# Speech 1NC TOC Rd 1 vs Mission San Jose 4-23 9AM

## 1

#### Interp and violation – 1ACs must use the three-tier process to justify the plan – they haven’t

Reid-Brinkley 8 [SHANARA ROSE REID-BRINKLEY- “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” Under the Direction of CHRISTINE HAROLD <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf> 2008] VHS AI

The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence. As Green argues, their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”57 In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledgemaking practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making 83 practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59 Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the doubleocto-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.”60 The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions 84 prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education.61 The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks. Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.

#### Vote for limits – there are an infinite amount of potential plans so you cherry-pick affs with no neg ground and I must prep all affs while they prep one which pigeonholes me to generics but there is a limited amount of ways bodies could affirm.

#### The telos of policymaking is the appropriation of synaptic labor into the racialized logistics.

Harney 14 [Note – I do not support the ableist language used in the evidence. Stefano Harney (Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University). “HAPTICALITY IN THE UNDERCOMMONS, OR FROM OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT TO BLACK OPS”. CUMMA PAPERS #9. 2014. Accessed 11/13/21. <https://cummastudies.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/cumma-papers-9.pdf> //Xu]

This may sound surprising to say there are no subjects in the social factory or that indeed the rhythm of work is omnipresent today. We face millions without work or not enough work in Europe and amongst the migrants seeking to reach Europe. We are told that the future of work in Europe is subjective, creative, professional, and most of all managerial, not rhythmic. And at any rate from more reliable sources like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri we understand that we are living in an era when immaterial labour – cognitive and affective labour - dominates and commands other forms of labour, even if factories are still widespread in Bangladesh or China. But this should not make us deaf to the rhythms we hear no matter where we go, the rhythms that break and kill humans. We have heard a lot from business about how we can become entrepreneurial, or how we can transform ourselves into leaders, of how we can become responsible for our own careers. And again from our comrades we have received a more accurate picture: conceptions of the artist, of the bohemian, of the researcher, and of the performer have been twisted by business to make us work harder, to convince us we can fulfil ourselves through work. Andrew Ross’s work is excellent here. Christian Marazzi has written about the way our bodies are today a kind of constant capital, machines for which we are responsible, which we must upkeep because they are the site of production. He is right. Franco Berardi speaks of the way our psyche and our souls descend into work as if engulfing our whole being, and Emma Dowling of the way even our affect is measured and managed, brought into metrics. It is easy to feel that work for those who have it is about the risk of having your subjectivity and your talents swallowed whole, about having your virtuosity consumed as Paolo Virno might put it. But a factory is neither a collection of machines nor a collection of workers however skilled, however virtuoso. A factory is a line. OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT The area of management studies concerned with the factory is Operations Management. Operations management has always been pretty clear about what a factory is, and however much it has expanded its understanding of the factory, this definition has not wavered. This is business ‘knowledge,’ with all its ideological limits, but it can be helpful to our own considerations here. For Operations Management, the factory is the scene of a process. This is process in the sense of procession, of movement. Inputs go into the factory to move along a process, a line, and outputs come out of the factory. Most importantly what machines and especially workers do, according to operations management, is work on the process not the product. In contemporary operations management theory this has meant improving that process. This is often designated by the Japanese term ‘kaizen’ originally associated with workers and managers devoting themselves to the continuous improvement of the line’s efficiency in Toyota factories. Soon kaizen expanded throughout service, extraction, information, and other sectors. Rather than attention to the product, including the immaterial product, which remains as much as ever the purview of a small fraction of the workforce, most workers are subjected to increased attention to the ‘assembly’ line. For management science, this is what a factory is: a line, a process, a procession, a movement, a rhythm through from inputs to outputs. And this too is what the social factory is. Its name is accurate even if we have sometimes been distracted by everything from the propaganda of creative classes to the critical discourse of the precariat. But that is not all. Kaizen has been accompanied by another development in the line. This is the extension of the management of inputs and outputs, of the extension to supply chains understood as part of the line, not just as raw clusters of labour, natural resources and machines waiting outside the door of the factory. And with logistics and reverse logistics this line is expanding exponentially, or rather, algorithmically. Logistics and supply chain management extend the metrics of line in both directions, toward inputs and outputs which now have their own work rhythms. SYNAPTIC LABOUR This algorithmically expanding line means the outside of the factory is measured like the inside, aligned with the processual inside. And when the factory is virtual, Post-Fordist, a social factory, the algorithms of the line extend the rhythm of production, of assembly across our lives. The two meanings of assembly, or perhaps two modes of assembly, begin to merge, to assemble is both to come together and to make, anywhere, anytime. But what is made when we assemble and re-assemble is the line itself first and foremost, not a product or a service. This is our work today. We take inventories of ourselves for components not the whole. We produce lean efforts to transconduct. We look to overcome constraints. We define values through metrics. These are all terms from operations management but they describe work far better than recourse to the discourse of subject formation. Creativity itself, supposedly at the heart of the battle for the subject today, is nothing but what operations management calls variance in the line, a variance that may lead to what is in turn called a kaizen event, an improvement, and is then assimilated back into an even more sophisticated line. Today ours is primarily the labour of adapting and translating, being commensurate and flexible, being a conduit and receptacle, a port for information but also a conductor of information, a wire, a travel plug. We channel affect toward new connections. We do not just keep the flow of meaning, information, attention, taste, desire, and fear moving, we improve this flow continuously. We must remain open and attuned to the rhythm of the line, to its merciless variances in rhythm. This is primarily a neurological labour, a synaptic labour of making contact to keep the line flowing, and creating innovations that help it flow in new directions and at new speeds. The worker operates like a synapse, sparking new lines of assembly in life. And she does so anywhere and everywhere because the rhythm of the line is anywhere and everywhere. The worker extends synaptic rhythms in every direction, every circumstance. With synaptic work, it is access not subjects that the line wants, an access, as Denise Ferreira da Silva reminds us, that was long at the heart of the abuse of the affected ones, the ones who granted access out of love, out of necessity, out of the consent not to be one, even before that granting was abused. GROUNDATIONS The rule of the line persists beyond the factory in time and space, and its rhythm makes the time and space of our lives. There is no outside to the line, or rather we might say the line runs through the outside promised in Fordism and supposed to be so heterogeneous in Post-Fordism. A rhythm that tears us apart, a rhythm that obliterates and wrecks our brain. In some places the line is all that is left of the factory, and logistics in this expanded sense is all that is left of production. The science of operations management becomes the science of society, the common sense of our lives.

#### TVA – defend your advocacy but focus on the way the politics you defend are influenced by your identity but they cannot solve their impacts before they control the levers of power

## 2

#### **Interp: Debaters must not defend the hypothetical implementation of an explicit actor or action**

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)

A picture containing text, sign

Description automatically generated



#### Unjust means unjust adjective US /ʌnˈdʒʌst/ **not morally right; not fair**: New laws will protect employees against unjust dismissals. (Definition of unjust from the Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary © Cambridge University Press)

That’s Cambridge Dictionary ND [“Meaning of unjust in English” Cambridge Dictionary, [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust]](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust%5d)

#### Violation: They cannot defend hypothetical implementation and use the state – or they are Extra-T

#### Voter for limits and ground - imprecisely includes thousands of affs that expand appropriation and deprives us of the public regs counterplan - makes it impossible to be neg

#### Grammar - very idea of a topic rests on the assumption that words have stable meanings and relationships - precision internal link turns every piece of aff offense

#### Critical Ed – creates better ethical subjectivity and critical thinking that o/ws on uniqueness to. Switch to policy and read the PTD aff on the water topic – solves all your offense

#### TVA: Read a K aff that affirms that private appropriation is unjust

## 3 – T-Sat

#### Interp: appropriation is exclusive occupation

#### Sats violate – OST proves its normal means for all space law

MATTHEW THORNBURG- April 14, 2019. Are the Non-appropriation Principle and the Current Regulatory Regime Governing Geostationary Orbit Equitable for All of Earth’s States? <http://www.mjilonline.org/are-the-non-appropriation-principle-and-the-current-regulatory-regime-governing-geostationary-orbit-equitable-for-all-of-earths-states/?fbclid=IwAR0ZuDK3s4rz5sHjt4z1cfnTrw-zx3AklLGgFapzLAqc1qUEssbjIkyNEMg> | [MATTHEW THORNBURG VOL. 40 ASSOCIATE EDITOR]

The OST is clear in prohibiting claims of sovereignty, but the subsequent clauses leave much to interpretation when considering what other acts constitute “national appropriation.” In other words, the question surrounding geostationary orbital slots is “whether the continued exclusive occupation by a geostationary satellite of the same physical area is a violation of the ban on national appropriation”[7] by use, occupation, or other means. In his article, Major Legal Issues Arising from the Use of the Geostationary Orbit, Stephen Gorove says that, “it is not clear that a satellite in geostationary orbit would be able to maintain its exact position and occupy the same area over a period of time…” so as to “appropriate” and thus violate Article II of the OST.

#### Vote neg -

#### a] Limits – Expanding the Topic to include temporary actions explodes Topic Ground – Aff’s can affect temporary docking of private actors on the ISS, using lunar bases in a temporary manner for broader space exploration efforts, satellites that go up temporarily in orbit – this devastates predictable topic division.

#### B] Extra-Topicality – Allowing Aff’s to affects other aspects of outer space gives them access to extra impacts and advantages that they can leverage proven by their ozone offense and we can’t turn it since it wasn’t grounded in the resolution.

## 4

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact and why schools fund debate

#### Accessibility – psychic violence is a prereq to being in debate and has durable impacts

#### Competing interps – 1. Reasonability encourages a race to the margins of what counts as sufficiently fair which incentivizes as much abuse as possible 2. Norm setting – it encourages the most fair rule through debating competing models 3. Judge intervention – Reasonability begs the question of what the judge thinks is sufficient which takes the round out of the debaters hands.

#### DTD – its key to deter future abuse and the abuse has already occurred

#### No rvi

#### [a] Baiting—they’ll bait the theory debate and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse since they’ll get away with unacceptable practices

#### [b] 1AR all-outs—they’ll collapse entirely to theory which crowds out substance and kills education.

#### [c] Chilling effect—people will be scared to read theory since they can lose off of it, so no one will check abuse.

#### [d] Norm-setting—I shouldn’t be forced to keep advocating for a bad norm if I realize it’s bad in the middle of the round.

#### [e] Flex—RVIs make theory uncondo so I always have to go for that route to the ballot, but both debaters should get multiple relevant layers and collapse options.

#### [f] Illogical—doesn’t make sense to win just for being fair.

## 5

#### Disability is constructed within the hyperreal of the abled, where it is fetishized and made legible as a spectacle of violence to preserve the illusion of safety. You should *shed the safe space of appearance and embrace the abjection of disability* as a method of chaotic interruption.

