## 1NC – T

#### Interpretation: topical affs must fiat an action through the World Trade Organization

#### Member nations of the WTO make policies as a whole

WTO ND [(World Trade Organization) “Whose WTO is it anyway?”] JL

The WTO is run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers (who usually meet at least once every two years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who meet regularly in Geneva). Decisions are normally taken by consensus.

In this respect, the WTO is different from some other international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In the WTO, power is not delegated to a board of directors or the organization’s head.

When WTO rules impose disciplines on countries’ policies, that is the outcome of negotiations among WTO members. The rules are enforced by the members themselves under agreed procedures that they negotiated, including the possibility of trade sanctions. But those sanctions are imposed by member countries, and authorized by the membership as a whole. This is quite different from other agencies whose bureaucracies can, for example, influence a country’s policy by threatening to withhold credit.

Reaching decisions by consensus among some 150 members can be difficult. Its main advantage is that decisions made this way are more acceptable to all members. And despite the difficulty, some remarkable agreements have been reached. Nevertheless, proposals for the creation of a smaller executive body — perhaps like a board of directors each representing different groups of countries — are heard periodically. But for now, the WTO is a member-driven, consensus-based organization.

#### Collective nouns are singular – this means “member nations” refers to a singular entity

MLA 3/8 [“Should I use a singular or plural verb with a collective noun?” MLA Style Center, 3/8/2021] JL

Collective nouns, like *team*, *family, class*, *group*, and *host*, take a singular verb when the entity acts together and a plural verb when the individuals composing the entity act individually. The following examples demonstrate this principle:

The team is painting a mural. (The team collectively paints the mural, so the verb is singular*.*)

#### Violation – they don’t

#### Prefer:

#### Precision – even if Jordan is a member nation, that’s distinct from fiating member nations as a unified actor – outweighs because it justifies jettisoning other words in the rez – prefer our interp – we have evidence from the WTO that explains what coordinated action looks like

#### Limits and ground – explodes the topic to include affs about any country reducing IP – ensuring it is an international reduction of IP which is ensures link magnitude and generics like WTO bad, multilat Ks, negotiations and politics DAs, and circumvention – stretches pre-tournament neg prep too thin and precluding rigorous testing – theory and medicine spec affs solve PICs

#### Topic ed – WTO patent waivers are the topic – their aff is just domestic policy passed in Jordan – proven by their second advantage – none of their internal links are about medical trade secrets which proves their interpretation is a cheap way of getting a relations impact about any two countries – justifies the US-Mexico or China-Japan aff. Outweighs – prep is determined by the lit and we only have 2 months to debate the topic

#### TVA – spec a medicine – ensures nuanced debates while preserving WTO-specific ground

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – they incentivize abusive strategies to bait shells and T is a basic aff burden

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

## 1NC – Consult CP

#### CP: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the World Health Organization over reducing data exclusivity for medicines. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will support the proposal and adopt the results of consultation.

#### WHO says yes:

#### It opposes data exclusivity and TRIPS-plus measures

WHO 17 [(World Health Organization) “Data exclusivity and other TRIPS-plus measures,” UHC Technical Brief, 2017] JL

Finally, data exclusivity could prevent the registration of generic versions of medicines even when there is no patent on a medicine, e.g. when a pharmaceutical product does not meet the standards for patentability (e.g. because it is not new or an inventive step), the patent lapses, when a country has no patent law, or when patents are not being granted for pharmaceuticals. The latter situation can arise in least-developed countries that are World Trade Organization (WTO) Members, which do not have to grant or enforce patents for pharmaceuticals until 2033.b

It has at times been argued that Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement makes it mandatory for countries to grant data exclusivity. However, careful reading of Article 39.3 (see Box 1) does not warrant this conclusion; the text of the Article does not make any reference whatsoever to exclusivity or exclusive rights.

Article 39.3 requires countries to protect undisclosed registration data about new chemical entities (i) against disclosure and (ii) against unfair commercial use. Thus, regulatory authorities may not publish registration data,c or share them with third parties (e.g. generic competitors). There is some debate as to what exactly is meant by “unfair commercial use”. Does the use of bioequivalence studies instead of full clinical trials represent “unfair commercial use”? There is no “unfair commercial use” by the generic company: the generic manufacturer never uses the originator’s data, and does not even have access to them. Meanwhile, regulatory authorities also do not normally use the originator’s data, though, as mentioned above, they may (indirectly) rely on them. Even even if the regulators were to use the data, it would not be commercial use, as the regulatory agency is not a commercial organization. The unfair comercial use does not apply to the work of a government regulatory body.

Thus, legal and public health experts believe that TRIPS requires data protection, but not data exclusivity – and national laws do not need to be more restrictive than TRIPS. It is important to note that least-developed countries are not required to provide the data protection mandated by TRIPS on pharmaceuticals till 2033.

It is also worthwhile noting that in developing countries, regulatory authorities often rely on data that are already published or otherwise in the public domain – and that therefore do not fall within the scope of Article 39.3 (which imposes protection only for undisclosed data).

As mentioned above, from the perspective of public health and access to medicines, it is preferable not to grant data exclusivity. Moreover, there is no requirement under international law that countries grant data exclusivity; countries have to provide for data protection only.

#### It supports increasing the availability of generics

Hoen 03 [(Ellen T., researcher at the University Medical Centre at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands who has been listed as one of the 50 most influential people in intellectual property by the journal Managing Intellectual Property, PhD from the University of Groningen) “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond,” Chicago Journal of International Law, 2003] JL

However, subsequent resolutions of the World Health Assembly have strengthened the WHO’s mandate in the trade arena. In 2001, the World Health Assembly adopted two resolutions in particular that had a bearing on the debate over TRIPS [30]. The resolutions addressed:

– the need to strengthen policies to increase the availability of generic drugs;

#### Existing share of generics in Jordan is below their recommendation

Alkhatib et al 18 [(Alaa R., works for the Jordan Food and Drug Administration, Shafa Badran, Amman, Jordan) “Assessment of Drug Prescribing in Jordan Using World Health Organization Indicators,” Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences, 11/21/2018] JL

Given the scarcity of studies of drug prescribing behavior in Jordan, the present study was an attempt to shed light on the current situation in Jordan and to provide baseline data for future action. The study was conducted in primary health care centers in Amman governorate; the capital of Jordan, using the WHO recommended protocol. The present study showed the values of five prescribing indicators, namely: the average number of prescribed drugs per outpatient encounter (3.0), the percentage of medicines prescribed by generic name (50.3%), the percentage of prescriptions with an antibiotic prescribed (61%), the percentage of prescriptions with an injection prescribed (7%) and the Percentage of drugs prescribed from essential drug list (97.6%). Poly-pharmacy, overuse of antibiotics and under-prescribing by generic name are still common in Jordan. The overall average number of prescribed drugs per outpatient prescription (3.0) was substantially higher than the international average of 1.7 drugs per prescription, as shown in Table 1 [7]. The range of number of drugs per encounter in different centers was from (2.7 to 3.4). Of particular concern was that 45% of prescriptions contained three or more drugs.

#### Consultation displays strong leadership and authority which are key to WHO legitimacy

Gostin et al 15 [(Lawrence O., Linda D. & Timothy J. O’Neill Professor of Global Health Law at Georgetown University, Faculty Director of the O’Neill Institute for National & Global Health Law, Director of the World Health Organization Collaborating Center on Public Health Law & Human Rights, JD from Duke University) “The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization,” Georgetown University Law Center, 5/2/2015] JL

Members want the WHO to exert leadership, harmonize disparate activities, and set priorities. Yet they resist intrusions into their sovereignty, and want to exert control. In other words, ‘everyone desires coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.’ States often ardently defend their geostrategic interests. As the Indonesian virus-sharing episode illustrates, the WHO is pulled between power blocs, with North America and Europe (the primary funders) on one side and emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India on the other. An inherent tension exists between richer ‘net contributor’ states and poorer ‘net recipient’ states, with the former seeking smaller WHO budgets and the latter larger budgets.

Overall, national politics drive self-interest, with states resisting externally imposed obligations for funding and action. Some political leaders express antipathy to, even distrust of, UN institutions, viewing them as bureaucratic and inefficient. In this political environment, it is unsurprising that members fail to act as shareholders. Ebola placed into stark relief the failure of the international community to increase capacities as required by the IHR. Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone had some of the world's weakest health systems, with little capacity to either monitor or respond to the Ebola epidemic.20 This caused enormous suffering in West Africa and placed countries throughout the region e and the world e at risk. Member states should recognize that the health of their citizens depends on strengthening others' capacity. The WHO has a central role in creating systems to facilitate and encourage such cooperation.

The WHO cannot succeed unless members act as shareholders, foregoing a measure of sovereignty for the global common good. It is in all states' interests to have a strong global health leader, safeguarding health security, building health systems, and reducing health inequalities. But that will not happen unless members fund the Organization generously, grant it authority and flexibility, and hold it accountable.

#### WHO is key to disease prevention – it is the only international institution that can disperse information, standardize global public health, and facilitate public-private cooperation

Murtugudde 20 [(Raghu, professor of atmospheric and oceanic science at the University of Maryland, PhD in mechanical engineering from Columbia University) “Why We Need the World Health Organization Now More Than Ever,” Science, 4/19/2020] JL

WHO continues to play an indispensable role during the current COVID-19 outbreak itself. In November 2018, the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine organised a workshop to explore lessons from past influenza outbreaks and so develop recommendations for pandemic preparedness for 2030. The salient findings serve well to underscore the critical role of WHO for humankind.

The world’s influenza burden has only increased in the last two decades, a period in which there have also been 30 new zoonotic diseases. A warming world with increasing humidity, lost habitats and industrial livestock/poultry farming has many opportunities for pathogens to move from animals and birds to humans. Increasing global connectivity simply catalyses this process, as much as it catalyses economic growth.

WHO coordinates health research, clinical trials, drug safety, vaccine development, surveillance, virus sharing, etc. The importance of WHO’s work on immunisation across the globe, especially with HIV, can hardly be overstated. It has a rich track record of collaborating with private-sector organisations to advance research and development of health solutions and improving their access in the global south.

