# Speech 1NC TOC Rd 3 vs Lexington 4-23 3PM

## 1

#### Interp: The affirmative must define “private entities” in a delimited text in the 1AC.

#### “Private Entities” are flexible and has too many interps – normal means shows no consensus and makes the round irresolvable since the judge doesn’t know how to compare between types of offense and o/w since it’s a side constraint on decision making.

UpCounsel ND [“Private Entity: Everything You Need to Know”. UpCounsel (interactive online service that makes it faster and easier for businesses to find and hire legal help). No Date. Accessed 12/17/21. <https://www.upcounsel.com/private-entity> //Xu]

A private entity can be a partnership, corporation, individual, nonprofit organization, company, or any other organized group that is not government-affiliated. Indian tribes and foreign public entities are not considered private entities.

Unlike publicly traded companies, private companies do not have public stock offerings on Nasdaq, American Stock Exchange, or the New York Stock Exchange. Instead, they offer shares privately to interested investors, who may trade among themselves.

Private Company vs. Private Entity

The Companies Act of 2013 governs the registration of private companies.

This type of company is formed by following the steps laid out by this law.

Private entities are determined not by this law but by ownership and holding. For example, sole proprietorships and partnerships are designed as private entities.

A private entity is not necessarily a private company, but all private companies are private entities.

How Private Entities Work

Although private companies can be of any size, they often include a small group of chosen investors who may include employees, colleagues, friends and family, and other interested parties. If this type of company needs funding to grow, it may seek it from venture capital firms or from large institutional investors. Some private companies eventually decide to go public with an initial public offering (IPO) of stock shares on a public exchange. Sometimes, public companies go private when a large investor buys a bulk of the outstanding stock shares and plans to remove them from public exchanges.

How FOIA Affects Private Entities

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a federal law that requires certain agencies to provide certain types of records to any person who asks. Major government bodies such as federal courts and Congress are exempt from FOIA. Some state agencies are also exempt depending on state laws governing public records. In general, FOIA applies to:

Federal, state, and local government agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission.

Certain state legislatures depending on the laws in those states.

Most private entities are not bound by federal FOIA laws. However, these laws may apply to private entities involved in government business. This situation occurred in Colorado in 2000, when a nonprofit corporation was required by the state's Court of Appeals to share documents related to a project it was working on with the city of Denver.

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night – triggers presumption since the aff wasn’t subject to well researched scrutiny. We lose access to Tech Race DA’s, Asteroid DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### 2] Real World – Policy makers will always define the entity that they are recognizing. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, private entities can circumvent since there is no delineated way to enforce the aff and means their solvency can’t actualize.

#### OSspec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from policies that require enforcement to function.

## 2

#### **Interp: Debaters must not defend the hypothetical implementation of an explicit actor or action**

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)



#### Violation: They defend “\_\_\_\_\_\_\_” as the actor and implement an \_\_\_\_\_\_ which isn’t resolutional OR they are extra T

#### 1] Limits and Ground - justifies infinite unpredictable aff advantage ground and extra topical enforcement mechanisms which wreck research burdens while spiking core generics.

#### 2] Semantics o/w –

#### a] Precision – they can arbitrarily jettison words which decks ground and preparation because there is no stasis point

#### b] Jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the authority to vote aff if it wasn’t legitimate

#### c] Durability – grammatical correctness makes debaters effective academics and professionals

#### d] Legal ed –

Heath 06 Brad, reporter at USA Today. “Small mistakes cause big problems” November 21, 2006. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-20-typo-problems\_x.htm IB

In the legislative world**, such** small errors**, while uncommon, can** carry expensive consequences. **In a few cases** around the nation **this year,** typos and **other** blunders have redirected millions of tax dollars or threatened to invalidate new laws.

#### 3] Phil Ed – creates better ethical subjectivity and critical thinking that o/ws on uniqueness to LD, switch to policy and LARP on the water topic – solves all your offense

#### 4] The telos of policymaking is the appropriation of synaptic labor into the racialized logistics.

Harney 14 [Note – I do not support the ableist language used in the evidence. Stefano Harney (Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University). “HAPTICALITY IN THE UNDERCOMMONS, OR FROM OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT TO BLACK OPS”. CUMMA PAPERS #9. 2014. Accessed 11/13/21. <https://cummastudies.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/cumma-papers-9.pdf> //Xu]

This may sound surprising to say there are no subjects in the social factory or that indeed the rhythm of work is omnipresent today. We face millions without work or not enough work in Europe and amongst the migrants seeking to reach Europe. We are told that the future of work in Europe is subjective, creative, professional, and most of all managerial, not rhythmic. And at any rate from more reliable sources like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri we understand that we are living in an era when immaterial labour – cognitive and affective labour - dominates and commands other forms of labour, even if factories are still widespread in Bangladesh or China. But this should not make us deaf to the rhythms we hear no matter where we go, the rhythms that break and kill humans. We have heard a lot from business about how we can become entrepreneurial, or how we can transform ourselves into leaders, of how we can become responsible for our own careers. And again from our comrades we have received a more accurate picture: conceptions of the artist, of the bohemian, of the researcher, and of the performer have been twisted by business to make us work harder, to convince us we can fulfil ourselves through work. Andrew Ross’s work is excellent here. Christian Marazzi has written about the way our bodies are today a kind of constant capital, machines for which we are responsible, which we must upkeep because they are the site of production. He is right. Franco Berardi speaks of the way our psyche and our souls descend into work as if engulfing our whole being, and Emma Dowling of the way even our affect is measured and managed, brought into metrics. It is easy to feel that work for those who have it is about the risk of having your subjectivity and your talents swallowed whole, about having your virtuosity consumed as Paolo Virno might put it. But a factory is neither a collection of machines nor a collection of workers however skilled, however virtuoso. A factory is a line. OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT The area of management studies concerned with the factory is Operations Management. Operations management has always been pretty clear about what a factory is, and however much it has expanded its understanding of the factory, this definition has not wavered. This is business ‘knowledge,’ with all its ideological limits, but it can be helpful to our own considerations here. For Operations Management, the factory is the scene of a process. This is process in the sense of procession, of movement. Inputs go into the factory to move along a process, a line, and outputs come out of the factory. Most importantly what machines and especially workers do, according to operations management, is work on the process not the product. In contemporary operations management theory this has meant improving that process. This is often designated by the Japanese term ‘kaizen’ originally associated with workers and managers devoting themselves to the continuous improvement of the line’s efficiency in Toyota factories. Soon kaizen expanded throughout service, extraction, information, and other sectors. Rather than attention to the product, including the immaterial product, which remains as much as ever the purview of a small fraction of the workforce, most workers are subjected to increased attention to the ‘assembly’ line. For management science, this is what a factory is: a line, a process, a procession, a movement, a rhythm through from inputs to outputs. And this too is what the social factory is. Its name is accurate even if we have sometimes been distracted by everything from the propaganda of creative classes to the critical discourse of the precariat. But that is not all. Kaizen has been accompanied by another development in the line. This is the extension of the management of inputs and outputs, of the extension to supply chains understood as part of the line, not just as raw clusters of labour, natural resources and machines waiting outside the door of the factory. And with logistics and reverse logistics this line is expanding exponentially, or rather, algorithmically. Logistics and supply chain management extend the metrics of line in both directions, toward inputs and outputs which now have their own work rhythms. SYNAPTIC LABOUR This algorithmically expanding line means the outside of the factory is measured like the inside, aligned with the processual inside. And when the factory is virtual, Post-Fordist, a social factory, the algorithms of the line extend the rhythm of production, of assembly across our lives. The two meanings of assembly, or perhaps two modes of assembly, begin to merge, to assemble is both to come together and to make, anywhere, anytime. But what is made when we assemble and re-assemble is the line itself first and foremost, not a product or a service. This is our work today. We take inventories of ourselves for components not the whole. We produce lean efforts to transconduct. We look to overcome constraints. We define values through metrics. These are all terms from operations management but they describe work far better than recourse to the discourse of subject formation. Creativity itself, supposedly at the heart of the battle for the subject today, is nothing but what operations management calls variance in the line, a variance that may lead to what is in turn called a kaizen event, an improvement, and is then assimilated back into an even more sophisticated line. Today ours is primarily the labour of adapting and translating, being commensurate and flexible, being a conduit and receptacle, a port for information but also a conductor of information, a wire, a travel plug. We channel affect toward new connections. We do not just keep the flow of meaning, information, attention, taste, desire, and fear moving, we improve this flow continuously. We must remain open and attuned to the rhythm of the line, to its merciless variances in rhythm. This is primarily a neurological labour, a synaptic labour of making contact to keep the line flowing, and creating innovations that help it flow in new directions and at new speeds. The worker operates like a synapse, sparking new lines of assembly in life. And she does so anywhere and everywhere because the rhythm of the line is anywhere and everywhere. The worker extends synaptic rhythms in every direction, every circumstance. With synaptic work, it is access not subjects that the line wants, an access, as Denise Ferreira da Silva reminds us, that was long at the heart of the abuse of the affected ones, the ones who granted access out of love, out of necessity, out of the consent not to be one, even before that granting was abused. GROUNDATIONS The rule of the line persists beyond the factory in time and space, and its rhythm makes the time and space of our lives. There is no outside to the line, or rather we might say the line runs through the outside promised in Fordism and supposed to be so heterogeneous in Post-Fordism. A rhythm that tears us apart, a rhythm that obliterates and wrecks our brain. In some places the line is all that is left of the factory, and logistics in this expanded sense is all that is left of production. The science of operations management becomes the science of society, the common sense of our lives.

