## 1NC – CP

#### CP: The United States should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the World Health Organization over reducing intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines. The United States will support the proposal and adopt the results of consultation.

#### WHO says yes

Kimball 5/7 [(Spencer, news editor with CNBC.com) “WHO chief urges world to follow U.S. lead and support waiving Covid vaccine patent protections,” CNBC, 5/7/2021] JL

World Health Organization Director General-Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus on Friday urged other countries, particularly the Group of Seven industrialized nations, to follow the U.S. example and support a World Trade Organization motion to temporarily waive Covid-19 vaccine patent protections.

“Wednesday’s announcement by the U.S. that it will support a temporary waiver of intellectual property protections for Covid-19 vaccines is a significant statement of solidarity and support for vaccine equity,” Tedros said at a press briefing. “I know that this is not a politically easy thing to do, so I very much appreciate the leadership of the U.S. and we urge other countries to follow their example.”

#### Consultation displays strong leadership, authority, and cohesion among member states which are key to WHO legitimacy

Gostin et al 15 [(Lawrence O., Linda D. & Timothy J. O’Neill Professor of Global Health Law at Georgetown University, Faculty Director of the O’Neill Institute for National & Global Health Law, Director of the World Health Organization Collaborating Center on Public Health Law & Human Rights, JD from Duke University) “The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization,” Georgetown University Law Center, 5/2/2015] JL

Members want the WHO to exert leadership, harmonize disparate activities, and set priorities. Yet they resist intrusions into their sovereignty, and want to exert control. In other words, ‘everyone desires coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.’ States often ardently defend their geostrategic interests. As the Indonesian virus-sharing episode illustrates, the WHO is pulled between power blocs, with North America and Europe (the primary funders) on one side and emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India on the other. An inherent tension exists between richer ‘net contributor’ states and poorer ‘net recipient’ states, with the former seeking smaller WHO budgets and the latter larger budgets.

Overall, national politics drive self-interest, with states resisting externally imposed obligations for funding and action. Some political leaders express antipathy to, even distrust of, UN institutions, viewing them as bureaucratic and inefficient. In this political environment, it is unsurprising that members fail to act as shareholders. Ebola placed into stark relief the failure of the international community to increase capacities as required by the IHR. Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone had some of the world's weakest health systems, with little capacity to either monitor or respond to the Ebola epidemic.20 This caused enormous suffering in West Africa and placed countries throughout the region e and the world e at risk. Member states should recognize that the health of their citizens depends on strengthening others' capacity. The WHO has a central role in creating systems to facilitate and encourage such cooperation.

The WHO cannot succeed unless members act as shareholders, foregoing a measure of sovereignty for the global common good. It is in all states' interests to have a strong global health leader, safeguarding health security, building health systems, and reducing health inequalities. But that will not happen unless members fund the Organization generously, grant it authority and flexibility, and hold it accountable.

#### WHO is critical to disease prevention – it is the only international institution that can disperse information, standardize global public health, and facilitate public-private cooperation

Murtugudde 20 [(Raghu, professor of atmospheric and oceanic science at the University of Maryland, PhD in mechanical engineering from Columbia University) “Why We Need the World Health Organization Now More Than Ever,” Science, 4/19/2020] JL

WHO continues to play an indispensable role during the current COVID-19 outbreak itself. In November 2018, the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine organised a workshop to explore lessons from past influenza outbreaks and so develop recommendations for pandemic preparedness for 2030. The salient findings serve well to underscore the critical role of WHO for humankind.

The world’s influenza burden has only increased in the last two decades, a period in which there have also been 30 new zoonotic diseases. A warming world with increasing humidity, lost habitats and industrial livestock/poultry farming has many opportunities for pathogens to move from animals and birds to humans. Increasing global connectivity simply catalyses this process, as much as it catalyses economic growth.

WHO coordinates health research, clinical trials, drug safety, vaccine development, surveillance, virus sharing, etc. The importance of WHO’s work on immunisation across the globe, especially with HIV, can hardly be overstated. It has a rich track record of collaborating with private-sector organisations to advance research and development of health solutions and improving their access in the global south.

It discharges its duties while maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between such diverse and powerful forces as national securities, economic interests, human rights and ethics. COVID-19 has highlighted how political calculations can hamper data-sharing and mitigation efforts within and across national borders, and WHO often simply becomes a convenient political scapegoat in such situations.

International Health Regulations, a 2005 agreement between 196 countries to work together for global health security, focuses on detection, assessment and reporting of public health events, and also includes non-pharmaceutical interventions such as travel and trade restrictions. WHO coordinates and helps build capacity to implement IHR.

#### Extinction – defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

#### WHO diplomacy solves great power conflict

Murphy 20 [(Chris, U.S. senator from Connecticut serving on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee) “The Answer is to Empower, Not Attack, the World Health Organization,” War on the Rocks, 4/21/2020] JL

The World Health Organization is critical to stopping disease outbreaks and strengthening public health systems in developing countries, where COVID-19 is starting to appear. Yemen announced its first infection earlier this month, and other countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East are at severe risk. Millions of refugees rely on the World Health Organization for their health care, and millions of children rely on the WHO and UNICEF to access vaccines.

The World Health Organization is not perfect, but its team of doctors and public health experts have had major successes. Their most impressive claim to fame is the eradication of smallpox – no small feat. More recently, the World Health Organization has led an effort to rid the world of two of the three strains of polio, and they are close to completing the trifecta.

These investments are not just the right thing to do; they benefit the United States. Improving health outcomes abroad provides greater political and economic stability, increasing demand for U.S. exports. And, as we are all learning now, it is in America’s national security interest for countries to effectively detect and respond to potential pandemics before they reach our shores.

As the United States looks to develop a new global system of pandemic prevention, there is absolutely no way to do that job without the World Health Organization. Uniquely, it puts traditional adversaries – like Russia and the United States, India and Pakistan, or Iran and Saudi Arabia – all around the same big table to take on global health challenges. It has relationships with the public health leaders of every nation, decades of experience in tackling viruses and diseases, and the ability to bring countries together to tackle big projects. This ability to bridge divides and work across borders cannot be torn down and recreated – not in today’s environment of major power competition – and so there is simply no way to build an effective international anti-pandemic infrastructure without the World Health Organization at the center.

## 1NC – T

#### Interpretation: topical affs must fiat an action through the World Trade Organization

#### Member nations of the WTO make policies as a whole

WTO ND [(World Trade Organization) “What is the WTO?” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/whatis\_e.htm] BC

The WTO is run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers (who usually meet at least once every two years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who meet regularly in Geneva).

In this respect, the WTO is different from some other international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In the WTO, power is not delegated to a board of directors or the organization’s head.

When WTO rules impose disciplines on countries’ policies, that is the outcome of negotiations among WTO members. The rules are enforced by the members themselves under agreed procedures that they negotiated, including the possibility of trade sanctions. But those sanctions are imposed by member countries, and authorized by the membership as a whole. This is quite different from other agencies whose bureaucracies can, for example, influence a country’s policy by threatening to withhold credit.

Reaching decisions by consensus among some 150 members can be difficult. Its main advantage is that decisions made this way are more acceptable to all members. And despite the difficulty, some remarkable agreements have been reached. Nevertheless, proposals for the creation of a smaller executive body — perhaps like a board of directors each representing different groups of countries — are heard periodically. But for now, the WTO is a member-driven, consensus-based organization.