It discharges its duties while maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between such diverse and powerful forces as national securities, economic interests, human rights and ethics. COVID-19 has highlighted how political calculations can hamper data-sharing and mitigation efforts within and across national borders, and WHO often simply becomes a convenient political scapegoat in such situations.

International Health Regulations, a 2005 agreement between 196 countries to work together for global health security, focuses on detection, assessment and reporting of public health events, and also includes non-pharmaceutical interventions such as travel and trade restrictions. WHO coordinates and helps build capacity to implement IHR.

#### Extinction – defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

#### WHO diplomacy solves great power conflict

Murphy 20 [(Chris, U.S. senator from Connecticut serving on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee) “The Answer is to Empower, Not Attack, the World Health Organization,” War on the Rocks, 4/21/2020] JL

The World Health Organization is critical to stopping disease outbreaks and strengthening public health systems in developing countries, where COVID-19 is starting to appear. Yemen announced its first infection earlier this month, and other countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East are at severe risk. Millions of refugees rely on the World Health Organization for their health care, and millions of children rely on the WHO and UNICEF to access vaccines.

The World Health Organization is not perfect, but its team of doctors and public health experts have had major successes. Their most impressive claim to fame is the eradication of smallpox – no small feat. More recently, the World Health Organization has led an effort to rid the world of two of the three strains of polio, and they are close to completing the trifecta.

These investments are not just the right thing to do; they benefit the United States. Improving health outcomes abroad provides greater political and economic stability, increasing demand for U.S. exports. And, as we are all learning now, it is in America’s national security interest for countries to effectively detect and respond to potential pandemics before they reach our shores.

As the United States looks to develop a new global system of pandemic prevention, there is absolutely no way to do that job without the World Health Organization. Uniquely, it puts traditional adversaries – like Russia and the United States, India and Pakistan, or Iran and Saudi Arabia – all around the same big table to take on global health challenges. It has relationships with the public health leaders of every nation, decades of experience in tackling viruses and diseases, and the ability to bring countries together to tackle big projects. This ability to bridge divides and work across borders cannot be torn down and recreated – not in today’s environment of major power competition – and so there is simply no way to build an effective international anti-pandemic infrastructure without the World Health Organization at the center.

#### Ought means should

Merriam Webster, No Date – Merriam Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary, “ought”, <http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/ought>  
ought /ˈɑːt/ verb  
Learner's definition of OUGHT [modal verb] 1 ◊ Ought is almost always followed by to and the infinitive form of a verb. The phrase ought to has the same meaning as should and is used in the same ways, but it is less common and somewhat more formal. The negative forms ought not and oughtn't are often used without a following to. — used to indicate what is expected They ought to be here by now. You ought to be able to read this book. There ought to be a gas station on the way. 2 — used to say or suggest what should be done You ought to get some rest. That leak ought to be fixed. You ought to do your homework.

#### Should means must and is immediate

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16) [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] [13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future *[in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

## 1NC – K

#### The aff’s portrayal of a world with reduced IP protections as an “information commons” where medical inequality is solved by deregulation perpetuates the neoliberal myth of a perfect market **Kapczynski 14** [(Amy, a Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Faculty Co-Director of the Global Health Justice Partnership, and Faculty Co-Director of the Collaboration for Research Integrity and Transparency. She is also Faculty Co-Director of the Law and Political Economy Project and cofounder of the Law and Political Economy blog. Her areas of research include information policy, intellectual property law, international law, and global health.) “INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S LEVIATHAN” Duke Law, Law & Contemporary problems, 2014. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4710&context=lcp] BC

Over the last decade or so, a powerful set of critiques has emerged to contest the dominant account just sketched out as well as the contemporary state of IP law.12 These arguments have come from many directions, some even arising from scholars who previously were champions of the dominant account.13 The most prominent and potent line of theoretical critique in the legal literature has come in the guise of arguments for free culture and the “information commons” and has been most influentially articulated by Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler.14 Both have stressed the problems with expansive exclusive rights regimes in information and have also sketched a set of actually existing alternatives to market-based exclusionary forms of information and cultural production.

Lessig has written a series of influential books that have made him a “rock star of the information age,”15 particularly for young Internet and free-culture activists. He has argued powerfully, for example, that existing copyright law is in deep conflict with the radical new possibilities for creativity in the digital age. As he points out, when a mother posting a video of her toddler dancing to a Prince song on YouTube is threatened with a $150,000 fine for copyright infringement, something has gone seriously awry.16 Lessig also contends that copyright law today is too long, too expansive, and instantiates a “permission culture” that is antithetical to free expression in the age of the remix.17 As he puts it, “the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that reaches far beyond local boundaries,” creating the possibility of markets that “include a much wider and more diverse range of creators,” if not stifled by incumbents who use IP law to “protect themselves against this competition.”18

Benkler’s work has also been extraordinarily formative in the field, particularly for his insights into the multiplicity of modes of information production. As he has stressed, the conventional justification for IP does not account for the many successful and longstanding modes of market nonexclusionary information production.19 For example, attorneys write articles to attract clients, software developers sell services customizing free and opensource software for individual clients, and bands give music away for free to increase revenues from touring or merchandise.20 More pathbreaking still is Benkler’s account of the importance of “commons-based peer production,” a form of socially motivated and cooperative production exemplified by the volunteer network that maintains Wikipedia or the groups of coders who create open-source software products such as the Linux operating system.21 In the digital networked age, as Benkler describes, the tools of information production are very broadly distributed, “creating new opportunities for how we make and exchange information, knowledge, and culture.”22 These changes have increased the relative role in our information economy of nonproprietary production and facilitate “new forms of production [that] are based neither in the state nor in the market.”23 Because commons-based peer production is not hierarchically organized and is motivated by social dynamics and concerns, it also offers new possibilities for human development, human freedom, a more critical approach to culture, and more democratic forms of political participation.24

This line of critique has been profoundly generative and has helped launch an important new conceptualization of the commons as a paradigm. That paradigm, as a recent book puts it, “helps us ‘get outside’ of the dominant discourse of the market economy and helps us represent different, more wholesome ways of being.”25 Proponents of the commons concept draw upon contemporary articulations of successful commons-based resource management by Elinor Ostrom and her followers.26 They do mobilize retellings of the political and economic history of the commons in land in Europe before enclosure,27 and recent evidence from psychology and behavioral economics that suggests that humans have deep tendencies toward cooperation and reciprocation.28 They argue that A key revelation of the commons way of thinking is that we humans are not in fact isolated, atomistic individuals. We are not amoebas with no human agency except hedonistic “utility preferences” expressed in the marketplace. No: We are commoners—creative, distinctive individuals inscribed within larger wholes. We may have unattractive human traits fueled by individual fears and ego, but we are also creatures entirely capable of self-organization and cooperation; with a concern for fairness and social justice; and willing to make sacrifices for the larger good and future generations.29

This stands, of course, as a powerful rebuke to the neoliberal imaginary, which “constructs and interpellates individuals as . . . rational, calculating creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for ‘self-care’— the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions.”30

III

Given this radical—and, in my view, critically important—attempt to rethink the subject at the core of neoliberal accounts, it is all the more striking that proponents of the commons often appear to adopt a neoliberal image of the state. For example, the introduction to a recently edited volume that gathers writings on the commons from seventy-three authors in thirty countries (entitled, tellingly, The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond Market and State) has this to say:

The presumption that the state can and will intervene to represent the interests of citizens is no longer credible. Unable to govern for the long term, captured by commercial interests and hobbled by stodgy bureaucratic structures in an age of nimble electronic networks, the state is arguably incapable of meeting the needs of citizens as a whole.31

The commons, they suggest, is a concept that seeks not only to liberate us from predatory and dysfunctional markets, but also from predatory and dysfunctional states. Something immediately seems incongruous here. If people are inherently cooperative reciprocators, why are states irredeemably corrupt? After all, as Harold Demsetz famously wrote in his 1967 attack on Arrow’s optimism about state production of information, “[g]overnment is a group of people.”32

Lessig, one of the progenitors of the language of the commons in the informational domain, often leads with a similar view of the state:

[I]f the twentieth century taught us one lesson, it is the dominance of private over state ordering. Markets work better than Tammany Hall in deciding who should get what, when. Or as Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase put it, whatever problems there are with the market, the problems with government are more profound.33

Lessig reveals his own sense of the power of this conception of the state when he seeks to tar IP law with the same brush; we should rebel against current IP law, he suggests, because we should “limit the government’s role in choosing the future of creativity.”34

Benkler is more measured but admits as well to viewing the state as “a relatively suspect actor.”35 We should worry, he suggests, that direct governmental intervention “leads to centralization in the hands of government agencies and powerful political lobbies,”36 a view that echoes the neoliberal account described above.

It should perhaps not surprise us that leading critics of neoliberal information policy embrace a neoliberal conception of the state. After all, neoliberalism is not merely an ideology, but also a set of policy prescriptions that may have helped to call forth the state that it has described. As David Harvey puts it, “[t]he neoliberal fear that special-interest groups would pervert and subvert the state is nowhere better realized than in Washington, where armies of corporate lobbyists . . . effectively dictate legislation to match their special interests.”37

There are, it must be said, few areas of law that better exemplify this problem than IP law. For example, Jessica Litman has documented the astonishing process through which the 1976 Copyright Act was drafted, in which Congress delegated most of the drafting to interest groups that were forced to negotiate with one another.38 Other scholars have offered similarly startling accounts of the genesis of the most important IP treaty today, the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. TRIPS came into force in 1996, revolutionizing international IP law by both imposing new standards and by rendering them enforceable through the WTO’s disputeresolution system, which authorizes trade retaliation to enforce its judgments. Most countries in the world are members of TRIPS, and the Agreement introduced, for developing countries in particular, substantial new obligations, such as the obligation to grant patents on medicines and food-related inventions. Several excellent histories of the treaty have been written, documenting its beginnings as a brash idea proposed by “twelve chief executive officers (representing pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software industries).”39 As Susan Sell has described, the TRIPS Agreement was a triumph of industry organizing. Through TRIPS, Industry revealed its power to identify and define a trade problem, devise a solution, and reduce it to a concrete proposal that could be sold to governments.

