### 1NC – Off

#### Current labor laws prevent widespread vaccine mandates strikes.

**Millhiser 7/30** [(Ian Millhiser is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he focuses on the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and the decline of liberal democracy in the United States. Before joining Vox, Ian was a columnist at ThinkProgress. Among other things, he clerked for Judge Eric L. Clay of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and served as a Teach for America corps member in the Mississippi Delta. He received a B.A. in philosophy from Kenyon College and a J.D., magna cum laude, from Duke University, where he served as senior note editor on the Duke Law Journal and was elected to the Order of the Coif. He is the author of Injustices: The Supreme Court's History of Comforting the Comfortable and Afflicting the Afflicted.) “Yes, Covid-19 Mandates are Legal” Vox. July 30, 2021.] AW

In 1902, the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, faced a smallpox outbreak. In response, the local health board ordered the city’s residents over the age of 21 to be vaccinated against this disease. Violators faced a $5 fine.

After a local pastor was fined for violating this vaccine mandate, he appealed his case all the way to the Supreme Court. The Court told him to pound sand in [Jacobson v. Massachusetts](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/197/11) (1905).

“The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint,” Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote for the Court. He added that “there are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.”

Under Jacobson, state and local governments — though not necessarily the federal government — may mandate vaccines for nearly all of their residents.

That decision has obvious relevance today. We now have multiple vaccines against Covid-19 that are both safe and shockingly effective, and they are available for free for all Americans. Yet the pandemic continues to rage in the United States because a large minority of Americans have yet to get a shot. While some people may [face legitimate obstacles](https://www.vox.com/22587443/covid-19-vaccine-refusal-hesitancy-variant-delta-cases-rate), others are [just obstinate](https://www.vox.com/2021/7/28/22594637/vaccine-mandates-covid-19-masks-delta-variants). Policymakers and other leaders, in other words, may need to take a page from Cambridge’s early 20th-century health board.

Some already are. Many of the first mandates are from employers: The state of New York, for example, recently announced that all of its employees will have to either [get vaccinated or submit to weekly coronavirus testing](https://twitter.com/GormleyAlbany/status/1420414312997392386?s=20), and President Joe Biden plans to [impose similar requirements on federal employees](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/28/us/politics/biden-federal-workers-vaccination.html).

Many private employers also require vaccines — Google, for example, will [insist that its employees be vaccinated](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/28/business/google-return-to-office-masks.html) in order to enter the company’s offices. More than [600 colleges and universities](https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/live-coronavirus-updates/heres-a-list-of-colleges-that-will-require-students-to-be-vaccinated-against-covid-19) require at least some of their students, faculty, and staff to be vaccinated.

These sorts of mandates will undoubtedly trigger lawsuits from vaccine resisters. In some cases, individuals with religious objections to vaccines or people with disabilities that preclude them from being vaccinated will have strong legal claims — much like schoolchildren who [can already seek exemptions](https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx) from schools’ vaccination requirements if they have religious objections.

But, assuming that the courts follow existing law — and assuming that Republican state governments [do not enact new laws](https://www.govtech.com/health/florida-gov-desantis-signs-bill-banning-vaccine-passports) prohibiting employers from disciplining workers who refuse to be vaccinated — most challenges to employer-imposed vaccination requirements should fail.

Under Jacobson, moreover, states should be free to order everyone within their borders to be vaccinated against Covid-19, although it’s [far from clear whether the federal government could do the same](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf).

Of course, there is no guarantee that the Roberts Court, which is [eager to impose limits on public health officials](https://www.vox.com/2021/7/27/22594374/courts-covid-delta-pandemic-supreme-court-brett-kavanaugh-public-health-destroy) and [not especially bothered about overruling precedents](https://www.vox.com/22575435/voting-rights-supreme-court-john-roberts-shelby-county-constitution-brnovich-elena-kagan), will follow Jacobson if a state does enact a vaccine mandate. But there is good reason to believe that it will. Even Justice Neil Gorsuch, one of the most conservative members of the current Court, recently [described Jacobson as a “modest” decision](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14249141472030529264&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr) that “didn’t seek to depart from normal legal rules during a pandemic.”

The bottom line, in other words, is that, under existing law, numerous institutions within the United States may require their employees — and, in some cases, their citizens — to be vaccinated against Covid-19.

Your boss probably can require you to get vaccinated

Employment relationships in the United States are typically “[at-will](https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/at-will-employment-states),” meaning that an employee can be fired at any time and for any reason, even if that reason is completely arbitrary. If you have an at-will relationship with your employer, your boss can fire you because they don’t like your haircut. Or because they don’t like what you had for breakfast last Tuesday.

Or, for that matter, because you refuse to get a Covid-19 vaccine.

The general rule, in other words, is that your employer can fire you for any reason unless some outside legal force — a federal or state law, or maybe an individual or collective bargaining contract between you and your employer — intervenes to give you additional job security. And there is no federal law prohibiting employers from requiring nearly all of their employees to get vaccinated.

#### The plan flips that— the unconditional right legitimizes strikes and kills the work force

**Koenig 11/4** [(David Koenig of the Associated Press contributed to this report and is a contributor to K5 News) “Vaccine mandate rules affecting 84 million Americans finalized” K5 News. November 4, 2021] AW

WASHINGTON — Tens of millions of Americans who work at [companies with 100 or more employees](https://www.king5.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/vaccine/biden-employer-vaccine-testing-mandate-covid/507-27e042a1-53ef-4bb4-8e6c-35f9d3c0e302) will need to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by Jan. 4 or get tested for the virus weekly under [government rules that took effect Thursday](https://www.osha.gov/coronavirus/ets2).

