#### **Kantian Libertarianism AC**

#### **The metaethic is practical reason.**

#### **Regress** – Ethical theories must have a basis, as without one they aren’t binding: we can always question their starting point. Reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself.

1. **Action Theory** – Every action can be broken down into an infinite amount of movements. Only reason can unify these movements, because reason explains the goals and intentions behind them. That further proves all actions collapse to reason.

#### **The obligation to act for reasons concludes that moral law must be universal, since we all have access to reason.**

**Velleman, 06** J. David Velleman, A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics, J. David Velleman (2006)

Roughly, the answer is that **to act for reasons is to act on the basis of considerations that would be valid for anyone in similar circumstances**; whereas immoral behavior always involves acting on considerations whose validity for others we aren't willing to acknowledge. **If we steal, for example, we take our own desire for someone else's property as a reason for making it our property instead**—**as if his desire for the thing wasn't a reason for its being his property instead** of ours. We thus take our desire as grounds for awarding ownership to ourselves, while denying that his desire is grounds for awarding ownership for him. Similarly, if we lie, we hope that others will believe what we say even though we don't believe it, as if what we say should count as a reason for them but not for us. Once again, **we attempt to separate reasons for us from reasons for others. In doing so, we violate the very concept of a reason, which entails that a reason for one is a reason for all. Hence we violate the requirement "Act for reasons."** [...] **Rational creatures have access to a shared perspective**, from which they not only see the same things but can also see the visibility of those things to all rational creatures.Consider, for example, our capacity for arithmetic reasoning. **Anyone who adds 2 and 2 sees, not just that the sum is 4, but also that anyone who added 2 and 2 would see that it's 4**, and that such a person would see this, too, and so on. The facts of elementary arithmetic are thus common knowledge among all possible reasoners, in the sense that every reasoner knows them, and knows that every reasoner knows them, and knows that every reasoner knows that the every reasoner knows them, and so on.As arithmetic reasoners, then, we have access to a perspective that is constant not only across time but also between persons. We can compute the sum of 2 and 2 once and for all,in the sense that we would only get the same answer on any other occasion; and each of us can compute the sum of 2 and 2one for all,in the sense that the others would only get the same answer. What's more, the universality of our perspective on the sum of 2and 2 is evident to each of us from within that very perspective. In computing the sum of2 and 2, we are aware of computing it for all,from a perspective that's shared by all arithmetic reasoners. In this sense, **our judgment of the sum is authoritative, because it speaks for the judgment of all.** This shared perspective is like a vantage point overlooking the individual perspectives of reasoners, a standpoint from which we not only see what everyone sees but also see everyone seeing it. And once we glimpse the availability of this vantage point, we cannot help but aspire to attain it. We are no longer satisfied with estimating or guessing the sum of two numbers, given the possibility of computing it once for all: we are ineluctable drawn to the perspective of arithmetic reason.Note that the aspect of arithmetic judgments to which we are drawn in this case resembles the authority that we initially regarded as definitive of moral requirements: it's the authority of being inescapable. We can compute the sum of 2 and 2 once for all because the answer we reach is the answer that would be reached from any perspective and is therefore inescapable. We can approach the sum of 2 and 2 from wherever we like, and we will always arrive at the same answer. The case of arithmetic reasoning shows that inescapability can in fact appeal to us, because it is the feature in virtue of which judgments constitute a stable and all-encompassing point-of-view. Perhaps, then,the authority of moral judgments, which consists in their inescapability, can appeal to using similar fashion, by offering an attractive vantage point of some kind.**~**But what does arithmetic reasoning have to do with acting for reasons? Well, **suppose** that the validity of reasons for acting were also visible from a perspective shared by allreasoners—by all practical reasoners, that is. In that case, our aspirations toward personhood would draw us toward the perspective of practical reason as well.Indeed, that may be the perspective toward which you were being drawn when **you felt compelled to find a reason for not exercising.** Your immediate concern was to find a set of considerations **whose validity** as reasons **would remain constant** through fluctuations in your preferences; but you would also have regarded those considerations as constituting reasons **for other people as well**, insofar as they were true of those people. **In accepting a**n incipient **cold as a reason to skip swimming, you would have regarded it as something that would count as a reason for anyone to skip swimming, in circumstances like yours.** What you were seeking may thus have been considerations that could count as reasons not only for you, whenever they were true of you, but for other agents as well. [...] To lie is intentionally to tell someone a falsehood. When we tell something to someone, we act with a particular kind of communicative intention: we say or write it to him with the intention of giving him grounds for believing it. Indeed, we intend to give him grounds for belief precisely by manifesting this very communicative intention in our speech or writing. We intend that the person acquire grounds for believing what we say by recognizing that we are acting with the intention of conveying those grounds. Now, **suppose that our wanting to give someone grounds for believing something constituted sufficient reason for telling it to him, whether or not we believed it ourselves.**In that case, **the validity of this reason would be common knowledge** among all reasoners, including him. He would **therefore** be able to see that, in wanting to give him grounds for believing the thing, as was manifest in our communicative action, we already had sufficient reason for telling it to him, whether or not we believed it. And if he could see that we had sufficient reason for telling it even if we ourselves didn't believe it, then **our telling it would give him no grounds for believing it, either.** Why should he believe what we tell him if we need no more reason for telling him than the desire, already manifest in the telling, to give him grounds for believing it? So if our wanting to give him grounds for believing something were sufficient reason for telling it to him, then **telling him wouldn't accomplish the result that we wanted**, and wanting that result wouldn't be a reason for telling him, after all. Wanting to convey grounds for belief can't be a sufficient reason for telling, then, because if it were, it would not be a reason at all.**~**I introduced these examples by asking you to imagine that you could construct a universally accessible perspective of practical reasoning, so that you could be required to act only on considerations whose validity you could enshrine in such a perspective. Yetit has now turned out that there already is such a perspective—or, at least, the beginnings of one—and it hasn't been constructed by anyone. For we have stumbled on one kind of practical result that anyone can see, and can see that anyone can see, and so on.The kind of practical result that we have found to be universally accessible has the following form: that the validity of some putative reason for acting could not be universally accessible. The validity of "I want the money" as a reason for denying receipt of deposit, or the validity of "I want him to believe it" as a reason for telling something to someone, could not be universally accessible, any more than the validity of "That would taste good" as a reason for going over your limit of drinks. The fact that the validity of these reasons could not be universally accessible—this fact is already universally accessible to practical reasoners, any of whom can perform the reasoning by which it has come to light.Thus, the notion of sharing a perspective with all practical reasoners is not a pipe-dream, after all. You already share a perspective with all practical reasoners to this extent, that **it is common knowledge among all reasoners that the validity of certain reasons for acting could not be common knowledge among all reasoners. This item of common knowledge constitutes a universally accessible constraint on what can count as a reason** for acting and hence what can satisfy a requirement to act for reasons. A requirement to act for reasons would forbid acting on the basis of considerations whose validity as reasons could not be common knowledge among all reasoners, and in the case of some considerations, this impossibility is itself common knowledge

