**Baudrillard AC**

**We live in a third-order simulacrum. Capitalism and mass production have separated us from what is “real,” and now we can only understand it through a series of self-referential symbols. This prevents us from acknowledging our desire from lack, which increases our determination to colonize and assimilate the “other.”**

**Mclennan 16** Mark McLennan is a graduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science, having completed a BA and a JD at the University of Sydney. Simulacra and Simulated Policing: Baudrillard and Criminology.

After describing a novel sociological position that regards **semiology, rather than capital, as the key component of domination** (Baudrillard [1968] 1998), **Baudrillard’s radical social theory emerges in light of considerations of consumerism, media, information and technology—all of which conspire to create what Baudrillard calls a ‘hyperreal’ society**. This is a contemporary world where all boundaries, categories and values implode into the ‘end of the social’. Baudrillard (1972) begins elaborating this theory in an article titled ‘Design and Environment or How Political Economy Escalates into Cyberblitz’ (Baudrillard, 1972, Chapter 10). In this essay, he points to the importance of ‘the passage out of a metallurgic into a semiurgic society’ (Ibid.: 185). Here, **consumer objects take on a life of their own ‘as an embodiment and functional part of a system of signs, independent of its status as a commodity**’ (Kellner, 1989: 76). He uses the German Bauhaus movement as an example to anticipate the ‘universal semantisation of the environment in which everything becomes the object of a calculus of function and signification’ (Baudrillard, 1972: 185-86). This is achieved by the synthesis ‘of form and function, beauty and utility, of art and technology’ in the design of objects that produces a functionalised universe whereby the meaning and function of **every object is determined by its place in the system**. As a result, ‘the whole environment becomes a signifier, objectified as an element of signification’ (Ibid.: 186-87). This is analogous to Derrida’s concept of ‘difference’ whereby meaning is never present ‘in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself’ (Derrida, 1965: 27). E**ssentially, objects, words and images have no direct relationship to the things in which they refer, they inherent meaning only by interacting with one another in an ongoing system of contrast. Baudrillard refers to this system as a ‘cybernetic code’,** and argues that **reality itself is shut out from this system of because the system is wholly self-referencing. This code creates ‘a functionalised, integrated and self-reproducing universe’ of meaning, controlled by simulacra and simulation**. And, like Derrida’s text, there is nothing outside of the code.In ‘The Orders of Simulacra’, **Baudrillard (1995) outlines the stages of the transition from traditional society to the contemporary society defined by simulations** (Baudrillard, 1995). First, according to Baudrillard, the feudal era had a fixed social order established by a hierarchy of obligatory signs indicating social class and rank. Here, a ‘natural law of value’ dominates the stage. **Simulacra, a representation of another image, first emerge as ‘counterfeits’ of the real**. For example, representations of class, law or value are said to be grounded in nature: art imitates life and democracy is legitimised by ‘natural rights’. Baudrillard indicates, however, that **the inherent goal of simulacra is to produce a controllable and universal system of power**. At this stage, counterfeit simulacra is working ‘only on substance and form, not yet on relations or structures’, but **its evolution will create ‘a pacified society, ground up into a deathless substance … that will guarantee an eternity of … cultural hegemony’** (Baudrillard, 1983b: 91). Next, the **second-order of simulacra appears during the industrial revolution**. Importantly, infinite reproducibility is introduced into society. For example, exact **replicas of objects are produced by assembly lines and automation**. No longer is there nostalgia for a natural order; **nature is to be dominated by production;** counterfeit simulacra are now obsolete. Most importantly, however, the infinite reproducibility of objects, augmented by the rise of capitalism, enables the emergence of the cybernetic code and contemporary society. Baudrillard claims that ‘**we are in the third-order simulacra’**, **where simulation models come to constitute the world and all referential finalities are abolished** (Ibid.: 100-01): God, Man, Nature, History, Society and others. This is because **images are only understood by reference to other images. Thus, society has moved from ‘a capitalist-productivitist society to a neo-capitalist cybernetic order’** (Ibid.: 111). As a result of this code, images no longer refer to an object; rather, they refer to another commutable image on the code. But, through models contained in common societal narrative and institutional discourse, simulations are able to produce a ‘reality effect’, which conceals the fact they are merely referring to other simulations (Bogard, 1996: 10). For example, the code continually sets up simulations of events, which test individuals and ‘[inscribe] them into the simulated order’ through a ‘process of signalisation’ (Kellner, 1989: 80). For example, every advertisement, choice of commodity, choice of entertainment, and political candidate presents a chance for a binary response of affirmation or negation. It is in this way that individuals are inserted into a dominating ‘coded system of similarities and dissimilarities, of identities and programed differences’ (Ibid.). Thus, Baudrillard’s contemporary social theory is distinguishable from previous determinist social theories that postulate powerful individuals, classes, or corporations manipulating the public for certain ends. Instead, Baudrillard suggests that social organisation is determined by individual’s responses to the pre-coded messages that are derived from simulations of economics, politics, culture or the banal decisions of everyday life (Baudrillard, 1983b: 111). Importantly for the third-order of simulacra, the binary system of the code creates a ‘deterrence model’ in which all ‘radical change is ruled out, since the very fact of an option between different political parties, [for example], acts as a deterrent against demands for radical social change’ (Kellner, 1989: 81). This is the end of society as traditionally theorised. In Symbolic Exchange and Death Baudrillard (1983c: 20) announces the end of traditional conceptions of society—the end of ‘labour, production, political economy’, and the ‘dialectic signifier/signified that permeated the accumulation of knowledge and of meaning’ (Baudrillard, 2002: 127). Baudrillard argues that **we are in a new era where media and the consumption of semiotic codes that inform images, have replaced production and political economy as the organising foundation of society**. For example, **labour is now a ‘sign among signs’** (Baudrillard, 1995b: 23), a symbol of one’s status and integration: ‘the choice of occupation, the utopia of an occupation custom-made for everyone … labour power is no longer violently bought and sold; **it is designed, it is marketed, it is merchandised. Production thus joins the consumerist system of signs’** (Baudrillard, 2002: 134). Because social reality is constituted by the ‘chess pieces’ of the signs and symbols that are mobilised through the media, **nothing is objectively determined and everything can be simulated** (Kellner, 1989: 62). **Thus, political economy is no longer the determinant that can explain social phenomena.**

#### **Intellectual property overcodes reality by adding an additional layer of simulacra: branded, patented items are presented as “authentic,” while copies are coded as inauthentic simulations. This further allows capitalist markets to control meaning and commodify information.**

**Hietanen et al., 19** Joel Hietanen, Jeff B. Murray, Antti Sihvonen, Henrikki Tikkanen, “Seduced by ‘fakes:’ Producing the excessive interplay of authentic/counterfeit from a Baudrillardian perspective,” Marketing Theory Vol 20, Issue 1 (August 19, 2019), <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1470593119870214>.

