# Speech 1NC UH Rd 1 vs Ardsley 1-14 3PM

## 1

#### 30 speaks – key to combat biases

#### Interp: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose their contact information

#### Violation: screenshots

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

#### Prefer

#### 1] Inclusion – Novices would have a way to contact you about your positions and learn from them and debaters would tell you before round about triggering positions that you’ve read before.

#### 2] Prep Skew- Pre-round disclosure can’t happen if you don’t have a preferable means of contact because I would never know the aff.

## 2

#### Interp: The affirmative must define “outer space” in a delimited text in the 1AC.

#### “Outer Space” is flexible and has too many interps – normal means shows no consensus and makes the round irresolvable since the judge doesn’t know how to compare between types of offense and o/w since it’s a side constraint on decision making – independently turns judicial application.

Leepuengtham 17 [Tosaporn Leepuengtham (Research Judge, Intellectual Property and International Trade Division, Supreme Court of Thailand). "International space law and its implications for outer space activities." 01-27-2017, Accessed 12-9-2021. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781785369612/06\_chapter1.xhtml // duongie

Those states which favor the precise demarcation of outer space support the spatial approach, whereas those who oppose to such demarcation prefer the functional approach, as the latter allows more flexibility in terms of the development of space technology.34 This lack of a definition and delimitation of outer space is problematic, since certain particular areas are neither explicitly defined as ‘air space’ or ‘outer space’. For example, it is vague whether an area located between 80 km and 120 km above sea level would be classified as either air space or outer space in the absence of demarcation, since 80 km is the maximum attitude for convention aircraft, and 120 km is the lowest attitude in which space activities could be carried out.35 Satellites which are stationed in a geostationary orbit are a good example of this ambiguity. Owing to this lack of any internationally recognized delimitation, equatorial states claim sovereignty over that part of the geostationary orbit which is located over their respective territories;36 whereas technologically developed countries believe that the geostationary orbit is an integral part of outer space.37 This uncertain status of areas leads to legal jurisdictional problems. According to international law, a state has sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.38 However, national sovereignty does not extend into outer space.39 Thus, it is necessary to determine where a state’s airspace ends to ensure that the appropriate legal regime is applied. One possible scenario which might occur and which is relevant to the subject of this book is the creation or infringement of an intellectual work is in just such an ambiguous location. This would cast doubt on the ‘legal’ location of creation or infringement, and the question of which applicable legal regime arises. Should we apply the law of the underlying state or is there no law to apply? For example, would satellite signals transmitted from a satellite stationed in a geostationary orbit located over equatorial countries be considered as works created or, if intercepted, be infringed, in outer space or in the sovereign air space of those respective countries? These hypothetical examples highlight why a boundary is necessary if unpredictability arising from different legal application is to be avoided. While it might be argued that this issue is being overemphasized at this stage, given increasing use of space technology, this problem is worth considering now rather than later.

appropriation[[1]](#footnote-1) is “a sum of money or total of assets devoted to a special purpose” but the rez doesn’t spec a purpose

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night – triggers presumption since the aff wasn’t subject to well researched scrutiny. We lose access to Tech Race DA’s, Asteroid DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### 2] Real World – Policy makers will always define the entity that they are recognizing. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, private entities can circumvent since there is no delineated way to enforce the aff and means their solvency can’t actualize.

#### OSspec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from policies that require enforcement to function.

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### DTD – its key to deter future abuse

#### No RVI’s- a) chilling effect – people will be too scared to read theory because RVI’s encourage baiting theory b) clash – people go all in on theory which decks substance engagement

#### 1NC theory first – 1] abuse was self inflcuetd 2] I have more time to develop args which o/w cuz we have better norms and is a seqeucing to theory

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

## 3

#### Presumption/permissibility negates – a] real world policies require positive justification before being adopted b] Unjust[[2]](#footnote-2) is “contrary to conscience or morality or law” so they need to prove the negative obligation c] more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways

#### The litmus test for ethics is certainty and non-arbitrariness – blurry guidelines for ethics allows agents to inconsistently understand morality or arbitrarily opt out which renders ethics useless since it can’t serve as a guide to action.

#### Thus, ethics is transcendental, not empirical –

#### 1] Cartesian Skepticism – perceptions of the external world are fundamentally incoherent – the possibility of a dream world, simulation, or a hallucination makes empiricism unreliable.

#### 2] Collapses – diff agents have diff obligations which fails to prescribe and guide action if its based off of contingencies

#### 3] Hume’s Guillotine – descriptive claims cannot prescribe action – “arsenic is poison” doesn’t mean “one ought not drink arsenic” because it doesn’t ought to be that way. Only the transcendental can form ought statements.

#### Thus, the standard is *consistency with the forms of objects* – the essence of the world that transcend space and time.

Wilber 19 [Jennifer Wilber (ESL instructor, substitute teacher, and freelance writer, B.A. in Creative Writing and English). “An Introduction to Plato’s Theory of Forms”. Owlcation. JUL 8, 2019. Accessed 12/21/20. [https://owlcation.com/humanities/An-Introduction-to-Platos-Theory-of-Forms //](https://owlcation.com/humanities/An-Introduction-to-Platos-Theory-of-Forms%20//) Xu]

The Platonic Forms, according to Plato, are just ideas of things that actually exist. They represent what each individual thing is supposed to be like in order for it to be that specific thing. For example, the Form of human shows qualities one must have in order to be human. It is a depiction of the idea of humanness. But no actual human is the perfect representation of the Form human. They are similar, but every human is different, and none are perfectly human. According to Plato, every object or quality in reality has a Form: dogs, cats, humans, oceans, tables, colors, beauty, love, and courage. Form answers the question "What is that?" Plato went a step further in asking “what is Form itself?” Plato assumed that an object was essentially or "really" a manifestation of the Form and that the phenomena were mere shadows that mimicked the Form. This means that objects in reality are momentary portrayals of the Form under varying circumstances. The “problem of universals,” or how can one Form in general be many things in particular, was solved by presuming that Form is a distinct singular thing that causes multiple representations of itself in particular objects. According to Plato’s Theory of Forms, matter is considered particular in itself. For Plato, Forms are more real than any objects that imitate them. Though the Forms are timeless and unchanging, physical manifestations of Forms are in a constant state of change. Where Forms are unqualified perfection, physical objects are qualified and conditioned. The Forms, according to Plato, are the essences of various objects. Forms are the qualities that an object must have to be considered that type of object. For example, there are countless chairs in the world but the Form of “chairness” is at the core of all chairs. Plato held that the world of Forms is transcendent to our own world, the world of substances, which is the essential basis of reality. Though no one has ever seen a perfect circle, nor a perfectly straight line, everyone knows what a circle and a straight line are. Plato uses this as evidence that his Forms are real. Perfect Examples of Forms Do Not Exist in Reality Forms are the purest representation of all things. Plato believed that true knowledge or intelligence is the ability to grasp the world of Forms with one's mind. It is difficult for many thinkers to understand the concept of perfect Forms. If there are no perfect examples, so how we can know what the Forms are, exactly? If there are no perfect humans, and we can't see the Form human, how do we know what the Form actually looks like? And if we don't know what it looks like, how do we know that no human is a perfect representation of that Form? Forms are aspatial (transcendent to space) and atemporal (transcendent to time). Forms do not exist within any time period, but rather provide the formal basis for time. Neither are they eternal in the sense of existing forever, nor mortal, existing for only a limited duration. Forms exists transcendent to time altogether, according to Plato’s Theory of Forms. Forms have no orientation in space, nor do they have a location. They are non-physical, but they are not in the mind. Forms are extra-mental ideas, meaning that they are real in the strictest sense of the word. Because the Forms exist independently of time and space, they can be said to exist only as ideas in people's minds. The Forms are objective "blueprints" for perfection. They are considered perfect themselves because they are unchanging. For example, if we have a square drawn on a blackboard, the square as it is drawn is not a perfect representation of a square. However, it is only the knowledge of the Form "square" that allows us to know the drawing on the chalkboard is meant to represent a square. The Form "square" is perfect and unchanging. The Form “square” is exactly the same no matter who thinks about it.