The new requirements are the Biden administration’s boldest move yet to persuade reluctant Americans to finally get a vaccine that has been widely available for months -- or potentially face financial consequences. If successful, administration officials believe it will go a long way toward ending a pandemic that has killed more than 750,000 Americans.

First previewed by President Joe Biden in September, the requirements will apply to about 84 million workers at medium and large businesses, although it is not clear how many of those employees are unvaccinated.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations will force the companies to require that unvaccinated workers test negative for COVID-19 at least once a week and wear a mask while in the workplace.

OSHA left open the possibility of expanding the requirement to smaller businesses. It asked for public comment on whether employers with fewer than 100 employees could handle vaccination or testing programs.

Tougher rules will apply to another 17 million people who work in nursing homes, hospitals and other facilities that receive money from Medicare and Medicaid. Those workers will not have an option for testing — they will need to be vaccinated.

Workers will be able to ask for exemptions on medical or religious grounds.

The requirements will not apply to people who work at home or outdoors.

Biden framed the issue as a simple choice between getting more people vaccinated or prolonging the pandemic.

“While I would have much preferred that requirements not become necessary, too many people remain unvaccinated for us to get out of this pandemic for good,” he said Thursday in a statement.

Biden said his encouragement for businesses to impose mandates and his own previous requirements for the military and federal contractors have helped reduce the number of unvaccinated Americans over 12 from 100 million in late July to about 60 million now.

Those measures, he said, have not led to mass firings or worker shortages, adding that vaccines have been required before to fight other diseases.

OSHA said companies that fail to comply with the regulations could face penalties of nearly $14,000 per violation.

The agency will face enforcement challenges. Even counting help from states, OSHA has [only 1,850 inspectors](https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-business-health-coronavirus-pandemic-henry-mcmaster-f33acd986ad5045e48088a832c6f9903) to oversee 130 million workers at 8 million workplaces. An administration official said the agency will respond to whistleblower complaints and make limited spot checks.

The release of the rules followed weeks of regulatory review and meetings with business groups, labor unions and others.

OSHA drafted the rules under emergency authority meant to protect workers from an imminent health hazard. The agency estimated that the vaccine mandate will save more than 6,500 worker lives and prevent more than 250,000 hospitalizations over the next six months.

The rules set up potential legal battles along partisan lines between states and the federal government. Several states and Republican governors threatened to sue, contending that the administration lacks the power to make such sweeping mandates under emergency authority.

OSHA's parent agency, the Labor Department, says it is on sound legal footing. The department's top legal official, Seema Nanda, said OSHA rules preempt conflicting state laws or orders, including those that bar employers from requiring vaccinations, testing or face masks.

Senate Republicans immediately launched a petition to force a vote to overturn the vaccine mandate, but with Democrats controlling the chamber, the effort is nearly certain to fail.

The [rules](https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2021-23643.pdf) will require workers to receive either two doses of the Pfizer or Moderna vaccines or one dose of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine by Jan. 4 or be tested weekly. Employees who test positive must be removed from the workplace.

Companies won't be required to provide or pay for tests for unvaccinated workers, but they must give paid time off for employees to get the shots and sick leave to recover from side effects that prevent them from working. The requirements for masks and paid time off for shots take effect Dec. 5.

Employers covered by the requirements must verify their workers’ vaccination status by checking documents such as CDC vaccination cards or records from doctors or pharmacies.

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services issued a separate rule requiring vaccination for workers in 76,000 health facilities and home health care providers that get funding from the government health programs. A senior administration official said that several large private health care organizations imposed their own mandates and achieved high vaccination rates — 96% or higher — without widespread resignations.

A previously announced requirement for federal contractors to make sure workers are vaccinated was scheduled to take effect Dec. 8, but on Thursday the administration delayed that measure until Jan. 4 to match the requirements on other large employers and health care providers. Already more than a dozen states have sued to block the mandate on contractors.

For weeks, Biden has [encouraged businesses not to wait](https://apnews.com/article/coronavirus-pandemic-joe-biden-business-health-6e758dc5e24320677e48f58cbfca37bf)for OSHA to act. He has touted businesses that announced their own vaccine requirements and urged other companies to follow their lead.

Administration officials say those efforts are paying off, with about 70% of the nation's adults now fully vaccinated.

Walmart, the nation’s largest private employer, said in late July it was requiring all workers at its headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas, and managers who travel within the United States to be vaccinated by Oct. 4. The retailer stopped short of requiring shots for frontline workers, however.

United Airlines required 67,000 U.S. employees to get vaccinated or face termination. Only a couple hundred refused to do so, although about 2,000 are seeking exemptions.

In August, Tyson Foods told its 120,000 U.S. workers that they must be vaccinated by Nov. 1. On Thursday, the company said more than 96% of its workforce was vaccinated, including 60,500 people who got their shots after the August announcement.

However, some companies have expressed fear that some vaccine-hesitant workers might quit, leaving their workforces even thinner in an already-tight labor market.

Several corporate groups, including the Business Roundtable, endorsed the mandate. However, retail groups worried the requirement could disrupt their operations during the critical Christmas shopping period. Retailers and others also said it could worsen supply chain disruptions.

The National Retail Federation suggested the new rules are not needed because the rolling average number of new daily cases in the U.S. has fallen by more than half since September.

“Nevertheless, the Biden administration has chosen to declare an ‘emergency’ and impose burdensome new requirements on retailers during the crucial holiday shopping season,” said David French, a senior vice president for the trade group.

The number of new infections in the U.S. is still falling from a summer surge caused by the highly contagious delta variant, but the rate of decline has slowed in recent weeks. The 7-day moving average is down 6% from two weeks ago, at more than 76,000 new cases and 1,200 deaths per day.