**Overboe 99** [Brackets Original. James Overboe (Professor in the Sociology department at Wilfrid Laurier University - Waterloo). “‘Difference in Itself’: Validating Disabled People’s Lived Experience.” Body and Society. Vol 5, No 4. 1999. Accessed 8/7/20. <http://intergender.net/OLD_IG/IG_ARCHIVE/a.parsons.edu/_nesrin/thesis/research/differenceinitself.pdf> //Xu]

Baudrillard’s Simulation: Through Foucault the Broadcasting of the Korper Disabled Body A few years ago I was a technical adviser for the play called Creeps, 3 which focused on the problems faced by institutionalized disabled people. This play illustrates both Foucault’s concept of disciplining of the body and Baudrillard’s concept of simulation. In Foucauldian terms, through functional, continuous and hierarchical surveillance (Foucault, 1984: 192), Tom McCamus, who played a person with cerebral palsy, had to discipline his body in order for him to mirror the spasms that are inherent in people who experience spastic cerebral palsy. For Tom these disciplining techniques became all-encompassing and pervasive as they permeated his body and caused him to experience pain which, ironically, is similar to that felt by many disabled people as they contort their bodies in an attempt to appear normal. Often audience members stated that they had a better appreciation of cerebral palsy because of the play. At first I thought this was only natural as the play concentrated on the discrimination against disabled people. However, these same people always remarked on Tom’s disabled/non-disabled persona. Both Tom and I felt others were losing a sense of us as individuals in their appreciation of this simulated disabled/non-disabled persona. For Baudrillard (1988: 20–1) appearance is the only thing that matters in the realm of hyperreality. In short, the concept of representation is no more, it’s been replaced by simulation that is reality. Baudrillard (1988: 16) asserts that in the era of hyperreality we no longer exist as playwrights or actors on the world’s stage, but as terminals of multiple networks. Tom was no longer an actor on stage portraying a person who experiences cerebral palsy. He had become a terminal that broadcast disabled and non-disabled networks. Tom’s simulation had become ‘more real’ than ‘real’. Tom had become a vulnerable, non-threatening person who had the strength to overcome any (imagined? or real? perhaps simulated?) disability. Agreeing with Linda William, Norden (1994: 6) believes that disabled people embody the paradoxical objectification of being both an object of desire and an object of horror for non-disabled people. Whenever the audience found his disability repugnant or grotesque they easily perceived Tom as having a non-disabled identity. Within the hyperreal world the audience ‘desires’ the exotic, but only if such observations take place in an environment that is safe for them. For example, in his discussion about the San Diego Zoo, Umberto Eco (1983: 51) argues that in the world of hyperreality one can witness savagery in a fabricated jungle setting while still feeling safe and secure. In the same manner, I argue that the audience with an able-bodied sensibility satisfies their ‘desire’ for the exotic ‘disabled’ by witnessing the simultaneous ‘absolutely fake but real’ spectacle of Tom’s wild and savage disability within a safe environment. They could be immersed in the experience of disability and feel the heightened titillation of the exotic without risk. To speak with disabled people the audience risks having to confront their own fear of disability as it manifests itself in our experience. I believe that the audience’s reaction to both Tom and his performance typifies what Derrida calls: . . . the theological stage [that] comports passive seated public, a public of spectators, of consumers, of ‘enjoyers’ . . . attending a production that lacks true volume or depth, a production that is level, offered to voyeuristic scrutiny. But what is this God who not only controls the audience but is also simultaneously ‘nowhere’ and ‘everywhere’? (Derrida, 1978: 235) The audience that attended the play Creeps, in Derridean terms, ‘defers’ (perhaps unwittingly and without awareness) to an able-bodied sensibility. This nondisabled sensibility in fact is a ‘God’ that is both ‘everywhere’ and ‘nowhere’, it is so pervasive that it permeates every pore of their being and in doing so is ‘naturalized’ and ‘normalized’. The Continuation of the Negation of a Disabled Presence in the Techno/Cyber World Baudrillard (1988) predicts that disabled people and their sensibilities will have a pivotal role in this hyperreal world. Baudrillard writes, Such are the blind, and the handicapped; mutant figures, because mutilated and hence closer to commutation, closer to this telepathic, telecommunicational universe than we others: humans all-too-human, condemned by our lack of disabilities to conventional forms of work. By the force of circumstance the disabled person is a potential expert in the motor or sensorial domain. And it is not by chance that the social is aligning itself more and more with the handicapped, and their operational advancement: they can become wonderful instruments because of their handicap. They may precede us on the path towards mutation and dehumanization. While I admire his intent I feel Baudrillard’s position is marred by his negation of disabled people’s presence, bodies and their flesh. Vivian Sobchack (1995), who is disabled, makes some interesting observations about embodiment and flesh within our techno-body world. At first she is enamoured by her prosthetic which is aesthetically pleasing with its lack of cellulite. Sobchack (1995: 208) admits, ‘The truth of the matter is that I feel more, not less, attractive than I used to. Hard body (however partial) that I am, I feel more erotically distracting and distracted than I have in years.’ Although Sobchack (1995) celebrates her prothesis she understands that it must be incorporated into her embodiment. While she realizes the limits of both her flesh and her prosthetic Sobchack gives preference to ‘her flesh’ over her prosthetic tool. Sobchack (1995: 213) writes: Living – rather than writing or thinking – my ‘newly extended body of technological engagement’, I find the fragility of my flesh significantly precious. While I am deeply grateful for the motility my prosthetic affords me (however much in a transformation that is perceptually reduced as well as amplified), the new leg is dependent finally upon my last leg. Without my lived-body to live it, the prosthetic exists as part of a body without organs – techno-body that has no sympathy for human suffering, cannot understand human pleasure and, since it has no conception of death, cannot possibly value life. Ironically, her prosthetic allowed Sobchack (1995) to conform more closely to an embodiment and mobility that has become normalized as the prototype for what is human. But this prosthetic solution that offered her ‘normalization’ proved unsatisfactory for Sobchack because it failed to meet the requirements of her lived experience. Many advocates of the cyberworld contend that the future seamless posthuman body of the cyborg will be free from oppression. Thus cyberworld bodily differences are situated knowledges located as sites on the equal textual plane of postmodernity (Caddick, 1995: 159). Caddick (1995: 159–61) points out these situated knowledges – such as body-image – are not equal sites on the playing field because these new technologies are concerned only with the surface of the body (in essence its image) and negate its visceral depth. Caddick (1995) contends that the difference between the ugliness and beauty is not diminished but heightened by a greater fetishism of a particular body – the body beautiful. Similarly, Nigel Clark (1995) argues that the notion that we are on the verge of a new age society is premature because the cyberworld relies on prior beliefs about what constitutes desirable bodies. Clark (1995: 125) argues that ‘the focus of contemporary digital body construction seems to lie neither in an unembellished “naturalism” nor in the unconstrained mutability of forms’. Instead digital body construction defers to the past by resurrecting images of dead film stars such as Marilyn Monroe, James Dean and Elvis Presley. Yet these spectacular digital bodies prove inadequate for this cyberworld and have been eclipsed by a constellation of still more spectacular bodies epitomized by the steroid and silicon enhanced physiques of human actors (Clark, 1995: 125). Clark (1995: 126) adds, ‘What we seem to be dealing with here is not the ultimate in cybernetic bodies, but a recursive corporeality which arises out of the transition from one generation of mediated affects to another.’ With its emphasis on ‘spectacular bodies’ this new generation of mediated affects continues the devaluation of disabled bodies. Thus, the oppression of disabled people extends from the analogue period to this post-analogue period. Difference in Itself and Repetition in Itself Baudrillard (1988) and Deleuze (1994) both use the term ‘dehumanization’ to denote a shift to the hyperreal or cyberworld. However, the term ‘de-humanization’ has often been evoked as a justification for the eradication of disabled people. For example, the government of Nazi Germany began the annihilation of disabled people by socially constructing their dehumanization (Proctor, 1995). More recently, under the auspice of ‘caring for his child’, Robert Latimer argued successfully that he was justified in killing his disabled daughter because her existence was ‘less than human’.4 In spite of my reservations I agree with both Baudrillard (1988) and Deleuze (1994) in their rejection of the restrictive aspects of humanity. Perhaps one could escape the shackles of this restrictive humanism by incorporating the sensibility of disability as it manifests itself in the lived experience of disability. Kroker and Kroker (1997: 24) have argued that the postmodern body is not as unsettling for women because their bodies have often been reduced to visual texts. In the same manner I argue that the notion of simulacra or ‘difference in itself’ has been an unrecognized part of disabled people’s existence. Deleuze (1994: 262) argues that difference has been thought of solely in terms of representation: identity in the concept; opposition in the predicate; analogy in judgement; and resemblance in perception. Identity of the concept derives from the formation of the thinking subjectwhich desires through memory, recognition and self-consciousness not only to make common sense of the world but to tame it. From the perspective of disabled people ‘identity in concept’ has meant the negation of a disabled presence. The desire to tame the world points to an extreme independent liberalism that negates the lived experience of many disabled people who are interdependent on others. This exclusion of disabled people can be traced to the fact that dependency has been, and continues to be, devalued and attributed to persons perceived as inadequate (Siegal, 1988: 113–14). Cheryl Wade (1994) argues this emphasis on independence created a new image for disabled people – the able-disabled. Wade (1994: 35) writes, ‘What was missing in the political identity, able–disabled crip identity was a true esteeming of the Cripple body.’ Agreeing with Wade, De Felice notes: The disabled movement has purchased political visibility at the price of physical invisibility. The cripple and the lame had bodies, but the handicapped, or so the social workers say, are just a little late at the starting gate. I don’t like that; it’s banal. When we speak in metaphorical terms we deny physical reality. The further we get from our bodies the further we get from the body politic. (De Felice, 1986: 13) The rhetoric of equality of rights is a cornerstone of identity politics movements with its liberal individualistic embodiment. By arguing that disabled people must demand equality of rights for themselves, supporters of ‘equality of rights’ deny the ‘lived experience’ of disabled people. For example, Bickenbach (1993: 163) argues that disabled people may have the ‘equal right’ to enter government offices, but if these offices are not accessible then many of us cannot exercise our ‘equal rights’. The obtaining of equal rights that maintains the systemic discrimination against disabled people does not resolve problems for us. It only exacerbates them. In respect of ‘identity in concept’ Deleuze (1994: 266) writes, ‘To restore difference in thought is to untie this first knot which consists of representing difference through the identity of the concept and the thinking subject.’ Applying Deleuze’s insights to disability I believe that by untying this knot that garrottes our lived experience and imposes an identity on us, we can begin to rid ourselves of the twin concepts of ableism and extreme liberal individualism that often lead others to see us as an abomination. Rather than an ‘equality of rights’ based on identity politics, I call for an ‘equality of condition’ that validates both a disabled embodiment and sensibility. Our physical, mental and emotional manifestations of disability as well as the social, political, moral and physical environment will continue to have an impact upon us. But shifting the notion of an identity which is devalued to a lived experience that is validated causes a change in approach. No longer would we be ‘done to’, and ‘done for’, or even ‘done with’ as so oftenwithin non-disabled and extreme liberal individualism parameters and with the restrictions of an ableist sensibility. The shedding of the illusion of identity allows for our ‘lived experience’ to come to the forefront. Thus our ‘lived experience’ would be an integral part of the atmosphere and tone for any change within our lives and our interaction with others, whether they be disabled or non-disabled. The second concept is the subordination of difference to resemblance. Deleuze (1994: 266) believes that ‘difference’ necessarily tends to be cancelled in the quality of the concept which covers it, while at the same time inequality tends to be equalized within the extension in which it is distributed. Thus ‘difference’ that reveals itself in the embodiment and sensibility of disabled people is cancelled (as the prefix ‘dis’ designates) in favour of an able-bodied corporeality and ‘common’ sense. When we overcome our disabilities, as in the case of ‘disabled heroes’ (Wendell, 1989: 116), we necessarily feedback into this loop by not validating our previous sensibility and by accepting the great equalizer – normality, the benchmark for humanity. I believe that the term ‘person with a disability’ demonstrates and is underscored by a ‘normative’ resemblance that we can attain if we achieve the status of being deemed ‘people first’ (with the term’s emphasis on independence and extreme liberal individualism) in the eyes of an ableist-centred society But our negation or inequality is equalized and extended because other disabled people fail to meet normative expectations and are deemed ‘damaged goods’ (Bauman, 1988). For those disabled people who fail to achieve this status there is a legitimization of their position because of the fairness of distribution. One has failed because one does not meet the legitimized basic standards required for acceptance into the ‘people first’ circle. The decision is not based on a discrimination against this particular person but a matter of ‘objective fact’. The ‘naturalness’ of the notion of the able-bodied liberal individual coupled with the negation of a disabled sensibility makes many disabled people queue for the chance to be anointed as ‘people first’, while simultaneously disavowing their previous embodied positions as ‘gimps’ and ‘cripples’. Ironically, disabled people who achieve ‘people first’ status are not achieving full normative status but are only legitimizing an able-bodied resemblance through their desire for normality. Moreover, they reinforce an extension of the legitimacy of this resemblance by validating a continuum of disabled persons ranging from the successful ‘people first’ to the pitiful ‘gimps’ and ‘cripples’ who are deemed worthless failures. To facilitate a notion of ‘difference’ that validates a disabled embodiment as well as a disabled sensibility I prefer the term ‘disabled persons’ because it implies that their disabilities not only inform their lives but may also be a positive factor in many aspects of their lives. Employing the term ‘disabled people’ allows for the ‘leib’ experience of all ‘gimps’ and ‘cripples’ to come to the forefront. If we acceptthe notion of ‘difference in itself’ then we do not have to accept the normative benchmark and its reliance on resemblance which sets the parameters of what constitutes a favourable difference. Disabled people may or may not choose to reject the notion of resembling a liberal individualistic able-bodied template. Hopefully, they will find desire in their own embodiment and sensibility ‘in and of itself’, as well as when it interacts with others. According to Deleuze (1994: 266) difference has been represented as opposition and limitation, which has led to hierarchical levels that have been counterproductive for people. For example, in his discussion about opposition and revolution Deleuze (1994: 268) writes, ‘Contradiction is not the weapon of the proletariat but, rather, the manner in which the bourgeoisie defends and preserves itself, the shadow behind which it maintains its claim to decide what the problems are.’ Similarly, by framing the argument within a non-disabled/ disabled restriction the able-bodied have been able to preserve and defend their superior position because their normalized embodiment and sensibility sets not only the parameters of ‘what the problem is’, but also the limits of the discussion and the type of communication required to take part in the dialogue. Thus, an able-bodied sensibility often excludes a disabled embodiment (such as a spastic embodiment), which is interpreted by others as conveying that this individual lacks the intelligence to partake in a discussion in any ‘meaningful’ or ‘appropriate’ manner. Disabled people may want to problematize the ableist assumptions that underscore their interaction or meetings with able-bodied people. But we are unable to articulate or communicate our position because often we have to attend to our disability rather than voice our opinion. At other times we are too tired. Given our subordinate position in our interaction with the non-disabled we might fear the negative consequences of ‘speaking our mind’. Or a disabled person may not want to speak because the lines of communication may not be open to them. For example, the linear rationality of the able-bodied subject has difficulty in understanding a somewhat chaotic communication that is informed by the ‘disruptive’ embodiment of a disabled person. In any case, others interpret disabled people’s silence as tacit agreement. Instead of hierarchy of levels, Deleuze (1994: 267) calls for a ‘diagonal’ approach that recognizes difference without negation. A diagonal approach would allow a disabled embodiment and sensibility to be perceived as one way of being without its automatic negation, or without inversely giving it prominence over nondisabled continuance. For example, disabled people have a sense of time which is informed by our embodiment. If we were to look at difference as ‘diagonal’ rather than ‘hierarchical’ then disabled people’s embodied sense of temporality and thinking would be neither valued or devalued but only exist.

