#### **Communitarianism AC**

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#### **Subjectivity is the basis for ethics since moral conduct is only relevant in the context of the subjects that must abide by it.**

**Our perceptions of the world are limited by our restrictive placements within it. We are not omnipotent divine beings with understanding of a priori truths.**

**Soyarslan, 11** Soyarslan, S. (2011). *Reason and Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics: Two Ways of Knowing, Two Ways of Living* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Duke University.

Let us accept Spinoza’s invitation and continue on with him step by step. What does EIIP11C tell us? First, as stated earlier, **the human mind is a member of and participates in the infinite system of actual thought that is necessarily produced from the essence of God or Nature:** This system is called the infinite intellect or the idea of God. **The human mind is a finite and limited member, however**, and Spinoza expresses this point by stating that when one says that “The human mind perceives this or that idea,” it means that “God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of human mind, has this or that idea.” As Allison puts it, this is Spinoza’s rather elaborate way of saying that **perception follows not from the absolute system of thought, but from the particular nature of the perceiving mind.**75 But this is not the only point that Spinoza is making here. He is also making a distinction between the human mind’s adequate and inadequate perception. For Spinoza, adequate perception occurs if the perceiving mind, which is a part of the infinite system of thought, conceives an idea in a complete way. But **insofar as God “has the idea of another thing simultaneously with the human mind, then we are saying that the human mind perceives a thing partially or inadequately.” In other words, an idea is inadequate if it is incomplete or dependent (in the infinite system of thought or knowledge) on other ideas that the human mind does not possess.** It is important to note that, for Spinoza, there is a sense in which all ideas are true and adequate, for all ideas are in God (EIP15), and all ideas in God agree entirely with their objects (by EIIP7C); this in turn means that (by IA6) “all ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true” (EIIP32). In other words, all ideas, insofar as they are parts of infinite intellect, are true because they are all in God and possessed adequately by God. What this implies is that “there is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are false” (EIIP33). If so, then what is the source of falsity or inadequacy? For Spinoza, **the source of falsity is “the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve” (EIIP35), and “there are no inadequate or confused ideas except insofar as they are related to the singular mind of someone.”**

**Likewise, subjects lack full control over their actions and decision making. Our actions are influenced by the conditions of the world around us.**

**Hardt 1** Hardt, M. The Power to be Affected. *Int J Polit Cult Soc* 28, 215–222 (2015).<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-014-9191-x>

**The first step of this process is to** take stock realistically and **recognize that we are not sovereign subjects**. Berlant is rightly suspicious of the standard ethical injunctions that assume our individual sovereignty, as well as those that aim at constructing or supporting sovereign political powers. Consider the sovereign individual, in correspondence with Carl Schmitt’s political formula, as the one who decides (2007). Berlant questions both elements of this statement: the one and the decision. **Sovereign decision, she claims, resides on an illusion of self-control, “a fantasy misrecognized as an objective state**” (2011, p. 97). People are not always engaged in projects of selfextension, she says, and in fact, they seldom have significant control over their decision-making. Spinoza expresses the same idea in quantitative terms. **The power of all individual or limited subjects to think and act** autonomously corresponds proportionally to the relation between their powers and the power of nature as a whole. “The force by which a man perseveres in existing **is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes**” (1985 Ethics IV P3). **Only God** (or nature as a whole) **is self-caused because it has no outside.** The fact that the power of the world outside of us so far surpasses our own power means that **we are affected by others much more than we affect the world** or even autonomously affect ourselves, **and thus, our capacity for sovereign decision-making is minimal** too. The other half of Schmitt’s dictum is equally unfounded: “the one” never decides or acts or is acted on. The subject is never one. Agency and causality, Berlant suggests, should be understood not in terms of unities but instead “as dispersed environmental mechanisms at the personal as well as the institutional level” (2011, p. 114). Spinoza expresses this too in mathematical and geometrical form. A body or an individual, he explains, is formed when a great number of parts agree with each other and thus communicate in a consistent way (1985 Ethics II P13 definition). Essential to a body is the relation: the body lives as long as that relation is maintained. Instead of thinking in terms of unities, then, we need to think the relation among multiplicities and recognize the consistency of dispersed landscapes. To identify the locus of decision or acting or being acted upon, we need to look to not the one but the consistent relation among the many. There is no point in lamenting our relative lack of power or unity or ability to rule ourselves autonomously. Spinoza, in fact, ridicules those wise men who, maintaining a fantasy of the sovereign subject, chastise us for being ruled by passions. “Philosophers look upon the passions by which we are assailed as vices, into which men fall by their own fault. So it is their custom to deride, bewail, berate them, or, if their purpose is to appear more zealous than others, to execrate them. They believe that they are thus performing a sacred duty, and that they are attaining the summit of wisdom when they have learnt how to shower extravagant praise on a human nature that nowhere exists and the revile that which exists in actuality. The fact is that they conceive men not as they are, but as they would like them to be. As a result, for the most part it is not ethics they have written, but satire; and they have never worked out a political theory that can have practical application” (2002 Political Treatise, Chapter 1, Introduction, 680). **A practical political theory instead must begin where people are, and really existing people are primarily filled, so to speak, by passions**. Berlant poses the terrain of the nonsovereign in terms of the “interruptions” or “intermissions” that break the imagined efforts of self216 Hardt extension of sovereign subjects. (Be careful, though, not to be misled by these terms because, as Berlant makes clear, they are the norm not the exception: we live in the interruption and the intermission the vast majority of the time.) What are we left with, then, if we cannot theorize in terms of the one who decides? Does this realistic standpoint condemn us to powerlessness?2 Neither Spinoza nor Berlant has much interest merely in recounting the disaster of our world and enumerating the damages we suffer. **Recognizing of our relative lack of power is simply the solid point of departure for theorizing the ethics and politics of nonsovereign subjects, a project of liberation**.