#### 5] Spectator politics DA.

Reid-Brinkley ‘8 (Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of Communications, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” 2008,)

And participation does not result in the majority of the debate community engaging in activism around the issues they research. Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original). The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

#### TVA: Read a phil aff that affirms that private appropriation is unjust with a util FW and don’t defend implementation

## 3

#### Interp – space mining isn’t appropriation – its not permanent and OST consensus.

Hofmann and Bergamasco 19 [Mahulena Hofmann (SES Chair in Space, SatCom and Media Law at the University of Luxembourg) and Federico Bergamasco (PhD Researcher in aviation, telecommunication and space law University of Luxembourg). “Space resources activities from the perspective of sustainability: legal aspects”. Global Sustainability. 9 December 2019. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DF153F4A77970AC9E12444EC2B001F8A/S2059479819000279a.pdf/div-class-title-space-resources-activities-from-the-perspective-of-sustainability-legal-aspects-div.pdf> //Xu]

However, the purpose of space mining activities is considered to be neither any ‘appropriation’ of parts of outer space nor of space resources in situ. Instead, the sole aim of any such activities is their extraction, use and commercialization, without any territorial demands or titles as to the celestial bodies (or parts thereof) concerned (Mizushima et al., 2017). The argument, which sees in the use or exploitation of a space mineral by one subject a limitation of the same right of another subject, is difficult to contest by other means than analogy with space exploration. As has been recognized by the drafters of the OST in its Articles IX and XII, a purely scientific project in one area of outer space could de facto prevent research at the same site by a subject from another State. To avoid such situations, the Treaty pre-envisages a system of international consultations aimed at avoiding any harmful interference with operations.

#### OST is the standard for space law.

Wikipedia No Date [Wikipedia. “Outer Space Treaty.” No Date. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outer_Space_Treaty> //Xu]

The Outer Space Treaty, formally the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, is a multilateral treaty that forms the basis of international space law. Negotiated and drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, it was opened for signature in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on 27 January 1967, entering into force on 10 October 1967. As of February 2021, 111 countries are parties to the treaty—including all major spacefaring nations—and another 23 are signatories.[1][5][note 1]

#### Violation – 1AC Mallick and Rajagopalan soilvency advocate says pitfalls of resource extraction and space mining

#### Vote for predictable limits – their aff explodes the object of the resolution to include random space activities from tourism to research to satellite surveillance – that allows them to cherry-pick the best aff with no neg ground – also kills predictable advocacies which decks prepared engagement.

## 4

#### Interp: If the affirmative defends anything other than “Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.”, they must provide a counter solvency advocate.

#### Violation

#### Prefer

#### 1. Limits – there are infinite things you could which pushes you to uncontestable arguments. Even if your interp, the only way to verify if it’s fair is proof of counter-arguments.

#### 2. Shiftiness- CSA conceptualizes what their advocacy is and how it’s implemented. Ambiguous affs we don’t know about can’t delink if they delineate these things.

#### 3. Research – Forces the aff to go to the other side of the library and contest their own view points and encourages more in-depth answers since I can find responses.

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation and substantive engagement

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact and why schools fund debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### Neg theory is drop the debater – a) Prep skew – infinite prep means they frontline every shell enough to be efficient at DA and skew substance enough b) 1AR Flex –you moot 6 min of my offense and restart on unpredictable layers while kicking the args.

#### 1NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea since the shell was read earlier.

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

#### No rvi

#### [a] Baiting—they’ll bait the theory debate and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse since they’ll get away with unacceptable practices

#### [b] 1AR all-outs—they’ll collapse entirely to theory which crowds out substance and kills education.

#### [c] Chilling effect—people will be scared to read theory since they can lose off of it, so no one will check abuse.

#### [d] Norm-setting—I shouldn’t be forced to keep advocating for a bad norm if I realize it’s bad in the middle of the round.

#### [e] Flex—RVIs make theory uncondo so I always have to go for that route to the ballot, but both debaters should get multiple relevant layers and collapse options.

#### [f] Illogical—doesn’t make sense to win just for being fair.

## 5

#### Outer space isn’t value neutral but has always been a question of militarization – debates between civilian and military use are two sides of the same coin that affectively polices society, culminating in total war.

Craven 19 [Brackets Original. Matt Craven (Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom). “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space”. European Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 2, May 2019, Pages 547–572, Accessed 1/12/22. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/30/2/547/5536739> //Xu]

There was little doubt to any of the observers of the launch of Sputniks I and II in 1957 that, despite their overtly ‘scientific’ purposes, the arms race had taken a decisive new turn. The exploration of outer space clearly offered a range of potential benefits; alongside the possibility of research into the physics of the atmosphere, it also would facilitate the collection of a host of meteorological, geophysical and cartographic data, enable enhanced capacity for radio communication and television broadcasting, facilitate safe navigation and, finally, open up the possibility of experimental flights to the moon and beyond. No one, however, was blind to the military implications.60 Within the USA, in particular, there was a widespread belief that command over outer space was an imperative that could not be missed: ‘[W]hoever controls outer space’, it was often said, ‘controls the world’.61 In the wilder speculations, thus, it was imagined that a nuclear power might be in a position to launch guided missiles from a space platform to any point on earth with barely any possibility of response, that outer space would be filled with ‘orbiting bombers’ or that the moon would become the site of military rocket installations. ‘Control’ of outer space, thus, was immediately conceived as being vital as a matter of security. Such concerns seemed to place a premium upon ensuring that the ‘use’ of outer space was exclusively peaceful – a view that seemed to be affirmed not merely by the establishment of COPUOS and successive proposals put to the UN by both the USA and Soviet Union. It was also recognized in the US National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which created a civilian space agency (NASA) and declared, in the process, that ‘it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind’.62 This theme was carried through into the code for outer space – UN General Assembly Resolution 1962 recognizing ‘the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes’ and the Outer Space Treaty that added in Article 4 that states should not place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in orbit and that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes’ (military bases and fortifications, in particular, being prohibited). Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson described the Outer Space Treaty as ‘the most important arms-control development since the limited test-ban treaty of 1963’.63 In an immediate sense, then, outer space was configured as a space radically distinct from atmospheric space and was placed at once beyond the field of both sovereignty and of war. These, however, were by no means co-terminous. The preferred analogy when discussing the status of outer space was often that of the high seas – like the seas, outer space should be marked by the principle of freedom of access and movement, a res communis incapable of being ‘enclosed’. In fact, this was the analogy used by the USA when defending its use of satellites for reconnaissance purposes; ‘reconnaissance’ from space, it was argued, was the functional equivalent of surveillance from the high seas.64 It is clear, however, that this analogy was problematic precisely because the high seas themselves were not immune from being brought within the field of military conflict.65 And, with that in mind, alternative modes of analysis were often proffered to ensure that the ‘commons’ was not to be equated with a potential field of battle.66 Nevertheless, there was always a certain equivocation running through discussions within the UN and elsewhere as to whether the military/non-military distinction was one that could be effectively held in place. Not only were the Declaration on Outer Space and Outer Space Treaty silent on certain vital matters – on the equipping of satellites, for example, with conventional weaponry or the militarization of the ‘extracelestial void’ – but the inclusion of Article 3, which instructed states to ‘carry on activities’ in accordance with international law and the UN Charter ‘in the interest of maintaining international peace and security’, gave expression to the idea, vaunted at various moments, that outer space may nevertheless be the site of military action in self-defence.67 ‘Peaceful’ use, on such a measure, was not to be calibrated by reference to the equipment or personnel put into space – whether military or civilian – but, rather, by reference to the ends or motivation of the actors in question.68 In the case of the USA, this was to resolve itself in the idea that ‘peaceful use’ should not be equated with ‘non-military use’ but, instead, with ‘non-aggressive’ use. As Senator Albert Gore was to put it, when speaking before the UN First Committee in 1962: [i]t is the view of the United States that outer space should be used only for peaceful – that is, non-aggressive and beneficial – purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both environments we must continue our efforts for general and complete disarmament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of any space activities must not be whether it is military or non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations of law.69 The same general tenor was maintained in the discussion over Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty concerning the demilitarization of the moon and celestial bodies. In this treaty, it was admitted that the use of military personnel ‘for scientific research or other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited’, largely in recognition of the fact that for both space powers it was the military, not civilian agencies, who were responsible for developing rocket and other outer space capabilities. What one might see in this is a straightforward determination, on the part of both space powers, to continue the practice of exploiting outer space for purposes of defence whilst holding on, at the same time, to the general idea that outer space was a space of peaceful endeavour. Defensive militarization, here, was to be conceptualized as the functional equivalent of total demilitarization. Yet ‘defence’ was also an unstable category in circumstances of a bipolar military standoff that depended upon a balance of forces. For not only might an effective defence depend upon first strike capability (as the doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ was to suggest),70 but also, as was later to become evident following the announcement of the US Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983,71 even the construction of an overtly ‘defensive’ system could assume an offensive cast if only one party possessed that capacity.72 There was, however, also a much deeper problematic at work here, which related to the persistence of a governmental rationality that was held over from the earlier decades of the 20th century, that understood the necessity of bringing all social resources – economic, technical, scientific and human – to bear in defence of the state against an existential threat. This was articulated in the interwar years in the theories of total war developed by the likes of Erich Ludendorff73 and Ernst Jünger,74 but was carried forward, well into the aftermath of World War II.75 Even if, at Nuremberg, the tribunal had associated the practice of total war with the pathologies of National Socialism,76 as the likes of Georg Schwarzenberger and Josef Kunz were to observe, it was a method of waging war that was only, in small part, to be associated with the problem of totalitarianism. For both, the phenomenon of total warfare was a much more general one – associated with technological developments in arms, indiscriminate modes of warfare and the mobilization of the civilian population – and was as much in play in the 1950s as it had been in earlier decades.77 If the prospect of nuclear annihilation meant that no element of society would be spared, so also, it seemed to follow, no element of society should be excluded from preparations to ward off that eventuality. Whilst, in the case of the Soviet Union, the ethos of centralized planning and a party bureaucracy equipped with an ideology of collective ownership and class warfare naturally dissolved any operative distinctions between the civil and the military establishment,78 the same was also apparent in the USA where, as was recognized as early as 1945, the ongoing development of new technologies of offence and defence, in conditions of competition, would require ‘the participation of every element of the civilian population’ and, in particular, the enlistment of the countries research capabilities.79 Alongside the development of what Dwight Eisenhower later described as a ‘military-industrial complex’, guided by a ‘scientific-technological elite’,80 the rationalities of the Cold War were to envelop US society in a much more profound way – from the mobilization of the media in defence of free thought, the enlistment of corporations, unions and research establishments in defence of national security and the co-option of cultural institutions (from Hollywood to the universities81) in the affective management and policing of public life.82 The significance of this in the context of outer space was the almost total loss of any way to distinguish effectively between military and civilian activities. Just as the requirements of resourcing a technologically dependent military armature increasingly depended upon a civilian infrastructure of research, industry and economic management,83 so also was it clear that prospective civilian and scientific activities in space (such as meteorology, remote sensing, navigation systems and telecommunications) all had military dimensions. If, for example, developments in meteorological knowledge and environmental science seemed to open up the possibility of weather control for the purposes of combating drought, improving agriculture or the avoidance of natural disasters, so also could that same science assist in the development of military communications and ballistic missile capability (which depended upon information about the lower and upper atmosphere, ionospheric behaviour, geodesy and geomagnetism).84 Such knowledge also opened up new possibilities for manipulating weather systems in order to procure military advantage (such as the manipulation of thunderstorms to disable communication systems or the creation of fog or cloud).85 But it was not just about scientific knowledge enabling new avenues of military innovation; it was also about the purposes to which the same technology might be put. Thus, for example, the camera-equipped satellite programmes (Tiros, CORONA), with the auxiliary systems of information recovery and reproduction, were virtually identical (give or take a few degrees of resolution) whether they were used for the purposes of geodetic measurement and weather prediction or military reconnaissance. In some cases, furthermore – such as the US Galactic Radiation Background satellite – intelligence-gathering electronics was incorporated within the same instrument used for the measurement of solar radiation.86