#### Attempts to reform the WTO are neoliberal attempts to sustain the US regime of accumulation – the contradictions of capitalism are why credibility is low, not IP protection

Bachand 20 [(Remi, Professor of International Law, Département des sciences juridiques, member of the Centre d’études sur le droit international et la mondialisation (CÉDIM), Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada) “What’s Behind the WTO Crisis? A Marxist Analysis” The European Journal of International Law, 8/12/2020. https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/31/3/857/5920920?redirectedFrom=fulltext] BC

To offer our own explanation, we must recall two aspects of our theoretical framework. The first is Robert Cox’s claim113 that the function of international organizations is to ensure the creation and reproduction of hegemony. To be more accurate, they serve, if we follow his argument, to defend and to expand the ‘mode of production’ (we elected to substitute this term for the concept of ‘regime of accumulation’ that appears to be more appropriate for our means) of the dominant social classes of the dominant state. Joining this idea with the école de la régulation and social structure of accumulation theory writing114 according to which a regime of accumulation needs some regulation institutions to help resolve its contradictions (and ensure profits and capital accumulation to dominant social classes), we can conclude that the Geneva organization’s function in the US hegemonic order is to make sure that neoliberalism works well enough to provide a satisfying rate of profit for US capitalists.

Going in that direction, Kristen Hopewell shows that the WTO’s creation participated in a shift in global governance from ‘embedded liberalism’ to neoliberalism115 and was slated to be an important part of that governance. Using the conceptual framework developed earlier, we can infer that the WTO was thus given a regulation function that was to ensure the operationalization of counteracting factors to the fall of the rate of profit for US capitalists. Now, as we have seen, the US rate of profit has been extremely unstable in the last two decades and Chinese expansion (and that of other ‘emerging countries’) allows one to predict that the situation could easily worsen in the future. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the crisis that has been striking neoliberalism for the last 20 years may also result in a crisis of the organizations that are supposed to manage its contradictions, especially the WTO. Concretely, this organization seems unable to fulfil its regulatory function anymore, which is to ensure US capitalists a good rate of profit and opportunities to operationalize enough counteracting factors to negate its fall.

To go further, we now need to return to Stephen Gill’s claim that the function of an international organization is to limit political and economic possibilities. It is to exclude, in other words, options that are incompatible with the social order promoted by the hegemon from what is possible and achievable.116 Effectively, the WTO was created to play such a role. Indeed, promoting liberalization of goods and services, protecting (notably intellectual) property rights and attacking subsidies (in non-agriculture sectors), just to give a few examples, all serve to severely reduce state interventions into the economy and to circumscribe or at least to strongly impede the turn towards an alternative model to neoliberalism

#### Neoliberal exploitation causes extinction.

Clark 18 (Brett, associate professor of sociology and sustainability studies at the University of Utah; Stefano B. Longo, Assistant Professor specializing in Environmental Sociology at NC State; “Land–Sea Ecological Rifts”, Land–Sea Ecological Rifts, https://monthlyreview.org/2018/07/01/land-sea-ecological-rifts/)

Covering approximately 70 percent of the Earth’s surface, the World Ocean is “the largest ecosystem.”1 Today all areas of the ocean are affected by multiple anthropogenic effects—such as overfishing, pollution, and emission of greenhouse gases, causing warming seas as well as ocean acidification—and over 40 percent of the ocean is strongly affected by human actions. Furthermore, the magnitude of these impacts and the speed of the changes are far greater than previously understood.2 Biologist Judith S. Weis explains that “the most widespread and serious type of [marine] pollution worldwide is eutrophication due to excess nutrients.”3 The production and use of fertilizers, sewage/waste from humans and farm animals, combustion of fossil fuels, and storm water have all contributed to dramatic increases in the quantity of nutrients in waterways and oceans. Research in 2008 indicated that there were over 400 “dead zones,” areas of low oxygen, mostly near the mouths of rivers.4 Nutrient overloading thus presents a major challenge to maintaining healthy aquatic ecosystems.

Nutrients are a basic source of nourishment that all organisms need to survive. Plants require at least eighteen elements to grow normally; of these, nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium are called macronutrients, because they are needed in larger quantities. While all essential nutrients exist in the biosphere, these three are the ones most commonly known to be deficient in commercial agricultural production systems. Beginning in the early twentieth century with the Haber-Bosch process, atmospheric nitrogen was converted into ammonia to create synthetic nitrogen fertilizer. The fixation of nitrogen, an energy-intensive process, made the nutrient far more widely available for use in agriculture. This in turn dramatically changed production systems, which no longer depended on legumes and manures to biologically supply nitrogen for other crops such as wheat, corn, and most vegetables.

In the modern era, particularly since the Second World War, the increased production and use of fertilizers served to greatly expand food production and availability. Major macronutrients are routinely applied to soils in order to maintain and increase the growth of plant life on farms, as well as private and public landscapes such as golf courses, nurseries, parks, and residences. They are used to produce fruits, vegetables, and fibers for human and non-human consumption, expand areas of recreation, and beautify communities. However, like many aspects of modern production, given the larger social dynamics and determinants that shape socioecological relationships, these technological and economic developments have generated serious negative—often unforeseen—consequences. The wide expansion and increasing rates of nitrogen and phosphorus application have caused severe damage to aquatic systems in particular. Rivers, streams, lakes, bays (estuaries), and ocean systems have been inundated with nutrient runoff, which has had far-reaching effects.

Here we examine the socioecological relationships and processes associated with the transfer of nutrients from terrestrial to marine systems. We employ a metabolic analysis to highlight the interchange of matter and energy within and between socioecological systems. In particular, we show how capitalist agrifood production contributes to distinct environmental problems, creating a metabolic rift in the soil nutrient cycle. We emphasize how the failure to mend nutrient cycles in agrifood systems has led to approaches that produce additional ruptures, such as those associated with nutrient overloading in marine systems. This analysis reveals the ways that the social relations of capitalist agriculture tend to produce interconnected ecological problems, such as those in terrestrial and aquatic systems. Further, we contend that these processes undermine the basic conditions of life on a wide-ranging scale. It is important to recognize that nutrient pollution of groundwater as well as surface waters has been a major concern since the rise of modern capitalist agriculture and the development of the global food regime.5 The failure to address the metabolic rupture in the soil nutrient cycle and the contradictions of capital are central to contemporary land-sea ecological rifts.

#### The alternative is a socialist movement that ends globalization

Galant 19 [(Michael, a coordinator of the Wire Pillar of the Progressive International, former economics and trade fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, MPP from Harvard University’s Kennedy School and BA in political economy from Brown University) “The Battle of Seattle: 20 years later, it's time for a revival” Open Democracy, 11/30/2019. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/battle-seattle-20-years-later-its-time-revival/] BC

20 years ago today, the streets of Seattle became front lines in the global class war.

Over the course of five days, some 40,000 individuals, representing unions, environmental groups, and Leftist organizations from around the world came together in an attempt to disrupt the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Using direct action tactics, activists physically delayed access to the meeting and led marches, rallies, and teach-ins that drew massive crowds. Protesters of all stripes were attacked by a violent police force – attracting international media coverage. The demonstrations outside became a wedge that would help drive the negotiations inside to collapse. The Battle of Seattle was won.

But the war continued. Seattle was about more than any single organization. The WTO was a symbol of the larger project of neoliberal globalization that was, in 1999, well on its way to reshaping the world in the interest of capital. The Battle of Seattle would become an equally potent symbol of resistance. The WTO protests marked the moment that the Alter-Globalization Movement (AGM), also known as the Global Justice, or disparagingly, the Anti-Globalization Movement, was launched into the public consciousness.

Much has changed in the two decades since. The AGM won many meaningful victories and experienced many more profound losses. Eventually, the movement faded. Today’s global economy resembles the neoliberal nightmare the Seattle protesters were fighting against more than the world they were fighting for. But recent years have revealed cracks in the surface. With an opportunity to finish what was started, it’s time to revive the spirit of Seattle.

Globalization and its dissent

Neoliberal globalization is a political project intended to raise the power of capital to the international level – to cement its supremacy as an immutable universal law beyond the reach of political communities. “Free trade” agreements and WTO rules establish the primacy of profit over democracy, labor, environmental, and consumer protections. World Bank and IMF loan conditions impose austerity, privatization, and deregulation on nations of the Global South. An international system of tax havens allows corporations and wealthy individuals to hoard their plundered resources. Global supply chain fragmentation shields multinationals from accountability for their abuses. Investment treaties unleash finance and corporations to cross borders in search of opportunities for exploitation, setting off a regulatory race to the bottom. If there was doubt before that capitalism must be confronted at the global level to be defeated, the power grab that is neoliberal globalization puts those doubts to rest. Capital is global. Labor must be too.

Yet there are forces preventing such global solidarity. Beginning during the Cold War, the majority of Northern labor accepted a compromise: support a foreign policy that enacts the interests of capital, and benefit from a share of the spoils in the form of minor concessions, a tempered welfare state, and cheap consumer goods. This tacit agreement survived largely intact into the neoliberal era – dividing the interests of a global working class and quelling demands for systemic global change.

The Alter-Globalization Movement rejected the compromise. While activists in the Global South had long resisted destructive free trade agreements and World Bank austerity, occasionally with solidarity from the North, the extremity of turn-of-the-century neoliberalism led to the explosion of a movement that refused to accept the mere crumbs of neocolonial extraction, and sought instead to build an alternative global economy for the many, both North and South.

This was a movement that brought together American anarchists with Korean peasants; libertarian socialist indigenous groups in Mexico with US anti-sweatshop activists; the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions with the Industrial Workers of the World; the Brazilian Movement for Landless Workers with Greenpeace; Filipino anti-capitalist scholars with French farmer activists best known for physically dismantling a McDonald’s. Their demands were many and varied – from land redistribution to the abolition of the World Bank, from a renegotiated NAFTA to the protection of indigenous knowledge of seeds from privatization – but all shared a vision of a global solidarity that would overcome the forces of neoliberal globalization.