**This concludes in the notion of “affect,” the external force that shapes decision making. By maximizing our affective relationships, we can gain increased knowledge and understanding, thereby allowing us to overcome our limited subjectivity.**

**Hardt 2** Hardt, M. The Power to be Affected. *Int J Polit Cult Soc* 28, 215–222 (2015).<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-014-9191-x>

Deleuze’s claim of this equivalence, I should point out, is not immediately evident to the casual reader of the Ethics nor widely recognized by scholars in the field. Deleuze substantiates his interpretation in part on the following proposition in which **Spinoza, although primarily aimed at configuring a parallel relation between mind and body, asserts the equivalence between the two powers, to act and to be affected.** 6 “I say this in general, that in proportion as a Body is more capable than others of doing many things at once or [vel] being acted on in many ways at once, so its Mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once” (1985 Ethics,IIP13S). To recognize the correspondence in this statement, one must read the “or” [vel] to signify equivalence: **a body with the power to do a great many things is also one with the power to be affected in many ways.** Deleuze also cites a second passage in which “or” similarly marks equivalence**. “Whatever so disposes the human Body that it can be affected in a great many ways, is useful to man; the more it renders the Body capable of being affected in a great many ways, or [vel] of affecting other bodies, the more useful it is; on the other hand, what renders the Body less capable of these things is harmful” (1985 Ethics IV P38). Here, Spinoza asserts that our power to affect and our corresponding power to be affected are useful, and he quickly adds in the subsequent proposition that “good” is what we judge to be useful to us and “evil” what is harmful. This correspondence and the affirmation** of our power to be affected are significant because they **open a**n alternative **route for ethical and political activity**, a path **that is more realistic**ally passable. **Instead of enjoining yourself (or others) to take control of your life or to follow the dictates of reason, the mandate here is to increase the extent and number of ways in which you can be affected. Explore and expand your powers to register and feel your world and those around you.** After all, **the first path**, which is fundamentally ascetic, **is blocked to the extent that your power is surpassed by external forces**. Try all you want to will yourself to take the path of self-control and mastery, but you are likely to get nowhere. **The path of being affected, instead, is open to all of us.** We are all able to engage our passions and exercise them and expand their scope. Spinoza tells us that working this way is (or can be) useful for us and good. This alternative path through the passions might seem to be like a Dantean descent in order to rise up eventually to the light, but really there is nothing dark about the passions. They constitute a power too—the power to be affected—that is as virtuous as other powers, and it is the power realistically to which we have the most access, one that illuminates a field of bodies and pleasures.

**Due to affect, communal enculturation provides the only coherent explanation for how we can attain knowledge and exercise judgement. That comes first, since it’s impossible to explain actions otherwise.**