#### The 1AC is a misdiagnosis of debris – wargames and coverups whitewashes militarism’s recreation of debris.

Reno 20 [Joshua O. Reno (Associate Professor of Anthropology at Binghamton University). February 2020. Accessed 1/15/22. “Military Waste: The Unexpected Consequences of Permanent War Readiness”. UC Press. <https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520316027/military-waste> //Xu]

As I write this, in the atmosphere miles above me, hundreds of millions of tiny artificial particles and larger fragments are circling the planet, mostly undetected, moving as fast as speeding bullets. This is orbital space debris—artificial objects and materials launched into orbit that no longer serve a purpose—and it has been accumulating in the sixty years since the Soviet Union sent Sputnik into space and transformed the stakes of the Cold War. In this chapter, I review various attempts to witness and revalue space debris, which expose the historical and ongoing militarization of outer space. At first glance, space debris would seem very different from the other objects discussed in this book. On the one hand, they are not as clearly linked to the military and permanent war preparation, because this connection has been actively foreclosed from public awareness by the US security state. Every space mission creates some debris, and many space missions had covert and classified goals that were not disclosed until later, and some never were. One famous example is the cover story used to account for the U2 incident in 1960. Shot down while conducting covert surveillance of suspected Russian ICBM development from Soviet airspace, the U2 spy plane was initially characterized as a NASA weather vessel. However, two days after the cover story was released, a photo was wired to the US government of Khrushchev holding aerial photographs the U2 had taken, proving the NASA story was a lie.1 If one problem with examining space debris as military waste is a history of secrecy, another concerns the undetectability immanent to space debris as a material object. It is one thing to write with authority about orbital space debris. It is quite another to bear witness to space debris, as one can other forms of American military waste. “To witness,” Michael Taussig writes, “as opposed to see, is to be implicated in a process of judgement. . .such that the mere act of seeing tilts the cosmos and deranges the eyeball” (2011, 71). Yet, with this most cosmic of wastes, witnessing is hard to come by. I cannot swear that I have seen orbital space debris (in orbit, that is) and haven’t met many who can. Amateur astronomers sometimes think they have seen space debris, but do not know for certain if they ever will again or if they’ll even know when they do. And, more importantly, they probably will not care if they do. If this book is about finding people who bear witness to military waste, who not only see it but become invested in this act of perception, then in that sense at least this chapter is premised on a failure. Those I spent the most time with—amateur astronomers and a ham radio operator in the Southern Tier of New York—were not already interested or invested in space debris. I did not trace a preexisting network linking nonhumans with humans (Latour 2005). I did not locate a public affected by an act of contamination, slow violence, or environmental injustice (Marres 2012). That is to say, with few exceptions, I did not succeed in finding a group for whom this object matters and using their interest to direct my own. Instead, I found a problematic object and tried to recruit people who might care to do so. One reason space debris is not very interesting for the people I got to know is that anything so labeled is uninteresting almost by definition. Space debris is perhaps the truest expression of what Mary Douglas (1966) meant when she labeled dirt, “matter out of place.” Almost anything can be considered space debris if it was launched into orbit and people think it should not be there anymore. It may refer to satellites that have aged and become obsolete or can no longer be contacted or controlled from the ground, thus rendering them useless. Space debris also consists of materials of varying size and substance that were purposely released or jettisoned by vessels and satellites to facilitate their ascent or as part of their ongoing maintenance. But whether something counts as space debris depends on who is making this judgment and how. Part of the reason that amateur astronomers might not care about space debris is that anything they do care about may no longer be recognized as debris. Consider NASA’s Cassini probe, which entered Saturn’s atmosphere after completing its twenty-year mission on September 15, 2017. I began hearing about Cassini’s final descent weeks earlier from the members of the Kopernik Astronomical Society (KAS). Cassini was being discarded, but it was difficult to find anyone characterizing it as debris. In early September, KAS members were still sharing their best photographs of the solar eclipse that had captivated the country in August. But soon they began posting links on the group’s public Facebook page related to Cassini’s last mission: September 14: #Live #Coverage: NASA Monitors #Cassini’s #Dive Into #Saturn Friday morning, NASA & #JPL will monitor the Cassini #Spacecraft as it ends its #mission by diving into the #clouds of Saturn. #NASATV and NASA & JPL #Internet #web-sites will provide live #steaming coverage as #scientists #monitor Cassini’s “#GrandFinale,” as well as #news#conferences before (Thursday afternoon) & after (Friday morning) the #event. September 16: A fantastic overview of the Cassini Mission, including it’s [sic] very last image. Such an amazing mission just to tease our wonder a little bit.#FarewellCassini Explore More! September 20: NOVA: Death Dive to Saturn These posts provided hashtags and links one could use to learn about Cassini’s final mission, witness live broadcasts, and honor the lost spacecraft. Cassini was singled out for so much praise by astronomy enthusiasts for good reason. Many knew it had been responsible for some of the best pictures of the solar system ever captured. As a writer for a science and technology website put it: While many uncrewed spacecraft have done an incredible job of revealing our solar neighborhood to us, honestly, none did it better than NASA’s Cassini probe. After exploring Saturn for 13 years, on September 15th at 4:55am PDT, the probe will plunge itself into the planet’s atmosphere, becoming one with the very object of its fascination. (Paoletta 2017) As in many examples that appeared around this time, on- and offline, this writer treats Cassini like a person. It is as if the probe itself were intentionally doing the “exploring,” plunging “itself,” and intentionally merging with “the very object of its fascination.” Such eulogistic prose could be found among many techno-science and astronomy feeds and sites at the time. Consequently, what otherwise might have been seen as just an expensive, floating camera became instead a subject of interest akin to Saturn itself. But objects never mean just one thing, even within the same community of practitioners.2 From another point of view, the disposal of Cassini on Saturn was more like an act of cosmic littering disguised as a funeral. One small but vocal group of Cassini-truthers claimed that there was another, more nefarious purpose behind the destruction of the probe. NASA was, they claimed, trying to accomplish its decade-old goal of creating another sun by detonating a nuclear payload on Saturn. Known as “Project Lucifer,” such a claim had been made before in relation to other space missions. But for every so-called conspiracy theory, there are even more people who delight in debunking and deconstructing them. A decade before Cassini’s final dive, an author for the online publication Universe Today had already set about deconstructing Project Lucifer’s assertions (see O’Neill 2008). It is worth noting, however, that claims and counterclaims such as these, much like narratives of UFO sightings and abductions, are about more than what “really happened.” They are more centrally concerned with whether or not hidden powers are operating in the shadows, just beneath awareness. If they exist, such powers are only visible in momentary glimpses and if one looks carefully enough to see the pattern.3 Whether Cassini is seen as a mournful loss or a frightening conspiracy, it is still not quite “debris” since it has greater purpose than something merely drifting, colliding, orbiting. In other words, whether something counts as debris depends on how astronomical observers (and conspiracists) think about and act towards the things that populate outer space. More than just claims to debunk, conspiracy theories like Project Lucifer raise ethical and political questions surrounding what is otherwise accepted as relatively innocent and harmless civilian science. More to the point, they point toward forgotten and troublesome understories associated with the exploration and exploitation of outer space. It is not so strange to suspect that NASA is concealing the true motivations behind its projects, as it has done in the past and as its less-wellknown sister agency, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), has done for the entirety of its existence. Fantasies of hidden nuclear reactions on Saturn are not just conspiratorial paranoia, therefore, but manifestations of a general mistrust around state secrets concerning the militarization of space, which did not end with the Cold War. This chapter explores space debris as openended rubbish (Thompson [1979] 2017) and as an object of militarized fantasies, past and present. The example of Cassini is telling because it represents a situation where what might otherwise be thought of as mere space debris is instead revalued as a sign of discovery and scientific achievement or, alternately, of conspiratorial, cosmic destruction. The intentional generation of space debris becomes more apparent by linking it with the historical and ongoing militarization of space. My argument is not that the US military is directly responsible for all space debris (a claim thatwould be difficult to definitively prove in any case). That being said, antisatellite weapons testing has by all accounts made the problem of space debris worse; furthermore, defense agencies have been at the forefront of studying and proposing solutions to space debris.4 In this chapter, I link both the historical and ongoing creation of space debris, as a problem, and current proposals to solve it to a common source: a tendency to imagine expert knowledge and technical practice as a form of mastery, despite the fact that they lead to new and unanticipated accidents and risks. Here I draw from the Aristotelian argument of Paul Virilio (2007, 5) that the accident reveals the substance. In other words, the invention of any substance is equally the invention of any of its accidental manifestations. The shipwreck is the invention of the ship (see chapter 3) just as the Chernobyl meltdown is the invention of the nuclear power station. So, too, space debris is the invention of the Cold War space race, an invention distinctly different from the way planets ordinarily shed and reabsorb materials. Clearly, orbital space debris is very different from things like planes, ships, and guns. Yet, it is