However, **contemporary marketing literature is generally founded upon the assumption of a consumer culture where consumers seek elusive yet foundationally experiential meanings in market offerings** (e.g. Arnould and Price, 2000; Arnould and Thompson, 2005), **with the notion of “authenticity” being deemed “the cornerstone of contemporary marketing practice”** (Beverland, 2006: 251). **In their quest for market-mediated meanings, consumers have thus generally been portrayed to be all but irresistibly drawn to authentic meanings in market offerings** (Belk and Costa, 1998; Beverland and Farrelly, 2010; Grayson and Martinec, 2004; Hartmann and Ostberg, 2013; Holt, 2002; Rose and Wood, 2005). Consequently, understanding what constitutes authentic offerings and their illicit counterfeit counterparts, including imitations and fakes, has received broad academic interest. Regarding market offerings, the “authentic” has been noted to stand for something of ambiguous and metaphysical nature, akin to a magical aura (Beverland and Farrelly, 2010; Dion and Arnould, 2011), an ethical imperative for consumers to follow (Chaudhry and Stumpf, 2011; Phau and Teah, 2009), as well as a genuine and legal connection with the brand an offering is marketed under (Commuri, 2009). **The counterfeit offering, as distinct from the authentic branded product, is often seen simply as an illicit object that constitutes a “menace” or “scourge” to which only an immoral or ignorant consumer could be attracted** (Bloch et al., 1993; Hamelin et al., 2013; Nill and Schultz, 1996). While a clear authentic/counterfeit distinction generally continues to be propagated in marketing literature, work in both cultural studies (Pang, 2008; Yang, 2014) and cultural anthropology (Nakassis, 2012) has shown how authentic/counterfeit meanings are far from stable and can only be maintained and prescribed in ideological and normative terms. Building on this, we adopt Jean Baudrillard’s critical social theory to assess the construction and maintenance of this binary logic in marketing scholarship and to explore how it persists as a normative framework that perpetuates the myth of authenticity in global markets. **Baudrillard’s semiotic perspective** (also Cherrier and Murray, 2004; Østergaard and Fitchett, 2012) **allows us to conceptually focus on the uneasy relationship between authentic and counterfeit in branded luxury markets as an inextricable system of signs.** We focus on branded luxury (or “loud luxury”) in the fashion market to offer an illustrative example characterized by strong brand visibility, aspirational conspicuousness, and “exclusivity” marketed primarily to mass consumers (Bian and Forsythe, 2012; Han et al., 2010; Hilton et al., 2004). These are readily recognizable luxury products with highly visible logos or other esthetic characteristics which are generally consumed for self-expression and presentation (Bian and Forsythe, 2012; Han et al., 2010), for example, Louis Vuitton handbags with the embedded “LV” monogram. As a segment, **branded luxury illustrates how what seemingly used to be the conspicuous indulgence of the affluent and wealthy has now increasingly translated into a cultural “necessity” in mass markets** (Kapferer and Bastien, 2009). The vastness and potential profitability of luxury markets has also brought about a parallel market for illicit counterfeit products which has been steadily growing alongside the luxury industry, and in no small terms (Hilton et al., 2004; Pang, 2008). In fact, the “International Chamber of Commerce estimates that seven percent of world trade is counterfeit goods” (Hilton et al., 2004: 345), with OECD (2016) figures making it a USD 461 billion industry worldwide. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess how **luxury markets as systems of signs have increasingly lost their ability to signify stable meanings** (also Østergaard and Fitchett, 2012), and we explore how authentic/counterfeit distinctions inextricably intertwine in intensifying fashion where their separation is typically assumed in extant literature. Second, to problematize binary representations, we develop an argument regarding how branded luxury markets could be characterized semiotically as an excessive interplay of seduction and ambivalence. This allows us to also comment on the possibility of consumer morality and the normative positions generally held in the literature dealing with the notion of branded commodities deemed authentic. [...] As we have seen, marketing scholarship has generally maintained a sharp distinction between authentic and counterfeit offerings, particularly in the context of luxury markets. A few notable exceptions notwithstanding (e.g. Hilton et al., 2004; Liao and Hsieh, 2013), much of this literature has focused on normatively ushering in a morality for consumers that is based on the normalization of business interests, both in terms of market ideology and related legislative practice. Making note of its origin, it is hardly surprising that this literature is generally more concerned with expediating market orders from managerialist perspectives rather than the complex cultural relations of signification in commodity markets. From a Baudrillardian perspective, however, branded luxury can be used to exemplify markets as systems of signs that simulate meaning, as it consists of simultaneous signs of uniqueness and ubiquity, quality and ephemerality, and a highly visible brand “autograph.” In this mixture of producing branded signs, a branded luxury product is a highly paradoxical entity of contradictory appearances; overtly commodified “authenticity” which simultaneously attempts to mask its commodity form as a market object. Following Baudrillard, in order to function as signs in free play, branded fashion commodities appear to exist autonomously from their means of production, but they are fully embedded in their cultural system of signification (also Hancock, 1999). Thus, they are primarily referential in how they inhabit a place in the system of signification where brands vary according to the extent of the destruction of value related to their acquisition (Hietanen et al., 2018). **By utilizing and exposing a rift in the stability of the system of exchange value, the idea of counterfeit seems to undermine the assumed semiotic system, akin to a foreign object.