#### Prefer –

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#### Thus, ethics is transcendental, not empirical –

#### 1] Cartesian Skepticism – perceptions of the external world are fundamentally incoherent – the possibility of a dream world, simulation, or a hallucination makes empiricism unreliable.

#### 2] Causal Determinism – the physical world removes culpability from the agent – agential action occurs because of an antecedent NOT their will – only the transcendental world assumes an agent not subject to physical side constraints.

#### 3] Hume’s Guillotine – descriptive claims cannot prescribe action – “arsenic is poison” doesn’t mean “one ought not drink arsenic” because it doesn’t ought to be that way. Only the transcendental can form ought statements.

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#### Prefer –

#### 1] Sequencing –

#### A] Understanding the form of objects is a prerequisite to the empirical

Cohen 15 [S. Marc Cohen- “Phaedo” <https://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/phaedo.htm> Last updated 7/24/2015] UT AI

This is both an argument for the existence of Forms and an argument for our possession of a priori concepts. Plato bases the argument on the imperfection of sensible objects and our ability to make judgments about those sensible objects. (The Forms are supposed to be the perfect objects that the sensibles only imperfectly approximate). The argument as given at Phaedo 74-76 concerns the concept of equality, but it could equally well be given with respect to a number of different concepts (any concept that might have some claim to being an a priori concept). The argument tries to show that we cannot abstract the concept of equality from our sense-experience of objects that are equal. For

1. We never experience (in sense-perception) objects that are really, precisely, equal, and
2. We must already have the concept of equality in order to judge the things we encounter in sense-perception to be approximately, imperfectly, equal.

The argument can be schematized as follows:

1. We perceive sensible objects to be F.
2. But every sensible object is, at best, imperfectly F. That is, it is both F and not F (in some respect - shades of Heraclitus??). It falls short of being perfectly F.
3. We are aware of this imperfection in the objects of perception.
4. So we perceive objects to be imperfectly F.
5. To perceive something as imperfectly F, one must have in mind something that is perfectly F, something that the imperfectly F things fall short of. (E.g., we have an idea of equality that all sticks, stones, etc., only imperfectly exemplify.)
6. So we have in mind something that is perfectly F.
7. Thus, there is something that is perfectly F (e.g., Equality), that we have in mind in such cases.
8. Therefore, there is such a thing as the F itself (e.g., the Equal itself), and it is distinct from any sensible object.

#### B] Bindingness – even if exceptions exist to an ethic, it proves empirical inconsistencies exist that only the transcendental can universally apply and reasonably guide action.

#### 2] Performativity – engaging within debate is an attempt to become the perfect debater by engaging in prep, drilling and practicing which concedes our thesis

#### 3] New affs are a voting issue for skewed preround prep and quality engagement

#### 4] Ideal Theory Good –

#### a] end point – we’d constantly be fixing injustices as a precondition to ethical action so we never get to the bottom of what is actually ethical

#### b] relevance – every society has different injustices that occur – the resolution is a universal values statement which means you cannot universalize any theory under nonideal theory

#### I defend the squo and negate –

#### First, the rez is indexed to private entities – by[[3]](#footnote-3) identifies “identifying the agent performing an action” and is specific to appropriation through private entities.

#### Second, “A private entity relies on a small group of chosen investors in order to grow and fund their business. This could be employees, colleagues, friends, family, or even large institutional investors. Interested parties are able to support the private entity in order to help the company grow.”

That’s QT Company 20 [“What Are Private Entities?”. Quest Trust Company (custodian of self-directed IRAs located in Houston, Austin, and Dallas, Texas with clients Nationwide. Quest Trust Company, is the leading provider of self-directed retirement account administration services. Quest Trust Company has been in business since 2003 with over $2 Billion in assets under management. As a neutral party, Quest Trust Company does not offer any investments and therefore has no conflicts of interest with what our clients want to do with their IRAs). September 28, 2020. Accessed 12/17/21. <https://www.questtrustcompany.com/2020/09/28/what-are-private-entities/> //Xu]

#### And theft and appropriation for self-interests are morally obligatory

Nobis summarizes egoism ND (The author doesn’t agree with egoism but explains what egoism would conclude in) [Nathan Nobis; Teaching Philosophy. 1000-Word Philosophy. Animals and Ethics 101; No Date; "Ethical Egoism"; 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology; https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/; 12-18-2021] //Miller

3.3. Egoism and Wronging Others for Your Own Gain Another objection takes us to the heart of the matter. Imagine this: Your credit card bill is due tonight, but you won’t be able to pay the full amount until next month, so you will be charged interest and a late fee. You just saw someone, however, accidentally leave their wallet on a park bench with a lot of cash hanging out of it. You saw where they went, but you could take the cash to pay the bill and nobody would ever know. Also, you know of an elderly person who always carries a lot of cash on their evening walk. You know you could rob them, pay your bill, certainly never get caught and then buy dinner at a fancy restaurant. If ethical egoism is true, not only can you permissibly take the wallet and rob someone, you must: not doing so would be wrong, since these crimes are in your self-interest. (If you’d feel guilty doing this, egoists respond that you shouldn’t since you’ve done nothing wrong on their view.) Many believe that, since actions like these are clearly wrong, this shows that egoism is false and the argument at 2.3 fails: egoism does not best explain our moral obligations even if we sometimes must do what’s best for ourselves. An egoist might respond that we are just assuming their theory is false: they don’t agree that we shouldn’t steal the wallet and refrain from assault.[5] But we aren’t “assuming” anything: we just have better reason to believe that assault for personal gain is wrong than that egoism is true. Recall that racists and sexists do not agree that their forms of discrimination are wrong either, but this doesn’t justify racism or sexism. People sometimes hold false moral views; this might be true of egoists.

#### Appropriation means “incorporation by joining or uniting” which is consistent with the form of private entities.

That’s Vocabulary.com [“appropriation”. Vocabulary.com. No Date. Accessed 12/17/21. <https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/appropriation> //Xu]

## 4

#### The ROB is to determine the truth of falsity of the resolution –

#### 1] Textuality – five dictionaries[[4]](#footnote-4) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[5]](#footnote-5) as to prove true.