productive to think of all forms of military waste not only as different kinds of things, but as associated with different microworlds of action connected with permanent war preparation. For this reason all of these forms, as rubbish, have elements of indeterminacy associated with them, which lead to disputes about their social and material potential. After all, what is difficult to represent clearly can be even more disturbing to imagine, since this usually makes it harder to control and predict.5 Is space debris polluted and polluting or valuable and meaningful? Is it raw material for a radical new vision or heritage that should be preserved? When objects are simultaneously rare and abundant like space debris, hard to relate to, yet ubiquitous in orbital environments, these questions pose even greater challenges. Acknowledging the militaristic origins of space debris does not make it more accessible or amenable to reuse and rethinking by civilians. As I will explain, even astronomers might only encounter space debris fleetingly, and only for a brief moment as it quickly vanishes out of sight. In some ways, this makes space debris both less visible and more threatening than the other forms of military waste I discuss in this book. When it comes to astronomical phenomena, seeing is believing. But believing is also seeing, insofar as imagined evidence of aliens or government conspiracy involves prior and ongoing attunement toward that which lies concealed beyond familiar experience and official explanation. The idea of cultivating ethical attunement of the senses, especially to listen for signs of otherworldly beings and designs, has been dis-cussed for religious subjects (Luhrmann and Morgain 2012; Hirschkind 2015; Zani 2019). I extend this to include visual attunement of lay astronomers. Astronomical attunement can involve searches for alien life, but it can also be more modest in its scope, associated with wise use of and participation in the Earth’s orbital environment. I was unsuccessful finding many people who already cared about space debris, but getting to know them I came to see their practices of attunement as an alternative to the dominant strategies to address space debris. Unlike the attunement of amateurs, space agencies represent space debris as a problem to address through techno-solutionism. This is a way of valuing the technical fix as an end in itself, and it is deeply connected to the militarization of space and the problem of space debris. the color out of space Space debris comes in the form of subsidiary materials intentionally or inadvertently discarded after helping satellites escape Earth’s gravity, as well as the satellites themselves. Some of these objects are broken down by interactions with other bits of debris and physical processes while in orbit, but may continue orbiting the Earth all the same. There are good records of the over six thousand satellites that have been launched since 1957. But they can be difficult to locate and identify from the ground all the same. Depending on the altitude, lost and disused satellites and their accompanying materials either circle the planet at low Earth orbit (LEO), medium Earth orbit (MEO), or geostationary orbit (GEO), and this also affects their relative velocity, with objects further away moving more slowly. The ISS is located about 250 miles above the surface of the Earth in LEO and moves about 17,500 miles per hour, whereas satellites in GEO are located about a hundred times further above the Earth and travel at less than half that velocity. The difference is that disused space junk has lost attitude control, meaning that its orientation becomes more haphazard as it tumbles through space.6 As different forms of space debris move, sometimes at tens of thousands of miles per hour, they occasionally collide with one another and splinter into additional, smaller fragments. There are an estimated half a million pieces today, a fraction of which can be tracked by space agencies like NASA. Using the publicized data from the DoD’s Space Surveillance Network, there have been numerous models generated to display the problem of space debris as it has accumulated over time. One of the problems with depicting space debris accurately has to do with the conditions of orbital environments. In time-lapse videos, one can visualize the Earth as if it were sloughing off dandruff—hundreds of thousands of tiny flecks that encircle it at various distances. This metaphor is actually more appropriate than it might seem. Like an animal’s scalp, the Earth routinely sheds materials that continue to orbit it or are jettisoned into the universe. As part of this metabolic process orbital environments “self-clean,” meaning that various planetary forces allow materials to leave and rejoin the surface, as well as capture that which other planetary bodies have jettisoned. In a certain sense, for something to be called “orbital space debris” depends entirely on human beings deciding something is no longer valuable, useful, or notable. Yet, what becomes of space debris depends on the power of the Earth itself.7 After all, debris is not something that troubles planets, but defines them. According to Lisa Messeri, the prevailing definition of a planet is an object that is “large enough to have either captured or expelled the debris to other orbits” (2016, 8). If not for Earth’s gravitational force, bending spacetime as it does, it would not require so much expenditure to escape its orbit, nor would so much material fall back to Earth or remain in orbit after the fact. As Lisa Ruth Rand notes, “the geophysical world of outer space” is “a historical actor of equivalent importance to astronauts, engineers, governments, and publics” (2016, 13). The planet’s metabolic relationship to debris is not simply a threat to life, but may help spread it across the cosmos.8 Anthropogenic space debris mixes with the naturally occurring debris of orbital environments to generate new risks and possibilities. Unlike functional satellites, which can be manipulated and brought more or less in sync with the designs of those on the ground, the alternative spatial and temporal rhythms of space debris represent a distinct risk to other things (and persons) in orbit. As such, they also represent a potential barrier to further human exploration and exploitation of space. To begin with, space debris is potentially dangerous to spacecraft. Space debris is partly assessed by treating returning spacecraft in a way they were never intended, as a “hypervelocity impact capture medium” as they are dented more by artificial objects than natural meteorites (Bernhard, Christiansen, and Kessler 1997). The impetus for tracking and modeling space debris thus comes from the temporal possibilities it threatens. This includes a hypothetical feedback process whereby objects continually collide and spread out, converting Earth orbits, especially in LEO, into a hazardous environment filled with tiny fragments. Space debris would then circle eternally overhead like a cloud of bullets awaiting a target, trapping us in fear on the surface. This was used to produce a new element of space horror in the recent science fiction film Gravity (2013), where space debris played a key role and was depicted as a monstrous threat—like a swarm of abiotic locusts—that cycled the Earth with an alien regularity. In this film, without warning debris hurtles into view to annihilate spacecraft or slaughter hapless astronauts.9 Whether this sort of possibility is a likely scenario or not, it reflects anxiety about the unexpected and emergent spacetime of materials orbiting the Earth. The time they threaten is not only the immediate present but future plans, which are increasingly incorporated into fantasies of space travel. At least one of the astronomers I spoke with considered space debris a broader environmental problem. One of the older staff members at the Kopernik Observatory was Nicholas, who grew up in the Southern Tier and designed computer hardware for IBM. When I interviewed Nicholas, he was preparing a talk for the public on the search for life and its creation from inorganic materials, a subject of great personal interest. This gave him a unique view on the ecological risks of space exploration, “I think of debris as sort of garbage. Stuff that’s out there, you don’t know what to do with it so you just leave it laying around, it’s like cluttering on a highway. You know?” For Nicholas, depositing leftover materials from missions, like the Cassini probe, on a foreign planet is about more than the technical junk itself. Even the most sanitized bit of space equipment might carry remnants of the living world it came from. Nicholas had pictures in his Facebook feed of tardigrades (or water bears), the peculiar microbes that seem capable of withstanding the vacuum of space. “To me that’s one of the areas that you could contaminate, if you’re searching for life, you don’t want to contaminate it. NASA scientists are aware of these concerns, which are normally glossed as planetary protection and were included as part of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. This stipulates the necessity of protecting the Earth from organisms that might exist beyond it, and protecting other planets from contamination by human and nonhuman earthlings. For instance, Cassini was positioned to collide with Saturn so that it would not inadvertently contaminate life that might exist on one of the gas giant’s moons (life which, many astronomical enthusiasts would be quick to point out, Cassini’s photographs had helped demonstrate might exist). And Nicholas was also not alone in thinking that enthusiasm for space exploration could lead to denial about its unforeseen consequences.10 Not everyone agrees, however. In 2018, the SETI institute sponsored a debate over planetary protection between a member of NASA and founder of the Mars Society and author Robert Zubrin. During the debate, Zubrin accused planetary protection of being nonsensical, since planets exchange substances all the time on their own, and dangerous, since it could limit human exploitation and exploration of the universe. Space debris is meaningful as both barrier and bridge to desirable futures. These hoped-for futures involve, for instance, further exploration and exploitation beyond LEO and into the very valuable and legally contested domain of geostationary orbit, where satellites can more easily analyze from and transmit data to the entire planet. This also includes NewSpace initiatives that seek to extend capitalism and empire beyond the limits of the Earth, whether to mine asteroids or colonize Mars.11 Such initiatives demonstrate a clear motivation to clean up the polluted and risk-filled environment in the vicinity of Earth. From this admittedly interested perspective, the presence of space debris limits the utilization of LEO, MEO, and GEO, creating risks for any state and/or capital investment. Insofar as space debris influences assessments concerning the utilization of outer space for various ends, it directly mediates the futures that space agencies and industries imagine possible and desirable. It may be that the risks of orbital debris are being somewhat amplified by filmmakers and the media more broadly. After all, most chunks of space debris burn up completely before descending to Earth, posing little threat to life on the surface. And only those nations