Organizing under such a big tent, the AGM is better understood as a dispersed, informal network – a “movement of movements” – than a unified political structure. This fluid network manifested in many forms. The flagship World Social Forum regularly convened activists in an alternative to the annual World Economic Forum. Transnational advocacy networks campaigned on issues such as Global South debt relief. Northern activists used their positions of relative privilege to support local campaigns in the South, fighting water privatization in Bolivia and indigenous displacement from hydroelectric dams in India. And, as in Seattle, meetings of international organizations became rallying points for major global demonstrations.

With these organizing methods, the movement achieved substantial victories. The Jubilee 2000 campaign led to significant debt relief for Southern nations. Potentially disastrous trade agreements from the FTAA to TPP have been, at least temporarily, defeated. International Financial Institutions like the IMF and World Bank – while still agents of global capital – have vastly improved their lending practices since the 90’s. But its greatest successes were intangible: the AGM undermined the hegemonic ambitions embodied in Thatcher’s “There Is No Alternative”, slowed neoliberal globalization’s seemingly inexorable onslaught, and kept alive the flame of resistance during an otherwise nadir of Leftist politics.

The AGM should not, however, be romanticized. Emerging in a moment when the failures of 20th century socialist politics weighed heavily on the Left’s imagination, the AGM turned too far in the opposing direction. Big-tentism led to a dilution of demands and paved the way for the NGO-ization of the World Social Fora. A preference for all things decentralized made grabbing headlines easy, but building lasting political structures difficult. Resistance was often treated as an intrinsically valuable ends, rather than a means to taking power. And criticisms of “neoliberalism” typically fell short of identifying the true enemy – capitalism – or advancing a coherent alternative – socialism.

Ultimately, the neoliberal plan for the global economy succeeded more than not. While resistance to neoliberal globalization would rage on in the South, Northern solidarity faded. The September 11th attacks were the beginning of the end. Energy shifted to the anti-war movement, the state expanded its repression of Leftist organizing, and increased pressures toward “patriotism” led some to reconsider the old foreign policy compromise. By the mid-2000’s, little was left of what the AGM once was.

A call for revival

It’s time to rekindle the flame.

The global economy is still structured in the interest of capital. But the neoliberal consensus has begun to waver under the weight of its own contradictions.

The Right has a response to the crisis. Reactionary nationalists like Trump and Johnson seize upon existing systems of oppression to scapegoat the symptoms of a failed economic model. The problem is not that the global working class has lost out to a global capital class. The problem is that “we” – White, Christian, cishet, native-born Americans – have lost out to “them” – People of Color, immigrants, entire foreign countries, feminists, LGBTQ+ folks, and all those who threaten our supremacy in their struggles for liberation.

The Left must offer an alternative vision. The dramatic growth of socialist organizing and rise in popularity of social democratic politicians should offer great hope. But as the AGM understood, social democracy for the North is not enough. Our socialism must not mean merely a greater share of neocolonial extraction for Northern workers. Our socialism must rightly identify the global nature of our challenge, and unite across borders to confront a globalized capital.

That means internationalizing labor organizing to confront multinational corporations. Changing the rules of trade and investment. Ending tax havens. Building alternatives to the existing intellectual property regime. Holding corporations accountable for abuses in their supply chains. Supporting the struggles of peasants, indigenous peoples, and all global subaltern groups. Democratizing global governance. Opening borders to those displaced by the ravages of global capitalism. Advancing alternative models of development. Transforming, if not abolishing and replacing, the Bretton Woods Institutions. And confronting the all-important threat of climate collapse with, to begin with, a global Green New Deal. These are not minor addendums to a socialist platform. Class war is global. Internationalist demands are fundamental.

Organizations that remain from the AGM, international labor, and newcomers like Justice Is Global, the Fight Inequality Alliance, and Bernie Sanders and Yanis Varoufakis’s Progressive International, are already struggling for this vision. But its fruition depends on the backing of a far broader movement.

Like the AGM, we must take a global frame of analysis, and see neoliberal globalization as a concerted effort to undermine our power. Unlike the AGM, we must understand that neoliberalism is merely one manifestation of a greater enemy.

Like the AGM, we must build diverse, anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-xenophobic movements that transcend borders. Unlike the AGM, we must not allow fears of centralization to undermine a coherent platform.

Like the AGM, we must reject a class compromise that sacrifices the possibility of a better world for the crumbs of colonialism. Unlike the AGM, we must build lasting political structures that back our rejection with political power.

20 years ago, the streets of Seattle echoed with a chant that would become the defining motto of the movement: “another world is possible!” It still is – if we’re willing to fight for it.

## 1NC – Case

#### No impact uniqueness and alt causes to econ

Kardoosh 19 [(Marwan A., development economist with 22 years of experience working in the Middle East and North Africa) “Jordan Struggles to Reverse Decades of Poor Economic Management,” Haaretz, 9/6/2019] JL

Situated in a highly unstable neighborhood and suffering decades of bad policy, Jordan is struggling to find solutions for its ailing economy. Since 2009, the rate of economic growth has slowed down dramatically. This year it has hovered at around 2.2 percent, significantly lower than the government’s goal of 5 percent, and the prospects for the rest of 2019 are not promising at all. Per capita GDP, which is more relevant to people’s lives, hasn’t grown at all due to Jordan’s swelling population. The overhang of the tax law passed last year has taken its toll on Jordan’s stock market, reducing consumer confidence and purchasing power in the process.

Complicating matters are the high levels of debt and unemployment, which are still acting as a drag on the economy. There’s been a 24 percent drop in the value of real estate transactions and a 40 percent free-fall in new construction activity. Car imports are down 60 percent, mainly due to poor policy making that saw the government recently increase customs on electric vehicles. Rising public debt, together with sinking foreign investment, complete the bleak picture. Ordinary Jordanians have responded to the dismal state of affairs with hundreds of protests nationwide.

For all the talk of Amman harnessing youth and escaping the middle-income trap, hundreds of thousands of Jordanians still cannot find a decent job. One of Jordan’s daily newspapers earlier this summer reported that almost a third of those surveyed expressed interest in leaving the country. With the rate of joblessness ranging from almost one in five for the general working population to as high as 38.5 percent for the youngest demographic (20-24), the search for better work opportunities continues to be the most significant driver for emigration.

Emigration also remains an option for Jordan’s Christian minority. While they enjoy a high degree of tolerance from the Hashemite monarchy, as well security and political power, they have always sought a second passport as an insurance policy against a sudden change. Yet a sagging economy has convinced scores more to want to leave, something the state should look at seriously and critically.

Sworn in during June 2018, with a mandate for a program of positive change, the government of Omar Razzaz, a competent ex-World Bank civil servant, has so far failed to produce any tangible results. Mind you, the problems he has to deal with are grave, real and long-standing.

At the same time, mounting fiscal pressures have meant that governments in Jordan are no longer able to attract competent technocrats from the private sector, where remuneration is significantly higher. This has resulted in a big gap in the state apparatus. On the one hand, there are the decision makers – senior public officers with the skills to exercise sophisticated economic judgment, manage multi-faceted projects and operate in complex political environments. On the other hand, there are the lower-ranking government officials, the majority of whom are incapable of comprehending the complex realities of globalization and its impact on public policy. Thus the capacity of senior government bureaucrats to implement decisions on issues such as trade, investment and planning has been limited.

#### No draw in – the United States won’t intervene in the Middle East

Harb 8/19 [(Imad, the Director of Research and Analysis at Arab Center Washington DC. He is the Founder and Director of Quest for Middle East Analysis, a research and consulting firm. Previously, he worked as Adjunct Professor of Middle East Studies at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University. He also served as Senior Analyst at the Abu Dhabi, UAE-based Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research and taught political science and international relations at the University of Utah and San Francisco State University. In addition, he worked as Senior Program Officer at the United States Institute of Peace. Harb writes and publishes on a number of topics including civil-military relations, regional politics, and US policy in the Middle East/North Africa and the Arabian Gulf, and is co-author, with John Bruni, of Domestic and Regional Challenges to US-Iran Relations (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2015). He is the co-editor, with Zeina Azzam, of The Arab World Beyond Conflict (ACW, 2019). Harb earned a PhD in political science from the University of Utah.) “After Afghanistan, a New Biden Middle East Doctrine Takes Shape” Arab Center Washington DC, 8/19/2021. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/after-afghanistan-a-new-biden-middle-east-doctrine-takes-shape/] BC

If there are lessons to be learned from the disastrous end of the American war in Afghanistan, they would be most applicable to the countries of the Arab Middle East. There, the United States has long-standing defense agreements, military guarantees and deployments, and numerous bases and headquarters. To be sure, the Arab world is one geographic expanse where political regimes rely on military and security institutions that are heavily dependent on American arms, training, and logistics. Most importantly, however, these regimes rely on what they have considered to be American credibility and commitment to their survival and sustenance as they traverse difficult domestic challenges and the regional strategic terrain.

Arab regimes accustomed to a close relationship with the United States should be worried about what happened in Afghanistan over the last few weeks, culminating in the triumphant return of the Taliban movement to Kabul. Those who have long counted on the premise that, if needed, the United States would come to their rescue will understand the Afghanistan collapse as a result of the US withdrawal announced by both Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Thus, they may quickly begin to question where they stand on the priority list of US foreign policy, evaluate the efficacy of their relationships with the United States, and perhaps look to bolster their security with different alliance patterns and partners, such as Russia and China.

What will increase their sense of trepidation is President Biden’s sobering speech on August 16 about the Afghan debacle, one that appears to have confirmed some important principles that may spell the contours of a “Biden Doctrine.” These principles, which could very well define US relations with the Middle East going forward, are necessitated by a combination of American domestic considerations—fighting the coronavirus pandemic, addressing economic concerns, building consensus around policy objectives, and others—and costly international threats and challenges. Nevertheless, governments that depend on a close relationship with the United States should heed these principles and respond to them in a way that mitigates their impact on their countries, at least for the duration of the Biden presidency.

First, Biden may have finally drawn the curtain on American military interventionism in the wider Middle East, or at least to commitments to many countries there. For US partners and friends in the Arabian Gulf, this should translate into utmost caution regarding both the rhetoric about Iran and the wish to forcefully curtail its activities. In fact, from now on, the United States will only advise diplomacy as the preferred strategy to deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Simultaneously, for the time being Washington will maintain its forces in the region, but only as a deterrent against any adventurism by Iran, which is now under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the new, and equally hard-line, President Ebrahim Raisi.