**Benhabib, 92** Seyla Benhabib. Situating the Self. 1992. Routledge.

Moral judgment differs from these other domains in one crucial respect: **the exercise of moral judgment is** pervasive and **unavoidable**; in fact, this exercise is coextensive with relations of social interaction in the lifeworld in general. Moral judgment is what **we “always already” exercise in virtue of being immersed in a network of human relationships that constitute our life together**. Whereas there can be reasonable debate about whether or not to exercise juridical, military, therapeutic, aesthetic, or even political judgment, in the case of moral judgment this option is not there. The domain of the moral is so deeply enmeshed with those interactions that constitute our lifeworld that **to withdraw from moral judgment is tantamount to ceasing to interact, to talk and act in the human community**. To justify my claim that moral judgment is what we “always already” exercise in virtue of being immersed in a network of human relations, I want to begin by recalling the most salient features of action as Arendt introduces them in The Human Condition.7 These are natality, plurality and the immersion of action in a web of interpretations which I shall call“[is] narrativity.” Natality is like a “second birth,” according to Arendt. It is that quality through which we insert ourselves into the world, this time not through the mere fact of being born but through the initiation of words and deeds. This initiation of words and deeds, which Arendt names “the prin- ciple of beginning” (HC, p. 177), can no more be avoided than the fact of birth itself. **The child becomes a member of a human community in that it learns to initiate speech and action**. Although an unavoidable aspect of human acculturation, the condition of natality implies no determinism. Just as every speaker of a language has a capacity to generate an infinite number of grammatically well- formed sentences, the doer of deeds has a capacity to initiate always the unexpected and the improbable which nonetheless belongs to the possible repertoire of human action and conduct. Whereas action corresponds to the fact of birth,“ s p e e c h cor- responds to the fact of distinctness and is the actualization of the human condition of plurality, that is, of living as a distinct and unique being among equals” (HC, p. 178). **Plurality**, **which is re-vealed in speech**, is rooted in the fact of human equality, **which** in this context **does not mean moral and political equality but rather a generic equality of the human constitution that allows humans to understand each other** (HC, p. 175). Whereas in the case of other species, this generic equality defines the individuality of each member of a species, in the case of humans the distinctness of individuals from one another is revealed through speech. We can say that the human capacity to use speech leads to a differentiation of the repertoire of activities beyond those which are species specific as well as allowing the emergence of a differentiated subjectivity in the inner life of the self. Speech differentiates action from mere behavior; the one who speaks is also the one who thinks, feels and experiences in a certain way. The individuation of the human self is simultaneously the process whereby this self becomes capable of action and of expressing the subjectivity of the doer. Speech and action are fundamentally related, and “many, and even most acts,” observes Arendt, “are performed in the manner of speech” (HC, p. 178). Speech and action have a revelatory quality: they reveal the “whoness” of the doer. This revelation of the whoness of the actor is always a revealing to somebody who is like oneself. Only if somebody else is able to understand the mean- ing of our words as well as the whatness of our deeds can the identity of the self be said to be revealed. Action and speech, there- fore, are essentially interaction. They take place between humans. Narrativity, or the immersion of action in a web of human rela- tionships, is the mode through which the self is individuated and acts are identified. Both the whatness of the act and the whoness of the self are disclosed to agents capable of communicative under- standing. **Actions are identified narratively**. Somebody has always done such-and-such at some point in time. **To identify an action is to tell the story of its initiation**, of its unfolding, **and** of **its immersion in a web of relations constituted through the actions** and narratives **of others**. Likewise, the whoness of the self is constituted by the story of a life– a coherent narrative of which we are always the protagonist, but not always the author or the producer. Narrativity is the mode through which actions are individuated and the identity of the self constituted. Of course, these claims concerning the role of narrative in the individuation of actions and the constitution of self-identity are not uncontested. The tendency in the philosophical tradition has been to view these phenomena along the models of substance and accidents or a thing and its properties. The self becomes the “I know not what” underlying or suspending its actions. These, in turn, are not considered as meaningful deeds that reveal something to someone but rather as properties of bodies. The self whom Hume stumbles upon while ruminating in his consciousness, or the Kantian “I” that accompanies all my representations is not the self in the human community, the acting or interacting self, but the self qua thinker, qua subject of consciousness withdrawn from the world. There is a fundamental connection between the tradition’s ignor- ing of the question of judgment in moral life and the neglect of the specificity of action as speech and action or communicative inter- action. **Once we see moral action as interaction**, performed toward others and in the company of others, **the role of judgment emerges** in at least three relevant areas of moral interaction.8 **These are the assessment of one’s duties**, the assessment of one’s actions as fulfill- ing these duties, and the assessment of one’s maxims as embodied, expressed or revealed in actions.

**Thus, the standard is consistency with the principles of communitarianism.**

**Prefer It:**

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#### **1) Ideal theory is necessary for a radical agenda — broad principles can inspire broad sweeping change and allow previously-excluded groups to claim political agency.**

**Shelby, 13** Shelby, Tommie [Tadwell Titcomb Professor of African-American Studies and Philosophy, Harvard University]. “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills.” *Critical Philosophy of Race* 1.2 (2013): 145-162.

**It is not clear how we are to develop a** philosophically adequate and **complete theory of how to respond to social injustice without first knowing what makes a social scheme unjust. When dealing with gross injustices**, such as slavery, **we may** of course be able to **judge** correctly **that a social arrangement is unjust simply by observing** it or having it described to us, relying exclusively on our pre-theoretic moral convictions. We don’t need a theory for that. **But** with less manifest injustices, or when our political values seem to conflict, or when we’re uncertain about what justice requires, or when there is great but honest disagreement about whether a practice is unjust, we won’t know which aspects of a society should be altered **in the absence of a more systematic conception** of justice. Without a set of principles **that enables us to identify the injustice-making features of a social system, we could not be confident in the direction** social **change should take**, at least not if our aim is to realize a fully just society. In light of these considerations, I have two questions about Mills’s project: **If we abandon the framework for ideal theorizing, how do we determine which principles** of justice **should guide** our reform or **revolution**ary efforts, and how do we justify these principles if we must rely exclusively on nonideal theory**?** Unless **Mills is prepared to relinquish the goal of realizing a fully just society**, he owes an answer to these questions.

#### **My framework best explains why oppression’s bad—one should never exclude the perspectives of the minority from the ethical community.**

**2) The NC Collapses: *Analytic***

**3) If TJFs matter, they flow Aff:**

#### **Resolvability –** Other frameworks create a mess of weighing and links, but Spinoza is easily resolvable because it becomes a question of what the community wants and needs.

1. **Accessibility –** The AC fosters education about ethical communities in which everyone can learn, be respected, and be included. That model is best for debate, as it allows all ideas to be heard.

**Impact Calc:**

**1) Ks critiquing governments don’t link: the resolution asks us to determine what governments should do given that they already exist, not whether they should exist in the first place.**

**2) Consequentialism Fails: *Analytic***

**I defend the whole resolution as a general principle.**

**Merriam Webster defines a “strike” as:**

Merriam Webster, “Strike,” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strike>

**To stop work in order to force an employer to comply with demands.**

**If you want me to spec, I’ll defend all the types of strikes currently considered legal under the US National Labor Relations Act, and I’ll defend the unconditional right to strike for all existing job sectors.**

**CX checks solve because I can't spend all my time just specifying random things, which checks back frivolous theory that shifts debate away from the topic. I’ll defend your choice of spec as long as it doesn’t exclude the AC framework or the offense under it. Also, PICs don't disprove my general thesis because exceptions to a generic statement doesn't prove it false.**