The earlier mandate on federal contractors led to demonstrations by opponents, including workers at a NASA rocket engine test site in Mississippi. Some said they are immune because they contracted COVID-19. Others said vaccines violated their religious beliefs and constitutional rights.

“No one should be forced to take a medical treatment just to keep their job,” said Nyla Trumbach, an engineer at the site. “There’s years and years of experience and skill out here, and I just want anyone who’s watching to see what we stand to lose here if these people don’t keep their jobs.”

#### A declining workforce decimates the economy

**Isidore 8/20** (Chris Isidore is a senior writer for CNN Business, where he covers the auto industry, airlines, labor and all other manner of breaking financial news. Over the last 30 years, he has covered most major US bankruptcies, including GM, Chrysler, Lehman Brothers, most US airlines and Sears, as well as the city of Detroit.) “Vaccine mandates at work meet their toughest opponent: America’s labor shortage” August 20, 2021.] AW

At Kevin Smith's home health care agency in Massachusetts, only 52% of his 400 staff members have been vaccinated. He'd like to order them all to get the shot, but he says he can't risk a mass exodus.

It's a legitimate fear. The labor market is very tight, with a [record number of job openings](http://www.cnn.com/2021/08/09/economy/record-job-openings-june/index.html) and not enough job candidates. And among unvaccinated workers asked what they would do if their employer instituted a mandate, 50% said they'd leave their job, according to a June survey by health policy think tank KFF.

"It puts you at risk of alienating the staff, if not losing them to a competitor," said Smith, who has run the family-owned Best of Care since 2013. "No one can afford to do that. That is why any employer in our industry is so reluctant to impose a mandate."

The meeting of the labor market challenge and public health crisis puts employers in a tough spot: The worker shortage means employer mandates are not likely to be the answer to raising the nation's vaccination rate. But a higher inoculation rate is exactly what experts say we need to end the pandemic.

Difficulty finding workers

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has given guidance to employers that they have the right to impose a vaccine mandate as long as there are exceptions for employees with health conditions that pose a risk or legitimate religious objections.

Yet "employers in a labor shortage environment don't want to create any barrier for employment, let alone any cause for people to go elsewhere," said Julia Pollak, chief economist for job site Ziprecruiter.

It's not clear how many employers are taking that step. A June survey from the Society of Human Resource Management showed 29% of workers say their employers are requiring vaccines. A Gartner survey from the end of July found only 9% doing so.

Even among hospitals, most employers don't have vaccine mandates: The American Hospital Association said only 2,100 hospitals, about a third of the nation's total, require vaccines. And many are in places where state laws or executive orders mandate them.

Brian Kropp, chief of research at consulting firm Gartner's HR practice, says he believes that figure will remain a minority -— even as household-name companies have begun implementing [mandates](https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/28/business/companies-vaccine-mandate/index.html) in response to the Delta variant surge of Covid cases.

They're most common at major tech companies such as Google ([GOOG](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=GOOG&source=story_quote_link)) and Facebook ([FB](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=FB&source=story_quote_link)), or Wall Street banks such as Goldman Sachs ([GS](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=GS&source=story_quote_link)) and Morgan Stanley ([MS](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=MS&source=story_quote_link)). But there's a critical difference here: These employers offer high-paying jobs, benefits and other advantages that inspire workers to stick around.

For the many small businesses and other employers who depend on hourly workers to fill most positions, there's greater fear about losing vaccine-hesitant employees and not being able to find vaccinated workers to replace them.

"If you run a restaurant or a store and you have employees who are vaccine-hesitant, they are going to quit and go to the store or restaurant next door," said Kropp. "It's a whole lot easier for people to switch jobs, particularly in today's labor market."

Even some employers with stable workforces are reluctant to impose a vaccine mandate. While United Airlines ([UAL](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=UAL&source=story_quote_link)) recent [ordered all US employees](http://www.cnn.com/2021/08/06/business/united-airlines-vaccine-mandate/index.html) to be vaccinated, rivals American ([AAL](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=AAL&source=story_quote_link)), Delta ([DAL](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=DAL&source=story_quote_link)) and Southwest ([LUV](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=LUV&source=story_quote_link)) [have yet to do so](https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/three-us-airlines-no-vaccine-mandate-workers/index.html).

'Divisive' moral arguments and partial rules

Further complicating matters is opposition to mandates, even from employees who have gotten vaccinated themselves. The KFF survey in June found that even among those who are vaccinated, 42% said they don't want it mandated by their employer, while only 43% want a vaccine required.

"In general we find that vaccine mandates are very divisive," said Liz Hamel, vice president and director of public opinion and survey research at KFF. "There's a sense that getting a vaccine is personal choice."

Attitudes may be changing with the recent surge in cases, however: [Recent polls](http://www.cnn.com/2021/08/18/politics/workplace-vaccine-mandate-poll/index.html) conducted by Axios/Ipos and Gallup found a slight majority of Americans favoring employer vaccine mandates. That compares to KFF's June survey that found only 28% wanted an employer mandate and 61% opposed the idea.

Seven states — Arizona, Arkansas, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota and Tennessee — have passed laws banning vaccine mandates for at least some employers, according to the National Academy for State Health Policy. Similar legislation has been introduced in 39 other states, all but Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada and West Virginia.

Another complex issue is differing rules for white-collar vs. blue-collar employees. Major employers including Walmart ([WMT](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=WMT&source=story_quote_link)) and UPS ([UPS](https://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=UPS&source=story_quote_link)) are requiring vaccines for corporate office staff, but not for those on the front lines, working in stores or driving trucks.

Neither company would comment on whether the labor crunch for hourly workers is the driving force of the different rules.

"Those office environments are very different than our operating facilities, which have been safely staffed in-person since the beginning and throughout the pandemic," said a statement from UPS.