#### That OW –

#### a] Jurisdiction – judges are constrained through their constitutive purpose and proves it’s a side constraint on what arguments they can vote on.

#### b] Predictability – people base prep off the pregiven terms in the resolution.

#### 2] Isomorphism – alternative ROBs aren’t binary truth/false because of topic lit biases which increases intervention and takes the debate out of the hands of debaters.

#### 3] Inclusion – any offense functions under it as long as debaters implicate their positions to prove the truth or falsity of the resolution which maximizes substantive clash through ground and is a sequencing question for engaging in debate.

#### 4] Logic – any statement relies on a conception of truth to function – for example, I’m hungry is the same as its true that I’m hungry – logic is a litmus test for any argument and proves your ROB collapse since it relies on truth.

#### I negate –

#### 1] the[[6]](#footnote-6) is “denoting a disease or affliction” but appropriation isn’t a disease

#### 2] of[[7]](#footnote-7) is to “expressing an age” but the rez doesn’t delineate a length of time

#### 3] private[[8]](#footnote-8) describes “belonging to or for the use of one particular person or group of people only” and an entity[[9]](#footnote-9) is “independent, separate, or self-contained existence”

#### They don’t exist – circumvention.

Martinez 21 [Katherine Latimer Martinez (Seattle University School of Law). “Lost in Space: An Exploration of the Current Gaps in Space Law”. Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental & Innovation Law: Vol. 11 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. 5-7-2021. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=sjteil> //Xu]

No company is able to operate in a purely private capacity and without State partnerships because of a need for government funding and the government’s need for additional research due to decreases in funding and resources.138 Private companies fall into two categories: (1) those focused on commercial space travel and (2) those focused on mining and space resources.

## 5

#### Cp text – endorse Marxist transhumanism.

Steinhoff 14 [James Steinhoff (postdoctoral fellow at the eScience Institute of the University of Washington, Ph.D., Media Studies, The University of Western Ontario, M.A., Philosophy, The University of Windsor, B.A., English Literature and Philosophy, The University of Windsor). “Transhumanism and Marxism: Philosophical Connections”. Journal of Evolution and Technology - Vol. 24 Issue 2 – May 2014. Accessed 11/5/21. <https://philpapers.org/archive/STETAM-4.pdf> //Xu]