**Offense:**

**1) Granting workers the right to strike recognizes the importance of their voices and opinions, thereby better embracing them into our ethical communities.**

**Tucker, 13**  Eric Tucker, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, “Can Worker Voice Strike Back? Law and the Decline and Uncertain Future of Strikes” (2013), <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/195146204.pdf>

The connection between voice and strikes, however, is not just limited to the achievement of better terms and conditions of employment. **Strikes are often viewed as a means for workers to exercise democratic voice. Thus, the Woods Task Force asserted that strikes had become “a part of the whole democratic system.” What they meant was that trade unionism contributed to the development of industrial democracy, the ability of workers to participate in workplace governance, and not just the determination of terms and conditions of employment.** Of course, the forms that industrial democracy could take varied considerably, but in the North American context, where almost any form of codetermination or social dialogue was beyond the pale, **collective bargaining and its associated institutions were the principal vehicle for worker participation in workplace governance.** [...] **Finally, strikes have been viewed not merely as a manifestation of collective worker voice, but as an activity that produce**s **higher levels of class consciousness, organization and, ultimately, power.** This Marxist notion views consciousness as the product of human activity, so that although workers’ interests may be structurally in conflict with those of capital, it is through the process of confrontation that workers are transformed and become a class for itself. The dialectical relationship between social activity and consciousness, of course, is not uniquely linked to participation in strikes, but in a world in which the repertoire of confrontation practices was built around the strike, their disappearance is deeply concerning and raises the pressing questions of whether the strike can be revived and if not whether new repertoires are in the making. We will return to these questions later in this chapter, but next we turn to evidence on the extent of strike activity.

**2) Strikes grant workers greater bargaining power and ability to publicize their concerns, ensuring that they have the freedom to affect others.**

**Lim, 19** Woojin Lim, *The Harvard Crimson*, “The Right to Strike” (December 11, 2019), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/12/11/lim-right-to-strike/>

The right to strike is a right to resist oppression. **The strike (and the credible threat of a strike) is an indispensable part of the collective bargaining procedure. Collective bargaining (or “agreement-making”) provides workers and employees with the opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules** that govern a large portion of their lives. The concerted withdrawal of labor allows workers to promote and defend their unprotected economic and social interests from employers’ unilateral decisions, and provide employers with pressure and incentives to make reasonable concessions. **Functionally, strikes provide workers with the bargaining power to drive fair and meaningful negotiations, offsetting the inherent inequalities of bargaining power in the employer-employee relationship. The right to strike is essential in preserving and winning rights.** Any curtailment of this right involves the risk of weakening the very basis of collective bargaining. Strikes are not only a means of demanding and achieving an adequate provision of basic liberties but also are themselves intrinsic, self-determined expressions of freedom and human rights. The exercise of the power to strike affirms a quintessential corpus of values akin to liberal democracies, notably those of dignity, liberty, and autonomy. **In acts of collective defiance, strikers assert their freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. Acts of striking, marching, and picketing command the attention of the media and prompt public forums of discussion and dialogue.** The question of civic obligations, however, remains at stake. Perhaps those disgruntled with the strike might claim on a whiff that the strike impedes upon their own freedom of movement, educational rights, privacy, and so forth. Do strikers, in virtue of expressing their own freedoms, shirk valid civic norms of reciprocity they owe to members of the community, for instance, to students? No. The right to strike stems from the premise of an unjust flaw in the social order, that is, the recognition that the benefits from shouldering the burdens of social cooperation are not fairly distributed. **Strikes and protests publicize this recognition and demand reform.**

#### **Without the unconditional right to strike, the affective relationship between workers and bosses is one of domination, silencing the former and nullifying their affective power.**

**Gourevitch, 18** Alex Gourevitch, associate professor of political science at Brown. Cambridge University Press, 21 June 2018, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/right-to-strike-a-radical-view/8B521F67E28D4FAE1967B17959620424>.

