## 1NC – T

#### Interpretation: topical affs must fiat an action through the World Trade Organization

#### Member nations of the WTO make policies as a whole

WTO ND [(World Trade Organization) “Whose WTO is it anyway?”] JL

The WTO is run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers (who usually meet at least once every two years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who meet regularly in Geneva). Decisions are normally taken by consensus.

In this respect, the WTO is different from some other international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In the WTO, power is not delegated to a board of directors or the organization’s head.

When WTO rules impose disciplines on countries’ policies, that is the outcome of negotiations among WTO members. The rules are enforced by the members themselves under agreed procedures that they negotiated, including the possibility of trade sanctions. But those sanctions are imposed by member countries, and authorized by the membership as a whole. This is quite different from other agencies whose bureaucracies can, for example, influence a country’s policy by threatening to withhold credit.

Reaching decisions by consensus among some 150 members can be difficult. Its main advantage is that decisions made this way are more acceptable to all members. And despite the difficulty, some remarkable agreements have been reached. Nevertheless, proposals for the creation of a smaller executive body — perhaps like a board of directors each representing different groups of countries — are heard periodically. But for now, the WTO is a member-driven, consensus-based organization.

#### Collective nouns are singular – this means “member nations” refers to a singular entity

MLA 3/8 [“Should I use a singular or plural verb with a collective noun?” MLA Style Center, 3/8/2021] JL

Collective nouns, like *team*, *family, class*, *group*, and *host*, take a singular verb when the entity acts together and a plural verb when the individuals composing the entity act individually. The following examples demonstrate this principle:

The team is painting a mural. (The team collectively paints the mural, so the verb is singular*.*)

#### Violation – they don’t

#### Prefer:

#### Precision – even if Jordan is a member nation, that’s distinct from fiating member nations as a unified actor – outweighs because it justifies jettisoning other words in the rez – prefer our interp – we have evidence from the WTO that explains what coordinated action looks like

#### Limits and ground – explodes the topic to include affs about any country reducing IP – ensuring it is an international reduction of IP which is ensures link magnitude and generics like WTO bad, multilat Ks, negotiations and politics DAs, and circumvention – stretches pre-tournament neg prep too thin and precluding rigorous testing – theory and medicine spec affs solve PICs

#### Topic ed – WTO patent waivers are the topic – their aff is just domestic policy passed in Jordan – proven by their second advantage – none of their internal links are about medical trade secrets which proves their interpretation is a cheap way of getting a relations impact about any two countries – justifies the US-Mexico or China-Japan aff. Outweighs – prep is determined by the lit and we only have 2 months to debate the topic

#### TVA – spec a medicine – ensures nuanced debates while preserving WTO-specific ground

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – they incentivize abusive strategies to bait shells and T is a basic aff burden

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

## 1NC – T

#### Interpretation: intellectual property protections is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that member nations of the World Trade Organization reduce a subset of intellectual property protections for medicines.

Nebel 19 Jake Nebel [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs.] , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.1 “Colleges and Universities” “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. Fourth, it is extremely unlikely that the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some.” No such addition would be necessary or expected for the generic interpretation since generics lack explicit quantifiers by default. The topic committee’s likely intentions are not decisive, but they strongly suggest that the generic interpretation is correct, since it’s prima facie unlikely that a committee charged with writing a sentence to be debated would be so badly mistaken about what their sentence means (which they would be if they intended the existential interpretation). The committee, moreover, does not write resolutions for the 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the national circuit; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic with respect to “colleges and universities,” given its face-value meaning and standard expectations about what LD resolutions tend to mean.

#### It applies to IP protections:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that nations ought to reduce one type of IPP does not entail that those nations ought to reduce all kinds of IPP

#### Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because a reduction is universal and permanent

#### Vote neg:

#### Limits – there are countless affs accounting for every kind of intellectual property protections, like tertiary patents, provisional patents, and design patents – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden

#### Ground – spec guts core generics like innovation that rely on reducing all kinds of IP for all medicines because individual types of IP don’t substantially affect the pharmaceutical industry – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs

#### TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez

#### C/a paradigm issues

## 1NC – Consult CP

#### CP: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the World Health Organization over reducing data exclusivity for medicines. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will support the proposal and adopt the results of consultation.

#### WHO says yes:

#### It opposes data exclusivity and TRIPS-plus measures

WHO 17 [(World Health Organization) “Data exclusivity and other TRIPS-plus measures,” UHC Technical Brief, 2017] JL

Finally, data exclusivity could prevent the registration of generic versions of medicines even when there is no patent on a medicine, e.g. when a pharmaceutical product does not meet the standards for patentability (e.g. because it is not new or an inventive step), the patent lapses, when a country has no patent law, or when patents are not being granted for pharmaceuticals. The latter situation can arise in least-developed countries that are World Trade Organization (WTO) Members, which do not have to grant or enforce patents for pharmaceuticals until 2033.b

It has at times been argued that Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement makes it mandatory for countries to grant data exclusivity. However, careful reading of Article 39.3 (see Box 1) does not warrant this conclusion; the text of the Article does not make any reference whatsoever to exclusivity or exclusive rights.

Article 39.3 requires countries to protect undisclosed registration data about new chemical entities (i) against disclosure and (ii) against unfair commercial use. Thus, regulatory authorities may not publish registration data,c or share them with third parties (e.g. generic competitors). There is some debate as to what exactly is meant by “unfair commercial use”. Does the use of bioequivalence studies instead of full clinical trials represent “unfair commercial use”? There is no “unfair commercial use” by the generic company: the generic manufacturer never uses the originator’s data, and does not even have access to them. Meanwhile, regulatory authorities also do not normally use the originator’s data, though, as mentioned above, they may (indirectly) rely on them. Even even if the regulators were to use the data, it would not be commercial use, as the regulatory agency is not a commercial organization. The unfair comercial use does not apply to the work of a government regulatory body.

Thus, legal and public health experts believe that TRIPS requires data protection, but not data exclusivity – and national laws do not need to be more restrictive than TRIPS. It is important to note that least-developed countries are not required to provide the data protection mandated by TRIPS on pharmaceuticals till 2033.

It is also worthwhile noting that in developing countries, regulatory authorities often rely on data that are already published or otherwise in the public domain – and that therefore do not fall within the scope of Article 39.3 (which imposes protection only for undisclosed data).

As mentioned above, from the perspective of public health and access to medicines, it is preferable not to grant data exclusivity. Moreover, there is no requirement under international law that countries grant data exclusivity; countries have to provide for data protection only.

#### It supports increasing the availability of generics

Hoen 03 [(Ellen T., researcher at the University Medical Centre at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands who has been listed as one of the 50 most influential people in intellectual property by the journal Managing Intellectual Property, PhD from the University of Groningen) “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond,” Chicago Journal of International Law, 2003] JL

However, subsequent resolutions of the World Health Assembly have strengthened the WHO’s mandate in the trade arena. In 2001, the World Health Assembly adopted two resolutions in particular that had a bearing on the debate over TRIPS [30]. The resolutions addressed:

– the need to strengthen policies to increase the availability of generic drugs;

#### Existing share of generics in Jordan is below their recommendation

Alkhatib et al 18 [(Alaa R., works for the Jordan Food and Drug Administration, Shafa Badran, Amman, Jordan) “Assessment of Drug Prescribing in Jordan Using World Health Organization Indicators,” Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences, 11/21/2018] JL

Given the scarcity of studies of drug prescribing behavior in Jordan, the present study was an attempt to shed light on the current situation in Jordan and to provide baseline data for future action. The study was conducted in primary health care centers in Amman governorate; the capital of Jordan, using the WHO recommended protocol. The present study showed the values of five prescribing indicators, namely: the average number of prescribed drugs per outpatient encounter (3.0), the percentage of medicines prescribed by generic name (50.3%), the percentage of prescriptions with an antibiotic prescribed (61%), the percentage of prescriptions with an injection prescribed (7%) and the Percentage of drugs prescribed from essential drug list (97.6%). Poly-pharmacy, overuse of antibiotics and under-prescribing by generic name are still common in Jordan. The overall average number of prescribed drugs per outpatient prescription (3.0) was substantially higher than the international average of 1.7 drugs per prescription, as shown in Table 1 [7]. The range of number of drugs per encounter in different centers was from (2.7 to 3.4). Of particular concern was that 45% of prescriptions contained three or more drugs.