#### Nation and government are synonymous

Merriam Webster ND [“nation” Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation] BC

Definition of nation

 (Entry 1 of 2)

1a(1): NATIONALITY sense 5athree Slav peoples … forged into a Yugoslavia without really fusing into a Yugoslav nation— Hans Kohn

(2): a politically organized nationality

(3)in the Bible : a non-Jewish nationality why do the nations conspire— Psalms 2:1 (Revised Standard Version)

b: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government Canada is a nation with a written constitution— B. K. Sandwell

c: a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent status a nation of vast size with a small population— Mary K. Hammond

#### Collective nouns are singular – this means “member nations” refers to a singular entity

MLA 3/8 [“Should I use a singular or plural verb with a collective noun?” MLA Style Center, 3/8/2021] JL

Collective nouns, like *team*, *family, class*, *group*, and *host*, take a singular verb when the entity acts together and a plural verb when the individuals composing the entity act individually. The following examples demonstrate this principle:

The team is painting a mural. (The team collectively paints the mural, so the verb is singular*.*)

#### Violation – they don’t

#### Prefer:

#### Precision – even if Jordan is a member nation, that’s distinct from fiating member nations as a unified actor – outweighs because it justifies jettisoning other words in the rez – prefer our interp – we have evidence from the WTO that explains what coordinated action looks like

#### Limits and ground – explodes the topic to include affs about any country reducing IP – ensuring it is an international reduction of IP which is ensures link magnitude and generics like WTO bad, multilat Ks, negotiations and politics DAs, and circumvention – stretches pre-tournament neg prep too thin and precluding rigorous testing – theory and medicine spec affs solve PICs

#### Topic ed – WTO patent waivers are the topic – their aff is just domestic policy passed in Jordan – proven by their second advantage – none of their internal links are about medical trade secrets which proves their interpretation is a cheap way of getting a relations impact about any two countries – justifies the US-Mexico or China-Japan aff. Outweighs – prep is determined by the lit and we only have 2 months to debate the topic

#### TVA – spec a medicine – ensures nuanced debates while preserving WTO-specific ground

#### Paradigm issues –

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

## 1NC – T

#### Interpretation – topical affs must defend a reduction of intellectual property protections for *medicines*.

#### Violation – they reduce IP protections on *vaccines* which is categorically distinct

#### Medicines are drugs

Senate Journal 12 [(SENATE JOURNAL STATE OF ILLINOIS )”NINETY-SEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 92ND LEGISLATIVE DAY”, <https://www.ilga.gov/senate/journals/97/2012/SJ097092R.pdf>, MARCH 8, 2012]

Medicines means and includes all drugs intended for human or veterinary use approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration.

#### Vaccines are not drugs

He et al 12 [(Yongqun, Professor of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Michigan Medical School, primary bioinformatics interests are development of biomedical ontologies and their applications in literature mining, Bayesian network modeling, microbial genomics, and vaccine informatics)“A 2012 Workshop: Vaccine and Drug Ontology in the Study of Mechanism and Effect,” Journal of Biomedical Semantics, 12/18/2012] JL

Innovative therapeutic interventions are critical to prevent and treat human and animal diseases. A way to broadly classify therapeutic interventions is through their timing in administration: Vaccines are classically administered to prevent the appearance of a medical problem, while drugs are generally administered to treat a medical problem. Noticeable exceptions can be found for both classes of therapeutic interventions such as cancer vaccines (that are administered after detection of the problem), and protein pump inhibitors (that are often administered to prevent gastric problems in co-therapy with other drugs or in specific hospital settings). Nevertheless, vaccines and drugs are similarly regulated both in research and development, manufacturing, clinical trials, government approval and regulation, and post-licensing usage surveillance and monitoring. In a broader scope, vaccine is a special type of drug. Vaccines and drugs also have many differences. For example, for vaccines, dose, time, route, and frequency of administration are generally known quite precisely. However, since drugs are used for patients with different conditions, dose, time, and frequency of drug administration are often very difficult to establish. Since vaccines are often administered to healthy people to prevent medical problems, attribution of an adverse event following vaccination is less likely to be confounded by signs or symptoms of underlying medical problems as it is with drugs that are administered to treat medical problems. However, separation of manifestation of medical problem from manifestation of drug adverse event is often very challenging. In the U.S.A, vaccines are regulated under different laws by the Center for Biologics (CBER) at FDA, while drugs are regulated under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act by the Center for Drugs (CDER) at FDA. Safety surveillance for vaccines is for the most part carried out by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, while for drugs it is carried out by the FDA. Due to these similarities and differences between vaccines and drugs, a closer communication between these two areas is important to create effective ontological frameworks around which we can build comparative and predictive systems for both vaccines and drugs.

#### Vaccines are medical interventions not medicines

Elbe 10 (Stefan Elbe, [director of the Centre for Global Health Policy and a professor of international relations at the University of Sussex. He is the author of Strategic Implications of HIV/AIDS, Security and Global Health, and Virus Alert: Security, Governmentality, and the AIDS Pandemic.], 5-3-2010, “Security and Global Health” Polity Press, accessed: 8-9-2021, https://books.google.com/books?id=PKMoMJrSsksC) ajs

Yet here too we must be careful not to overlook other types of medical intervention simultaneously pursued by the 'social' arm of modern medicine at the population level. Vaccines in particular continue to be particularly important medical interventions that repeatedly surface in a variety of different health security delib- erations. Strictly speaking, vaccines are not medicines because they consist of small concentrations of disease-causing microbes (or their derivatives) used to enhance a person's immuno-response to a future infection. As a public health measure, vaccines have therefore also been largely sidelined in the existing medicalization literature. Yet, generally speaking, vaccines too can be considered as medical inter- ventions. That is certainly how the World Health Organization views them, pointing out that 'vaccines are among the most important medical interventions for reducing illness and deaths' available today (WHO 2009a). Whereas pills and other therapies mark the tools of clinical medicine, vaccines play a crucial part in the arsenal of 'social' medicine and public health. Developing and rolling out of new vaccines against a range of current (and future) diseases therefore represents further evidence of how the rise of health security is also encouraging security to be practised through the introduction of new medical interventions in society.

#### Prefer –

#### Limits – allowing non medicines explodes limits to include affs that defend reducing protections for surgeries, therapy, injury prevention, cosmetic procedures, etc. - makes neg prep impossible because the case neg to the Botox and Laser Eye Surgery affs would have no overlap -- privileges the aff by stretching pre-tournament neg prep too thin and precluding nuanced rigorous testing of aff.

#### Ground – arbitrarily not defending medicines kills links to core neg generics about drug innovation, competition over pharmaceutical development, or production of medicine needing to increase because medical interventions are uncontroversial. Drugs and Vaccines are not regulated in the same way which proves any lit about why WTO changing protections for one would not be applicable to the other – that’s He. Pushes 1NCs to the fringes like Ks that disagree with everything or sketchy CPs which destroys clash.

## 1NC – Case

### Disease Adv

#### COVID inevitable even with vaccines – antibodies fade and high transmissibility

Zhang 20 [(Sarah, staff writer at The Atlantic, winner of a 2018 AAAS Kavli Science Journalism Silver Award) “The Coronavirus Is Never Going Away,” The Atlantic, 8/4/2020] JL

The coronavirus is simply too widespread and too transmissible. The most likely scenario, experts say, is that the pandemic ends at some point—because enough people have been either infected or vaccinated—but the virus continues to circulate in lower levels around the globe. Cases will wax and wane over time. Outbreaks will pop up here and there. Even when a much-anticipated vaccine arrives, it is likely to only suppress but never completely eradicate the virus. (For context, consider that vaccines exist for more than a dozen human viruses but only one, smallpox, has ever been eradicated from the planet, and that took 15 years of immense global coordination.) We will probably be living with this virus for the rest of our lives.

