# Speech 1NC UH Octas vs Westside 1-16 9AM

## 1

#### The aff must defend the implementation of a policy action should determine aff and neg ground – hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet.

#### “Resolved” means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or **determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘it was resolved **by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”**.

#### 1] predictable limits – radically re-contextualizing the resolution lets them defend any method tangentially related to the topic, which erases neg ground via perms and renders research burdens untenable.

#### Fair engagement is good and prior –

#### A] An absence of constant refinement dooms revolutionary potential by disregarding iterative testing and effective engagement

#### B] Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters.

#### C] Can’t weigh the aff—it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### 2] Advocacy Skills –

**Branson ’07** (Josh Branson, Former Northwestern Debater and NDT Champion, “Reflections about debate and policymaking”, <http://edebate.ndtceda.narkive.com/tDdAQukx/reflections-about-debate-and-policymaking#post1>, *wcp*)  
1. **Debate’s reliance on crappy evidence and arguments  
  
I wrote about this at length back when we were arguing about the Harrison card, so I won’t rehash all that stuff again. But I will say that this was, for me, one of the two biggest differences between debate and the “real” policy arena.** Copley News Service (I don’t mean to overly focus on that card, it’s just the most obvious example) and its ilk routinely pass for pretty much 100% credible evidence in debates, where it is completely useless in the policy world.   
I’ve been wondering for a while how serious this issue is…and I think that it’s fairly serious. **Debate trains us as debaters and coaches to look for a certain type of evidence** (see Antonucci’s quite elegant explanation of my thoughts on this matter: evidence that contains simple and easy-to-consume analogies, flamboyant claims, simple and direct rhetorical claims etc), **and at least for me, I’ve found myself falling into that trap when doing CSIS work this year at times.  
  
When debaters read academic journals or law reviews in debates, they quickly skip over all the ‘background’ and ‘history’ and much of the grunt legwork that underlines all the final substantive claims of the article, jumping to the conclusions of each section.** We want conclusions listed with a succinct summary of each warrant, so that it’s easy to read quickly, simply explained, and rhetorically direct.  
  
This really hit me hard this year, when working on things that I thought I was already pretty damn knowledgeable about---nuclear weapons. **I went into the year thinking I was going to be God’s gift to the nonprolif department, because ‘none of these people have had debate, so they won’t really understand all the nonprolif issues as well as I do, no matter how much expertise they may have.’**  
  
**Well, that’s not the way it worked at all, at least for me. No doubt in a collegiate debate judged by one of ya’ll I could have killed them all on the Pan K, probably even if we talked slow, but in the real world, I was kind of surprised to find that the knowledge generated by debate proved to be fairly damn cursory and artificial. I could rattle off a list of most of the arguments for/against most of the general nonproliferation doctrines, but a lot of the empirical and factual basis for these arguments was completely missing in my brain.** I could make the basic claim for almost anything in the field, but the technical issues that underlines a lot of them (the names and locations of the Russian CW destruction plants, an understanding of how the fine points of the budget process works, how a capital market sanction would actually be implemented, where did we get our intelligence that revealed Chinese serial proliferators selling bombs to AQ Khan, how does a centrifuge cascade work and why exactly would multilateral sanctions undermine Iran’s ability to get uranium gas piping technology, the names of the key players in the various foreign governments that make nonproliferation policy etc) was all missing.

#### TVA –

#### A] by passionately playing the game, we can effectively parody the System.

Gerry Coulter 7, sociology at Bishop's University in Sherbrooke, Canada. He is the founding editor of the International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, '7 "Jean Baudrillard And The Definitive Ambivalence Of Gaming," Games and Culture, October 2007, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 358-365, [http://insomnia.ac/essays/baudrillard\_on\_gaming/](http://insomnia.ac/essays/baudrillard_on_gaming/~~) SLHS-RR Recut CHO

The game comes from nowhere – “radical alterity” – idea of being something not of the system. Rules are always parodies and exaggerations of reality – it’s a way to engage in a non-system. Their acceleration comes form an overloading of meaning – to be absurd. What is more absurd than the game of debate. The game is a challenge and the dark sphere inhabited by its players involves a strong passion for rules (Baudrillard, 1979). Baudrillard (1979) understands the gamer to exist in a kind of hyperfreedom where the arbitrariness of the program is exchanged for society and the law. The game is perhaps the most poetic way we have yet discovered to "rid ourselves," he says, "of social conceptions of freedom" (Baudrillard, 2005b, p. 55). The spirit of gaming extends, for Baudrillard, back to well before the arrival of the virtual and technological gamer of today. We have long been avid devotees of games -- of a kind of rules-bound uncertainty and unpredictability we enjoy in our simulated absence from society while engaged in any game (Baudrillard, 1990). For Baudrillard (2001), the rules of the game "seem to come from some other sphere, with nothing to justify them -- just like chance, that eternal unjustified principle" (p. 90). Ambivalence reappears here as he considers that our submission to chance in the game is, at the same time, a way of parodying the ethics of work, value and economy (Baudrillard, 1979). The game contains the passion of illusion and appearances, and who is more passionate today than the gamer? (Baudrillard, 1990) For Baudrillard (2005a), "the fundamental passion is that of the game" (p. 149). This passion, in our transpolitical era, is replacing political passions from earlier times. Today, Baudrillard (1993a) says, even "hope bringing movements" (green or feminist) become part of the promotional machine of American and Western culture (p. 152). The cool passion of the game, an important aspect of its cool ambivalence, works to replace the former hot passions of politics or the body. When we play a game, we are impassioned, says Baudrillard, by the stakes -- not necessarily a positive or negative passion but a passion just the same -- the "passion of battle," he calls it (Baudrillard, 2005a, p. 149). We play the game, we make progress through its network, we lose, and we lose again; eventually we may even win -- it is the passion of this experience. In the place of liberty in today's society, Baudrillard (1979) finds instead the game and reminds us that our very passion for games and rules parodies all ideologies of liberty.

#### B] Analyze how private space entities use hyperreal images to justify wars – causes critical interrogation.

Stockwell 20 [Brackets Original. Samuel Stockwell (Research Project Manager, the Annenberg Institute at Brown University). “Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space Companies”. E-International Relations. Jul 20 2020. Accessed 12/7/21. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/> //Xu]

Private Space Corporations and Orbital Surveillance: Dual-Use Satellite Technology Starting in 2013, the leaking of classified information by former US National Security Agency employee Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which American intelligence agencies were collaborating with the private sector in mass surveillance operations (Bauman et al., 2014). In what has been described as the ‘securitisation’ of society, contemporary states have shifted from “politics to policing and from governing to managing” the public, which has often occurred without the consent or knowledge of their citizens (Petit, 2020: 31). While such practices have conventionally been Earth-bound in nature, the space domain provides an entirely radical and strategically beneficial perspective for conducting surveillance through satellites. Although many commercial US satellites provide an array of environmental and internet capabilities on Earth, they are also absolutely essential from a national security perspective of maintaining US space superiority (Chatters IV & Crothers, 2009: 257). This is known as the “dual-use” nature of satellites, where civilian and military purposes are blurred into a single observational system and can be adapted for different functions when necessary (Lubojemski, 2019: 128-129). Dual-use satellite technology has been vital for the US military in offering a tactical edge on the battlefield, with 80% of its satellite communications needs being derived from commercial satellites (Hampson, 2017: 7). The reliance on these networks forms a component of the broader US military doctrine of ‘space control’, part of which aims to secure the transmission of commercial satellite data that will prevent the exposure of sensitive military tactics (Peña & Hudgins, 2002). Whilst the OST does not contain any clauses specifying the rules or regulations of data monitoring in space, any form of malicious or illegal surveillance can be seen to violate Article XI, which requires states to: “Inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as to the public and international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practical, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of [space] activities” (UN, 1967). Yet, legal scholars have claimed that this clause is significantly weak, since states can withhold vital information about their space activities on the basis that the dissemination of such information is neither ‘feasible’ nor ‘practical’ (Chatterjee, 2014: 31-32). The absence of any clear UN guidelines has also meant that American satellite corporations are increasingly capable of refusing to state their intentions, or who their customers are – with the US government being one of these elusive clients. The 1994 Presidential Decision Decree-23 authorised the US government to require firms to either limit or stop sales of certain satellite images through a process known as ‘shutter control’. It is controversial because it designates the US executive branch the ability to limit publicly accessible information in certain circumstances, possibly violating First Amendment rights (Livingston & Robinson, 2003: 12). During the 2001 War in Afghanistan, the US government bought the rights to all orbital images taken over the theatre of operations by GeoEye’s Ikonos satellite on the grounds of ‘national security’ (The Guardian, 2001). However, media groups accused the government deal of preventing them from informing the public about matters of critical importance that in no way implicated national security, including the independent verification of government claims concerning damage to civilian structures and possible casualties (Livingston & Robinson, 2003: 12). These measures therefore undermined the OST’s Article XI clause by concealing important information to the public when it was feasibly possible, through the guise of national security discourse. At the same time, it allowed the US government to manipulate media coverage of areas it deems to be essential for conditioning public war support in Afghanistan, whilst simultaneously strengthening its space control doctrine. In many ways this strategy can also be seen as facilitating a ‘global panoptical’ intelligence network (Backer, 2008). By extending the private-public hybrid structure of surveillance into outer space, businesses and governments have the opportunity to observe millions of global citizens unknowingly at any one point – and with it – immense amounts of data. Given that GeoEye received nearly two million dollars in contract-related fees from the US government for its Ikonos pictures (The New York Times, 2001), this could incentivise the commercial satellite industry to continue to restrict data that might serve the interests of citizens globally. As such, satellite imaging may turn into a form of orbital data-siphoning where companies conducting observations in space could sell off their data to the highest bidder, with a concerning disregard for privacy rights. Indeed, the revelations surrounding Cambridge Analytica and Facebook have underscored the extent to which private entities are monetising off the sensitive information of their consumers unknowingly (Balkin, 2018: 2050-2051).