#### Consultation displays strong leadership and authority which are key to WHO legitimacy

Gostin et al 15 [(Lawrence O., Linda D. & Timothy J. O’Neill Professor of Global Health Law at Georgetown University, Faculty Director of the O’Neill Institute for National & Global Health Law, Director of the World Health Organization Collaborating Center on Public Health Law & Human Rights, JD from Duke University) “The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization,” Georgetown University Law Center, 5/2/2015] JL

Members want the WHO to exert leadership, harmonize disparate activities, and set priorities. Yet they resist intrusions into their sovereignty, and want to exert control. In other words, ‘everyone desires coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.’ States often ardently defend their geostrategic interests. As the Indonesian virus-sharing episode illustrates, the WHO is pulled between power blocs, with North America and Europe (the primary funders) on one side and emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India on the other. An inherent tension exists between richer ‘net contributor’ states and poorer ‘net recipient’ states, with the former seeking smaller WHO budgets and the latter larger budgets.

Overall, national politics drive self-interest, with states resisting externally imposed obligations for funding and action. Some political leaders express antipathy to, even distrust of, UN institutions, viewing them as bureaucratic and inefficient. In this political environment, it is unsurprising that members fail to act as shareholders. Ebola placed into stark relief the failure of the international community to increase capacities as required by the IHR. Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone had some of the world's weakest health systems, with little capacity to either monitor or respond to the Ebola epidemic.20 This caused enormous suffering in West Africa and placed countries throughout the region e and the world e at risk. Member states should recognize that the health of their citizens depends on strengthening others' capacity. The WHO has a central role in creating systems to facilitate and encourage such cooperation.

The WHO cannot succeed unless members act as shareholders, foregoing a measure of sovereignty for the global common good. It is in all states' interests to have a strong global health leader, safeguarding health security, building health systems, and reducing health inequalities. But that will not happen unless members fund the Organization generously, grant it authority and flexibility, and hold it accountable.

#### WHO is key to disease prevention – it is the only international institution that can disperse information, standardize global public health, and facilitate public-private cooperation

Murtugudde 20 [(Raghu, professor of atmospheric and oceanic science at the University of Maryland, PhD in mechanical engineering from Columbia University) “Why We Need the World Health Organization Now More Than Ever,” Science, 4/19/2020] JL

WHO continues to play an indispensable role during the current COVID-19 outbreak itself. In November 2018, the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine organised a workshop to explore lessons from past influenza outbreaks and so develop recommendations for pandemic preparedness for 2030. The salient findings serve well to underscore the critical role of WHO for humankind.

The world’s influenza burden has only increased in the last two decades, a period in which there have also been 30 new zoonotic diseases. A warming world with increasing humidity, lost habitats and industrial livestock/poultry farming has many opportunities for pathogens to move from animals and birds to humans. Increasing global connectivity simply catalyses this process, as much as it catalyses economic growth.

WHO coordinates health research, clinical trials, drug safety, vaccine development, surveillance, virus sharing, etc. The importance of WHO’s work on immunisation across the globe, especially with HIV, can hardly be overstated. It has a rich track record of collaborating with private-sector organisations to advance research and development of health solutions and improving their access in the global south.

It discharges its duties while maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between such diverse and powerful forces as national securities, economic interests, human rights and ethics. COVID-19 has highlighted how political calculations can hamper data-sharing and mitigation efforts within and across national borders, and WHO often simply becomes a convenient political scapegoat in such situations.

International Health Regulations, a 2005 agreement between 196 countries to work together for global health security, focuses on detection, assessment and reporting of public health events, and also includes non-pharmaceutical interventions such as travel and trade restrictions. WHO coordinates and helps build capacity to implement IHR.

#### Extinction – defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

#### WHO diplomacy solves great power conflict

Murphy 20 [(Chris, U.S. senator from Connecticut serving on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee) “The Answer is to Empower, Not Attack, the World Health Organization,” War on the Rocks, 4/21/2020] JL

The World Health Organization is critical to stopping disease outbreaks and strengthening public health systems in developing countries, where COVID-19 is starting to appear. Yemen announced its first infection earlier this month, and other countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East are at severe risk. Millions of refugees rely on the World Health Organization for their health care, and millions of children rely on the WHO and UNICEF to access vaccines.

The World Health Organization is not perfect, but its team of doctors and public health experts have had major successes. Their most impressive claim to fame is the eradication of smallpox – no small feat. More recently, the World Health Organization has led an effort to rid the world of two of the three strains of polio, and they are close to completing the trifecta.

These investments are not just the right thing to do; they benefit the United States. Improving health outcomes abroad provides greater political and economic stability, increasing demand for U.S. exports. And, as we are all learning now, it is in America’s national security interest for countries to effectively detect and respond to potential pandemics before they reach our shores.

As the United States looks to develop a new global system of pandemic prevention, there is absolutely no way to do that job without the World Health Organization. Uniquely, it puts traditional adversaries – like Russia and the United States, India and Pakistan, or Iran and Saudi Arabia – all around the same big table to take on global health challenges. It has relationships with the public health leaders of every nation, decades of experience in tackling viruses and diseases, and the ability to bring countries together to tackle big projects. This ability to bridge divides and work across borders cannot be torn down and recreated – not in today’s environment of major power competition – and so there is simply no way to build an effective international anti-pandemic infrastructure without the World Health Organization at the center.

## 1NC – K

#### The aff’s portrayal of a world with reduced IP protections as an “information commons” where medical inequality is solved by deregulation perpetuates the neoliberal myth of a perfect market **Kapczynski 14** [(Amy, a Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Faculty Co-Director of the Global Health Justice Partnership, and Faculty Co-Director of the Collaboration for Research Integrity and Transparency. She is also Faculty Co-Director of the Law and Political Economy Project and cofounder of the Law and Political Economy blog. Her areas of research include information policy, intellectual property law, international law, and global health.) “INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S LEVIATHAN” Duke Law, Law & Contemporary problems, 2014. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4710&context=lcp] BC

Over the last decade or so, a powerful set of critiques has emerged to contest the dominant account just sketched out as well as the contemporary state of IP law.12 These arguments have come from many directions, some even arising from scholars who previously were champions of the dominant account.13 The most prominent and potent line of theoretical critique in the legal literature has come in the guise of arguments for free culture and the “information commons” and has been most influentially articulated by Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler.14 Both have stressed the problems with expansive exclusive rights regimes in information and have also sketched a set of actually existing alternatives to market-based exclusionary forms of information and cultural production.

Lessig has written a series of influential books that have made him a “rock star of the information age,”15 particularly for young Internet and free-culture activists. He has argued powerfully, for example, that existing copyright law is in deep conflict with the radical new possibilities for creativity in the digital age. As he points out, when a mother posting a video of her toddler dancing to a Prince song on YouTube is threatened with a $150,000 fine for copyright infringement, something has gone seriously awry.16 Lessig also contends that copyright law today is too long, too expansive, and instantiates a “permission culture” that is antithetical to free expression in the age of the remix.17 As he puts it, “the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that reaches far beyond local boundaries,” creating the possibility of markets that “include a much wider and more diverse range of creators,” if not stifled by incumbents who use IP law to “protect themselves against this competition.”18

Benkler’s work has also been extraordinarily formative in the field, particularly for his insights into the multiplicity of modes of information production. As he has stressed, the conventional justification for IP does not account for the many successful and longstanding modes of market nonexclusionary information production.19 For example, attorneys write articles to attract clients, software developers sell services customizing free and opensource software for individual clients, and bands give music away for free to increase revenues from touring or merchandise.20 More pathbreaking still is Benkler’s account of the importance of “commons-based peer production,” a form of socially motivated and cooperative production exemplified by the volunteer network that maintains Wikipedia or the groups of coders who create open-source software products such as the Linux operating system.21 In the digital networked age, as Benkler describes, the tools of information production are very broadly distributed, “creating new opportunities for how we make and exchange information, knowledge, and culture.”22 These changes have increased the relative role in our information economy of nonproprietary production and facilitate “new forms of production [that] are based neither in the state nor in the market.”23 Because commons-based peer production is not hierarchically organized and is motivated by social dynamics and concerns, it also offers new possibilities for human development, human freedom, a more critical approach to culture, and more democratic forms of political participation.24