** Its growing worldwide popularity thus represents a danger that the distinction between the signs of authentic branded luxury and counterfeit is not safe from ambiguity. Such dissolution of distinction and the potential losses of profits for luxury companies is a threat that many business scholars are eager to assume and warn against (see Commuri, 2009; Hamelin et al., 2013; Lai and Zaichkowsky, 1999). Yet, in an ironic fashion and following conventional marketing wisdoms, practitioners in brand houses producing luxury offerings have themselves been hard at work to eradicate the semiotic distinction between authentic and counterfeit products. This has come about through the implementation of conventional marketing management tools of rationalizing marketing activities with respect to increasing market share and market capitalization (Grandy and Mills, 2004), of expanding customer base through segmentation to virtually all price points, the mimicry of each other’s designs by brand houses (Hemphill and Suk, 2009; Raustiala and Sprigman, 2006), producing goods in factory nightshifts, allowing the presence of counterfeit for marketing communications purposes (Hilton et al., 2004; Thomas, 2007), and blurring any connection between manufacturing and country of origin (country of design vs. country of manufacture) to virtual nonexistence (Pang, 2008). **What seems to be easily forgotten in the literature is that there already is “a global world factory,” exemplified by Pang’s (2008) work in the Chinese context, which produces both authentic and counterfeit products, and indeed often in the same factories.** While simulated authenticity may still be the order of the day for the marketers of branded luxury, Baudrillard calls us to examine the interplay of authentic/counterfeit meanings from a more fatalistic perspective of markets where signs take part in an ever-increasing intensification and its seductive qualities. In contrast to a reified distinction between authentic and counterfeit offerings, a Baudrillardian interpretation would see the authentic/counterfeit interplay in luxury markets as a grand display of seduction and ambivalence in late capitalism (also Bogard, 1990; Singer, 1991). Based on this, we suggest that counterfeits are all too easily reduced to pure product attributes that readily enable making a clear distinction between authentic and counterfeit. Thus, while the idea of authenticity is often elevated in the literature to the level of “magical” properties that persistently present to us nothing more than a “black box of extravagance,” counterfeit offerings are not spoken of in a similar sense. As they are not readily treated as a relational part of the code, counterfeit objects are typically seen to contain no value whatsoever. They have been deemed to occupy the rotten end of the binary. **Drawing from Baudrillard, what has been ushered to the background is the seductive power of counterfeit that produces an excessive symbolic dimension** (of surface, appearance, and play) where simulated distinctions start to blur in ever-increasing intensifications of capitalist production of artificial market meanings. **In analyzing counterfeit, seduction seems especially fitting considering that it deals with the displacement of authenticity with artifice and appearance** (Singer, 1991), or “an insanity borne by the vertiginous absence that unites them” (Baudrillard, 1990: 82). Seduction thus marks an enchanting and euphoric relation to excess and ritualistic symbolism that remains with us from previous societal forms (Genosko, 1994), a manic desire that is “supra-subjective and supra-sensual […] that consumes its subjects” (Baudrillard, 1990: 100). **By reversing orders of signification, it enchants by replacing authenticity with a flux of artificial meanings in consumption** (Hietanen et al., 2013). Thus, if the authentic market offering is awarded “magical” qualities in the literature, the idea of counterfeit needs to be examined as equally radiant in its arrays of signification. **Following Baudrillard, instead of operating as fixed notions, the semiotic interplay between authentic and counterfeit products could be rather read as a relationship of an ever-increasing intensification of how the signs of authentic and counterfeit feed on each other and continue to accrue ambiguity in late capitalist markets of signs.** What is at stake “is that the distinction between appearances and depths is collapsing, and that, as it were, from both sides” (Singer, 1991: 141). **Thus, the authentic and the counterfeit arise from the ambivalence put into place by endless repetition of industrial production and become signs that chase each other in seductive interplay.** This already manifests in multiple different forms such as the introduction of a brand called “Louis Vuitton FAKE” which products are marketed as explicit fakes at prices exceeding the authentic offerings (see Nakassis, 2012). In similar fashion, the logo of the luxury streetwear brand “Supreme” has been imitated by “Supreme Italia” that now sell legal counterfeits in Spain and Italy, while initiating global collaborations with companies such as Samsung.1 The irony is of course intensified in that the recognizable “Supreme” logotype is in itself already an imitation of Barbara Kruger’s propaganda posters from the late 1980s. Relatedly, communities of consumption have also spun around counterfeit luxury items where the art behind duplication is keenly discussed (Key et al., 2013). How does the semiotic flux of authentic/counterfeit become seductive? In a Baudrillardian view of how signs circulate in the entire system of consumption, the semiotics of authentic and counterfeit cannot be separated, but rather form an intensifying semiotic relationship that starts to bleed into each other (Morris, 1988; Pawlett, 1997). **In this sense, we can move beyond the typical separation maintained in the literature by intensifying the sign of the authentic (luxury) product to the point it becomes hyperauthentic, a point where it is only a repetition of industrial production adorning a marketed logo, effectively simulating its own simulation and thus increasingly dissolving its claims to authenticity and uniqueness.**