#### SSD – key to demonstrate that dogmatism is good and the uselessness of information by advocating for contradicting sides

#### Drop the Debater – 1AR restarts force late-developing debates that favor the aff since they get a 7-6 time skew and ensure surface-level clash.

#### No impact turns or RVIs –

#### A] Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position.

#### B] Dead end – strategy guides debates so they’ll desire that people read T to beat them on the impact turn – that proves their strategy is reactive and can’t solve since they rely on the structures they critique.

#### C] Logic

#### D] models

#### Competing interp – offense defense paradigm is the best method for evaluation since you can compare benefits under both interps easier.

## 2

#### Interp – debaters must open source disclose all documents they read on the NDCA LD wiki 30 minutes after the round has ended.

#### Violation – screenshots from 9PM last night shows NOTHING IS disclosed and when I asked, they only sent cites

Text

Description automatically generated

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated

#### 1] inequities—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs and can’t cut mass amounts of cards

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – pairings don’t give enough time but disclosing ASAP solves. That’s a voter – we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### 3] clash – allows debaters to come up with more nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate

## 3

#### CP Text – ????

#### The 1AC’s semiotic coherence within the world is sutured through a western model of scriptocentrism that is exclusionary and violent towards racialized bodies

Conquergood, Dwight. Cultural struggles: Performance, ethnography, praxis. University of Michigan Press, 2013. (a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University)//Elmer

According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a **hallmark of Western imperialism**. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulator)' powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., **green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders**—what de Certeau calls "intextuation": "Ever)' power, including **the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects"** (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the "undocumented" immigrants, the so-called "il- legal aliens," known in the vernacular as the people "sin papeles," the people without papers, indocitmentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble "the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141). **The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined.** Transcrip- tion is not a **transparent or politically innocent model for** conceptualizing or **engaging the world**. The root metaphor of the text underpins the **supremacy of Western knowledge systems** by **erasing** the vast realm of human **knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered,** "a history of the tacit and the habitual" (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean ComarofFpay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors "both verbally and nonverbally" (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and strug- gle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comarofis intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where "text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all" (1992:26). "In this day and age," they ask, "do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage **cannot speak at all? Or**, under greater or lesser duress, **opt not to** do so" (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

#### Solves case.

**Steinmann 15** [Catherine A. Steinmann (THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA). “Visceral Exposure: Melanie Gilligan, Hito Steyerl, and the Biopolitics of Visibility”. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies (Art History) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver). March 2015. Accessed 11/29/20. <https://open.library.ubc.ca/media/download/pdf/24/1.0135689/1> //Houston Memorial DX]

In her 2007 essay “Documentary Uncertainty,” Hito Steyerl recounts a story in which she watched a CNN broadcast during the first days of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In that segment, a correspondent riding in an armored vehicle jubilantly held a broadcast cell phone camera out the window, exclaiming that this type of live broadcast had never before been seen. He was right, Steyerl avers, but only because the low-resolution images showed nothing more than largely illegible green and brown blotches slowly moving across the screen. For Steyerl, what she calls the “abstract documentarism” of these blurred, poor images mirrors the uncertain reality of contemporary life: Actually, the picture looked like the camouflage of combat fatigues; a military version of abstract expressionism. What does this type of abstract documentarism tell us about documentarism as such? It points at a deeper characteristic of many contemporary documentary pictures: the more immediate they become, the less there is to see. The closer to reality we get, the less intelligible it becomes.112 For Steyerl, poor images such as these embody the “uncertainty principle of modern documentarism,”113 a genre that generates meaning more through how it is organized and how it circulates than what it represents—a form of abstract documentarism appropriate for an era in which political representation has become abstract and blurred. In her later essay “In Defense of the Poor Image” (2009), Steyerl elaborates on the poor image. For her, the poor image is a low-res image, a compressed, corrupted copy of a copy, always in motion, gradually deteriorating. Because it is constantly ripped, reproduced, remixed, reformatted, and re-edited, “the poor image tends towards abstraction,” she writes. “It is a visual idea in its very becoming.”114 Although Steyerl, who often refers to critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin as inspiration in her written work, does not mention Benjamin in “In Defense of the Poor Image,” her essay clearly owes a debt to his text The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility (1936), in which Benjamin considers originals in relation to copies, to copies of copies, and subsequent iterations. As Daniel Rourke notes, for Benjamin, the copy detracts from the aura of the original, yet the copy’s own aura, as it propagates, remains stable, “actually heightened in a system of ever-poorer repetitions and redisplays.”115 At one level, Steyerl’s defense of the blurred or poor image, much like her Strike videos, appears as a critique of increasingly oppressive regimes of visual representation—for example, of the slick, smooth surfaces of the images of high-end advertising. It also anticipates the collective desire the artist would articulate yet another two years later, in her 2012 essay “The Spam of the Earth: Withdrawal from Representation” (as we saw in chapter two), to become invisible in an era of mass paparazzi and exhibitionist voyeurism in which “the flare of photographic flashlights turns people into victims, celebrities, or both.”116 Her championing of the low-res, degraded image also can be interpreted as a protest against the larger regime that information-rich images participate in—the regime that, since mid-2013, when Edward Snowden first came forward in public with revelations about NSA surveillance and data collection, has been popularly called “Big Data”; 117 this is a regime always seeking to learn more, to gather more information, to represent us as so many data points. In a sentence that brings to mind both the breaking down of human subjects into the data sets and the fractal-recombinant info-commodities that, as we have seen, Franco “Bifo” Berardi describes as the building blocks of semiocapital, Steyerl writes: “As we register at cash tills, ATMs, and other checkpoints—as our cellphones reveal our slightest movements and our snapshots are tagged with GPS coordinates—we end up not exactly amused to death but represented to pieces.”118 Reading between the lines in Steyerl’s text, we see that the poor image thus suggests a second kind of abstraction. If the poor image is in the first place formally abstract in being blurred or in containing less data, in the second, it also enacts a strategy of withdrawal in the spirit of the Latin abstrahere, which, as curator Maria Lind notes, means “to withdraw”: It tends toward a politically useful opacity that resists a culture of open surveillance, of oppressive transparency.119 Here, abstraction embodies the principle of “less data,” and the withdrawal and visual opacity it entails emerge as a subset of a larger impulse that can be observed among artists working in today’s milieu of ultraefficient data gathering and transmission: to reject the culture of “information”— information that describes, represents, and constitutes the contemporary subject, thereby controlling it. As the writer and curator Anthony Huberman observes in his essay “I (not love) information,” whereas conceptual artists in the 1960s and 1970s, attracted to “the raw blankness of information, which they saw as a powerful opponent to the tyranny of ‘content’,” embraced information as a means of stepping away from the modernist project,120 artists working in the period of late post-Fordism seek instead to disrupt information, “to compromise the way information clings to their practice and identities.”121 Today, Huberman holds, information has become poisonous. Instead of offering us freedom, it has become an addiction: “Like all drugs, information takes hold of everything, surrounds it, swallows it, clings to it, bludgeons it and spits it back out.”122 In formulating abstraction as a kind of opacity or retreat from hypervisualization, Steyerl’s work thus can be situated within a larger contemporary trajectory of flight from description. At yet another level, Steyerl’s 2009 “defense of the poor image” points to both the image that can no longer claim to represent and to a reality that cannot be represented in traditionally indexical images. The poor image is less about what the image shows than what it does, how it moves, what encounters it has. This is an image that no longer refers to “the real thing—the originary original,” she writes. “Instead, it is about its own real conditions of existence: about swarm circulation, digital dispersion, fractured and flexible temporalities. It is about defiance and appropriation just as it is about conformism and exploitation. In short: it is about reality.”123 Once again reading between the lines in Steyerl’s text, we can consider the poor image abstract in a third sense: It has been wrested—in other words, abstracted— from its original contexts of production and use and thrust into circulation, and its indexical role is lost. It now functions as what Berardi refers to as a fractal-recombinant fragment of semiocapital. In his book After the Future, Berardi argues that fragmentation and recombination (which I discussed in chapter two) are both abstract and biopolitical, with profound implications for the subject: Recombination is the (informational and biopolitical) technique that transforms the activity of individual brains in an abstract productive continuum. The individual brain can act effectively only through the recombinant modality: functional recombination of fragments of cognitive labor scattered in time and space, but functionally unified inside the Net.124 In the new globalized network of semiocapital, he asserts, workers have been replaced with “an infinite brain-sprawl, an ever-changing mosaic of fractal cells of available nervous energy.” Here, the worker or “person” is reduced to mere precarious residue.125