This line of critique has been profoundly generative and has helped launch an important new conceptualization of the commons as a paradigm. That paradigm, as a recent book puts it, “helps us ‘get outside’ of the dominant discourse of the market economy and helps us represent different, more wholesome ways of being.”25 Proponents of the commons concept draw upon contemporary articulations of successful commons-based resource management by Elinor Ostrom and her followers.26 They do mobilize retellings of the political and economic history of the commons in land in Europe before enclosure,27 and recent evidence from psychology and behavioral economics that suggests that humans have deep tendencies toward cooperation and reciprocation.28 They argue that A key revelation of the commons way of thinking is that we humans are not in fact isolated, atomistic individuals. We are not amoebas with no human agency except hedonistic “utility preferences” expressed in the marketplace. No: We are commoners—creative, distinctive individuals inscribed within larger wholes. We may have unattractive human traits fueled by individual fears and ego, but we are also creatures entirely capable of self-organization and cooperation; with a concern for fairness and social justice; and willing to make sacrifices for the larger good and future generations.29

This stands, of course, as a powerful rebuke to the neoliberal imaginary, which “constructs and interpellates individuals as . . . rational, calculating creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for ‘self-care’— the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions.”30

III

Given this radical—and, in my view, critically important—attempt to rethink the subject at the core of neoliberal accounts, it is all the more striking that proponents of the commons often appear to adopt a neoliberal image of the state. For example, the introduction to a recently edited volume that gathers writings on the commons from seventy-three authors in thirty countries (entitled, tellingly, The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond Market and State) has this to say:

The presumption that the state can and will intervene to represent the interests of citizens is no longer credible. Unable to govern for the long term, captured by commercial interests and hobbled by stodgy bureaucratic structures in an age of nimble electronic networks, the state is arguably incapable of meeting the needs of citizens as a whole.31

The commons, they suggest, is a concept that seeks not only to liberate us from predatory and dysfunctional markets, but also from predatory and dysfunctional states. Something immediately seems incongruous here. If people are inherently cooperative reciprocators, why are states irredeemably corrupt? After all, as Harold Demsetz famously wrote in his 1967 attack on Arrow’s optimism about state production of information, “[g]overnment is a group of people.”32

Lessig, one of the progenitors of the language of the commons in the informational domain, often leads with a similar view of the state:

[I]f the twentieth century taught us one lesson, it is the dominance of private over state ordering. Markets work better than Tammany Hall in deciding who should get what, when. Or as Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase put it, whatever problems there are with the market, the problems with government are more profound.33

Lessig reveals his own sense of the power of this conception of the state when he seeks to tar IP law with the same brush; we should rebel against current IP law, he suggests, because we should “limit the government’s role in choosing the future of creativity.”34

Benkler is more measured but admits as well to viewing the state as “a relatively suspect actor.”35 We should worry, he suggests, that direct governmental intervention “leads to centralization in the hands of government agencies and powerful political lobbies,”36 a view that echoes the neoliberal account described above.

It should perhaps not surprise us that leading critics of neoliberal information policy embrace a neoliberal conception of the state. After all, neoliberalism is not merely an ideology, but also a set of policy prescriptions that may have helped to call forth the state that it has described. As David Harvey puts it, “[t]he neoliberal fear that special-interest groups would pervert and subvert the state is nowhere better realized than in Washington, where armies of corporate lobbyists . . . effectively dictate legislation to match their special interests.”37

There are, it must be said, few areas of law that better exemplify this problem than IP law. For example, Jessica Litman has documented the astonishing process through which the 1976 Copyright Act was drafted, in which Congress delegated most of the drafting to interest groups that were forced to negotiate with one another.38 Other scholars have offered similarly startling accounts of the genesis of the most important IP treaty today, the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. TRIPS came into force in 1996, revolutionizing international IP law by both imposing new standards and by rendering them enforceable through the WTO’s disputeresolution system, which authorizes trade retaliation to enforce its judgments. Most countries in the world are members of TRIPS, and the Agreement introduced, for developing countries in particular, substantial new obligations, such as the obligation to grant patents on medicines and food-related inventions. Several excellent histories of the treaty have been written, documenting its beginnings as a brash idea proposed by “twelve chief executive officers (representing pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software industries).”39 As Susan Sell has described, the TRIPS Agreement was a triumph of industry organizing. Through TRIPS, Industry revealed its power to identify and define a trade problem, devise a solution, and reduce it to a concrete proposal that could be sold to governments.

#### Attempts to reform the WTO are neoliberal attempts to sustain the US regime of accumulation – the contradictions of capitalism are why credibility is low, not IP protection

Bachand 20 [(Remi, Professor of International Law, Département des sciences juridiques, member of the Centre d’études sur le droit international et la mondialisation (CÉDIM), Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada) “What’s Behind the WTO Crisis? A Marxist Analysis” The European Journal of International Law, 8/12/2020. https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/31/3/857/5920920?redirectedFrom=fulltext] BC

To offer our own explanation, we must recall two aspects of our theoretical framework. The first is Robert Cox’s claim113 that the function of international organizations is to ensure the creation and reproduction of hegemony. To be more accurate, they serve, if we follow his argument, to defend and to expand the ‘mode of production’ (we elected to substitute this term for the concept of ‘regime of accumulation’ that appears to be more appropriate for our means) of the dominant social classes of the dominant state. Joining this idea with the école de la régulation and social structure of accumulation theory writing114 according to which a regime of accumulation needs some regulation institutions to help resolve its contradictions (and ensure profits and capital accumulation to dominant social classes), we can conclude that the Geneva organization’s function in the US hegemonic order is to make sure that neoliberalism works well enough to provide a satisfying rate of profit for US capitalists.

Going in that direction, Kristen Hopewell shows that the WTO’s creation participated in a shift in global governance from ‘embedded liberalism’ to neoliberalism115 and was slated to be an important part of that governance. Using the conceptual framework developed earlier, we can infer that the WTO was thus given a regulation function that was to ensure the operationalization of counteracting factors to the fall of the rate of profit for US capitalists. Now, as we have seen, the US rate of profit has been extremely unstable in the last two decades and Chinese expansion (and that of other ‘emerging countries’) allows one to predict that the situation could easily worsen in the future. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the crisis that has been striking neoliberalism for the last 20 years may also result in a crisis of the organizations that are supposed to manage its contradictions, especially the WTO. Concretely, this organization seems unable to fulfil its regulatory function anymore, which is to ensure US capitalists a good rate of profit and opportunities to operationalize enough counteracting factors to negate its fall.

To go further, we now need to return to Stephen Gill’s claim that the function of an international organization is to limit political and economic possibilities. It is to exclude, in other words, options that are incompatible with the social order promoted by the hegemon from what is possible and achievable.116 Effectively, the WTO was created to play such a role. Indeed, promoting liberalization of goods and services, protecting (notably intellectual) property rights and attacking subsidies (in non-agriculture sectors), just to give a few examples, all serve to severely reduce state interventions into the economy and to circumscribe or at least to strongly impede the turn towards an alternative model to neoliberalism

#### Neoliberal exploitation causes extinction.

Clark 18 (Brett, associate professor of sociology and sustainability studies at the University of Utah; Stefano B. Longo, Assistant Professor specializing in Environmental Sociology at NC State; “Land–Sea Ecological Rifts”, Land–Sea Ecological Rifts, https://monthlyreview.org/2018/07/01/land-sea-ecological-rifts/)

Covering approximately 70 percent of the Earth’s surface, the World Ocean is “the largest ecosystem.”1 Today all areas of the ocean are affected by multiple anthropogenic effects—such as overfishing, pollution, and emission of greenhouse gases, causing warming seas as well as ocean acidification—and over 40 percent of the ocean is strongly affected by human actions. Furthermore, the magnitude of these impacts and the speed of the changes are far greater than previously understood.2 Biologist Judith S. Weis explains that “the most widespread and serious type of [marine] pollution worldwide is eutrophication due to excess nutrients.”3 The production and use of fertilizers, sewage/waste from humans and farm animals, combustion of fossil fuels, and storm water have all contributed to dramatic increases in the quantity of nutrients in waterways and oceans. Research in 2008 indicated that there were over 400 “dead zones,” areas of low oxygen, mostly near the mouths of rivers.4 Nutrient overloading thus presents a major challenge to maintaining healthy aquatic ecosystems.

Nutrients are a basic source of nourishment that all organisms need to survive. Plants require at least eighteen elements to grow normally; of these, nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium are called macronutrients, because they are needed in larger quantities. While all essential nutrients exist in the biosphere, these three are the ones most commonly known to be deficient in commercial agricultural production systems. Beginning in the early twentieth century with the Haber-Bosch process, atmospheric nitrogen was converted into ammonia to create synthetic nitrogen fertilizer. The fixation of nitrogen, an energy-intensive process, made the nutrient far more widely available for use in agriculture. This in turn dramatically changed production systems, which no longer depended on legumes and manures to biologically supply nitrogen for other crops such as wheat, corn, and most vegetables.