#### The 1AC’s belief of a better future becomes complicit in the logic of rehabilitative futurism that consistently renders the disabled body as ontologically negative. Imagining a better future is threatened by the notion of disabled child – these notions of futurism necessitate the cure or elimination of disability.

**Mollow 15**[Anna Mollow(Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar, UC Dissertation-Year Fellow, coeditor of Sex and Disability and the co-editor of DSM-CRIP). “The Disability Drive.” University of California at Berkeley. Pg 85-88. Spring 2015. Accessed 3/6/20. <https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf> //Recut Xu from UTDD]

Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the innocent‟Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman‟s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### The 1AC is a form of loco parentis – their action of governing the actions of private entities creates a distinction between ourselves as “full and smart subjects” versus the other “irrational and crazy nations” who will engage in bad actions – this developmental logic supercharges ableist oppression by validating the “inferior” “superior” divide,

**Mills and Lefrançois 18** [China Mills( [The University of Sheffield](https://sheffield.academia.edu/), [School of Education](https://sheffield.academia.edu/Departments/School_of_Education/Documents), Faculty Member) and Brenda A. Lefrançois(Professor @ School of Social Work for [Memorial University of Newfoundland](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_org&hl=en&org=17452456186544668394)). “Child As Metaphor: Colonialism, Psy-Governance, and Epistemicide.” The Journal of New Paradigm Research. Volume 74, 2018 - [Issue 7-8: Transdisciplinary Child and Youth Studies](https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/gwof20/74/7-8). Pages 503-524. 17 Dec 2018. Accessed 3/18/20. [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02604027.2018.1485438 //](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02604027.2018.1485438%20//) Recut Xu from BL]

For Ashis Nandy (2007), the Western worldview of childhood as an imperfect transitional state on the way to adulthood is embedded in ideologies of colonialism and modernity, meaning “the use of the metaphor of childhood [is] a major justification of all exploitation” (p. 59). Accordingly, parentification – or even in loco parentis – has been used to justify, and to deem benevolent, interventions used by the powerful to “protect” those who are “childlike”. Not so hidden from the surface are the vested capitalist interests as well as the social, political, and psychological agendas of power and control taken on by those in the parental role within these socially constructed and contrived “parent-child” relations. The developmental logic that underlies these power relations legitimizes various regimes of ruling that promote the subordination of certain groups in the name of benevolence. In this article, we demonstrate the ways in which these forced paternalistic encounters, and the infantilization that characterize them, serve not only to debase and erase racialized/colonized, psychiatrized and/or disabled adults and children as knowers, but also serve to reinscribe children themselves as incompetent and inferior. Colonial logics intersect with medical and psychiatric logics that enable not just the marking of certain individual bodies as sub-human but also the global categorizing of whole groups of people as being undeveloped, underdeveloped and/or wrongly developed. Correspondingly, we understand the importance placed within mainstream corporate academia upon the subfields of developmental studies within political science, international development, international relations, economics, geography, child psychology, and medicine, all which serve the same function of maintaining the status quo of (white) supremacy whilst (re)producing majority world people, children, psychiatrized and/or disabled people as childlike (Blaut, 1993). We expose and contest such debasement whilst also disputing the essentialized and adultist meanings contained within the very concept of childlike, a concept which emanates from dominant Eurowestern and adult-centric constructions of childhood. Metaphor is “pervasive in everyday life”, and is classically understood as structuring the way we think and act, and enabling us to understand and experience “one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 3–5). Yet many concepts may not be separate as such, and may be historically entangled with one another. Metaphors are contextually bound and have a performative aspect in that they structure what action we can take (Kövecses, 2015). Understanding something through metaphor may hide aspects of a concept that are not consistent with that metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and thus metaphors can be used to do political and ideological work. We are interested in how certain groups of peoples (colonized, racialized, mad and crip)2 come to be understood, talked about and acted upon through the metaphor of childhood. Specifically, the pervasive, entangled and co-constitutive nature of metaphors of the child, colony/“savage”, mad and crip are explored. The intersections of these metaphors call for an approach attuned to overlaps and not constricted by disciplinary boundaries. We engage in this analysis through a creative transdisciplinary inquiry that is not discipline-specific but instead brings together knowledges that are rarely understood to coexist and that may at times be in tension with each other (Augsburg, 2014; Leavy, 2006; Mitchell & Moore, 2015; Montuori, 2013). Transdisciplinarity – as contingent and non-essentialized – alerts us to and rejects the politics of differentiation and exclusion, key to the bordering and disciplining practices of social scientific knowledge and their beginnings in the codification of Enlightenment rationality used to justify slavery, colonialism and apartheid (Sehume, 2013). Following Nicolescu (2008), we understand transdisciplinary inquiry to be a form of meaning-making that breaks down the academic hierarchy of epistemological relationships, that is open to different forms of logic including that which is unknown (Augsburg, 2014), and that strives to eliminate epistemic injustice (Leblanc & Kinsella, 2016) or epistemicide (Santos, 2014). Further, our inquiry is informed by mad studies, critical disability studies, critical childhood studies, as well as critical race, transnational and post-colonial theories. Mad studies transgresses the academy and its disciplines, with its beginnings being located outside the academy and within mad social movements (Gorman & LeFrançois, 2017; LeFrançois et al., 2013; Russo & Sweeney, 2016). A transdisciplinarity lens is consistent with Mad studies, in that it is not only inquiry based but also questions the logics and the very form in which that inquiry may take (Augsburg, 2014), whilst Mad studies may further rebelliously challenging enlightenment and eurocentric notions of rationality (Blaut 1993) which underpins and structures knowledge emanating from academic disciplines (Sehume 2013). That is, at times, Mad studies may be at odds with rationalism as the basis of knowledge production and as the basis of the formation of the academy. As Bruce (2017) notes, “(r)ationalist readers may fear that such a mad study…detrimentally reinforces myths of black savagery and subrationality. Such investment in rationalism presumes that Reason is paramount for fully realized modern personhood” (p. 307). Like Bruce (2017), we reject such investments and presumptions, and our work instead interrogates the adultist, disableist, saneist, colonial and racist logics that often underpin the conventional academic imaginary. However, debasement of mad people’s knowledges does not just occur within the academy but also within the general public (Leblanc & Kinsella, 2016). Mad studies produces knowledge where the meaning-making of mad people is centred, but where other meanings emanating from other sources – academic or otherwise – also can be considered and deconstructed, incorporated or rejected. So too do we argue that critical childhood studies should also be seen as not only transdisciplinary (Mitchell & Moore, 2015) and as a direct challenge on ‘Reason’ as key for children’s entrance into a fully realized personhood, given the ways adultist notions of children’s inherent irrationality, lack of reason, rule by passion, animism (Scott and Chrisjohn, forthcoming), and their supposed lack of contribution as productive members of (capitalist) society is conventionally inscribed on their bodies and minds in the West. According to Rollo (2018, 61) this denigration and subordination of children – misopedy –was in ancient Greece a “form of social and political hierarchy”. Here the child functions as the ontological other to reason and politics; children as a group for whom there was seen to be a moral obligation to assist but for whom political claims were seen as impossible. It was this that made possible the framing of violence as necessary and legitimated as being in children’s ‘best interests’. As these dominant notions of children and childhood not only exist but also shut down discussions of the social construction of childhood within most academic disciplines (child psychology, sociology, social work, medicine, psychiatry, etc), understanding (critical) childhood studies as a direct challenge to this denotes the desire to disrupt and break away from “the governing strictures found within academic modes of dominant knowledge production that both center and reproduce privileged and constraining notions of reason and productivity” (LeFranc¸ois and Voronka forthcoming). For the most part, the academy neither acknowledges the existence of nor includes knowledge production emanating from children themselves, whether such contributions mirror dominant (adult) discourses or not, as the concept of “children’s contributions” is read through an adultist lens. This is not to imply that the heterogeneous accounts of children and/or mad people are innocent; it is instead about radically calling into question what the academy counts as knowledge. For those contributions deemed childlike, whether they emanate from children, colonized and racialized peoples, psychiatrized or disabled people, transdisciplinarity coupled with Mad studies may provide a platform for ensuring epistemic justice through both the deconstruction of dominant, racist, sanist and ableist strictures but also by opening up a wider space for meaning-making beyond such adultist and Euro-western positivism. We argue that the use of child as metaphor operates as a form of epistemicide – what Santos (2014) terms, a “failure to recognise the different ways of knowing by which people across the globe provide meaning to their existence” (p. 111), including different ways of knowing children. This operates as a form “cognitive injustice” often followed by attempts to destroy epistemological diversity with a single story that claims to be universal (Santos, 2014), including a single developmental story about children and those deemed childlike. These concepts are mostly used by Santos in reference to the violent eradication of Indigenous knowledge systems enabled through a colonial framing of irrationality. Yet cognitive injustice is also at work in the dismissal of alternative experiences of reality and alternative cognitions that are classified as ‘mad’ and intellectually disabled respectively, and hence, marked as incompetency and irrationality. We are interested in how the child functions as a metaphor for colonized, racialized, psychiatrized and disabled peoples. Literature on the iconography of childhood usually makes a distinction between metaphorical or symbolic and actual “flesh and blood” children (Burman, 2016; Morrigan, 2017). We also make this distinction here by exploring the performative nature of “child as metaphor” for those deemed childlike, and for actual children. However, in making this distinction we do not seek to reify a naturalized and essentialized developmental child. Sánchez-Eppler (2005) notes the entanglement of “childhood as a discourse and childhood as persons”, particularly in Euro-western affective deployments of childhood (p. xxiii). Furthermore, we recognize that given the “societally as well as intrapsychically invested character of childhood, arguably all appeals to ‘the child’ are metaphorical” (Burman, 2016, p. 2; Stainton Rogers & Stainton Rogers, 1992). Our point of departure, then, is the analytic task outlined by Burman (2016) to render “explicit the work done by the rhetorical appeal to childhood” (p. 2), and the task in this article is to trace the work done by the metaphorical appeal to childhood, specifically in relation to colonialism, madness and disability. While we are concerned with the effects of metaphor, we are cognizant that the conceptual basis on which “child as metaphor” functions is largely a Euro-western construction of childhood as an early rung on a linear developmental ladder and a stage marked by a lack of intellectual capacity, dependency, irrationality, animism, emotionality, – or “rule by passion”, and economic unproductivity (Blaut, 1993). This is an evolutionary and developmentalist narrative globalized by the West as a universal standard (Nieuwenhuys, 2009) and, as we shall see, a narrative that is deeply entangled with colonialism (Blaut, 1993) and epistemicide (Santos, 2014).