## 4

#### Commercial Space Race favors American Companies – losing green-lights Chinese Dominance

Autry and Kwast 19 Greg Autry and Steve Kwast 8-22-2019 "America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China" (Greg Autry, a clinical professor of space leadership, policy, and business at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, and Steve Kwast)//Elmer

America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China The private sector can give the United States a much-needed rocket boost. The current U.S. space defense strategy is inadequate and on a path to failure. President Donald Trump’s vision for a Space Force is big enough. As he said on June 18, “It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.” But the Air Force is not matching this vision. Instead, the leadership is currently focused on incremental improvements to existing equipment and organizational structures. Dominating the vast and dynamic environment of space will require revolutionary capabilities and resources far deeper than traditional Department of Defense thinking can fund, manage, or even conceive of. Success depends on a much more active partnership with the commercial space industry— and its disruptive capabilities. U.S. military space planners are preparing to repeat a conflict they imagined back in the 1980s, which never actually occurred, against a vanished Soviet empire. Meanwhile, China is executing a winning strategy in the world of today. It is burning hard toward domination of the future space markets that will define the next century. They are planning infrastructure in space that will control 21st-century telecommunications, energy, transportation, and manufacturing. In doing so, they will acquire trillion-dollar revenues as well as the deep capabilities that come from continuous operational experience in space. This will deliver space dominance and global hegemony to China’s authoritarian rulers. Despite the fact that many in the policy and intelligence communities understand exactly what China is doing and have been trying to alert leadership, Air Force leadership has convinced the White House to fund only a slightly better satellite command with the same leadership, while sticking a new label onto their outmoded thinking. A U.S. Space Force or Corps with a satellite command will never fulfill Trump’s call to dominate space. Air Force leadership is demonstrating the same hubris that Gen. George Custer used in convincing Congress, over President Ulysses S. Grant’s better experience intuition, that he could overtake the Black Hills with repeating rifles and artillery. That strategy of technological overconfidence inflamed conflict rather than subduing it, and the 7th Cavalry were wiped out at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The West was actually won by the settlers, ranchers, miners, and railroad barons who were able to convert the wealth of the territory itself into the means of holding it. They laid the groundwork that made the 20th century the American Century and delivered freedom to millions of people in Europe and Asia. Of course, they also trampled the indigenous people of the American West in their wake—but empty space comes with no such bloody cost. The very emptiness and wealth of this new, if not quite final, frontier, however, means that competition for resources and strategic locations in cislunar space (between the Earth and moon) will be intense over the next two decades. The outcome of this competition will determine the fate of humanity in the next century. China’s impending dominance will neutralize U.S. geopolitical power by allowing Beijing to control global information flows from the high ground of space. Imagine a school in Bolivia or a farmer in Kenya choosing between paying for a U.S. satellite internet or image provider or receiving those services for free as a “gift of the Chinese people.” It will be of little concern to global consumers that the news they receive is slanted or that searches for “free speech” link to articles about corruption in Western democracies. Nor will they care if concentration camps in Tibet and the Uighur areas of western China are obscured, or if U.S. military action is presented as tyranny and Chinese expansion is described as peacekeeping or liberation. China’s aggressive investment in space solar power will allow it to provide cheap, clean power to the world, displacing U.S. energy firms while placing a second yoke around the developing world. Significantly, such orbital power stations have dual use potential and, if properly designed, could serve as powerful offensive weapons platforms. China’s first step in this process is to conquer the growing small space launch market. Beijing is providing nominally commercial firms with government-manufactured, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles they can use to dump launch services on the market below cost. These start-ups are already undercutting U.S. pricing by 80 percent. Based on its previous success in using dumping to take out U.S. developed industries such as solar power modules and drones, China will quickly move upstream to attack the leading U.S. launch providers and secure a global commercial monopoly. Owning the launch market will give them an unsurmountable advantage against U.S. competitors in satellite internet, imaging, and power. The United States can still build a strategy to win. At this moment, it holds the competitive advantage in every critical space technology and has the finest set of commercial space firms in the world. It has pockets of innovative military thinkers within groups like the Defense Innovation Unit, under Mike Griffin, the Pentagon’s top research and development official. If the United States simply protects the intellectual property its creative minds unleash and defend its truly free markets from strategic mercantilist attack, it will not lose this new space race. The United States has done this before. It beat Germany to the nuclear bomb, it beat the Soviet Union to the nuclear triad, and it won the first space race. None of those victories was achieved by embracing the existing bureaucracy. Each of them depended on the president of the day following the only proven path to victory in a technological domain: establish a small team with a positively disruptive mindset and empower that team to investigate a wide range of new concepts, work with emerging technologies, and test innovative strategies. Today that means giving a dedicated Space Force the freedom to easily partner with commercial firms and leverage the private capital in building sustainable infrastructure that actually reduces the likelihood of conflict while securing a better economic future for the nation and the world.

#### Pomo undermines heg – they said will to transparentcy is the wewst in cx they linik

Handler 92

[Joel Handler teaches Law and the Poor, a research seminar on social welfare issues, and another seminar titled Comparative Welfare States. His research interests include poverty, social welfare reform, and the European conception of social citizenship. He has been a member of the National Academy of Science's Committee on the Status of Black America and chaired the Academy's Panel on High Risk Youth. He is a past president of the Law and Society Association, 05-1992, "Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements" Law and Society Association, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3053811?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents> //GBS//Jacobs]

Derrida's critique of identity describes the organization of society itself. The constitution of a social identity is an act of power. Accordingly, postmodernists consider foundationalism or essentialism-whether liberal capitalism or Marxism-a fundamental obstacle to the deepening and extension of democracy throughout civil society (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:19; Thomas 1991). In contrast, deconstruction refers back to the contingency, the contextual determinant of all meaning. The rejection of foundationalist theories is based on two key ideas: the decentered subject and a reconceptualization of the theory of hegemony (Hunt 1990). The postmodern subject is not defined either by particular values such as possessive in- dividualism or by class, or by race, ethnicity, or gender. There is no unified essence. Rather, the postmodern subject is a plu- rality of contingent social, political, and epistemic relations. Moreover, these relations are constantly subject to rearticulation. Because there are no a priori relations based on hege- monic practices, agents are only contingently allied in more or less stable arrangements (Deutsche 1991:21; Laclau & Mouffe 1985:27, 28; Thomas 1991:2, 4). Hegemonic structures-that is, the processes of mobilizing consent-are also contingent. Social relations are constructed and transformed through discourse and articulation that are never complete, never totalizing, even if not contested. In con- trast to the Frankfurt school, the postmoderns believe that hegemony is never stable. People are never merely passively subordinated, never totally manipulated. Opposition is always possible within alternative practices, structures, and spaces (Deutsche 1991:20; Grossberg 1988:52-53; Laclau & Mouffe 1985:30). Postmodernists think that the potential for subversive struggle today is especially propitious because of the discredit- ing of Marxism, the instabilities of late capitalism, and the contradictions of the bureaucratic welfare state. Interpersonal relations have been commodified and bureaucratized. modernists see these negative effects as a source of resistance and freedom (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:36, 37). Change will be brought about through small-scale transformation. By increasing the plasticity of social structures, the state itself will be converted from a source of stability to a source of change (Boyle 1985). Change will be in the democratic direction. Equality and rights discourse play a fundamental role in reconstructing collective identities. When people ac- cept the legitimacy of the principal of equality in one sphere, they will attempt to extend it other spheres (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:39). In this way, the contradictions and instabilities of late capitalism can be subverted from within (Thomas 1991:2). Sub- version from "within" usually means from "below." "Below" could encompass geographically situated communities, such as factories, offices, neighborhoods or "intentional" communities (Aronowitz 1988:47). The theoretical elements of postmodern philosophy link to- gether to form the basis for a postmodern political theory: through deconstruction, hegemonic structures are destabilized, making resistance always possible. The ideology of equality transforms subordinate relations into oppression and then resistance. However, while subversive groups need a concep- tion of the social order, postmodernists, in contrast to founda- tionalists, insist that this conception must always be unstable, contested, and open. The task is to "institutionalize discursive discontinuity"