#### 

**Furthermore, WTO IP protections are an example of tactics used by Pharma to police and exploit the Global South, denying underdeveloped countries much-needed medications in order to preserve the biopolitical, semiocapitalist and neo-colonial hegemony of the West.**

**Kolářová and Wiedlack, 16** Kateřina Kolářová, Charles University, Prague, Department of Gender Studies, Faculty Member, PhD, and Katharina Wiedlack, Hertha Firnberg post-doc Research Fellow at the Department for English and American Studies, University of Vienna; “Crip Notes on the Idea of Development,” Somatechnics 6.2 (2016): 125–141

Towards a Crip Critique of Development Alongside the general hegemonic persistence of the ideology of development, there is a long tradition of criticism of development. Such criticism has shed light on the ways in which **development has been fundamentally entangled with the colonial project and has tied modernisation to dominance and progress to subjection and exploitation.** Raymond William’s ground-breaking Keywords (orig. published 1976) debunked the myth of ‘developed’ countries coming to aid of ‘developing’ ones. He unmasks such ‘help schemes’ as a ruse to legitimise global exploitative market domination: It is clear that, ... an often generous idea of ‘aid to the developing countries’ is confused with wholly ungenerous practices of cancellation of the identities of others, by their definition as underdeveloped or less developed, and of imposed processes of development for a world market controlled by others. (Williams 1976: 104; emphases in the original). Walter Mignolo’s words—‘However you look at it, “development” is a capitalist mission’ (2011: 305)—aptly summarise how **development targets such countries and regions that can serve its colonial aspiration. Celebratory visions of modernity must be spoiled when we consider modernity’s links to its ‘dark side’, coloniality** (Mignolo 2011). Mignolo’s scepticism echoes the thoughts of Franz Fanon, expressed much earlier in A Dying Colonialism (orig. published 1959). Fanon believed that what ‘drives the colonised to appraise all the coloniser’s contribution in a pejorative and absolute way’ (1965: 122) stems from an embodied (and in bodies inscribed) memory of ‘development’ that was part and parcel of the centuries of oppression. Of interest to the focus of this issue, Fanon included a chapter called ‘Medicine and Colonialism’ in which he discussed the reasons why ‘the colonised’ maintain a very ambivalent if not outright dismissive view of ‘Western medical science’, resulting in what he termed ‘almost organic confusion’ (1965: 121). From the perspective of present-day critical disability studies, there is much that can be criticised about Fanon’s belief that medicine is driven only and purely by ‘concern [for] man’s [sic] health’ and the ‘very principle to ease pain’ (165: 121), on which basis he formulated this notion of ‘confusion’ and concluded ‘it is clear that no negative reaction can be justified’. This notwithstanding, Fanon’s appraisal remains crucial for understanding the ways medicine is implicated in the ‘colonial situation’: [T]he French medical service in Algeria could not be separated from French colonialism in Algeria’ ... saying yes to ... certain innovations of the occupier, the colonised perceived that he thus became the prisoner of the entire system, ... while [t]he good faith [saying yes to some innovations] is immediately taken advantage of by the occupier and transformed into a justification of the occupation (1965: 122–3). **Cripping Development foregrounds the epistemological dominance reflected in the Global North’s unwillingness to ‘conceive of the world “in terms of mutual belonging (co-belonging) across difference” but only in relationship of sameness**’ (Mbembe qtd. in Grzˇinic´ 2014: 135). The idea of development functions as a useful legitimising rationale for this compulsory sameness. **Crip criticism of this notion of development focuses on disability as an axis of power that is frequently omitted from critiques of coloniality/modernity but is central to their workings**. It seeks to show how the rationale of development is oftentimes upheld by disability and its interarticulations with race, indigeneity, class, gender and sexuality, and caste, and how **precarious, disenfranchised, and dispossessed people in particular are the ones who are made to pay the price for the future promises of development**. The issue thence raises questions about ‘the geopolitics of disability in crip times’ (McRuer 2010: 163) and the ‘global economy of debility’ (Kola´rˇova´ 2015), where the ‘black disabled body’ (Erevelles 2011) becomes a commodity in the transatlantic exchange and can be ‘recapacitated’ for profit (Puar 2012). It builds off the collective efforts and deeds of disability studies work that strive to initiate dialogues with post-colonial, indigenous, and de-colonising projects along what remains, in Karen Soldatic and Shaun Grech’s recent wording, ‘anxious intersections’ (2015; see also Naidu Parekh, 2007; Barker and Murray 2010; Barker and Senier 2013). In the decades that have passed since the publication of Fanon’s essay, **the alliance between medicine and colonialism has certainly not grown any weaker; the exploitation of ‘the black body’ that Erevelles posits as one of the starting points of the political project of disability studies continues in the neocolonial capitalism of the biocapital, pharmaceutical quest for** (use of) chemically innocent bodies, the use of **bodies for medical experiments, and the use of surrogate-mother or organ-donor bodies**. On another level, transnational health policies are framed as part of transnational developmental help and transnational health policies. ‘**National health’ and health plans are turned into an indicator of ‘national development’ (or rather proof of underdevelopment), a correlation that can very easily reinforce stigmatised and racialised images of illness and disability**. Tanya Titschosky and Katie Aubrecht’s analysis of **the WHO** MIND project (the short name for ‘Mental Health Improvements for Nations Development’) attests to and describes just this. Titschosky and Aubrecht demonstrate how the MIND project links ‘positive mental health’ to ‘a range of development outcomes...’ in a way that **utilises health management ‘as a new form of imposed order on postcolonial countries**’ (2015: 3). It is hard to overlook the more recent reverberations of reinforced stigmatisation and racialisations in panicky reports about the ‘rise of dementia and Alzheimer’s in the third world’. The discourse produced around dementia that guides the transnational health policies of (corporate) bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) in fact indicates the extent to which **global capitalisation of debility is in fact buttressed by transnational structures**. These transnational bodies express anxiety about the rise of ‘dementia’ in ‘low-income’ and ‘lower-middle-income’ countries and the economic burden it will put on them. And yet, ‘[i]t is a cruel paradox of the global economy of debility that the “developmental help” provided by transnational bodies to “low-income” countries will be calculated against assumed “work potential”, ultimately commodifiable as bio-capital in schemes of outsourced surrogate reproductive care to populations from wealthier nations’ (Kola´rˇova´ 2015: 84–5). The violent histories of colonialism, slavery, and exploitation that continue to overshadow the post/neocolonial present, however, also leave their traces in the post-colonial and de-colonial criticism that considers disability—if it is noticed at all—as a mere effect of, or a figure of thought representing, colonial violence. Thus, Lucy Barker and Stuart Murray open their important issue exploring postcoloniality by echoing the concern of earlier disability studies’ appraisals of post-colonial theory and noting, ‘there is a pressing need ... to resist the too-easy censure of narratives that construct disability as loss’ (2010: 230). This critique does not lose its importance, as the intersections of these critical projects remain ‘anxious’. On the other hand, disability theory and disability studies need to reckon with the material hurt of colonial and racialised dominance. The field needs to rethink its epistemic paradigms and recognise colonial legacies and consider how it contributes to processes of racialisation. We need to question the way disability studies sometimes serves these colonial legacies on a global scale. **Colonialism, slavery, and the exploitative practices of extracting vitality have left a material and embodied legacy** of relationality ‘buried deep in the psyche and embodied collective memory of the colonized and the colonizer’ (Grech 2015: 3). It is this legacy that constitutes the epistemic horizons and the horizons of knowledge production. And disability, as a notion and epistemic category, was and is deeply implicated in, produced by, and actively co-producing these ambivalent material histories. Grech notes, ‘understanding the disability narrative in the global South means (re)positioning it and understanding it as a global historical narrative’ (2015: 3; cf. also Meekosha 2011).

#### 

#### 

#### 

#### **Medicine is needed to fight back against debilitations brought on by capitalism and imperialism: absent a complete withdrawal of Pharma, these abuses will continue, insured as mere “accidents” by healthcare providers.**

**Puar, 17** Jasbir Puar, associate professor in the Department of Women's and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, all around badass, The Right to Maim, Duke University Press, 2017