Second, and as a corollary, the United States will not commit more blood and treasure to countries whose leaderships, state institutions, and militaries fail to firmly face threats and challenges. As President Biden highlighted in his speech, the United States spent more than a trillion dollars to sustain a well-armed Afghan military force, an institutional edifice for a modern state, and the pillars of an open economy. That much of this expenditure was to sustain an American presence that sought to fight extremists—yet, in reality, also protected corrupt officials and fostered a dependent economy—seems to be beside the point. What the Biden Administration saw was a failed Afghan army that withdrew from the battlefield against a ragtag militia with a millennial ideology. Especially embarrassing was the Taliban’s capture of billions of dollars-worth of sophisticated American weaponry that will be used to fortify a regime that previously ruled the country savagely—and one that also sheltered a terrorist organization, al-Qaeda, that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. Indeed, and despite the embarrassment and recrimination, it looks like the Biden team, much like the Trump Administration, has decided that where there is no vital American national interest, the United States will be ready and willing to simply pack up and leave, notwithstanding the damage to its reputation and credibility.

Third, the United States will no longer attempt to engage in open-ended efforts at nation-building. The Afghanistan experiment bolstered the American public’s gradually increasing reticence to expend energy and funds to help build (or resuscitate) state institutions in faraway places. This principle will have many applications in today’s Arab world where US economic, technical, military, and other assistance is required to differing degrees. Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Iraq, Tunisia, Syria, and Lebanon are prime examples of countries in need of such support. The United States will not undergo far-reaching engagement with these countries if their governing institutions and leaders do not exhibit the necessary will and readiness to govern and implement needed development programs and reforms.

#### Their Silverstein evidence is about Israel-Iran war:

#### They haven’t read an internal link for Jordan-Israel tensions spilling over to Iran

#### Alt causes

DW 20 [(Deutsche Welle, German public state-owned international broadcaster funded by the German federal tax budget) “Israel-Iran conflict to be major Middle East issue in 2020,” 1/2/2020] JL

European signatories to the JCPOA have been unable to effectively lift the renewed embargoes on trade with Iran, prompting Tehran to gradually restart uranium enrichment as the deal crumbled in mid-2019. Meanwhile, tit-for-tat confrontations on Iranian and US proxies in the Persian Gulf, along with Israeli attacks on Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq, have escalated.

Israel and Iran have been antagonists since the 1980s. But, after the US's 2003 invasion of Iraq and the formal withdrawal of American troops in 2011, the regional balance of power was broken, leaving the Middle East without a clear hegemon. That created a vacuum that has brought the countries into increasing conflict.

Despite their aggressive rhetoric, officials in neither country seek an all-out, direct war. But differences in perception, deteriorating commitment to the vestiges of the JCPOA, and the vagaries of elections in Israel, Iran and the US all ratchet up the prospect that an inadvertent clash could escalate the conflict.

Ali Vaez, an Iran analyst for the International Crisis Group, told DW that the conflict has become "a screw that only turns in one direction, getting tenser and tenser over time."

"There are serious risks of miscalculation that could push the parties into even greater and more direct confrontation," Vaez said.

In recent years, Iran has expanded its influence in the region. In Syria, it has bolstered the operations of President Bashar Assad. In Iraq, it has supported political parties and various militias since the US invasion in 2003 and, according to anonymous US officials cited by *The New York Times*, has recently been building up an arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles there. In Yemen, it has backed the Houthis against Saudi Arabia; in December the US claimed it had intercepted a transfer of advanced Iranian missile parts to the Houthis.

To Israel's north, Iran has maintained strategic support for Hezbollah, Lebanon's strongest political party, with a paramilitary wing widely considered to be more powerful than the Lebanese army.

Tehran is trying to establish a balance in a region where Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates massively outspend Iran militarily and Israel already possesses nuclear weapons, Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of the Washington-based think tank Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told DW. With a limited, aging air force that cannot compete with regional and US combat aircraft, missiles are Iran's only conventional deterrent.

Israel has long carried out undeclared strikes on Iranian targets in Syria, but recent months have seen officials publicly claim the operations, intensify the attacks and expand the theater of war.

Israel's military hit more than 200 Iran-backed targets in Syria in 2017 and 2018. In a rare public admission in late November, the military claimed one of the largest strikes in recent years on Iranian and Syrian targets in Damascus, in the midst of a flare-up of violence with Gaza.

The intensity of the operations has increased since the latest standoff in the Persian Gulf started in May, when the United States deployed military assets around the Strait of Hormuz, a number of tankers were sabotaged and seized, and rival drones were shot down in what appeared to be active if indirect engagement between forces operating on behalf of the US and Iran.

#### No Israel-Iran war

Safaei 9/17 [(Sajjad, postdoctoral fellow at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology) “Israel Isn’t Strong Enough to Attack Iran,” Foreign Policy, 9/17/2021] JL

To be sure, Israel has in the past carried out relatively limited operations against Iran—such as raids on Iranian allies in Syria and nuclear sabotage—and may continue to do so in the future. But to what extent should we believe Tel Aviv is truly ready and willing to launch a strike on Iran because of advances in the Iranian nuclear program, knowing full well that this is likely to push the two countries and their allies into war? The political and military constraints on Israeli decision-makers suggests such a military showdown is highly unlikely.

To speak of an imminent and undisguised IDF strike deep inside Iranian territory is to overlook a long-established norm that has for decades governed U.S.-Israel relations: Israel cannot simply ignore the wishes and concerns of its chief patron, especially when core U.S. foreign policy priorities are at stake.

This norm was expressed in clear terms by no less a figure than Israel’s former premier and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in his autobiography *My Country, My Life*. Here, Barak spelled out the paradigm that has shaped—and will likely continue to shape—the contours of Israeli action against Iran. “There were only two ways,” he explained, that Israel could stop the Iranians from getting a nuclear weapon (read: “nuclear program,” for Barak willfully ignores U.S. intelligence assessments that Iran had halted pursuits for nuclear weapons in 2003). One way was “for the Americans to act.” The only other option was “for [the United States] not to hinder Israel from doing so.”

But according to Barak, “hinder” is precisely what consecutive U.S. administrations have done—and are still likely to do.

Even during the military interventionism of the George W. Bush presidency, Israel did not have a blank check to do as it pleased. As Barak notes in his memoirs, when Bush learned in 2008 of Israeli efforts to purchase heavy munitions from the United States, he confronted Barak and then-premier Ehud Olmert. “I want to tell both of you now, as president,” Bush warned, “We are totally against any action by you to mount an attack on the [Iranian] nuclear plants.”

“I repeat,” Bush further clarified, “in order to avoid any misunderstanding. We expect you not to do it. And we’re not going to do it, either, as long as I am president. I wanted it to be clear.” It deserves mention that according to Barak, Bush issued this warning despite knowing that Israel did not even possess the military capacity to assault Iran at the time.

According to Barak, this staunch opposition to a strike on Iran had a “dramatic” effect on him and Olmert since the Bush administration had supported Israel’s 2007 bombing of Syria’s nascent nuclear program just a year before. In both cases, Washington’s approval, or lack thereof, was demonstrably consequential.

Barak’s memoirs show that the same dynamic continued to govern U.S.-Israel relations during Obama’s presidency. He recalls how then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta “made no secret of the fact he didn’t want us to launch a military strike” at a time when the Obama administration was focused on putting international political and economic pressure on Iran. Panetta “urged me to ‘think twice, three times,’ before going down that road,” Barak wrote, and saw it as a given that Tel Aviv would keep Washington abreast of its decisions. “If you do decide to attack the Iranian facilities, when will we know?” he allegedly asked Barak.

According to Barak’s account, Israel was dissuaded from going forward with a supposed strike on Iran’s nuclear installations in summer 2012 “because of the damage it would do to our ties with the United States.” Washington’s demands continued to limit Tel Aviv after the finalization of the nuclear deal in 2015. Even then, Barak recalls, the Israelis could not simply act against Iran without a green light from the Obama administration: “We needed to reach agreement with the Americans about what kind of military strike we, or they, might have to take if the Iranians again moved to get nuclear weapons.”

As evinced by Barak’s autobiography, U.S. presidents are not taciturn about making their views and wishes known to Israeli officials, especially when primary U.S. foreign policy objectives are involved. Nor can Tel Aviv afford to ignore Washington’s express demands and concerns on such matters. And today, any flagrant Israeli violation of Iranian sovereignty will instantly clash with two mutually reinforcing goals that have come to define the Biden administration’s foreign policy: curbing Iran’s nuclear program through non-military means (efforts currently focused on reviving the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal) and winding down U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

These political realities make it unlikely Israel will pursue an overt strike on Iran. Just as important, however, are the military constraints that Israel faces.

To be sure, even without its ready-to-launch nuclear warheads, Israel is more than capable of delivering swift and devastating blows to Iran’s armed forces, both in the skies and seas. Its fleet of American fighter jets and bombers alone can irreparably trounce Iran’s air defenses as well as its dilapidated air force. Even Iran’s increasingly powerful, accurate, and far-reaching missile and drone systems don’t radically alter the balance of power in the skies. In short, in terms of military hardware, the IDF’s superiority over Iran’s armed forces is indisputable, not to mention otherworldly.

But this prodigious superiority will be rendered far less consequential in the event of an all-out war that lures the IDF ground forces into the battlefield. Why? Ever since the IDF’s embarrassing defeat during the 2006 war with Hezbollah, Israel’s top military brass have become acutely aware that the country’s land forces are ill-prepared for a full-scale war with a fighting force even moderately capable of packing a punch.

#### No water wars - drought diplomacy solves

AFP 8/31 [(Agence France-Presse, international news agency headquartered in Paris, world's oldest news agency) “Drought diplomacy boosts Israel-Jordan ties,” Al Jazeera, 8/31/2021] JL

But, experts say, instead of the pressure provoking arguments, Israel and Jordan could be poised for an unprecedented boom in water cooperation amid technological advancements and climate pressures.

Warnings about looming “water wars”, including in the Middle East, were often inflated, said Duke University professor Erika Weinthal.

“Water is a resource that allows for adversaries to actually find ways to cooperate,” said Weinthal, a specialist in global environmental politics, who has worked extensively on Israel-Jordan issues.