#### Extinction.

Ikenberry 20 John Ikenberry 6-9-2020 “The Next Liberal Order: The Age of Contagion Demands More Internationalism, Not Less” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/next-liberal-order> (Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, in South Korea)//Elmer

The rivalry between the United States and China will preoccupy the world for decades, and the problems of anarchy cannot be wished away. But for the United States and its partners, a far greater challenge lies in what might be called “the problems of modernity”: the deep, worldwide transformations unleashed by the forces of science, technology, and industrialism, or what the sociologist Ernest Gellner once described as a “tidal wave” pushing and pulling modern societies into an increasingly complex and interconnected world system. Washington and its partners are threatened less by rival great powers than by emergent, interconnected, and cascading transnational dangers. Climate change, pandemic diseases, financial crises, failed states, nuclear proliferation—all reverberate far beyond any individual country. So do the effects of automation and global production chains on capitalist societies, the dangers of the coming revolution in artificial intelligence, and other, as-yet-unimagined upheavals. The coronavirus is the poster child of these transnational dangers: it does not respect borders, and one cannot hide from it or defeat it in war. Countries facing a global outbreak are only as safe as the least safe among them. For better or worse, the United States and the rest of the world are in it together. Past American leaders understood that the global problems of modernity called for a global solution and set about building a worldwide network of alliances and multilateral institutions. But for many observers, the result of these efforts—the liberal international order—has been a failure. For some, it is tied to the neoliberal policies that produced financial crises and rising economic inequality; for others, it evokes disastrous military interventions and endless wars. The bet that China would integrate as a “responsible stakeholder” into a U.S.-led liberal order is widely seen to have failed, too. Little wonder that the liberal vision has lost its appeal. Liberal internationalists need to acknowledge these missteps and failures. Under the auspices of the liberal international order, the United States has intervened too much, regulated too little, and delivered less than it promised. But what do its detractors have to offer? Despite its faults, no other organizing principle currently under debate comes close to liberal internationalism in making the case for a decent and cooperative world order that encourages the enlightened pursuit of national interests. Ironically, the critics’ complaints make sense only within a system that embraces self-determination, individual rights, economic security, and the rule of law—the very cornerstones of liberal internationalism. The current order may not have realized these principles across the board, but flaws and failures are inherent in all political orders. What is unique about the postwar liberal order is its capacity for self-correction. Even a deeply flawed liberal system provides the institutions through which it can be brought closer to its founding ideals. However serious the liberal order’s shortcomings may be, they pale in comparison to its achievements. Over seven decades, it has lifted more boats—manifest in economic growth and rising incomes—than any other order in world history. It provided a framework for struggling industrial societies in Europe and elsewhere to transform themselves into modern social democracies. Japan and West Germany were integrated into a common security community and went on to fashion distinctive national identities as peaceful great powers. Western Europe subdued old hatreds and launched a grand project of union. European colonial rule in Africa and Asia largely came to an end. The G-7 system of cooperation among Japan, Europe, and North America fostered growth and managed a sequence of trade and financial crises. Beginning in the 1980s, countries across East Asia, Latin America, and eastern Europe opened up their political and economic systems and joined the broader order. The United States experienced its greatest successes as a world power, culminating in the peaceful end to the Cold War, and countries around the globe wanted more, not less, U.S. leadership. This is not an order that one should eagerly escort off the stage. Any alternative is worse and causes great power war. The major alternatives to a modernized world order supported by the United States appear unlikely, unappealing, or both. A Chinese-led order, for example, would be an illiberal one, characterized by authoritarian domestic political systems and statist economies that place a premium on maintaining domestic stability. There would be a return to spheres of influence, with China attempting to domi-nate its region, likely resulting in clashes with other regional powers, such as India, Japan, and Vietnam, which would probably build up their conventional or even nuclear forces. A new democratic, rules-based order fashioned and led by medium powers in Europe and Asia, as well as Canada, however attractive a concept, would simply lack the military capacity and domestic political will to get very far. A more likely alternative is a world with little order—a world of deeper disarray. Protectionism, nationalism, and populism would gain, and democracy would lose. Conflict within and across borders would become more common, and rivalry between great powers would increase. Cooperation on global challenges would be all but precluded. If this picture sounds familiar, that is because it increasingly corresponds to the world of today. The deterioration of a world order can set in motion trends that spell catastrophe. World War I broke out some 60 years after the Concert of Europe had for all intents and purposes broken down in Crimea. What we are seeing today resembles the mid-nineteenth century in important ways: the post– World War II, post–Cold War order cannot be restored, but the world is not yet on the edge of a systemic crisis. Now is the time to make sure one never materializes, be it from a breakdown in U.S.-Chinese relations, a clash with Russia, a conflagration in the Middle East, or the cumulative effects of climate change. The good news is that it is far from inevitable that the world will eventually arrive at a catastrophe; the bad news is that it is far from certain that it will not.

#### Transition Wars.

Khalizad 16 Zalmay Khalizad 3-23-2016 “4 Lessons about America's Role in the World” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/4-lessons-about-americas-role-the-world-15574?page=show (former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, counselor at the CSIS)//Elmer

Ultimately, however, we concluded that the United States has a strong interest in precluding the emergence of another bipolar world—as in the Cold War—or a world of many great powers, as existed before the two world wars. Multipolarity led to two world wars and bipolarity resulted in a protracted worldwide struggle with the risk of nuclear annihilation. To avoid a return such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ultimately agreed that our objective must be to prevent a hostile power to dominate a “critical region,” which would give it the resources, industrial capabilities and population to pose a global challenge. This insight has guided U.S. defense policy throughout the post–Cold War era. Giving major powers the green light to establish spheres of influence would produce a multipolar world and risk the return of war between the major powers. Without a stabilizing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S. relationships with Jordan and the Gulf States, Iran could shut down oil shipments in its supposed sphere of influence. A similar scenario in fact played out during the 1987 “tanker war” of the Iran-Iraq war, which eventually escalated into a direct military conflict between the United States and Iran. Iran’s nuclear program makes these scenarios even more dangerous. The United States can manage the rise and resurgence of great powers like China, Russia and Iran at an acceptable cost without ceding entire spheres of influence. The key is to focus on normalizing the geopolitics of the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, which the United States can do by strengthening its transatlantic and transpacific alliances and adapting them to the new, dangerous circumstances on the horizon. The United States should promote a balance of power in key regions while seeking opportunities to reconcile differences among major actors.

#### Nuke war causes extinction

* Checked

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

#### Extinction o/w under Baudy

#### 1] future improvement

#### 2] material conditions

#### 3] prereq to VTl

## 5

#### Ethics must be derived from the a priori world –

#### 1] External Worlds Skepticism –

Chapman summarizes 14 [Andrew Chapman (lecturer in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder). “External World Skepticism”. 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. 6 FEBRUARY 2014. Accessed 12/11/21. <https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/> //Xu]

You’re being deceived by a very powerful evil demon right now. This demon has the ability to manipulate your sensory impressions such that it will seem to you that things are some way when they are not that way at all. Accordingly, things are actually nothing like P. For example, suppose it seems to you as though you are in a room with a table and chair in it and that you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (1) is true, then you actually are in a room with a table and chair in it and you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, then you are not in a room with a table and chair in it and you are not reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, things are very different from how they seem to you to be.1

\*Footnote 1\*

1 If the evil demon scenario is too far-fetched for you, imagine that you are dreaming or that you are hallucinating or even that you are in a laboratory and your visual cortex is being stimulated by electrodes.

\*Paragraph Following the First\*

Philosophers call (2) a skeptical scenario. In skeptical scenarios, you are radically misled, deceived, or bamboozled by your evidence in such a way that how things seem to you is different from how things actually are. Perhaps the most famous propounder of skeptical scenarios in the history of philosophy is René Descartes (1596-1650) in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). In the Meditations, Descartes considers that he might be dreaming or that he might be being deceived by the evil demon from our scenario (2) above. Hollywood has made much of skeptical scenarios in movies like Total Recall, The Matrix, and Inception. So back to our original question: Which of (1) or (2) is best supported or best justified by its seeming to you that P? If you’re being honest with yourself, you’ll conclude that how things seem equally well supports (1) and (2). From your internal, first-personal perspective, either of (1) or (2) could be true given how things seem to you. And if that weren’t bad enough, here comes the kicker: If both (1) and (2) are equally well supported by your evidence, how can you ever possibly know anything about the world outside your own skin? This is the problem of external world skepticism, perhaps the central problem of modern epistemology.