Some employers are following the lead of President Joe Biden's [order for federal workers](https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/29/politics/joe-biden-vaccination-requirement-announcement/index.html), giving them the choice of vaccination or the more stringent testing and masking, said Amber Clayton, director of SHRM's HR Knowledge Center.

"That's probably what we'll see more of than full vaccine mandates," she said.

A plea to government leaders

Smith, the CEO of the home health care agency in Massachusetts, wants more than just a model from the government: He would prefer a mandate at the state or federal level to require everyone in his industry to get vaccinated. It would level the playing field among all employers in the sector, he explained, and would help protect the health of his employees and clients.

"From a pure safety standpoint, it would make me feel better if it were required," he said. "And it would take the pressure off me."

Smith's wish is hardly unique, Kropp said.

Many other employers are worried unvaccinated workers could spread the virus even to inoculated coworkers and cause high absenteeism. And some workers, especially those with young children at home or other vulnerable family members, won't want to return to the office unless they know everyone else is vaccinated, he said.

"What almost every employer wants is either the governors or some other government body to say vaccines are required," Kropp said. "Then they get what they want, and they don't get any of the blame or frustration."

**Economic decline causes global nuclear war**

**Tønnesson 15** [(Stein, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University) “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311, 2015] SJDI

Several **recent works** on China and Sino–US relations **have made** substantial **contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances** a combination of **nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers**. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that **interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict** are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides **but** **asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and** negative trade expectations may **generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that** in turn **increase the risk of military conflict** (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, **decisions for war** and peace **are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations**. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. **If leaders** on either side of the Atlantic **begin to seriously** fear or anticipate their own nation’sdecline then they **may blame** this on **external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain** respect or **credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and** ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms **or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen** abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.

Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions **in East Asia** are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more **precarious**. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. **This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so**. **Deterrence could lose its credibility**: one of the two **great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional** limited **war**, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change

Starr 15 [(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015] DD  
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs.

Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.]

The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere.

Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.]

Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years?

The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death.

Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet.  Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

### 1NC – Off

**The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing**

1. **Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues**.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values**.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable**.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes**:** “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**Moreover, *only* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, **I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable.** Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, **there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values** that counts in hedonism’s favor**: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain.** To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, **wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly.** **Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after.** To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if **the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain** (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), **then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts.** **The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists.** The challenge can be phrased as the following question: **If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?**27

1. **Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.  
   Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]  
   These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

#### No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act – governments actively decide not to act so there is no omission. Also, If we foresee a consequence, then it is intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

#### Universizability requires the equal satisfaction of everyone’s preferences

**R. M. Hare** [White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1966 until 1983. “Universal Prescriptivism.” Originally published in Peter Singer, A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell Publishers, 1991)] **AJ**A possible move for one who is looking for the necessary constraints on moral thinking is to say that **unless I treat the person,** in **who**se place **I am imagining myself being**, **on equal terms with myself,** showing him equal concern, **I am not really imagining him as being me. This entails treating his preferences as of equal weight with my own** present preferences, and thus forming preferences for the hypothetical situation in which I am he, equal in strength to those which he actually has. This is what is involved in following the Golden Rule, doing to others as we wish others to do to us, and loving our neighbours as ourselves. It is also implicit in Bentham's maxim 'Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one' (cited in Mill, 1861, Ch. 5 s.f.). The Kantian method we have been outlining is consistent with a form of utilitarianism (though not, we must add, exactly Bentham's form, because that is put in terms of pleasure, whereas Kant's theory is put in terms of will). It is wrong to think, as many do, that Kantianism and utilitarianism have to be at odds. **To treat a person** 'never simply as a means but always at the same time **as an end' requires, as Kant** himself **says** on the next page, **that 'the ends of a subject** who is an end in himself **must,** if this conception is to have its full effect [46] in me, **be also,** as far as possible**, my ends’** (1785, BA 69=430 f.). An end is what is willed for its own sake; **so we are,** according to Kant, **to give equal respect to everybody's** wills-for-**ends**, including our own; and **this is** what **util**itarianism also binds us do. **This involves,** in a harmless sense**, treating the ends of many people as if they were the ends of** one person **(myself).** But this does not involve failing to 'take seriously the distinction between persons' (Rawls, 1971,pp. 27, 187)- a distinction of which Kant and the utilitarians are well aware.

#### 6. Actor specificity –

#### A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen.

#### 7. Don’t oppress if trying to lift up all and stop death for all not just a few

### Case

**Use epistemic modesty – multiply the probability of the framework by the extent to which they are winning offense under it – prevents blippy preclusion arguments and ensures debates don’t devolve to framework vs. framework, which preserves substantive education**

Util provides an objective starting point — even if people have slightly different experiences of pleasure and pain, they still generally seek pleasure and avoid pain. Also, no evil demon.

(If you win your position then you disprove their bindingness argument because it proves that pleasure and pain, not pure rationality, are binding on individuals)

No naturalistic fallacy - the fact that we all eexpeirnece pleasure and pain proves that we have an obligation to preserve it.