Back in the winter, public-health officials were more hopeful about SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus that causes COVID-19. SARS, a closely related coronavirus, emerged in late 2002 and infected more than 8,000 people but was snuffed out through intense isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine. The virus was gone from humans by 2004. SARS and SARS-CoV-2 differ in a crucial way, though: The new virus spreads more easily—and in many cases asymptomatically. The strategies that succeeded with SARS are less effective when some of the people who transmit COVID-19 don’t even know they are infected. “It’s very unlikely we’re going to be able to declare the kind of victory we did over SARS,” says Stephen Morse, an epidemiologist at Columbia University.

If not, then what does the future of COVID-19 look like? That will depend, says Yonatan Grad, on the strength and duration of immunity against the virus. Grad, an infectious-disease researcher at Harvard, and his colleagues have modeled a few possible trajectories. If immunity lasts only a few months, there could be a big pandemic followed by smaller outbreaks every year. If immunity lasts closer to two years, COVID-19 could peak every other year.

At this point, how long immunity to COVID-19 will last is unclear; the virus simply hasn’t been infecting humans long enough for us to know. But related coronaviruses are reasonable points of comparison: In SARS, antibodies—which are one component of immunity—wane after two years. Antibodies to a handful of other coronaviruses that cause common colds fade in just a year. “The faster protection goes away, the more difficult for any project to try to move toward eradication,” Grad told me.

This has implications for a vaccine, too. Rather than a onetime deal, a COVID-19 vaccine, when it arrives, could require booster shots to maintain immunity over time. You might get it every year or every other year, much like a flu shot.

Even if the virus were somehow eliminated from the human population, it could keep circulating in animals—and spread to humans again. SARS-CoV-2 likely originated as a bat virus, with a still-unidentified animal perhaps serving as an intermediate host, which could continue to be a reservoir for the virus. (SARS also originated in bats, with catlike palm civets serving as an intermediate host—which led officials to order the culling of thousands of civets.) Timothy Sheahan, a virologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, wonders if, with SARS-CoV-2 so widespread across the globe, humans might be infecting new species and creating new animal reservoirs. “How do you begin to know the extent of virus spread outside of the human population and in wild and domestic animals?” he says. So far, tigers at the Bronx Zoo and minks on Dutch farms seem to have caught COVID-19 from humans and, in the case of the minks, passed the virus back to humans who work on the farm.

The existence of animal reservoirs that can keep reinfecting humans is also why scientists don’t speak of “eradication” for these viruses. The Ebola virus, for example, probably comes from bats. Even though human-to-human transmission of Ebola eventually ended in the West African epidemic in 2016, the virus was still somewhere on Earth and could still infect humans if it found the right host. And indeed, in 2018, Ebola broke out again in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Ebola can be contained through contact tracing, isolation, and a new vaccine, but it cannot be “eradicated.” No one is quite sure why SARS has never reemerged from an animal reservoir, but this coronavirus could well follow a different pattern.

#### Waivers don’t improve vaccine supply or distribution, but do allow for poorly made vaccines that undermine vaccine confidence

Delgado 5/25 [(Carla, health & culture journalist who’s written for Insider, Architectural Digest, Elemental, Observer, and Mental Floss) “Experts Say Patent Waivers Aren't Enough To Increase Global Vaccination,” Verywell Health, 5/25/2021] JL

“Waiving intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines is likely to only have a modest impact on global vaccine supply,” William Moss, MD, executive director of the International Vaccine Access Center at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, tells Verywell. “A vaccine IP waiver is not in itself likely to lead to increased vaccine production in less developed countries because much more needs to be in place to increase the global vaccine supply.”

For several countries outside of the U.S. that have the necessary equipment to produce mRNA vaccines effectively and safely, the IP waiver can be of great help. However, many more countries lack this capacity, and this move still leaves them behind.

“The majority of the world’s countries lack the capacity to produce and distribute COVID-19 vaccines, and especially at the scale required to get this pandemic under control,” Richard Marlink, MD, director of the Rutgers Global Health Institute, tells Verywell. “They need funding, manufacturing facilities, raw materials, and laboratory staff with the technological expertise required.”

We've already seen what can go wrong with substandard vaccine manufacturing. In April, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspected the Emergent BioSolutions factory in Baltimore and consequently shut down their production after concerning observations, which include:3

The factory was not maintained in a clean and sanitary condition.

Waste handling was found to be inadequate because generated waste was transported through the warehouse before disposal, which can potentially contaminate other areas.

Employees were seen dragging unsealed bags of medical waste from the manufacturing area across the warehouse.

Peeling paint, paint flecks, loose particles/debris were observed. There were also damaged floors and rough surfaces that cannot be properly cleaned and sanitized.

Employees were seen removing their protective garments where raw materials were staged for manufacturing.

They reportedly spoiled about 15 million doses of the Johnson and Johnson COVID-19 vaccine, and more than 100 million doses are on hold as regulators inspect them for possible contamination.4

“Vaccines are complex biological products, much more complex than drugs, and need to be produced by manufacturers and in facilities with the highest quality control standards,” Moss says. “Adverse events associated with a poorly made or contaminated batch of vaccines would have a devastating impact on vaccine confidence.”

In a statement last October, Moderna announced that they will not enforce their COVID-19-related patents against those who will make vaccines during this pandemic.5 While waiving some vaccine patents may allow third-party manufacturers to make and sell COVID-19 vaccines, the transfer of skills and technology that will allow them to manage production isn't very simple.

For instance, a spokesperson for Pfizer said that the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine required 280 different components sourced from 86 suppliers across various countries. Manufacturing the vaccine would require highly specialized equipment and complex technology transfers.6

“Technology transfer also would need to be a critical component to expand vaccine manufacturing by other companies as an IP waiver is insufficient to provide the ‘know how’ needed to manufacture mRNA or adenovirus-vectored COVID-19 vaccines,” Moss says. “And supply chains for the reagents, supplies, and equipment would be needed.”

Interested manufacturers would need to have the proper equipment to test the quality and consistency of their manufacturing. At present, the World Health Organization (WHO) has plans to facilitate the establishment of technology hubs to transfer "a comprehensive technology package and provide appropriate training" to manufacturers from lower- and middle-income countries.7

While waiving vaccine patents is necessary, it's likely not enough. Additionally, negotiations about it are still ongoing. Even though the U.S. supports the waiver of COVID-19 vaccine patents, other countries like the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany oppose it.8

It's also important to remember that manufacturing vaccines is only one step of the process of vaccinating the global population—distributing it is yet another hurdle.

“Many countries are counting on COVAX, a global collaboration to distribute COVID-19 vaccines more equitably around the world,” Marlink says. “The single largest supplier to COVAX is in India, where exports have been suspended since March due to the country’s COVID-19 crisis.”