#### 2] Paradox of induction

Black’s quotes Hume [Brackets Original. David Hume (Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, historian, economist, librarian and essayist). “The Paradox of Induction”. Black’s Academy. No Date. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://www.blacksacademy.net/pages/px-015-pxqekj-paradox-induction.php> //Xu]

The paradox of induction is the problem that in all scientific reasoning we form conclusions, called laws, that are of a general nature; however, the evidence we have for those laws is based upon particular experiences. For example, we form the conclusion that all rays of light will be bend as the pass from air into glass, but we have only ever observed a finite number of instances of this law. On further reflection we see that there is no necessary connection between something happening on one occasion and the same thing happening in like circumstances on another occasion. We are not directly acquainted with the “power” behind events that ensures the uniformity of nature throughout space and time.

Another illustration of this might concern the uniformity of space. Imagine that a space mission is about to be sent to the nearest star, Alpha Centuri. People might be queuing up to volunteer to be the first people to witness life on a distant planet. On the other hand, there might be anxious reluctant passengers, desperate not to be dragged on the fool-hardy mission. Why? Because there is no guarantee that the laws of nature operate in the same way in outer space as they do in our solar system. It is entirely conceivable that once the space ship passes beyond the perimeter of our solar system, that entirely different laws of physics will apply, and the space ship could be destroyed by chaotic forces that cannot be anticipated. We have no way at present of being sure that universe is uniform. We have only sampled physical nature in our own limited portion of the universe. We might regard the fear of the passengers as outlandish, but it is not an irrational fear. Just because things have happened at one point of space and at a given time in a certain way is no guarantee that they always will happen that way.

This, then, is the paradox. Every day we reason from particular instances to generalities, and such inference is essential to our way of life; but there is no guarantee that such an inference is valid, and, indeed, very often such inferences prove to be fallacious — as in the case of the chicken that reasoned that its master would always feed it just because its master always has!

#### 3] Is-Ought Gap –

Gray 11 [James W. Gray (MA in philosophy from San Jose State University). "The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"" Ethical Realism. N.p., 19 July 2011. Web. 28 Oct. 2015. //Massa]

**The is/ought gap is a problem in moral philosophy where what is the case and what ought to be the case seem quite different, and it presents itself as the following question** to David Hume: **How do we *know* what morally ought to be the case from what is the case?** Hume posed the question in A Treatise of Human Nature Book III Part I Section I: In **every system of morality**, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs, when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change **is imperceptible**; but is, however, of the last consequence. **For as this ought**, or ought not, **expresses some new relation** or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, **for what seems altogether inconceivable**, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. It is here that Hume points out that **philosophers argue about** various **nonmoral facts, then somehow conclude what ought to be the case** (or what people ought to do) **based on** those facts (about **what is the case**). **For example, we might find out that arsenic is poisonous and conclude that we ought not consume it. But we need to know how nonmoral facts can lead to moral conclusions. These two things seem unrelated.** The is/ought gap doesn’t seem like a problem for nonmoral oughts—what we ought to do to accomplish our goals, fulfill our desires, or maintain our commitments. For example, we could say, “If you want to be healthy, you ought not consume arsenic.” However, it might be morally wrong to consume arsenic. If it is, we have some more explaining to do.

#### 4] Empirical Models are impossible – Bonini’s pardox.

Wikipedia summarizes Dutton and Starbuck [Brackets Original. John M. Dutton (He enrolled in Harvard Business School in 1955, graduated with an M.B.A. in 1957, and embarked on an academic career that culminated as professor of business administration. He stayed on at Harvard as a research associate and taught at Northeastern University. He taught at Purdue University Krannert School of Industrial Engineering in Lafayette, IN from 1960 to 1968. His research included organizational behavior, computer simulation of human behavior, history of business technology, progress-principal studies, and strategic changes in the energy industry. He was elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. He was the Lucas Visiting Professor at the University of Birmingham in England from 1963 to 1964. He went on to teach at Southern Methodist University Business School in Dallas, TX from 1968 to 1971. In 1971 he moved to Manhattan where he taught and was Associate Dean at New York University, Stern Graduate School of Business Administration retiring in 1998. While at NYU he helped develop and teach the executive M.B.A. programs in France and Japan). William Haynes Starbuck (graduated from Harvard University and the Carnegie Institute of Technology. He is an organizational scientist who has held professorships in social relations, sociology, business administration, and management). “Bonini's paradox”. Wikipedia. No Date. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonini%27s_paradox> //Houston Memorial DX]

In modern discourse, the paradox was articulated by John M. Dutton and William H. Starbuck[2] "As a model of a complex system becomes more complete, it becomes less understandable. Alternatively, as a model grows more realistic, it also becomes just as difficult to understand as the real-world processes it represents".[3] This paradox may be used by researchers to explain why complete models of the human brain and thinking processes have not been created and will undoubtedly remain difficult for years to come. This same paradox was observed earlier from a quote by philosopher-poet Paul Valéry, "Ce qui est simple est toujours faux. Ce qui ne l’est pas est inutilisable".[4] ("A simple statement is bound to be untrue. One that is not simple cannot be utilized."[5]) Also, the same topic has been discussed by Richard Levins in his classic essay "The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology", in stating that complex models have 'too many parameters to measure, leading to analytically insoluble equations that would exceed the capacity of our computers, but the results would have no meaning for us even if they could be solved.[6] (See Orzack and Sober, 1993; Odenbaugh, 2006)

#### Only practical reason is a priori.

Korsgaard [Korsgaard, Christine (Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University). “Creating The Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations.” (p. 317-318). https://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.CKE.Essay.pdf]

On what I take to be the correct interpretation, the distinction is not between two kinds of beings, but between the beings of this world insofar as they are authentically active and the same beings insofar as we are passively receptive to them. The “gap” in our knowledge exists not because of the limits of experience but because of its essential nature: to experience something is (in part) to be passively receptive to it, and therefore we cannot have experiences of activity as such.xxvi As thinkers and choosers we must regard ourselves as active beings, even though we cannot experience ourselves as active beings, and so we place ourselves among the noumena, necessarily, whenever we think and act. According to this interpretation, the laws of the phenomenal world are laws that describe and explain our behavior. But the laws of the noumenal world are laws which are addressed to us as active beings; their business is not to describe and explain at all, but to govern what we do.xxvii Reason has two employments, theoretical and practical. We view ourselves as phenomena when we take on the theoretical task of describing and explaining our behavior; we view ourselves as noumena when our practical task is one of deciding what to do.xxviii The two standpoints cannot be mixed because these two enterprises - explanation and decision - are mutually exclusive.xxix These two ways of understanding the noumenal/phenomenal distinction yield very different interpretations of Kant’s strictures against trying to picture the relation between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. On the ontological view, the question how the two worlds are related is one which, frustratingly, cannot be answered. On the active/passive view, it is one which cannot coherently be asked. There is no question that is answered by my descriptions of how Marilyn’s freedom interacts with the causal forces that determine her. For freedom is a concept with a practical employment, used in the choice and justification of action, not in explanation or prediction; while causality is a concept of theory, used to explain and predict actions but not to justify them.xxx There is no standpoint from which we are doing both of these things at once, and so there is no place from which to ask a question that includes both concepts in its answer.

#### O/W –

#### A] Infinite Regress – certainty must answer “why” because it would otherwise allow agents to infinitely question why it’s true – other frameworks allow agents to question every part of it, but questioning reason concedes its authority which proves its inescapable.

#### That justifies universal laws of morality – there’s no distinction between practical reasoners – its incoherent to claim that 1+1=2 just for me.

#### Thus, the standard is *consistency with universalizable maxims* – actions are ethical insofar as willing it doesn’t infringe on the ability to will it.

#### 1] Performativity – when you enter debate, you presume that you will be free to set and pursue ends in the round because of a system of reciprocally enforced constraints.

#### 2] Ideal Theory Good – a] end point – we’d constantly be fixing injustices as a precondition to ethical action so we never get to the bottom of what is actually ethical b] relevance – every society has different injustices that occur – the resolution is a universal values statement which means you cannot universalize any theory under nonideal theory.

#### Negate –

#### 1] not defending the topic is non-universalizable b/c if nobody defended the topic than a topic wouldn’t have even been created in the first place which is a contradiction.

#### 2] Space appropriation and exploration originates from private companies such as Space X and Blue Origin. Preventing such is a restriction on the ability of companies to set and pursue their ends and these companies gain contracts with the government for projects which turns promise breaking offense.

