**Baudrillard K**

**We live in a third-order simulacrum. Capitalism and mass production have separated us from what is “real:” we now understand it through self-referential symbols. This prevents us from acknowledging our desire from lack, which increases our determination to colonize and assimilate the “other.”**

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After describing a novel sociological position that regards **semiology, rather than capital, as the key component of domination** (Baudrillard [1968] 1998), **Baudrillard’s radical social theory emerges in light of considerations of consumerism, media, information and technology—all of which conspire to create what Baudrillard calls a ‘hyperreal’ society**. This is a contemporary world where all boundaries, categories and values implode into the ‘end of the social’. Baudrillard (1972) begins elaborating this theory in an article titled ‘Design and Environment or How Political Economy Escalates into Cyberblitz’ (Baudrillard, 1972, Chapter 10). In this essay, he points to the importance of ‘the passage out of a metallurgic into a semiurgic society’ (Ibid.: 185). Here, **consumer objects take on a life of their own ‘as an embodiment and functional part of a system of signs, independent of its status as a commodity**’ (Kellner, 1989: 76). He uses the German Bauhaus movement as an example to anticipate the ‘universal semantisation of the environment in which everything becomes the object of a calculus of function and signification’ (Baudrillard, 1972: 185-86). This is achieved by the synthesis ‘of form and function, beauty and utility, of art and technology’ in the design of objects that produces a functionalised universe whereby the meaning and function of **every object is determined by its place in the system**. As a result, ‘the whole environment becomes a signifier, objectified as an element of signification’ (Ibid.: 186-87). This is analogous to Derrida’s concept of ‘difference’ whereby meaning is never present ‘in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself’ (Derrida, 1965: 27). E**ssentially, objects, words and images have no direct relationship to the things in which they refer, they inherent meaning only by interacting with one another in an ongoing system of contrast. Baudrillard refers to this system as a ‘cybernetic code’,** and argues that **reality itself is shut out from this system of because the system is wholly self-referencing. This code creates ‘a functionalised, integrated and self-reproducing universe’ of meaning, controlled by simulacra and simulation**. And, like Derrida’s text, there is nothing outside of the code.In ‘The Orders of Simulacra’, **Baudrillard (1995) outlines the stages of the transition from traditional society to the contemporary society defined by simulations** (Baudrillard, 1995). First, according to Baudrillard, the feudal era had a fixed social order established by a hierarchy of obligatory signs indicating social class and rank. Here, a ‘natural law of value’ dominates the stage. **Simulacra, a representation of another image, first emerge as ‘counterfeits’ of the real**. For example, representations of class, law or value are said to be grounded in nature: art imitates life and democracy is legitimised by ‘natural rights’. Baudrillard indicates, however, that **the inherent goal of simulacra is to produce a controllable and universal system of power**. At this stage, counterfeit simulacra is working ‘only on substance and form, not yet on relations or structures’, but **its evolution will create ‘a pacified society, ground up into a deathless substance … that will guarantee an eternity of … cultural hegemony’** (Baudrillard, 1983b: 91). Next, the **second-order of simulacra appears during the industrial revolution**. Importantly, infinite reproducibility is introduced into society. For example, exact **replicas of objects are produced by assembly lines and automation**. No longer is there nostalgia for a natural order; **nature is to be dominated by production;** counterfeit simulacra are now obsolete. Most importantly, however, the infinite reproducibility of objects, augmented by the rise of capitalism, enables the emergence of the cybernetic code and contemporary society. Baudrillard claims that ‘**we are in the third-order simulacra’**, **where simulation models come to constitute the world and all referential finalities are abolished** (Ibid.: 100-01): God, Man, Nature, History, Society and others. This is because **images are only understood by reference to other images**. Thus, **society has moved from ‘a capitalist-productivitist society to a neo-capitalist cybernetic order’** (Ibid.: 111). As a result of this code, images no longer refer to an object; rather, they refer to another commutable image on the code. But, through models contained in common societal narrative and institutional discourse, simulations are able to produce a ‘reality effect’, which conceals the fact they are merely referring to other simulations (Bogard, 1996: 10). For example, the code continually sets up simulations of events, which test individuals and ‘[inscribe] them into the simulated order’ through a ‘process of signalisation’ (Kellner, 1989: 80). For example, every advertisement, choice of commodity, choice of entertainment, and political candidate presents a chance for a binary response of affirmation or negation. It is in this way that individuals are inserted into a dominating ‘coded system of similarities and dissimilarities, of identities and programed differences’ (Ibid.). Thus, Baudrillard’s contemporary social theory is distinguishable from previous determinist social theories that postulate powerful individuals, classes, or corporations manipulating the public for certain ends. Instead, Baudrillard suggests that social organisation is determined by individual’s responses to the pre-coded messages that are derived from simulations of economics, politics, culture or the banal decisions of everyday life (Baudrillard, 1983b: 111). Importantly for the third-order of simulacra, the binary system of the code creates a ‘deterrence model’ in which all ‘radical change is ruled out, since the very fact of an option between different political parties, [for example], acts as a deterrent against demands for radical social change’ (Kellner, 1989: 81). This is the end of society as traditionally theorised. In Symbolic Exchange and Death Baudrillard (1983c: 20) announces the end of traditional conceptions of society—the end of ‘labour, production, political economy’, and the ‘dialectic signifier/signified that permeated the accumulation of knowledge and of meaning’ (Baudrillard, 2002: 127). Baudrillard argues that **we are in a new era where media and the consumption of semiotic codes that inform images, have replaced production and political economy as the organising foundation of society**. For example, **labour is now a ‘sign among signs’** (Baudrillard, 1995b: 23), a symbol of one’s status and integration: ‘the choice of occupation, the utopia of an occupation custom-made for everyone … labour power is no longer violently bought and sold; **it is designed, it is marketed, it is merchandised. Production thus joins the consumerist system of signs’** (Baudrillard, 2002: 134). Because social reality is constituted by the ‘chess pieces’ of the signs and symbols that are mobilised through the media, **nothing is objectively determined and everything can be simulated** (Kellner, 1989: 62). **Thus, political economy is no longer the determinant that can explain social phenomena.**