Text In their brutal diagnostic of the relations between state apparatuses, wag machines, debilitation, and labor, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari direct our attention to the genealogy of the accident. **The accident is no accident**: "It is an optical illusion to attribute these mutilations to accidents... **accidents are the result of mutilations that took place long ago**."1 The accident functions as an alibi for the constitutive relations of force necessary to bring about something, an event that is in retrospect deemed an accident. What does the "accident" of wartime mutilation mask? Indebted to what structure does the accident labor? Deleuze and Guattari upend the teleological assumption of the statements "war kills" and "war hideously mutilates" by showing us that **the war machine of the state predisposes those who are to be mutilated, and those who are to be killed. Linking mutilation** as "a presupposition of the State apparatus" of the war machine **to** the "organization of **work**," they refuse the mythology of the work zombie, articulating instead the linkage between work and war. The zombie as work myth, in fact, aids the elision of mutilation and crippling debilitating in war mythology. Fusing these two together-the work myth and the war myth-Deleuze and Guattari insist on the utility of what they call "predisabled people" to the braided operations of capitalism and the war machine of the state. **Mutilation and amputation are thus no accident but are part of the biopolitical scripting of populations available for injury**, whether through laboring or through warring or both: **laboring in the service of war that mutilates both national bodies and foreign entities denoted as enemies; or laboring as an inverted form of warfare against a disposable population** ensnared as laborers-consigned-to-having-an-accident. The twinning of working and warring predicates the emergence of the modern subject of disability. The aftermath of World War ll gives rise to forms of activism, visibility, and collective consciousness about the plight of injured veterans.2 Work and war as debilitating activities foreground U.S imperialism, global injustice, exploitative labor conditions, the industry of incarceration, and environmental toxicity.3 These are situations where **the accident is not even invoked as unfortunate because it is constituted as "part of the job" and thus quite the intended accident**. Here. the facade of the accident is easily unpeeled. And yet Deleuze and Guattari also warn that "accidents are the result of mutilations that took place long ago in the embryo of our world."4 The embryo is the site where the **biopolitics of debilitation come to gather to weaponize genetics**, **environmental toxicity**, **generational trauma** the structural and psychic impacts of racism, imperialism. and capitalism. The work machine and the war machine both need bodies that are preordained for injury and maiming, often targeted maiming. Capitalism, war, forced migration, settler colonial occupation, and, in the case of this chapter, U.S. capitalist imperialism are the generators of much of the world's disability, yet contribute unruly source material for rights discourses that propagate visibility, empowerment. Identification, and pride. Much of this debilitation is caused by the exploitative capital and imperial structures of the global north. Claiming an empowered disability identity as a site of creative embodiment and resistance--what David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder call "peripheral embodiment"–is perhaps more tenable when disability is perceived or felt as the result of an unfortunate accident, or a misfortune, as an exceptional circumstance for which the body impacted is in no way to blame.5 Far from suggesting that there is by any means a "fortunate" accident. I am gesturing to bodily experiences that can be capacitated through a reorganization of resources, of white privilege and class and economic mobility. For others, **disability is a product–not a by-product, but a deliberate product–of exploitative labor conditions, racist incarceration and policing practices, militarization, and other modes of community disenfranchisement. Lived as the ongoing marking of an already defective body, this body**, Alison Kafer writes, is one whose "disablement [is] a foregone conclusion?6 Disability in these cases does not present any possibility organization of privilege; rather, it reinforces the stigma of lack of privilege. Often perceived as the result of aberrant or destructive individual lifestyle “choices," the inevitability of debility should more accurately be comprehended as wedded to biopolitical population metrics. Kafer points out that the responsibilization narrative of disability scruntizes how it has occurred and how it is lived, placing the failure or success of "overcoming” disability on the individual, either as the fault or as the virtuous of the body in question.7 The responsibility for disability works inverse: in that certain bodies are seen as the bearers of disability-responsible for the very fact of their disability because of markers of race, class, religion, and region. Other bodies, unmarked by other markers of defect, in other words, not already an Other, are projected as unfortunately maligned in a system that should have protected them. In other words, their disability not an inherent property of the body. When disability becomes fodder for life, when it is seen as not the fault of the body living that disability or of the population to which that body belongs, there is (limited) availability of a recapacitation of within the biopolitical vector of make live. When disability is instrumentalized necropolitically, when, as Nimtala Erevelles points out, "human variation (e.g. race) is itself deployed in the construction of disabled identifies for purely oppressive purposes (e.g. slavery. colonialism, immigration law. etc.)" combined with the deliberate deprivation and dearth of avenues of support and recapacitation, disability then becomes a commodity that functions for what Rey Chow calls "the ascendency of whiteness.8 That is not to claim that all uses of the category of disability are a capacitation of (not always literal) whiteness, but rather to note the explicit instances in which **disability is biopolitically mobilized in the service of white supremacy, liberal racism, and nationalist projects of modernity**. These Mobius strip-like enfoldings and divisions are modulated through global north/south and developed/developing demarcations, whereby **the global north holds the key to the liberalization of disability while the global south bears the brunt of its weaponization. They are also temporally demarcated through positing a eugenics-oriented past against a contemporary biopolitical incorporative mechanism of inclusion, which then creates a temporal drag of racialization between discipline and control.**

**Thus, the advocacy: I affirm the resolution as a form of radical mimicry of the system itself, and one that creates the possibility of freedom from semiocapitalism. We force the government and WTO to confront the issues of hyperreality, exposing their underlying incoherence. Likewise, our use of the inherently meaningless construct of fiat exposes and implodes the operations of the code.**

**Merriam Webster defines a “medicine” as:**

Merriam Webster, Medicine, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/medicine>

**“A substance or preparation used in treating disease.”**

#### **The World Trade Organization is a global organization built to facilitate the exchange of private property. Thus, by undermining its hyperreal and imperialist agenda, the Aff forces the WTO to engage in an incoherent movement antithetical to its existence.**

**Baldwin, 12** Jon Baldwin, “Exacerbation, Singularity, Indifference: Baudrillard and Politics,” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies Volume 9, Number 3 (October 2012), <https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/exacerbation-singularity-indifference-baudrillard-and-politics/>.