# AC

### ToP

#### Baudrillard’s relativism justifies ignoring atrocities – conflict is real, denying it is worse.

Every ‘7

[Peter, Department of Computing at Coventry University. “The Fascination Payload: Cultural Studies and the first Gulf War.” <http://www.academia.edu/6175231/The_Fascination_Payload_Cultural_Studies_and_the_First_Gulf_War>] pat

Jean Baudrillard chose the occasion of the Gulf Conflict to extend his thesis that global society is so caught in the grip of media simulation that its connection with reality has, once and for all, been severed: “Just a couple of days before war broke out in the Gulf, one could find Baudrillard regaling readers of the Guardian newspaper with an article which declared that this war would never happen, existing as it did only as a figment of mass media simulation, war‐games rhetoric or imaginary scenarios beyond all limits of real‐world, factual possibility” (Norris: 11) In choosing to concentrate on the undeniably manifest talk of war and foregrounding the role of strategic simulation whilst, simultaneously, refusing to engage in an account of events beyond the media, Jean Baudrillard was able to construct the case that a war conducted at a distance would be, of necessity, a matter of pure speculation and simulation: “Exchanging war for the signs of war” (Baudrillard 1994: 62). Written in to this article, almost as a fail‐safe device against the collapse of his contention, was an interdiction against the ability of anyone to make a claim to know the truth of the situation. For, in Baudrillard’s eyes, such a claim would be “banking on a realist ontology that clung to some variant of the truth/falsehood or fact/fiction dichotomy” (Norris: 13). A claim that would be forever stuck in nostalgia for some ultimate truth telling discourse (or metalanguage) ‐ offering a delusory refuge from the “knowledge that we are nowadays utterly without resources in the matter of distinguishing truth from falsehood” (ibid: 13). This is akin to Richard Rorty’s position in “Contingency, Irony and Solidarity” in which: “To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human language, and that human languages are human creations. Truth cannot be out there ‐ cannot exist independently of the human mind ‐ because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there”. (q.v. Sprinkler: 125) The ethical consequences of such linguistic relativism can be seen when one compares Baudrillard or Rorty’s position to that of revisionist historian Robert Faurrison. Faurrison claimed that as there were no surviving ‘eye witnesses’ to Nazi gas chambers there would, ultimately, be no way of confirming those chamber’s existence. These consequences became more evident as events unfolded in the Gulf. Outbreaks of the real – Virilio’s ‘interruptions’ – such as the bombing of the El Almiriyah air raid shelter (no matter how mediated or explained away by military spokespeople) could not disguise the fact that people, civilians, actually died. There were eye‐witness survivors. Baudrillard’s take on the fact/fiction dichotomy began to look decidedly sickening: “There will be nobody in a position to know what they are seeing, reading or hearing is not some fictive ‘simulacrum’ of the real, conjured up by the ubiquitous propaganda machine or the various techniques of media disinformation” (Norris: 12) To go down the road, like Baudrillard, of a fictive conspiracy theory in which images of death at El Almiriyah were nothing more than the a highly competent, cinematically constructed, simulation is surely stretching the limits of credibility. If contemporary truth is, according to this post‐modern critical line, only a matter of rhetorical or suasive force then El Almiriya was the point at which Baudrillard’s “(un)truth claim” lost its own persuasive appeal – breaking the bounds of virtually every consensual notion of reality. Despite this, following the conflict, Baudrillard was minded to publish an article entitled “La Guerre du Golfe n’a pas en lieu” (The Gulf War did not take place) in Liberation ‐ An extract of which was published in The Guardian. In the article he conceded that “this ‘simulated’ war has not been entirely a product of mass media illusionist techniques; that large numbers of Iraqi conscripts and civilians had been killed by the Allied aerial bombardment; that massive damage had been inflicted on the country’s infrastructure” (Norris: 192). Nevertheless, none of the ‘facts’ had persuaded him to drop his original contention that the war had predominantly existed as a virtual construct: “If we have no practical knowledge of this war ‐ and such knowledge is out of the question ‐ then let us at least have the sceptical intelligence to reject the probability of all information, of all images whatever their source. To be more ‘virtual’ than the events themselves, not to re‐establish some criterion of truth ‐ for this we lack the means” (q.v. Norris 194). With this Baudrillard maintains a strict adherence to the notion of the impossibility of veridical knowledge. And herein lays his paradox ‐ that in the same article he can admit the ‘facts’ as regards casualties whilst denying any means of ascertaining their truth. Admitting knowledge and the impossibility of knowledge, in the same breath, is a logical error ‐ both cannot be true.

#### Baudrillard over-totalizes and is western centric

Robinson 13 (Andrew, political theorist and activist, weekly contributor to Ceasefire magazine, author of *Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social movements, networks and hierarchies*, “Jean Baudrillard and Activism: A critique”, Ceasefire Magazine, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-14/)//Elmer

One limit to Baudrillard’s theory is his tendency to over-totalise. Baudrillard is talking about tendential processes, but he often talks as if they are totally effective. There are still, for instance, a lot of uncharted spaces, a lot of unexplained events, a lot of things the system can’t handle. While Baudrillard is describing dominant tendencies in the present, these tendencies coexist with older forms of capitalism, in a situation of uneven development. The persistence of the system’s violence is a problem for Baudrillard’s perspective: the smooth regime of neutralisation and inclusive regulation has notended older modalities of brutality. At times, Baudrillard exaggerates greatly the extent to which the old authoritarian version of capitalism has been replaced by subtle regimes of control. He exaggerates the extent to which contemporary capitalism is tolerant, permissive and ‘maternal’. This may be because his works were mostly written in France in the 1970s-80s, when the dominant ethos was still largely social-democratic. What Baudrillard recognises as the retrograde version of capitalism associated with the right-wing was to return with a vengeance, especially after 911. Another problem is a lack of a Southern dimension. Like many Northern authors, Baudrillard’s approach mainly applies to the functioning of capitalism in the North. The penetration of the code is substantially less in countries where information technology is less widespread. In parts of Africa, even simple coding exercises such as counting votes or recording censuses are extremely difficult. This is for the very reasons of respondent reflexivity which Baudrillard highlights. People will under-record themselves to stay invisible, or over-record themselves to obtain benefits. And without massive resources to put into its bureaucracies, the system is unable to find enough people who will act as transmitters for the code. Instead, people use their power to extract what they can from the system. Explosions still happen regularly in the South. Furthermore, a contracting system ‘forcibly delinks’ large portions of the globe. Its power on the margins is lessened as its power at the core is intensified. As the system becomes ever more contracted and inward-looking, liberated zones may appear [around the edges](http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Anonymous__Desert.html). Without an element of border thinking, Baudrillard tends to exaggerate the system’s completeness and effectiveness. Baudrillard assumes that any excess is everywhere absorbed into the code. He ignores the persistence of borderlands. And when he talks about the South, he admits that the old regime of production might still exist here: people still work seeking betterment; colonial wars are fought to destroy persisting symbolic exchange; Saddam was not playing the Gulf War by the rules of deterrence. The Arab masses are still able to become inflamed by war or non-war; Iran and Iraq can still fight a real war, not a simulated non-war. So perhaps only a minority, only thse included layers within the North, are trapped within simulation and the ‘masses’. Perhaps reality has not died, but been displaced to the South. It seems, therefore, premature to suggest that the system has encompassed all of social life in the code. To be sure, its reach has expanded, but it has also forcibly delinked large areas of the globe. The penetration of simulated reality into everyday life varies in its effectiveness. At the limit, as in Somalia, simulated states collapse under their own irrelevance. In other cases, an irrelevant state hovers over a largely autonomous society. And the struggle Baudrillard advocated in his early works against subordination as labour-power is not simply theoretical. In fact, there is a constant war, fought at various degrees of intensity, between the system and its others, especially in highly marginal parts of the global South: Chiapas, Afghanistan, the Niger Delta, Somalia, West Papua, rural Colombia, Northeast India, the Andes.