“If you look at the data, you see more cooperation over water than conflict, and where there is conflict, it is usually verbal.”

Jordan is one of the world’s most water-deficient countries, suffering from extreme droughts, and water cooperation with Israel long pre-dates a 1994 peace deal between the two.

The issue came to prominence in 1921, when Pinhas Rutenberg, a Russian-Jewish engineer who had moved to Palestine, convinced British authorities and Hashemite royals to approve a hydropower station where the Yarmuk tributary meets the Jordan River.

It continued after Israel’s founding in 1948, through decades when the nations were officially at war.

Water deals, like all bilateral ties, suffered in recent years under former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whom critics have accused of neglecting Jordan as he pursued deeper ties with Iran’s foes in the Gulf.

But there have been signs of progress since Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s government took office in June, with the countries agreeing to their largest-ever water transaction.

New technologies reducing costs have made seawater desalination “a profitable concern”, with investors from Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates – which just normalised ties with the Jewish state – showing interest, said Gidon Bromberg, Israel director at EcoPeace Middle East.

“The people that are going to invest in more desalination very much see the opportunities for profit,” Bromberg said.

It means that Israel – one of the world’s desalination leaders – can sell more water, including natural freshwater from the Sea of Galilee, to Jordan without threatening domestic demand, he said.

And Israel has a new incentive to do so, because it now needs something from Jordan in return, according to analysts.

To meet the 2015 Paris climate accord commitments, Bennett’s government has approved a target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector by at least 85 percent. Multiple assessments show Israel does not have enough land to ramp up the necessary solar production, so it will have to buy solar power from Jordan to hit its targets.

“For the very first time, all sides will have something to sell and something to buy,” said Bromberg, whose organisation works in Israel, Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territory, which is also struggling from a worsening water crisis.

This unprecedented alignment of interests could help repair semi-fractured diplomatic relations, he argued.

“There are relatively few opportunities to try and rebuild trust,” Bromberg added. “Water and energy are one of those rare opportunities.”

#### ME war doesn’t go nuclear absent external powers – Israel would never

* They’d have done it by now – preemptively attacked Iraq and Syria within weeks of finding single reactors
* A strike would make the bomb more likely by emboldening Iran, they’d leave the NPT, kick out IAEA watchdogs, and sanctions support collapses – funds nuke mod in Iran
* It hurts Israel by eroding regional allies and Iran gets a face lift – independently messes up US-Israel ties and erodes assurances
* Veto players – Netanyahu needs approval from the IDF and security cabinet and they all hate him

Keck 15 [Zachary Keck is the Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Before that, he was a researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. "5 Reasons Israel Won't Attack Iran." https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-reasons-israel-wont-attack-iran-9469?page=0%2C1]

Although the interim deal does further reduce Israel’s propensity to attack, the truth is that the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has always been greatly exaggerated. There are at least five reasons why Israel isn’t likely to attack Iran.

1. You Snooze, You Lose

First, if Israel was going to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have done so a long time ago. Since getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel has generally acted proactively to thwart security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with nuclear-weapon programs. For example, Israel bombed Saddam Hussein’s program when it consisted of just a single nuclear reactor. According to ABC News, Israel struck Syria’s lone nuclear reactor just months after discovering it. The IAEA had been completely in the dark about the reactor, and took years to confirm the building was in fact housing one.

Contrast this with Israel’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the program has expanded into two fully operational nuclear facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and countless other well-protected and -dispersed sites. Furthermore, America’s extreme reluctance to initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least as far back as 2008. It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates for it to standby until the last minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat.

2. Bombing Iran Makes an Iranian Bomb More Likely

Much like a U.S. strike, only with much less tactical impact, an Israeli air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would only increase the likelihood that Iran would build the bomb. At home, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could use the attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against possessing a nuclear-weapons program, while using the greater domestic support for the regime and the nuclear program to mobilize greater resources for the country’s nuclear efforts.

Israel’s attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the world’s eyes) reason to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out international inspectors. If Tehran’s membership didn’t even prevent it from being attacked, how could it justify staying in the regime? Finally, support for international sanctions will crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, giving Iran more resources with which to rebuild its nuclear facilities.

3. Helps Iran, Hurts Israel

Relatedly, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be a net gain for Iran and a huge loss for Tel Aviv. Iran could use the strike to regain its popularity with the Arab street and increase the pressure against Arab rulers. As noted above, it would also lead to international sanctions collapsing, and an outpouring of sympathy for Iran in many countries around the world.

Meanwhile, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would leave Israel in a far worse-off position. Were Iran to respond by attacking U.S. regional assets, this could greatly hurt Israel’s ties with the United States at both the elite and mass levels. Indeed, a war-weary American public is adamantly opposed to its own leaders dragging it into another conflict in the Middle East. Americans would be even more hostile to an ally taking actions that they fully understood would put the U.S. in danger.

Furthermore, the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab nations against Iran would evaporate overnight. Even though many of the political elites in these countries would secretly support Israel’s action, their explosive domestic situations would force them to distance themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of time. Israel’s reputation would also take a further blow in Europe and Asia, neither of which would soon forgive Tel Aviv.

4. Israel’s Veto Players

Although Netanyahu may be ready to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, he operates within a democracy with a strong elite structure, particularly in the field of national security. It seems unlikely that he would have enough elite support for him to seriously consider such a daring and risky operation.

For one thing, Israel has strong institutional checks on using military force. As then vice prime minister and current defense minister Moshe Yaalon explained last year: “In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any military move, undergoes the approval of the security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet… the decision is not made by two people, nor three, nor eight.” It’s far from clear Netanyahu, a fairly divisive figure in Israeli politics, could gain this support. In fact, Menachem Begin struggled to gain sufficient support for the 1981 attack on Iraq even though Baghdad presented a more clear and present danger to Israel than Iran does today.

What is clearer is that Netanyahu lacks the support of much of Israel’s highly respected national security establishment. Many former top intelligence and military officials have spoken out publicly against Netanyahu’s hardline Iran policy, with at least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking a nuclear weapon. Another former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces told The Independent that, “It is quite clear that much if not all of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] leadership do not support military action at this point…. In the past the advice of the head of the IDF and the head of Mossad had led to military action being stopped.”

#### The US responds to Russian attacks against them OR allies with a devastating counterforce – that crushes Russia.

Lonsdale 19 [David Lonsdale is the Director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull, UK, “The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?,” *Comparative Strategy* 28:2, pub. online, May 17, 2019]

The important question is: what objectives would the U.S. pursue within a nuclear conflict, and how would they be achieved? It appears that the primary objectives sought would be damage limitation (an important component of warfighting) and the reestablishment of deterrence. This fits with the preliminary qualifying statement to this section of the review, in which it is stated that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons in compliance with the law of armed conflict.86 Indeed, the NPR is at pains to note that nuclear forces would only be used for defensive purposes. One assumes that this rules out counter-value targeting (deliberate attacks against enemy population centers). This leaves counterforce operations as the only option. Strikes against enemy nuclear forces and their command and control, in conjunction with active ballistic missile defenses (BMD), would help ensure damage limitation for the U.S. and its allies.87 A focus on counterforce options is reminiscent of later Cold War strategy, when the U.S. increasingly procured weapon systems with increased accuracy and penetrative capability designed for warfighting. Indeed, Lieber and Press argue that increases in accuracy and remote sensing have enhanced the potency of counterforce options, to the point that low-casualty counterforce options are possible for the first time.88 One can reasonably assume, although it is not explicitly noted in the review, that the restoration of deterrence would be achieved through a combination of intra-war deterrence by denial (as noted above in relation to counter-escalation strategies) and punishment for coercive purposes. Inclusion of the latter is premised on references to “unacceptable consequences” resulting from nuclear attack elsewhere in the NPR. 89 However, in the face of no counter-value targeting, it is reasonable to question how these costs would be inflicted. There are three possible answers, although none of them is discussed in the NPR. First, it may be that the enemy values highly their nuclear forces; so that the loss of them would inflict unacceptable costs. Alternatively, there may be an unwritten assumption that counterforce strikes would inevitably produce “bonus” counter-value damage. Much of the nuclear force infrastructure (including command and control, airbases, etc.) is within or near population centers. Thus, even a limited counterforce strike is likely to have a significant detrimental effect on counter-value targets. This assumption, however, is somewhat thrown into question by the stated desire to procure accurate limited-yield weapons and to operate within the norms of the war convention. Low-yield accurate weapons would be ideal for counterforce missions and would minimize damage to counter-value target sets. Thus, bonus damage is likely to be limited. Finally, although again not explicitly noted in the NPR, perhaps there is a return to the notion of attacking targets associated with political control. Yet again, though, concerns over collateral damage would likely restrict a campaign aimed at the means of political control. We are, thus, left with many questions concerning how the coercive effects of nuclear weapons would be administered. This is problematic, for as Thomas C. Schelling eloquently noted, “The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attributes of military force.” 90 It has to be concluded that the uncertainties in this area of strategy reflect either a paradox or incomplete strategic thinking in the NPR. Clarity on these matters would be welcome, especially as it would enhance deterrence credibility still further. Although countervailing is back on the agenda in the 2018 NPR, there is no mention of prevailing in a nuclear conflict. Indeed, the review quotes Defense Secretary Mattis, echoing the early thoughts of Brodie, that nuclear war can never be won, and thus must never be fought.91 This is both curious and disappointing from a warfighting perspective, and speaks to the need for the further development of strategic thinking in U.S. nuclear strategy under Trump. Damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence are perfectly admirable goals within the context of nuclear conflict. However, if the U.S. is to achieve its objectives in a post-deterrence environment, it must have a comprehensive theory of victory. Damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence are limited negative objectives. They do not provide a positive driving force for the use of nuclear weapons. To reiterate, victory refers to a policy objective that must be achieved in the face of the enemy. And, as Clausewitz reminds us, the will of the enemy must be broken by destroying his ability to resist, or putting him in such a position as his defeat is inevitable.92 If we consider the conditions under which U.S. nuclear weapons could be used, as stipulated by the 2018 NPR, then we can assume that an enemy power (likely) Russia, China, North Korea, or a state-sponsored terror group) has launched a substantial attack on either the U.S. or one of its allies. We can think in terms of a Russian assault on the Baltic States, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or perhaps a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Alternatively, the U.S. may have been subjected to a substantial strategic attack, involving either weapons of mass destruction (including biological or chemical) or a crippling cyberattack. In any of these scenarios, more expansive objectives would be required. As Lieber and Press note, “In some cases, wars may be triggered by events that compel U.S. leaders to pursue decisive victory, conquest, and/or regime change.” 93 Thus, in order to achieve its objectives, the U.S. would variously need to: punish an aggressor to reinstate deterrence; defeat enemy forces for damage limitation or to reclaim lost territory; and, in the North Korean case, presumably overthrow a communist regime. In some of these cases, damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence would not be enough. Enemy forces would have to be defeated, removed, destroyed, or coerced (to withdraw from allied territory). Any operations in pursuit of these goals would need a theory of victory built on a detailed understanding of the use of nuclear weapons in the service of military objectives; i.e., nuclear warfighting. This could include defeating enemy nuclear forces for force protection of U.S. and allied conventional forces. Alternatively, U.S. nuclear forces may be required to defeat regionally superior enemy conventional forces. And yet, as previously noted, the NPR rules out a return to nuclear warfighting. This is a significant disjuncture in U.S. nuclear strategy. It is even more curious when one considers the range of modern forces the Trump administration seeks to acquire under the 2018 NPR.