#### TRIPs waiver is a symbolic gesture that prevents vaccine production and distribution

Ikenson 6/25 [(Dan, former director of the Cato Institute's Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University) “Stop Blaming Patents For The World’s Low Vaccination Rates,” Forbes, 6/25/2021] JL

The premise of the need for a TRIPS waiver is simply absurd. It serves to divert attention from the failures of governments to protect their citizens with smart public health policies and, importantly, to demonize intellectual property protections more broadly. Governments are already free to waive IP protections and to engage in compulsory licensing in times of health crises but have not done so because patents are not the bottleneck. The bottlenecks result from limited global expertise in the highly technical process of producing the vaccine, the dearth of production facilities and capacity to ramp up production at existing facilities, the tight supply of crucial pharmaceutical ingredients (including vials, bags, and other components), and the limited distribution channels through which the proper handling of vaccines at proper temperatures can be assured.

To be sure, global health officials and biopharmaceutical companies have been working to resolve these real bottlenecks—a process that has benefited significantly from the fact that U.S. officials have more bandwidth to devote more attention and other resources to these matters precisely because U.S. vaccination efforts have been successful. And why have they been successful? In large measure, they have been successful because intellectual property protections have bred expectations of future intellectual property protections, which has invited and enabled an accumulation of R&D investment, infrastructure, and expertise in the United States.

The effort to surmount these real impediments to producing, distributing, and injecting vaccines is not made any easier by a symbolic waiver of IP protections—and may be made more difficult. The volume of vaccines necessary to ending the pandemic requires governments and public health officials to coordinate and focus on ramping up the capacity to produce and distribute, and to safeguard against the squandering of pharmaceutical ingredients by ensuring those inputs are channeled to producers with expertise in manufacturing and distribution. On the contrary, suspending IP protection might encourage novice firms with no expertise to end up wasting limited, essential ingredients.

#### Waivers antagonize drug-makers and manufacturers which reduces vaccine production

Furlong 4/21 [(Ashleigh, health care reporter for POLITICO, based in London, former reporter at the science policy publication Research Fortnight who covered biomedical research policy) “Why waiving patents might not boost global access to coronavirus vaccines,” Politico EU, 4/21/2021] JL

Lifting IP rules may make it pretty straightforward to make some types of drugs where technology transfer isn’t important, said ‘t Hoen. For example, during the pandemic, both Hungary and Russia have issued compulsory licenses for remdesivir, with both countries then producing the drug. But that’s not true for vaccines.

A vaccine patent prevents another company from producing the same product. But even without a patent in the way, the company that produced the vaccine holds an enormous amount of relevant know-how that it's not going to turn over for free. So when drugmakers make deals with other manufacturers to produce their vaccine, they transfer this knowledge along under strict agreements. For example, AstraZeneca reached a licensing agreement with the Serum Institute of India last June that ensured that SII treats AstraZeneca as a priority customer in return for access to the technology behind the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine.

Compulsory licensing may also be an over-hyped solution, aside from removing the possibility of being sued for patent infringement, says Guilherme Cintra, director of innovation policy at the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, a pharma lobby. It could actually be "an antagonistic move," he added. "In a way it removes trust, and undermines the possibility of engaging in good faith to build up manufacturing."

#### The plan alienates pharma companies and doesn’t solve lack of vaccine purchasing

Glassman 5/6 [(Amanda, executive vice president and senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, research focuses on priority-setting, resource allocation and value for money in global health, former director for global health policy at the Center from 2010 to 2016, former deputy director of the Global Health Financing Initiative at Brookings and carried out policy research on aid effectiveness and domestic financing issues in the health sector in low-income countries, MSc from the Harvard School of Public Health) “Big Pharma Is Not the Tobacco Industry,” Barrons, 5/6/2021] JL

In fact, several of them did just that in the pandemic: invested their own money to develop patented manufacturing technologies in record time. Those technologies are literally saving the world right now. Public funding supported research and development, but companies also brought their own proprietary ingenuity and private investments to bear toward solving the world’s singular, collective challenge. Their reward should be astronomical given the insane scale of the health and economic benefits these highly efficacious vaccines produce every day. Market incentives sent a clear signal that further needed innovation—greater efficacy, single doses, more-rapid manufacturing, updated formulations, fast boosters, and others—would be richly rewarded. Market incentives could also have been used to lubricate supply lines and buy vaccines on behalf of the entire world; with enough money, incredible things can happen.

But activist lobbying to waive patents—a move the Biden administration endorsed yesterday—sends exactly the opposite signal. It says that the most important, valuable innovations will be penalized, not rewarded. It tells innovators, don’t bother attacking the most important global problems; instead, throw your investment dollars at the next treatment for erectile disfunction, which will surely earn you a steady return with far less agita.

It is worth going back to first principles. What problem are we trying to solve? We have highly efficacious vaccines that we would like to get out to the entire world as quickly as possible to minimize preventable disease and deaths, address atrocious inequities, and enable the reopening of society, trade, and commerce. Hundreds of millions of people have been plunged into poverty over the past year; in the developing world, the pandemic is just getting started.

What is the quickest way to get this done? Vaccine manufacturing is not just a recipe; if you attack and undermine the companies that have the know-how, do you really expect they’ll be eager to help you set up manufacturing elsewhere? Is the plan to march into Pfizer and force its staff to redeploy to Costa Rica to build a new factory? Do the U.S. administration or activists care that this decision could take years to negotiate at the World Trade Organization, and will likely be litigated for years thereafter? Does it make sense to eliminate the incentive for private companies to invest in vaccine R&D or in the response to the next health emergency? And if the patent waiver is only temporary and building a factory takes months or years, will anyone bother to do so, even if they could?

No, none of it makes sense. Worse still, we could solve the policy problem more easily by harnessing market incentives for the global good by ponying up cash to vaccinate the entire world. No confiscation necessary.

The big problem is that countries have not bought enough vaccine to inoculate most of their populations. Covax, buying on behalf of 91 lower-income countries, is only collecting enough funding to cover 20% of their population. In many parts of the world, such as the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and some countries in Latin America, we see very low levels of vaccine prepurchasing. We have seen this week that the government of India had not ordered enough vaccine to cover its own population, for example, resulting in export bans on its domestic vaccine manufacturers; nor has it approved the Pfizer vaccine. Our collective focus instead must be to make the market: to set up advance purchase agreements to establish demand via country cooperation, Covax, and the multilateral development banks.

#### No extinction from pandemics

* Death rates as high as 50% didn’t collapse civilization
* Fossil fuel record caps risk at .1% per century
* health, sanitation, medicine, science, public health bodies, solve
* viruses can’t survive in all locations
* refugee populations like tribes, remote researchers, submarine crews, solve

Ord 20 Ord, Toby. Toby David Godfrey Ord (born 18 July 1979) is an Australian philosopher. He founded Giving What We Can, an international society whose members pledge to donate at least 10% of their income to effective charities and is a key figure in the effective altruism movement, which promotes using reason and evidence to help the lives of others as much as possible.[3] He is a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, where his work is focused on existential risk. BA in Phil and Comp Sci from Melbourne, BPhil in Phil from Oxford, PhD in Phil from Oxford. The precipice: existential risk and the future of humanity. Hachette Books, 2020.

Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10 The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11 When Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely novel diseases. Over thousands of years each population had built up resistance to their own set of diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by far the worse end of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox. During the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose scale may never be known, due to great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the Americas during that century, though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this should be attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent of the world’s people.13 Centuries later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible. Near the end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu) spread to six continents, and even remote Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the First World War, and possibly both World Wars combined. Yet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential.15 In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional 25 to 50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization. It changed the relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if they were global in scale. The 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development despite its global reach. It looks like it was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of history.16 It is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the accompanying violence and imperial rule. The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record argument from Chapter 3. Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted. But this argument only works where the risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but not for pandemics. We have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics more likely to occur, and some that could increase their damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk. Our population now is a thousand times greater than over most of human history, so there are vastly more opportunities for new human diseases to originate.17 And our farming practices have created vast numbers of animals living in unhealthy conditions within close proximity to humans. This increases the risk, as many major diseases originate in animals before crossing over to humans. Examples include HIV (chimpanzees), Ebola (bats), SARS (probably bats) and influenza (usually pigs or birds).18 Evidence suggests that diseases are crossing over into human populations from animals at an increasing rate.19 Modern civilization may also make it much easier for a pandemic to spread. The higher density of people living together in cities increases the number of people each of us may infect. Rapid long-distance transport greatly increases the distance pathogens can spread, reducing the degrees of separation between any two people. Moreover, we are no longer divided into isolated populations as we were for most of the last 10,000 years.20 Together these effects suggest that we might expect more new pandemics, for them to spread more quickly, and to reach a higher percentage of the world’s people. But we have also changed the world in ways that offer protection. We have a healthier population; improved sanitation and hygiene; preventative and curative medicine; and a scientific understanding of disease. Perhaps most importantly, we have public health bodies to facilitate global communication and coordination in the face of new outbreaks. We have seen the benefits of this protection through the dramatic decline of endemic infectious disease over the last century (though we can’t be sure pandemics will obey the same trend). Finally, we have spread to a range of locations and environments unprecedented for any mammalian species. This offers special protection from extinction events, because it requires the pathogen to be able to flourish in a vast range of environments and to reach exceptionally isolated populations such as uncontacted tribes, Antarctic researchers and nuclear submarine crews. 21 It is hard to know whether these combined effects have increased or decreased the existential risk from pandemics. This uncertainty is ultimately bad news: we were previously sitting on a powerful argument that the risk was tiny; now we are not. But note that we are not merely interested in the direction of the change, but also in the size of the change. If we take the fossil record as evidence that the risk was less than one in 2,000 per century, then to reach 1 percent per century the pandemic risk would need to be at least 20 times larger. This seems unlikely. In my view, the fossil record still provides a strong case against there being a high extinction risk from “natural” pandemics. So most of the remaining existential risk would come from the threat of permanent collapse: a pandemic severe enough to collapse civilization globally, combined with civilization turning out to be hard to re-establish or bad luck in our attempts to do so.

### Exec Flex

#### Biden has already passed tons of executive orders like rejoining Paris – should have solved

#### Negative feedback loops check for warmiing

[Singer](https://www.heartland.org/sites/default/files/12-04-15_why_scientists_disagree.pdf) et al 15. (Dr. Siegfried Fred Singer is an Austrian-born American physicist and emeritus professor of environmental science at the University of Virginia. Dr. Robert Merlin Carter was an English palaeontologist, stratigrapher and marine geologist. Dr. Craig D. Idso is the founder, former president and current chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming. December 4, 2015. https://www.heartland.org/sites/default/files/12-04-15\_why\_scientists\_disagree.pdf)

A doubling of CO2 from pre-industrial levels (from 280 to 560 ppm) would likely produce a temperature forcing of 3.7 Wm-2 in the lower atmosphere, for about ~1°C of prima facie warming. # IPCC models stress the importance of positive feedback from increasing water vapor and thereby project warming of ~3–6°C, whereas empirical data indicate an order of magnitude less warming of ~0.3–1.0°C. # In ice core samples, changes in temperature precede parallel changes in atmospheric CO2 by several hundred years; also, temperature and CO2 are uncoupled through lengthy portions of the historical and geological records; therefore CO2 cannot be the primary forcing agent for most temperature changes. Atmospheric methane (CH4) levels for the past two decades fall well below the values projected by IPCC in its assessment reports. IPCC’s temperature projections incorporate these inflated CH4 estimates and need downward revision accordingly. # The thawing of permafrost or submarine gas hydrates is not likely to emit dangerous amounts of methane at current rates of warming. # Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions are expected to fall as CO2 concentrations and temperatures rise, indicating it acts as a negative climate feedback. # Other negative feedbacks on climate sensitivity that are either discounted or underestimated by IPCC include increases in low-level clouds in response to enhanced atmospheric water vapor, increases in ocean emissions of dimethyl sulfide (DMS), and the presence and total cooling effect of both natural and industrial aerosols.

#### No extinction – assumes 45 degrees celcius

Alexey Turchin 19, Researcher at the Foundation Science for Life Extension in Moscow, Brian P. Green, director of technology ethics at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University, 3/11/19, “Islands as refuges for surviving global catastrophes,” https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/FS-04-2018-0031/full/html

Different types of possible catastrophes suggest different scenarios for how survival could happen on an island. What is important is that the island should have properties which protect against the specific dangers of particular global catastrophic risks. Specifically different islands will provide protection against different risks, and their natural diversity will contribute to a higher total level of protection:

- Quarantined island survives pandemic. An island could impose effective quarantine if it is sufficiently remote and simultaneously able to protect itself, possibly using military ships and air defense.

- Far northern aboriginal people survive an ice age. Many far northern people have adapted to survive in extremely cold and dangerous environments, and under the right circumstances could potentially survive the return of an ice age. However, their cultures are endangered by globalization. If these people become dependent on the products of modern civilization, such as rifles and motor boats, and lose their native survival skills, then their likelihood of surviving the collapse of the outside world would decrease. Therefore, preservation of their survival skills may be important as a defense against the risks connected with extreme cooling.

- Remote polar island with high mountains survives brief global warming of median surface temperatures, up to 50˚C. There is a theory that the climates of planets similar to the Earth could have several semi-stable temperature levels (Popp et al., 2016). If so, because of climate change, the Earth could transition to a second semi-stable state with a median global temperature of around 330 K, about 60˚C, or about 45˚C above current global mean temperatures. But even in this climate, some regions of Earth could still be survivable for humans, such as the Himalayan plateau at elevations above 4,000 m, but below 6,000 (where oxygen deficiency becomes a problem), or on polar islands with mountains (however, global warming affects polar regions more than equatorial regions, and northern island will experience more effects of climate change, including thawing permafrost and possible landslides because of wetter weather). In the tropics, the combination of increased humidity and temperature may increase the wet bulb temperature above 36˚C, especially on islands, where sea moisture is readily available. In such conditions, proper human perspiration becomes impossible (Sherwood and Huber, 2010), and there will likely be increased mortality and morbidity because of tropical diseases. If temperatures later returned to normal – either naturally or through climate engineering – the rest of the Earth could be repopulated.