**Health care policy is a mechanism through which imperialist states expand their efficacy into the future. The Aff expands semiocapitalism’s control over citizens’ immune systems: it allows Western states to claim to defend democracy and freedom while regulating and conscripting life.**

**Ahuja, 16** Neel Ahuja, Professor of English @ University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, *Bioinsecurities: Disease Interventions, Empire, and the Government of Species*, 2016

Even at their most powerful, states are rarely ever able to remake life in their own sovereign image.1 The difference in the case of an **imperial state** is not simply that it has incrementally more power to control, but that its scale of intervention and **fantasies of mastery doom it to ever more desperate interventions that seek to postpone its overextension and demise.** Imperial states extend tentacles of intervention into varied domains of life in order to displace the crises of reproduction and legitimacy they inevitably generate. Given this precarious, adaptive, and expansionist form of empire, it is unsurprising **in the early twenty-first century that basic controversies about the protection of biological life have become major concerns of a United States that brands its own rule as a defense of democracy and thus both freedom and life**. Indeed, as in past eras of empire, many of the most intimate bodily experiences of living and dying drive political debate.2 With steady media attention to health care policy, humanitarian intervention, abortion, prenatal genetic testing, drug patents, assisted suicide, animal rights, environmental regulation, and biosecurity, the idea of the vulnerable body as an object of governance—its transformation for better or worse through state policies, technological intervention, and ecological forces—is today quite conventional. **One element common to this biopolitics of empire is an anxiety about the dependence of the human body on forces that appear inhuman, even inhumane: medical technologies to extend, optimize, or end life; markets and institutions that unequally distribute resources for sustaining life; environmental processes that support, deprive, or injure bodies.** Such concerns were, of course, entirely common to twentieth-century modernist fears of alienation from nature, as well as to liberal, socialist, and fascist states that each proclaimed to defend the life of the people in the major imperial wars. Yet due to the ongoing expansion of government into life through technological, economic, and environmental interventions, **a growing number of crises that advertise dreaded risks to life as we know it—climate change, nuclear toxicity, disease pandemics, biological weapons, and financial speculation**, to name a few—have recently pressed critical studies of empire to think politics and agency at queer scales of relation, from the grand vantage of planetary geology and climate, through the lively migrations of commodities and animals, all the way down to the microbial, molecular, and quantum worlds of matter in which advanced sciences produce new technologies and knowledge. In an era in which **excessive hope is invested in the idea that empire’s so-called free markets will inevitably deliver resources for improving life**, discussions of risk and security increasingly provoke concern about how bodies are either threatened or safeguarded in links to other species, to ecology, and to technology. Public fears and hopes are thus invested in questions about how bodies interface beyond the skin of the organism. The living body is not only an ecology reproduced by constituent species (think of the life-sustaining work of gut bacteria or the ingested flesh of animals or plants). It is also an assemblage crosscut by technological, economic, and environmental forces (medical technologies, insurance markets, agricultural systems, toxic pollution) that render the body vulnerable as they reproduce its conditions of possibility. Yet there remains a sense of tension concerning how social theorists frame the vulnerability of human life between biopolitics and these emerging posthumanist ideas. While biopolitical analysis foregrounds the contested figure of the human, emphasizing that the human body is an effect of power crafted through the social reproduction of nationality, race, sex, and/or class factors conjoined in inhuman fields of power, emerging posthumanist and newmaterialist fields including animal studies, environmental humanities, and object-oriented ontology more often emphasize the agency of the nonhuman and the surprising liveliness of physical matter. As such, despite the avowed critique of the