The term “transhumanism” was coined by evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley in 1957. In a short paper bearing the same neologism as its title, he asserts that: The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself – not just sporadically, an individual here in one way, an individual there in another way, but in its entirety, as humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: man remaining man, but trans­cending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature. (Huxley 1957) This early formulation contains the kernel of transhumanism, which is the desirability and feasibility of the self-directed evolution or transcendence of humanity beyond its current form or nature. Recently, philosopher Max More has offered this more precise definition: Transhumanism is both a reason-based philosophy and a cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition by means of science and technology. Transhumanists seek the continuation and acceleration of the evolution of intelligent life beyond its currently human form and human limitations by means of science and technology, guided by life-promoting principles and values. (More 2009) Transhumanism indicates a transitional state on the road to a posthuman state. This transition is to be accomplished primarily by technological means in a transfer of control over the process of evolution from natural selection to conscious human direction. The possibility of taking control of evolution is not a specifically transhumanist belief. Diverse non-transhumanist thinkers such as political scientist Francis Fukuyama and sociobiologist E.O. Wilson acknowledge the coming reality of “volitional evolution” or “a species deciding what to do about its own heredity,” as Wilson puts it (1998, 299). What is distinctly transhumanist is the optimism with which the prospects of volitional evolution are regarded. Fukuyama calls for “humility” regarding human nature and fears that transhumanists will “deface humanity with their genetic bulldozers and psychotropic shopping malls” (Fukuyama 2004). Transhumanists, by contrast, desire to use such new and emerging technologies as genetics, robotics, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology to achieve ambitious goals: the elimination of disease; radical life extension (even immortality);1 the creation of substrate-independent minds (capable of being uploaded to non-biological systems);2 augmented or virtual realities; and enhanced intellectual, physical, aesthetic and ethical capabilities. Some transhumanists even aim at the abolition of all forms of suffering for all sentient life.3 This is not to say, as many critics have, that transhumanists blithely dismiss the prospects of technological advancements going horribly wrong. Nick Bostrom, in particular, has written much about “existential risks” or the possibilities that new technologies present for the extinction of life on earth (Bostrom 2002). Nonetheless, many transhumanists prefer a “Proactionary Principle” of rational risk-assessment, as More (2005) puts it, as opposed to a “Precautionary Principle” of excessive safeguarding regarding technological developments. Politically, transhumanists have covered the spectrum. Proto-transhumanists such as molecular biologist J.D. Bernal and geneticist/evolutionary biologist J.B.S. Haldane were Marxists, Bernal being a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain, while Haldane was an external supporter of the Party. Riccardo Campa, chair of the Associazione Italiana Transumanisti (AIT), expresses “only conditional confidence” in the power of markets and asserts that if “market mechanisms do not deliver, we should have to consider socializing what are, from the transhumanist point of view, the key sectors” (Campa 2008). On a different note, Max More and most of those subscribing to his brand of transhumanism (known as Extropianism) originally espoused anarcho-capitalist views. However, in the past decade More has tended more toward liberal democracy. Ray Kurzweil has not written explicitly on his political stance, but one can safely assume that his views lie somewhere not far from liberal, capitalistic democracy, given his entrepreneurial career and frequent assertions of liberal democratic rights. H+ (formerly The World Transhumanist Association), of which Nick Bostrom is a co-founder, is explicitly a liberal democratic organization. In the past few years, rumors and accusations concerning transhumanist fascists have been buzzing about the Italian transhumanist community. The “overhumanists” or “sovrumanists” (from the Italian “sovrumanismo”), a group of members within the ITA, have been accused of fascist tendencies.4 As I have not been able to read any of the purportedly fascist texts (Stefano Vaj’s Biopolitica being the most prolifically accused), I leave this discussion untouched. Suffice to say that the allegations lend some support to an appearance that transhumanists range widely across the political spectrum. James Hughes (2001) suggests that leftist thought and transhumanist ideas parted ways after the experience of Nazi eugenics and that the two are only beginning to meet up again indirectly: through Donna Haraway’s cyborgology, speculative fiction, some radical green movements, and various other dispersed projects. Hughes, himself a transhumanist sociologist, argues for a “democratic transhumanism.” He writes: “For transhumanism to achieve its own goals it needs to distance itself from its anarcho-capitalist roots and its authoritarian mutations, clarify its commitments to liberal democratic institutions, values and public policies, and work to reassure skittish publics and inspire them with Big Projects” (Hughes 2001). Yet as the WTA survey shows, 47 per cent of transhumanists surveyed identify as “left,” so transhumanism and the left would seem to have already been reunited. Perhaps the pertinent thing to do now is to search around “inside” the left for useful political bits and pieces that do not originate from liberal democracy – particularly, Marxism. 2. Technological advancement and revolution 2.1 Marxism is a staunchly materialist philosophy. It rejects all notions of higher realms, “spirit,” and immaterial substance. Marx’s philosophy is an appropriation of the Hegelian dialectical form, but Marx rejected Hegel’s assertion that the subject of the dialectical movement is abstract spirit or mind that exists above humans and achieves its true form as Absolute Knowledge. For Marx, thought must begin with “real premises from which abstraction can only be made in imagination … [from] real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live” (Marx 1978, 149). “Life is not determined by consciousness,” says Marx, “but consciousness by life” (Marx 1978, 155). Marxism is concerned with the concrete, material details of the lives of individuals. The material conditions of the relations and means of production produce the situations and systems in which individuals live and by which their conceptions of reality are determined. The social problems of private property and alienation arise from the material reality of the means of production being owned by the capitalist class. Thus Marx’s projected socialist revolution has as a necessary condition a change in the material conditions of society. We can note two key aspects of revolution for Marx. First, revolution must be eminently practical and not merely theoretical. Marx writes: “all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism … only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations ... that not criticism, but revolution is the driving force of history” (Marx 1973, 164). The socialist revolution will not occur because scathing critiques of capitalism are written, or even by widespread understanding of the contradictions of capitalism – the actual relations of production must be overturned by real people. Workers must seize the means of production. This, however, can only be achieved, Marx says, through the advancement of the productive forces. Thus the second key aspect: that technological advancement is a necessary precondition for revolution. Marx holds that to achieve a socialist society one of the first priorities of the revolutionary proletariat must be to “centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State … to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible” (Marx 1978, 490). Through automation and new technologies, the productive forces should be enhanced so that less and less actual human labor is required to produce the goods necessary for satisfying human needs. The idea is that humans need to have easy access to and abundant quantities of the necessities of life (including time itself) if they are to seek a way of life beyond mere survival. Marx holds: “slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine and the mule and spinning-jenny, serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture … people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, housing and clothing in adequate quality and quantity” (Marx 1978, 169). It is thus only in a society in which machines perform much of the labor required for human survival that humans can achieve revolutionarily new ways of living. 2.2 Most transhumanists are also materialists. The 2007 WTA Survey shows that 64 per cent of those surveyed identify as secular/atheist, while 31 per cent are spread widely across several subcategories of “Religious or spiritual” identifications and 5 per cent describe their beliefs as “Other.” Even the non-secular transhumanists agree that changes to the material conditions of the world are instrumental to the achievement of transhumanist revolution. Indeed, The Mormon Transhumanist Association (MTA) proclaims that humanity’s power over the material world is what will lead to a realization of the objects of traditionally spiritual yearning. The MTA website lists “affirmations” such as: We believe that scientific knowledge and technological power are among the means ordained of God to enable [the spiritual and physical] exaltation [of individuals and their anatomies, as well as their communities and environments] including realization of diverse prophetic visions of transfiguration, immortality, resurrection, renewal of this world, and the discovery and creation of worlds without end.5 It is therefore safe to say that all transhumanists agree that technological development is necessary for revolution, although it is true that for transhumanists what counts as advanced technology is considerably beyond anything imagined by Marx. Many transhumanists posit the technological Singularity as a necessary precondition for their sense of revolution, which is the transition to a posthuman state. On one popular interpretation, the Singularity is the projected moment in the future when artificial intelligence (AI) reaches human-level capabilities. Since technology evolves at an exponential rate far exceeding biological evolution, the theory is that AI will quickly outstrip human intelligence by several magnitudes and will continue to evolve at blinding speed. This explosion of intelligence will produce unimaginable change, advanced technologies, and ideas that will be essential in the creation of the posthuman. Ray Kurzweil calls the advent of human-level AI an event of importance equaling the advent of biology itself (2005, 296). While not all transhumanists are Singularitarians, it is always the prospects of advanced technology that make a transhumanist revolution feasible. Goals such as radical life extension, increased cognitive capacity, and increased well-being are generally not sought through spiritual or mystical means such as transcendental meditation, revelation, or divine communion, but through the increasing sophistication of technology. Thus transhumanists support research programs and/or business ventures they believe will advance the human ability to revolutionarily modify the material world. Nick Bostrom emphasizes the narrow locus of transhumanist change: As you advance, the horizon will recede. The transformation is profound, but it can be as gradual as the growth that made the baby you were into the adult you think you are. You will not achieve this through any magic trick or hokum, nor by the power of wishful thinking, nor by semantic acrobatics, meditation, affirmation, or incantation. And I do not presume to advise you on matters theological. I urge on you nothing more, nothing less, than reconfigured physical situation. (Bostrom 2010, 4) Also evident here is a call for practical, rather than merely theoretical, revolution in the transhumanist openness to synthetic augmentation of the biological body and brain. Nanotechnology, for