To explain why the right to strike is a right to resist oppression, I first must give an account of the relevant oppression. Oppression is the unjustifiable deprivation of freedom. Some deprivations or restrictions of freedom are justified and therefore do not count as oppression. The oppression that matters for this article is the class-based oppression of a typical liberal capitalist society. By the class-based oppression, I mean the fact that **the majority of able-bodied people find themselves forced to work for members of a relatively small group who dominate control over productive assets and who, thereby, enjoy unjustifiable control over** the activities and products of those **workers**. There are workers and then there are owners and their managers. The facts I refer to here are mostly drawn from the United States to keep a consistent description of a specific society. While there is meaningful variation across liberal capitalist nations, the basic facts of class-based oppression do not change in a way that vitiates my argument’s applicability to those countries too. Empirical analysis of each country to which the argument applies, and how it would apply, is a separate project. The first element of oppression in a class society resides in the fact that (a) there are some who are forced into the labor market while others are not and (b) those who are forced to work—workers—have to work for those who own productive resources. **Workers are forced into the labor market because they have no reasonable alternative but to find a job**.8 They cannot produce necessary goods for themselves, nor can they rely on the charity of others, nor can they count on adequate state benefits. **The only way most people can gain reliable access to necessary goods is by buying them**. The most reliable, often only, way most people have of acquiring enough money to buy those goods is through employment. That is the sense in which **they have no reasonable alternative but to find a job working for an employer**. Depending on how we measure income and wealth, about 60–80% of Americans are in this situation for most of their adult lives.9 This forcing is not symmetrical. A significant minority is not similarly forced to work for someone else, though they might do so freely. That minority has enough wealth, either inherited or accumulated or both, that they have a reasonable alternative to entering the labor market. So, this first dimension of **oppression comes** not **from** the fact that some are forced to work, but from the fact that the forcing is unequal and that asymmetry means some are forced to work for others.10 That is to say, what makes it oppressive is the wrong of unequally forcing the majority to work, for whatever purpose, while others face no such forcing at all.11 That way of organizing and **distributing coercive work obligations, and of imposing** certain kinds of forcing on workers, is an unjustifiable way of **limiting their freedom** and therefore oppressive. To fix ideas, I call this the structural element of oppression in class societies. **This structural element leads to a second, interpersonal dimension of oppression in the workplace itself. Workers are forced to join workplaces typically characterized by large swathes of uncontrolled managerial power** and authority. This oppression is interpersonal in the sense that it is power that specific individuals— **employers and their managers—have to get other specific individuals—employees—to do what they want.** We can distinguish between three overlapping forms that this interpersonal, workplace oppression takes: subordination, delegation, and dependence. Subordination: Employers have what are sometimes called “managerial prerogatives,”12 which are legislative and judicial grants of authority to owners and their managers to make decisions about investment, hiring and firing, plant location, work process, and the like.13 These powers come from judicial precedent and from the constellation of corporate, labor, contract, and property law. Managers may change working speeds and assigned tasks, the hours of work, or even force workers to spend up to an hour going through security lines after work without paying them (Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk 2014). Managers may fire workers for Facebook comments, their sexual orientation, for being too sexually appealing, or for not being appealing enough (Emerson 2011; Hess 2013; Strauss 2013; Velasco 2011). Workers may be given more tasks than can be performed in the allotted time, locked in the workplace overnight, required to work in extreme heat and other physically hazardous conditions, or punitively isolated from other coworkers (Greenhouse 2009, 26–27, 49–55, 89, 111–112; Hsu 2011; JOMO 2013; Urbina 2013). Managers may pressure employees into unwanted political behavior (HertelFernandez 2015). In all of these cases, managers are exercising legally permitted prerogatives.14 The law does not require that workers have any formal say in how those powers are exercised. In fact, in nearly every liberal capitalist country, employees are defined, in law, as “subordinates.”15 This is subordination in the strict sense: workers are subject to the will of the employer..

**3) Strikes themselves are a form of community-building, fostering worker solidarity.**

**Dixon et al., 04** Dixon, Marc, Vincent J. Roscigno, and Randy Hodson. “Unions, Solidarity, and Striking.” *Social Forces* 83, no. 1 (2004): 3–33. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598231>.