Consequentialism ails -

No infinite consequences - we can stop calculating at extinction and util provides a way to connect actions A to its consequences

Aggregation doesn’t fail - body counts are objective

### Contention

#### Only consequentialism can justify the actions necessary to reach some moral end.

Sinnot-Armstrong 92 -- Walter (prof. of philosophy @ Yale University, Philosophical Perspectives, 6, Ethics, “An Argument for Consequentialism”, p. 415-416)

All of this leads to necessary enabler **consequentialism** or NEC. NEC **claims that all moral reasons for acts are provided by facts that the acts are necessary enablers for preventing harm or promoting good**. All moral reasons on this theory are consequential reasons, but there are two kinds. Some moral reasons are prevention reasons, because they are facts that an act is a necessary enabler for preventing harm or loss. For example, if giving Alice food is necessary and enables me to prevent her from starving, then that fact is a moral reason to give her food. In this case, I would not cause her death even 416 / Walter Sinnott-Armstrong if I let her starve, but other moral prevention reasons are reasons to avoid causing harm. For example, if turning my car to the left is necessary and enables me to avoid killing Bobby, that is a moral reason to turn my car to the left. The other kind of moral reason is a promotion reason. This kind of reason occurs when doing something is necessary and enables me to promote (or maximize) some good. For example, I have a moral reason to throw a surprise party for Susan if this is necessary and enables me to make her happy. Because of substitutability, these moral reasons for actions also yield moral reasons against contrary actions. **There are then also moral reasons not to do what will cause harm or ensure a failure to prevent harm or to promote good. What makes these facts moral reasons is that they can make an otherwise immoral act moral.** If I have a moral reason to feed my child, then it might be immoral to give my only food to Alice, who is a stranger. But this would not be immoral if giving Alice food is necessary and enables me to prevent 'Alice from starving, as long as my child will not starve also. Similarly, it is normally immoral to lie to Susan, but a lie can be moral if it is necessary and enables me to keep my party for Susan a surprise, and if this is also necessary and enables me to make her happy. Thus, NEC fits nicely into the above theory of moral reasons. **NEC can provide a natural explanation of moral substitutability for both kinds of moral reasons. I have a prevention moral reason to give someone food when doing so is necessary and enables me to prevent that person from starving. Suppose that buying food is a necessary enabler for giving the person food, and getting in my car is a necessary enabler for buying food. Moral substitutability warrants the conclusion that I have a moral reason to get in my car. And this act of getting in my car does have the property of being a necessary enabler for preventing starvation. Thus, the necessary enabler has the same property that provided the moral reason to give the food in the first place.** This explains why substitutability holds for moral prevention reasons. The other kind of moral reason covers necessary enablers for promoting good. In my example above, if a surprise party is a necessary enabler for making Susan happy, and letting people know about the party is a necessary enabler for having the party, then letting people know is a necessary enabler for making Susan happy. The very fact that provides a moral reason to have the party also provides a moral reason to let people know about it. Thus, NEC can explain why moral substitutability holds for every kind of moral reason that it includes. Similar explanations work for moral reasons not to do certain acts, and **this explanatory power is a reason to favor** NEC.17

#### Kant justifies a fundamental right to property

Merges 11 [(Robert, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Professor of Law and Technology, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law) “Justifying Intellectual Property,” Harvard University Press, 2011] JL

Kant believed that any object onto which a person projects his or her will may come to be owned. Kant seemed to consider ownership as a primitive concept whose roots run very deep in human consciousness. This is evident from the language he uses. The origin of property, he says, is in a deep and abiding sense of “Mine and Yours.” “That is rightfully mine,” he writes, “if I am so bound to it that anyone who uses it without my consent would thereby injure me.”15

But what is the point of this? Why do people want to be bound to things? In essence, Kant says, to expand their range of freedom— their autonomy.16 People have a desire to carry out projects in the world. Sometimes, those projects require access to and control over external objects. The genesis of property is the desire of an individual to carry out personal projects in the world, for which various objects are necessary. For Kant, this desire must be given its broadest scope, to promote the widest range of human choice, and therefore human projects. Kant accordingly refuses to accept any binding legal rule that makes some objects strictly unownable, because the rationale for such a rule would conflict with the basic need for maximal freedom of action. Freedom to appropriate is so basic, so tied to matters of individual will and personal choice, that Kant finds it unthinkable to rule out large categories of things from the domain of the potentially ownable. As Kant scholar Paul Guyer says, for Kant, “The fundamental principle of morality dictates the protection of the external use of freedom or freedom of action, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice and thus as part of autonomy as a whole. . . .”17 This captures it in a nutshell: freedom of action, including the right to possess, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice, or autonomy.

#### Unions prevent cruel conduct and aggression, which is a violation of rights.

Richman quoting Spencer 12 [(Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) wrote those words in his Principles of Sociology (1896)); May 20, 2012; “Is There a Libertarian Case for Organized Labor?”; <http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/20/is-there-a-libertarian-case-for-organize>] LADI//WJ \*brackets in original

Spencer begins his discussion of unions by noting that worker guilds (like employers) historically preferred suppression of competition to the uncertainties of market rivalry. He criticizes the hypocrisy of workers who applaud competition that lowers the price of bread, but oppose competition that lowers the price of labor. He also argues that agitation for higher wages, if successful throughout the economy, would do workers no good because prices and hence the cost of living would rise as a consequence. (This analysis requires some assumptions that may not in fact hold.) But he also notes that “[u]nder their original form as friendly societies—organizations for rendering mutual aid–[unions] were of course extremely beneficial; and in so far as they subserve this purpose down to the present time, they can scarcely be too much lauded.” Nevertheless Spencer asks: “Must we say that while ultimately failing in their proposed ends [higher wages], trade-unions do nothing else than inflict grave mischiefs in trying to achieve them?” His response: “This is too sweeping a conclusion. . . . There is an ultimate gain in moral and physical treatment if there is no ultimate gain in wages.” For example: Judging from their harsh and cruel conduct in the past, it is tolerably certain that employers are now prevented from doing unfair things which they would else do. Conscious that trade-unions are ever ready to act, they are more prompt to raise wages when trade is flourishing than they would otherwise be; and when there come times of depression, they lower wages only when they cannot otherwise carry on their businesses. Knowing the power which unions can exert, masters are led to treat the individual members of them with more respect than they would otherwise do: the status of the workman is almost necessarily raised. Moreover, having a strong motive for keeping on good terms with the union, a master is more likely than he would else be to study the general convenience of his men, and to carry on his works in ways conducive to their health. He thinks unions are necessary because: “Everywhere aggression begets resistance and counter-aggression; and in our present transitional state, semi-militant and semi-industrial, trespasses have to be kept in check by the fear of retaliatory trespasses.” Spencer, however, is not satisfied with this state of affairs. Recall that he says trade-unions belong to “a passing phase of social evolution.” Passing to what?