In the modern era, particularly since the Second World War, the increased production and use of fertilizers served to greatly expand food production and availability. Major macronutrients are routinely applied to soils in order to maintain and increase the growth of plant life on farms, as well as private and public landscapes such as golf courses, nurseries, parks, and residences. They are used to produce fruits, vegetables, and fibers for human and non-human consumption, expand areas of recreation, and beautify communities. However, like many aspects of modern production, given the larger social dynamics and determinants that shape socioecological relationships, these technological and economic developments have generated serious negative—often unforeseen—consequences. The wide expansion and increasing rates of nitrogen and phosphorus application have caused severe damage to aquatic systems in particular. Rivers, streams, lakes, bays (estuaries), and ocean systems have been inundated with nutrient runoff, which has had far-reaching effects.

Here we examine the socioecological relationships and processes associated with the transfer of nutrients from terrestrial to marine systems. We employ a metabolic analysis to highlight the interchange of matter and energy within and between socioecological systems. In particular, we show how capitalist agrifood production contributes to distinct environmental problems, creating a metabolic rift in the soil nutrient cycle. We emphasize how the failure to mend nutrient cycles in agrifood systems has led to approaches that produce additional ruptures, such as those associated with nutrient overloading in marine systems. This analysis reveals the ways that the social relations of capitalist agriculture tend to produce interconnected ecological problems, such as those in terrestrial and aquatic systems. Further, we contend that these processes undermine the basic conditions of life on a wide-ranging scale. It is important to recognize that nutrient pollution of groundwater as well as surface waters has been a major concern since the rise of modern capitalist agriculture and the development of the global food regime.5 The failure to address the metabolic rupture in the soil nutrient cycle and the contradictions of capital are central to contemporary land-sea ecological rifts.

#### The alternative is a socialist movement that ends globalization

Galant 19 [(Michael, a coordinator of the Wire Pillar of the Progressive International, former economics and trade fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, MPP from Harvard University’s Kennedy School and BA in political economy from Brown University) “The Battle of Seattle: 20 years later, it's time for a revival” Open Democracy, 11/30/2019. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/battle-seattle-20-years-later-its-time-revival/] BC

20 years ago today, the streets of Seattle became front lines in the global class war.

Over the course of five days, some 40,000 individuals, representing unions, environmental groups, and Leftist organizations from around the world came together in an attempt to disrupt the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Using direct action tactics, activists physically delayed access to the meeting and led marches, rallies, and teach-ins that drew massive crowds. Protesters of all stripes were attacked by a violent police force – attracting international media coverage. The demonstrations outside became a wedge that would help drive the negotiations inside to collapse. The Battle of Seattle was won.

But the war continued. Seattle was about more than any single organization. The WTO was a symbol of the larger project of neoliberal globalization that was, in 1999, well on its way to reshaping the world in the interest of capital. The Battle of Seattle would become an equally potent symbol of resistance. The WTO protests marked the moment that the Alter-Globalization Movement (AGM), also known as the Global Justice, or disparagingly, the Anti-Globalization Movement, was launched into the public consciousness.

Much has changed in the two decades since. The AGM won many meaningful victories and experienced many more profound losses. Eventually, the movement faded. Today’s global economy resembles the neoliberal nightmare the Seattle protesters were fighting against more than the world they were fighting for. But recent years have revealed cracks in the surface. With an opportunity to finish what was started, it’s time to revive the spirit of Seattle.

Globalization and its dissent

Neoliberal globalization is a political project intended to raise the power of capital to the international level – to cement its supremacy as an immutable universal law beyond the reach of political communities. “Free trade” agreements and WTO rules establish the primacy of profit over democracy, labor, environmental, and consumer protections. World Bank and IMF loan conditions impose austerity, privatization, and deregulation on nations of the Global South. An international system of tax havens allows corporations and wealthy individuals to hoard their plundered resources. Global supply chain fragmentation shields multinationals from accountability for their abuses. Investment treaties unleash finance and corporations to cross borders in search of opportunities for exploitation, setting off a regulatory race to the bottom. If there was doubt before that capitalism must be confronted at the global level to be defeated, the power grab that is neoliberal globalization puts those doubts to rest. Capital is global. Labor must be too.

Yet there are forces preventing such global solidarity. Beginning during the Cold War, the majority of Northern labor accepted a compromise: support a foreign policy that enacts the interests of capital, and benefit from a share of the spoils in the form of minor concessions, a tempered welfare state, and cheap consumer goods. This tacit agreement survived largely intact into the neoliberal era – dividing the interests of a global working class and quelling demands for systemic global change.

The Alter-Globalization Movement rejected the compromise. While activists in the Global South had long resisted destructive free trade agreements and World Bank austerity, occasionally with solidarity from the North, the extremity of turn-of-the-century neoliberalism led to the explosion of a movement that refused to accept the mere crumbs of neocolonial extraction, and sought instead to build an alternative global economy for the many, both North and South.

This was a movement that brought together American anarchists with Korean peasants; libertarian socialist indigenous groups in Mexico with US anti-sweatshop activists; the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions with the Industrial Workers of the World; the Brazilian Movement for Landless Workers with Greenpeace; Filipino anti-capitalist scholars with French farmer activists best known for physically dismantling a McDonald’s. Their demands were many and varied – from land redistribution to the abolition of the World Bank, from a renegotiated NAFTA to the protection of indigenous knowledge of seeds from privatization – but all shared a vision of a global solidarity that would overcome the forces of neoliberal globalization.

Organizing under such a big tent, the AGM is better understood as a dispersed, informal network – a “movement of movements” – than a unified political structure. This fluid network manifested in many forms. The flagship World Social Forum regularly convened activists in an alternative to the annual World Economic Forum. Transnational advocacy networks campaigned on issues such as Global South debt relief. Northern activists used their positions of relative privilege to support local campaigns in the South, fighting water privatization in Bolivia and indigenous displacement from hydroelectric dams in India. And, as in Seattle, meetings of international organizations became rallying points for major global demonstrations.

With these organizing methods, the movement achieved substantial victories. The Jubilee 2000 campaign led to significant debt relief for Southern nations. Potentially disastrous trade agreements from the FTAA to TPP have been, at least temporarily, defeated. International Financial Institutions like the IMF and World Bank – while still agents of global capital – have vastly improved their lending practices since the 90’s. But its greatest successes were intangible: the AGM undermined the hegemonic ambitions embodied in Thatcher’s “There Is No Alternative”, slowed neoliberal globalization’s seemingly inexorable onslaught, and kept alive the flame of resistance during an otherwise nadir of Leftist politics.

The AGM should not, however, be romanticized. Emerging in a moment when the failures of 20th century socialist politics weighed heavily on the Left’s imagination, the AGM turned too far in the opposing direction. Big-tentism led to a dilution of demands and paved the way for the NGO-ization of the World Social Fora. A preference for all things decentralized made grabbing headlines easy, but building lasting political structures difficult. Resistance was often treated as an intrinsically valuable ends, rather than a means to taking power. And criticisms of “neoliberalism” typically fell short of identifying the true enemy – capitalism – or advancing a coherent alternative – socialism.

Ultimately, the neoliberal plan for the global economy succeeded more than not. While resistance to neoliberal globalization would rage on in the South, Northern solidarity faded. The September 11th attacks were the beginning of the end. Energy shifted to the anti-war movement, the state expanded its repression of Leftist organizing, and increased pressures toward “patriotism” led some to reconsider the old foreign policy compromise. By the mid-2000’s, little was left of what the AGM once was.

A call for revival

It’s time to rekindle the flame.

The global economy is still structured in the interest of capital. But the neoliberal consensus has begun to waver under the weight of its own contradictions.

The Right has a response to the crisis. Reactionary nationalists like Trump and Johnson seize upon existing systems of oppression to scapegoat the symptoms of a failed economic model. The problem is not that the global working class has lost out to a global capital class. The problem is that “we” – White, Christian, cishet, native-born Americans – have lost out to “them” – People of Color, immigrants, entire foreign countries, feminists, LGBTQ+ folks, and all those who threaten our supremacy in their struggles for liberation.

The Left must offer an alternative vision. The dramatic growth of socialist organizing and rise in popularity of social democratic politicians should offer great hope. But as the AGM understood, social democracy for the North is not enough. Our socialism must not mean merely a greater share of neocolonial extraction for Northern workers. Our socialism must rightly identify the global nature of our challenge, and unite across borders to confront a globalized capital.