Poulantzas’s contribution was to explain that **when multinational capital penetrates “a host social formation”, it arrives not merely as abstract “direct foreign investment”, but as “a transformative social force within the country”** (Ibid.). Far from the state receding or losing importance, “the host state actually becomes responsible for taking charge of the complex relations of international capital” (Ibid.) and actively helps establish “**relations of production characteristic of American monopoly capitalism**” (Poulantzas in Ibid.:13) within their own metropolis. **The notion of the ‘host’ state becoming held hostage to global capital is apt and would find agreement with Baudrillard’s use of Stockholm syndrome to diagnose the age.** Following the crisis of the Bretton Woods system and American defeat in Vietnam, **Poulantzas suggests the birth of a new era of imperialism and American global dominance. This is a non-territorial imperialism, and implanted and maintained “not through direct rule…nor even through political subordination of a neo-colonial type” (Panitch, 2000: 9). It thereby transcends “the restrictive confines of earlier Marxist theories of imperialism”** (Ibid.). For its part, the ‘superpower’ attempts to discredit the notion of imperialism, with its connotations of expansionist and aggressive foreign policy. Indeed, “**American imperialism** has been made plausible by the insistence that it **is** not imperialistic” (Ibid.:18). Poulantzas demonstrates that globalization does not mean “the virtual disappearance of national state power” (Ibid.:10) rather “they had to be transformed from welfare systems into regimes **designed to facilitate and police the free flow of capital around the globe**” (Ibid.:11). One must be careful not to invest this process with too much coherence, and the political actors with too much clarity and foresight, but it happens that turmoil in Britain provided the first crucial test of “a confrontation between radical-democratic and financial-capital solutions” (Ibid.:12). **In 1974, a combined strike by miners and engineering workers had brought a virtual state of emergency to the country, culminating in the fall of Edward Heath’s Conservative government. The Labour government returned to office**, with the apocryphal boast of Denis Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to ‘squeeze the rich until their pips squeaked’. **The response from financial markets was to administer a ferocious assault on sterling, and within two years Healey was forced to petition the International Monetary Fund for credits** to end the run on the currency. **The conditions attached by the IMF imposed financial capital and neoliberal economic policy “upon a major Western state whose people had just voted for public expenditure and full employment**” (Ibid.). The necessary vigour with which the IMF conditions were met, and the ensuing dismantling of Britain’s capital controls and welfare state meant that “for the first few years of her government Thatcher could claim she was only following Labour’s policies” (Ibid.:13). (Contemporary austerity measures taken by David Cameron’s coalition government can likewise be seen to be merely the continuation of the principles of Tony Blair’s ‘new’ Labour). **The process of globalization** then, far from dominating, dwarfing, eradicating states, or being threatened by states, **has been constituted through, and by, state action: eradication of cross-border control on financial flows, the breakdown of internal barriers in financial markets, privatisation of public services and assets, and broad financial deregulation has all been accomplished through state action.** This also facilitates “a legalization and juridification of new relations among economic agents in both domestic and international arenas” (Ibid.:15). **This has been achieved, for instance, without any abdication by states of their ‘supervision’ of banks: “in some respects they have even been strengthened” (Ibid.).** Witness the recent bailing out of banks. Those who hold out hope for European social democracy in a battle over capital controls and a taming of the chaos that is global finance today “could not be more mistaken” (Ibid.:20). Thinkers on the left, retaining the domination model, who have been unable to theorise the hegemonic ‘new imperialism’, have been likened to “generals who, overtaken by events, make elaborate preparations for the last war” (Susan Strange in Ibid.:16). **The citizen, like the state, becomes hostage to capital.** The bailing out of banks, which so outraged us all recently with the socialist solution to the problems of capitalism, has occurred before. Baudrillard discusses the French government bailout of Crédit Lyonnais in 1995. Once this is done “capital, confident in its impunity, can step forward without its mask, saying explicitly: ‘Capital is you! The State is you!’…If all cases of social need are taken care of, there’s no reason not to assist Crédit Lyonnais when it’s in distress…If Crédit Lyonnais falls, you fall. If the factory closes, you clear out!” (Baudrillard, 1998: 55) The unemployed and so forth, however, “are now given to understand that they have to look after themselves, that they have to manage their ‘enterprise’ better” (Ibid.:55). In this role-reversal, whereby **the individual is treated as a capitalist business and the capitalist business as a citizen on welfare, “the social has backfired in a manner entirely to the advantage of capital”** (Ibid.). All of this was not the case in the classic age of domination and exploitation, “when the demarcation line between oppressed and oppressors, exploited and exploiters, was clear” (Ibid.:56). The citizen is now a shareholder interested in his business. **It is the nervous system of the human that is now being ever more proletarianized**: “the cognitive has been reduced to calculability – logos has become…ratio” (Stiegler, 2010: 46).

**Only our strategy of radical mimicry of the system itself can ensure its death.**

**Pawlett, 13** William Pawlett, Senior Lecturer in the School of Law, Social Sciences and Communication at the University of Wolverhampton, in Ashgate Publishing, in 2013 ["Violence society and radical theory: Bataille, Baudrillard and contemporary society", https://www.researchgate.net/publication/288148526\_Violence\_society\_and\_radical\_theory\_Bataille\_Baudrillard\_and\_contemporary\_society, pg. 33-35, 1-5-2019]

