#### Multitude of alt causes affect Israel-Jordan relations

**Zeevi,** Dror**. 2020** “Israel and Jordan: A Peace in Ruins.” *Dror Zeevi is a full professor in the Department of Middle East Studies at BenGurion University of the Negev* https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/101-200/meb133.pdf

The advantages of the peace treaty for Israel are clear. Since the treaty was signed there have been almost no clashes between Jordanians and Israelis, or between Palestinians and Israelis, across the Israel-Jordan border and almost no successful attempts by militants to infiltrate Israeli territory from Jordan. The IDF is therefore able to defend this long border with a tiny force of a few hundred soldiers. But the peace soon lost its steam, and a cold wind swept away hopes of wider benefits. There were many reasons for this: Quite a few were the result of policy choices, others emanated from regional security tensions, and still others had to do with bilateral issues. Exactly one year after the signing of the treaty, Prime Minister Rabin—King Hussein’s personal friend and a co-architect of the treaty—was assassinated. Soon afterwards, the Oslo process with the Palestinians sputtered to a halt. Palestinian suicide bombers blew themselves up in buses and malls in Israel, and the Israeli army responded with a heavy hand. After a failed attempt by Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat to find a permanent solution to the conflict at the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000, a second Palestinian uprising erupted, more violent than the first. Witnessing the daily clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces and the killing of Palestinians on their television screens, the Jordanian public’s feelings about peace soured. One part of the peace that has shown signs of success and remains alive is the joint attempt to create special “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZ) that take advantage of the free trade agreements between the U.S. and Israel. Such zones, in which mostly Israeli entrepreneurs employ cheap local and imported labor, were established in several Jordanian towns. In 2018, work began on another such zone on the border between the two countries, which is projected to employ some 10,000 workers, mostly Jordanian.7 In order to make QIZ projects work, both sides have attempted to maintain a low profile.8 But even this aspect of the peace, which is to both sides’ advantage, has encountered many problems and never reached its expected potential. Israel’s attempt to move textile production to Jordan was threatened by the allure of cheap labor in East Asia. QIZ projects were also subject to boycotts and strikes by Jordanians, sometimes supported by Jordanian labor unions. In 2003, this was given further impetus by a fatwa published by the influential cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who called on Muslims to refrain from purchasing Israeli and American products. There were other cooperative projects that did not materialize because Israel failed to comply with commitments that were mentioned in general terms in the treaty and elaborated and agreed upon in subsequent bilateral talks. In other cases, Israel carried out such commitments only grudgingly. The most important one was the plan to connect the Red Sea to the Dead Sea by a canal and water pipeline, an idea enthusiastically embraced by Jordan. Nicknamed “Red-Dead,” this project had several aims. First, it would use the altitude difference between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea (a salty lake approximately -1400 feet below sea level, the lowest point on land) to generate electricity. It would also replenish the supply of briny water to the Dead Sea, which was (and still is) rapidly drying up as a result of irrigation upriver and years of drought. Another part of the “Red-Dead” project was using electricity generated by hydroelectric power to operate a large-scale desalination plant that would supply the water needs of Amman and its vicinity. A related cooperative project also envisioned building a joint airport for Aqaba and Eilat, thereby creating a joint tourism venture. But a combination of Israel’s skepticism about whether cooperation with Jordan could be maintained in the long run (including the question of whether the Hashemites would remain in power) and potential environmental impacts raised concerns about the entire Red-Dead venture.9 Moreover, economic estimates performed 4 by Israel’s Ministry of Finance found that a pipeline from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea that ran solely through Israeli territory would be less costly and more profitable. The Red-Dead project was, accordingly, quietly abandoned. Even the desalination plant and the proposed joint airport, so crucial for Jordan’s economy, did not materialize. Israel finally decided to build a new international hub—now called Ramon Airport—on its own soil, rather than a shared one on the border. Another article of the peace treaty recognized Jordan’s historic role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites on the Noble Sanctuary (al-Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem (Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, in an area which Israel refers to as the Temple Mount—Har HaBayit) and implied that Jordan should have a function in overseeing these shrines in any agreement on the permanent status of the city.10 This was in the interest of both sides. For the Hashemite family, Jerusalem was a kind of consolation prize for losing Mecca and Medina to the Saudis seventy years earlier: The former custodians of the Kaaba could still keep one major Islamic holy site under the family’s control. For Israel, this was insurance against Palestinian claims to sovereignty over what came to be known as “the Holy Basin” in Jerusalem. As long as Jordan controls this area, Israel can claim that it is bound by a treaty with a Muslim-majority country. Today, Jordan is still officially in charge of the Noble Sanctuary area, but its control is challenged on all sides. Although Israel recognizes Jordan’s role, it has allowed archeologists to excavate the foundations of the compound without Jordanian consent, asserting its right to archeological study of the ancient Temple site. It has also attempted several times to monitor the entrances to the compound. Finally, Israel allows members of an Orthodox Jewish movement known as the Temple Mount and Land of Israel Faithful to enter the area in groups and pray on the platform of the holy shrines, sometimes provoking both guards and Muslim worshippers. The Palestinian Authority (PA) also strives to wrest that role from Jordan, precisely in order to claim it as part of the Palestinians’ heritage and, therefore, their responsibility. It has taken over from Jordan the appointment of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem— currently Muhammad Ahmad Hussein—who regularly preaches at Al-Aqsa Mosque. The PA also organizes crowds to demonstrate against Israeli conduct on related matters, and in its negotiations with Israel it demands sovereignty over the compound. Lately, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has joined the fray, seeing involvement in Jerusalem as a way for Turkey to carve another niche as the champion of Sunni Islam and patron of the Palestinians. Finally, Saudi Arabia has suggested several times that control of the holy shrines should be entrusted to an international oversight body— which, in practical terms, would be led by the Saudis.