human, they may take for granted the apparent universality of the human lifeworld from which they flee, foreclosing attention to the processes that anthropomorphize the human in order to characterize the human’s sovereign domination of the nonhuman. This move allows some posthumanist critics to project upon an outside, the nonhuman (in the form of environment, animal, machine, or other object), the possibility of resistance to anthropocentrism. Such thinking might be seen as a ruse of transcendence—an assumption that turning attention from the human to the nonhuman could bypass Marxist, feminist, critical race, and postcolonial critiques of imperial systems that proliferate inequality under the guise of universal human freedom. Despite this liberal, idealist trend among posthumanists (which is more pronounced in the humanities than it is in the social sciences), studies of empire increasingly confront the fact that the apparent exteriority of the subject (the worlds of body, physical matter, and interspecies exchange) has more often formed the center of the politics of empire rather than its excluded outside. It is thus my hope that the collision of biopolitical and posthumanist thought may be salvaged in a practical if unexpected crossing: a more robust accounting of the ways in which politics, including **the liberal and neoliberal politics of empire, is embedded in living bodies and planetary environments, which are themselves constituted as objects of knowledge and intervention for imperial science**. Such an understanding goes beyond an assertion that life is controlled by human government, which would embrace the strong postEnlightenment division between government and life, human and nonhuman. I instead hope to explore the queer hypothesis that the adaptability, risk, and differentiation central to life increasingly constitute the very matter of politics. This book is about how **disease outbreaks**, **med**ical **tech**nologies, **and the relations between humans, animals, bacteria, and viruses galvanized racialized fears and hopes that determined the geopolitical form of US empire** during the long twentieth century, following the continent-wide establishment of Euro-American settler networks. Before explaining that argument, however, this brief preface explores how—in addition to established methods of postcolonial study that define empire through histories of conquest, settlement, and the exploitation of labor and resources—the inequalities and violences of imperialism can productively be understood from the vantage of species, the field of life itself. Research on colonial environmental history and disease control is long established in postcolonial studies, even as today there is growing attention to Global South environmental activism, advanced biotechnologies, and human-animal and human-plant interactions as significant concerns in the planetary routes of European and US empire. Yet my sense of an interspecies politics is still relatively unfamiliar from even the vantage of these studies. Extant studies have long highlighted questions of representation, agency, influence, and domination, explaining the unequal distribution of the privileges accorded for being anthropomorphized, for being made human through colonial ideological and social processes. **While maintaining focus on such racialized inequalities fracturing the figure of the human in the worldwide routes of European and US imperialisms, it is the aim of this book to articulate an additional sense of the political as a lively zone of embodied connection and friction.** “Interspecies relations form the often unmarked basis upon which scholarly inquiry organizes its objects, political interventions such as ‘human rights’ stake their claims, and capitalist endeavors maneuver resources and marshal profit.”3 **A critique of the interspecies zone of the political**—which at its broadest **would** expand beyond the human-animal and human-microbial relations discussed in this book to **include the diversity of living species, matter, energies, and environmental systems that produce everyday life out of biosocial crossings**—helps us understand the persistence of **empire in a postcolonial age precisely because it conjoins power to forces that retreat into the seemingly natural and ahistorical domains of body and matter.**

**The Alt is negation and nihilism, which breaks down the hyperreal. This is the strategy of the masses, who have no other options left.**

**Baudrillard, 90** Jean Baudrillard and James Benedict, “The Transparency of Evil : Essays on Extreme Phenomena,” 2009,

<https://www.worldcat.org/title/transparency-of-evil-essays-on-extreme-phenomena/oclc/286421990>