#### Hyper-Reality isn’t true, it’s unfalsifiable, and the Alt Fails

TlMOTHY W. LUKE 91 [\*], Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Power and politics in hyperreality: The critical project of Jean Baudrillard. By: Luke, Timothy W., Social Science Journal, 03623319, 1991, Vol. 28, Issue 3, Ebsco //Elmer

Baudrillard's critical project clearly outlines a fascinating and innovative appraisal of the often confusing and contradictory tendencies in contemporary society that are usually labelled as "postmodernity." Nonetheless, there are considerable weaknesses as well as great strengths in Baudrillard's system of analysis. The tenacity of "reality" or "modernity" in several spheres of everyday life, for example, often still overshadows "hyperreality." Thus, it seems that Baudrillard's major flaw is mistaking a handful of incipient developments or budding trends for a full-blown or completely fixed new social order. The total break with all past forms of social relations cannot be verified either from within or from outside of Baudrillard's frameworks. While he denies finding much systematicity in hyperreal capitalism and sees the end of "production" and "power" in the rise of seduction, Baudrillard still clings to the image of a powerful exploitative system in his call to the masses to recognize "that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic."( n21) This twist in his thinking raises important questions. Why does a social order that no longer really exists need his theoretical intervention to be transformed by mass resistance **if it is not real**, powerful or productive? Likewise, if the history of power and production has ended, then why does Baudrillard envision today's best radical opposition to capital and the state assuming the form of hyperconformity by pushing "the system" into a hyperlogical practice of itself to induce the crisis that might abolish it?¶ On the other hand, Baudrillard's strategy of "hyperconformity," as a means of radical resistance, does not seriously challenge the consumerist modes of domination intrinsic to transnational corporate capitalism. Moreover, its ties to consumer subjectivity do not even begin to address other possible strategies of resistance following lines drawn by gender, race, ethnicity, language or ecology. Unlike Lyotard, he does not advance any new conceptions of postmodern justice or articulate alternative principles to represent meaningful narratives about values in hyperreality. Thus, Baudrillard also can be tarred with the brush of neoconservatism, like many other postmodernist critics of society.( n22) Baudrillard tends to misplace the concreteness of the relations that he is investigating, lumping everything into the category of "seduction" which, in turn, totally subsumes such complex factors as power, production, sex, and economy into one universal force. He claims somewhat contradictorily that "seduction . . . does not partake of the real order." Yet, at the same time, "seduction envelops the whole real process of power, as well as the whole real order of production, with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation--without which neither power nor production would even exist."( n23) While Baudrillard makes these claims, he never really demonstrates definitely how this all works with carefully considered evidence.

#### We control multiple counter-examples

Every 7 Peter - Peter is a Principal Lecturer and an Associate Head of Department for Computing at Coventry University. He graduated with a first class honours degree in Communication Studies in 1995 and obtained an MA with distinction in Media and Cultural theory (post '68 European philosophy - initially written in '96, edited in '07, "The Fascination Payload: Cultural Studies and the first Gulf War" -<http://www.academia.edu/6175231/The_Fascination_Payload_Cultural_Studies_and_the_First_Gulf_War>  
Moreover, in promoting simulation to the position of a global cultural dominant Baudrillard ignores or dismisses texts which are not ‘sucked up’ into hyperreal circulation. Sporadically, some journalism, some academic critical work, some lifestyles, some ‘moments’ of experience, cannot be forced to fit into the logic of ‘meaninglessness’ ‐ the existence of marginalised identities, resistant video and film, or the ‘samisdat’ publication of forbidden opinions that can puncture the media’s, and hence society’s, ambivalence give evidence to the fact that not all epistemological positions can be evacuated of affective meaning sufficiently, as to be circulated without real effects. That John Pilger’s documentaries are heavily underscored by the media device of designating them as: ‘A personal view’ reveals that not just anything can be grist to the media mill without first being ‘made safe’. For Baudrillard, there simply cannot be any geographical locations, identities, or states of mind, in which the media’s saturation of the subject does not operate. How can we then, explain extreme nationalism, fighting and dying, or any one of a myriad of active life‐choice’ which fall beyond the expected (behaviouristic) responses of ambivalence and inactivity predicated by a simulated subjectivity. When the bombs hit the El Almiriyah shelter it was not, I would argue, experienced or comprehended by the grieving relatives in terms of some Murdoch sponsored tele‐visual human interest story ... and now the commercial break.

#### We need pragmatic action and researched argumentation to create real change — criticism, action, and change are impossible in their world—this is both a defense of our methodology and in indict to theirs

King, 1998 [Anthony, Professor at Essex University, Telos Journal, “Baudrillard’s Nihilism and the End of Theory”, <http://eric.exeter.ac.uk/exeter/bitstream/10036/71394/1/King%2520Baudrillard%2520Telos.pdf>]

Compare this style of writing with J. G. Ballard’s *Crash* — a novel providing a very successful (and deliberately obscene) description of postmodern culture. It recognizes that culture’s bodily indulgence, and knows that it does not liberate the individual but reduces the body to a machine for pleasure, just as the car is a machine for speech. The car-crash and the sexact are the moments when the wholly technical machineries of the car and the bodies are decomposed in an instant of pain that is transformed (for ironic effect) into one of intense pleasure for the perverts who populate the book. In communicating this new, debased ethic of bodily pleasure, where the delight in bodily mutilation parallels a correlating spiritual disfigurement, Ballard describes a questionnaire about car crashes which Vaughan, the central figure in the book, has prepared and which lists every conceivable injury: “Lastly came that group of injuries which had clearly most preoccupied Vaughan — genital wounds caused during automobile accidents. . . . the breasts of teenage girls deformed by instrument binnacles, the partial mammoplasties of elderly housewives carried out by chromium louvres of windshield assemblies, nipples sectioned by manufacturers’ dashboard medallions; injuries to male and female genitalia caused by steering wheel shrouds, windshields during ejection, crushed door pillars, seat springs and handbrake units, cassette player instrument toggles.”28 The descriptions Ballard provides of both cars and bodies are wholly technical and anatomical, emphasizing that, in this culture, both “bodyworks” are (obscenely) reduced to the same level. Against Ballard’s rich, selfdeveloping text, Baudrillard’s writing is flat and strained. He simply breaks down his academic text into aphoristic gobblets and draws on alexicon of dead, static metaphors. In the end, Baudrillard falls between the two stools of demanding that academic writing is inadequate to the analysis of hyperreality, but still writing according to its conventions and thereby vitiating either the academic or the literary merit of his later work. However, even if Baudrillard wanted his later writing to be read as literature and even if he had been successful in producing text which could be judged as literature, the project of this later writing would still have been irretrievably self-deluded. Even if his terrorism were a successful form of literature, it could never (as he claims) communicate hyperreality to the reader directly, for all writing is necessarily mediated; all writing is an interpretation.29 Unavoidably, his terroristic writing is an interpretation of hyperreal culture, which does not obviate the necessity of interpretation, however directly it tries to communicate hyperreality.

In insisting on representing hyperreality directly, Baudrillard does not, as he claims, present a clearer idea of hyperreality but, on the contrary (and ironically), **a less illuminating and less direct one**. As a result of his demand to present hyperreality directly, he simply stops at the first point of the interpretive process and presents his initial assumptions as the definitive statement on contemporary culture. Thus, he does not provide a clearer insight into the true nature of televisual culture but rather obscures the role of television with an assertive and arrogant hypostatization of an immediate concept. **His terrorism halts the dialectical process at its first and most inadequate initial point, before the critical process has begun**. Instead of developing his concepts through a thorough immersion in “hyperreal” culture, refining his interpretation to make it more adequate to that object, Baudrillard reifies his first impressions into absolute truths. In breaking off the dialectical engagement with the actual social practices of postmodern culture, he hypostatizes his crude standpoint into “the truth.”

Ironically, **in trying to present hyperreality immediately, Baudrillard falls into exactly the same error for which he so effectively criticized Marx**. Just as Marx failed to provide a truly radical alternative to capitalism by employing the concepts of capitalist political economy, Baudrillard’s fragmented aphorisms are **unable** to provide a critical alternative to hyperreality, because they are **so** **thoroughly** **embedded** in and dependent on the **very cultural forms they are intended to oppose**. The fragmentation of Baudrillard’s later writing does not serve the critical purpose for which it was intended, but rather, if it has any effect, it sensitizes the reader to the global media culture Baudrillard wanted to resist. His attempt to portray a culture in which allegedly there is no longer any reality beyond its representations, **is the academic extension of that culture.** Contrary to his own intentions, it is the very intellectual path he has insisted on taking, which turns its back on careful research and close critical analysis, which makes the desert of hyperreality grow. It robs the reader of any critical understanding of contemporary culture. Moreover, it denies the importance of developing alternative knowledge and understandings, which would undermine media representations of the world **because it asserts that these alternative visions would always already be incorporated into hyperreality.** **It is not enough simply to say that television is a false reality;** **one must try and reconstruct a reality in which political freedom and critique are possible**, even though any constructed reality must itself always be subjected to critique. Consequently, against Baudrillard, **an appropriate form of academic resistance would be to insist upon even more rigorously researched and detailed work**.30 In particular, the dialectical method which demands the constant overhaul of concepts, whereby nothing is taken for granted, would have prevented Baudrillard from falling into the **hyperbolic reification of mere assertions.**

#### The aff engages in uncritical oversimplification—context and content ARE relevant—their blanket criticism is shoddy scholarship that ought to be rejected—prefer our appeal to specificity—that’s the litmus test

Kellner, 2002 [Douglas, Prof at UCLA, “Baudrillard: A New McLuhan?” <http://gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/illumina%20folder/kell26.htm>]

Yet doubts remain as to whether the media are having quite the impact that Baudrillard ascribes to them and whether his theory provides adequate concepts to analyze the complex interactions between media, culture, and society today. In this section, I shall suggest that Baudrillard's media theory is **vitiated** by three subordinations which undermine its theoretical and political usefulness and which raise questions as well about the status of postmodern social theory. I shall suggest that the limitations in Baudrillard's theory can be related to his **uncritical** **assumption** of certain positions within McLuhan's media theory and that therefore earlier critiques of McLuhan can accurately and usefully be applied to Baudrillard. This critique will suggest that indeed Baudrillard is a "new McLuhan" who has repackaged McLuhan into new postmodern cultural capital.