Less clear is the role played by group solidarity. Rather than explicitly theorizing how activist solidarity and consciousness are created or galvanized, accounts emphasizing SMOs typically assume that activist interactional processes and social networks are important parts of social movement mobilizing structures (e.g., McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996). Partially in response, collective identity theorists have shifted the analytic focus to the normative and cultural processes that generate individual participation and group solidarity in the first place (Gamson 1995; Melucci 1985; Taylor & Whittier 1992). The suggestion here is that **protest emergence and persistence hinge on a sense of groupness and a common interpretive framework among activists. Identity construction processes that build on the day-to-day experiences and shared grievances of potential activists are especially central.** Insights on the role of SMOs and identity have been applied to a wide array of social movements, old and new (Klandermans & de Weerd 2000), and are pertinent for understanding labor activism. Indeed, much of the research on worker insurgency has been union-centered, with the assumption that the resources, leadership, and leverage that unions bring to bear will bolster workers' power and capacity to demand change through formal and informal, collective channels (e.g., Ashenfelter & Johnson 1969; Edwards 1996; Rubin 1986). Alternatively, the focus on collective identity resonates with both general theoretical discussions (e.g., Della Fave 1980; Giddens 1982; Mann 1973) and historically grounded research on class consciousness, solidarity, and worker action (e.g., Gould 1995; Kimeldorf 1999; Roscigno & Danaher 2001; Southworth & Stepan-Norris 2003). There is good theoretical reason to suggest that organizational and identity foci can and should be synthesized. First, as noted by Oberschall (1973, 1993), **to successfully "bloc recruit" and mobilize on a large scale, social movement organizations must tap into preexisting networks of individuals who share common life experiences and social identities. Second, and within the context of SMOs trying to recruit or mobilize, goal-directed decision making and rational calculations among individuals about whether to participate are filtered through, if not fundamentally weighted by, friendship networks, group affiliations, and prior experiences** (Dixon & Roscigno 2003; Oberschall 1994; see also Blau 1964; Huber 1997). Consequently, frames introduced by SMOs themselves must resonate with the lived grievances and already established identities of prospective participants. According to Snow and McAdam (2000), it is precisely this interplay of solidarity and organizational processes that is crucial for the unfolding of movement activity (see also Polletta & Jasper 2001). Empirical evidence suggests that unions, like social movement organizations in general, have a positive and significant influence on worker mobilization. Workers in highly organized industries are more likely to engage in militant action (Cornfield 1985, 1991; Wallace, Griffin & Rubin 1989), due in part to the organizational capacity of unions and the resources they provide (McCammon 1990, 1994; Rubin 1986). Rubin, Griffin, and Wallace (1983) of-fer one of the more thorough empirical examinations of the union-insurgency dynamic, concluding that labor organization indeed fostered worker militancy during certain eras. Simultaneously, they add, widespread strike activity in-creased labor organization. Strikes were thus "both the causes and effects of mobilized resources" (Rubin, Griffin & Wallace 1983:341). This work is notable in attempting to disentangle the complex relationships between formal orga-nization and labor militancy. Labor research in recent years, however, has failed to follow through on this important question (but see Kimeldorf 1999). That unions are necessary for work-based collective action is either implicitly or explicitly noted in much of the labor research. Worker identity and solidarity, in contrast, tend to be either neglected or treated as nonproblematic. **The exception is a relatively small body of work denoting the importance, if not necessity, of grievance interpretation, interaction, and ultimately solidarity processes among workers — processes that are complex, often emergent in the workplace itself, and shaped by lived experiences. For Fantasia (1988), worker solidarity and militancy are not likely to be driven by unions, but rather will emerge out of conflict in the workplace, more indigenous worker strategies and practices, and "active work-group social relationships"** (108; see also Roscigno & Hodson 2004). **Such relations could range from mundane cooperative strategies to heated confrontations with supervisors, all of which may serve to create a "collective identity separate from management" and lay the groundwork for collective action** (Hodson et al. 1993:399; Vallas 2003). **Historically grounded analyses of labor mobilization concur on these points**. Kimeldorf's (1999) study of longshoremen and restaurant and hotel workers on the East Coast in the early 1900s reveals that industrial unrest unfolded in accord with worker grievances and strategies that were formulated proximate to the point of production, rather than being fostered by the political or organizational character of unions. In a similar vein, Roscigno and Danaher's (2001) recent analysis of southern textile strikes during the 1930s shows how considerable mobilization occurred with little or, at best, limited union organization. Rather, worker solidarity and ultimately mobilization were bolstered largely by indigenous strategies and cultural practices that denoted common constraints and grievances (e.g., paternalism, work hours). The interplay of unions and solidarity is undoubtedly complex and vari-able across time, place, and particular form of labor organization. The history of a given workplace, and variations across workplaces in worker grievances themselves, for instance, may be influential for the likelihood of activism above and beyond union presence and worker consciousness (Hodson 1997; Kimeldorf 1985; Wellman 1995). In this regard, we view grievances and the formation of a critical consciousness and solidarity at a given workplace as intuitively linked, although by no means perfectly overlapping.' Moreover, unions themselves are not monolithic in terms of practices, strategies, and willingness to support contentious activity. Differences between craft and in-dustrial unions, for instance, are especially important given historical varia-tions in organizing logics, mobilizing tactics, ideology, and social composition (Cornfield 1991; Freeman & Medoff 1984). **Our assessment and predictions, rather than prioritizing unions over solidarity or vice versa, suggest the possibility of a mutually reinforcing interplay between the two — an interplay sometimes implied (albeit rarely tested) in the social movement literature and that draws from insights provided by both union-centered and historically grounded studies of worker action.** Some recent work (e.g., Hodson 1997) has begun to address this possibility, noting how unions would do well to tap into informal practices of resistance in the workplace.

**Advantage: Democracy**

**Global democracy is on the brink of collapse.**

**Freedom House, 21** Freedom House. Freedom House works to defend human rights and promote democratic change, with a focus on political rights and civil liberties. We act as a catalyst for freedom through a combination of analysis, advocacy, and action. Our analysis, focused on 13 central issues, is underpinned by our international program work. “New Report: The global decline in democracy has accelerated”. 3-3-2021. <https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated>.