That means internationalizing labor organizing to confront multinational corporations. Changing the rules of trade and investment. Ending tax havens. Building alternatives to the existing intellectual property regime. Holding corporations accountable for abuses in their supply chains. Supporting the struggles of peasants, indigenous peoples, and all global subaltern groups. Democratizing global governance. Opening borders to those displaced by the ravages of global capitalism. Advancing alternative models of development. Transforming, if not abolishing and replacing, the Bretton Woods Institutions. And confronting the all-important threat of climate collapse with, to begin with, a global Green New Deal. These are not minor addendums to a socialist platform. Class war is global. Internationalist demands are fundamental.

Organizations that remain from the AGM, international labor, and newcomers like Justice Is Global, the Fight Inequality Alliance, and Bernie Sanders and Yanis Varoufakis’s Progressive International, are already struggling for this vision. But its fruition depends on the backing of a far broader movement.

Like the AGM, we must take a global frame of analysis, and see neoliberal globalization as a concerted effort to undermine our power. Unlike the AGM, we must understand that neoliberalism is merely one manifestation of a greater enemy.

Like the AGM, we must build diverse, anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-xenophobic movements that transcend borders. Unlike the AGM, we must not allow fears of centralization to undermine a coherent platform.

Like the AGM, we must reject a class compromise that sacrifices the possibility of a better world for the crumbs of colonialism. Unlike the AGM, we must build lasting political structures that back our rejection with political power.

20 years ago, the streets of Seattle echoed with a chant that would become the defining motto of the movement: “another world is possible!” It still is – if we’re willing to fight for it.

## 1NC – Case

#### They have read zero internal links between Jordan pharma and its economy writ large

#### No impact uniqueness and alt causes to econ

Kardoosh 19 [(Marwan A., development economist with 22 years of experience working in the Middle East and North Africa) “Jordan Struggles to Reverse Decades of Poor Economic Management,” Haaretz, 9/6/2019] JL

Situated in a highly unstable neighborhood and suffering decades of bad policy, Jordan is struggling to find solutions for its ailing economy. Since 2009, the rate of economic growth has slowed down dramatically. This year it has hovered at around 2.2 percent, significantly lower than the government’s goal of 5 percent, and the prospects for the rest of 2019 are not promising at all. Per capita GDP, which is more relevant to people’s lives, hasn’t grown at all due to Jordan’s swelling population. The overhang of the tax law passed last year has taken its toll on Jordan’s stock market, reducing consumer confidence and purchasing power in the process.

Complicating matters are the high levels of debt and unemployment, which are still acting as a drag on the economy. There’s been a 24 percent drop in the value of real estate transactions and a 40 percent free-fall in new construction activity. Car imports are down 60 percent, mainly due to poor policy making that saw the government recently increase customs on electric vehicles. Rising public debt, together with sinking foreign investment, complete the bleak picture. Ordinary Jordanians have responded to the dismal state of affairs with hundreds of protests nationwide.

For all the talk of Amman harnessing youth and escaping the middle-income trap, hundreds of thousands of Jordanians still cannot find a decent job. One of Jordan’s daily newspapers earlier this summer reported that almost a third of those surveyed expressed interest in leaving the country. With the rate of joblessness ranging from almost one in five for the general working population to as high as 38.5 percent for the youngest demographic (20-24), the search for better work opportunities continues to be the most significant driver for emigration.

Emigration also remains an option for Jordan’s Christian minority. While they enjoy a high degree of tolerance from the Hashemite monarchy, as well security and political power, they have always sought a second passport as an insurance policy against a sudden change. Yet a sagging economy has convinced scores more to want to leave, something the state should look at seriously and critically.

Sworn in during June 2018, with a mandate for a program of positive change, the government of Omar Razzaz, a competent ex-World Bank civil servant, has so far failed to produce any tangible results. Mind you, the problems he has to deal with are grave, real and long-standing.

At the same time, mounting fiscal pressures have meant that governments in Jordan are no longer able to attract competent technocrats from the private sector, where remuneration is significantly higher. This has resulted in a big gap in the state apparatus. On the one hand, there are the decision makers – senior public officers with the skills to exercise sophisticated economic judgment, manage multi-faceted projects and operate in complex political environments. On the other hand, there are the lower-ranking government officials, the majority of whom are incapable of comprehending the complex realities of globalization and its impact on public policy. Thus the capacity of senior government bureaucrats to implement decisions on issues such as trade, investment and planning has been limited.

#### Alt causes affect Israel-Jordan relations

**Zeevi,** Dror**. 2020** “Israel and Jordan: A Peace in Ruins.” *Dror Zeevi is a full professor in the Department of Middle East Studies at BenGurion University of the Negev* https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/101-200/meb133.pdf

The advantages of the peace treaty for Israel are clear. Since the treaty was signed there have been almost no clashes between Jordanians and Israelis, or between Palestinians and Israelis, across the Israel-Jordan border and almost no successful attempts by militants to infiltrate Israeli territory from Jordan. The IDF is therefore able to defend this long border with a tiny force of a few hundred soldiers. But the peace soon lost its steam, and a cold wind swept away hopes of wider benefits. There were many reasons for this: Quite a few were the result of policy choices, others emanated from regional security tensions, and still others had to do with bilateral issues. Exactly one year after the signing of the treaty, Prime Minister Rabin—King Hussein’s personal friend and a co-architect of the treaty—was assassinated. Soon afterwards, the Oslo process with the Palestinians sputtered to a halt. Palestinian suicide bombers blew themselves up in buses and malls in Israel, and the Israeli army responded with a heavy hand. After a failed attempt by Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat to find a permanent solution to the conflict at the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000, a second Palestinian uprising erupted, more violent than the first. Witnessing the daily clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces and the killing of Palestinians on their television screens, the Jordanian public’s feelings about peace soured. One part of the peace that has shown signs of success and remains alive is the joint attempt to create special “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZ) that take advantage of the free trade agreements between the U.S. and Israel. Such zones, in which mostly Israeli entrepreneurs employ cheap local and imported labor, were established in several Jordanian towns. In 2018, work began on another such zone on the border between the two countries, which is projected to employ some 10,000 workers, mostly Jordanian.7 In order to make QIZ projects work, both sides have attempted to maintain a low profile.8 But even this aspect of the peace, which is to both sides’ advantage, has encountered many problems and never reached its expected potential. Israel’s attempt to move textile production to Jordan was threatened by the allure of cheap labor in East Asia. QIZ projects were also subject to boycotts and strikes by Jordanians, sometimes supported by Jordanian labor unions. In 2003, this was given further impetus by a fatwa published by the influential cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who called on Muslims to refrain from purchasing Israeli and American products. There were other cooperative projects that did not materialize because Israel failed to comply with commitments that were mentioned in general terms in the treaty and elaborated and agreed upon in subsequent bilateral talks. In other cases, Israel carried out such commitments only grudgingly. The most important one was the plan to connect the Red Sea to the Dead Sea by a canal and water pipeline, an idea enthusiastically embraced by Jordan. Nicknamed “Red-Dead,” this project had several aims. First, it would use the altitude difference between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea (a salty lake approximately -1400 feet below sea level, the lowest point on land) to generate electricity. It would also replenish the supply of briny water to the Dead Sea, which was (and still is) rapidly drying up as a result of irrigation upriver and years of drought. Another part of the “Red-Dead” project was using electricity generated by hydroelectric power to operate a large-scale desalination plant that would supply the water needs of Amman and its vicinity. A related cooperative project also envisioned building a joint airport for Aqaba and Eilat, thereby creating a joint tourism venture. But a combination of Israel’s skepticism about whether cooperation with Jordan could be maintained in the long run (including the question of whether the Hashemites would remain in power) and potential environmental impacts raised concerns about the entire Red-Dead venture.9 Moreover, economic estimates performed 4 by Israel’s Ministry of Finance found that a pipeline from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea that ran solely through Israeli territory would be less costly and more profitable. The Red-Dead project was, accordingly, quietly abandoned. Even the desalination plant and the proposed joint airport, so crucial for Jordan’s economy, did not materialize. Israel finally decided to build a new international hub—now called Ramon Airport—on its own soil, rather than a shared one on the border. Another article of the peace treaty recognized Jordan’s historic role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites on the Noble Sanctuary (al-Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem (Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, in an area which Israel refers to as the Temple Mount—Har HaBayit) and implied that Jordan should have a function in overseeing these shrines in any agreement on the permanent status of the city.10 This was in the interest of both sides. For the Hashemite family, Jerusalem was a kind of consolation prize for losing Mecca and Medina to the Saudis seventy years earlier: The former custodians of the Kaaba could still keep one major Islamic holy site under the family’s control. For Israel, this was insurance against Palestinian claims to sovereignty over what came to be known as “the Holy Basin” in Jerusalem. As long as Jordan controls this area, Israel can claim that it is bound by a treaty with a Muslim-majority country. Today, Jordan is still officially in charge of the Noble Sanctuary area, but its control is challenged on all sides. Although Israel recognizes Jordan’s role, it has allowed archeologists to excavate the foundations of the compound without Jordanian consent, asserting its right to archeological study of the ancient Temple site. It has also attempted several times to monitor the entrances to the compound. Finally, Israel allows members of an Orthodox Jewish movement known as the Temple Mount and Land of Israel Faithful to enter the area in groups and pray on the platform of the holy shrines, sometimes provoking both guards and Muslim worshippers. The Palestinian Authority (PA) also strives to wrest that role from Jordan, precisely in order to claim it as part of the Palestinians’ heritage and, therefore, their responsibility. It has taken over from Jordan the appointment of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem— currently Muhammad Ahmad Hussein—who regularly preaches at Al-Aqsa Mosque. The PA also organizes crowds to demonstrate against Israeli conduct on related matters, and in its negotiations with Israel it demands sovereignty over the compound. Lately, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has joined the fray, seeing involvement in Jerusalem as a way for Turkey to carve another niche as the champion of Sunni Islam and patron of the Palestinians. Finally, Saudi Arabia has suggested several times that control of the holy shrines should be entrusted to an international oversight body— which, in practical terms, would be led by the Saudis.