#### No internal link – 1AC El Shami and Solomon makes vacuous references to instability – no scenario for collapsing the peace treaty

#### Drought diplomacy solves

AFP 8/31 [(Agence France-Presse, international news agency headquartered in Paris, world's oldest news agency) “Drought diplomacy boosts Israel-Jordan ties,” Al Jazeera, 8/31/2021] JL

But, experts say, instead of the pressure provoking arguments, Israel and Jordan could be poised for an unprecedented boom in water cooperation amid technological advancements and climate pressures.

Warnings about looming “water wars”, including in the Middle East, were often inflated, said Duke University professor Erika Weinthal.

“Water is a resource that allows for adversaries to actually find ways to cooperate,” said Weinthal, a specialist in global environmental politics, who has worked extensively on Israel-Jordan issues.

“If you look at the data, you see more cooperation over water than conflict, and where there is conflict, it is usually verbal.”

Jordan is one of the world’s most water-deficient countries, suffering from extreme droughts, and water cooperation with Israel long pre-dates a 1994 peace deal between the two.

The issue came to prominence in 1921, when Pinhas Rutenberg, a Russian-Jewish engineer who had moved to Palestine, convinced British authorities and Hashemite royals to approve a hydropower station where the Yarmuk tributary meets the Jordan River.

It continued after Israel’s founding in 1948, through decades when the nations were officially at war.

Water deals, like all bilateral ties, suffered in recent years under former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whom critics have accused of neglecting Jordan as he pursued deeper ties with Iran’s foes in the Gulf.

But there have been signs of progress since Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s government took office in June, with the countries agreeing to their largest-ever water transaction.

New technologies reducing costs have made seawater desalination “a profitable concern”, with investors from Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates – which just normalised ties with the Jewish state – showing interest, said Gidon Bromberg, Israel director at EcoPeace Middle East.

“The people that are going to invest in more desalination very much see the opportunities for profit,” Bromberg said.

It means that Israel – one of the world’s desalination leaders – can sell more water, including natural freshwater from the Sea of Galilee, to Jordan without threatening domestic demand, he said.

And Israel has a new incentive to do so, because it now needs something from Jordan in return, according to analysts.

To meet the 2015 Paris climate accord commitments, Bennett’s government has approved a target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector by at least 85 percent. Multiple assessments show Israel does not have enough land to ramp up the necessary solar production, so it will have to buy solar power from Jordan to hit its targets.