**Washington - March 3, 2021 — Authoritarian actors grew bolder during 2020 as major democracies turned inward, contributing to the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom**, according to *Freedom in the World 2021*, the annual country-by-country assessment of political rights and civil liberties released today by **Freedom House.** The **report found that the share of countries designated Not Free has reached its highest level since the deterioration of democracy began in 2006, and that countries with declines in political rights and civil liberties outnumbered those with gains by the largest margin recorded during the 15-year period.** The report downgraded the freedom scores of 73 countries, representing 75 percent of the global population. Those affected include not just authoritarian states like China, Belarus, and Venezuela, but also troubled democracies like the United States and India. **In one of the year’s most significant developments, India’s status changed from Free to Partly Free, meaning less than 20 percent of the world’s people now live in a Free country—the smallest proportion since 1995. Indians’ political rights and civil liberties have been eroding since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014.** His Hindu nationalist government has presided over increased pressure on human rights organizations, rising intimidation of academics and journalists, and a spate of bigoted attacks—including lynchings—aimed at Muslims. The decline deepened following Modi’s reelection in 2019, and the government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 featured further abuses of fundamental rights. **The changes in India formed part of a broader shift in the international balance between democracy and authoritarianism, with authoritarians generally enjoying impunity for their abuses and seizing new opportunities to consolidate power or crush dissent**. In many cases, promising democratic movements faced major setbacks as a result. **In Belarus and Hong Kong, for example, massive pro-democracy protests met with brutal crackdowns by governments that largely disregarded international criticism. The Azerbaijani regime’s military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh indirectly threatened recent democratic gains in Armenia, while the armed conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region dashed hopes for the tentative political opening in that country since 2018.** All four of these cases notably featured some degree of intervention by an autocratic neighbor: Moscow provided a backstop for the regime in Belarus, Beijing propelled the repression in Hong Kong, Turkey’s government aided its Azerbaijani counterpart, and Ethiopia’s leader called in support from Eritrea. **The malign influence of the regime in China, the world’s most populous dictatorship, ranged far beyond Hong Kong in 2020. Beijing ramped up its global disinformation and censorship campaign to counter the fallout from its cover-up of the initial coronavirus outbreak**, which severely hampered a rapid global response in the pandemic’s early days. Its efforts also featured increased meddling in the domestic political discourse of foreign democracies, as well as transnational extensions of rights abuses common in mainland China. The Chinese regime has gained clout in multilateral institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council, which the United States abandoned in 2018, as Beijing pushed a vision of so-called noninterference that allows abuses of democratic principles and human rights standards to go unpunished while the formation of autocratic alliances is promoted. **“This year’s findings make it abundantly clear that we have not yet stemmed the authoritarian tide,” said Sarah Repucci, vice president of research and analysis at Freedom House. “Democratic governments will have to work in solidarity with one another, and with democracy advocates and human rights defenders in more repressive settings, if we are to reverse 15 years of accumulated declines and build a more free and peaceful world.”** A need for reform in the United States While still considered Free, the United States experienced further democratic decline during the final year of the Trump presidency. The US score in Freedom in the World has dropped by 11 points over the past decade, and fell by three points in 2020 alone. The changes have moved the country out of a cohort that included other leading democracies, such as France and Germany, and brought it into the company of states with weaker democratic institutions, such as Romania and Panama. Several developments in 2020 contributed to the United States’ current score. The Trump administration undermined government transparency by dismissing inspectors general, punishing or firing whistleblowers, and attempting to control or manipulate information on COVID-19. The year also featured mass protests that, while mostly peaceful, were accompanied by high-profile cases of violence, police brutality, and deadly confrontations with counterprotesters or armed vigilantes. There was a significant increase in the number of journalists arrested and physically assaulted, most often as they covered demonstrations. Finally, the outgoing president’s shocking attempts to overturn his election loss—culminating in his incitement of rioters who stormed the Capitol as Congress met to confirm the results in January 2021—put electoral institutions under severe pressure. In addition, the crisis further damaged the United States’ credibility abroad and underscored the menace of political polarization and extremism in the country. ”January 6 should be a wake-up call for many Americans about the fragility of American democracy,” said Michael J. Abramowitz, president of Freedom House. **“Authoritarian powers, especially China, are advancing their interests around the world, while democracies have been divided and consumed by internal problems. For freedom to prevail on a global scale, the United States and its partners must band together and work harder to strengthen democracy at home and abroad. President Biden has pledged to restore America’s international role as a leading supporter of democracy and human rights, but to rebuild its leadership credentials, the country must simultaneously address the weaknesses within its own political system.”** “Americans should feel gratified that the courts and other important institutions held firm during the postelection crisis, and that the country escaped the worst possible outcomes,” said Abramowitz. “But the Biden administration, the new Congress, and American civil society must fortify US democracy by strengthening and expanding political rights and civil liberties for all. People everywhere benefit when the United States serves as a positive model, and the country itself reaps ample returns from a more democratic world.” The effects of COVID-19 Government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the global democratic decline. Repressive regimes and populist leaders worked to reduce transparency, promote false or misleading information, and crack down on the sharing of unfavorable data or critical views. Many of those who voiced objections to their government’s handling of the pandemic faced harassment or criminal charges. Lockdowns were sometimes excessive, politicized, or brutally enforced by security agencies. And antidemocratic leaders worldwide used the pandemic as cover to weaken the political opposition and consolidate power. In fact, many of the year’s negative developments will likely have lasting effects, meaning the eventual end of the pandemic will not necessarily trigger an immediate revitalization of democracy. In Hungary, for example, the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took on emergency powers during the health crisis and misused them to withdraw financial assistance from municipalities led by opposition parties. In Sri Lanka, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa dissolved Parliament in early March and, with new elections repeatedly delayed due to COVID-19, ruled without a legislature for several months. Later in the year, both Hungary and Sri Lanka passed constitutional amendments that further strengthened executive power. The resilience of democracy Despite the many losses for freedom recorded by Freedom in the World during 2020, people around the globe remained committed to fighting for their rights, and democracy continued to demonstrate its remarkable resilience. A number of countries held successful elections, independent courts provided checks on executive overreach, journalists in even the most repressive environments investigated government transgressions, and activists persisted in calling out undemocratic practices.

**Strikes increase democratic participation, which reinvigorates democracy.**

**McElwee, 15** Sean; Research Associate at Demos; “How Unions Boost Democratic Participation,” The American Prospect; 9/16/15; <https://prospect.org/labor/unions-boost-democratic-participation/>.