#### No internal link – 1AC El Shami and Solomon makes vacuous references to instability – no scenario for collapsing the peace treaty

#### Drought diplomacy solves Jordan-Israel war

AFP 8/31 [(Agence France-Presse, international news agency headquartered in Paris, world's oldest news agency) “Drought diplomacy boosts Israel-Jordan ties,” Al Jazeera, 8/31/2021] JL

But, experts say, instead of the pressure provoking arguments, Israel and Jordan could be poised for an unprecedented boom in water cooperation amid technological advancements and climate pressures.

Warnings about looming “water wars”, including in the Middle East, were often inflated, said Duke University professor Erika Weinthal.

“Water is a resource that allows for adversaries to actually find ways to cooperate,” said Weinthal, a specialist in global environmental politics, who has worked extensively on Israel-Jordan issues.

“If you look at the data, you see more cooperation over water than conflict, and where there is conflict, it is usually verbal.”

Jordan is one of the world’s most water-deficient countries, suffering from extreme droughts, and water cooperation with Israel long pre-dates a 1994 peace deal between the two.

The issue came to prominence in 1921, when Pinhas Rutenberg, a Russian-Jewish engineer who had moved to Palestine, convinced British authorities and Hashemite royals to approve a hydropower station where the Yarmuk tributary meets the Jordan River.

It continued after Israel’s founding in 1948, through decades when the nations were officially at war.

Water deals, like all bilateral ties, suffered in recent years under former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whom critics have accused of neglecting Jordan as he pursued deeper ties with Iran’s foes in the Gulf.

But there have been signs of progress since Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s government took office in June, with the countries agreeing to their largest-ever water transaction.

New technologies reducing costs have made seawater desalination “a profitable concern”, with investors from Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates – which just normalised ties with the Jewish state – showing interest, said Gidon Bromberg, Israel director at EcoPeace Middle East.

“The people that are going to invest in more desalination very much see the opportunities for profit,” Bromberg said.

It means that Israel – one of the world’s desalination leaders – can sell more water, including natural freshwater from the Sea of Galilee, to Jordan without threatening domestic demand, he said.

And Israel has a new incentive to do so, because it now needs something from Jordan in return, according to analysts.

To meet the 2015 Paris climate accord commitments, Bennett’s government has approved a target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector by at least 85 percent. Multiple assessments show Israel does not have enough land to ramp up the necessary solar production, so it will have to buy solar power from Jordan to hit its targets.

“For the very first time, all sides will have something to sell and something to buy,” said Bromberg, whose organisation works in Israel, Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territory, which is also struggling from a worsening water crisis.

This unprecedented alignment of interests could help repair semi-fractured diplomatic relations, he argued.

“There are relatively few opportunities to try and rebuild trust,” Bromberg added. “Water and energy are one of those rare opportunities.”

#### Their Lazarov internal link is about annexing the West Bank – that’s inevitable

Ayyad 10/1 [(Samera, MSc in Middle East politics from SOAS University of London, Junior Research Fellow at IEMed) “Israel’s Annexation Plan: One State Based on Equality and Justice Is the Only Solution,” European Institute of the Mediterranean, 10/1/2021] JL

When Netanyahu’s government announced in May that it would formally annex parts of the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, the international community immediately reacted with outrage, even though settlements, deemed illegal under international law, have been rising and expanding in the territory for more than half a century. Annexation has been an ongoing and generational process for Palestinians, and it did not start, nor will stop, with Netanyahu’s announcement. Palestinians know that annexation is not a momentum, it represents years of Israeli policy that has gone unchallenged. It would merely formalize *de jure* a system of occupation Palestinians have been living under, and would close the door to a negotiated two-state solution, signalling a failure of the Oslo Accords.

The 1993 agreements and their flaws have already been extensively analysed in the literature, so I will not delve into them in detail. However, to understand the current crisis, one must consider the process that started with these accords, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) recognized Israel’s right to exist for the first time. The Accords were formulated as a temporary framework for bilateral cooperation with the goal of establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza after a five-year transitional phase, by dividing the West Bank into three different areas. Area A, which represents 18 percent of the territory, ideally under full Palestinian control, Area B, including 20 percent of the West Bank under a joint Israeli security control and Palestinian civil control, and finally Area C, 62 percent of the territory, exclusively under Israeli control, where most Jewish settlements have been established and where most natural resources are. In this process, other issues to be tackled were the right of return of refugees, the status of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements and border management. Today, none of these have been accomplished and Israel has taken advantage of the intricate jurisdictional structure and loopholes of the accords to reduce the transfer of territory and authority back to Palestinian institutions.

When the PLO recognized the legitimacy of the Jewish State within the parameters of the Oslo Agreements, this was not done in exchange for the recognition of the rights of Palestinians, their dispossession, nor their right of return. Over the years, the institutional architecture of the accords disappeared and these were reduced to security agreements only benefiting Israel, which changed the PLO into a collaborating agency under the name of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Meanwhile, Israel took advantage of a destabilized Palestinian leadership and gradually disempowered the Palestinians, unprotected from repression, facing institutionalized discrimination, systematic abuse and settlers’ violence. Palestinians were deceived into believing that a Palestinian state would eventually be established. Instead, they endured military occupation and remained under “a transitional administration with a Palestinian flag, obliged to serve the Israeli security system under the deceptive label of security coordination.”[2]As identified by Dajani and Lovatt, the accords helped in consolidating Israel’s control over the West Bank by distorting international law as a tool of conflict resolution and creating uncertainty around Israel’s clear responsibilities as an occupying power.[3]For instance, Israel claims that since the PA does not have any actual control over Area C, the establishment of settlements and the displacements of Palestinians there is permitted. As a consequence of practices like this one, the Israeli authorities now have de facto total control of the West Bank, achieved thanks to years of occupation that turned the territory into an Israelized extension of the Jewish State, with Palestinian enclaves surrounded and suffocated by illegal settlements.