#### The 1AC’s understanding of intelligibility operates on the terrain of fluency which sutures neoliberal governance and compulsory ability on the level of subjectivity – vote negative to forefront disability as dysfluency as an unintelligible frame that interrupts those hegemonic processes.

St. Pierre 17 [Joshua St. Pierre, co-founder of the Did I Stutter Project, philosophy at University of Alberta. 2017. Accessed 11/30/20. “Becoming Dysfluent: Fluency as Biopolitics and Hegemony.” <https://online.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/abs/10.3828/jlcds.2017.26> //Xu]

Fluency as hegemony is constitutively wider than communicative practices, depicting the way that bodies are compelled to live within linear and uni-directional time that has no becoming. Yet communication highlights the sorts of oppressions that can result from fluent processes. Ableist “choreographies” of communication (St. Pierre “Distending”) regulate access to the present and shape who gets to participate within encounters. For example, Autistic people often process language at different rates and in different modes and are thus unable to “keep up” with the pace of fluent conversation in everyday social encounters. Without hitting the right cues and interjecting at the appropriate times, dysfluent and slow speakers are excluded from meaningful participation in shared time (see Paterson; St. Pierre “Construction”). From this perspective, disability politics are always, in part, a question of heterogeneous temporalities and differential rates of access that have been swept up in an unsustainable ableist beat. With this being said, dysfluency offers a critical response by questioning who can access, participate, and even belong within collective time. Tanya Titchkosky writes that “access is a way to orient to, and even come to wonder about, who, what, where, and when we find ourselves to be in social space” (3) and we might extend this analysis into a temporal register. Dysfluency calls from our relations not better communication skills, nor “understanding,” nor simply “more time,” but what we might term “responsiveness”: a reorientation towards the other through the body. The stubborn materiality of disability offers a resource for becoming responsive to one another and to our social situation, and responsiveness thus offers a way to imagine access as relation alongside the needed flexibility of crip time. Yet while the accelerated temporality of fluency has worrisome overt consequences in itself, it also hides a distinctly hegemonic function: fluency works to close the present moment such that nothing, in the existential sense, happens. Arendt is helpful at this junction, since her theory of “action,” by which she means the human capacity to begin something new, spontaneous, and thus transformative in the world, resonates in fruitful ways with dysfluency and crip politics. What defines the intersubjective process of action is precisely its unpredictability and its capacity to interrupt hegemonic social processes with a chain of unforeseeable consequences. Arendt, in this way, reads modern politics as an impulse toward closure and stability: The attempt to eliminate action because of its uncertainty and to save human affairs from their frailty by dealing with them as though they were or could become the planned products of human making has first of all resulted in channeling the human capacity for action…into an attitude toward nature which up to the latest stage of the modern age had been one of exploring natural laws and fabricating objects out of natural material. (230–31) Arendt has in mind the reduction of political action to bureaucratic management and the “fabrication” of the nation-state. Yet in a move that she would likely resist, we might also consider the chrononormative politics that seek to render action and its uncertainty inert within our intersubjective relations. During my daily commute a couple years ago a high school-aged girl with Down’s seated herself beside me on the crowded subway. As we started talking she quickly became aware of my dysfluent speech and accordantly asked if I, like her, had an aid in school. I was aware of the onlookers acutely uncomfortable with our public display of dysfluency that was rupturing the normalized social field and of the fluent impulse to disavow our relation: to reassert fixed identities and to align myself with able-bodiedness—“Why would I have an aid? My speech does not make me like you.” Instead, we just talked. Our shared dysfluency opened something new: a site of kinship and solidarity that modified an ableist social field and hegemonic ways of relating to ourselves and others. Fluency channelizes the human capacity for action within our communicative bodies to mitigate the possibilities of something aporetic interrupting the tractable passage of time. Yet what might happen if fluency didn’t govern our time and interactions? The impulse towards closure, the collapse of polyvocal access and engagement within the encounter, is ultimately an effort to render the present and its possibility for rupture utterly inert.4 I have suggested that neoliberal and postindustrial subjects are rendered governable and productive in part through technologies of closure that seek to collapse the encounter through a series of sutures enacted upon and through the body. Only by inscribing social order in our bodies and smoothing over/ disavowing the site of politics can compulsory able-bodiedness manifest as a stable, seamless, and natural field—everywhere and nowhere at once. “Compulsory able-bodiedness,” once again, “functions by covering over, with the appearance of a choice, a system in which there actually is no choice” (McRuer 8). While paraded around in discourses and practices like liberal eugenics, this “choice” is in fact covered by fluent processes that both disavow thick moments of collective access and judgment and that regulate and streamline the encounter to effectively exclude uncertainty and the voices of those most affected by ableist and eugenic logic. Ableist and eugenic ideology contribute to this “common ground” of disability oppression, the apparent consensus on the desirability of able-bodiedness, but ideology is always a secondary inscription: an echo of the material in the sphere of representation. Attention to fluency complicates strategies of resistance to hegemony. For example, while expanding the limits of subjective intelligibility (such as widening “sex” to account for non-dimorphic sexed bodies; or seeking cultural representation of disability) is a critical political intervention, we must recognize that intelligibility is always already a function of biopower. Foucault famously claimed that “the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are” (“The Subject and Power,” 134; emphasis added), and we must soberly ask whether we can refuse subjectivization fluently and whether fluency can unmake fluent, ableist ontologies. Is a “becoming-minority” or a “becoming-crip” possible without a “becoming-dysfluent”?5 Or in Foucault’s terms again, to “promote new forms of subjectivity [and intersubjectivity] through the refusal of this kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for centuries” (134) perhaps requires that we think beyond the individualizing effects of clarity, intelligibility, and closure that restrict the possibilities of crip lives and render us functions of fluent time. Dysfluency as Escape In conclusion, we might consider that for McRuer, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “disability” can refer to “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of bodily, mental, or behavioral functioning aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” (156–57). An attention to dysfluent voices as material enunciations offers one specific way to think about this crip excess, particularly as resistance to hegemony. Fluent voices presume to signify monolithically and thus anticipate and linearly sustain the givenness of what is—fluency must be decomposed for a crip politic to flourish. Yet while fluency may have the first word (my speech arrives always a hesitation), it certainly never has the last—the impulse of fluency is totalizing but “something always escapes!” (Beasley-Murray xxi). Chris Eagle has written that an attention to dysfluency within disability studies would “understand mastery over language as always already tenuous, fragile, and partial” (6) and we might in this way begin to imagine dysfluency not as a communicative “breakdown” but as a type of escape or, in Deleuzio-Guattarian terms, flight. In Lexicon of the Mouth: Poetics and Politics of the Voice and the Oral Imaginary, Brandon LaBelle suggests that by “considering interrupted speech, we enter into a politics of the mouth. By tripping over the word, stuttering evidences the deep performative drive of the mouth under the spell of the linguistic. It stumbles precisely over a syllable, a grammar, a phoneme; the mouth gasps along the fault lines of a given vocabulary, to lisp over words, and in doing so, raises the volume on the very question as to what constitutes ‘proper speech’” (139; emphasis added). I have always imagined LaBelle’s offhanded remark a playful engagement with the Germanic fable the “Pied Piper.” In many versions of this classic tale, the piper leads all but three of the entranced village children into the river to drown. These are three crips, in fact: the first, physically disabled who could not keep pace; the second, deaf, who like Odysseus who could not hear the piper’s song; and the third, blind. Only those transformed by disability could resist the irresistible, the linear pull into deep water. In a similar way, the spell of fluency lures and strings words from our mouths in the lock-and-file order of “proper speech,” intelligibility, and surplus value. To what world and what dangers does this straightening syntax lead? The crip mouth, on the other hand, stumbles over and along the major grammar. It cannot follow and in this excess forms a collective site of material agency that stubbornly resists the spell of the linguistic. Against the liberal sirens (those masters of consensus) the agential capacity of dysfluency lies precisely in its flight from understanding and intelligibility.