#### Exec flex is key to heg

**Royal ‘11**

John-Paul, Institute of World Politics, Class of 2011 Valedictorian, “War Powers and the Age of Terrorism,” <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Royal-_Final_Paper.pdf>

The international system itself and national security challenges to the United States in particular, underwent rapid and significant change in the first decade of the twenty-first century. War can no longer be thought about strictly in the terms of the system and tradition created by the Treaty of Westphalia over three and a half centuries ago. Non-state actors now **possess a level of destructiveness formerly enjoyed only by nation states.** Global terrorism, coupled with the threat of **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction developed organically or obtained from rogue regimes, presents new challenges to U.S. national security and place innovative demands on the Constitution’s system of making war. In the past, as summarized in the 9/11 Commission Report, threats emerged due to hostile actions taken by enemy states and their ability to muster large enough forces to wage war: “Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful, they also had more to lose. They could be deterred" (National Commission 2004, 362). This mindset assumed that peace was the default state for American national security. Today however, we know that threats can emerge quickly. Terrorist organizations half-way around the world are able to wield weapons **of unparalleled destructive power**. These attacks are more **difficult to detect** and deter due to their unconventional and asymmetrical nature. In light of these new asymmetric threats and the resultant changes to the international system, peace can no longer be considered the default state of American national security. Many have argued that the Constitution permits the president to use unilateral action only in response to an imminent direct attack on the United States. In the emerging security environment described above, pre-emptive action taken by the executive branch may be needed more often than when nation-states were the principal threat to American national interests. Here again, the 9/11 Commission Report is instructive as it considers the possibility of pre-emptive force utilized over large geographic areas due to the diffuse nature of terrorist networks: In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests “over there” should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America “over here.” In this sense, the American homeland is the planet (National Commission 2004, 362). Furthermore, the report explicitly describes the global nature of the threat and the global mission that must take place to address it. Its first strategic policy recommendation against terrorism states that the: U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power (National Commission 2004, 367). Thus, fighting continues against terrorists in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and beyond, as we approach the tenth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, into the hands of these terrorists **is the most dangerous threat to the United States**. We know from the 9/11 Commission Report that Al Qaeda has attempted to make and obtain nuclear weapons for at least the past fifteen years. Al Qaeda considers the acquisition of **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction to be a religious **obligation** while “more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursing CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials” (National Commission 2004, 397). Considering these statements, rogue regimes that are openly hostile to the United States and have or seek to develop nuclear weapons capability such as North Korea and Iran, or **extremely unstable** nuclear countries such as Pakistan, pose a special threat to American national security interests. These nations were not necessarily a direct threat to the United States in the past. Now, however, due to proliferation of nuclear weapons and **missile tech**nology, they can inflict damage at considerably higher levels and magnitudes than in the past. In addition, these regimes may pursue proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology to other nations and to allied terrorist organizations. The United States must pursue condign punishment and appropriate, **rapid action** against hostile terrorist organizations, rogue nation states, and nuclear weapons proliferation threats in order to protect American interests both at home and abroad. Combating these threats are the “top national security priority for the United States…with the full support of Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the American people” (National Commission 2004, 361). Operations may take the form of **pre-emptive and sustained** action against those who have expressed hostility or declared war on the United States. **Only the executive branch can effectively execute this mission**, authorized by the 2001 AUMF. If the national consensus or the nature of the threat changes, Congress possesses the intrinsic power to rescind and limit these powers.

#### No heg impact

Peace is not because of the U.S. – only logical explanation is states want peace – the fact there is peace without hegemony proves other factors outweigh – empirics only prove our claim

Theoretically if other people wanted war – us couldn’t stop them, thus people just don’t want war

There is peace where the u.s. isn’t which means there is obvi something else at play

Even when hegemony decreased, war still decreased which means that they’re not related

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs states have decided that their interest are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

#### US hegemony is dead – there’s no coming back

* COVID, economic downturns, nationalistic politics, security internationally
* Rise in other great powers to rival
* Weaker states can seek alternatives to US support
* Rise in right-wing networks vs liberal policies

Cooley and Nexon 6/9 (Alexander Cooley is the Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, Daniel H. Nexon is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 6/9/2020, Foreign Affairs, “How Hegemony Ends”, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends) //EG

Multiple signs point to a crisis in global order. The uncoordinated international response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the resulting economic downturns, the resurgence of nationalist politics, and the hardening of state borders all seem to herald the emergence of a less cooperative and more fragile international system. According to many observers, these developments underscore the dangers of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America first” policies and his retreat from global leadership.

Even before the pandemic, Trump routinely criticized the value of alliances and institutions such as NATO, supported the breakup of the European Union, withdrew from a host of international agreements and organizations, and pandered to autocrats such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. He has questioned the merits of placing liberal values such as democracy and human rights at the heart of foreign policy. Trump’s clear preference for zero-sum, transactional politics further supports the notion that the United States is abandoning its commitment to promoting a liberal international order.

Some analysts believe that the United States can still turn this around, by restoring the strategies by which it, from the end of World War II to the aftermath of the Cold War, built and sustained a successful international order. If a post-Trump United States could reclaim the responsibilities of global power, then this era—including the pandemic that will define it—could stand as a temporary aberration rather than a step on the way to permanent disarray.

After all, predictions of American decline and a shift in international order are far from new—and they have been consistently wrong. In the middle of the 1980s, many analysts believed that U.S. leadership was on the way out. The Bretton Woods system had collapsed in the 1970s; the United States faced increasing competition from European and East Asian economies, notably West Germany and Japan; and the Soviet Union looked like an enduring feature of world politics. By the end of 1991, however, the Soviet Union had formally dissolved, Japan was entering its “lost decade” of economic stagnation, and the expensive task of integration consumed a reunified Germany. The United States experienced a decade of booming technological innovation and unexpectedly high economic growth. The result was what many hailed as a “unipolar moment” of American hegemony.

But this time really is different. The very forces that made U.S. hegemony so durable before are today driving its dissolution. Three developments enabled the post–Cold War U.S.-led order. First, with the defeat of communism, the United States faced no major global ideological project that could rival its own. Second, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its accompanying infrastructure of institutions and partnerships, weaker states lacked significant alternatives to the United States and its Western allies when it came to securing military, economic, and political support. And third, transnational activists and movements were spreading liberal values and norms that bolstered the liberal order.

Today, those same dynamics have turned against the United States: a vicious cycle that erodes U.S. power has replaced the virtuous cycles that once reinforced it. With the rise of great powers such as China and Russia, autocratic and illiberal projects rival the U.S.-led liberal international system. Developing countries—and even many developed ones—can seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support. And illiberal, often right-wing transnational networks are pressing against the norms and pieties of the liberal international order that once seemed so implacable. In short, U.S. global leadership is not simply in retreat; it is unraveling. And the decline is not cyclical but permanent.

#### Pursuit of hegemony is leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.

Porter, DPhil, 19

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — that escalates to the use of nuclear force

Klare 18 – Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. (Michael T., “The Pentagon Is Planning a Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia,” April 4, 2018, https://fpif.org/the-pentagon-is-planning-a-three-front-long-war-against-china-and-russia/)//sy

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences

#### Hegemony fails and propagates terrorism – it justifies intervention and empirically causes blowback.

Bandow 19 (Doug, senior fellow @ Cato Institute and JD Stanford, 6-2-2019, "Understanding the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Albright Doctrine," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/understanding-failure-us-foreign-policy-albright-doctrine-60477) AG

Since 9/11, Washington has been extraordinarily active militarily—invading two nations, bombing and droning several others, deploying special operations forces in yet more countries, and applying sanctions against many. Tragically, the threat of Islamist violence and terrorism only have metastasized. Although Al Qaeda lost its effectiveness in directly plotting attacks, it continues to inspire national offshoots. Moreover, while losing its physical “caliphate” the Islamic State added further terrorism to its portfolio.

Three successive administrations have ever more deeply ensnared the United States in the Middle East. War with Iran appears to be frighteningly possible. Ever-wealthier allies are ever-more dependent on America. Russia is actively hostile to the United States and Europe. Washington and Beijing appear to be a collision course on far more than trade. Yet the current administration appears convinced that doing more of the same will achieve different results, the best definition of insanity.