In the international context, states who had been critical of Israel, felt legitimized in normalizing ties with the country based on the PLO’s recognition of the Jewish State, and even started importing goods produced in Israeli settlements. Today, the international community’s continuous assistance to the PA, which provides services to the population in the West Bank, creates a contradictory situation in which international actors pay the price for Israel’s unlawful actions, but rarely take coordinated measures to challenge them nor engage in a tangible political strategy for ending Israeli occupation. The lack of any coherent action, compensated with huge financial aid, and combined with a continuous endorsement of a dead peace process and the two-state solution this implies, makes the international community complicit in the deterioration of Palestinians’ rights. The reaction from the international community can no longer be the resuscitation of Oslo’s failed framework. Instead, it needs to suggest a new structure that recognizes the one-state solution as the only viable reality. The international actors’ and the Palestinian leadership’s fixation on a two-state solution within Oslo’s parameters, reflects that they have been ignoring the reality on the ground, where Israeli settlers occupy 60 percent of the West Bank. At the same time, Trump’s so-called “deal of the century,” and Israel’s subsequent annexation threats provide a sense of urgency and momentum for the discussion and signal a shift in the international approach to the issue, particularly for countries that have remained largely silent on the subject of annexation up until now. Taking into account the improbability that Israel will take action towards de-occupation, the international community has a crucial role in promoting an alternative to Oslo.[4]

The first step to take in this change of approach is to recognize that a single state already represents today’s reality on the ground; the issue is that it has adopted the form of an apartheid.[5]Acknowledging that the struggle is between a colonized people and an apartheid colonizer,[6]enables the use of a new language for discussing power imbalances and ultimately achieving Palestinian rights.[7] As stated above, Israel and the West Bank operate as one geographic space, there are no precise borders or Palestinian currency. However, in the same territory, Israeli settlers are granted ethno-religious privileges and rights under Israeli civil law, while Palestinians in the West Bank face discrimination everyday under a military rule. Even Palestinian citizens of Israel are not granted the same rights and privileges as Israeli Jews.[8]To end this discrimination, Palestinians need to have their voices heard when the future state they will live in is going to be shaped, and “they can do so only on equal footing with their Jewish counterparts before the law, not under military occupation.”[9]Furthermore, a key issue in advancing this new paradigm is recognizing that the essence of the conflict is not a territorial one and that its focus needs to shift from the division of land, which historically has never been successful, to people’s rights. Under this model, all Palestinians, including refugees, and Israeli Jews would live in a regime based on equality and justice, built on the ruins of the existing colonial apartheid system. Therefore, all structures of inequality need to be dismantled, whilst simultaneously addressing the widespread injustices faced by Palestinians. Other factors to consider are the Palestinian leadership and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian population, particularly in how it experiences occupation. In this sense, the struggle of each Palestinian is localized, meaning that each identity is confined to each community. Palestinian citizens of Israel fight for equality and for preserving their identity, Palestinian refugees in Arab countries and in the West wait for their return, even Palestinians within Area A, B or C face occupation in different ways.[10]This fragmentation needs to be stopped as it damages a potential national movement and hinders the possibility of uniting a Palestinian response. To achieve this, Palestinians need to establish a political movement that represents and mobilizes them all.

What is going to happen if no action is taken and Israel implements its annexation plans? There is still uncertainty on when and if the Israeli government is putting into practice its plans, scheduled for 1 July. In practical terms, this would not make a big difference, given the reality on the ground. In fact, even if the Israeli Parliament has not voted yet, the settler population already occupies 60 percent of the West Bank and benefits from services and infrastructures of any Israeli city. For Palestinians, annexation entails further displacement – Israel would destroy even more communities and would forcibly transfer them to other parts of the West Bank, where they would be isolated and economically suffocated. It is time to question whether this system can continue, or if this is the moment to redefine and build a just system, where everyone can benefit from equal rights and freedom, irrespective of religion, under “a model which seeks reconciliation and not separation and where people are protected and not viewed as subjects of control.”[11]

#### Tons of alt causes to Middle East instability – Taliban takeover and JCPOA failure

Walker 8/16 [(Tony, vice chancellor's fellow at La Trobe University. He is a columnist for The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald) “As Afghanistan falls, what does it mean for the Middle East?” The Conversation, 8/16/2021] JL

Will the al-Qaeda and Islamic State franchises be allowed to re-establish themselves in a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan? Will the Taliban re-emerge as a state sponsor of terrorism? Will it continue to allow Afghanistan to be used as a giant market garden in the opium trade?

In other words, will the Taliban change its ways and behave in such a manner that it does not constitute a threat to its neighbours, and the region more generally?

From America’s perspective, its exit from Afghanistan leaves its attempts to [breathe life into the nuclear deal with Iran](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/31/us/politics/biden-iran-nuclear-deal.html) as its main piece of unfinished Middle East business – if we put aside the seemingly intractable Israel-Palestine dispute.

Attempts to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have formed a cornerstone of the Biden administration’s efforts to engage more constructively in the Middle East.

Progress has been faltering. The election of a new hardline Iranian president further complicates efforts to achieve compromise. Failure to resuscitate the JCPOA, abandoned by President Donald Trump, will add a new layer of uncertainty – and risk – to Middle East calculations.

Iranian leadership, including President Ebrahim Raisi, will be watching events in Afghanistan with great interest. AAP/AP/Vahid Salemi

There will have been no more interested party in developments in neighbouring Afghanistan than the leadership in Tehran. Iran’s relationship with the Taliban has been fraught at times, cooperative at others, given the anxiety in Tehran over mistreatment of Afghanistan’s Shia population.

Shia Iran and the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban are not natural partners.

Further afield, the latest developments in Afghanistan will be capturing the close attention of Gulf states. Qatar has provided a diplomatic haven for the Taliban during peace talks with the vanquished Ghani government. This [peace initiative](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443), under US auspices, is now revealed to have been a foil for the Taliban’s ambitions to return to power in its own right.

How any reasonable observer could have believed otherwise is confounding.

Saudi Arabia will be unsettled by developments of the past few days because it is not in Riyadh’s interests for American authority in the region to be undermined. But the Saudis have their own longstanding links with the Taliban.

In Saudi Arabian foreign policy, Afghanistan is not a zero sum game.

More generally, the hit to US standing in the region will be worrying for its moderate Arab allies. This includes Egypt and Jordan. For both, with their own versions of the Taliban lurking in the shadows, events in Afghanistan are not good news.

The Taliban success in Afghanistan will also have implications for the most combustible corner of the Middle East. In both Iraq and parts of Syria where the US maintains a military presence, the American exit will be unsettling.

In Lebanon, which has become to all intents and purposes a [failed state](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/lebanon-failed-state-heres-what-numbers-say), the Afghanistan debacle will be adding to the gloom.

Israel will be calculating the implications of the setback suffered by its principal ally. Increased Middle East instability would not seem to be to Israel’s advantage.

#### Their Silverstein evidence is about Israel-Iran war:

#### They haven’t read an internal link for Jordan-Israel tensions spilling over to Iran

#### Alt causes

DW 20 [(Deutsche Welle, German public state-owned international broadcaster funded by the German federal tax budget) “Israel-Iran conflict to be major Middle East issue in 2020,” 1/2/2020] JL

European signatories to the JCPOA have been unable to effectively lift the renewed embargoes on trade with Iran, prompting Tehran to gradually restart uranium enrichment as the deal crumbled in mid-2019. Meanwhile, tit-for-tat confrontations on Iranian and US proxies in the Persian Gulf, along with Israeli attacks on Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq, have escalated.

Israel and Iran have been antagonists since the 1980s. But, after the US's 2003 invasion of Iraq and the formal withdrawal of American troops in 2011, the regional balance of power was broken, leaving the Middle East without a clear hegemon. That created a vacuum that has brought the countries into increasing conflict.

Despite their aggressive rhetoric, officials in neither country seek an all-out, direct war. But differences in perception, deteriorating commitment to the vestiges of the JCPOA, and the vagaries of elections in Israel, Iran and the US all ratchet up the prospect that an inadvertent clash could escalate the conflict.

Ali Vaez, an Iran analyst for the International Crisis Group, told DW that the conflict has become "a screw that only turns in one direction, getting tenser and tenser over time."

"There are serious risks of miscalculation that could push the parties into even greater and more direct confrontation," Vaez said.

In recent years, Iran has expanded its influence in the region. In Syria, it has bolstered the operations of President Bashar Assad. In Iraq, it has supported political parties and various militias since the US invasion in 2003 and, according to anonymous US officials cited by *The New York Times*, has recently been building up an arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles there. In Yemen, it has backed the Houthis against Saudi Arabia; in December the US claimed it had intercepted a transfer of advanced Iranian missile parts to the Houthis.

To Israel's north, Iran has maintained strategic support for Hezbollah, Lebanon's strongest political party, with a paramilitary wing widely considered to be more powerful than the Lebanese army.

Tehran is trying to establish a balance in a region where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates massively outspend Iran militarily and Israel already possesses nuclear weapons, Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of the Washington-based think tank Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told DW. With a limited, aging air force that cannot compete with regional and US combat aircraft, missiles are Iran's only conventional deterrent.

Israel has long carried out undeclared strikes on Iranian targets in Syria, but recent months have seen officials publicly claim the operations, intensify the attacks and expand the theater of war.

Israel's military hit more than 200 Iran-backed targets in Syria in 2017 and 2018. In a rare public admission in late November, the military claimed one of the largest strikes in recent years on Iranian and Syrian targets in Damascus, in the midst of a flare-up of violence with Gaza.