In Simmel's words, '**Negation is the simplest thing imaginable**. That is why the broad masses, whose component elements cannot achieve agreement as to goals, come together here.' **It is useless to expect a positive opinion or a critical will from the masses**, for they have none: **all they have is an undifferentiated power, the power to reject.** **Their strength flows solely from what they are able to expel, to negate** - and that is, first and foremost, any project that goes beyond them, any class or understanding that transcends them. **There is something here of a philosophy of cunning born of the most brutal experience - the experience of animals, or of peasants:** 'They won't put that over on us again, we won't fall for their calls to sacrifice, or listen to their pie in the sky.' **Profound disgust for the political order - though one that may well coexist with specific political opinions. Disgust for the pretension and transcendence of power, for the inevitability and abomination of the political sphere. Where once there were political passions, we now find only the violence peculiar to a fundamental disgust with everything political.** [...] It is true in a sense that nothing really disgusts us any more. In our eclectic culture, which embraces the debris of all others in a promiscuous confusion, nothing is unacceptable. But for this very reason disgust is nevertheless on the increase - the desire to spew out this promiscuity, this indifference to everything no matter how bad, this viscous adherence of opposites. To the extent that this happens, what is on the increase is disgust over the lack of disgust. **A**n allergic **temptation to reject everything en bloc: to refuse all the gentle brainwashing, the soft-sold overfeeding, the tolerance, the pressure to embrace synergy and consensus. All the talk of immunity, antibodies, grafting and rejection should not surprise anyone.** In periods of scarcity, absorption and assimilation are the order of the day. In periods of abundance, rejection and expulsion are the chief concerns. Today, **generalized communication and surplus information threaten to overwhelm all human defences. Symbolic space, the mental space of judgement, has no protection** whatsoever. Not only am I unable to decide whether something is beautiful or not, original or not, but the biological organism itself is at a loss to know what is good for it and what is not. **In such circumstances everything becomes a bad object, and the only primitive defence is abreaction or rejection.**

**The Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debater who best disengages from the hyperreal: this is key to avoiding tyranny, hierarchies, and fascism. Roleplaying in debate forces us to adopt masks that erase our identities, and we must disengage from this.**

**Antionio, 95** Robert J. Antonio, “Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” 1995,<https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/handle/1808/17941>

According to Nietzsche, **the "subject" is** Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic **expression of resentment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline** "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). **Leveling** of Socratic **culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important.** For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, apoearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that **persons** (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations **overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement**. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" **They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character."** This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). **Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduce**s **persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra.** One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" **Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"** (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." **Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity).** The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural **leaders**hip. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors **amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a** new type of **tyrant.**

**Theory Hedge:**

**1) Reject 1AR theory: *Analytic***

**2) NC theory first: Neg abuse only occurs in reaction to the abuse in the AC.**

#### 

**T - Reduce**

**Interpretation: “Reduce” implies an unconditional and permanent change, while the Aff is merely a suspension.**

**Violation: They only defend a temporary waiver for one type of medicine and for a limited time period.**

**Reynolds, 95** Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway. [\*\*\*13] **The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.**

**Impacts:**

**A) Semantics Outweighs – It controls the internal link to any sort of engagement, since it’s the only basis for pre-round prep. B) Jurisdiction – Regardless of pragmatics, if you aren’t debating the res, you aren’t following the pre-set burden for this round.**

**Standards:**

**1) Limits - There are infinite temporary waivers and specific non-reduction changes that you can spec. That gives you a massive prep advantage - it’s impossible for me to prep every single AC out, but you get to frontline just one Aff, so you’ll always be ahead. It’s also uniquely terrible for small-school debaters, which makes debate less accessible.**

**2) Ground - Most of my disads and CPs won’t link to your Aff, which denies me ground. For example, disads relating to the economic need for IP won’t link to an Aff that doesn’t actually “reduce” IP. This moots education and denies the Neg a route to the ballot.**

**Ground controls the internal link to clash, since I can’t engage substantively with a hyper-specific Aff. I’m forced to read generics, which turns any topic education arguments you may have.**

**TVA Solves Your Offense - You can just change your implementation mechanism to be broader and more permanent, and we’ll still learn about the specifics of your Aff.**

**Fairness and Education are voters.**

* Debate is a competition, so if it were unfair, nobody would participate.
* Education is key to funding for the debate space: schools organize debate teams and fund them solely because of debate’s educational value.

**Drop the debater: 1) To rectify time lost running T. 2) To deter future abuse. 3) Drop the arg on T is drop the debater since you lose your advocacy.**

**Competing interps, since the debate over brightline for reasonability collapses into competing interps. Any brightline is arbitrary, and reasonability causes a race to the bottom to see who can be the most abusive.**

**No RVIs:**

1. **Logic** - My opponent should not win simply because they were able to prove that they did not violate any rules.
2. **Chilling Effect** - RVIs disincentivize people to read theory against abuse.
3. **Baiting** - RVIs incentivize good theory debaters to be as abusive as possible in order to bait out theory and win.