“For the very first time, all sides will have something to sell and something to buy,” said Bromberg, whose organisation works in Israel, Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territory, which is also struggling from a worsening water crisis.

This unprecedented alignment of interests could help repair semi-fractured diplomatic relations, he argued.

“There are relatively few opportunities to try and rebuild trust,” Bromberg added. “Water and energy are one of those rare opportunities.”

#### Their Lazarov internal link is about annexing the West Bank – that’s inevitable

Ayyad 20 [(Samera, MSc in Middle East politics from SOAS University of London, Junior Research Fellow at IEMed) “Israel’s Annexation Plan: One State Based on Equality and Justice Is the Only Solution,” European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2020] JL

When Netanyahu’s government announced in May that it would formally annex parts of the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, the international community immediately reacted with outrage, even though settlements, deemed illegal under international law, have been rising and expanding in the territory for more than half a century. Annexation has been an ongoing and generational process for Palestinians, and it did not start, nor will stop, with Netanyahu’s announcement. Palestinians know that annexation is not a momentum, it represents years of Israeli policy that has gone unchallenged. It would merely formalize *de jure* a system of occupation Palestinians have been living under, and would close the door to a negotiated two-state solution, signalling a failure of the Oslo Accords.

The 1993 agreements and their flaws have already been extensively analysed in the literature, so I will not delve into them in detail. However, to understand the current crisis, one must consider the process that started with these accords, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) recognized Israel’s right to exist for the first time. The Accords were formulated as a temporary framework for bilateral cooperation with the goal of establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza after a five-year transitional phase, by dividing the West Bank into three different areas. Area A, which represents 18 percent of the territory, ideally under full Palestinian control, Area B, including 20 percent of the West Bank under a joint Israeli security control and Palestinian civil control, and finally Area C, 62 percent of the territory, exclusively under Israeli control, where most Jewish settlements have been established and where most natural resources are. In this process, other issues to be tackled were the right of return of refugees, the status of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements and border management. Today, none of these have been accomplished and Israel has taken advantage of the intricate jurisdictional structure and loopholes of the accords to reduce the transfer of territory and authority back to Palestinian institutions.

When the PLO recognized the legitimacy of the Jewish State within the parameters of the Oslo Agreements, this was not done in exchange for the recognition of the rights of Palestinians, their dispossession, nor their right of return. Over the years, the institutional architecture of the accords disappeared and these were reduced to security agreements only benefiting Israel, which changed the PLO into a collaborating agency under the name of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Meanwhile, Israel took advantage of a destabilized Palestinian leadership and gradually disempowered the Palestinians, unprotected from repression, facing institutionalized discrimination, systematic abuse and settlers’ violence. Palestinians were deceived into believing that a Palestinian state would eventually be established. Instead, they endured military occupation and remained under “a transitional administration with a Palestinian flag, obliged to serve the Israeli security system under the deceptive label of security coordination.”[2]As identified by Dajani and Lovatt, the accords helped in consolidating Israel’s control over the West Bank by distorting international law as a tool of conflict resolution and creating uncertainty around Israel’s clear responsibilities as an occupying power.[3]For instance, Israel claims that since the PA does not have any actual control over Area C, the establishment of settlements and the displacements of Palestinians there is permitted. As a consequence of practices like this one, the Israeli authorities now have de facto total control of the West Bank, achieved thanks to years of occupation that turned the territory into an Israelized extension of the Jewish State, with Palestinian enclaves surrounded and suffocated by illegal settlements.