**This additionally proves that we must treat people as ends, not mere means. Infringing on someone’s freedom is not universalizable: it would deny our own ability to universalize. Furthermore, all practical reasoners are inherently valuable.**

**The universality of freedom justifies a libertarian state, which outweighs on actor specificity: frameworks must discuss the obligations of a state to be morally relevant to this resolution.**

**Otteson, 9** James R. Otteson (professor of philosophy and economics at Yeshiva University) “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3, Winter 2009

In a crucial passage in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that **the “Universal Principle of Right” is “‘every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right**.’” He concludes, “Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (1991, 133, emphasis in original).5 **This stipulation becomes for Kant the grounding justification for the existence of a state**, its raison d’être, and **the reason we leave the state of nature is to secure this sphere of maximum freedom compatible with the same freedom of all others.** Because this freedom must be complete, in the sense of being as full as possible given the existence of other persons who demand similar freedom, it entails that **the state may—indeed, must—secure this condition of freedom, but undertake to do nothing else because any other** state **activities** would **compromise the very autonomy the state seeks to defend**. Kant’s position thus outlines and implies a political philosophy that is broadly libertarian; that is, it endorses a state constructed with the sole aim of protecting its citizens against invasions of their liberty. For Kant, **individuals create a state to protect their moral agency, and in doing so they consent to coercion only insofar as it is required to prevent themselves or others from impinging on their own or others’ agency**. In his argument, **individuals cannot rationally consent to a state that instructs them in morals, coerces virtuous behavior, commands them to trade or not, directs their pursuit of happiness, or forcibly requires them to provide for their own or others’ pursuits of happiness**. And except in cases of punishment for wrongdoing,6 **this severe limitation on the scope of the state’s authority must always be respected**: “The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance” (Perpetual Peace, 1991, 125). The implication is that a Kantian state protects against invasions of freedom and does nothing else; in the absence of invasions or threats of invasions, it is inactive.