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#### 1] ballot proximity

#### 2] form over content

#### 3] psychic violence

## 6

#### Outer space isn’t value neutral but has always been a question of militarization – debates between civilian and military use are two sides of the same coin that affectively polices society, culminating in total war.

Craven 19 [Brackets Original. Matt Craven (Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom). “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space”. European Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 2, May 2019, Pages 547–572, Accessed 1/12/22. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/30/2/547/5536739> //Xu]

There was little doubt to any of the observers of the launch of Sputniks I and II in 1957 that, despite their overtly ‘scientific’ purposes, the arms race had taken a decisive new turn. The exploration of outer space clearly offered a range of potential benefits; alongside the possibility of research into the physics of the atmosphere, it also would facilitate the collection of a host of meteorological, geophysical and cartographic data, enable enhanced capacity for radio communication and television broadcasting, facilitate safe navigation and, finally, open up the possibility of experimental flights to the moon and beyond. No one, however, was blind to the military implications.60 Within the USA, in particular, there was a widespread belief that command over outer space was an imperative that could not be missed: ‘[W]hoever controls outer space’, it was often said, ‘controls the world’.61 In the wilder speculations, thus, it was imagined that a nuclear power might be in a position to launch guided missiles from a space platform to any point on earth with barely any possibility of response, that outer space would be filled with ‘orbiting bombers’ or that the moon would become the site of military rocket installations. ‘Control’ of outer space, thus, was immediately conceived as being vital as a matter of security. Such concerns seemed to place a premium upon ensuring that the ‘use’ of outer space was exclusively peaceful – a view that seemed to be affirmed not merely by the establishment of COPUOS and successive proposals put to the UN by both the USA and Soviet Union. It was also recognized in the US National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which created a civilian space agency (NASA) and declared, in the process, that ‘it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind’.62 This theme was carried through into the code for outer space – UN General Assembly Resolution 1962 recognizing ‘the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes’ and the Outer Space Treaty that added in Article 4 that states should not place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in orbit and that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes’ (military bases and fortifications, in particular, being prohibited). Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson described the Outer Space Treaty as ‘the most important arms-control development since the limited test-ban treaty of 1963’.63 In an immediate sense, then, outer space was configured as a space radically distinct from atmospheric space and was placed at once beyond the field of both sovereignty and of war. These, however, were by no means co-terminous. The preferred analogy when discussing the status of outer space was often that of the high seas – like the seas, outer space should be marked by the principle of freedom of access and movement, a res communis incapable of being ‘enclosed’. In fact, this was the analogy used by the USA when defending its use of satellites for reconnaissance purposes; ‘reconnaissance’ from space, it was argued, was the functional equivalent of surveillance from the high seas.64 It is clear, however, that this analogy was problematic precisely because the high seas themselves were not immune from being brought within the field of military conflict.65 And, with that in mind, alternative modes of analysis were often proffered to ensure that the ‘commons’ was not to be equated with a potential field of battle.66 Nevertheless, there was always a certain equivocation running through discussions within the UN and elsewhere as to whether the military/non-military distinction was one that could be effectively held in place. Not only were the Declaration on Outer Space and Outer Space Treaty silent on certain vital matters – on the equipping of satellites, for example, with conventional weaponry or the militarization of the ‘extracelestial void’ – but the inclusion of Article 3, which instructed states to ‘carry on activities’ in accordance with international law and the UN Charter ‘in the interest of maintaining international peace and security’, gave expression to the idea, vaunted at various moments, that outer space may nevertheless be the site of military action in self-defence.67 ‘Peaceful’ use, on such a measure, was not to be calibrated by reference to the equipment or personnel put into space – whether military or civilian – but, rather, by reference to the ends or motivation of the actors in question.68 In the case of the USA, this was to resolve itself in the idea that ‘peaceful use’ should not be equated with ‘non-military use’ but, instead, with ‘non-aggressive’ use. As Senator Albert Gore was to put it, when speaking before the UN First Committee in 1962: [i]t is the view of the United States that outer space should be used only for peaceful – that is, non-aggressive and beneficial – purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both environments we must continue our efforts for general and complete disarmament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of any space activities must not be whether it is military or non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations of law.69 The same general tenor was maintained in the discussion over Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty concerning the demilitarization of the moon and celestial bodies. In this treaty, it was admitted that the use of military personnel ‘for scientific research or other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited’, largely in recognition of the fact that for both space powers it was the military, not civilian agencies, who were responsible for developing rocket and other outer space capabilities. What one might see in this is a straightforward determination, on the part of both space powers, to continue the practice of exploiting outer space for purposes of defence whilst holding on, at the same time, to the general idea that outer space was a space of peaceful endeavour. Defensive militarization, here, was to be conceptualized as the functional equivalent of total demilitarization. Yet ‘defence’ was also an unstable category in circumstances of a bipolar military standoff that depended upon a balance of forces. For not only might an effective defence depend upon first strike capability (as the doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ was to suggest),70 but also, as was later to become evident following the announcement of the US Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983,71 even the construction of an overtly ‘defensive’ system could assume an offensive cast if only one party possessed that capacity.72 There was, however, also a much deeper problematic at work here, which related to the persistence of a governmental rationality that was held over from the earlier decades of the 20th century, that understood the necessity of bringing all social resources – economic, technical, scientific and human – to bear in defence of the state against an existential threat. This was articulated in the interwar years in the theories of total war developed by the likes of Erich Ludendorff73 and Ernst Jünger,74 but was carried forward, well into the aftermath of World War II.75 Even if, at Nuremberg, the tribunal had associated the practice of total war with the pathologies of National Socialism,76 as the likes of Georg Schwarzenberger and Josef Kunz were to observe, it was a method of waging war that was only, in small part, to be associated with the problem of totalitarianism. For both, the phenomenon of total warfare was a much more general one – associated with technological developments in arms, indiscriminate modes of warfare and the mobilization of the civilian population – and was as much in play in the 1950s as it had been in earlier decades.77 If the prospect of nuclear annihilation meant that no element of society would be spared, so also, it seemed to follow, no element of society should be excluded from preparations to ward off that eventuality. Whilst, in the case of the Soviet Union, the ethos of centralized planning and a party bureaucracy equipped with an ideology of collective ownership and class warfare naturally dissolved any operative distinctions between the civil and the military establishment,78 the same was also apparent in the USA where, as was recognized as early as 1945, the ongoing development of new technologies of offence and defence, in conditions of competition, would require ‘the participation of every element of the civilian population’ and, in particular, the enlistment of the countries research capabilities.79 Alongside the development of what Dwight Eisenhower later described as a ‘military-industrial complex’, guided by a ‘scientific-technological elite’,80 the rationalities of the Cold War were to envelop US society in a much more profound way – from the mobilization of the media in defence of free thought, the enlistment of corporations, unions and research establishments in defence of national security and the co-option of cultural institutions (from Hollywood to the universities81) in the affective management and policing of public life.82 The significance of this in the context of outer space was the almost total loss of any way to distinguish effectively between military and civilian activities. Just as the requirements of resourcing a technologically dependent military armature increasingly depended upon a civilian infrastructure of research, industry and economic management,83 so also was it clear that prospective civilian and scientific activities in space (such as meteorology, remote sensing, navigation systems and telecommunications) all had military dimensions. If, for example, developments in meteorological knowledge and environmental science seemed to open up the possibility of weather control for the purposes of combating drought, improving agriculture or the avoidance of natural disasters, so also could that same science assist in the development of military communications and ballistic missile capability (which depended upon information about the lower and upper atmosphere, ionospheric behaviour, geodesy and geomagnetism).84 Such knowledge also opened up new possibilities for manipulating weather systems in order to procure military advantage (such as the manipulation of thunderstorms to disable communication systems or the creation of fog or cloud).85 But it was not just about scientific knowledge enabling new avenues of military innovation; it was also about the purposes to which the same technology might be put. Thus, for example, the camera-equipped satellite programmes (Tiros, CORONA), with the auxiliary systems of information recovery and reproduction, were virtually identical (give or take a few degrees of resolution) whether they were used for the purposes of geodetic measurement and weather prediction or military reconnaissance. In some cases, furthermore – such as the US Galactic Radiation Background satellite – intelligence-gathering electronics was incorporated within the same instrument used for the measurement of solar radiation.86

#### The 1AC is a misdiagnosis of debris – wargames and coverups whitewashes militarism’s recreation of debris.

Reno 20 [Joshua O. Reno (Associate Professor of Anthropology at Binghamton University). February 2020. Accessed 1/15/22. “Military Waste: The Unexpected Consequences of Permanent War Readiness”. UC Press. <https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520316027/military-waste> //Xu]

