## 1NC – CP

#### CP: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the World Health Organization over reducing intellectual property protections for medicines. Member nations will support the proposal and adopt the results of consultation.

#### WHO says yes – it supports increasing the availability of generics and limiting TRIPS

Hoen 03 [(Ellen T., researcher at the University Medical Centre at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands who has been listed as one of the 50 most influential people in intellectual property by the journal Managing Intellectual Property, PhD from the University of Groningen) “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond,” Chicago Journal of International Law, 2003] JL

However, subsequent resolutions of the World Health Assembly have strengthened the WHO’s mandate in the trade arena. In 2001, the World Health Assembly adopted two resolutions in particular that had a bearing on the debate over TRIPS [30]. The resolutions addressed:

– the need to strengthen policies to increase the availability of generic drugs;

– and the need to evaluate the impact of TRIPS on access to drugs, local manufacturing capacity, and the development of new drugs

#### Consultation displays strong leadership, authority, and cohesion among member states which are key to WHO legitimacy

Gostin et al 15 [(Lawrence O., Linda D. & Timothy J. O’Neill Professor of Global Health Law at Georgetown University, Faculty Director of the O’Neill Institute for National & Global Health Law, Director of the World Health Organization Collaborating Center on Public Health Law & Human Rights, JD from Duke University) “The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization,” Georgetown University Law Center, 5/2/2015] JL

Members want the WHO to exert leadership, harmonize disparate activities, and set priorities. Yet they resist intrusions into their sovereignty, and want to exert control. In other words, ‘everyone desires coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.’ States often ardently defend their geostrategic interests. As the Indonesian virus-sharing episode illustrates, the WHO is pulled between power blocs, with North America and Europe (the primary funders) on one side and emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India on the other. An inherent tension exists between richer ‘net contributor’ states and poorer ‘net recipient’ states, with the former seeking smaller WHO budgets and the latter larger budgets.

Overall, national politics drive self-interest, with states resisting externally imposed obligations for funding and action. Some political leaders express antipathy to, even distrust of, UN institutions, viewing them as bureaucratic and inefficient. In this political environment, it is unsurprising that members fail to act as shareholders. Ebola placed into stark relief the failure of the international community to increase capacities as required by the IHR. Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone had some of the world's weakest health systems, with little capacity to either monitor or respond to the Ebola epidemic.20 This caused enormous suffering in West Africa and placed countries throughout the region e and the world e at risk. Member states should recognize that the health of their citizens depends on strengthening others' capacity. The WHO has a central role in creating systems to facilitate and encourage such cooperation.

The WHO cannot succeed unless members act as shareholders, foregoing a measure of sovereignty for the global common good. It is in all states' interests to have a strong global health leader, safeguarding health security, building health systems, and reducing health inequalities. But that will not happen unless members fund the Organization generously, grant it authority and flexibility, and hold it accountable.

#### WHO is critical to disease prevention – it is the only international institution that can disperse information, standardize global public health, and facilitate public-private cooperation

Murtugudde 20 [(Raghu, professor of atmospheric and oceanic science at the University of Maryland, PhD in mechanical engineering from Columbia University) “Why We Need the World Health Organization Now More Than Ever,” Science, 4/19/2020] JL

WHO continues to play an indispensable role during the current COVID-19 outbreak itself. In November 2018, the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine organised a workshop to explore lessons from past influenza outbreaks and so develop recommendations for pandemic preparedness for 2030. The salient findings serve well to underscore the critical role of WHO for humankind.

The world’s influenza burden has only increased in the last two decades, a period in which there have also been 30 new zoonotic diseases. A warming world with increasing humidity, lost habitats and industrial livestock/poultry farming has many opportunities for pathogens to move from animals and birds to humans. Increasing global connectivity simply catalyses this process, as much as it catalyses economic growth.

WHO coordinates health research, clinical trials, drug safety, vaccine development, surveillance, virus sharing, etc. The importance of WHO’s work on immunisation across the globe, especially with HIV, can hardly be overstated. It has a rich track record of collaborating with private-sector organisations to advance research and development of health solutions and improving their access in the global south.