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#### **Thus, the standard is consistency with a libertarian state of non-interference.**

**Prefer It:**

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#### **1) Ideal theory is necessary for a radical agenda — broad principles can inspire broad sweeping change and allow previously-excluded groups to claim political agency.**

**Shelby, 13** Shelby, Tommie [Tadwell Titcomb Professor of African-American Studies and Philosophy, Harvard University]. “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills.” *Critical Philosophy of Race* 1.2 (2013): 145-162.

**It is not clear how we are to develop a** philosophically adequate and **complete theory of how to respond to social injustice without first knowing what makes a social scheme unjust. When dealing with gross injustices**, such as slavery, **we may** of course be able to **judge** correctly **that a social arrangement is unjust simply by observing** it or having it described to us, relying exclusively on our pre-theoretic moral convictions. We don’t need a theory for that. **But** with less manifest injustices, or when our political values seem to conflict, or when we’re uncertain about what justice requires, or when there is great but honest disagreement about whether a practice is unjust, we won’t know which aspects of a society should be altered **in the absence of a more systematic conception** of justice. Without a set of principles **that enables us to identify the injustice-making features of a social system, we could not be confident in the direction** social **change should take**, at least not if our aim is to realize a fully just society. In light of these considerations, I have two questions about Mills’s project: **If we abandon the framework for ideal theorizing, how do we determine which principles** of justice **should guide** our reform or **revolution**ary efforts, and how do we justify these principles if we must rely exclusively on nonideal theory**?** Unless **Mills is prepared to relinquish the goal of realizing a fully just society**, he owes an answer to these questions.

#### **My framework best explains why oppression’s bad—one should never treat other reasoners as mere means.**

**2) It’s Inescapable - You are using reason to argue right now in-round, which shows that reason is a constitutive part of human discourse.**

**3) If TJFs matter, they flow Aff.**

#### **Resolvability –** Other frameworks create a mess of weighing and links, but Kant is easily resolvable because it becomes a question of consulting the categorical imperative.

1. **Education -** It’s the only framework that provides both phil and real-world education. Util debate is about policies, not philosophy, and Kant is the only other framework used by governments.

**Impact Calc:**

**1) Ks critiquing states don’t link: the resolution asks us to determine what governments should do given that they already exist, not whether they should exist in the first place.**

**2) Consequentialism Fails: *Analytic***

**I defend the whole resolution as a general principle.**

**Merriam Webster defines a “medicine” as:**

Merriam Webster, Medicine, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/medicine>

**“A substance or preparation used in treating disease.”**

**CX checks solve because I can't spend all my time just specifying random things, which checks back frivolous theory that shifts debate away from the topic. I’ll defend your choice of spec as long as it doesn’t exclude the AC framework or the offense under it. Also, PICs don't disprove my general thesis because exceptions to a generic statement doesn't prove it false.**

**Offense:**

**1) Intellectual property restrictions impose arbitrary and coercive restrictions on human freedoms of speech and thought, violating the framework.**

**Long, 95** Roderick T. Long, “The Libertarian Case Against Intellectual Property Rights,” *Formulations* (1995), <http://freenation.org/a/f31l1.html>.