#### Just as individuals maintain a right to self-defense even in the omnilateral will because omitting such a right is inconsistent with the individual’s duty of self-preservation, individuals maintain a right to unionize to counter such aggression *even if* the aggression is already illegal in order to protect their own freedom.

#### \*The current corporate climates manages employers as just another cost to manage. This ends based approach leads to coercive action that damages the autonomy of employees. Unions are key – through championing polices that protect worker rights – they represent a stance against employer tyranny. Turns econ and layoff arguments – aff mindset makes corporation more effective.

Budd and Scoville 5 [John W., Industrial Relations Land Grant Chair and Director of the Center for Human Resources and Labor Studies at the University of Minnesota, and James G., Professor Emeritus of Industrial Relations. University of Minnesota. “The Ethics of Human Resources and Industrial Relations. <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=56dE7nLMNdoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR6&dq=The+Ethics+of+Human+Resources+and+Industrial+Relations&ots=4b42WHrdDh&sig=FsQwOJzAdgSX3zQsK5_H1DtKfXA#v=onepage&q&f=false>] LADI//JD

Ethical Human Resources Management in the Kantian tradition Respecting the Humanity of a Person Many of the moral objections to human resource management amount to the fact that employees are treated as merely a means to increase proﬁts for stockholders. If enlightened human resource management techniques lead to greater proﬁt, then they should be adopted. If they do not lead to greater proﬁt then they should not be adopted. This was the view allegedly held by jack Welch. In his early days at GE. he was known as “neutron jack” because he let the buildings but ﬁred so many employees. Later he discovered enlightened human resource management and became convinced that GE could be more profitable with that approach. Welch was asked. If later evidence nulliﬁed the greater proﬁtability of the enlightened approach. would he give it up? “Of course” was his answer. Welch's View regarding human resource management is purely instrumental. The Kantian argues that employees must not be treated in certain ways even if proﬁtability could be increased by doing so. For example, the use of coercion or deception is wrong. The charge that employees are routinely lied to in the business context is a serious indictment of the morality of management. Retirees have been promised health beneﬁts only to have them denied. Employees have been promised a certain level of pension contribution only to have management renege. Enron management urged employees not to sell Enron stock even though they knew that Enron was in serious ﬁnancial trouble and even though they sold their own stock. The list of companies that have engaged in such conduct is seemingly endless. From a Kantian perspective that conduct is wrong. These actions violate not only the second formulation of the categorical imperative but the ﬁrst formulation as well. Since all the actions involve lying or deception, they cannot be consistently universalized. Thus one of the ways to treat the humanity in a person with respect is to be transparent in word and deed. One goal of Kantian human resource management should be an increase in transparency, for it is transparency that provides the proper antidote to deception. One of the most transparent management practices is open book management. Developed by jack Stack at the Springfield Manufacturing Company (Stack 1992), open book management won a prestigious business ethics award. The goal of open book management is to make everyone a mini-CFO; employees are given all the ﬁnancial information about the company. Needless to say. open book management is not soft. Imagine a business in which everyone in the organization focused on the proﬁtability of the firm. Thus, open book management is supposed to be good business. With complete information and the proper incentives, employees behave responsibly without the usual layers of supervision. The success of open book management can be dramatically increased when it is combined with a proﬁt-sharing program. As one foreman put it, where there is a profit- sharing plan and complete sharing of information, no one is likely to order extra inventory or make other choices that will undercut the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm. However. the case for open book management is not just proﬁt related. in a video exploring the practice. employees speak of their increased freedom and responsibility. One woman sums it up: “I'm not just a name on a time card. I am somebody, I am a person that is just the kind of statement a Kantian wants to hear. Obviously the employees under open book management do not feel that they are treated as a means merely. “icy feel treated as autonomous responsible adults—as persons (Case 1995).Though much has been written about proﬁt sharing, few have recognized that profit sharing throughout the business could be a means for reducing coercion and deception. Profit-sharing plans that extend to the entire workforce could allow everyone to share in the gains that result from increasing productivity. Since everyone would have an interest in the success of the ﬁrm, there would be demands for access to informa- tion to make sure that the proﬁt-sharing plan is handled fairly (Ben-Ner and Jones 1995). In theory, companywide profit-sharing plans also allow everyone to share the risks of an economic downturn—speciﬁcally, by avoiding lay- offs. Many critics of capitalism argue that layoffs are coercive. Defenders of layoffs argue that they are often an economic necessity, one that every employee understands when agreeing to employment, and that an employee who freely accepts an employment contract cannot complain of coercion when a layoff occurs. That response raises an interesting philosophical issue about the nature of coercion. The overwhelming number of people need to work to survive, at least for a large portion of their lives. There is a sense in which people are forced to work. When an assailant says, “Your wallet or your life,” you technically have a choice. However, for many this situation is the paradigm of coercion. How close is the analogy between the assailant and the requirements of the employer? Admittedly, in good times the balance of power shifts somewhat, but in hard times the balance of power is with the employer. Most people have to take the terms of employment as they get them (Manning 2003). Someone wanting employment does not negotiate about whether or not to be tested for drugs, for example. If drug testing is the company policy, you either submit to the test or forfeit the job. If you want a job, you agree to employment at will and to layoffs if management believes they are nec- essary. Survival for yourself and any dependents requires it. As with the assailant, you technically have a choice, but most employees argue they have little choice about multiple important terms of employment. A Kantian, in common with the pluralist school of industrial relations, maintains that the imbalance between employer and employee ought to be addressed. Otherwise, industrial relations rests on an unethical foundation. Layoffs are psychologically devastating to most employees. You can lose many of the goods you purchase with your salary without feeling a loss of respect. However, in Kantian terms, a layoff damages self-respect. The person who loses a job feels herself diminished and someone who is not fully worthy. I suspect that some of this results because the person who loses a job also loses some of her freedom or autonomy, and autonomy is a central human value. Thus a Kantian would argue on moral grounds that there is a prima facie case against layoffs. Layoffs are some- what coercive and are damaging to employee self-respect, so unless they are absolutely necessary, they are wrong. Proﬁt sharing is a way of avoiding layoffs. If proﬁts fall, everyone suffers a diminished paycheck. However, unless the fall-off in proﬁts is incredibly severe, no one need lose a job. Indeed, if there were no prof- its to be shared, there still are alternatives to layoffs. Rather than anyone being laid off, everyone can take a cut in pay. In other words, in troubled economic times, the pain can be spread rather than fall completely on those who are laid off. Sometimes layoffs are an economic necessity, and the moral pre- sumption against them is overridden. However, a Kantian does not like to ﬁre people and seeks alternatives to layoffs wherever possible. More- over, the Kantian approach makes sound business sense. Research, including that by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Frederick F. Reichheld, has doc- umented the payoffs that result when management seeks alternatives to layoffs (Pfeffer 1994, 1998; Reichheld 1996). Another study shows that the stock prices of companies that downsize do more poorly than those that don’t (Dorfman 1991). Companies that do not downsize have also been found to have a productivity advantage (Pfeffer 1998). Managers also often overlook the cost of training. Reichheld (1996) has demonstrated the cost savings that result from a stable and loyal workforce. Sometimes a negative case tells as much as a positive one. Apple Computer serves as a poignant example. Under Steve Jobs, Apple had a unique culture that was characterized by high employee morale. Apple was known for employee accessibility to management, recognition of employee milestones, and bagels and cream cheese on Fridays. Employ- ment was stable. The employee handbook celebrated the importance of people to the ﬁrm’s success. But Apple was under extreme competitive pressure from Microsoft. How should management handle this pressure? The company behaved in a traditional and destructive manner. John Scully replaced Steve Jobs and introduced a new management philosophy that traditionally pleases Wall Street. Scully saw employees as costs, not as responsible moral beings deserving of respect. Layoffs were made in 1985, with a second round in 1991. By then Apple had eliminated 10% of its workforce. But Apple’s competitive position did not improve, and Scully was ﬁred. The approach to employees remained the same, however; they were viewed as costs and the layoﬁ's continued. By 1997 Apple had less than half of its original workforce.