example, is a commonly cited way of augmenting the material condition of the body: it has been suggested that digestion, healing, and synaptic processes will be augmented or taken over by nanobots that will perform these functions better. Says Bostrom: “The roots of suffering are planted deep in your brain. Weeding them out and replacing them with nutritious crops of well-being will require advanced skills and instruments for the cultivation of your neuronal soil” (2010, 6). The idea is that practical modification of the human condition at the bodily level is needed to produce social change – theorizing is not enough. We may have to download our consciousnesses to synthetic systems to conquer death. In Bostrom’s words: “Your body is a deathtrap … You are lucky to get seven decades of mobility; eight if you be Fortuna’s darling. That is not sufficient to get started in a serious way, much less to complete the journey. Maturity of the soul takes longer” (2010, 4). Ignoring the poeticism of “the soul” here, the notion is that augmented bodies that are less susceptible to disease, hunger, and decay could give people more time to concern themselves with their freely chosen life-activities instead of the vagaries of quotidian existence and the demands imposed by capitalism. Nanotechnology also presents the theoretical possibility of assemblers that can manipulate matter at the molecular and atomic levels to construct anything conceivable by the laws of physics.6 Such machines would need only a supply of raw materials to work with, coupled with a power supply and instructions, to produce all kinds of human needs and wants, ranging from computers to tools to the very Star Trek-esque possibility of food and drink. Echoing Marx, transhumanists might say that the abolition of (paid) slavery is impossible without a superabundance provided by molecular assemblers or that liberation from the bodily death trap is impossible without strong AI. 2.3 Here is the first point that Marxists should take note of: the extent of technological development required for a revolutionary shift in human existence might be much higher than merely the massive automation of labor. Advanced or theoretical technologies such as molecular assemblers might be required to wrest production from the hands of the capitalists. Molecular assemblers present the possibility of very cheap production of almost any product. It is surely too optimistic to say that molecular assemblers might lead to the total destruction of the commodity form, but it seems likely that even a moderately wide spread of such technology would seriously undermine the capitalist system.7 There would simply be no need for the industrial production of most products if families or communities were able to produce those products themselves. Advanced technological development not only presents the possibility of the elimination of dehumanizing labor. It presents more fundamental changes in the material basis of production – the potential elimination of the feasibility of large-scale centralized production and potentially the destruction of exchange-value. Marx understands exchange-value as an abstraction, determined solely by market forces, tacked onto an object that obscures its actual qualities or use-value (Marx 1978, 307). With widespread molecular assembling technology available, the cost of a product would be reduced almost to the cost of information – the instructions required for the assembler to build that product – since raw materials would be of minimal cost and the machine would perform the labor of assembling. Of course, if information remains commodified then a capitalist system could continue to thrive. However, we are currently witnessing the difficulties with commodifying information in the Global North’s “war on piracy.” It seems unlikely that anything short of an openly totalitarian regime could effectively stamp out information piracy. In short, transhumanism contains an exhortation to Marxists to keep abreast of the particulars of new technologies and to engage with them critically, looking for the unique revolutionary (and counter-revolutionary) potentials they hold. Transhumanists should here consider that Marx argues that the centralization of the productive apparatus by the revolutionary proletariat is of fundamental importance to the acceleration of productive capacity. This is because, for Marx, capitalist production divorces or alienates the worker from the activity she engages in, subjecting her instead to “alien” powers – her employer’s need for profit. Marx elaborates: the division of labour offers us the first example of how … as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily … divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. (Marx 1845) Her labor, which is all the worker owns, is divorced by capitalism from her interests and goals – she is alienated from herself and her essential ability of self-determination. Transhumanists, by leaving technological advancement in the hands of profit-driven capitalist enterprise, are analogously alienating the human that is to be transcended from itself. Capitalism enslaves humans to economically profitable, but, in terms of transhumanist goals, conservative or regressive endeavors. Think of the production of cheap, disposable dollar-store toys or the infinite cycle of the military-industrial complex. Centralization of production offers the prospect of stripping away those endeavors that do not serve to advance the technological apparatus necessary for transhumanist goals. In short, I suggest that the advance of technology, if divorced from human self-determination, may not present revolutionary opportunities, but rather the opposite. 3 Human nature 3.1 For Marx, humans have a dual nature: both active and passive. He offers this description: Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand furnished with natural powers of life – he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities – as impulses. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his impulses exist outside him, as objects independent of him; yet these objects are objects of his need – essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers. (Marx 1978, 115) We can note three important points in this passage: that humans are “natural,” that humans are active or determining – that we can change ourselves and the world, and that humans are also passive or determined by a particular biological nature. The passive aspect of human nature refers to the fact that humans do not exist purely of themselves like omnipotent deities. To exist, humans must fulfill certain needs that are external to their bodies and are not aspects of their selves. Obvious examples are food and drink, but as Herbert Marcuse notes: “‘need’ is not be understood only in the sense of physical neediness: man needs ‘a totality of human manifestations of life’” (1973, 23). For example, having all one’s physical needs met, but being completely isolated from all contact with other humans is not a situation in which human needs are being met. That humans are needy means that they are in a large sense passive beings. One is necessarily dependent on the water’s being there before one can drink it – and without it, death is certain. Thus, Marcuse holds that for Marx: “Distress and neediness here do not describe individual modes of man’s behavior at all: they are features of his whole existence” (Marcuse 1973, 21). Marx holds that since external objects are essential to life, they are actually parts of human life. The passivity of humans means that their lives are determined to the extent that they must meet certain needs to continue existing – there are certain constraints on human life. These limits constitute a fundamental connection to the natural. But as Marcuse noted above, human needs are not only physical needs. There are also what might be called social needs which constitute a fundamental connection between the individual and other individuals in society. Humans need other humans for non-material needs such as education, friendship, and culture. Uniquely human (as far as we can tell) qualities, such as culture, require human beings to be social beings; thus sociality is part of human nature. But humans are also active, self- and world-determining beings. Humans have the ability to relate to objects “universally,” through labor. Human labor produces objects: buildings, computers, medicines. All of these creations we regard as created by “us” – as humans – out of the raw materials found in nature. In producing such objects we constitute a world in which we see ourselves everywhere. Says Marx: “Man is a species being, not only because in practice and theory he adopts the species as his object (his own as well as those of other things), but – also because he treats himself as the actual, living species: because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being” (Marx 1978, 75). While animals produce nests and dams these are only for “immediate physical needs,” while “man produces universally … man produces even when he is free from immediate need and truly produces in freedom therefrom” (1978, 76). The endless creation of new objects and technologies supports Marx’s claim: we do not produce technologies solely for survival – we produce in an aesthetic mode, as well as a profiteering mode. Indeed, and this is Marx’s most important claim about human nature, we actually produce ourselves in other objects. Marx’s proclamation that “man produces man” does not refer solely to biological reproduction (Marcuse 1973, 25). Humans produce a world in which every object has some amount of human involvement in it – the human species becomes universally present. But what is the distinctive stamp of humanity, the “essence” that it imparts to objects? Marx’s sense of essence must be recognized as wholly material. He holds that what philosophers have called the substance or essence of the human is a “material result” ... [a] sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and generation finds in existence as something given” (Marx 1973, 165). At any moment how humans conceive of themselves is a product of the social and material conditions that previous generations of humans set up. Human “essence” is a historical phenomenon. But this does not mean that humans lack a true nature. Marx writes: “The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity. It is its life-activity. Man makes his life-activity the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life-activity … his own life is an object for him” (Marx 1978, 76). The “essence” of the human shifts over time because it is not a static form. It is, rather, a self-transformative function or an evolving process. The human is the animal whose nature is to change its own nature. We are thus led to another relevant aspect of Marxian human nature – its open-endedness. Marx describes the new kind of “wealth” that socialist society will produce as the “absolute working-out of [human] creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such, the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick” because he is not committed to a particular form of human life or metric by which to judge it (Marx 1973, 488). István Mészáros elaborates, asserting that never “can there be a point in history at which we could say: ‘now the human substance has been fully realized.’ For such a fixing would deprive the human being of his essential attribute: his power of ‘self-mediation’ and ‘self-development’” (Mészáros 1970, 119). It is impossible to posit an ideal ending to the saga of human history as that would constrain the freedom of the human by not allowing her very nature of self-determination to be expressed. 