It discharges its duties while maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between such diverse and powerful forces as national securities, economic interests, human rights and ethics. COVID-19 has highlighted how political calculations can hamper data-sharing and mitigation efforts within and across national borders, and WHO often simply becomes a convenient political scapegoat in such situations.

International Health Regulations, a 2005 agreement between 196 countries to work together for global health security, focuses on detection, assessment and reporting of public health events, and also includes non-pharmaceutical interventions such as travel and trade restrictions. WHO coordinates and helps build capacity to implement IHR.

#### Extinction – defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

#### CPs negate – prove an opportunity cost to the plan and you haven’t justified truth testing

## 1NC – NC

**The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing:**

1. **Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues**.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values**.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable**.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes**:** “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

1. **Moreover, *only* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, **I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable.** Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, **there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values** that counts in hedonism’s favor**: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain.** To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, **wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly.** **Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after.** To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if **the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain** (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), **then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts.** **The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists.** The challenge can be phrased as the following question: **If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?**27

1. **Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.  
   Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]  
   These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

#### Actor-specificity: side constraints freeze action because government policies always require trade-offs since they have finite resources—the only justifiable way to resolve those conflicts is by benefiting everyone. Actor-specificity first -- different agents have different ethical obligations.

#### No intent-foresight distinction – if we foresee a consequence, then it is intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

#### Lexical pre-requisite: Threats to life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories

#### Reject calc indicts: Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### Permissibility and presumption negate:

#### We presume statements false absent an active reason to think otherwise – proven by conspiracy theories

#### Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false – this means you negate in the absence of offense

## 1NC – Case

### 1AR – UV

Yes 1ar theory but reasonability and drop the arg – disincentives going all in on theory too early which kills topic ed and checks 2ar judge psychology - no such thing as infinite abuse in finite speech times and 2ar collapse solves time tradeoff – intervention’s inevitable so intervene for substance

No infinite abuse in finite speech times

And 2ar collapse and judge psychology solve

### 1AR – AFC/ACC

#### Counterinterp: the neg can contest the aff’s framework and contention

#### Net benefits:

#### Phil ed – we can’t contest whether the aff’s offense is an example of their framework AND whether the framework is true – don’t learn about OR apply ethics which ow

#### Reciprocity – the 1ar can choose whether or not jettison the contention and read turns under the neg framework OR go for their own framework, but the neg only has 1 substance route to the ballot

#### Our interp is better because anyone can answer any arg – reading offense under other fwks like you did solves

Strat skew – you can go for multiple layers too like 1ar theory

Depth – solved by multiple rounds and more efficiency – phil ed link turns

### 1AR – Kant Fwk

AT naturalistic fallacy

* All normative ethics begins with some descriptive claim about the way the world is — the fact that pleasure is an intrinsic good generates an obligation to maximize it — otherwise this argument would equally impugn the aff since their framework begins with a descriptive statement about what it is to be a rational agent

AT empirical uncertainty

* Abduction disproves external world skepticism — we can reason to the best inference that external objects are the cause of my sense perception since it's existence of external objects is presupposed by other theories that we can verify, and those theories transfer warrant to the presupposition

AT constitutive

* 1) Pleasure's goodness is also inescapable — to ask, "why pleasure is good?" Is tautological because goodness just is pleasure
* 2) reason's inescapability is not the key internal link — they need to win that our rational agency commits us to willing universal maxims — yes, agents act on reasons but what we view as reason for action is dictated by which action maximizes pleasure

AT action theory

* Util can explain why the constitutive features of an action are morally relevant because those actions are required in order to complete an action that maximizes pleasure
* Util doesn't deny that agents act on reasons — we just contest that value consists in rational agency as opposed to states of affairs

AT universality

* + The implicit generality of reasons does not force me, on pain of inconsistency, to treat others in any particular way — if I view getting to work on time as a reason for getting out of bed in the morning, that means any person, committed to getting to work on time, has reason to get out of bed in the morning — but I am not committed to legislating a rule based on that action that commits me to not impinging the freedom of others — reasons are not laws, and there's no reason to view myself as a legislator

Performativity flows aff

* The ability to make arguments presupposes you are live, which proves we have an obligation to preserve life