Symbolic Exchange and Death begins with a remarkably strident and politically radical preface: it declares that symbolic exchange is the only effective means of challenging or defying the capitalist system at a fundamental level. **The capitalist system,** for Baudrillard, **is** a vast and insidious system of control, **adept at neutralising critique and political contestation**. Critique may be neutralised by suppression or mis-representation, but increasingly **critique is assimilated as commodity** and as information/data through electronic solicitude. Taking its place within the general information overload, critical thought becomes just another link on the home page of the sort of person who ‘likes’ critical thought, one of your endless options on a Kindle or something you are made to read on an unpopular module during a university degree. That is, critical thought does not succeed in challenging the capitalist system; **the cheap and abundant availability of works of critical thought, on Amazon for example, not only provides profits to a tax-dodging mega-corporation, it also demonstrates (or rather, simulates) the openness, tolerance and freedoms** of the consumer capitalist system. How does symbolic exchange embody a greater or more successful defiance? Taking up Mauss’s notion of gift exchange as a concept “more radical than Marx’s or Freud’s”, Baudrillard insists that symbolic exchange does not merely describe the traditional practices of certain archaic cultures but is also “taking place here and now” (Baudrillard 1993a: 1). According to Baudrillard, **symbolic exchange “haunts” capitalist social relations**, it is present in them (in the sign – the medium of exchange) a**nd it “mocks” these structural significations “in the form of their own death”.** To understand what Baudrillard might mean by this it is important to stress that symbolic exchange is not a concept to be deployed as critique, symbolic exchange is, in itself, the practice of defiance; it is the living reversal of the system’s order. Symbolic exchanges, in Baudrillard’s sense, are the practice or act of reversal of the system’s priorities and values and so, in this sense, spell death for the system: not ‘real’ but symbolic death and **symbolic death is more fundamental and humiliating than ‘real’ death. It is the enormity and reach of the system that makes it so vulnerable, like a much larger opponent being thrown by the momentum of their own weight in martial arts. The system is eminently vulnerable because it is built upon the sense of its own invulnerability, and** specifically on its sense of irreversibility: the **irreversibility of rationality, of progress, of (Western) dominance, the irreversibility of technological advancement.** Given these conditions, according to Baudrillard, even a small or “infinitesimal” injection of reversibility can threaten the entire edifice; **the system has no defences against symbolic reversion while it is more than capable of neutralising a frontal attack.** Such reversions, the reversion of all the system’s ‘gifts’ include: the reversion of power in the sudden, unanticipated defiant acts of the apparently weak; the reversion of technological supremacy in the breakdown or computer virus; the reversion of rationality in the experience of the irreducible irrationality of rationality; the reversion **of official meanings and sense into nonsense and mockery**; the reversion of control in catastrophic failures. The effect of symbolic reversibility then consists in sudden, catastrophic reversals suffered by power and by the powerful which reveal, perhaps momentarily, the system’s deep vulnerability. Baudrillard’s position on symbolic exchange is not to be confused with the strategies of the Situationists, though he remained sympathetic towards this movement with which he was involved in the 1960s (Baudrillard 2004a: 15-20). An egg or custard flan thrown in the face of someone powerful and captured by the same media channels which the powerful usually dominate, can be far more effective in countering power than an unwieldy political statement. However, if the Situationists sought meaningful spaces for self-assertion in the gaps, lapses and dead zones of the capitalist system, Baudrillard’s approach is quite distinct. It seeks the setting in motion of a chain reaction or a chain failure through the rippling effects of symbolic humiliation by counter-gift or potlatch. The counter-gift may well be more effective when it is immediate, unplanned, or more specifically when it is not the result of subjective desires and considered beliefs – which can generally be accommodated by the system through simulation. One example might be the sudden, unexpected haranguing of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by an elderly lady in 1983. Yet, this example does not really capture the sudden escalation that is involved in placing one’s life and death as a stake against the system. The tragic suicide in December 2012 of a nurse, Jacintha Saldanha, who worked at the private hospital in London favoured by the British royal family and was tricked into revealing information about a royal by two ‘journalists’ working for a Australian radio show, captures something of this fatal escalation. She had been humiliated by the journalists, yet her suicide vastly escalated the stakes and re-directed the humiliation back at the journalists, the media and wider society, generating a truly devastating, ‘potlatching’ humiliation of the journalists responsible (who seemed to crumble inwards), it further weakened the reputation of the so-called ‘free’ press and also brought to a close the British royal family’s ‘bounce’ in popularity after the royal wedding, jubilee and the London Olympics. Each of these powerful interests suffered an immediate reversion of their standing, a symbolic death ; and although the British media partially succeeded in limiting these symbolic effects to the designated sacrificial scapegoats consisting of the two journalists, the fundamental nature of the sacrificial or symbolic sphere became, temporarily, brutally obvious. In a sense we could say that the system cannot suffer a ‘real’ death in any case, not only because it is not a discrete, finite organism but because, in Baudrillard’s terminology, it is already dead, **it has no genuine life or vitality and is kept alive only by its life support systems of simulation**. The vampiric nature of capitalism was, of course, already a prominent feature of the Marxist critique (Marx Capital Vol. 1). For Baudrillard, the capitalist system does not only draw the life-blood of its exploited workers, it condemns its citizen-consumers to a life-less survival, a living-on in a state of humiliation and dependence, a ‘life’ that is shaped by the system, a life that is made to seem a gift of the system. Though suicide is expressly forbidden by both religious and secular law, that is the system exerts ownership over our death as well as our life, the point of biological termination does represent the absolute limit of the system’s control. Given these conditions **the only fundamental strategy of defiance, for Baudrillard, is to reverse this humiliation, to refuse the ‘gifts’ and imprecations, to reverse this derisory life through a symbolic death hurled back at the system.** This may take the form of the reversal of the poisonous gifts of consumer goods and information **through** a greater counter-gift of **“hyper-conformity”: the absorbing of anything and everything the system gives while refusing the proper use of these ‘gifts’.** One example given by Baudrillard is obesity, the indiscriminate absorption of food to a degree that becomes a social problem; this involves a (literally) internal revolt against the cult of physical fitness and the body beautiful, a rejection of the injunction to compulsory sexuality and sexual enjoyment (Baudrillard 1990b: 27-34). A further example is the reversal and cancellation of the overload of information through its spontaneous “poetic dispersal” into paradox and ever greater uncertainty: only in the correct dosage does information aid understanding, in excess it creates an absolute uncertainty. **These forms of internal reversal reveal the ambivalence hidden within the system**. It is not ‘real’ (or biological) death, nor ‘real’ violence, which has the power to challenge the system, it is death as symbolic form which is excluded from the system, and it is the symbolic death through the reversion of its systems which may be re-introduced into the system to subversive and fatal effect. According to Baudrillard, symbolic exchange is experienced “as a demand forever blocked by the law of value” and embodies “an intoxicating revolt”. This intoxication is always present so it does suggest a radically different pattern of social relations, which for Baudrillard would be “based on the extermination of values” (Baudrillard 1993a: 1). But could this extermination of all controlling values ever exist beyond clearly circumscribed ritual occasions, such as those described by Mauss (1990)? It seems that for both Bataille and Baudrillard the answer must be negative, there can only ever be a dynamic alternation or a fundamental duality and, Baudrillard suggests, all social formations except Western modernity have implicitly understood this. This issue is re-visited in more detail in Chapter 2. For Baudrillard “the principle of reversibility (the counter-gift) must be imposed against all the economistic, psychologistic and structuralist interpretations” (1993a: 1-2) and he adopts a very Bataillean formulation when he declares that symbolic exchange is “a functional principle sovereignly outside and antagonistic to our economic reality principle” (1993a: 2). Baudrillard comes close to a definition of symbolic exchange with the following:The symbolic is neither a concept, an agency, a category, nor a ‘structure’, but an act of exchange and a social relation which puts an end to the real, which resolves the real, and, at the same, puts an end to the opposition between the real and the imaginary. This initiatory act is the reverse of our reality principle … the symbolic is what puts an end to the disjunctive code and to separated terms … in the symbolic operation the two terms lose their reality (Baudrillard 1993a: 133).

#### **If we fail to act, the impacts of hyperreality are immense, as semiocapitalism’s control over subjectivity is the root cause of all violence. Current systems of power create oppression and overcoding of the subject, which makes the aff a priori question.**

#### **Guattari, 96** Felix Guattari 1996 “Semiological Subjection, Semiotic Enslavement” in “The Guattari Reader” edited by Gary Genosko, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, pg 143-145