and corporations powerful enough to summon the resources to escape the planet’s gravitational pull, to operate the ISS for example, place themselves directly at risk. In this regard, space debris is somewhat analogous to floating Pacific garbage patches in the world’s oceans (see chapter 6). While troubling and aesthetically striking, space debris and garbage patches are located in little-used borderlands rather than directly inhabited landscapes. They would seem to lack an affected public, that is, a collective of interested social actors directly impacted by the problem and thus likely to organize to bring the problem to light. The analogy between the garbage patches and space debris is more than incidental. At the opposite side of the Pacific from the first garbage patch to be discovered is another dumping zone. Known as Point Nemo—the place in the ocean furthest from any land—this stretch of ocean has been used for decades as a convenient place to deposit space debris, when such a thing is possible for space agencies.12 But debris does not always land where one would expect. And the threat of damage from orbital space debris is real. Space debris represents a clear barrier to the continued use of orbital environments. The ISS had to perform approximately eight evasive maneuvers during its first decade of operation in order to avoid collisions with debris. Calculations are normally performed at least three times a day to determine risks of collision over the subsequent seventy-two hours; if the chance of collision with a large enough object is determined to be greater than one in ten thousand, then maneuvers are planned and executed. In late August of 2008, the ISS had to engage in a collision avoidance maneuver when it was nearly struck by just one piece of more than five hundred cataloged bits of debris that resulted from Kosmos 2421’s planned fragmentation earlier that summer (see Johnson and Klinkrad 2009, 5). In this case, the ISS was not dodging anonymous debris, but the specific fragments that are attributable to a Russian spy satellite that was launched in 2006 and began fragmenting two years later. According to widely agreed-upon space policy, if old satellites cannot be sent to the “parking zones” above LEO, then they are sent crashing into the atmosphere to hopefully disintegrate.13 In some ways, concerns over orbital debris can be related to the discourse around climate change, sociologist and historian of science Lisa Ruth Rand argues, insofar as both are global in scope and have been associated with “tipping points” toward certain and perpetual disaster. “With no control over where surviving fragments might land, orbital space became a site from which pollutants could cross geographic boundaries and extraterritorial regions” (Rand 2016, 11). In this sense, orbital regions are not some sort of beyond, disconnected from terrestrial life. Like the atmosphere itself, planetary borderlands are dynamically entangled with life on Earth. Moreover, like the seemingly never-ending threat of nuclear annihilation, they are also associated with the rise of the national security state in the twentieth century.14 When specific entities generate fragments or are threatened by them, orbital space debris begins to resemble other pollution events where there is an alleged perpetrator and a documented victim. More often than not, it is not just any perpetrator accused. Discussions of space debris events frequently single out America’s adversaries as being responsible, as in the episode above, despite the fact that Americans contaminate orbital environments as well and that other countries are frequently responding to and imitating the ongoing American militarization of space. Politicizing space debris in this way fits easily into previous Cold War–era assessments of risk and blame where it is only national rivals to the United States and Europe who break rules and incur risks, namely China and Russia, which implies that Americans are blameless by contrast.15 Space Debris as Military Waste All of the information provided in the section above, outlining orbital space debris as a problem, can be considered entirely without reference to the US military. This not only leaves out an important part of the story of space exploration and exploitation; it also helps further distinctions between civilian science and defense projects, as if the two were completely separate spheres of social action and imagination. In fact, they are continuous. The launch of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union was the beginning of space exploration and the age of satellites. It also set the stage for a new alliance between scientific experts, the federal government, and the DoD. Prior to Sputnik, it was widely believed throughout the US that its Soviet rivals were incapable of launching a satellite into space. When they did, it not only demonstrated a flaw in this chauvinist presumption, but made clear that the Soviet Union had the capacity to launch intercontinental missiles as well. Even though the Eisenhower administration knew, by this time, that there was no “bomber gap” between the two countries, this real embarrassment and virtual threat radically altered relationships between scientists and government and military officials, which had previously been strained by McCarthyism and the Korean War. At least some Americans felt vulnerable to attack, and Eisenhower, who had hoped to reduce what he regarded as wasteful military spending, reevaluated his position on the matter and helped foster the military industrial complex he would later name and criticize.16 If an interpretation of space exploration as militarization is often foreclosed from consideration, one of the reasons is that the intentions behind space discovery have been successfully represented in different ways over the course of NASA’s history. Outer space and space agencies are more popularly represented in terms of discovery, invention, and wonder. This has been a deliberate effort on the part of civilian scientists, government officials, and media organizations to differentiate NASA from military projects. Though NASA was created to be a civilian space agency, the end result of the initial shock and panic surrounding the launch of Sputnik, this was not a foregone conclusion. At the time, all of the technology that might have been used for possible space exploration was in the hands of the US military; consequently, some prominent members of the government scientific advisory, as well as Eisenhower himself, were initially in favor of folding all space exploration within the DoD as part of ARPA. ARPA had itself been recently created in order to consoli- date and reduce waste from interdepartmental competition. Consequently, it only stood to reason that it would also absorb the space agenda, which also had enormous implications for the future of defense. The reason NASA emerged, instead, was the result of fears of the militarization of space, both because of the dangers this would raise for people on Earth but also because it went against the utopian internationalism of many American scientists of the time. It was decided that there would be a civilian space agency, but one that would remain funded by and deeply connected to the military, for fear that the loss of military relevance in space missions would cause it to die on the vine.17 While NASA is a civilian agency, stories of its rise and contemporary relevance illustrate the longstanding relationship its people and projects have had with the DoD. Near-continuous war games in space go back to when the first satellites entered near-Earth orbit and generated ever more debris. According to Rand, “Both superpowers carried out high altitude and exoatmospheric nuclear weapons tests beginning in 1958 and ending in 1963 with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” (2016, 10). Secrecy regarding military-related space missions (and the debris they have caused) is most clearly associated with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the “other space agency” that was created in 1961 but kept a secret until 1992 (Paglen 2009, 20–31). As an author from Wired magazine puts it, debris is a legacy of militaristic statecraft: In 2007. . .China decided to de-orbit one of its defunct weather satellites...by firing a missile at it. That certainly took the sat out of its path—but it also created a flume of debris that flung toward the Space Station in 2011. In February 2008, the US Navy launched its own projectile at a spy satellite toward its own satellite. The government claimed to worry that if it let the satellite fall back intact, its hydrazine fuel could release toxic vapors at breathing level. But some, at the time and still, interpret the action militarily. (Scoles 2017) Debris from the NRO was not necessarily from weapons testing, moreover, because weapons are not the only space projects of great military interest. As Rand explains: New kinds of satellites—from giant, shiny inflatable balloons to a ring of hundreds of millions of tiny copper fibers—tested the use of space for communications while spurring controversy over whether such satellites could interfere with astronomy, crowd the electromagnetic spectrum, or present a collision hazard to other spacecraft. (2016, 10) Official histories of space exploration as civilian science tend to demilitarize its relevance. Moreover, when a cover story is needed—as with the U2 spy plane debacle—the official narrative can be called upon to distract or misinform inquiring Americans, allies or rivals. The activities of ARPA and especially the NRO are shrouded in mystery, though that has not stopped amateur astronomers from successfully tracking their activity.18 From the beginning of the space race, nation-states with property in orbit worked out the basic terms of space law (see Beery 2016), which among other things does not allow for the practices of salvage characteristic of maritime law. Instead of seeing these materials as property to be protected, astronomers were historically the first group to mobilize against the contamination of the planetary borderlands with space debris. Sputnik’s launch also began a wave of UFO sightings of all kinds, which would continue over the ensuing decades. As Americans watched the night skies, it was as if their apprehension and mistrust of Soviets somehow turned on their own government. And why not? Space exploration was begun in earnest by competing US and Soviet militaries during the Cold War and continues to be central to the machinations of securitizing states today.19 The ability for anyone with a telescope to track near-Earth objects makes complete secrecy all but impossible. Most recently, space enthusiasts were the first to raise awareness about the possibility of China’s Tiangong-1 space lab tumbling out of the sky, before the Chinese state admitted this was happening. In essence, it was amateur astronomers who first noticed that the space lab was acting more like space debris, against the wishes of a government hoping to keep this from public knowledge. The first story reclassifying the space lab as space debris appeared in June 2016, and was quoted from for the next year and a half by the Guardian and the Washington Post. Eventually the Chinese state admitted that it had lost control of the lab and that it would likely fall to Earth sometime in late 2017 or early 2018 (see David 2016).20