In the international context, states who had been critical of Israel, felt legitimized in normalizing ties with the country based on the PLO’s recognition of the Jewish State, and even started importing goods produced in Israeli settlements. Today, the international community’s continuous assistance to the PA, which provides services to the population in the West Bank, creates a contradictory situation in which international actors pay the price for Israel’s unlawful actions, but rarely take coordinated measures to challenge them nor engage in a tangible political strategy for ending Israeli occupation. The lack of any coherent action, compensated with huge financial aid, and combined with a continuous endorsement of a dead peace process and the two-state solution this implies, makes the international community complicit in the deterioration of Palestinians’ rights. The reaction from the international community can no longer be the resuscitation of Oslo’s failed framework. Instead, it needs to suggest a new structure that recognizes the one-state solution as the only viable reality. The international actors’ and the Palestinian leadership’s fixation on a two-state solution within Oslo’s parameters, reflects that they have been ignoring the reality on the ground, where Israeli settlers occupy 60 percent of the West Bank. At the same time, Trump’s so-called “deal of the century,” and Israel’s subsequent annexation threats provide a sense of urgency and momentum for the discussion and signal a shift in the international approach to the issue, particularly for countries that have remained largely silent on the subject of annexation up until now. Taking into account the improbability that Israel will take action towards de-occupation, the international community has a crucial role in promoting an alternative to Oslo.[4]

The first step to take in this change of approach is to recognize that a single state already represents today’s reality on the ground; the issue is that it has adopted the form of an apartheid.[5]Acknowledging that the struggle is between a colonized people and an apartheid colonizer,[6]enables the use of a new language for discussing power imbalances and ultimately achieving Palestinian rights.[7] As stated above, Israel and the West Bank operate as one geographic space, there are no precise borders or Palestinian currency. However, in the same territory, Israeli settlers are granted ethno-religious privileges and rights under Israeli civil law, while Palestinians in the West Bank face discrimination everyday under a military rule. Even Palestinian citizens of Israel are not granted the same rights and privileges as Israeli Jews.[8]To end this discrimination, Palestinians need to have their voices heard when the future state they will live in is going to be shaped, and “they can do so only on equal footing with their Jewish counterparts before the law, not under military occupation.”[9]Furthermore, a key issue in advancing this new paradigm is recognizing that the essence of the conflict is not a territorial one and that its focus needs to shift from the division of land, which historically has never been successful, to people’s rights. Under this model, all Palestinians, including refugees, and Israeli Jews would live in a regime based on equality and justice, built on the ruins of the existing colonial apartheid system. Therefore, all structures of inequality need to be dismantled, whilst simultaneously addressing the widespread injustices faced by Palestinians. Other factors to consider are the Palestinian leadership and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian population, particularly in how it experiences occupation. In this sense, the struggle of each Palestinian is localized, meaning that each identity is confined to each community. Palestinian citizens of Israel fight for equality and for preserving their identity, Palestinian refugees in Arab countries and in the West wait for their return, even Palestinians within Area A, B or C face occupation in different ways.[10]This fragmentation needs to be stopped as it damages a potential national movement and hinders the possibility of uniting a Palestinian response. To achieve this, Palestinians need to establish a political movement that represents and mobilizes them all.

What is going to happen if no action is taken and Israel implements its annexation plans? There is still uncertainty on when and if the Israeli government is putting into practice its plans, scheduled for 1 July. In practical terms, this would not make a big difference, given the reality on the ground. In fact, even if the Israeli Parliament has not voted yet, the settler population already occupies 60 percent of the West Bank and benefits from services and infrastructures of any Israeli city. For Palestinians, annexation entails further displacement – Israel would destroy even more communities and would forcibly transfer them to other parts of the West Bank, where they would be isolated and economically suffocated. It is time to question whether this system can continue, or if this is the moment to redefine and build a just system, where everyone can benefit from equal rights and freedom, irrespective of religion, under “a model which seeks reconciliation and not separation and where people are protected and not viewed as subjects of control.”[11]

#### Their Silverstein evidence is about Israel-Iran war:

#### They haven’t read an internal link for Jordan-Israel tensions spilling over to Iran

#### Alt causes

DW 20 [(Deutsche Welle, German public state-owned international broadcaster funded by the German federal tax budget) “Israel-Iran conflict to be major Middle East issue in 2020,” 1/2/2020] JL

European signatories to the JCPOA have been unable to effectively lift the renewed embargoes on trade with Iran, prompting Tehran to gradually restart uranium enrichment as the deal crumbled in mid-2019. Meanwhile, tit-for-tat confrontations on Iranian and US proxies in the Persian Gulf, along with Israeli attacks on Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq, have escalated.