Ethically, property rights of any kind have to be justified as extensions of the right of individuals to control their own lives. Thus any alleged property rights that conflict with this moral basis — like the "right" to own slaves — are invalidated. In my judgment, intellectual property rights also fail to pass this test. **To enforce copyright laws and the like is to prevent people from making peaceful use of the information they possess. If you have acquired the information legitimately** (say, by buying a book), **then on what grounds can you be prevented from using it, reproducing it, trading it? Is this not a violation of the freedom of speech and press?** It may be objected that the person who originated the information deserves ownership rights over it. But **information is not a concrete thing an individual can control; it is a universal, existing in other people's minds and other people's property, and over these the originator has no legitimate sovereignty. You cannot own information without owning other people.** Suppose I write a poem, and you read it and memorize it. By memorizing it, you have in effect created a "software" duplicate of the poem to be stored in your brain. But clearly I can claim no rights over that copy so long as you remain a free and autonomous individual. That copy in your head is yours and no one else's. But now **suppose you proceed to transcribe my poem, to make a "hard copy" of the information stored in your brain. The materials you use — pen and ink — are your own property. The information template which you used — that is, the stored memory of the poem — is also your own property. So how can the hard copy you produce from these materials be anything but yours to publish, sell, adapt, or otherwise treat as you please?** An item of intellectual property is a universal. Unless we are to believe in Platonic Forms, universals as such do not exist, except insofar as they are realized in their many particular instances. Accordingly, I do not see how anyone can claim to own, say, the text of Atlas Shrugged unless that amounts to a claim to own every single physical copy of Atlas Shrugged. But the copy of Atlas Shrugged on my bookshelf does not belong to Ayn Rand or to her estate. It belongs to me. I bought it. I paid for it. (Rand presumably got royalties from the sale, and I'm sure it wasn't sold without her permission!) The moral case against patents is even clearer. **A patent is, in effect, a claim of ownership over a law of nature. What if Newton had claimed to own calculus, or the law of gravity? Would we have to pay a fee to his estate every time we used one of the principles he discovered?** "... the patent monopoly ... consists in protecting inventors ... against competition for a period long enough to extort from the people a reward enormously in excess of the labor measure of their services, — in other words, in giving certain people a right of property for a term of years in laws and facts of Nature, and the power to exact tribute from others for the use of this natural wealth, which should be open to all." (Benjamin Tucker, Instead of a Book, By a Man Too Busy to Write One: A Fragmentary Exposition of Philosophical Anarchism (New York: Tucker, 1893), p. 13.) Defenders of patents claim that patent laws protect ownership only of inventions, not of discoveries. (Likewise, defenders of copyright claim that copyright laws protect only implementations of ideas, not the ideas themselves.) But this distinction is an artificial one. Laws of nature come in varying degrees of generality and specificity; **if it is a law of nature that copper conducts electricity, it is no less a law of nature that this much copper, arranged in this configuration, with these other materials arranged so, makes a workable battery.** And so on. Suppose you are trapped at the bottom of a ravine. Sabre-tooth tigers are approaching hungrily. Your only hope is to quickly construct a levitation device I've recently invented. You know how it works, because you attended a public lecture I gave on the topic. And it's easy to construct, quite rapidly, out of materials you see lying around in the ravine. But there's a problem. I've patented my levitation device. I own it — not just the individual model I built, but the universal. Thus, you can't construct your means of escape without using my property. And I, mean old skinflint that I am, refuse to give my permission. And so the tigers dine well. This highlights the moral problem with the notion of intellectual property. **By claiming a patent on my levitation device, I'm saying that you are not permitted to use your own knowledge to further your ends.** By what right?

**2) Patents are a form of government-imposed monopoly, severely restricting the free market in ways antithetical to libertarian principles.**

**Kinsella, 11** N. Stephan Kinsella, “How Intellectual Property Hampers the Free Market,” Foundation for Economic Education (May 25, 2011), <https://fee.org/articles/how-intellectual-property-hampers-the-free-market/>.

**There are good reasons to think that IP is not actually property—that it is actually antithetical to a private-property, free-market order.** By intellectual property, I mean primarily patent and copyright. It’s important to understand the origins of these concepts. As law professor Eric E. Johnson notes, “**The monopolies now understood as copyrights and patents were originally created by royal decree, bestowed as a form of favoritism and control.** As the power of the monarchy dwindled, these chartered monopolies were reformed, and essentially by default, they wound up in the hands of authors and inventors.” **Patents were exclusive monopolies to sell various goods and services for a limited time.** The word patent, historian Patricia Seed explains, comes from the Latin patente, signifying open letters. Patents were “open letters” granted by the monarch authorizing someone to do something—to be, say, the only person to sell a certain good in a certain area, to homestead land in the New World on behalf of the crown, and so on. It’s interesting that many defenders of IP—such as patent lawyers and even some libertarians—get indignant if you call patents or copyright a monopoly. “It’s not a monopoly; it’s a property right,” they say. “If it’s a monopoly then your use of your car is a monopoly.” But **patents are State grants of monopoly privilege. One of the first patent statutes was England’s Statute of Monopolies of 1624, a good example of truth in labeling.** Granting patents was a way for the State to raise money without having to impose a tax. Dispensing them also helped secure the loyalty of favorites. **The patentee in return received protection from competition. This was great for the State and the patentee but not for competition or the consumer.** **In today’s system** we’ve democratized and institutionalized intellectual property. Now anyone can apply. You don’t have to go to the king or be his buddy. You can just go to the patent office. But the same thing happens. Some companies apply for patents just to keep the wolves at bay. After all, if you don’t have patents someone might sue you or reinvent and patent the same ideas you are using. If you have a patent arsenal, others are afraid to sue you. **So companies spend millions of dollars to obtain patents for defensive purposes.** Large companies rattle their sabers or sue each other, then make a deal, say, to cross-license their patents to each other. That’s fine for them because they have protection from each other’s competition. **But what does it do to smaller companies? They don’t have big patent arsenals or a credible countersuit threat. So patents amount to a barrier to entry, the modern version of mercantilist protectionism.**