Despite his sometimes abusive and incendiary rhetoric, the president has departed little from his predecessors’ policies. For instance, American forces remain deployed in Afghanistan and Syria. Moreover, the Trump administration has increased its military and materiel deployments to Europe. Also, Washington has intensified economic sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and even penalized additional countries, namely Venezuela.

U.S. foreign policy suffers from systematic flaws in the thinking of the informal policy collective which former Obama aide Ben Rhodes dismissed as “The Blob.” Perhaps no official better articulated The Blob’s defective precepts than Madeleine Albright, United Nations ambassador and Secretary of State.

First is overweening hubris. In 1998 Secretary of State Albright declared that “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”

Even then her claim was implausible. America blundered into the Korean War and barely achieved a passable outcome. The Johnson administration infused Vietnam with dramatically outsize importance. For decades, Washington foolishly refused to engage the People’s Republic of China. Washington-backed dictators in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and elsewhere fell ingloriously. An economic embargo against Cuba that continues today helped turn Fidel Castro into a global folk hero. Washington veered dangerously close to nuclear war with Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and again two decades later during military exercises in Europe.

U.S. officials rarely were prepared for events that occurred in the next week or month, let alone years later. Americans did no better than the French in Vietnam. Americans managed events in Africa no better than the British, French, and Portuguese colonial overlords. Washington made more than its share of bad, even awful decisions in dealing with other nations around the globe.

Perhaps the worst failing of U.S. foreign policy was ignoring the inevitable impact of foreign intervention. Americans would never passively accept another nation bombing, invading, and occupying their nation, or interfering in their political system. Even if outgunned, they would resist. Yet Washington has undertaken all of these practices, with little consideration of the impact on those most affected—hence the rise of terrorism against the United States. Terrorism, horrid and awful though it is, became the weapon of choice of weaker peoples against intervention by the world’s industrialized national states.

The U.S. record since September 11 has been uniquely counterproductive. Rather than minimize hostility toward America, Washington adopted a policy—highlighted by launching new wars, killing more civilians, and ravaging additional societies—guaranteed to create enemies, exacerbate radicalism, and spread terrorism. Blowback is everywhere. Among the worst examples: Iraqi insurgents mutated into ISIS, which wreaked military havoc throughout the Middle East and turned to terrorism.

#### Terrorism causes global nuclear war—collapses internal AND external stability – 1AC Royal evidence proves it’s happening now so we control uniqueness

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But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

#### Heg is ineffective and causes instability---no causal relationship with peace

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Conflict and Hegemony by Region Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion,

etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### No transition wars---Cross-sectional datasets prove retrenchment is peaceful---only we have non-theoretical support for our argument