Israel and Iran have been antagonists since the 1980s. But, after the US's 2003 invasion of Iraq and the formal withdrawal of American troops in 2011, the regional balance of power was broken, leaving the Middle East without a clear hegemon. That created a vacuum that has brought the countries into increasing conflict.

Despite their aggressive rhetoric, officials in neither country seek an all-out, direct war. But differences in perception, deteriorating commitment to the vestiges of the JCPOA, and the vagaries of elections in Israel, Iran and the US all ratchet up the prospect that an inadvertent clash could escalate the conflict.

Ali Vaez, an Iran analyst for the International Crisis Group, told DW that the conflict has become "a screw that only turns in one direction, getting tenser and tenser over time."

"There are serious risks of miscalculation that could push the parties into even greater and more direct confrontation," Vaez said.

In recent years, Iran has expanded its influence in the region. In Syria, it has bolstered the operations of President Bashar Assad. In Iraq, it has supported political parties and various militias since the US invasion in 2003 and, according to anonymous US officials cited by *The New York Times*, has recently been building up an arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles there. In Yemen, it has backed the Houthis against Saudi Arabia; in December the US claimed it had intercepted a transfer of advanced Iranian missile parts to the Houthis.

To Israel's north, Iran has maintained strategic support for Hezbollah, Lebanon's strongest political party, with a paramilitary wing widely considered to be more powerful than the Lebanese army.

Tehran is trying to establish a balance in a region where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates massively outspend Iran militarily and Israel already possesses nuclear weapons, Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of the Washington-based think tank Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told DW. With a limited, aging air force that cannot compete with regional and US combat aircraft, missiles are Iran's only conventional deterrent.

Israel has long carried out undeclared strikes on Iranian targets in Syria, but recent months have seen officials publicly claim the operations, intensify the attacks and expand the theater of war.

Israel's military hit more than 200 Iran-backed targets in Syria in 2017 and 2018. In a rare public admission in late November, the military claimed one of the largest strikes in recent years on Iranian and Syrian targets in Damascus, in the midst of a flare-up of violence with Gaza.

The intensity of the operations has increased since the latest standoff in the Persian Gulf started in May, when the United States deployed military assets around the Strait of Hormuz, a number of tankers were sabotaged and seized, and rival drones were shot down in what appeared to be active if indirect engagement between forces operating on behalf of the US and Iran.

#### No Israel-Iran war

Safaei 9/17 [(Sajjad, postdoctoral fellow at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology) “Israel Isn’t Strong Enough to Attack Iran,” Foreign Policy, 9/17/2021] JL

To be sure, Israel has in the past carried out relatively limited operations against Iran—such as raids on Iranian allies in Syria and nuclear sabotage—and may continue to do so in the future. But to what extent should we believe Tel Aviv is truly ready and willing to launch a strike on Iran because of advances in the Iranian nuclear program, knowing full well that this is likely to push the two countries and their allies into war? The political and military constraints on Israeli decision-makers suggests such a military showdown is highly unlikely.

To speak of an imminent and undisguised IDF strike deep inside Iranian territory is to overlook a long-established norm that has for decades governed U.S.-Israel relations: Israel cannot simply ignore the wishes and concerns of its chief patron, especially when core U.S. foreign policy priorities are at stake.

This norm was expressed in clear terms by no less a figure than Israel’s former premier and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in his autobiography *My Country, My Life*. Here, Barak spelled out the paradigm that has shaped—and will likely continue to shape—the contours of Israeli action against Iran. “There were only two ways,” he explained, that Israel could stop the Iranians from getting a nuclear weapon (read: “nuclear program,” for Barak willfully ignores U.S. intelligence assessments that Iran had halted pursuits for nuclear weapons in 2003). One way was “for the Americans to act.” The only other option was “for [the United States] not to hinder Israel from doing so.”

But according to Barak, “hinder” is precisely what consecutive U.S. administrations have done—and are still likely to do.