Labor organizer Helen Marot once observed, "**The labor unions are group efforts in the direction of democracy." What she meant is that more than simply vehicles for the economic interests of workers** (which they certainly are), **labor unions also foster civic participation for workers. And nowhere is this clearer than in voter turnout, which has suffered in recent years along with union membership**. Indeed, new data from the Census Bureau and a new analysis of American National Election Studies data support the case that **unions' declining influence has also deeply harmed democracy. In 2014, voter turnout was abysmal, even for a midterm**. Census data suggest that only 41.9 percent of the citizen population over 18 turned out to vote. However, as I note in my new Demos report Why Voting Matters, there are dispiriting gaps in turnout across class, race, and age. To examine how unions might affect policy, I performed a new analysis of both Census Bureau and American National Election Studies data. The data below, from the 2014 election, show the differences in voter turnout between union and non-union workers (the sample only includes individuals who were employed, and does not include self-employed workers). While only 39 percent of non-union workers voted in 2014, fully 52 percent of union workers did. As part of ongoing research, **James Feigenbaum, an economics PhD candidate at Harvard, ran a regression using American National Election Studies data suggesting that union members are about 4 percentage points more likely to vote and 3 points more likely to register** (after controlling for demographic factors) and individuals living in a union household are 2.5 points more likely to vote and register. This is largely in line with the earlier estimates of Richard Freeman. **These numbers may appear modest, but in a close national election they could be enough to change the result. Other research has found an even stronger turnout effect from unions.** Daniel Stegmueller and Michael Becher find that after applying numerous demographic controls, **union members are 10 points more likely to vote. What's particularly important is that unions boost turnout among low- and middle-income individuals**. In a 2006 study, political scientists Jan Leighley and Jonathan Nagler found that, "**the decline in union membership since 1964 has affected the aggregate turnout of both low and middle-income individuals more than the aggregate turnout of high-income individuals." In 2014, the gap between unions and non-union workers shrunk at the highest rung of the income ladder. There was a 15-point gap among those earning less than $25,000** (40 percent turnout for union workers, **and 25 percent turnout for non-union workers).** Among those earning more than $100,000, the gap was far smaller (49 percent for non-union workers and 52 percent for union workers). Individuals living in union households are also more progressive than those in non-union households. I examined 2012 ANES data and find that union households aren't largely different from non-union households on many issues regarding government spending, but they are more likely to have voted for Obama, identify as Democratic, and support a robust role for the government in reducing income inequality. When looking at union members specifically, the gaps become slightly larger. More upscale union members are far more progressive than their non-union counterparts. Non-union households with an income above $60,000 oppose government intervention to reduce inequality by 11 points, with 32.2 percent in favor and 43.4 percent against. But richer union households support government intervention, with 42.5 percent in favor and 29.9 percent opposed. As Richard B. Freeman has pointed out, "union members are more likely to vote for a Democrat for the House or Presidency than demographically comparable nonunion voters." He similarly finds that "unionism moves members to the left of where they would be given their socioeconomic status," in line with the data I examined from 2012. A 2013 study by Jasmine Kerrissey and Evan Schofer finds that **union members are not only more likely to vote, but also more likely to belong to other associations, and to protest. They also find that these effects are strongest among people with lower levels of education, suggesting that unions may help mobilize the least politically active groups**. A recent study of European countries finds union members vote more and identifies those aspects of union membership that contribute to the higher turnout. The strongest factor is that **workers who engage in democratic organizations in the workplace (via collective bargaining) are more likely to engage in democracy more broadly by, for instance, voting. Other studies support the idea that civic participation creates a feedback loop that leads to higher voting rates.** Another factor is that union members make more money, and higher income is correlated with voting behavior. Finally, union members are encouraged by peers and the union to engage in politics, which also contributes to higher levels of turnout. It's not entirely surprising that politicians who savage unions often share a similar contempt for the right to vote. **Democracy in the workplace leads to democracy more broadly throughout society. Workers with more democratic workplaces are more likely to democratically engage in in society. Further, when unions and progressives demonstrate that government can benefit them, Americans are more likely to want to participate in decision-making**. For all these reasons, unions play a unique and indispensable role in the progressive project. As Larry Summers, certainly not a leftist, recently argued, "the weakness of unions leaves a broad swath of the middle class largely unrepresented in the political process."

**Democratic backsliding increases the likelihood of existential threats such as terrorism, climate change, econ collapse, and nuclear war.**

**Kendall-Taylor, 16** Andrea; Deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, Senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” CSIS; 7/15/16; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order/>.

**It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there is an emerging consensus in the world of foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising**. The norms, values, laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships between nations are being gradually dismantled. The most discussed sources of this pressure are the ascent of China and other non-Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals. **Largely missing from these discussions, however, is the specter of widespread democratic decline. Rising challenges to democratic governance across the globe are a major strain on the international system**, but they receive far less attention in discussions of the shifting world order. In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. The United States has promoted the spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system. However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War, over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. A 2015 Freedom House report stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years.” Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of key trends that are working to undermine democracy. The **rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes** in today’s global order. Democratic decline would **weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation** abroad. Research demonstrates that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, **democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.”** An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the **formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system**. Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing. Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, **the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril**. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations. **A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions**, including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, **the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together**. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. **Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become fragmented and less effective. Violence and instability would also likely increase** if more democracies give way to autocracy. International relations literature tells us that **democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines**. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. **Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order** because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows. Finally, **widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States** and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics. Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western enthusiasm for democracy support has waned. Rising levels of instability, including in Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, **and sustained threats from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and stability**. U.S. preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human rights considerations. While **rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s shift from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor**. Policy discussions tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the confines of a single country. From this perspective, **the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights**. A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries. Many of the threats to the current global order, such as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven by factors that the United States and West more generally have little leverage to influence or control. Democracy, however, is an area where Western actions can affect outcomes. Factoring in the risks that arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a vital step to building a comprehensive approach to democracy support. Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in foreign policy, but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.