**3) Granting patents is not universalizable and results in a contradiction in will: patents are definitionally exclusive, but if everyone were granted a patent, that exclusivity would no longer exist, thereby destroying their purpose.**

**Advantage: Econ Collapse**

**COVID-19 is still a pressing issue: not only will it cost countless lives, but declining tourism and unequal vaccine rollout will destroy underdeveloped economies if left unchecked.**

**UNCTAD, 21** United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Global economy could lose over $4 trillion due to COVID-19 impact on tourism,” United Nations (30 June 2021), <https://unctad.org/news/global-economy-could-lose-over-4-trillion-due-covid-19-impact-tourism>

**The crash in international tourism due to the coronavirus pandemic could cause a loss of more than $4 trillion to the global GDP for the years 2020 and 2021**, according to an UNCTAD report published on 30 June. The estimated loss has been caused by the pandemic’s direct impact on tourism and its ripple effect on other sectors closely linked to it. The report, jointly presented with the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), says **international tourism and its closely linked sectors suffered an estimated loss of $2.4 trillion in 2020** due to direct and indirect impacts of a steep drop in international tourist arrivals. **A similar loss may occur this year, the report warns, noting that the tourism sector’s recovery will largely depend on the uptake of COVID-19 vaccines globally.** “The world needs a global vaccination effort that will protect workers, mitigate adverse social effects and make strategic decisions regarding tourism, taking potential structural changes into account,” UNCTAD Acting Secretary-General Isabelle Durant said. UNWTO Secretary-General Zurab Pololikashvili said: “Tourism is a lifeline for millions, and **advancing vaccination to protect communities and support tourism’s safe restart is critical to the recovery of jobs and generation of much-needed resources, especially in developing countries, many of which are highly dependent on international tourism.**” Developing countries hurt by vaccine inequity. With COVID-19 vaccinations being more pronounced in some countries than others, the report says, tourism losses are reduced in most developed countries but worsened in developing countries. **COVID-19 vaccination rates are uneven across countries, ranging from below 1% of the population in some countries to above 60% in others. According to the report, the asymmetric roll-out of vaccines magnifies the economic blow tourism has suffered in developing countries, as they could account for up to 60% of the global GDP losses.** The tourism sector is expected to recover faster in countries with high vaccination rates, such as France, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, the report says. But experts don’t expect a return to pre-COVID-19 international tourist arrival levels until 2023 or later, according to UNWTO. The main barriers are travel restrictions, slow containment of the virus, low traveller confidence and a poor economic environment. Up to $2.4 trillion loss expected in 2021. A rebound in international tourism is expected in the second half of this year, but the UNCTAD report still shows a loss of between $1.7 trillion and $2.4 trillion in 2021, compared with 2019 levels. The results are based on simulations that capture the effects of international tourism reduction only, not policies such as economic stimulus programmes that may soften the pandemic’s impact on the sector.

**Waiving IPP would allow more widespread availability of the COVID-19 vaccine, remedying these issues.**

**Gupta and Namboodiri, 21** Vineeta Gupta and Sreenath Namboodiri, “America And The TRIPS Waiver: You Can Talk The Talk, But Will You Walk The Walk?”, Health Affairs (July 13, 2021), <https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210712.248782/full/>