Even during the military interventionism of the George W. Bush presidency, Israel did not have a blank check to do as it pleased. As Barak notes in his memoirs, when Bush learned in 2008 of Israeli efforts to purchase heavy munitions from the United States, he confronted Barak and then-premier Ehud Olmert. “I want to tell both of you now, as president,” Bush warned, “We are totally against any action by you to mount an attack on the [Iranian] nuclear plants.”

“I repeat,” Bush further clarified, “in order to avoid any misunderstanding. We expect you not to do it. And we’re not going to do it, either, as long as I am president. I wanted it to be clear.” It deserves mention that according to Barak, Bush issued this warning despite knowing that Israel did not even possess the military capacity to assault Iran at the time.

According to Barak, this staunch opposition to a strike on Iran had a “dramatic” effect on him and Olmert since the Bush administration had supported Israel’s 2007 bombing of Syria’s nascent nuclear program just a year before. In both cases, Washington’s approval, or lack thereof, was demonstrably consequential.

Barak’s memoirs show that the same dynamic continued to govern U.S.-Israel relations during Obama’s presidency. He recalls how then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta “made no secret of the fact he didn’t want us to launch a military strike” at a time when the Obama administration was focused on putting international political and economic pressure on Iran. Panetta “urged me to ‘think twice, three times,’ before going down that road,” Barak wrote, and saw it as a given that Tel Aviv would keep Washington abreast of its decisions. “If you do decide to attack the Iranian facilities, when will we know?” he allegedly asked Barak.

According to Barak’s account, Israel was dissuaded from going forward with a supposed strike on Iran’s nuclear installations in summer 2012 “because of the damage it would do to our ties with the United States.” Washington’s demands continued to limit Tel Aviv after the finalization of the nuclear deal in 2015. Even then, Barak recalls, the Israelis could not simply act against Iran without a green light from the Obama administration: “We needed to reach agreement with the Americans about what kind of military strike we, or they, might have to take if the Iranians again moved to get nuclear weapons.”

As evinced by Barak’s autobiography, U.S. presidents are not taciturn about making their views and wishes known to Israeli officials, especially when primary U.S. foreign policy objectives are involved. Nor can Tel Aviv afford to ignore Washington’s express demands and concerns on such matters. And today, any flagrant Israeli violation of Iranian sovereignty will instantly clash with two mutually reinforcing goals that have come to define the Biden administration’s foreign policy: curbing Iran’s nuclear program through non-military means (efforts currently focused on reviving the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal) and winding down U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

These political realities make it unlikely Israel will pursue an overt strike on Iran. Just as important, however, are the military constraints that Israel faces.

To be sure, even without its ready-to-launch nuclear warheads, Israel is more than capable of delivering swift and devastating blows to Iran’s armed forces, both in the skies and seas. Its fleet of American fighter jets and bombers alone can irreparably trounce Iran’s air defenses as well as its dilapidated air force. Even Iran’s increasingly powerful, accurate, and far-reaching missile and drone systems don’t radically alter the balance of power in the skies. In short, in terms of military hardware, the IDF’s superiority over Iran’s armed forces is indisputable, not to mention otherworldly.

But this prodigious superiority will be rendered far less consequential in the event of an all-out war that lures the IDF ground forces into the battlefield. Why? Ever since the IDF’s embarrassing defeat during the 2006 war with Hezbollah, Israel’s top military brass have become acutely aware that the country’s land forces are ill-prepared for a full-scale war with a fighting force even moderately capable of packing a punch.

#### Hour evidence is about Russia intervening in Syria – no reason they’re drawn into other countries

#### No draw in – the United States won’t intervene in the Middle East

Harb 8/19 [(Imad, the Director of Research and Analysis at Arab Center Washington DC. He is the Founder and Director of Quest for Middle East Analysis, a research and consulting firm. Previously, he worked as Adjunct Professor of Middle East Studies at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University. He also served as Senior Analyst at the Abu Dhabi, UAE-based Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research and taught political science and international relations at the University of Utah and San Francisco State University. In addition, he worked as Senior Program Officer at the United States Institute of Peace. Harb writes and publishes on a number of topics including civil-military relations, regional politics, and US policy in the Middle East/North Africa and the Arabian Gulf, and is co-author, with John Bruni, of Domestic and Regional Challenges to US-Iran Relations (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2015). He is the co-editor, with Zeina Azzam, of The Arab World Beyond Conflict (ACW, 2019). Harb earned a PhD in political science from the University of Utah.) “After Afghanistan, a New Biden Middle East Doctrine Takes Shape” Arab Center Washington DC, 8/19/2021. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/after-afghanistan-a-new-biden-middle-east-doctrine-takes-shape/] BC