As I write this, in the atmosphere miles above me, hundreds of millions of tiny artificial particles and larger fragments are circling the planet, mostly undetected, moving as fast as speeding bullets. This is orbital space debris—artificial objects and materials launched into orbit that no longer serve a purpose—and it has been accumulating in the sixty years since the Soviet Union sent Sputnik into space and transformed the stakes of the Cold War. In this chapter, I review various attempts to witness and revalue space debris, which expose the historical and ongoing militarization of outer space. At first glance, space debris would seem very different from the other objects discussed in this book. On the one hand, they are not as clearly linked to the military and permanent war preparation, because this connection has been actively foreclosed from public awareness by the US security state. Every space mission creates some debris, and many space missions had covert and classified goals that were not disclosed until later, and some never were. One famous example is the cover story used to account for the U2 incident in 1960. Shot down while conducting covert surveillance of suspected Russian ICBM development from Soviet airspace, the U2 spy plane was initially characterized as a NASA weather vessel. However, two days after the cover story was released, a photo was wired to the US government of Khrushchev holding aerial photographs the U2 had taken, proving the NASA story was a lie.1 If one problem with examining space debris as military waste is a history of secrecy, another concerns the undetectability immanent to space debris as a material object. It is one thing to write with authority about orbital space debris. It is quite another to bear witness to space debris, as one can other forms of American military waste. “To witness,” Michael Taussig writes, “as opposed to see, is to be implicated in a process of judgement. . .such that the mere act of seeing tilts the cosmos and deranges the eyeball” (2011, 71). Yet, with this most cosmic of wastes, witnessing is hard to come by. I cannot swear that I have seen orbital space debris (in orbit, that is) and haven’t met many who can. Amateur astronomers sometimes think they have seen space debris, but do not know for certain if they ever will again or if they’ll even know when they do. And, more importantly, they probably will not care if they do. If this book is about finding people who bear witness to military waste, who not only see it but become invested in this act of perception, then in that sense at least this chapter is premised on a failure. Those I spent the most time with—amateur astronomers and a ham radio operator in the Southern Tier of New York—were not already interested or invested in space debris. I did not trace a preexisting network linking nonhumans with humans (Latour 2005). I did not locate a public affected by an act of contamination, slow violence, or environmental injustice (Marres 2012). That is to say, with few exceptions, I did not succeed in finding a group for whom this object matters and using their interest to direct my own. Instead, I found a problematic object and tried to recruit people who might care to do so. One reason space debris is not very interesting for the people I got to know is that anything so labeled is uninteresting almost by definition. Space debris is perhaps the truest expression of what Mary Douglas (1966) meant when she labeled dirt, “matter out of place.” Almost anything can be considered space debris if it was launched into orbit and people think it should not be there anymore. It may refer to satellites that have aged and become obsolete or can no longer be contacted or controlled from the ground, thus rendering them useless. Space debris also consists of materials of varying size and substance that were purposely released or jettisoned by vessels and satellites to facilitate their ascent or as part of their ongoing maintenance. But whether something counts as space debris depends on who is making this judgment and how. Part of the reason that amateur astronomers might not care about space debris is that anything they do care about may no longer be recognized as debris. Consider NASA’s Cassini probe, which entered Saturn’s atmosphere after completing its twenty-year mission on September 15, 2017. I began hearing about Cassini’s final descent weeks earlier from the members of the Kopernik Astronomical Society (KAS). Cassini was being discarded, but it was difficult to find anyone characterizing it as debris. In early September, KAS members were still sharing their best photographs of the solar eclipse that had captivated the country in August. But soon they began posting links on the group’s public Facebook page related to Cassini’s last mission: September 14: #Live #Coverage: NASA Monitors #Cassini’s #Dive Into #Saturn Friday morning, NASA & #JPL will monitor the Cassini #Spacecraft as it ends its #mission by diving into the #clouds of Saturn. #NASATV and NASA & JPL #Internet #web-sites will provide live #steaming coverage as #scientists #monitor Cassini’s “#GrandFinale,” as well as #news#conferences before (Thursday afternoon) & after (Friday morning) the #event. September 16: A fantastic overview of the Cassini Mission, including it’s [sic] very last image. Such an amazing mission just to tease our wonder a little bit.#FarewellCassini Explore More! September 20: NOVA: Death Dive to Saturn These posts provided hashtags and links one could use to learn about Cassini’s final mission, witness live broadcasts, and honor the lost spacecraft. Cassini was singled out for so much praise by astronomy enthusiasts for good reason. Many knew it had been responsible for some of the best pictures of the solar system ever captured. As a writer for a science and technology website put it: While many uncrewed spacecraft have done an incredible job of revealing our solar neighborhood to us, honestly, none did it better than NASA’s Cassini probe. After exploring Saturn for 13 years, on September 15th at 4:55am PDT, the probe will plunge itself into the planet’s atmosphere, becoming one with the very object of its fascination. (Paoletta 2017) As in many examples that appeared around this time, on- and offline, this writer treats Cassini like a person. It is as if the probe itself were intentionally doing the “exploring,” plunging “itself,” and intentionally merging with “the very object of its fascination.” Such eulogistic prose could be found among many techno-science and astronomy feeds and sites at the time. Consequently, what otherwise might have been seen as just an expensive, floating camera became instead a subject of interest akin to Saturn itself. But objects never mean just one thing, even within the same community of practitioners.2 From another point of view, the disposal of Cassini on Saturn was more like an act of cosmic littering disguised as a funeral. One small but vocal group of Cassini-truthers claimed that there was another, more nefarious purpose behind the destruction of the probe. NASA was, they claimed, trying to accomplish its decade-old goal of creating another sun by detonating a nuclear payload on Saturn. Known as “Project Lucifer,” such a claim had been made before in relation to other space missions. But for every so-called conspiracy theory, there are even more people who delight in debunking and deconstructing them. A decade before Cassini’s final dive, an author for the online publication Universe Today had already set about deconstructing Project Lucifer’s assertions (see O’Neill 2008). It is worth noting, however, that claims and counterclaims such as these, much like narratives of UFO sightings and abductions, are about more than what “really happened.” They are more centrally concerned with whether or not hidden powers are operating in the shadows, just beneath awareness. If they exist, such powers are only visible in momentary glimpses and if one looks carefully enough to see the pattern.3 Whether Cassini is seen as a mournful loss or a frightening conspiracy, it is still not quite “debris” since it has greater purpose than something merely drifting, colliding, orbiting. In other words, whether something counts as debris depends on how astronomical observers (and conspiracists) think about and act towards the things that populate outer space. More than just claims to debunk, conspiracy theories like Project Lucifer raise ethical and political questions surrounding what is otherwise accepted as relatively innocent and harmless civilian science. More to the point, they point toward forgotten and troublesome understories associated with the exploration and exploitation of outer space. It is not so strange to suspect that NASA is concealing the true motivations behind its projects, as it has done in the past and as its less-wellknown sister agency, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), has done for the entirety of its existence. Fantasies of hidden nuclear reactions on Saturn are not just conspiratorial paranoia, therefore, but manifestations of a general mistrust around state secrets concerning the militarization of space, which did not end with the Cold War. This chapter explores space debris as openended rubbish (Thompson [1979] 2017) and as an object of militarized fantasies, past and present. The example of Cassini is telling because it represents a situation where what might otherwise be thought of as mere space debris is instead revalued as a sign of discovery and scientific achievement or, alternately, of conspiratorial, cosmic destruction. The intentional generation of space debris becomes more apparent by linking it with the historical and ongoing militarization of space. My argument is not that the US military is directly responsible for all space debris (a claim thatwould be difficult to definitively prove in any case). That being said, antisatellite weapons testing has by all accounts made the problem of space debris worse; furthermore, defense agencies have been at the forefront of studying and proposing solutions to space debris.4 In this chapter, I link both the historical and ongoing creation of space debris, as a problem, and current proposals to solve it to a common source: a tendency to imagine expert knowledge and technical practice as a form of mastery, despite the fact that they lead to new and unanticipated accidents and risks. Here I draw from the Aristotelian argument of Paul Virilio (2007, 5) that the accident reveals the substance. In other words, the invention of any substance is equally the invention of any of its accidental manifestations. The shipwreck is the invention of the ship (see chapter 3) just as the Chernobyl meltdown is the invention of the nuclear power station. So, too, space debris is the invention of the Cold War space race, an invention distinctly different from the way planets ordinarily shed and reabsorb materials. Clearly, orbital space debris is very different from things like planes, ships, and guns. Yet, it is productive to think of all forms of military waste not only as different kinds of things, but as associated with different microworlds of action connected with permanent war preparation. For this reason all of these forms, as rubbish, have elements of indeterminacy associated with them, which lead to disputes about their social and material potential. After all, what is difficult to represent clearly can be even more disturbing to imagine, since this usually makes it harder to control and predict.5 Is space debris polluted and polluting or valuable and meaningful? Is it raw material for a radical new vision or heritage that should be preserved? When objects are simultaneously rare and abundant like space debris, hard to relate to, yet ubiquitous in orbital environments, these questions pose even greater challenges. Acknowledging the militaristic origins of space debris does not make it more accessible or amenable to reuse and rethinking by civilians. As I will explain, even astronomers might only encounter space debris fleetingly, and only for a brief moment as it quickly vanishes out of sight. In some ways, this makes space debris both less visible and more threatening than the other forms of military waste I discuss in this book. When it comes to astronomical phenomena, seeing is believing. But believing is also seeing, insofar as imagined evidence of aliens or government conspiracy involves prior and ongoing attunement toward that which lies concealed beyond familiar experience and official explanation. The idea of cultivating ethical attunement of the senses, especially to listen for signs of otherworldly beings and designs, has been dis-cussed for religious subjects (Luhrmann and Morgain 2012; Hirschkind 2015; Zani 2019). I extend this to include visual attunement of lay astronomers. Astronomical attunement can involve searches for alien life, but it can also be more modest in its scope, associated with wise use of and participation in the Earth’s orbital environment. I was unsuccessful finding many people who already cared about space debris, but getting to know them I came to see their practices of attunement as an alternative to the dominant strategies to address space debris. Unlike the attunement of amateurs, space agencies represent space debris as a problem to address through techno-solutionism. This is a way of valuing the technical fix as an end in itself, and it is deeply connected to the militarization of space and the problem of space debris. the color out of space Space debris comes in the form of subsidiary materials intentionally or inadvertently discarded after helping satellites escape Earth’s gravity, as well as the satellites themselves. Some of these objects are broken down by interactions with other bits of debris and physical processes while in orbit, but may continue orbiting the Earth all the same. There are good records of the over six thousand satellites that have been launched since 1957. But they can be difficult to locate and identify from the ground all the same. Depending on the altitude, lost and disused satellites and their accompanying materials either circle the planet at low Earth orbit (LEO), medium Earth orbit (MEO), or geostationary orbit (GEO), and this also affects their relative velocity, with objects further away moving more slowly. The ISS is located about 250 miles above the surface of the Earth in LEO and moves about 17,500 miles per hour, whereas satellites in GEO are located about a hundred times further above the Earth and travel at less than half that velocity. The difference is that disused space junk has lost attitude control, meaning that its orientation becomes more haphazard as it tumbles through space.6 As different forms of space debris move, sometimes at tens of thousands of miles per hour, they occasionally collide with one another and splinter into additional, smaller fragments. There are an estimated half a million pieces today, a fraction of which can be tracked by space agencies like NASA. Using the publicized data from the DoD’s Space Surveillance Network, there have been numerous models generated to display the problem of space debris as it has accumulated over time. One of the problems with depicting space debris accurately has to do with the conditions of orbital environments. In time-lapse videos, one can visualize the Earth as if it were sloughing off dandruff—hundreds of thousands of tiny flecks that encircle it at various distances. This metaphor is actually more appropriate than it might seem. Like an animal’s scalp, the Earth routinely sheds materials that continue to orbit it or are jettisoned into the universe. As part of this metabolic process orbital environments “self-clean,” meaning that various planetary forces allow materials to leave and rejoin the surface, as well as capture that which other planetary bodies have jettisoned. In a certain sense, for something to be called “orbital space debris” depends entirely on human beings deciding something is no longer valuable, useful, or notable. Yet, what becomes of space debris depends on the power of the Earth itself.7 After all, debris is not something that troubles planets, but defines them. According to Lisa Messeri, the prevailing definition of a planet is an object that is “large enough to have either captured or expelled the debris to other orbits” (2016, 8). If not for Earth’s gravitational force, bending spacetime as it does, it would not require so much expenditure to escape its orbit, nor would so much material fall back to Earth or remain in orbit after the fact. As Lisa Ruth Rand notes, “the geophysical world of outer space” is “a historical actor of equivalent importance to astronauts, engineers, governments, and publics” (2016, 13). The planet’s metabolic relationship to debris is not simply a threat to life, but may help spread it across the cosmos.8 Anthropogenic space debris mixes with the naturally