3.2 Transhumanists generally agree with the natural being of the human but they tend to differ from Marx on the significance of humanity’s active and passive aspects, emphasizing the active nature of humans and downplaying the significance of the passive and needy aspect.8 Most transhumanists agree that humans are natural beings and are products of natural processes like natural selection. Humans are distinguished from other animals primarily by their level of complexity (biological and social) and ability to modify their own ways of living. It is material aspects that make humans different: our particular brains, bodies and technological capabilities. Transhumanists do not deny the passive and needy aspects of human nature, although they do question the permanence and desirability of human needs. Nick Bostrom argues that: “not just any aspect of present human nature ... is worth preserving. Rather it is especially those features which contribute to self-development and self-expression, to certain kinds of relationships, and to the development of our consciousness and understanding” that should be preserved (Bostrom 2005). Some human needs may be eliminated entirely through technology. The nutritive aspect of eating might, for example, be separated from the gustatory, just as the pleasurable aspect of sex has largely been separated from its reproductive function through contraceptive technologies. Nutrients and calories could be supplied through smart drugs, supplements, and nanotech delivery systems, and nanobots might filter out unwanted aspects of digested food, making eating a wholly aesthetic experience. The need for human social interaction is already being partially met through technological alternate-realities such as the online worlds Second Life and World of Warcraft and myriad social networking sites. Such virtual worlds, while currently primitive, are being increasingly seamlessly integrated with “real reality.” Courtship, funerals, marriages, and complex economies already occur in virtual worlds. Kurzweil suggests that we might find living in virtual worlds preferable once they reach a high level of sophistication (1995, 29). The idea is that human needs are subject to change and even disappearance as the human being develops. It is clear then that transhumanists generally give precedence to the active aspect of human nature. More invokes “Perpetual Progress” as a transhumanist tenet that “captures the way transhumanists challenge traditional assertions that we should leave human nature fundamentally unchanged in order to conform to ‘God’s will’ or to what is considered ‘natural’” (More 2009). Neither social institutions nor moral intuitions should be taken as reasons for not modifying human nature. Currently alien and even unimaginable forms of existence can all be stamped with the mark of humanity, or whatever it is that humanity will call itself in the transhuman and posthuman stages of its existence. The important point is that transhumanists consider some aspects of human nature to be of negative value and seek their elimination. Some transhumanists even cite an ethical duty to future generations of the species and hold that it is morally irresponsible not to alleviate suffering and death as much as possible for these future beings. But transhumanists do not seek only the alleviation of perceived lacks. They also aim for the expansion of human qualities and abilities and new levels of existence that are currently unavailable to humans. Bostrom (2001) speaks of new “modes of being” that cannot be imagined by current humans. Kurzweil holds that technology will allow us to map, extract and upload the patterns of energy that constitute our consciousnesses. Through this technique we will ultimately “transcend” the material nature of humanity: “We can ‘go beyond’ the ‘ordinary’ powers of the material world through the power of patterns ... It’s through the emergent powers of the pattern that we transcend. Since the material stuff of which we are made turns over quickly, it is the transcendent power of our patterns that persists” (Kurzweil 2005, 388). Despite this rather mystical language we can discern a concept of human nature not unlike the Marxian one. Human nature is not any set of limits, conditions or needs; rather, it is an evolving process that constantly breaks through perceived limits. Humans can perceive themselves in all kinds of alien objects and forms – humanity is “universal” in Marx’s sense. Kurzweil describes a transhumanist sense of human essence: “the essence of being human is not our limitations – although we do have many – it’s our ability to reach beyond our limitations” (Kurzweil 2005, 311). Mészáros echoes these sentiments in his reading of Marx: “Nothing is therefore ‘implanted in human nature.’ Human nature is not something fixed by nature, but, on the contrary, a ‘nature’ which is made by man in his acts of ‘self-transcendence’ as a natural being” (Mészáros 1970, 170). Humans are nature “coming out of itself” and transforming itself – a process. The transhumanist conception of human nature is also, like the Marxian conception, an open-ended one. Whether due to the unforeseeable ruptures with the past that the Singularity will produce, or more modestly, due to human beings’ abysmal track record at predicting the future, most transhumanists do not commit to hard and fast images of the future. Speaking as a hypothetical future self, Bostrom explains: “I can pass you no blueprint for Utopia, no timetable, no roadmap. All I can give you is my assurance that there is something here, the potential for a better life” (Bostrom 2010, 7). All that can be done is to fix what we know now is broken (e.g. short life spans, genetic disease) and envision, rationally, future possibilities. Despite frequent (and often understandable) accusations of utopianism, most transhumanists do not, in fact, aim for a technological heaven of perfection. While Kurzweil’s far-future projections do sometimes sound something like this, the practical import of the transhumanist project is about making human life better in ways that are possible and comprehensible to us now or in the near future. Thus Riccardo Campa holds that “only when a technology exists and is experimentally proved should it become part of immediate transhumanist policies and action programs aimed at obtaining their implementation and broad accessibility. Until then, it can only be a working hypothesis for scientists in their laboratories or of science fiction writers in their literary works” (Campa 2008). Projections should be recognized as being defeasible, though useful, ways for informing our current actions, which will undoubtedly lead to at least some unforeseeable consequences. The open-ended nature of human development means that qualitatively different forms of life lie in the future of our species. While the “meaning” of such a radically different life will no doubt be unlike that of our current lives, this is no call for alarm, transhumanists argue. It may not be possible to judge the “meaning” of transhuman or posthuman lives by the values we currently live by. As Bostrom holds: “Our own current mode of being … spans but a minute subspace of what is possible or permitted by the physical constraints of the universe … It is not farfetched to suppose that there are parts of this larger space that represent extremely valuable ways of living, relating, feeling, and thinking” (2001, 2). 3.3 We have seen that for both transhumanism and Marxism openness to redefinitions of the human are called for by human nature itself. The similarities are significant, but there is a striking difference between the two: sociality. Most transhumanist thought tends to place little emphasis on the social nature of the human – and this is where transhumanists should take a point from Marx. The transformation of the human seems to be regarded by most transhumanists as a process undergone by atomistic individuals who each exist in no more than a loose aggregate with others. Transformation is of the self, by the self, with social considerations tacked on afterwards – “technological self-transformation” (More 1993). While material conditions in the form of technological apparatuses are certainly an essential aspect of transhumanist revolution, the material aspects of social structures are not usually taken into account beyond assertions that the “freedom” of liberal democracy and/or capitalism provides optimal productivity. While Bostrom advocates equal or wide access to the trans and posthuman realm, he does not touch on the social hierarchy that underlies the current capitalist system and how it will impinge on such egalitarian access (Bostrom 2001, 7). Marx pointed out that in a capitalist society (and this applies now more than ever) individuals can be bestowed with formally equal rights while simultaneously being differentiated and stratified by the underlying economic structure (Marx 1978, 34). An impoverished fisherman in Newfoundland and a CEO of a multinational corporation formally have the same rights as citizens of Canada, yet it is practically true that the millionaire CEO is able to perform actions that the fisherman cannot, through the hierarchical powers inherent in the possession of the means of production.9 Now imagine that the fisherman and the CEO are both given, through an equal distribution of rights, radically extended lives. Would this in any way change the social asymmetry between them? It seems unlikely. The fisherman will still be dependent on dwindling fisheries for his livelihood while the CEO thrives on the extraction of surplus value. Technological developments occur in a society that has the power to determine to what end those technologies are used and to what extent their equal distribution benefits the transhumanist project. While some proposed technologies, such as molecular assemblers, do present possibilities of undermining or upsetting social structures, it is also possible that oppressive social structures will inhibit or corrupt the optimal utilization of new technologies. A recent (and depressing example) is the internet; the democratic potential of which is currently under sustained assault by governments and multinational corporations worldwide.10 There is also the suppression of the General Motors EV1 electric vehicle by a combination of corporate and governmental forces.11 Transhumanists should take note of Marx’s insistence on what is often recognized as the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, the contradiction between the forces of production and the social relations of production. Marx writes: At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production … with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. (Marx 1978, 4) The capitalist system of production’s sole aim is to extract ever greater surplus value from labor through the increasingly intense exploitation of workers, sophistication of machinery and lay-offs, but at a certain point, Marx holds, these techniques begin to turn back against production and inhibit it. A simple, abstract example: increasing productive efficiency through the use of the above-mentioned techniques means that more product is produced by less workers who receive less wages. Therefore there are less and/or poorer consumers to consume ever more product. With no one to buy up all of the product and thus produce a profit, the capitalist must develop his extraction of surplus value through the same techniques that further shrink the pool of potential consumers, producing a stagnant economy that is cured only when a new market is found or demand for the product resurfaces. The property relations of capitalism – the capitalist owns the means of production, while the worker owns only his labor power – become anti-productive once the productive forces are sufficiently developed. This ponderous method pays little heed to needs of the people in the society it exists within, operating solely by the capitalist directive of “maximizing shareholder profit,” to use contemporary terms. We are now well aware of stratagems such as planned obsolescence (automobiles) and novelty-mongering (Apple excels at this) that capitalist organizations deploy to keep consumption going. The question for transhumanists is whether they want revolutionarily life-changing technologies to be produced and distributed by the clumsy and brutal hand of capitalist production. Surely, we can only expect molecular assembling technology to come to the public, if it does, from the non-profit sector, because from a capitalist perspective, selling assemblers would be identical to selling off ownership of the means of production. In summary, transhumanists need to take into account the fact that, while technology does restructure society, the structures of society – which are social relations between humans – also influence the deployment of technologies. If the ultimate goal of transhumanism is the flourishing of the evolving being that is currently called “human,” current social relations between humans cannot be bracketed out. The “freedom” to compete and accumulate wealth under capitalism is not equivalent to the freedom to reach beyond limits for all individuals. From a Marxian angle: “What is to be avoided above all else is the re-establishing of ‘Society’ as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being … Man’s individual life and social life are not different” (Marx 1978, 86). Society is an association of individuals, not just a neutral space in which technological development will bring about changes in the human condition. The transformation of the individual and the transformation of society are inseparable.