#### Constitutivism fails—showing we inevitably do engage in agency is insufficient to prove we ought to

Enoch 11 [(David, Philosophy Professor at Hebrew University) “Shmagency Revisited,” New Waves in Metaethics pp 208-233, 2011, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899\_11] TDI

3.2 Irrelevance

So much, then, for the implausibility of the but-you-do-care response to the whyshould-I-care-about-(e.g.)-self-understanding challenge. What I want to argue now is that even if we ignore this implausibility, still this response cannot possibly work, because it does not even qualify as a response – it fails to address the challenge. The thought here is very simple: Noting that I do Φ is never a good answer to the question whether I should Φ. This is true for actions, and it is just as true for carings. Perhaps I do care about something; but how does noticing this fact count as an answer to the normative question whether I should care about it, or indeed as a reason for caring about it?

The point is not merely an is-ought-gap kind of point. True, some of us have somehow become very good at convincing ourselves that sometimes, an ought can after all be derived from an is, or that some normative facts or properties just are some natural facts or properties, or some such. But what we are up against here is an especially problematic instance of such a move – it is the move from someone caring about something, immediately to it being the case that she should care about it, or at least that she has a reason to so care. I take it even those of us with the strongest stomach for naturalistic fallacies should not be happy with such a move. When someone asks "Why should I care about self-understanding?" (or whatever else is constitutive of agency), and the response comes "But you do care!", all that is needed by way of counter-response is "So what? I asked whether I should care, not whether I 14 do. You haven't answered my question." The but-you-do-care response is thus no response at all. It is utterly irrelevant.

Constitutivists like to emphasize that the agency game is not just one we do play, but also one we cannot avoid playing, agency is – in certain senses – inescapable for creatures like us. Constitutivists then sometimes suggest that the inescapability of agency somehow helps with the shmagency challenge (and related challenges) 17.

Thus, Velleman (136-7) distinguishes two senses of inescapability, suggesting that their combined strength helps in answering the why-should-I-care-about-self-understanding challenge. His two senses may be labeled natural and dialectical18. Let me postpone discussion of dialectical inescapability to sections 5 through 7. The natural inescapability of agency seems to come down to the fact that we cannot opt out of the game of agency, such opting out is just not something we can do. We can, of course, choose to end our lives, but as I also noted in "Agency, Shmagency" (188), far from opting out of the game of agency, this would be a major move within this game. And we can temporarily opt out of this game, say by going to sleep. But still, acting and choosing is, as Korsgaard likes to put things, "our plight"19.

I want to concede that agency is indeed naturally inescapable for us. But I also want to note (as I did, to an extent, in "Agency, Shmagency" (188 and on)) that such inescapability does not matter in our context, and in particular does not render the but- you-do-care response any better. For the move from "You inescapably Φ" to "You should Φ" is no better – not even the tiniest little bit – than the move from "You actually Φ" to "You should Φ".

#### Even if shmagency is impossible the objection still applies

Enoch 11 [(David, Philosophy Professor at Hebrew University) “Shmagency Revisited,” New Waves in Metaethics pp 208-233, 2011, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899\_11] TDI

Perhaps an example can help here. Assume a philosopher – call her the paperskeptic – who believes that there's something intellectually corrupting about the papers analytic philosophers are so fond of reading and writing. Philosophical progress, she thinks, can only be achieved by writing books. The paper-frenzy is just a race to philosophical superficiality, and an incentive to substitute technical skills for deep philosophical insights. Being a conscientious professional, she writes this all down, presenting her analysis and arguments, culminating in the conclusion that philosophers should not write papers. But – in order for the example to be interesting – she writes this all down in the format of a paper, and proceeds to submit it to her friendly-neighborhood philosophy journal (where it is rejected, without comments, eleven months later).