#### The US could eliminate their nuclear arsenal with a conventional strike

Plesch 18 [(Dan, Director of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of London) “Could the US win World War III without using nuclear weapons?” The Conversation, 4/19/2018] BC

As the US, Russia and China test each other’s patience and strategic focus, speculation about the chances of a world war has hit a new high. But many of the people seriously engaged in this weighty discussion often get it wrong.

When it comes to estimating military capability, the Western media is principally concerned with the weapons capabilities of weaker states – and it rarely pays much attention to the colossal capability of the US, which still accounts for most of the world’s defence spending.

Any sensible discussion of what a hypothetical World War III might look like needs to begin with the sheer size and force of America’s military assets. For all that China and Russia are arming up on various measures, US commanders have the power to dominate escalating crises and counter opposing forces before they can be used.

Take missile warfare alone. The US Navy already has 4,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Navy and Air Force are currently taking delivery of 5,000 JASSM conventional cruise missiles with ranges from 200-600 miles. Barely visible to radar, these are designed to destroy “hardened” targets such as nuclear missile silos. Russia and China, by contrast, have nothing of equivalent quantity or quality with which to threaten the US mainland.

The same holds true when it comes to maritime forces. While much is made of Russia’s two frigates and smaller vessels stationed off the Syrian coast, France alone has 20 warships and an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean – and US standing forces in the area include six destroyers equipped with scores of cruise missiles and anti-missile systems. At the other end of Europe, the Russian military is threatening the small Baltic states, but it is rarely noted that the Russian Baltic fleet is the same size as Denmark’s and half the size of Germany’s.

Meanwhile, China’s aggressively expansionist behaviour in the South China Sea is reported alongside stories of its first aircraft carrier and long-range ballistic missiles. But for all that the Chinese navy is large and growing, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it’s still only numerically equivalent to the combined fleets of Japan and Taiwan, while the US boasts 19 aircraft carriers worldwide if its marine assault ships are included.

But overhanging all this, of course, is the nuclear factor.

Out of the sky

The US, Russia and China are all nuclear-armed; Vladimir Putin recently unveiled a new fleet of nuclear-capable missiles which he described as “invincible in the face of all existing and future systems”, and some have suggested that China may be moving away from its no-first-use policy. This is all undeniably disturbing. While it has long been assumed that the threat of nuclear weapons acts as a deterrent to any war between the major powers, it’s also possible that the world may simply have been riding its luck. But once again, the US’s non-nuclear capabilities are all too often overlooked.

US leaders may in fact believe they can remove Russia’s nuclear deterrent with an overwhelming conventional attack backed up by missile defences. This ability was cultivated under the Prompt Global Strike programme, which was initiated before 9/11 and continued during the Obama years. Organised through the US Air Force’s Global Strike Command, it is to use conventional weapons to attack anywhere on Earth in under 60 minutes.

This is not to say the task would be small. In order to destroy Russia’s nuclear missiles before they can be launched, the US military would need to first blind Russian radar and command and communications to incoming attack, probably using both physical and cyber attacks. It would then have to destroy some 200 fixed and 200 mobile missiles on land, a dozen Russian missile submarines, and Russian bombers. It would then need to shoot down any missiles that could still be fired.

Russia is not well positioned to survive such an attack. Its early warning radars, both satellite and land-based, are decaying and will be hard to replace. At the same time, the US has and is developing a range of technologies to carry out anti-satellite and radar missions, and it has been using them for years. (All the way back in 1985, it shot down a satellite with an F15 jet fighter.) That said, the West is very dependent on satellites too, and Russia and China continue to develop their own anti-satellite systems.

The air war

Russia’s bomber aircraft date back to the Soviet era, so despite the alarm they provoke when they nudge at Western countries’ airspace, they pose no major threat in themselves. Were the Russian and US planes to face each other, the Russians would find themselves under attack from planes they couldn’t see and that are any way out of their range.

US and British submarine crews claim a perfect record in constantly shadowing Soviet submarines as they left their bases throughout the Cold War. Since then, Russian forces have declined and US anti-submarine warfare has been revived, raising the prospect that Russian submarines could be taken out before they could even launch their missiles.

The core of the Russia’s nuclear forces consists of land-based missiles, some fixed in silos, others mobile on rail and road. The silo-based missiles can now be targeted by several types of missiles, carried by US planes almost invisible to radar; all are designed to destroy targets protected by deep concrete and steel bunkers. But a problem for US war planners is that it might take hours too long for their missile-carrying planes to reach these targets – hence the need to act in minutes.

One apparently simple solution to attacking targets very quickly is to fit quick nuclear ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads. In 2010, Robert Gates, then serving as secretary of defence under Barack Obama, said that the US had this capability. Intercontinental ballistic missiles take just 30 minutes to fly between the continental US’s Midwest and Siberia; if launched from well-positioned submarines, the Navy’s Tridents can be even quicker, with a launch-to-target time of under ten minutes.

From 2001, the US Navy prepared to fit its Trident missiles with either inert solid warheads – accurate to within ten metres – or vast splinter/shrapnel weapons. Critics have argued that this would leave a potential enemy unable to tell whether they were under nuclear or conventional attack, meaning they would have to assume the worst. According to US Congressional researchers, the development work came close to completion, but apparently ceased in 2013.

Nonetheless, the US has continued to develop other technologies across its armed services to attack targets around the world in under an hour – foremost among them hypersonic missiles, which could return to Earth at up to ten times the speed of sound, with China and Russia trying to keep up.

Missile envy

The remainder of Russia’s nuclear force consists of missiles transported by rail. An article on Kremlin-sponsored news outlet Sputnik described how these missile rail cars would be so hard to find that Prompt Global Strike might not be as effective as the US would like – but taken at face value, the article implies that the rest of the Russian nuclear arsenal is in fact relatively vulnerable.

Starting with the “Scud hunt” of the First Gulf War, the US military has spent years improving its proficiency at targeting mobile ground-based missiles. Those skills now use remote sensors to attack small ground targets at short notice in the myriad counter-insurgency operations it’s pursued since 2001.

If the “sword” of Prompt Global Strike doesn’t stop the launch of all Russian missiles, then the US could use the “shield” of its own missile defences. These it deployed after it walked out of a treaty with Russia banning such weapons in 2002.

While some of these post-2002 missile defence systems have been called ineffective, the US Navy has a more effective system called Aegis, which one former head of the Pentagon’s missile defence programs claims can shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles. Some 300 Aegis anti-ballistic missiles now equip 40 US warships; in 2008, one destroyed a satellite as it fell out of orbit.

War mentality

In advance of the Iraq war, various governments and onlookers cautioned the US and UK about the potential for unforeseen consequences, but the two governments were driven by a mindset impervious to criticism and misgivings. And despite all the lessons that can be learned from the Iraq disaster, there’s an ample risk today that a similarly gung-ho attitude could take hold.

Foreign casualties generally have little impact on domestic US politics. The hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who died under first sanctions and then war did not negatively impact presidents Clinton or George W. Bush. Neither might the prospect of similar casualties in Iran or North Korea or other states, especially if “humanitarian” precision weapons are used.

But more than that, an opinion poll run by Stanford University’s Scott Sagan found that the US public would not oppose the preemptive use of even nuclear weapons provided that the US itself was not affected. And nuclear Trident offers that temptation.

The control of major conventional weapons as well as WMD needs urgent attention from international civil society, media and political parties. There is still time to galvanise behind the Nobel-winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the nuclear ban treaty, and to revive and globalise the decaying arms control agenda of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which played a vital part in bringing the Cold War to a largely peaceful end.

Like the Kaiser in 1914, perhaps Trump or one of his successors will express dismay when faced with the reality a major US offensive unleashes. But unlike the Kaiser, who saw his empire first defeated and then dismembered, perhaps a 21st-century US president might get away with it.

1. **Successful preemptive strike forces a surrender – solves further escalation**

Sarah **Johnson 17**, "U.S. Nuclear First Strike Policy; Be Afraid", Bill Track 50, https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/in-the-news/u-s-nuclear-first-strike-policy-be-afraid/

The second situation is a [preemptive strike](http://www.dictionary.com/browse/preemptive-strike) — a first-strike attack with nuclear weapons carried out to destroy an enemy’s capacity to respond. Preemptive strikes can be based on the assumption that the enemy is planning an **imminent attack**, but don’t have to be. The methodology behind a preemptive nuclear strike is to attack the enemy’s **strategic nuclear weapon facilities** (missile silos, submarine bases, bomber airfields), command and control sites and storage depots first. By hitting these targets first the enemy will be **so wounded** with **so little of their resources left** that they will be **forced to surrender** with minimal damage to the attacking party.