## FW

#### Consequentialism means determinism is true

#### 1] Induction if x action leads to y result then x action must be influenced by prior action which means a causal chain of events structure my action rather than my will

#### 2] Focus on end states necessitates determinism because scientific models assume x will happen if y – anything else means you can’t predict the end point of any actions

3] **The best neuroscientific, psychological, and medical evidence evidence free will doesn’t exist. This article is a giant literature review of different fields.**

Andrea **Lavazza**, Neuroethics, Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy, Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It, **2016**, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

**All** these **experiments seem to indicate that free will is an illusion**. Yet, these relevant experiments can be interpreted in many ways. A possible view is that, in some way, determinism can be observed directly within ourselves. This interpretation might lead to the conclusion that free will is just an illusion. In fact, if one considers as a condition of free will the fact that it should be causa sui (i.e., it should be able to consciously start new causal chains), such a condition is incompatible with determinism as it is usually defined. For it, in fact, all events are linked by casual relations in the form of natural laws, which started long before we were born and which we cannot escape. However, determinism has generally been regarded as a metaphysical claim, not refutable by empirical findings. One could properly talk of automatism in the brain, not of determinism, based on the evidence available. (In any case, endorsing indeterminism might lead to consider our behavior as the causal product of choices that every time produce different results, as if we rolled a dice. This doesn’t seem to make us any freer than if determinism were overturned; cf. Levy, 2011). Most importantly, another feature of freedom seems to be a pure illusion, namely the role of consciousness. The experiments considered thus far heavily question the claim that consciousness actually causes voluntary behavior. **Neural activation starts the decisional process culminating in the movement, while consciousness “comes after”, when “things are done”. Therefore, [and] consciousness cannot trigger our voluntary decisions**. But the role of consciousness in voluntary choices is part of the definition of free will (but the very definition of consciousness is a matter of debate, cf. Chalmers, 1996). Empirical research in psychology also shows that our mind works and makes choices without our conscious control. As proposed by psychologist Wegner (2002, 2003, 2004) and Aarts et al. (2004), **we are “built” to have the impression to consciously control our actions or to have the power to freely choose, even though all that is only a cognitive illusion**. Many priming experiments show that people act “mechanically” (even when their behavior might appear suited to the environment and even refined). Automatic cognitive processes, of which we aren’t always aware, originate our decisions, and they were only discovered thanks to **the most advanced scientific research**. Ultimately, consciousness, which should exercise control and assess the reasons for a choice, is thus allegedly causally ineffective: a mere epiphenomenon, to use the terminology of the philosophy of mind. This is what has been called Zombie Challenge, “based on an amazing wealth of findings in recent cognitive science that **demonstrate** the surprising ways in which **our everyday behavior is controlled by automatic processes that unfold in the complete absence of consciousness**” (Vierkant et al., 2013).

#### Actions are predetermined which means we aren’t culpable for actions we don’t take

#### We have an intuitive preference for the squo.

**Henderson 16,** Rob. 2016. “How Powerful Is Status Quo Bias?” Psychology Today. Retrieved April 19, 2019 (<https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/after-service/201609/how-powerful-is-status-quo-bias).//SS>

Status quo bias is a cognitive bias that explains our preference for familiarity. Many of us tend to resist change and prefer the current state of affairs. How powerful is this cognitive bias? Consider this thought experiment from the renowned philosopher, Robert Nozick: "Suppose there was an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Super-duper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel like you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Of course, while in the tank you won't know that you're there; you'll think that it's all actually happening. Would you plug into this machine for life?" For most of us, our intuition is to say no. We might say something like, “There is more to life than pleasure," and cite the importance of our relationships with loved ones and connection to reality. And perhaps that’s true. But consider this variant on the above proposal: "It is Saturday morning and you are planning to stay in bed for at least another hour when all of the sudden you hear the doorbell. Grudgingly, you step out of bed to go open the door. At the other side there is a tall man, with a black jacket and sunglasses, who introduces himself as Mr. Smith. He claims to have vital information that concerns you directly. Mildly troubled but still curious, you let him in. ‘‘I am afraid I have to some disturbing news to communicate to you’’ says Mr. Smith. ‘‘There has been a terrible mistake. Your brain has been plugged by error into an experience machine created by neurophysiologists. All the experiences you have had so far are n**othing but the product of a computer program** designed to provide you with pleasurable experiences. All the unpleasantness you may have felt during your life is just an experiential preface conducive toward a greater pleasure (e.g. like when you had to wait in that long line to get tickets for that concert, remember?). Unfortunately, we just realized that we made a mistake. You were not supposed to be connected; someone else was. We apologize. That’s why we’d like to give you a choice: **you can either remain connected to this machine (and we’ll remove the memories of this conversation taking place) or you can disconnect**. However, you may want to know that your life outside is not at all like the life you have experienced so far. What would you choose?" This question comes from an experiment by **Felipe De Brigard**, a researcher at Duke University, who challenged the intuitions many of us hold when we read the original happiness machine thought experiment. One might think that individuals, when faced with the choice between reality and simulation, would consider contact with reality to be critical and therefore a clear majority of people would opt to exit the machine. However, when De Brigard posed this question to participants and measured the responses, **he found** the opposite result. Among the respondents, **59 percent stated that they would prefer to remain connected to the machine**, while only 41 percent stated that they would prefer to disconnect. The result of this study has interesting implications for the way we think about our capacity for change and our preference for the familiar. **When individuals are faced with the choice to change their environment or remain in their current state of affairs**, even when the decision is between simulated familiarity and unknown reality, **most will choose the familiar**. It is likely that this is a form of risk aversion that is characteristic of status quo bias—that individuals averse to the risk of losing their current reality will choose to remain, even at the expense of living in real, rather than a virtual, reality. Research from Kahneman and Tversky suggests that losses are twice as psychologically harmful as gains are beneficial. In other words, individuals feel twice as much psychological pain from losing $100 as pleasure from gaining $100. One interpretation is that in order for an individual to change course from their current state of affairs is that the alternative must be perceived as twice as beneficial. This highlights the challenges we may face when considering a change to our usual way of doing things. When military members are considering their choices as their contract comes to an end, many consider re-enlisting simply because they are unaware of the many opportunities that exist for them. Even when we understand our current path is no longer beneficial or no longer makes us happy, we must still overcome the natural urge to stay on the path unless the alternative is sufficiently attractive. In order for us to readily pursue an alternate path, we must believe that the alternative is clearly superior to the current state of affairs. **The status quo effect is pervasive in both inconsequential and major decisions. Oftentimes we are held back by what we believe to be the safe option, simply because it is the default**. Bearing in mind our natural propensity for the status quo will enable us to recognize the allure of inertia and more effectively overcome it.