Now, us paper-writing philosophers are eager to defeat the paper-skeptic's challenge. Does it suffice, in order to do that, to show that she has no stable ground to stand on while she's launching her attack, that in a sense she defeats herself because she wrote down her paper-skepticism in the form of a paper? Perhaps – though I doubt it – this shows that our paper-skeptic is in some sense in trouble. But this certainly does not show that we are out of trouble. If her arguments still work, then we – committed as we are to writing papers – are in trouble. We need a substantive answer to the challenge she puts in a sort-of self-defeating way. The challenge is real enough. It is real enough even if putting her paper-skepticism in the format of a paper is for some reason inescapable for her. Indeed, the challenge is real enough even if a paper-skeptic does not, or even cannot, exist. And so it is better to tell the story without anthropomorphizing the arguments at all. There are arguments attempting to show that we shouldn't be so seriously into writing papers. We need to deal with these arguments. It just doesn't matter whether there is a character – the paper-skeptic – who can help us make this debate more dramatic. And even if there is such a character, we should not mistake finding flaws with her for vindicating our paperwriting practices28. We should not, in a term I borrow from Crispin Wright (1991, 89), commit the mistake of the adversarial stance.

The analogy, I hope, is clear. Showing that the practical-reason-skeptic (the one asking "Why should I care about (e.g.) self-understanding?") has no safe grounds from which to launch his attack is neither here nor there. It does not even begin to vindicate practical reason. Thinking otherwise is like settling – in the discussion with the paper-skeptic – for noting that she's written a paper, without tackling her arguments against paper-writing head on. And so here too – as in the paper-skepticism case – we are better off avoiding the dramatic effects and anthropomorphizing the challenge. The challenge is a challenge for us, non-skeptic as we are29. It is we who have to come up with a theory of normativity that will be adequate (at least) by our own lights. It is we who must be convinced that agency is not normatively arbitrary (for us), that

we do have, even upon reflection, reason to care about whatever it is that's constitutive of action and agency30, even if regardless of having or failing to have such a story, we inescapably do care about it. And so, it is us who are vulnerable to the shmagency challenge. Whether or not there is an agent (or a shmagent) who can stably embody this challenge is just beside the point.

#### No link – util agrees that intrinsic values exist and torture is intrinsically wrong

Vergara 11 [(Francisco, economist and philosopher, author of The Philosophical Foundations of Liberalism) “Bentham and Mill on the ‘quality’ of Pleasures,” Revue d’études benthamiennes, 9/15/2011] JL  
These critics are wrong on two counts. First of all, as we saw above, the fact that something has “no intrinsic value” does not imply that it is less important than other things. Some of the most important institutions for a happy society (taxes and prisons, for example) are, in a greater or lesser degree, unpleasant in themselves but have, through their consequences, enormous value.

42Second of all, in the utilitarian system everything that is pleasant in itself has intrinsic value. And anyone who has lived through a period of oppression knows how unpleasant it is to be deprived of freedom of expression and how pleasant it is to recover it afterwards (independently of the well-known *beneficial consequences* of free discussion).

43Freedom of expression is so unpleasant to be deprived of (has so much intrinsic value) that people who are accustomed to it would not accept *a life without it* in exchange for *a life* containing any amount of ice-cream, tobacco, wine or whatever other pleasure of “mere sensation” they may happen to enjoy. As Mill writes (in an often misunderstood phrase), they “would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of”.[**21**](https://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/422?lang=en#ftn21)

44This is what Mill means when he writes that, for those who have become familiarized with them, the pleasures “of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments”[**22**](https://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/422?lang=en#ftn22) have an *intrinsic* *superiority* over the pleasures of “mere sensation”. The word “intrinsic” simply points to the fact that the superior value of these pleasures lies not only in their excellent consequences; but also in the fact that they are better as pleasures.

45What seems to trouble authors like Sen is that when Utilitarians elevate a freedom (like *freedom of* *expression*) to the rank of “a right” – meaning that society has the duty to intervene if someone is deprived of it – they do not do this because of its “intrinsic value” (*its* *pleasantness*); they do it because of its “public utility” (*its consequences and implications*for the happiness of the community).

46A similar mistake is made by Harvard Professor Michael Sandel, who writes that Utilitarians “do not assert that torturing a human being is intrinsically wrong, only that practicing torture will have bad effects”.[**23**](https://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/422?lang=en#ftn23) The truth is almost the exact opposite. All Utilitarians consider torture to be intrinsically wrong; some Utilitarians think that it can occasionally have good effects (avoid a catastrophe).

47The explanation, here again, is quite simple. “Pain” is the very definition of evil for Utilitarians. And torture – being deliberately designed to cause physical or mental pain – is undoubtedly evil. Some Stoics may believe that “pain is no evil”, Utilitarians do not.