If there are lessons to be learned from the disastrous end of the American war in Afghanistan, they would be most applicable to the countries of the Arab Middle East. There, the United States has long-standing defense agreements, military guarantees and deployments, and numerous bases and headquarters. To be sure, the Arab world is one geographic expanse where political regimes rely on military and security institutions that are heavily dependent on American arms, training, and logistics. Most importantly, however, these regimes rely on what they have considered to be American credibility and commitment to their survival and sustenance as they traverse difficult domestic challenges and the regional strategic terrain.

Arab regimes accustomed to a close relationship with the United States should be worried about what happened in Afghanistan over the last few weeks, culminating in the triumphant return of the Taliban movement to Kabul. Those who have long counted on the premise that, if needed, the United States would come to their rescue will understand the Afghanistan collapse as a result of the US withdrawal announced by both Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Thus, they may quickly begin to question where they stand on the priority list of US foreign policy, evaluate the efficacy of their relationships with the United States, and perhaps look to bolster their security with different alliance patterns and partners, such as Russia and China.

What will increase their sense of trepidation is President Biden’s sobering speech on August 16 about the Afghan debacle, one that appears to have confirmed some important principles that may spell the contours of a “Biden Doctrine.” These principles, which could very well define US relations with the Middle East going forward, are necessitated by a combination of American domestic considerations—fighting the coronavirus pandemic, addressing economic concerns, building consensus around policy objectives, and others—and costly international threats and challenges. Nevertheless, governments that depend on a close relationship with the United States should heed these principles and respond to them in a way that mitigates their impact on their countries, at least for the duration of the Biden presidency.

First, Biden may have finally drawn the curtain on American military interventionism in the wider Middle East, or at least to commitments to many countries there. For US partners and friends in the Arabian Gulf, this should translate into utmost caution regarding both the rhetoric about Iran and the wish to forcefully curtail its activities. In fact, from now on, the United States will only advise diplomacy as the preferred strategy to deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Simultaneously, for the time being Washington will maintain its forces in the region, but only as a deterrent against any adventurism by Iran, which is now under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the new, and equally hard-line, President Ebrahim Raisi.

Second, and as a corollary, the United States will not commit more blood and treasure to countries whose leaderships, state institutions, and militaries fail to firmly face threats and challenges. As President Biden highlighted in his speech, the United States spent more than a trillion dollars to sustain a well-armed Afghan military force, an institutional edifice for a modern state, and the pillars of an open economy. That much of this expenditure was to sustain an American presence that sought to fight extremists—yet, in reality, also protected corrupt officials and fostered a dependent economy—seems to be beside the point. What the Biden Administration saw was a failed Afghan army that withdrew from the battlefield against a ragtag militia with a millennial ideology. Especially embarrassing was the Taliban’s capture of billions of dollars-worth of sophisticated American weaponry that will be used to fortify a regime that previously ruled the country savagely—and one that also sheltered a terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. Indeed, and despite the embarrassment and recrimination, it looks like the Biden team, much like the Trump Administration, has decided that where there is no vital American national interest, the United States will be ready and willing to simply pack up and leave, notwithstanding the damage to its reputation and credibility.

Third, the United States will no longer attempt to engage in open-ended efforts at nation-building. The Afghanistan experiment bolstered the American public’s gradually increasing reticence to expend energy and funds to help build (or resuscitate) state institutions in faraway places. This principle will have many applications in today’s Arab world where US economic, technical, military, and other assistance is required to differing degrees. Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Iraq, Tunisia, Syria, and Lebanon are prime examples of countries in need of such support. The United States will not undergo far-reaching engagement with these countries if their governing institutions and leaders do not exhibit the necessary will and readiness to govern and implement needed development programs and reforms.