**In October 2020, the governments of India and South Africa, with the support of 62 WTO member states, proposed a TRIPS Agreement waiver proposal that would temporarily waive intellectual property rights protections for technologies needed to prevent, contain, or treat COVID-19, including vaccines and vaccine-related technologies.** More than 100 low-income countries support this proposal, but it is receiving much opposition from many high-income countries, including some European Union (EU) member states, the UK, Japan, Canada, and Australia. On May 5, 2021, the Biden administration announced support for negotiating this waiver, intensifying debate in the US and the EU—but so far the US has not gone further than its announcement of support. **The TRIPS waiver is critical to combating the COVID-19 pandemic around the world. Demand for the vaccine has already surpassed supply, with high-income countries taking a large share of reserved doses. Given that no single vaccine manufacturer could produce enough vaccines to meet the demand of the entire globe, supporters of the waiver ponder the ethics of multinational manufacturers holding exclusive rights to information** and technology, preventing other companies from entering the markets that are not being served—primarily in low- and middle-income countries. **Sharing vaccine-related information will not only help get the pandemic in check now, but it could also encourage firms to develop the next round of vaccines that will be necessary to address new variants. The TRIPS waiver is critical to ensuring an equitable distribution of vaccines around the globe.** High-income countries already have widespread vaccination campaigns well underway, while many low-income countries have yet to administer a single dose. Without a TRIPS waiver, the gap between vaccination rates in high-income and low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) will only widen.

#### **An economic depression may lead to nuclear war.**

#### **Tkacik, 20** Michael Tkacik, “Ingredients in place for new great power war,” Asia Times (4-21-2020), <https://asiatimes.com/2020/04/ingredients-in-place-for-new-great-power-war/>.

#### **The events leading to war in** **1939** **included** a sharp division between the wealthy and everyone else, **economic catastrophe in the Great Depression**, sharp reductions in global trade, a breakdown in international cooperation, and the end of liberal governance in much of the world. Once again, these variables are present. **Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, trade was decreasing** and beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies had become the norm. It might be tempting to place this blame on Trump, but he was elected by people in his country who have suffered 40 years of criminal economic competition from China. It is no wonder they elected Trump and it is no wonder he undermined a global trade system that has failed America’s working class. Similarly, **evidence of the breakdown of international cooperation** **and** **liberalism** **are everywhere**. The world is unable to deal with the existential threat of climate change. Authoritarian regimes have seats on the UN Human Rights Council. There is a great and increasing gap between the wealthy and everyone else, a new Gilded Age. Liberalism, unable to cope, is in retreat everywhere, from the US and the UK to fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Our world is gravely ill. Pandemic **Into this morass we stir a global pandemic**, with its origin in a corrupt, authoritarian state that is hostile to openness, human dignity and truth. That China denied and then exported the pandemic was as predictable as it is lamentable. The pandemic will bring a global economic depression, the only variable from World War II not present today. We should expect more governments to fall, we should expect liberalism to retreat further, and we should expect increased nationalism and violence upon our own species. In short, we are in for dark days. **Dictators attempt to divert the attention of their people from corruption and injustice by seeking external enemies. Wars will therefore increase, and status quo powers such as the United States may attempt to defend a crumbling system. The chance of war between China and the United States has increased dramatically** because almost all of the structural variables today point toward war. Both World War I and II were avoidable because different variables were present. Consequently, had skilled leadership been present, each war might have been avoided by correctly diagnosing the causes of the impending crises. That the wars were not avoided does not mean they could not have been; it simply means leadership was not up to the task. But today the causes of both of those wars have been combined in a single cauldron. So it is reasonable to ask, even with good leadership (of which there is no doubt we are lacking), can great-power war be avoided?

**Nuclear war causes mass death due to ozone losses, firestorms, and ecological disruption.**

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**The detonation of an atomic bomb** with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area of three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the blast, fire, and radiation from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. However, the long-term environmental effects of the war **could significantly disrupt the global weather for at least a decade, which would likely result in a vast global famine.** The scientists predicted that nuclear firestorms in the burning cities would cause at least **five million tons of black carbon smoke** to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks **and would form a** global stratospheric **smoke layer** that would **remain for more than a decade**. The **smoke would absorb warming sunlight**, which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, **producing ozone losses of 20 to 50 percent** over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals. As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface, it would produce the coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that global food production would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a five-year period following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to two billion people to perish from famine. The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to 80 times more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT. Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square miles. **A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite immense nuclear firestorms** covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would **produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot and smoke**, which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to 20 years, **and** it would **block** as much as **70 percent of sunlight** from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight. Under such conditions, it would only require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum **temperatures to fall below freezing** in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. **Growing seasons would be completely eliminated** for more than a decade; it would be too cold and dark to grow food crops, **which would doom the** majority of the **human population.**