#### US-Russian cooperation is a unique form of empire---leverages political weight to exacerbate inequality and block the interests of developing countries

Haris Durrani 19, JD/PhD candidate at Columbia Law School and Princeton University, winner of the Sacknoff Prize for Space History, 7/19/19, “Is Spaceflight Colonialism?” <https://www.thenation.com/article/apollo-space-lunar-rockets-colonialism/>

The signatories also proclaimed that American and Soviet dominance of space amounted to de facto claims of sovereignty—a “technological partition” of orbit. Today, the Colombian Constitution still contains a provision claiming sovereignty over the orbital segment above the country’s territory.

The Bogotà Declaration is one piece of a bigger story. Historically, Third World lawyers and diplomats have long sought to reshape international law to equitably reorder barriers to access in extraterritorial or transnational domains like space, the sea, and the electromagnetic spectrum (for telecommunications). They articulated these claims by portraying US and Soviet or Russian extraterritorial activity as a unique form of empire. They saw global inequality as a perpetuation of older, more formal colonial orders, and they argued that the “Great Powers” exploited such inequality as they shaped the laws that governed extraterritorial domains.

It is often forgotten that the Outer Space Treaty of 1967—the first and, to this day, most influential treaty governing spaceflight—arrived on the heels of decolonization. Article II of the Space Treaty, which famously proscribes “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means” in space, is frequently interpreted by US, Soviet, and European lawyers as an artifact of a Cold War compromise between the United States and USSR. But during its drafting, developing countries had recently declared independence or were continuously staving off foreign intervention. In light of this historical context, the treaty’s ban on claims of sovereignty has probably meant something different to the majority of the 107 state parties to the treaty which might be considered developing countries. Meanwhile, the treaty came to ban only weapons of mass destruction in space, not militarization as a whole.

#### The Moon Treaty’s project of a “common heritage” is a trojan horse for instilling militaristic control – this managerial lens renders nature and humanity fungible.

Craven 19 [Matt Craven (Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom). “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space”. European Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 2, May 2019, Pages 547–572, Accessed 1/12/22. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/30/2/547/5536739> //Xu]

With these considerations in mind, Argentina, France and Poland submitted a proposal in the following year,110 leading the legal sub-committee of COPUOS to embark upon a ten-year project to draft what was to become the, largely abortive, Moon Treaty of 1979. Whilst much of the text of the Moon Treaty tracked the parallel provisions in the Outer Space Treaty, the main area of contention concerned the question of resource exploitation. As early as 1967, the Argentinian representative, Aldo Armando Cocca, had argued that the wealth and natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies could be used ‘solely for the benefit of mankind as a whole’,111 and had subsequently submitted a draft agreement to COPUOS proclaiming such resources to be the ‘common heritage of all mankind’.112 What this was generally understood to mean was not that outer space resources should be free from ownership or exploitation (as an early Soviet draft proposed113) but, rather, that, as and when they were exploited, it should be for the benefit of the entirety of humanity.114 From that point on, the debate stabilized around two alternative schemes: whether, on the one hand, states should be entitled to exploit the resources individually subject only to an obligation to distribute the benefits ‘to all’ or whether, in the alternative, the exploitation of resources was only to take place through the medium of an international regime/agency and, pending its establishment, be subject to a moratorium.115 The final agreement offered support for both positions.116 On the one hand, it declared the moon and its natural resources to be the common heritage of mankind and that the resources ‘in place’ should not become the property of any state, international organization, non-governmental entity or natural person. It also committed parties to ‘undertake to establish an international regime’ to govern exploitation as soon as it became feasible.117 On the other hand, by limiting the prohibition on ownership of surface and subsurface resources to those ‘in place’, it offered the possibility that they might nevertheless be claimed once removed. The absence of a vaunted ‘moratorium’ on extraction, furthermore, was to suggest that exploitation might proceed subject only to the principle of ‘equitable sharing’ until the moment at which the international regime came to be established.118 In the end, however, the Moon Treaty remained largely unratified as many of its vocal opponents in the USA objected to the way in which it appeared to inaugurate a ‘system of international socialism’,119 foreclosing ‘the commercial uses of outer space by American enterprise’.120 What is worth bringing out here is not the surface-level disagreement as to the relationship between collective and individual modes of extraction or, indeed, the way in which an ‘east–west adversarialism’ appeared to have given way to a dynamic of ‘north–south resource disparity’ but, rather, to the conditions under which the formation of the outer space commons was to appear.121 In the first place, as the Nigerian representative in COPUOS noted, the language of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ had facilitated a subtle shift from a language of exploration to that of exploitation.122 Outer space was no longer simply a site of speculative scientific endeavour or open to projects of exploration and discovery, but it had become a resource or, indeed, as Myres McDougal and others were to explain, a myriad of resources of varying kinds, in which everything from solar radiation, magnetic and gravitational forces, wave lengths, geostationary locations123 through to meteors tracking through the solar system came to be conceptualized in terms of their ultimate ‘value’ or ‘utility’.124 Once again, thus, one sees the presence of a particular technological rationality undergirding the outer space regime, in which the natural and human environments were to be understood to be the objects of an instrumental reasoning that concerned itself with how they might be manipulated, controlled, exploited and, ultimately, commodified, and in which the technology through which those ends were to be both conceived and achieved (space rockets, probes, telescopes, satellites, planetary rovers and so on) would take the form of a passive, neutral, medium – as mere machines and mechanisms or as ways of doing things.125 The embrace of this rationality may, on the face of it, be seen to have been utterly perverse: the ultimate outcome of a desire to avoid a competitive stripping of the resources of the moon and other celestial bodies, resolving itself in the creation of a regime in which that objective, and that way of thinking about our planetary environment, was not just dominant but also subordinate to everything else. The technology through which those projects were to be made thinkable, furthermore, was clearly only ‘neutral’ to the extent that one could separate its existence from the fact of its (largely exclusive) possession and control by two violent, competitive, superpowers.126 As Marcuse observed, however, that same rationality – common to both Western and Soviet state forms127 – cut deeper than this. On the one hand, the technologies of mass communication, surveillance and warfare were to profoundly shape the perception, experience and apprehension of everyday life, creating a ‘technological reality’ of an ‘object world’ conceived ‘as a world of instrumentalities’.128 On the other hand, however, that same rationality would serve to alienate the subject from their life world through their incorporation into the ‘technological community of the administered population’.129 The domination of nature that technology appeared to enable was thus only one side of a formation that had, as its complement, a human domination propagated through the technological ‘administration’ of the subject and the manufacture of human desires, needs and interests.130 To the extent, then, that the Moon Treaty embraced this rationality, it was one that was ultimately pacifying in effect, swallowing up and repulsing all alternatives, bringing all within the sway of the same totalitarian tendency. In the second place, and as an apparently countervailing measure, was the idea that access to, and the use of, outer space resources should be subject to an international regime, the ‘purposes’ of which were set out in Article 11(7). Just as the International Telecommunication Union managed the ‘technical’ distribution of wavelengths and frequencies, allocating slots in the geostationary orbit, and just as the World Meteorological Organization coordinated the collection and dissemination of meteorological data, so also it was envisaged that the resources of the moon should similarly be subject to the oversight of an international regime of rational administration. The anticipated regime, it was explained, would concern itself with the ‘orderly and safe development of the natural resources’, their ‘rational management’, ‘the expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources’ and an ‘equitable sharing of the benefits’. The model of administration imagined here was one clearly designed to displace the possibility of unrestricted pillage or of primitive accumulation, and the language deployed elicited a sense of distance from precisely those ideas. No mention is made of the practices of extraction, commodification or exploitation that might be enabled; rather, it is faintly suggested, the moon might be ‘improved’ through its ‘development’, terraformed perhaps into a site fit for tourism or colonization? Yet, by the same token, the arrangements seemed to be concerned merely with the transfiguration of relations of power into bureaucratic technique and, in doing so, maintained in place the very same conditions that underpinned the practices to which it was opposed. Certainly, it was clearly envisaged that a further agreement would follow, setting out in more detail the administrative arrangements required for the purposes of the ‘equitable sharing of benefits’. Certainly, it was also possible that such arrangements might include the transfer of technology, the sharing of science and the distribution of profits. But no measure of administration could avoid the observation that the regime was to authorize in space precisely the same operations that had been productive of the material inequalities on earth, albeit this time it was ‘colonization’ or ‘conquest’ in the name of humanity (‘mankind’) rather than some small subset of the same. Finally, and related to this, the very ‘commonness’ of humanity to which the regime gave expression was ultimately a vestigial one. Humanity was to be represented here, not as a universal community of free-willing subjects or as a set of values – of rights or needs – but, rather, through the mediate category of material ‘interests’; the exploration and use of the moon, as Article 4 puts it, ‘shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries’. What humanity had in common, thus, and what defined it once one took away the categories of rule and ownership, was a fluid, economy of ‘interests’,131 the fulfilment of which was always more or less and which was open to be bargained, traded, sacrificed and exchanged. These ‘interests’ assumed the same metaphorical function of assets and liabilities in double-entry bookkeeping – as abstract quantities capable of being compiled, indexed, managed, balanced and administered in the same way as the material resources to which they appeared to relate. Whilst undoubtedly central to the foundations of both capitalism132 and liberal democratic thought,133 they bespoke, in the same measure, of a natural social mechanism or instinct that transcended time and place, that was universally operable and ascribable equally to ‘future generations’ as much as to those of the present. They were/are, in that sense, always ‘common’ and everywhere present, even if the plea to ‘commonness’ would frequently arrive in the form of a demand for their moderation. Their function, however, has been to rationalize social relations, describe their operative mechanics and authorize sovereignty, all in a manner akin to the market – in which human life, qua interests, is the formal subject matter of processes of transaction and exchange. If then the ultimate telos of the regime was to turn, by some bewitching magic, something that was not capable of being owned into something that might become so (through its removal), so also it seemed to imagine that this was also the case with respect to the category of ‘humanity’ that it ushered into existence. Humanity comes to be expressed, ultimately, in a metaphorically commodified form of life identified in and through its relationship to the resources over which it seeks to have control. To be human is to partake of the ‘interests’ in the resources of the moon and other planetary bodies in which all are deemed to share. Just as outer space was a site in which the distinction between peace and war became blurred so as to make warfare itself an illegible part of the regime, so also we might observe, in this context, another similar construction. Here, the regime takes on the character of that which it seeks to prevent or avoid – a system of resource extraction and of primitive accumulation, through which every other relationship humankind might have with the outer space environment, and, indeed, with itself, comes to be mediated. As the instrumental object of a regime of management that has the ‘use’ of nature as its operative configuration, outer space becomes enmeshed within the one-dimensional dynamics of the total administrative state that was central to its formation and, with it, the very meaning of what it is to be human in space.

#### Climate crisis is not anthropocentric and isn’t just the extinction of humanity – climate change is a product of white culture and means the extinction of minorities.