## Adv

#### Tautnology

#### transhumanism increases empathy and solves oppression

Singh ‘17, (Sarwant, "Transhumanism And The Future Of Humanity: 7 Ways The World Will Change By 2030" Forbes, 11-20-2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/2017/11/20/transhumanism-and-the-future-of-humanity-seven-ways-the-world-will-change-by-2030/) //AL

We will be more empathetic The adoption of virtual reality can play an influential role in our ability to understand perspectives other than our own at the current moment. For example, VR could be used to understand the plight of refugees, giving us the opportunity to step into their shoes, which may make us more likely to take action or donate money.[iv] Other examples may include stepping into the shoes of our future selves, and looking at the lives we will live 40-50 years down the road if we save $200 a month vs. $2000. This application can bring home the need to save over the short term desire to spend. BMIs may also advance our ability to empathize if we are able to understand someone else’s full perspective straight from their own brain, rather than if they are trying to communicate it and misspeak or their intention is misinterpreted by the listener.

#### Pathologizgn material constraints and technological accommodations is ableist

#### Feely 16

Michael Feely is an Assistant Professor of Social Work at Trinity Dublin College and has a Ph.D. from Queens University. “Disability studies after the ontological turn: a return to the material world and material bodies without a return to essentialism” in Disability & Society, Volume 31(7), p. 863-883 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09687599.2016.1208603?journalCode=cdso20 “///” indicates paragraphs Language edited NT 17

Poststructuralist approaches have been the subject of much critique within academia in general, and disability studies in particular. Critics regularly cite three problems: these approaches **overlook the (often inaccessible) material world** that disabled people inhabit; they are **unable to engage productively rather than critically with science** and technology; and **they discount the importance of embodied experience, including pain**. /// Regarding poststructuralism’s failure to deal with the realities of the material world, Shakespeare (2014, 52) suggests that ‘critical disability studies writers generally seem much **more interested in texts and discourses than** in the ordinary **lives of disabled people’**. Meanwhile, Wendell (1996, 45) notes that ‘in most postmodern cultural theorizing about the body, there is no recognition of – and, as far as I can see, no room for recognising – **the** hard physical realities **that are** faced bypeople with disabilities’ [disabled people]. Similarly, Barnes (2012, 23) argues that poststructuralist accounts ‘**downplay the material reality of disabled people’s lives’** and have served to de-radicalise disability **studies** by diverting **critical** attention from identifying and challenging material forces underpinning disablement ‘towards a politically benign focus onculture, language, anddiscourse’. /// Poststructuralism’s difficulty with discussing the material world also leads to problems engaging productively with the material sciences and new technologies. These shortcomings have been highlighted by philosophers, scientists and disability scholars. The philosopher Searle (1998, 38), for example, suggests that while cultural practices may be relative, treating the knowledge produced by material sciences as **simply** a social construction is foolish and **prevents meaningful engagement** with ‘the most successful system that the human intellect has ever produced for getting knowledge of how the world works’. Material scientists have voiced similar objections, sometimes in very creative ways. In 1996, for instance, the physicist Sokal submitted a spoof paper – which suggested quantum gravity was a social construction – to a postmodern journal, Social Text. The journal published the jargon-rich but utterly meaningless paper, prompting a gleeful Sokal (1996) to invite poststructuralists who believed gravity to be a social construction to jump from his apartment window. Poststructuralism’s ambivalent and often suspicious position on science and technology is also problematic **and limiting for disability studies**. To explain, from a **Foucauldian** perspective, a prosthetic arm might be treated with suspicion as a normalising device whilst overlooking[ignoring] its **positive** potential to increase **a body’s** capacities. Similarly, psychiatric medications might be understood as disciplinary technologies that produce docile patients whilst overlooking[ignoring] their capacity to reduce **mental** pain **and visceral suffering**. /// This brings us to a third common criticism of poststructuralist approaches: that they **fail to provide an account of embodied experience**. In Grosz’s (1994, 116) words: ‘The body remains primarily as a text to be marked, traced, written upon by various regimes of institutional, (discursive and non-discursive) power’. Meanwhile – in common with thesocial model – poststructuralist approaches remain relatively silent on the embodied and visceral aspects of impairment, including pain. Shakespeare makes this point by drawing on personal experience: /// I confess to a certain **discomfort** when it comes to **non-disabled researchers** … telling me, who has two rather **painful and disabling impairments, that impairment does not exist or is only the product of discourse** … **My problem is my physical embodiment** and my experience of negative symptoms arising from impairment. (2014, 66–67) /// Similarly, Vehmas and Watson (2014, 649) argue that certain impairments – for example, motor neuron disease and depression – are undesirable ‘not merely because of **the** cultural representations **attached** to them but because these **conditions …** cause suffering irrespective of one’s cultural environment’. Finally, Siebers (2008) suggests that – in overlooking visceral experience – poststructuralists offer wholly **inadequate solutions to** the problem of **impairment**, and their political strategy of refusing to identify as impaired is deeply flawed because it ultimately implies that ‘imagination can curewhat ailsthe body’ (2008, 76).

1. <https://www.google.com/search?q=appropriation+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=appr&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i57j69i59l2j69i60l3.1218j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/unjust [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.google.com/search?q=by+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=by+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59.1737j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://www.google.com/search?q=the+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=the+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i64j69i61j69i60l2.1976j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i61l3.1473j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. <https://www.google.com/search?q=private+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=private+&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i57j69i60j69i61.1372j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-9)