occurring debris of orbital environments to generate new risks and possibilities. Unlike functional satellites, which can be manipulated and brought more or less in sync with the designs of those on the ground, the alternative spatial and temporal rhythms of space debris represent a distinct risk to other things (and persons) in orbit. As such, they also represent a potential barrier to further human exploration and exploitation of space. To begin with, space debris is potentially dangerous to spacecraft. Space debris is partly assessed by treating returning spacecraft in a way they were never intended, as a “hypervelocity impact capture medium” as they are dented more by artificial objects than natural meteorites (Bernhard, Christiansen, and Kessler 1997). The impetus for tracking and modeling space debris thus comes from the temporal possibilities it threatens. This includes a hypothetical feedback process whereby objects continually collide and spread out, converting Earth orbits, especially in LEO, into a hazardous environment filled with tiny fragments. Space debris would then circle eternally overhead like a cloud of bullets awaiting a target, trapping us in fear on the surface. This was used to produce a new element of space horror in the recent science fiction film Gravity (2013), where space debris played a key role and was depicted as a monstrous threat—like a swarm of abiotic locusts—that cycled the Earth with an alien regularity. In this film, without warning debris hurtles into view to annihilate spacecraft or slaughter hapless astronauts.9 Whether this sort of possibility is a likely scenario or not, it reflects anxiety about the unexpected and emergent spacetime of materials orbiting the Earth. The time they threaten is not only the immediate present but future plans, which are increasingly incorporated into fantasies of space travel. At least one of the astronomers I spoke with considered space debris a broader environmental problem. One of the older staff members at the Kopernik Observatory was Nicholas, who grew up in the Southern Tier and designed computer hardware for IBM. When I interviewed Nicholas, he was preparing a talk for the public on the search for life and its creation from inorganic materials, a subject of great personal interest. This gave him a unique view on the ecological risks of space exploration, “I think of debris as sort of garbage. Stuff that’s out there, you don’t know what to do with it so you just leave it laying around, it’s like cluttering on a highway. You know?” For Nicholas, depositing leftover materials from missions, like the Cassini probe, on a foreign planet is about more than the technical junk itself. Even the most sanitized bit of space equipment might carry remnants of the living world it came from. Nicholas had pictures in his Facebook feed of tardigrades (or water bears), the peculiar microbes that seem capable of withstanding the vacuum of space. “To me that’s one of the areas that you could contaminate, if you’re searching for life, you don’t want to contaminate it. NASA scientists are aware of these concerns, which are normally glossed as planetary protection and were included as part of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. This stipulates the necessity of protecting the Earth from organisms that might exist beyond it, and protecting other planets from contamination by human and nonhuman earthlings. For instance, Cassini was positioned to collide with Saturn so that it would not inadvertently contaminate life that might exist on one of the gas giant’s moons (life which, many astronomical enthusiasts would be quick to point out, Cassini’s photographs had helped demonstrate might exist). And Nicholas was also not alone in thinking that enthusiasm for space exploration could lead to denial about its unforeseen consequences.10 Not everyone agrees, however. In 2018, the SETI institute sponsored a debate over planetary protection between a member of NASA and founder of the Mars Society and author Robert Zubrin. During the debate, Zubrin accused planetary protection of being nonsensical, since planets exchange substances all the time on their own, and dangerous, since it could limit human exploitation and exploration of the universe. Space debris is meaningful as both barrier and bridge to desirable futures. These hoped-for futures involve, for instance, further exploration and exploitation beyond LEO and into the very valuable and legally contested domain of geostationary orbit, where satellites can more easily analyze from and transmit data to the entire planet. This also includes NewSpace initiatives that seek to extend capitalism and empire beyond the limits of the Earth, whether to mine asteroids or colonize Mars.11 Such initiatives demonstrate a clear motivation to clean up the polluted and risk-filled environment in the vicinity of Earth. From this admittedly interested perspective, the presence of space debris limits the utilization of LEO, MEO, and GEO, creating risks for any state and/or capital investment. Insofar as space debris influences assessments concerning the utilization of outer space for various ends, it directly mediates the futures that space agencies and industries imagine possible and desirable. It may be that the risks of orbital debris are being somewhat amplified by filmmakers and the media more broadly. After all, most chunks of space debris burn up completely before descending to Earth, posing little threat to life on the surface. And only those nations and corporations powerful enough to summon the resources to escape the planet’s gravitational pull, to operate the ISS for example, place themselves directly at risk. In this regard, space debris is somewhat analogous to floating Pacific garbage patches in the world’s oceans (see chapter 6). While troubling and aesthetically striking, space debris and garbage patches are located in little-used borderlands rather than directly inhabited landscapes. They would seem to lack an affected public, that is, a collective of interested social actors directly impacted by the problem and thus likely to organize to bring the problem to light. The analogy between the garbage patches and space debris is more than incidental. At the opposite side of the Pacific from the first garbage patch to be discovered is another dumping zone. Known as Point Nemo—the place in the ocean furthest from any land—this stretch of ocean has been used for decades as a convenient place to deposit space debris, when such a thing is possible for space agencies.12 But debris does not always land where one would expect. And the threat of damage from orbital space debris is real. Space debris represents a clear barrier to the continued use of orbital environments. The ISS had to perform approximately eight evasive maneuvers during its first decade of operation in order to avoid collisions with debris. Calculations are normally performed at least three times a day to determine risks of collision over the subsequent seventy-two hours; if the chance of collision with a large enough object is determined to be greater than one in ten thousand, then maneuvers are planned and executed. In late August of 2008, the ISS had to engage in a collision avoidance maneuver when it was nearly struck by just one piece of more than five hundred cataloged bits of debris that resulted from Kosmos 2421’s planned fragmentation earlier that summer (see Johnson and Klinkrad 2009, 5). In this case, the ISS was not dodging anonymous debris, but the specific fragments that are attributable to a Russian spy satellite that was launched in 2006 and began fragmenting two years later. According to widely agreed-upon space policy, if old satellites cannot be sent to the “parking zones” above LEO, then they are sent crashing into the atmosphere to hopefully disintegrate.13 In some ways, concerns over orbital debris can be related to the discourse around climate change, sociologist and historian of science Lisa Ruth Rand argues, insofar as both are global in scope and have been associated with “tipping points” toward certain and perpetual disaster. “With no control over where surviving fragments might land, orbital space became a site from which pollutants could cross geographic boundaries and extraterritorial regions” (Rand 2016, 11). In this sense, orbital regions are not some sort of beyond, disconnected from terrestrial life. Like the atmosphere itself, planetary borderlands are dynamically entangled with life on Earth. Moreover, like the seemingly never-ending threat of nuclear annihilation, they are also associated with the rise of the national security state in the twentieth century.14 When specific entities generate fragments or are threatened by them, orbital space debris begins to resemble other pollution events where there is an alleged perpetrator and a documented victim. More often than not, it is not just any perpetrator accused. Discussions of space debris events frequently single out America’s adversaries as being responsible, as in the episode above, despite the fact that Americans contaminate orbital environments as well and that other countries are frequently responding to and imitating the ongoing American militarization of space. Politicizing space debris in this way fits easily into previous Cold War–era assessments of risk and blame where it is only national rivals to the United States and Europe who break rules and incur risks, namely China and Russia, which implies that Americans are blameless by contrast.15 Space Debris as Military Waste All of the information provided in the section above, outlining orbital space debris as a problem, can be considered entirely without reference to the US military. This not only leaves out an important part of the story of space exploration and exploitation; it also helps further distinctions between civilian science and defense projects, as if the two were completely separate spheres of social action and imagination. In fact, they are continuous. The launch of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union was the beginning of space exploration and the age of satellites. It also set the stage for a new alliance between scientific experts, the federal government, and the DoD. Prior to Sputnik, it was widely believed throughout the US that its Soviet rivals were incapable of launching a satellite into space. When they did, it not only demonstrated a flaw in this chauvinist presumption, but made clear that the Soviet Union had the capacity to launch intercontinental missiles as well. Even though the Eisenhower administration knew, by this time, that there was no “bomber gap” between the two countries, this real embarrassment and virtual threat radically altered relationships between scientists and government and military officials, which had previously been strained by McCarthyism and the Korean War. At least some Americans felt vulnerable to attack, and Eisenhower, who had hoped to reduce what he regarded as wasteful military spending, reevaluated his position on the matter and helped foster the military industrial complex he would later name and criticize.16 If an interpretation of space exploration as militarization is often foreclosed from consideration, one of the reasons is that the intentions behind space discovery have been successfully represented in different ways over the course of NASA’s history. Outer space and space agencies are more popularly represented in terms of discovery, invention, and wonder. This has been a deliberate effort on the part of civilian scientists, government officials, and media organizations to differentiate NASA from military projects. Though NASA was created to be a civilian space agency, the end result of the initial shock and panic surrounding the launch of Sputnik, this was not a foregone conclusion. At the time, all of the technology that might have been used for possible space exploration was in the hands of the US military; consequently, some prominent members of the government scientific advisory, as well as Eisenhower himself, were initially in favor of folding all space exploration within the DoD as part of ARPA. ARPA had itself been recently created in order to consoli- date and reduce waste from interdepartmental competition. Consequently, it only stood to reason that it would also absorb the space agenda, which also had enormous implications for the future of defense. The reason NASA emerged, instead, was the result of fears of the militarization of space, both because of the dangers this would raise for people on Earth but also because it went against the utopian internationalism of many American scientists of the time. It was decided that there would be a civilian space agency, but one that would remain funded by and deeply connected to the military, for fear that the loss of military relevance in space missions would cause it to die on the vine.17 While NASA is a civilian agency, stories of its rise and contemporary relevance illustrate the longstanding relationship its people and projects have had with the DoD. Near-continuous war games in space go back to when the first satellites entered near-Earth orbit and generated ever more debris. According to Rand, “Both superpowers carried out high altitude and exoatmospheric nuclear weapons tests beginning in 1958 and ending in 1963 with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” (2016, 10). Secrecy regarding military-related space missions (and the debris they have caused) is most clearly associated with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the “other space agency” that was created in 1961 but kept a secret until 1992 (Paglen 2009, 20–31). As an author from Wired magazine puts it, debris is a legacy of militaristic statecraft: In 2007. . .China decided to de-orbit one of its defunct weather satellites...by firing a missile at it. That certainly took the sat out of its path—but it also created a flume of debris that flung toward the Space Station in 2011. In February 2008, the US Navy launched its own projectile at a spy satellite toward its own satellite. The government claimed to worry that if it let the satellite fall back intact, its hydrazine fuel could release toxic vapors at breathing level. But some, at the time and still, interpret the action militarily. (Scoles 2017) Debris from the NRO was not necessarily from weapons testing, moreover, because weapons are not the only space projects of great military interest. As Rand explains: New kinds of satellites—from giant, shiny inflatable balloons to a ring of hundreds of millions of tiny copper fibers—tested the use of space for communications while spurring controversy over whether such satellites could interfere with astronomy, crowd the electromagnetic spectrum, or present a collision hazard to other spacecraft. (2016, 10) Official histories of space exploration as civilian science tend to demilitarize its relevance. Moreover, when a cover story is needed—as with the U2 spy plane debacle—the official narrative can be called upon to distract or misinform inquiring Americans, allies or rivals. The activities of ARPA and especially the NRO are shrouded in mystery, though that has not stopped amateur astronomers from successfully tracking their activity.18 From the beginning of the space race, nation-states with property in orbit worked out the basic terms of space law (see Beery 2016), which among other things does not allow for the practices of salvage characteristic of maritime law. Instead of seeing these materials as property to be protected, astronomers were historically the first group to mobilize against the contamination of the planetary borderlands with space debris. Sputnik’s launch also began a wave of UFO sightings of all kinds, which would continue over the ensuing decades. As Americans watched the night skies, it was as if their apprehension and mistrust of Soviets somehow turned on their own government. And why not? Space exploration was begun in earnest by competing US and Soviet militaries during the Cold War and continues to be central to the machinations of securitizing states today.19 The ability for anyone with a telescope to track near-Earth objects makes complete secrecy all but impossible. Most recently, space enthusiasts were the first to raise awareness about the possibility of China’s Tiangong-1 space lab tumbling out of the sky, before the Chinese state admitted this was happening. In essence, it was amateur astronomers who first noticed that the space lab was acting more like space debris, against the wishes of a government hoping to keep this from public knowledge. The first story reclassifying the space lab as space debris appeared in June 2016, and was quoted from for the next year and a half by the Guardian and the Washington Post. Eventually the Chinese state admitted that it had lost control of the lab and that it would likely fall to Earth sometime in late 2017 or early 2018 (see David 2016).20