48But, is torture an intrinsic or an extrinsic evil? Or both? Though *many Utilitarians* believe that, if everything is considered, it will globally produce *bad effects* (which would make it an *extrinsic* evil), all Utilitarians believe that it is very unpleasant in itself, which makes it an intrinsic evil.

### 1NC – Contention

#### Consequentialist – result of patents is that people choose not to participate in scientific advancement because they can’t profit from it

#### Free markets cause violence

Robinson 14 [William I. Robinson, Professor of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies at UC-Santa Barbara, 2014, “Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity.” Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/global-capitalism-and-the-crisis-of-humanity/5E69D07E53766BDCFBB9DF48C530267E]

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis*. Structural crises* reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of *social reproduction.* The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of *hegemony* and *domination.* National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanityI mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; *1984 has arrived;* 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that *intensive* expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term *21st century fascism*.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty

-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

#### Yes universalizable – you don’t restrict your own ability to produce medicine if you hold the patent because you created it

### 1NC – Contention Turns

#### Kant justifies a fundamental right to property

Merges 11 [(Robert, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Professor of Law and Technology, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law) “Justifying Intellectual Property,” Harvard University Press, 2011] JL

Kant believed that any object onto which a person projects his or her will may come to be owned. Kant seemed to consider ownership as a primitive concept whose roots run very deep in human consciousness. This is evident from the language he uses. The origin of property, he says, is in a deep and abiding sense of “Mine and Yours.” “That is rightfully mine,” he writes, “if I am so bound to it that anyone who uses it without my consent would thereby injure me.”15

But what is the point of this? Why do people want to be bound to things? In essence, Kant says, to expand their range of freedom— their autonomy.16 People have a desire to carry out projects in the world. Sometimes, those projects require access to and control over external objects. The genesis of property is the desire of an individual to carry out personal projects in the world, for which various objects are necessary. For Kant, this desire must be given its broadest scope, to promote the widest range of human choice, and therefore human projects. Kant accordingly refuses to accept any binding legal rule that makes some objects strictly unownable, because the rationale for such a rule would conflict with the basic need for maximal freedom of action. Freedom to appropriate is so basic, so tied to matters of individual will and personal choice, that Kant finds it unthinkable to rule out large categories of things from the domain of the potentially ownable. As Kant scholar Paul Guyer says, for Kant, “The fundamental principle of morality dictates the protection of the external use of freedom or freedom of action, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice and thus as part of autonomy as a whole. . . .”17 This captures it in a nutshell: freedom of action, including the right to possess, as a necessary expression of freedom of choice, or autonomy.

#### IP is property

Schultz 14 [(Mark, Chair in Intellectual Property Law and the Director of the Intellectual Property and Technology Law Program at the University of Akron School of Law and co-founder and a leader of the Center for Intellectual Property x Innovation Policy at George Mason University) “A free market perspective on intellectual property rights,” American Enterprise Institute, 2/23/2014] JL

Point 1.Intellectual property secures the same values as physical property

As an institution, property secures rights in what we create through our work. In this regard, there’s no cause or need to distinguish intellectual property from any other forms of property. In all cases, a person employs his intellect and talents to impose his plan and will on his environment to bring something new into the world. This is the essence of productive labor, the fruits of which property protects.

Distinguishing between physical and intellectual labor, as some would, is misguided, because both are, at heart, the same activity. Whether it is a carpenter building a house, a farmer planting a field, an author writing a book, a director filming a movie, or an inventor developing a new drug, the activity is, ultimately, productive labor.