**The normatized agents of production are set in motion before the transformation of each individual into a speaker-listener** capable of adopting a linguistic comportment compatible with the modes of competence that assign to one a particular position in society and in production. **The components of semiotic enslavement constitute, in reality, the fundamental tools that permit[s] the dominant classes their assurance of power over the agents of production.** The "miracle" of **capitalism** is that it **manages to direct language**, as it is spoken, as it is taught, as it is televised, as it dreams, etc., **in such a way that it remains perfectly adapted to its own evolution.** Furthermore, this operation always appears to be self -evident: the syntagms of power, its presuppositions, its threats, i t s modes of intimidation, of seduction and of submission, are conveyed at an unconscious level, a little like the "clandestine" images that advertisers insert into a film. If there is an urgency that compels a febrile search for a new model of the unconscious, such a phenomenon must be accounted for! **Reject the idea that the syntactic markers of capitalist languages express the fundamental requirements of the human condition; consider these markers**, on the contrary, **to be the result of a field of semiological transformations established by a system of power less and less tolerant of modes of intrinsic coding.** These seemingly harmless moves singularly exceed the traditional scope of linguistics and semiotics! The totality of machines, be they social, technical , desiring, etc ., can no longer escape from the overcoding of the signifying machines of the State. In fact, the signifying power of national languages and the multi­ form power of States and of the network of collective assemblages tend to coincide. **The molecular links of expression substitute for the ancient segmentary structures ofthe socius to constitute a homogeneous plane of content that conveys at the same time the categorical imperative of the Kantian moral law, the "necessities" of class conscience, the demands of custom and the repressive habits of the majoritarian consensus, and, on top of this, the persecuting themes of the ambient super-ego.** It is by the exhaustion of this plane that the intensities of desire detach from their ancient territories and receive their subject-object polarities. **Mediatized and controlled, they become social need, demand, necessity and submission. They exist no longer except to the degree that their expression resonates with mass-mediatized significations.** Or they withdraw into themselves, translate themselves, that is to say, renounce their character of nomadic flux. There is no doubt that the threat of a seizure of power by a decoded flux exists prior to capitalism and already in the most "primitive" societies (in this regard it is appropriate to distinguish, amongst these latter, between what Pierre Clastres called societies with a State and societies without a State, as they do not share the same attitude to the "defense" against an eventual accumulation of power in a State appara­ tus5). There is no doubt that ancient societies were already traversed, strictly speaking, by the capitalist flows that they were trying so hard to master! But one must admit that a series of causes, circumstances, and accidents peculiar to the Middle Ages and the Western "Renaissance" resulted in the social structures losing definitively a certain type of control of the decoded flows and engaging in a kind of generalized Baroque style - economic, political, religious, aesthetic, scientific, etc. leading to capitalist societies in the proper sense. **The semiotic and machinic enslavement of desiring flows and the semiological subjection on which capitalist societies rest are established in reaction to an uncontrollable dispersion of territorialized codes. They are the correlatives of the installation of new types of divisions between the sexes, the generations, the divisions of labor, the relations of social segmentarities, etc. A new use of languages, signs, and icons leads to a state of affairs in which** the least effect of meaning - **even the most intimate, the most unconscious - falls under the control of social hierarchies. Capitalist powers never cease "rethinking"** in detail each significative relation, differentiating and specifying each semiological "allocation" **During the course of an apprenticeship in language, a child will be called upon, for example, to model its first infinitive intensives in such a way as to put them into the service of pragmatic predicatives and fundamental deictic strategies of power (encodings of hierarchical position, role permutability, sexual division, etc.).** "Becoming sexed-body" will be fixed in its relation with "becoming social-body" by the regime of pronominality and the genres which axiomatize the subjective positions of feminine alienation. Despite appearances, in a pragmatic capitalist field the differ­ ent social categories of an identical linguistic community men, women, children, the elderly, people in rural areas , immigrants, etc. - do not speak the same language. National languages, those which are spoken at the Academie francaise or on television, are metalanguages. **Their "distance" in relation to the languages of the land, the arbitrary forcefulness of their overcoding, are the guarantors of their efficiency and, paradoxically, of their degree of interiorization.** This semiological economy of power and its implications for modes of generation, of the transformation of syntactic components, lexicals, morpho-phonological and prosodic elements of language, is the foundation for even the pragmatic fields of enunciation, which Oswald Ducrot designated as the "polemical value" (in the etymological sense) of language.

**Thus, the Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debater who best disengages from the hyperreal. Traditional models of debate centered around utility, death-related impact calculus, and reason require securitizing ourselves against the other and the threat of scarcity, thereby reinforcing semiocapitalist logic and systems of power.**

**Winnubst, 06** Shannon Winnubst, professor of Women’s and gender studies at Ohio State University, Queering Freedom, pg. 183

For Bataille, the servility to utility is displayed particularly in the temporality of such a world—the temporality of anticipation. Returning again to the role of the tool, he writes, In **efficacious activity man becomes the equivalent of a tool, which produces; he is like the thing the tool is, being itself a product**. The implication of these facts is quite clear: the tool’s meaning is given by the future, in what the tool will produce, in the future utilization of the product: like the tool, he who serves—who works—has the value of that which will be later, not of that which is. (1988–91, 2:218) **The reduction of our lives to the order of utility forces us to project ourselves endlessly into the future**. Bataille writes of this as our anguished state, caused by this anticipation “that must be called anticipation of oneself. For he must apprehend himself in the future, through the anticipated results of his action” (1988–91, 2:218). **This is why advanced capitalism and phallicized whiteness must ground themselves in a denial of death: death precludes the arrival of this future.** It cuts us off from ourselves, severing us from the future self that is always our real and true self. Resisting the existential turn, however, **Bataille refuses to read this denial of death as an ontological condition of humanity**. For Bataille, **this is a historical and economic denial, one in which only a culture grounded in the anticipation of the future must participate. He frames it primarily as a problem of the intellect. In the reduction of the world to the order of utility, we have reduced our lives and experiences to the order of instrumental reason**. This order necessarily operates in a sequential temporality, facing forward toward the time when the results will be achieved, the questions solved, the theorems proved—and also when political domination will be ended and ethical an- guish quieted. As Bataille credits Hegel for seeing, “knowledge is never given to us except by unfolding in time” (1988–91, 2:202). It never appears to us except, finally, “as the result of a calculated effort, an operation useful to some end” (1988–91, 2:202)—and its utility, as we have seen, only drives it forward toward some future utility, endlessly. **There are always new and future objects of thought to conquer and domesticate**. Within this order of reason, death presents the cessation of the very practice of knowledge itself. Severing us from the future objects of thought and from our future selves, “death prevents man from attaining himself” (1988–91, 2:218). As Bataille explains, “the fear of death appears linked from the start to the projection of oneself into a future time, which [is] an effect of the positing of oneself as a thing” (1988–91, 2:218). **The fear of death derives from the subordination to the order of utility and its dominant form of the intellect, instrumental reason.** While death is unarguably a part of the human condition, for Bataille the fear of death is a historically habituated response, one that grounds cultures of advanced capitalism and phallicized whiteness. In those frames of late modernity, **death introduces an ontological scarcity into the very human condition: it represents finitude, the ultimate limit. We must distance ourselves from such threats, and we do so most often by projecting them onto sexualized, racialized, and classed bodies.** But for Bataille, **servility to the order of knowledge is as unnecessary as servility to the order of utility**. To die humanly, he argues, is to accept “the subordination of the thing” (1988– 91, 2:219), which places us in the schema that separates our present self from the future, desired, anticipated self: “to die humanly is to have of the future being, of the one who matters most in our eyes, the senseless idea that he is not” (1988–91, 2:219). But **if we are not trapped in the endless anticipation of our future self as the index of meaning in our lives**, we may not be anguished by this cessation: “**If we live sovereignly, the representation of death is impossible, for the present is not subject to the demands of the future”** (1988–91, 2:219). **To live sovereignly is not to escape death, which is ontologically impossible. But it is to refuse the fear, and subsequent attempts at disavowal, of death as the ontological condition that defines humanity.** Rather than trying to transgress this ultimate limit and prohibition, the sovereign [person] man “cannot die fleeing. He [it] cannot let the threat of death deliver him over to the horror of a desperate yet impossible flight” (1988–91, 2:219). Living in a temporal mode in which “anticipation would dissolve into NOTHING” (1988–91, 2: 208), the sovereign man [person] “lives and dies like an animal” (1988–91, 2:219). He lives and dies without the anxiety invoked by the forever unknown and forever encroaching anticipation of the future. As Bataille encourages us elsewhere, “Think of the voracity of animals, as against the composure of a cook” (1988–91, 2:83).