### COVID

#### Jordan COVID containment successful now

Al Kazwini 4/9 [(Akeel T., Associate Professor at German Jordanian University’s School of Applied Medical Sciences, PhD in Radiation Medical Biophysics from Dundee University, Scotland) “How did Jordan combat COVID-19: Lessons learned for scaling,” Cell Press, 4/9/2021] JL

When the COVID-19 virus emerged in early 2020, Jordan’s response was unique, and the measures undertaken in terms of severity and urgency served to ensure a slower spread and lower mortality rates. Here, we summarize and discuss a list of practical measures implemented by the government.

The initial lockdown rules in Jordan were very different from the majority of other nations. A curfew was established, and nobody could leave home except medical staff, security forces, and providers of essential services such as food and fuel delivery, which did not experience any shortage. The police implemented mandatory wearing of masks and gloves and 2-m social distancing in public spaces.

Some private and public sector hospitals were designated for COVID patients, and no visitors were permitted at these facilities. Factories started to manufacture masks and disinfectants: essential medicines and food were delivered to doorsteps, mainly for senior citizens. By taking nasopharyngeal swabs, PCR COVID-19 sampling was performed door-to-door by either the ministry of the health task force or private laboratories at a very affordable cost. These regulations and policies were implemented efficiently and were accepted with a high uptake by the entire population. The government established expert task forces for health, education, social development, security, and technology to develop contingency, action, and execution plans to ensure continuity.

#### Middle East vaccine hesitancy thumps

Schaer 4/16 [(Cathrin, journalist based in Berlin, has been published in New York Times, Vogue, Wired and Wallpaper) “Coronavirus: Arab countries struggle with high vaccine hesitancy,” Deutsche Welle, 4/16/2021] JL

In 2019, the World Health Organization listed vaccine hesitancy as one of top 10 threats to global health. More recently, data scientists have said that the idea of "herd immunity" against COVID-19 is endangered by vaccine hesitation because herd immunity requires a faster rollout of immunization campaigns.

A number of surveys would seem to suggest that Mahmoud is far from alone in the Middle East. "The Middle East was among the regions with the lowest vaccine acceptance rates globally," reported a January study published in the medical journal, *Vaccines*, that looked at willingness of people to be vaccinated around the world.

The researchers were particularly alarmed about vaccine acceptance rates of just 23% in Kuwait and 28% in Jordan.

There are similar stories coming out of other Middle Eastern nations.

In Iraq, a January study by local researchers found that, of 1,069 locals surveyed, almost all would eventually take the vaccine. However the same survey also found that — just like Mahmoud — almost two-thirds, 64%, would wait before getting a jab.

A poll of over 27,000 Egyptian medical students, also from January, came up with similar results: Almost all the students eventually intended to get vaccinated, but 46% wanted to wait. At the end of March, a US-based study noted that 52% of all Egyptians were not sure or unwilling to be vaccinated.

A February telephone survey of 1,219 Tunisians discovered that only about a third wanted to vaccinate.

In Lebanon, local officials have blamed vaccine hesitancy for the slow pace of registrations on the government's official portal for vaccinations. By April 15, only around 17% of the Lebanese population had registered.

Informal public opinion surveys in the Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen by journalists from independent media outlet, Daraj, found that most people there were not enthusiastic about COVID-19 vaccines either. In a February poll they conducted of 121 residents in the city of Aden, over 84% didn't want to be innoculated.

From the various surveys, it's clear that vaccine hesitancy in the Middle East is partially based on the same safety concerns: a fear of the potential side effects, and the speed at which the COVID-19 vaccine was developed.

But where countries like Iraq, Tunisia and Lebanon really differ from others is the low level of trust they have in local government and public health care systems. Ongoing work by the Arab Barometer, which studies public opinion in the Middle East, has long found that, on average, many citizens don't have a lot of faith in their own governments' performance, believing it to be corrupt, inept or both.