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end, violating the premises of an agreed upon duty based on freedom

#### 3] The aff homogenizes all strikes as an unconditional right which is unethical.

Loewy 2K, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since., rc HKR-RM)

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic —that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, inasmuch as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.

#### International law solves nothing – no enforcement

Hathaway 02 [Oona Hathaway, Assc Professor, Boston U. School of Law. Associate Professor Designate, Yale Law School, 2002 (“Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” 111 Yale L.J. 1935) Lexis

Where there is a disjuncture between expressive benefits and instrumental goals, it is possible that the expressive aspect of treaties will serve to relieve pressure for real change in performance in countries that ratify the treaty. Because such treaties offer rewards "for positions rather than for effects," 230 countries can and will take positions to which they do not subsequently conform and benefit from doing so. This is particularly true of treaties enacted for the direct benefit neither of the joining parties nor of those pushing for enactment, but rather of uninvolved third parties. In this sense, **human rights treaties can take on the character of "charitable" enactments** that are "designed to benefit people other than the ones whose gratification is the payment for passage," and **which**, as a result, often **suffer from indifferent enforcement** **and have little impact**. **231** There is arguably no area of international law in which the disjuncture between the expressive and instrumental aspects of a treaty is more evident than human rights. **Monitoring and enforcement of human rights treaty obligations are often minimal**, thereby making it difficult to give the lie to a country's expression of commitment to the goals of a treaty. The strongest means of treaty enforcement - military intervention and economic sanctions - are used relatively infrequently to enforce human rights norms, 232 in no small part because there is little incentive for individual states to take on the burden of engaging in such enforcement activity. **233** **Because of the infrequency** with which the international community resorts to such means of enforcement, **the threat of their use does not contribute** meaningfully to day-to-day compliance with the multitude of human rights treaties. 234 Moreover, as Louis Henkin puts it, "the principal element of horizontal deterrence is missing" in the area of human rights: "The threat that "if you violate the human rights of your inhabitants, we will violate the human rights of our inhabitants' hardly serves as a deterrent." 235  [\*2007]  Consequently, most human rights treaties rely not on sanctions to encourage compliance but instead on treaty-based and charter-based organs dedicated to monitoring compliance with particular treaties or particular sets of treaties, often through a system of self-reporting. 236 Were these monitoring systems effective, it is possible that the threat to reputation that they could pose to noncomplying countries would be sufficient to keep noncompliance at low levels. Yet most of these **systems have proven** woefully **inadequate, with countries** regularly and repeatedly **failing to meet minimal procedural requirements with no repercussions**. **237** Indeed, although treaties often require countries that join them to submit to semi-regular scrutiny by a treaty body, there is no real penalty for failure to participate in this process or for obeying the letter but not the spirit of the treaty requirements. **238** As a consequence, the failure of a country to comply with its treaty obligations is, in most cases, unlikely to be revealed and examined except by already overtaxed NGOs. **239**