The intensity of the operations has increased since the latest standoff in the Persian Gulf started in May, when the United States deployed military assets around the Strait of Hormuz, a number of tankers were sabotaged and seized, and rival drones were shot down in what appeared to be active if indirect engagement between forces operating on behalf of the US and Iran.

#### No Israel-Iran war

Safaei 9/17 [(Sajjad, postdoctoral fellow at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology) “Israel Isn’t Strong Enough to Attack Iran,” Foreign Policy, 9/17/2021] JL

To be sure, Israel has in the past carried out relatively limited operations against Iran—such as raids on Iranian allies in Syria and nuclear sabotage—and may continue to do so in the future. But to what extent should we believe Tel Aviv is truly ready and willing to launch a strike on Iran because of advances in the Iranian nuclear program, knowing full well that this is likely to push the two countries and their allies into war? The political and military constraints on Israeli decision-makers suggests such a military showdown is highly unlikely.

To speak of an imminent and undisguised IDF strike deep inside Iranian territory is to overlook a long-established norm that has for decades governed U.S.-Israel relations: Israel cannot simply ignore the wishes and concerns of its chief patron, especially when core U.S. foreign policy priorities are at stake.

This norm was expressed in clear terms by no less a figure than Israel’s former premier and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in his autobiography *My Country, My Life*. Here, Barak spelled out the paradigm that has shaped—and will likely continue to shape—the contours of Israeli action against Iran. “There were only two ways,” he explained, that Israel could stop the Iranians from getting a nuclear weapon (read: “nuclear program,” for Barak willfully ignores U.S. intelligence assessments that Iran had halted pursuits for nuclear weapons in 2003). One way was “for the Americans to act.” The only other option was “for [the United States] not to hinder Israel from doing so.”

But according to Barak, “hinder” is precisely what consecutive U.S. administrations have done—and are still likely to do.

Even during the military interventionism of the George W. Bush presidency, Israel did not have a blank check to do as it pleased. As Barak notes in his memoirs, when Bush learned in 2008 of Israeli efforts to purchase heavy munitions from the United States, he confronted Barak and then-premier Ehud Olmert. “I want to tell both of you now, as president,” Bush warned, “We are totally against any action by you to mount an attack on the [Iranian] nuclear plants.”

“I repeat,” Bush further clarified, “in order to avoid any misunderstanding. We expect you not to do it. And we’re not going to do it, either, as long as I am president. I wanted it to be clear.” It deserves mention that according to Barak, Bush issued this warning despite knowing that Israel did not even possess the military capacity to assault Iran at the time.

According to Barak, this staunch opposition to a strike on Iran had a “dramatic” effect on him and Olmert since the Bush administration had supported Israel’s 2007 bombing of Syria’s nascent nuclear program just a year before. In both cases, Washington’s approval, or lack thereof, was demonstrably consequential.

Barak’s memoirs show that the same dynamic continued to govern U.S.-Israel relations during Obama’s presidency. He recalls how then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta “made no secret of the fact he didn’t want us to launch a military strike” at a time when the Obama administration was focused on putting international political and economic pressure on Iran. Panetta “urged me to ‘think twice, three times,’ before going down that road,” Barak wrote, and saw it as a given that Tel Aviv would keep Washington abreast of its decisions. “If you do decide to attack the Iranian facilities, when will we know?” he allegedly asked Barak.

According to Barak’s account, Israel was dissuaded from going forward with a supposed strike on Iran’s nuclear installations in summer 2012 “because of the damage it would do to our ties with the United States.” Washington’s demands continued to limit Tel Aviv after the finalization of the nuclear deal in 2015. Even then, Barak recalls, the Israelis could not simply act against Iran without a green light from the Obama administration: “We needed to reach agreement with the Americans about what kind of military strike we, or they, might have to take if the Iranians again moved to get nuclear weapons.”

As evinced by Barak’s autobiography, U.S. presidents are not taciturn about making their views and wishes known to Israeli officials, especially when primary U.S. foreign policy objectives are involved. Nor can Tel Aviv afford to ignore Washington’s express demands and concerns on such matters. And today, any flagrant Israeli violation of Iranian sovereignty will instantly clash with two mutually reinforcing goals that have come to define the Biden administration’s foreign policy: curbing Iran’s nuclear program through non-military means (efforts currently focused on reviving the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal) and winding down U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

These political realities make it unlikely Israel will pursue an overt strike on Iran. Just as important, however, are the military constraints that Israel faces.

To be sure, even without its ready-to-launch nuclear warheads, Israel is more than capable of delivering swift and devastating blows to Iran’s armed forces, both in the skies and seas. Its fleet of American fighter jets and bombers alone can irreparably trounce Iran’s air defenses as well as its dilapidated air force. Even Iran’s increasingly powerful, accurate, and far-reaching missile and drone systems don’t radically alter the balance of power in the skies. In short, in terms of military hardware, the IDF’s superiority over Iran’s armed forces is indisputable, not to mention otherworldly.

But this prodigious superiority will be rendered far less consequential in the event of an all-out war that lures the IDF ground forces into the battlefield. Why? Ever since the IDF’s embarrassing defeat during the 2006 war with Hezbollah, Israel’s top military brass have become acutely aware that the country’s land forces are ill-prepared for a full-scale war with a fighting force even moderately capable of packing a punch.

#### No draw-in:

#### Hour evidence is about Russia intervening in Syrian Civil War – alt cause and no reason they’re drawn into other countries

#### No draw in – the United States won’t intervene in the Middle East

Harb 8/19 [(Imad, the Director of Research and Analysis at Arab Center Washington DC. He is the Founder and Director of Quest for Middle East Analysis, a research and consulting firm. Previously, he worked as Adjunct Professor of Middle East Studies at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University. He also served as Senior Analyst at the Abu Dhabi, UAE-based Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research and taught political science and international relations at the University of Utah and San Francisco State University. In addition, he worked as Senior Program Officer at the United States Institute of Peace. Harb writes and publishes on a number of topics including civil-military relations, regional politics, and US policy in the Middle East/North Africa and the Arabian Gulf, and is co-author, with John Bruni, of Domestic and Regional Challenges to US-Iran Relations (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2015). He is the co-editor, with Zeina Azzam, of The Arab World Beyond Conflict (ACW, 2019). Harb earned a PhD in political science from the University of Utah.) “After Afghanistan, a New Biden Middle East Doctrine Takes Shape” Arab Center Washington DC, 8/19/2021. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/after-afghanistan-a-new-biden-middle-east-doctrine-takes-shape/] BC

First, Biden may have finally drawn the curtain on American military interventionism in the wider Middle East, or at least to commitments to many countries there. For US partners and friends in the Arabian Gulf, this should translate into utmost caution regarding both the rhetoric about Iran and the wish to forcefully curtail its activities. In fact, from now on, the United States will only advise diplomacy as the preferred strategy to deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Simultaneously, for the time being Washington will maintain its forces in the region, but only as a deterrent against any adventurism by Iran, which is now under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the new, and equally hard-line, President Ebrahim Raisi.

Second, and as a corollary, the United States will not commit more blood and treasure to countries whose leaderships, state institutions, and militaries fail to firmly face threats and challenges. As President Biden highlighted in his speech, the United States spent more than a trillion dollars to sustain a well-armed Afghan military force, an institutional edifice for a modern state, and the pillars of an open economy. That much of this expenditure was to sustain an American presence that sought to fight extremists—yet, in reality, also protected corrupt officials and fostered a dependent economy—seems to be beside the point. What the Biden Administration saw was a failed Afghan army that withdrew from the battlefield against a ragtag militia with a millennial ideology. Especially embarrassing was the Taliban’s capture of billions of dollars-worth of sophisticated American weaponry that will be used to fortify a regime that previously ruled the country savagely—and one that also sheltered a terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. Indeed, and despite the embarrassment and recrimination, it looks like the Biden team, much like the Trump Administration, has decided that where there is no vital American national interest, the United States will be ready and willing to simply pack up and leave, notwithstanding the damage to its reputation and credibility.

Third, the United States will no longer attempt to engage in open-ended efforts at nation-building. The Afghanistan experiment bolstered the American public’s gradually increasing reticence to expend energy and funds to help build (or resuscitate) state institutions in faraway places. This principle will have many applications in today’s Arab world where US economic, technical, military, and other assistance is required to differing degrees. Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Iraq, Tunisia, Syria, and Lebanon are prime examples of countries in need of such support. The United States will not undergo far-reaching engagement with these countries if their governing institutions and leaders do not exhibit the necessary will and readiness to govern and implement needed development programs and reforms.