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Exploring the link between shifting power and variation in a state’s foreign policy has long been central to the study of international relations. However, it has also become a question of increased political importance as policy-makers in the United States grapple with fears of decreasing international influence caused by the economic and military growth of great power competitors. Scholarship exploring this topic has been deeply divided, with prominent scholars such as Brooks et al. (2013), Copeland (2000), and Gilpin (1983) suggesting that a strategy of retrenchment will leave declining states less safe and less prosperous and Copeland (2000) and Gilpin (1983) contending that retrenchment will open a declining state up to predation and imperil their security. On the other hand, scholars such as Layne (2009, 2012), MacDonald and Parent (2011), and Posen (2013) suggest that retrenchment will lead to a more secure and prosperous America. Although there has been intense theoretical debate regarding the benefits and costs of retrenchment, these theories have only been tested on a handful of cases with various degrees of methodological rigor. Work by MacDonald and Parent (2011) represents one notable exception as they base their findings on a cross-case analysis of all major powers over the same time span that we analyze. However, their analysis is limited in its ability to control for confounding factors that may affect the success of strategies of retrenchment. We build on this work by testing these arguments on a time-series crosssectional dataset of all major powers that stretches from 1870 to the present. Scholars have often pointed to the United Kingdom’s successful policy of retrenchment following World War II as a rare exception to an otherwise bleak record (Gilpin, 1983). Our findings suggest that retrenchment is generally effective, making states more likely to recover their previous power and less likely to experience the most dangerous interstate conflicts. We propose two hypotheses that directly test two of the most contentious claims in the literature.H1: When in a period of decline, a state that chooses to retrench will be more likely to recover their previous position than a state that does not.H2: A great power experiencing a period of decline will be less likely to be the target of predation at the hands of fellow states than a great power that does not.Research designWe test our argument on a sample comprising all states identified as great powers by the Correlates of War (COW) project from 1870 to 2007. This specific time-span is analyzed due to data availability.1 States enter the dataset in 1870 or the first year thereafter in which they achieve great power status and exit the dataset when they lose their great power status for the last time. The full list of countries and years included in the data is provided in Table 1.To operationalize relative power, we follow MacDonald and Parent (2011) in constructing an ordinal ranking of all great powers in a given year. States are ranked according to their overall share of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita among great powers. This is preferable to measures of absolute power, such as overall capabilities, that do not allow us to capture the relational nature of our theory. States can experience relative decline because their own economic performance is poor, or because other states are simply advancing faster than they are.2States are coded as entering a period of relative decline when they lose at least one rank in a given year. States exit a period of decline, or recover, when they regain at least one ordinal rank after they enter a period of decline. In our view, partial recoveries that reverse the process of decline without restoring a state to its full previous rank still indicate successful retrenchment. We also believe that states should maintain their improved ranking for some minimum period of time. States that regain a rank but immediately lose it again have not successfully recovered. Since we have no strong theoretical priors regarding how long this period should be, we use two different thresholds and present results for both. One requires a state to maintain their improved ranking for at least one year after recovery, and the other requires states to maintain their ranking for five years. Once states recover, they become “at risk” of experiencing another period of decline.To operationalize retrenchment, we use the percentage change in a state’s military expenditures over the previous year as a proxy for its military posture. Whether they are drawing down foreign commitments or decreasing military investment at home, states engaged in a strategy of retrenchment should display declining military expenditures. This provides a continuous measure that allows us to capture both whether a state retrenches and the degree to which it does so. Data on military expenditures come from the COW project’s National Military Capabilities Dataset and are measured in nominal values (Lemke and Reed, 1998).3 Because we do not have reliable data on the inflation rate for military capabilities, we choose not to adjust these values for inflation. This decision should be inconsequential for our results, since we care more about yearly changes in military expenditures rather than their absolute level.4We include several control variables to ensure that our models capture the effects of adopting a strategy of retrenchment rather than changes in latent military capabilities. To control for the effects of a state’s absolute power, independent of its position relative to other states, we include the absolute level of GDP per capita. We also include the change in GDP per capita over the previous year to control for abrupt changes in absolute power. We also control for factors that may affect a state’s ability to retrench effectively. First, states with strong alliance portfolios should have an easier time retrenching by relying on allies to take up the slack in managing international security threats. We control for this using the S alliance score measure, which provides a measure of alliance portfolio strength relative to the system leader (Small and Singer, 1969). Second, states capable of nuclear deterrence may be able to reduce military spending more easily by cutting conventional capabilities. We control for this using data on nuclear weapons status from Jo and Gartzke (2007). Third, regime type may have an effect on a state’s ability to retrench. Because autocracies possess less veto players, we expect that they may be able to adjust their spending priorities more easily. In addition, since well-consolidated regimes of either type may be more capable of adjusting state policy than anocracies, regime type may have a curvilinear effect on our variables. To account for this, we include both the state’s Polity2 score and its square using data from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).5 To avoid the possibility of simultaneity bias, we lag our independent variables and the control variables accounting for power by one year in all models.Recovery modelsH1 predicts that states in periods of decline are more likely to recover their previous status if they retrench. To test this, we use discrete time duration models to estimate the probability that a state in a period of decline recovers in a given year. The dependent variable for these models is our binary indicator of Recovery. For each version of our Recovery variable (1 year and 5 year), we estimate binomial logit models on the subset of the data for all years in which a state is coded as in decline. We model the change in the probability of failure as a function of time using cubic polynomials of the time since the beginning of the period of decline (Carter and Signorino, 2010). Because some countries never experience decline, both sets of models omit observations on some countries.We begin by discussing the results of our models that employ the one year recovery threshold (see Table 2). Model 1 estimates the probability of recovery solely as a function of a state’s change in military expenditures. Model 2 introduces the control variables discussed above, and Model 3 introduces fixed effects for each country (i.e., unit-specific intercepts) to control for unobserved heterogeneity induced by including repeated measures on the same units. Taken together, these results provide modest support for the argument that retrenchment helps a state recover their previous standing during periods of decline. Although the coefficient on changes in military expenditures is insignificant in Model 1 and 2, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in Model 3 reveals that increases in military expenditures have a negative and significant effect (at the 0.1 level) on the probability of recovery. Put otherwise, states that decrease their military spending in a given year are less likely to experience recovery in the following year.To illustrate the substantive significance of this effect, Figure 1 plots the predicted probability of recovery as a function of changes in military expenditures with all other variables held at their observed values. The probability of recovery is highest after states make significant cuts in their military spending. This probability steadily decreases from 0.239 to 0.018 at the high end of military expenditures, indicating that states which make sharp increases in their military spending have almost no chance of recovery. Table 3 presents the results of our models using the five year recovery threshold. Although the coefficients are in the predicted direction, our military expenditures variable is not significant in any of the three models. In addition, including fixed effects in the model requires dropping a number of cases, since several states never experience our more restrictive coding of recovery. As such, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on the basis of these models. In sum, we find some evidence that retrenchment facilitates recovery, although this is sensitive to both measurement and model specification.Predation modelsH2 predicts that states in periods of decline may be subject to increased attacks by enemy states. To test this argument, we use binomial logistic regression to model the probability that a great power is attacked by another state. Our dependent variable is a measure of whether another state initiated a militarized interstate dispute (MID) against a state in a given year (Palmer et al., 2015). Because we care about whether other states actually attack declining great powers, we restrict our analysis to MIDs that involve fatalities. Our primary independent variables are our indicator of whether a state is in decline and our measure of retrenchment. Since the choice of recovery threshold determines how long a state is coded as in decline, we run models using both our one year and five year coding schemes. We present the models using our one year threshold here. Models using the five year threshold are included in the Supplementary Online Appendix. These models include the same control variables discussed in the previous section as well as cubic polynomials of the number of years since the last MID initiation.Table 4 presents the results of these models. Model 1 includes only our measures of decline and retrenchment, Model 2 introduces control variables, and Model 3 introduces fixed effects for each country year. Our results provide modest support for the argument that states experiencing relative decline are subject to opportunistic attacks by challengers. Although this effect does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in Model 1, it becomes significant after introducing control variables (Model 2) and fixed effects (Model 3). Holding all other variables constant at their observed values, the predicted probability of fatal MID onset in a given year is 0.063 for states in periods of decline and 0.031 for states that are not. As such, great powers in periods of decline are effectively twice as likely to be attacked by another state in a given year. This provides support for the argument that great powers may be subject to opportunistic attacks by challengers during periods of weakness.We also find modest support for the proposition that great powers that retrench may be able to avoid predatory attacks by challengers. The coefficient for change in military expenditures is positive and significant at the 0.1 level in two of our three models. This indicates that increases in military spending are associated with an increased risk of predatory attacks. This effect is also substantively significant. To provide some intuition of the size of the effect, Figure 2 plots the predicted probability of fatal MID onset using Model 3 across the observed range of our Retrenchment variable with all other variables held at their observed values. The predicted probability of fatal MID onset increases from 0.008 at the minimum to 0.146 at its maximum. This provides modest support for the position of retrenchment optimists. Although great powers do appear to be subject to attack during periods of relative decline, our results suggest that states that decrease their military expenditures may be less prone to this type of behavior. On the whole, our results are relatively robust. In general, the predicted values of both sets of models track well with the observed data.6 Both our models of recovery and predation are robust to changes in the coding of our decline variable using both one and five year thresholds for our recovery variable. However, our results are somewhat sensitive to measurement and model specification, which points to the need for further testing before drawing firm conclusions. In particular, the fixed effects model performs well in all of our analyses. We believe this is the theoretically most appropriate model, since it controls for unit effects and corrects for the violations of the assumption that observations are measured independently. Nonetheless, this speaks to the need for further testing before drawing firm conclusions on the basis of our results. Additional studies that employ alternate measures of power and retrenchment would be especially useful in this regard.ConclusionIn this paper, we have assessed the outcomes of great power retrenchment using a dataset of all great powers from 1870–2007. Counter to the expectations of the skeptics, we have found that retrenchment has led to relatively successful outcomes. Declining states that choose to retrench experience shorter periods of relative economic decline and are less likely to be the targets of predation than declining states that choose not to retrench. While these findings are suggestive, more research needs to be done to fully assess the outcomes of retrenchment. Among other topics, future work should explore the impact that retrenchment has on the credibility of the international commitments that the declining state chooses to maintain. Additionally, our data contain a number of instances of declining states that chose not to retrench and subsequently experienced prolonged economic problems and predation. Our findings suggest that retrenchment would have mitigated some of the negative effects of decline. Of these cases, post-World War II France represents and interesting instance of a declining power that chose not to retrench (Spruyt, 2005). Future research should employ quantitative counterfactual analyses, such as synthetic control, to explore how retrenchment could have changed France’s fortunes.

#### Pursuit of hegemony is not inevitable – Trump made alternatives politically imaginable, Americans are skeptical, Congress is regaining power

Walt 19 [STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School and the author of The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy. Foreign Affairs. May/June. “The End of Hubris And the New Age of American Restraint.” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/end-hubris> My OCR sometimes turns E’s into C’s, I think I got them all, but please let me know if I missed oneDespite the stagnation within the foreign policy establishment, the prospects for a more realist, more restrained U.S. foreign policy are better today than they have been in many years. For all his flaws, 'Trump has made it easier to propose alternatives to liberal hegemony by expressing such disdain for the elite consensus. Younger Americans are more skeptical of their country’s imperial pretensions than are their elders, and some new members of Congress seem bent on clawing back some of the control over foreign policy that presidents have amassed over the past 70 years.

Furthermore, powerful structural forces are working against liberal hegemony and in favor of offshore balancing. China’s rise and the partial revival of Russian power are forcing the United States to pay closer attention to balance-of-power politics, especially in Asia. The intractable problems of the Middle East will make future presidents reluctant to squander more blood and treasure there especially in chasing the siren song of democracy promotion. Pressure on the defense budget is unlikely to diminish, especially once the costs of climate change begin to bite, and because trillions of dollars' worth of domestic needs cry out for attention.