#### Following international law only limits US heg.

Rivkin 2000 [Partner @ Baker & Hostetler LLP [David, “The Rocky Shoals of International Law”, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2000_Winter/ai_68547471/>]

The impetus for extending the reach of international law stems from both our allies and our adversaries, who have chosen to use it as a means to check, or at least harness, American power. While each group has different strategic goals, from the perspective of both, the great "problem" of international affairs in the post-Cold War world is the unchallenged military, diplomatic, economic and even cultural predominance of the United States. Our global antagonists, particularly China, would like to see the United States disengage from world affairs. For our allies, who continue to depend far too much on U.S. military might to wish for a new American isolationism, the great danger has become American "unilateralism"—an all-purpose term for U.S. action not sanctioned by the "international community." They do not want to prevent U.S. global engagement; they want to influence and control it.¶ Both our allies and our adversaries understand the value of international law in achieving their ends. Law and its rhetoric have always played a far more important role in the United States than in almost any other country. We are a nation bound together not by ties of blood or religion, but by paper and ink. The Declaration of Independence itself was, at its heart, an appeal to law—the laws of nature and of nature’s God—to justify an act of rebellion against the British Crown. As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in the early days of the American republic: "[t]he influence of legal habits [in the United States] extends beyond the precise limits I have pointed out. Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question. Hence all parties are obliged to borrow, in their daily controversies, the ideas, and even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings." Tocqueville was clearly prescient. Today almost every key policy issue in the United States is framed as a legal question. Law is our genius and our Achilles’ Heel. If the trends of international law in the 1990s are allowed to mature into binding rules, international law may prove to be one of the most potent weapons ever deployed against the United States.

#### US leadership in this decade solves global war and results in a peaceful end to Chinese revisionism **Erickson and Collins 10/21** [(Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021] U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. **China’s power is peaking**; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) **domestic strength.** In the long term, China’s **likely decline** after this peak is a **good thing.** But right now, it creates a **decade of danger** from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a **short time** to fulfill some of its **most critical**, long-held **goals.**

Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in [Xinjiang](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html), and coercively enveloping Hong Kong.

The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan.

Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown.

Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career.

U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power.

As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut.

China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds.

As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do.

Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts.

Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries.

Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action.

While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and [Hong Kong](https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210716_33) have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time.

While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years.

Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to ~~cripple~~ [destroy] the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with.

Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade.

The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge.

So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan.

U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches.

Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on [oil](http://english.customs.gov.cn/Statics/0aba4bfd-f8ed-477c-9d16-dc3def897b7b.html), but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes.

Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war.

Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have 20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on.

Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to [Taiwan](https://www.andrewerickson.com/2021/06/quick-look-cmsis-4-6-may-2021-conference-large-scale-amphibious-warfare-in-chinese-military-strategy-taiwan-strait-campaign-focus/). But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets).

Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China.

Bombastic Chinese reactions to emerging cohesive actions verify the approach’s effectiveness and potential for halting—and perhaps even reversing—the revisionist tide China has unleashed across the Asian region. Consider the recent nuclear submarine deal among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Beijing’s strong public reaction (including toleration of [nuclear threats](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234460.shtml) made by the state-affiliated *Global Times*) highlights the gap between its global information war touting China’s irresistible power and deeply insecure internal self-perception. Eight nuclear submarines will ultimately represent formidable military capacity, but for a bona fide superpower that believes in its own capabilities, they would not be a game-changer. Consider the U.S.-NATO reaction to the Soviet Union’s commissioning of eight Oscar I/II-class cruise missile subs during the late Cold War. These formidable boats each carried 24 SS-N-19 Granit missiles specifically designed to kill U.S. carrier battle groups, yet NATO never stooped to public threats.

With diplomatic proofs of concepts like the so-called AUKUS deal, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and hard security actions like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative now falling into place, it is time to comprehensively peak the non-authoritarian world’s protective action to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific. During this decade, U.S. policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate Chinese behavior. Xi’s recreation of a “one-man” system is a one-way, high-leverage bet that decisions he drives will succeed.

If Xi miscalculates, a significant risk given his suppression of dissenting voices while China raises the stakes in its confrontation with the United States, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left him with outsized returns on a successful bet would instead amplify the downside, all of which he personally and exclusively signed for. Resulting tensions could very realistically undermine his status and authority, embolden internal challengers, and weaken the party. They could also foreseeably drive him to double down on mistakes, especially if those led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict. Personal survival measures could thus rapidly transmute into regional or even global threats.

If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the U.S. electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure as well as that of allies and partners abroad for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that actual conflict is a concrete possibility. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“if you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a variety of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with China.

Given these unforgiving dynamics and stakes, implications for U.S. planners are stark: Do whatever remains possible to “peak” for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s, and accept whatever trade-offs are available for doing so.

Nothing we might theoretically achieve in 2035 and beyond is worth pursuing at the expense of China-credible capabilities we can realistically achieve no later than the mid-to-late 2020s.

#### US primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; //GrRv)  
Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profited far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fictional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how significantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacific, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

The threats today are compelling and urgent, and there may someday come a time when the balance of power has shifted so markedly that the postwar international system cannot be sustained. Yet that moment of failure has not yet arrived, and so the goal of U.S. strategy should be not to hasten it by giving up prematurely, but to push it off as far into the future as possible. Rather than simply acquiescing in the decline of a world it spent generations building, America should aggressively bolster its defenses, with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change

Starr 15 [(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015] DD  
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs.

Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.]

The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere.

Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.]

Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years?

The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death.

Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet.  Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?