#### IP protections are central to human freedom – individuals must retain the right to control their creativity with the prospect of compensation

Merges 11 [(Robert, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Professor of Law and Technology, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, and co-founder of the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology.) “Justifying Intellectual Property” Harvard University Press, 2011. https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/JIP-Chapter-9.pdf] BC

Kant has complex ideas about creativity, ideas that track well with the structure of IP law. He begins with some primitive notions— the individual, his or her will, and the extension or application of that will onto objects. For Kant, the desire to shape and control things external to the self (that is, objects) is a powerful impulse for human beings. A project involving an external object may require that a person shape or control that object over a period of time. Therefore, human freedom depends, to some degree, on the ability to relate to an object in this way, to control and shape it over time. For some objects, this might be achieved by a per sis tent physical grasping, but this is obviously a limited strategy. Some objects are too big, hard to grasp, and so forth; generally, a more robust type of possession beyond physical grasping would be more effective in promoting the freedom to work on an object over time. Kant believes that this broader concept of possession is crucial to human freedom— so crucial, in fact, that it provides the impetus behind the creation of formal legal institutions, and hence civil society itself. For Kant, legal own ership is central to human freedom. F

### 1NC – Heg Advantage

#### No heg impact

Peace is not because of the U.S. – only logical explanation is states want peace – the fact there is peace without hegemony proves other factors outweigh – empirics only prove our claim

Theoretically if other people wanted war – us couldn’t stop them, thus people just don’t want war

There is peace where the u.s. isn’t which means there is obvi something else at play

Even when hegemony decreased, war still decreased which means that they’re not related

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs states have decided that their interest are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

#### US hegemony is dead – there’s no coming back

* COVID, economic downturns, nationalistic politics, security internationally
* Rise in other great powers to rival
* Weaker states can seek alternatives to US support
* Rise in right-wing networks vs liberal policies

Cooley and Nexon 6/9 (Alexander Cooley is the Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, Daniel H. Nexon is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 6/9/2020, Foreign Affairs, “How Hegemony Ends”, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends) //EG

Multiple signs point to a crisis in global order. The uncoordinated international response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the resulting economic downturns, the resurgence of nationalist politics, and the hardening of state borders all seem to herald the emergence of a less cooperative and more fragile international system. According to many observers, these developments underscore the dangers of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America first” policies and his retreat from global leadership.

Even before the pandemic, Trump routinely criticized the value of alliances and institutions such as NATO, supported the breakup of the European Union, withdrew from a host of international agreements and organizations, and pandered to autocrats such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. He has questioned the merits of placing liberal values such as democracy and human rights at the heart of foreign policy. Trump’s clear preference for zero-sum, transactional politics further supports the notion that the United States is abandoning its commitment to promoting a liberal international order.

Some analysts believe that the United States can still turn this around, by restoring the strategies by which it, from the end of World War II to the aftermath of the Cold War, built and sustained a successful international order. If a post-Trump United States could reclaim the responsibilities of global power, then this era—including the pandemic that will define it—could stand as a temporary aberration rather than a step on the way to permanent disarray.

After all, predictions of American decline and a shift in international order are far from new—and they have been consistently wrong. In the middle of the 1980s, many analysts believed that U.S. leadership was on the way out. The Bretton Woods system had collapsed in the 1970s; the United States faced increasing competition from European and East Asian economies, notably West Germany and Japan; and the Soviet Union looked like an enduring feature of world politics. By the end of 1991, however, the Soviet Union had formally dissolved, Japan was entering its “lost decade” of economic stagnation, and the expensive task of integration consumed a reunified Germany. The United States experienced a decade of booming technological innovation and unexpectedly high economic growth. The result was what many hailed as a “unipolar moment” of American hegemony.

But this time really is different. The very forces that made U.S. hegemony so durable before are today driving its dissolution. Three developments enabled the post–Cold War U.S.-led order. First, with the defeat of communism, the United States faced no major global ideological project that could rival its own. Second, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its accompanying infrastructure of institutions and partnerships, weaker states lacked significant alternatives to the United States and its Western allies when it came to securing military, economic, and political support. And third, transnational activists and movements were spreading liberal values and norms that bolstered the liberal order.

Today, those same dynamics have turned against the United States: a vicious cycle that erodes U.S. power has replaced the virtuous cycles that once reinforced it. With the rise of great powers such as China and Russia, autocratic and illiberal projects rival the U.S.-led liberal international system. Developing countries—and even many developed ones—can seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support. And illiberal, often right-wing transnational networks are pressing against the norms and pieties of the liberal international order that once seemed so implacable. In short, U.S. global leadership is not simply in retreat; it is unraveling. And the decline is not cyclical but permanent.