**First**, in what might be called a formalist subordination, Baudrillard, like McLuhan, privileges the form of media technology over what might be called the media apparatus, and thus subordinates content, meaning, and the use of media to its purely formal structure and effects. Baudrillard -- much more so than McLuhan who at least gives some media history and analysis of the media environment -- tends to abstract media form and effects from the media environment and thus erases political economy, media production, and media environment (i.e. **society as large**) from his theory. Against abstracting media form and effects from context, I would argue that the **use** and **effects** of media **should be carefully examined and evaluated in terms of specific contexts.** **Distinctions between context and use, form and content, media and reality, all dissolve,** however, **in Baudrillard's one-dimensional theory where global theses and glib pronouncements replace careful analysis and critique**.

#### Claims to undermine meaning is an imposition of meaning

Francois Debrix 3, professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnical Institute, Rituals of Mediation: International Politics and Social Meaning, p. xxxvii-xxxix, google books //Elmer

Wodiczko's projections encourage their observers to not just remain passive consumers of rituals of transformation or representation.33 They intimate that social meanings come from the inside, from the mediated visions that, in late modernity, have taken over the social domain within which individual subjects interact. Wodiczko's method is to "manipu- late the system from within (and) interfere with (itsl codes."34 Because mediation's codes are crucial to the production of meaning and social meaning maintains relations of power, wealth, and cultural governance, the commanding force of mediation must be revealed. To reveal media- tion, Wodiczko chooses to ironically mimic and exaggerate the effects of some media forms and objects (architecture, public monuments, televi- sion) by defacing and perverting them. Wodiczko's point is not to use different mediated forms to condemn mediation's excesses. His method is rather to use and reappropriate traditionally mobilized modern ritu- als of transformation to display their power of signification. ¶ The problematization of mediation is not an end in itself for Wodiczko, though. Problematizing modern rituals of transformation by defacing them is necessary for him to the extent that it contributes to reopening social meaning and to freeing up cultural possibilities. Another project by Wodiczko, the Alien Staff, demonstrates the capacity Of perverting and mimicking (re)mediations to open up (their) meaning.35 The Alien Staff is a situation performance concocted by Wodiczko to reveal the pluralizing potential of mediation once it has been freed from transfor- mative and representational rituals. In this art project, Wodiczko asked immigrants (in the United States mostly) to walk about the city and carry a tall stick made to look like a biblical staff (a new type Of flåneur perhaps). The staff opens up at its top to reveal an inserted television screen. On the screen, the same individual who carries the biblical staff is shown telling his or her life story. The staff bearer is asked to meander around the city and abruptly Stop in front Of pedestrians. The pedestri- ans are then faced with the staff and its mini TV screen. The staff bearer never speaks, and in fact remains as still and stoic as can be. Only the staff is active and conveys information. ¶ At one level, Alien Staff could be interpreted as a work of critical trans- formation and radical mobilization performed by this new kind of me- diating ritual. Wodiczko, perhaps, uses the magical staff and its talking head as a metaphor for the silencing of immigrant populations in in- dustrialized societies. Postmodern mediations do not give voice to im- migrants in societies still governed by Modern Man's political power and regime of economic production. This is one possible interpreta- tion offered by Wodiczko's art. Wodiczko does not indicate whether the problematization of postmodern media forms is the intended meaning of the display. But I think that Wodiczko, as silent as his staff bearer, re- fuses to tell the meaning of this art performance on purpose. Explain- ing the art scene would imply that one signification has been imposed. Meaning would be foreclosed and, contrary to the image that is shown, the immigrant would thus be forced to speak. By forcing the immigrant to speak (through someone else's narrating voice), the social system that "silenced" the immigrant in the first place would be reaffirmed. ¶ At another level, this performative (re)mediation by Wodiczko is an ironic play of meaning. The contrasting image of a silent human being with this same being's talking face on a miniature TV screen mimics the blinding sight and the deafening sound of contemporary media(tions) that have no place for the immigrant. Who pays attention to television's message anyway? But instead of individual silence or the media's white noise, Wodiczko's Alien Staff speaks volumes. While it denounces and challenges our postmodern mediating rituals, it also offers people (im- migrants in this case) vectors of speech, new methods of signification and presentation Of themselves. Outside the dominant code, different forms of meaning may be accessed. Perhaps, through new mediations of meaning, new social interactions and cultural practices may be developed. Wodiczko observes: "If I could make it more playful. Laughter—all the jokes, the disruptions, the changes of topics, all the absurdity and impossibility of talking about identity. This is the new community." ¶ Wodiczko's mediated art forms reimagine subjectivities and commu- nities but do not give them names. They enable meaning by multiplying the ways by which meaning is produced. They Offer different paths through which presentation Of one's body and self can be realized with- out having to postulate this presence from systems Of representation or transformation. In fact, multiple, possibly not essential, but certainly meaningful presentations Of one's selves (as immigrant, as Street per- former, as artist, as talking head) are facilitated. At the same time, Wodiczko's performances are not inaccessible to observers in search Of more traditional representational and transformative rituals Of media- tion. AS a ritual Of representation, Wodiczko's Alien Staff may be taken as an allegory for the im—ble passage of some individuals in demo- cratic political Systems from the status of alien to that Of citizen. Simi- larly, Alien Staff could be interpreted as a ritual Of transformation that denounces the unequal status of some individuals in society visa-vis Others and thus calls for a change of condition. Although those are possi- ble interpretations of Wodiczko's mediations, however, they may not be the most fruitful as they merely seek to impose one (their) privileged understanding of the method of mediation onto Wodiczko's own rituals. ¶ In the end, Wodiczko provides a pluralizing model of mediation. Differ- ent outcomes of mediation can take place because, after all, the method of mediation is neither value-free nor the sole possession of romantic man. What Wodiczko's plural approach to the manipulation of the medium and to the use of mediation wants to avoid is not the fact that mediation is being used to produce social meanings. This, Wodiczko suggests, is inevitable and in a sense desirable. What it wants to avoid and what it protects against is the idea, prevalent among proponents of mediation as either or transformation, that desirable so- cial meanings are decided and often established before the method of mediation even has a chance to deploy its cultural and political effects. When this happens, mediation remains an empty middle point between two distant realities or is used as a tool for something else, for some other more romantic social reality that mediation helps to substantiate. When this happens, mediation negates pluralization. The following es- show that contemporary transnational cultural interactions often mobilize mediations to dc just this. The (mediating) internationals that result from such mediations are not always as open and plural as they could be.

### Presumption

#### RoB \_ vote for the better debater- anythigin else is self serving and arbitrary

#### 1. Vote neg to vote aff – I know this is an awful argument, but it destroys the semiotic economy of debate –they’re gonna say “vote aff to vote neg to vote aff” – but

#### a. their automative response to this shows they can’t escape the normative debate techne, which is another double turn with Baudrillard’s idea of communicative exchange as the mode of production

#### b. any attempt to create exclusivity of their position is an attempt to draw a distinction between signifier and signified which links back into systems of meaning they critique.

#### c. voting aff is an active action – requiring the judge to rationalize their RFD and contradicts the passivity in the face of communication. Instead, vote for me and just don’t give an RFD.

#### 2. The only reason negation is good is because it can’t be exchanged within economies of meaning – but they ask for a ballot as recognition by the judge or topic – you can vote neg to subtract the ballot from the 1AC even if you think the aff is a good idea.

#### 3. Nothing about the aff is new or interesting – half these cards were stolen from Mich KM who were knockoffs of Loyola EM– there’s no endpoint

4. What parts of the 1AC were transformative or anti-capitalist? The parts where they read established scholars, using standard citational practices? Or the parts where they organized cards into a conventional 1AC and used NSDA Campus’s servers to broadcast?

5. Ballot not key---competitive incentives dilute solvency and permit affirming Westside’s scholarship without tying it to external action. Nothing leaves Zoom Room 104 other than a winner and a loser

#### 6. No evidence for the power of the ballot – debate specific – negate on presumption.

Ritter 13 [Michael, JD UTexas Law, B.A. cum laude Trinity University. September 2013. “Overcoming the Fiction of ‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s to Learn From 2Pac’s Changes?” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9896ec\_8b2b993ec42440ecaab1b07645385db5.pdf]

Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “competitive interscholastic debate” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, none of the many academics who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support the social change fiction. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted.

#### 7] cx literally said may 68 did nothing