Wynter, ‘07 [2007, Sylvia, Professor Emeritus in Spanish and Romance Languages at Stanford Univeristy, “The Human being as noun? Or being human as praxis? Towards the Autopoietic turn/overturn: A Manifesto,” otl2.wikispaces.com/file/view/The+Autopoetic+Turn.pdf]

For if, as Time magazine reported in January 2007 (Epigraph 2), a U.N. Intergovernmental panel of Natural Scientists, were soon to release "a smoking-gun report which confirms that human activities are to blame for global warming" (and thereby for climate change), and had therefore predicted "catastrophic disruptions by 2100," by April, the issued Report not only confirmed the above, but also repeated the major contradiction which the Time account had re-echoed. This contradiction, however, has nothing to do in any way with the rigor, and precision of their natural scientific findings, but rather with the contradiction referred to by Derrida's question in Epigraph 3—i.e., But who, we? That is, their attribution of the non-natural factors driving global warming and climate change to, generic human activities, and/or to "anthropocentric forcings"; with what is, in effect, this mis-attribution then determining the nature of their policy recommendations to deal with the already ongoing reality of global warming and climate change, to be ones couched largely in economic terms. That is, in the terms of our present mode of knowledge production, and its "perceptual categorization system" as elaborated by the disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (or "human sciences") and which are reciprocally enacting of our present sociogenic genre of being human, as that of the West's Man in its second Liberal or bio-humanist reinvented form, as homo oeconomicus; as optimally "virtuous Breadwinner, taxpayer, consumer, and as systemically over-represented as if it, and its behavioral activities were isomorphic with the being of being human, and thereby with activities that would be definable as the human-as-a-species ones. Consequently, the Report's authors because logically taking such an over-representation as an empirical fact, given that, as highly trained natural scientists whose domains of inquiry are the physical and (purely) biological levels of reality, although their own natural-scientific order of cognition with respect to their appropriate non-human domains of inquiry, is an imperatively self-correcting and therefore, necessarily, a cognitively open/open-ended one, nevertheless, because in order to be natural scientists, they are therefore necessarily, at the same time, middle class Western or westernized subjects, initiated 15 as such, by means of our present overall education system and its mode of knowledge production to be the optimal symbolically encoded embodiment of the West's Man, it its second reinvented bio-humanist homo oeconomicus, and therefore bourgeois self-conception, over-represented as if it were isomorphic with the being of being human, they also fall into the trap identified by Derrida in the case of his fellow French philosophers. The trap, that is, of conflating their own existentially experienced (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) referent "we," with the "we" of "the horizon of humanity." This then leading them to attribute the reality of behavioral activities that are genre-specific to the West's Man in its second reinvented concept/self-conception as homo oeconomicus, ones that are therefore as such, as a historically originated ensemble of behavioral activitiesas being ostensibly human activities-in-general. This, in spite of the fact that they do historicize the origin of the processes that were to lead to their recent natural scientific findings with respect to the reality of the non-naturally caused ongoing acceleration of global warming and climate change, identifying this process as having begun with the [West's] Industrial Revolution from about 1750 onwards. That is, therefore, as a process that can be seen to have been correlatedly concomitant in Great Britain, both with the growing expansion of the largely bourgeois enterprise of factory manufacturing, as well with the first stages of the political and intellectual struggles the British bourgeoisie who were to spearhead the Industrial Revolution, to displace the then ruling group hegemony of the landed aristocracy cum gentry, and to do so, by inter alia, the autopoetic reinvention of the earlier homo politicus/virtuous citizen civic humanist concept of Man, which had served to legitimate the latter's traditionally landed, political, social and economic dominance, in new terms. This beginning with Adam Smith and the Scottish School of the Enlightenment in the generation before the American, French, and Haitian (slave) revolutions, as a reinvention tat was to be effected in now specifically bourgeois terms as homo oeconomicus/and virtuous Breadwinner. 116 That is as the now purely secular genre of being human, which although not to be fully (i.e., politically, intellectually, and economically) institutionalized until the mid-nineteenth century, onwards, when its optimal incarnation came to be actualized in the British and Western bourgeoisie as the new ruling class, was, from then on, to generate its prototype specific ensemble of new behavioral activities, that were to impel both the Industrial Revolution, as well as the West's second wave of imperial expansion, this based on the colonized incorporation of a large majority of the world's peoples, all coercively homogenized to serve its own redemptive material telos, the telos initiating of global warming and climate change. Consequently, if the Report's authors note that about 1950, a steady process of increasing acceleration of the processes of global warming and climate change, had begun to take place, this was not only to be due to the Soviet Revolution's (from 1917 onwards) forced march towards industrialization (if in its still homo oeconomicus conception, since a march spearheaded by the 116 See the already cited essay by J.G.A. Pocock "symbolic capital," education credentials owning and technically skilled Eastern European bourgeoisie)—as a state-directed form of capitalism, nor indeed by that of Mao's then China, but was to be also due to the fact that in the wake of the range of successful anti-colonial struggles for political independence, which had accelerated in the wake of the Second World War, because the new entrepreneurial and academic elites had already been initiated by the Western educational system in Western terms as homo oeconomicus, they too would see political independence as calling for industrialized development on the "collective bovarysme "117 model of the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, with the acceleration of global warming and climate change gaining even more momentum as all began to industrialize on the model of homo oeconomicus, with the result that by the time of the Panel's issued April 2007 Report the process was now being driven by a now planetarily homogenized/standardized transnational "system of material provisioning or mode of techno-industrial economic production based on the accumulation of capital; as the means of production of ever-increasing economic growth, defined as "development"; with this calling for a single model of normative behavioral activities, all driven by the now globally (post-colonially and post-the-1989-collapse-of-the-Soviet Union), homogenized desire of "all men (and women) to," realize themselves/ourselves, in the terms of homo oeconomicus. In the terms, therefore, of "its single (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) understanding" of "man's humanity," over-represented as that of the human; with the well-being and common good of its referent "we"—that, not only of the transnational middle classes but even more optimally, of the corporate multinational business industries and their financial networks, both indispensable to the securing of the Western-bourgeois conception of the common good, within the overall terms of the behavior-regulatory redemptive material telos of ever-increasing economic growth, put forward as the Girardot-type "cure" for the projected Malthusian-Ricardo transumed postulate of a "significant ill" as that, now, ostensibly, of mankind's threatened subordination to [the trope] of Natural Scarcity, this in the reoccupied place of Christianity of its postulate of that "ill" as that of enslavement to Original Sin."' With the result that the very ensemble of behavioral activities indispensable, on the one hand, to the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a Western and westernized transnational ruling class, is the same ensemble of behaviors that is directly causal of global worming and climate change, as they are, on the other, to the continued dynamic enactment and stable replication of the West's second reinvented concept of Man; this latter in response to the latter's existential imperative of guarding against the entropic disintegration of its genre of being human and fictive nation-state mode of kind. Thereby against the possible bringing to an end, therefore, of the societal order, and autopoetic living Western and westernized macro world system in it bourgeois configuration, which is reciprocally the former's (i.e., its genre of being human, and fictive modes of kind's condition of realization, at a now global level. This, therefore, is the cognitive dilemma, one arising directly from the West's hitherto unresolvable aporia of the secular, that has been precisely captured by Sven Lutticken in a recent essay. Despite, he writes, "the consensus that global warming cannot be ascribed to normal fluctuations in the earth's temperature... [the] social and political components of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, the new (un)natural history presented as fate." And with this continuing to be so because (within the terms, I shall add, of our present "single understanding of man's humanity" and the unresolvable aporia which it continues to enact), "[t]he truly terrifying notion is not that [global warming and climate change] is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at the cost of radically changing the economic and social order..."119 The changing, thereby, of the now globally hegemonic biologically absolute answer that we at present give to the question to who we are, and of whose biohumanist homo oeconomicus symbolic life/death (i.e., naturally selected/dysselected) code's intentionality of dynamic enactment and stable replication, our present "economic and social order" is itself the empirical actualization.

#### The impact is *unending war* and *environmental catastrophe*.

Craven 19 [Matt Craven (Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom). “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space”. European Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 2, May 2019, Pages 547–572, Accessed 1/12/22. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/30/2/547/5536739> //Xu]

Even in the aftermath of the pronounced ‘closure’ of the Cold War, the residue of the formation that was brought into play in space remains very much with us today. On the one hand, outer space has been progressively enveloped within the technological infrastructure of warfare and policing actions – the first Gulf War of 1990 ushering in a new era of ‘smart’ weaponry and GPS-configured surgical violence139 – anticipating, in the process, the ‘remote’ operations of the drone and cyber warfare of the contemporary era. The blurring of the demarcation between the (outer space) technologies of war and peace finds its contemporary parallels in the collapse of a range of other operative distinctions – between the virtual and the real, the combatant and the civilian, the battlefield and the battle space, the interstate and the intra-state. The juridical formations on which these depend, furthermore, have themselves become enveloped within the same strategic operations – ‘lawfare’ becoming the adjunct to a new form of totalized warfare stripped of any spatial determinacy. On the other side, outer space has increasingly become the terrain of speculative capitalism, which, following the growth of space tourism (pioneered by the Russian space administration in the 1990s140), has seen the active development of a range of commercial projects from the construction of sub-orbital ‘space planes’ to asteroid and lunar mining undertaken by both public and private agencies. The imaginative resources for such projects have come from various directions, but a common theme is that impending resource depletion on earth will soon bring such resources within commercial and technological reach, and that outer space will therefore provide a ‘spatial fix’ for a system of global capitalism that might otherwise run into the ground.141 There is, as Katarina Damjanov has noted,142 a deep parallelism here between the juridical opening of the seas (mare liberum), which served to stabilize the system of sovereignty within Europe in the 17th century by extroverting the site of conflict and competition,143 and the opening of outer space three centuries later as another prophylactic measure, even if, in this case, that which was to be guarded against was a planetary-wide, environmental catastrophe. Perhaps the deepest irony, here, is that the mode of salvation on offer is precisely the same as that which is the extant cause of crisis, which one may take to be a remorseless instrumentalization of nature.