#### Pursuit of hegemony is leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.

Porter, DPhil, 19

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — that escalates to the use of nuclear force

Klare 18 – Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. (Michael T., “The Pentagon Is Planning a Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia,” April 4, 2018, https://fpif.org/the-pentagon-is-planning-a-three-front-long-war-against-china-and-russia/)//sy

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences

#### Hegemony fails and propagates terrorism – it justifies intervention and empirically causes blowback.

Bandow 19 (Doug, senior fellow @ Cato Institute and JD Stanford, 6-2-2019, "Understanding the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Albright Doctrine," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/understanding-failure-us-foreign-policy-albright-doctrine-60477) AG

Since 9/11, Washington has been extraordinarily active militarily—invading two nations, bombing and droning several others, deploying special operations forces in yet more countries, and applying sanctions against many. Tragically, the threat of Islamist violence and terrorism only have metastasized. Although Al Qaeda lost its effectiveness in directly plotting attacks, it continues to inspire national offshoots. Moreover, while losing its physical “caliphate” the Islamic State added further terrorism to its portfolio.

Three successive administrations have ever more deeply ensnared the United States in the Middle East. War with Iran appears to be frighteningly possible. Ever-wealthier allies are ever-more dependent on America. Russia is actively hostile to the United States and Europe. Washington and Beijing appear to be a collision course on far more than trade. Yet the current administration appears convinced that doing more of the same will achieve different results, the best definition of insanity.

Despite his sometimes abusive and incendiary rhetoric, the president has departed little from his predecessors’ policies. For instance, American forces remain deployed in Afghanistan and Syria. Moreover, the Trump administration has increased its military and materiel deployments to Europe. Also, Washington has intensified economic sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and even penalized additional countries, namely Venezuela.

U.S. foreign policy suffers from systematic flaws in the thinking of the informal policy collective which former Obama aide Ben Rhodes dismissed as “The Blob.” Perhaps no official better articulated The Blob’s defective precepts than Madeleine Albright, United Nations ambassador and Secretary of State.

First is overweening hubris. In 1998 Secretary of State Albright declared that “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”

Even then her claim was implausible. America blundered into the Korean War and barely achieved a passable outcome. The Johnson administration infused Vietnam with dramatically outsize importance. For decades, Washington foolishly refused to engage the People’s Republic of China. Washington-backed dictators in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and elsewhere fell ingloriously. An economic embargo against Cuba that continues today helped turn Fidel Castro into a global folk hero. Washington veered dangerously close to nuclear war with Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and again two decades later during military exercises in Europe.

U.S. officials rarely were prepared for events that occurred in the next week or month, let alone years later. Americans did no better than the French in Vietnam. Americans managed events in Africa no better than the British, French, and Portuguese colonial overlords. Washington made more than its share of bad, even awful decisions in dealing with other nations around the globe.

Perhaps the worst failing of U.S. foreign policy was ignoring the inevitable impact of foreign intervention. Americans would never passively accept another nation bombing, invading, and occupying their nation, or interfering in their political system. Even if outgunned, they would resist. Yet Washington has undertaken all of these practices, with little consideration of the impact on those most affected—hence the rise of terrorism against the United States. Terrorism, horrid and awful though it is, became the weapon of choice of weaker peoples against intervention by the world’s industrialized national states.

The U.S. record since September 11 has been uniquely counterproductive. Rather than minimize hostility toward America, Washington adopted a policy—highlighted by launching new wars, killing more civilians, and ravaging additional societies—guaranteed to create enemies, exacerbate radicalism, and spread terrorism. Blowback is everywhere. Among the worst examples: Iraqi insurgents mutated into ISIS, which wreaked military havoc throughout the Middle East and turned to terrorism.

#### Terrorism causes global nuclear war—collapses internal AND external stability

Arguello and Buis, 18 – \*Irma, Founder and Chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation (Non-proliferation for Global Security), degree in Phyisics Science from the University of Buenos Aires, Master degree in Business Administration from IDEA/Wharton School, Defense and Security studies (Master level) at the Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Argentina; \*\*Emiliano, lawyer and associate professor of public international law, international humanitarian law, international law of disarmament, and the origins of international law in antiquity (Irma Arguello & Emiliano J. Buis, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812)

But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.