1. **Otherwise, Russia will broadly scale up military AI – extinction**

Mike **Rogers 17**, former US Representative from Michigan, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Artificial intelligence — the arms race we may not be able to control", TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/351725-artificial-intelligence-is-the-new-arms-race-we-may-not-be-able-to-control

“Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will **become ruler of the world**,” [said](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world) Vladimir Putin. The sphere the President of Russia is referring to is **artificial intelligence** (AI) and his comments should give you a moment of pause. Addressing students at the beginning of our Labor Day weekend, Putin remarked “Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind,” adding, “It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict.” For once, I find myself in agreement with the President of Russia, but just this once. Artificial Intelligence offers **incredible** promise and **peril**. **Nowhere is this clearer than in the realm of national security**. Today un-crewed systems are a fact of modern warfare. Nearly every country is adopting systems where personnel are far removed from the conflict and wage war by remote control. AI [stands](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligence-terminator.html) to sever that ground connection. Imagine a **fully autonomous Predator or Reaper drone**. Managed by an AI system, the drone could **identify targets**, **determine their legitimacy**, and **conduct a strike** all **without human intervention.** Indeed, the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom issued a press [statement](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/12/16286580/uk-government-killer-robots-drones-weapons) in September that the country “does not possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of developing them,” and that its weapons systems “will always be under control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight and authority and accountability.” Let’s think smaller. Imagine a tiny insect-sized drone loaded with explosive. Guided by a [pre-programmed AI](https://www.amazon.com/Life-3-0-Being-Artificial-Intelligence/dp/1101946598), it could hunt down a specific target — a politician, a general, or an opposition figure — determine when to strike, how to strike, and if to strike based on its own learning. Howard Hughes Medical Center [recently](https://qz.com/1000011/scientists-attached-an-electronic-backpack-to-a-genetically-modified-dragonfly-and-turned-it-into-a-drone/) attached a backpack to a genetically modified dragonfly and flew it remotely. These examples are, however, where humans are involved and largely control the left and right limits of AI. **Yet, there are examples of AI purposely and independently going beyond programed parameters.** Rogue algorithms led to a [flash crash](http://gizmodo.com/rogue-algorithm-blamed-for-historic-crash-of-the-britis-1787523587) of the British Pound. In 2016, in-game AIs **created super AIs weapons** and [**hunted down**](http://www.kotaku.co.uk/2016/06/03/elites-ai-created-super-weapons-and-started-hunting-players-skynet-is-here) **human players**, and AIs have [**created**](https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2017/07/31/facebook-ai-creates-its-own-language-in-creepy-preview-of-our-potential-future/#1cf69787292c) **their own languages** that were **indecipherable to humans**. AIs proved more effective than their human counterparts in producing and catching users in **spear phishing programs**. Not only did the AIs create more content, they successfully [captured](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Seymour-Tully-Weaponizing-Data-Science-For-Social-Engineering-Automated-E2E-Spear-Phishing-On-Twitter.pdf) more users with their deception. While seemingly simple and low stakes in nature, **extrapolate these scenarios into more significant and risky areas and the consequences become much greater.** Cybersecurity is no different. Today we are focused on the hackers, trolls, and cyber criminals (officially sanctioned and otherwise) who seek to penetrate our networks, steal our intellectual property, and leave behind malicious code for activation in the event of a conflict. Replace the individual with an AI and imagine how fast hacking takes place; networks against networks, at machine speed all without a human in the loop. Sound far-fetched? **It’s not**. In 2016, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency held an AI on AI capture the flag contest called the [Cyber Grand Challenge](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSgYu3w3DMM) at the DEF CON event. AI networks against AI networks. In August of this year the founders of 116 AI and robotics companies signed a letter petitioning the United Nations [to ban](https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/21/16177828/killer-robots-ban-elon-musk-un-petition) lethal autonomous systems. Signatories to this letter included Google DeepMind’s co-founder Mustafa Suleyman and Elon Musk who, in response to Putin’s quote [tweeted](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/904638455761612800), “Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo (sic)”. AI is not some far off future challenge. It is a challenge today and one with which we must grapple. I am in favor of fielding any system that enhances our national security, but we must have an open and honest conversation about the implications of AI, the consequences of which **we do not**, **and may not**, **fully understand**. This is not a new type of bullet or missile. This is a potentially **fully autonomous system** that even with human oversight and guidance will make its own decisions on the battlefield and in cyberspace. How can we ensure that the system does not **escape our control?** How can we prevent such systems from falling into the hands of terrorists or insurgents? Who controls the source code? How and can we build in so-called impenetrable kill switches? AI and AI-like systems are slowly being introduced into our arsenal. Our adversaries, China, Russia, and others are also introducing AI systems into their arsenals as well. Implementation is happening faster than our ability to fully **comprehend the consequences.** Putin’s new call spells out a new arms race. **Rushing to AI weapon systems without guiding principles is a dangerous**. It risks an **escalation** that we do not fully understand and may not be able to control. The cost of limiting AI intelligence being weaponized [**could vastly exceed**](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf) **all of our nuclear proliferation efforts to date**. More troubling, the **consequences of failure are equally existential.**

AI causes extinction.

Bilton 14 [(Nick, a Special Correspondent for Vanity Fair, where he writes about technology, politics, business and culture. A columnist and reporter for The New York Times for over a decade, Bilton is a bestselling author, screenwriter, CNBC contributor and host of the Vanity Fair podcast, Inside the Hive.) Internally cites Bostrom (Nick, Professor, University of Oxford, Director, Future of Humanity Institute, Director, Governance of AI program) Musk (Elon, known for founding Tesla Motors and SpaceX, which launched a landmark commercial spacecraft in 2012.) Hawking (Steven, an English theoretical physicist, cosmologist, and author who was director of research at the Centre for Theoretical Cosmology at the University of Cambridge at the time of his death.) Docherty (Bonnie, a lecturer on law at Harvard University and a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch) Hassabis (Demis, founder and chief executive of DeepMind) “Artificial Intelligence as a Threat” The New York Times 11/5/2014] BC

Ebola sounds like the stuff of nightmares. Bird flu and SARS also send shivers down my spine. But I’ll tell you what scares me most: artificial intelligence.

The first three, with enough resources, humans can stop. The last, which humans are creating, could soon become unstoppable.

Before we get into what could possibly go wrong, let me first explain what artificial intelligence is. Actually, skip that. I’ll let someone else explain it: Grab an iPhone and ask Siri about the weather or stocks. Or tell her “I’m drunk.” Her answers are artificially intelligent.

Right now these artificially intelligent machines are pretty cute and innocent, but as they are given more power in society, these machines may not take long to spiral out of control.

In the beginning, the glitches will be small but eventful. Maybe a rogue computer momentarily derails the stock market, causing billions in damage. Or a driverless car freezes on the highway because a software update goes awry.

But the upheavals can escalate quickly and become scarier and even cataclysmic. Imagine how a medical robot, originally programmed to rid cancer, could conclude that the best way to obliterate cancer is to exterminate humans who are genetically prone to the disease.

Nick Bostrom, author of the book “Superintelligence,” lays out a number of petrifying doomsday settings. One envisions self-replicating nanobots, which are microscopic robots designed to make copies of themselves. In a positive situation, these bots could fight diseases in the human body or eat radioactive material on the planet. But, Mr. Bostrom says, a “person of malicious intent in possession of this technology might cause the extinction of intelligent life on Earth.”

Artificial-intelligence proponents argue that these things would never happen and that programmers are going to build safeguards. But let’s be realistic: It took nearly a half-century for programmers to stop computers from crashing every time you wanted to check your email. What makes them think they can manage armies of quasi-intelligent robots?

I’m not alone in my fear. Silicon Valley’s resident futurist, Elon Musk, recently said artificial intelligence is “potentially more dangerous than nukes.” And Stephen Hawking, one of the smartest people on earth, wrote that successful A. I. “would be the biggest event in human history. Unfortunately, it might also be the last.” There is a long list of computer experts and science fiction writers also fearful of a rogue robot-infested future.

Two main problems with artificial intelligence lead people like Mr. Musk and Mr. Hawking to worry. The first, more near-future fear, is that we are starting to create machines that can make decisions like humans, but these machines [don’t have morality](http://ethicbots.na.infn.it/meetings/kom/veruggio.pdf) and likely never will.

The second, which is a longer way off, is that once we build systems that are as intelligent as humans, these intelligent machines will be able to build smarter machines, often referred to as superintelligence. That, experts say, is when things could really spiral out of control as the rate of growth and expansion of machines would increase exponentially. We can’t build safeguards into something that we haven’t built ourselves.

“We humans steer the future not because we’re the strongest beings on the planet, or the fastest, but because we are the smartest,” said James Barrat, author of “Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era.” “So when there is something smarter than us on the planet, it will rule over us on the planet.”

What makes it harder to comprehend is that we don’t actually know what superintelligent machines will look or act like. “Can a submarine swim? Yes, but it doesn’t swim like a fish,” Mr. Barrat said. “Does an airplane fly? Yes, but not like a bird. Artificial intelligence won’t be like us, but it will be the ultimate intellectual version of us.”

Perhaps the scariest setting is how these technologies will be used by the military. It’s not hard to imagine countries engaged in an arms race to build machines that can kill.

Bonnie Docherty, a lecturer on law at Harvard University and a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, said that the race to build autonomous weapons with artificial intelligence — which is already underway — is reminiscent of the early days of the race to build nuclear weapons, and that treaties should be put in place now before we get to a point where machines are killing people on the battlefield.

“If this type of technology is not stopped now, it will lead to an arms race,” said Ms. Docherty, who has written several reports on the dangers of killer robots. “If one state develops it, then another state will develop it. And machines that lack morality and mortally should not be given power to kill.”

So how do we ensure that all these doomsday situations don’t come to fruition? In some instances, we likely won’t be able to stop them.

But we can hinder some of the potential chaos by following the lead of Google. Earlier this year when the search-engine giant acquired DeepMind, a neuroscience-inspired, artificial intelligence company based in London, the two companies put together an artificial intelligence safety and ethics board that aims to ensure these technologies are developed safely.

Demis Hassabis, founder and chief executive of DeepMind, said in a video interview that anyone building artificial intelligence, including governments and companies, should do the same thing. “They should definitely be thinking about the ethical consequences of what they do,” Dr. Hassabis said. “Way ahead of time.”