#### The alternative is *Worldism* – the refusal of international relations and specialization as dictated by militarism in favor of epistemological interventions into the exercise of Space as a carceral apparatus.

Agathangelou and Ling 09 Anna M. Agathangelou is an Associate Professor in the Departments of Political Science and Women’s Studies at York University, Canada and co-director of the Global Change Institute, Nicosia, Cyprus, L.H.M. Ling is an Associate Professor in the Graduate Program in Inter- national Affairs at The New School, New York, USA., Transforming World Politics: From empire to multiple worlds, The New International Relations Series, 2009.

MAIN ASPECTS Worldism presents world politics as a site of multiple worlds. These refer to the various and contending ways of being, knowing, and relating that have been passed onto us from previous generations. Histories, languages, myths, and memories institutionalize and embody multiple worlds through simple daily acts like cooking and eating, singing and dancing, joking and playing but also through larger events like trade, development, conflict, and war. Worldism registers not only the “difference” that comes from multiple worlds (see Inayatullah and Blaney 2004) but also their entwinements. Selves and others reverberate,2 producing multi- and trans-subjectivities that leave us legacies of reinforcement and conflict, reconstruction and critique, reconciliation and resistance. Such syncretic engagements belie seeming oppositions and contradictions among multiple worlds to reveal their underlying connections despite hegemony’s violent erasures. On this basis, communities have opportunities to heal and recuperate so they can build for another day, for another generation. Worldism as everyday life enacts self–other reverberations and syncretic engagements, especially by communities at the margins. Worldism as an analytical framework theorizes about them. Both types of worldist activity expose the problematic of empire in practice and logics. Building on the postcolonial notion that all parties make history, albeit with unequal access to power, worldism leads to an undeniable conclusion: our mutual embeddedness makes us mutually accountable. One cannot escape from the other. Mutual accountability brings with it duties and responsibilities, to be sure, but also possibilities: that is, (a) an internal dialectic of constant questioning to check and problematize hegemony, so that (b) we can expand our visions, strategies, and approaches beyond the narrow, hegemonic confines of realism/liberal internationalism, in order to (c) arrive at a more inclusive, conciliatory, and democratic world politics. In brief, worldism consists of two simultaneous processes: descriptive and analytical. Worldism-as-description features the following: (a) multi- and trans-subjectivities that institutionalize the social and structural reverberations between selves and others; (b) the agency of all parties, despite inequities and injustices, to create, build, and articulate multiple worlds; (c) syncretic engagements that consolidate the entwinements of multiple worlds into concrete strategies for change, adjustment, adaptation, refor- mulation, and transformation; and (d) community-building that integrates and accretes these syncretic engagements despite denials of such efforts from hegemonic elites and their ideologies. Worldism-as-analysis draws on the struggles and learning undertaken in worldist daily life to emphasize: (a) accountability as a hallmark of worldist inquiry that ensures (b) an internal criticality to question, contest, and challenge hegemony, so that we may (c) arrive at emancipatory construction even as we critique and resist. The critical reader may interject: Couldn’t “agency” and “accountabil- ity” in worldism be taken as a fancy way of blaming the victim? Are Jews, for example, responsible for the Holocaust; slaves for their enslavement; or any oppressed people for their oppression? Worldism as a politics of multiple relations subsumes this liberal, individualist understanding of responsibility. Multiple relations produce a web of effects and consequences to any kind of decisions and/or set of practices. Accountability in worldism asks: Who’s involved, under what conditions, and through which processes can we redress or transform the violence? What kinds of understanding are generated to account for these relations and/or to make them invisible? Without the painful concession that all of us, “abusers,” “victims,” and “innocent bystanders” alike, contribute to the production of hegemonic violence, whether it results in domestic abuse (see Adler and Ling 1995) or state violence (see Ling 1994), we may never realize how violence is conceived, generated, and sustained. By extension, we will never understand ways to end it. Instead, in our injuries and (self ) alienation, we may reproduce time and again the same conditions of violence or hegemony that afflicted us in the past and which seems the only option for the present. Suspended political ideals, in this case, could also block us from action and change. Worldist agency and accountability compel us to face the complicities (including our own) that sustain violence in the making of history, so that we may, as Marx exhorted, change it. Where do these ideas come from?, our reader may ask. Let us delineate the intellectual precedents to worldism. INTELLECTUAL PRECEDENTS Worldism draws on constructivism and postmodernism but also differs from them. Worldism shares with constructivism its emphasis on intersubject- ivity, and with postmodernism its insights on asymmetrical difference: that is, the norms, institutions, practices, and behaviors that set up certain subjects and subjectivities as more privileged and protected than others. Power, then, cannot be reduced to an objectified, reified condition of who’s “on top” or who “has more” but instead results from agents contributing to macro-political structures like ideology, organization, and capitalist relations. Power redefined in these terms stems from an intersubjective consensus within a context of material conditions and relations. The crux here lies in the framing. Since narration as a process is never complete, the story can always change.3 However, worldism departs from constructivism by asking: What kinds of intersubjectivity are constructed, by whom, and for what purpose, and how do theories of subjectivity restructure the world “otherwise”? And is this how we want the world to be? Not probing into the social relations of intersubjectivity, according to worldism, effectively erases the power politics of meaning, including the political economy behind such constructions. And unlike postmodernism, worldism distinguishes power from the resistance it induces. Contra Foucault (1994), we differentiate between the colonizer and colonized in their experiences of colonial power (see Stoler 2002) and the entwinements that follow, both reinforcing and conflicting complicity (see Ling 2002b). Not doing so implicitly reinforces the imperialist assertion that “this is the way the world is”: that is, it is not open to alternative concepts, discourses, strategies, or ways of being. These gaps in constructivism and postmodernism return us to the conventional treatment of power as domination, pure and simple. Ronen Palan (2000), for instance, finds a strain of conservative realism in Alexander Wendt’s “naturalist” version of constructivism, primarily because he claims to offer a method only, and not an interpretation, of politics. Wendt (2005) himself admits as much. For similar reasons, Samir Amin (2004) calls postmodernism an “ideological accessory” to elite, bourgeois interests just as Aijaz Ahmad (1992) considers post-structuralist theories serve as alibis for imperialism. Both post- modernism and poststructuralism value critique and deconstruction over political action, thereby keeping de facto power intact. We note that although critical theories like postmodernism and con- structivism open up spaces to think about shifting power politics, they fall short of transforming the very asymmetries they critique. Inattention to structural, material interest and lack of integrating the Other analytically – that is, as a substantive maker of the world – undermines their claims of emancipatory social theory. Ultimately, the Other becomes a repository of raw materials for hegemonic actors and sites in the North to process. Worldism acknowledges a deep intellectual debt to postcolonial studies. Here, race, gender, sexuality, class, and nationality serve as analytics and substance in examinations of power relations. Postcolonial studies demystify empire’s boast, like Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden,” that the imperial Self makes the world for all Others. And that world is unidimensional (top- down state power), unilateral (center dominates periphery), and unilinear (past–present–future). Postcolonial studies record a more nuanced and multiple history by problematizing the ways colonial power is imposed on the colonized. That is, colonization involves more than a unilateral and mechanical domination of the subjugated by colonizers and their states. As documented by postcolonial studies, tensions and contradictions emerge from these relations (Said 1979; Spivak 1999), leading to adaptations and integrations between hegemonic selves and subaltern others. From this inter- action, “colonizers” and “colonized” produced something together over the course of time that neither anticipated nor perhaps desired but which all learned to live with, and eventually called their own. Divides along lines of property, race, class, language, religion, and ideology did not disappear. They fused, rather, into hybrid, creole, or mélange cultures that, nonethe- less, contested these categories constantly (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1995; Lewis and Mills 2003). In recognizing that colonizer and colonized mutually construct their sub- jectivities, postcolonial studies attribute to both the legacies of power that we face today. Note, for example, Britain’s principal instrument of colonial and imperial power: the East India Company. Sudipta Sen (1998) shows that, contrary to claims that the British brought capitalism to India, the East India Company had to adjust to pre-existing market structures and political relations to gain access to the thriving trade already in place in northern India.4 Only through this kind of entry could the East India Company later redirect the trade to its favor. L.H.M. Ling (2002b) traces how institutional elites in East Asia learned syncretically and “interstitially” between two world orders – the agrarian-based, cosmo-moral universe of Confucian governance and the Westphalian inter-state system of commerce and trade – to cumulate into what we know as Asian capitalism today. Walter Mignolo (2000) highlights the “gnosis” of thought and action, Self and Other, that comes from centuries of transgressing and reformulating the colonial boundaries that comprise Latin America. Of course, those subjected to hegemony must accommodate others more than those who perpetrate it. Yet hegemony’s very asymmetry highlights the resilience and creativity of the marginalized. Ordinary people can journey across subjectivities to engage syncretically with others, even under conditions of poverty and inequality, to rebuild, reconstruct, and reorganize communities. Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua (1983) characterize their straddling of multiple worlds as life on the “borderlands.” Typically, they point out, women of color from the South must bear the biggest burden of negotiating the multiple worlds of language, culture, class, and gender to survive white- majority society in the North despite systemic discrimination and obstacles. Still, they are able to exercise internal reserves of freedom, thought, and action to sort through hegemony, not simply surrender to it. Similarly, the indigenous populations of the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand have entered into treaties with their white majorities to retain aspects of indigenous ontologies by formalizing them in Western institutions (Shilliam 2008).