#### Terrorism is militarism making its own bed and refusing to lie in it - the aff’s vague allusions to the threat of terrorism feeds global economies of racial militarism.

Rana 16 – [Junaid Rana is an anthropologist who writes about global capitalism, diaspora, racism, and social protest movements. He is an associate professor of Asian American Studies at the University of Illinois with appointments in the Department of Anthropology, the Center for South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, and the Unit for Criticism and Interpretive Theory; “The Racial Infrastructure of the Terror-Industrial Complex,” December 2016, <https://islamophobiaisracism.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/rana-racial-infrastructure-social-text-2016-rana-111-38.pdf>]

In a similar vein, James Risen has recently called this formation the Homeland Security–industrial complex to reference the proliferation of companies seeking military contracts to provide the infrastructure of the Global War on Terrorism.3 In making a distinction from the militaryindustrial complex, Risen describes this system thus: “The new homeland security-complex operates differently. It is largely made up of a web of intelligence agencies and their contractors, companies that mostly provide secret services rather than large weapons systems and equipment. These contractors are hired to help Washington determine the scale and scope of the terrorist threat; they make no money if they determine that the threat is overblown or, God forbid, if the war on terror ever comes to an end.”4 Risen refers to details shared by these conceptual approaches through an explicit mandate through independent contractors while also highlighting a temporal frame of the security obsession with terror. This system that is so concerned with combating terrorism is indeed premised on a fundamental shift in military combat that reimagines the terms of war and the notion of an enemy. Propagating this in terms of a future sense of permanence and fixity, there is a financial interest for those who predict terrorism in such static terms. In other words, this is a system of war with no end, and the fulfillment of a system of racial capitalism that I describe as racial infrastructure. Infrastructure in the Marxist usage refers to the means of production and the category of class, or what might be referred to more generally as economic and social position. While infrastructure connotes the basic physical and organizational facilities from which society or a social system operates, I am here referring to racial infrastructure as a spatial formation in which the social, political, and economic relationships of racial systems operate through dominance and discursive power.

What I find instructive in the examples used by Risen and a range of reportage on the post-9/11 security state and the War on Terror is the unspoken racialization of terror with Islam and Muslims.5 Certainly, Risen and others are critical of how the War on Terror fixates on Islam through an oversimplified syllogism that equates Muslims with terrorism, yet as I argue in what follows, the impact of the terror-industrial complex is far more extreme than a representational mistake based in the fearmongering of Islam and Muslims. Rather, it is the larger systems of structural violence that are normalized through the workings of concepts such as race and permanent war that create an unprecedented flexibility in the workings of social domination and capital accumulation. As an ideological structure it is present in a range of security and biopolitical technologies, including, for example, policing, health care, social services, and the framing of criminality and illegality in the detention and deportation regime. Whereas the military-industrial complex conjoined national military and political forces with the arms industry, the shift toward the private sector to conduct military and intelligence operations is part of the transition into the twenty-first-century development of the terror-industrial complex and what others such as Risen refer to in terms of security. Although the concomitant or analogous construction to terror in this sense is security, a concept that has often been used in political theory, I prefer to think through these conjoined forces using the notion of terror. Security is certainly an important ideological piece of how the terror-industrial complex is deployed, alongside other representations of state power such as surveillance. However, terror also indicates the shift from institutions of power to amorphous ideas so endemic in the rubrics of the War on Terror.6

The terror-industrial complex has dramatically shaped and altered social life across geographic locations with dramatic differences in scale. The wide-ranging escalation of structural and physical violence through war include, for example, the use of drones in targeted assassination and surveillance of social life, the everyday conditions of military occupation through means of war and governance, domestic and foreign mass surveillance, the militarization of policing domestically, and the use of surveillance and intelligence gathering by local law enforcement in collaboration or modeled after domestic and international spying agencies. Recent scholarship has begun to chip away at these deep transformations to social life that are guided by the racialization of Islam and Muslims.7 It is in this sense that, while the Obama administration no longer uses the specific term War on Terror to describe what rapidly developed under the Bush years after 9/11, the expansion of the security and surveillance state has brought the enormous apparatus of the terror-industrial complex into full bloom.

Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork of the everyday in a New York neighborhood in the decades following the domestic US War on Terror, my analysis and observations describe how the terror-industrial complex is now interwoven in Muslim life. Examining this as structural violence, I focus on quotidian shifts that mark and connect notions of terror through surveillance, policing, and disciplining in what can only be described as a normalization of permanence that in itself represents a range of other possibilities and innovations, which nonetheless are the contentious manufacturing of ways of life. Here I draw on what Nikhil Singh refers to as the racial liberalism of permanent war to describe the structural violence of an emergent racial infrastructure of the War on Terror.8 This is a system perpetuated by the terror-industrial complex and histories of racial formation and global white supremacy.

#### The impact is *unending war* and *environmental catastrophe*.

Craven 19 [Matt Craven (Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom). “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space”. European Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 2, May 2019, Pages 547–572, Accessed 1/12/22. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/30/2/547/5536739> //Xu]

Even in the aftermath of the pronounced ‘closure’ of the Cold War, the residue of the formation that was brought into play in space remains very much with us today. On the one hand, outer space has been progressively enveloped within the technological infrastructure of warfare and policing actions – the first Gulf War of 1990 ushering in a new era of ‘smart’ weaponry and GPS-configured surgical violence139 – anticipating, in the process, the ‘remote’ operations of the drone and cyber warfare of the contemporary era. The blurring of the demarcation between the (outer space) technologies of war and peace finds its contemporary parallels in the collapse of a range of other operative distinctions – between the virtual and the real, the combatant and the civilian, the battlefield and the battle space, the interstate and the intra-state. The juridical formations on which these depend, furthermore, have themselves become enveloped within the same strategic operations – ‘lawfare’ becoming the adjunct to a new form of totalized warfare stripped of any spatial determinacy. On the other side, outer space has increasingly become the terrain of speculative capitalism, which, following the growth of space tourism (pioneered by the Russian space administration in the 1990s140), has seen the active development of a range of commercial projects from the construction of sub-orbital ‘space planes’ to asteroid and lunar mining undertaken by both public and private agencies. The imaginative resources for such projects have come from various directions, but a common theme is that impending resource depletion on earth will soon bring such resources within commercial and technological reach, and that outer space will therefore provide a ‘spatial fix’ for a system of global capitalism that might otherwise run into the ground.141 There is, as Katarina Damjanov has noted,142 a deep parallelism here between the juridical opening of the seas (mare liberum), which served to stabilize the system of sovereignty within Europe in the 17th century by extroverting the site of conflict and competition,143 and the opening of outer space three centuries later as another prophylactic measure, even if, in this case, that which was to be guarded against was a planetary-wide, environmental catastrophe. Perhaps the deepest irony, here, is that the mode of salvation on offer is precisely the same as that which is the extant cause of crisis, which one may take to be a remorseless instrumentalization of nature.

#### The alternative is *Worldism* – the refusal of international relations and specialization as dictated by militarism in favor of epistemological interventions into the exercise of Space as a carceral apparatus.

Agathangelou and Ling 09 Anna M. Agathangelou is an Associate Professor in the Departments of Political Science and Women’s Studies at York University, Canada and co-director of the Global Change Institute, Nicosia, Cyprus, L.H.M. Ling is an Associate Professor in the Graduate Program in Inter- national Affairs at The New School, New York, USA., Transforming World Politics: From empire to multiple worlds, The New International Relations Series, 2009.

MAIN ASPECTS Worldism presents world politics as a site of multiple worlds. These refer to the various and contending ways of being, knowing, and relating that have been passed onto us from previous generations. Histories, languages, myths, and memories institutionalize and embody multiple worlds through simple daily acts like cooking and eating, singing and dancing, joking and playing but also through larger events like trade, development, conflict, and war. Worldism registers not only the “difference” that comes from multiple worlds (see Inayatullah and Blaney 2004) but also their entwinements. Selves and others reverberate,2 producing multi- and trans-subjectivities that leave us legacies of reinforcement and conflict, reconstruction and critique, reconciliation and resistance. Such syncretic engagements belie seeming oppositions and contradictions among multiple worlds to reveal their underlying connections despite hegemony’s violent erasures. On this basis, communities have opportunities to heal and recuperate so they can build for another day, for another generation. Worldism as everyday life enacts self–other reverberations and syncretic engagements, especially by communities at the margins. Worldism as an analytical framework theorizes about them. Both types of worldist activity expose the problematic of empire in practice and logics. Building on the postcolonial notion that all parties make history, albeit with unequal access to power, worldism leads to an undeniable conclusion: our mutual embeddedness makes us mutually accountable. One cannot escape from the other. Mutual accountability brings with it duties and responsibilities, to be sure, but also possibilities: that is, (a) an internal dialectic of constant questioning to check and problematize hegemony, so that (b) we can expand our visions, strategies, and approaches beyond the narrow, hegemonic confines of realism/liberal internationalism, in order to (c) arrive at a more inclusive, conciliatory, and democratic world politics. In brief, worldism consists of two simultaneous processes: descriptive and analytical. Worldism-as-description features the following: (a) multi- and trans-subjectivities that institutionalize the social and structural reverberations between selves and others; (b) the agency of all parties, despite inequities and injustices, to create, build, and articulate multiple worlds; (c) syncretic engagements that consolidate the entwinements of multiple worlds into concrete strategies for change, adjustment, adaptation, refor- mulation, and transformation; and (d) community-building that integrates and accretes these syncretic engagements despite denials of such efforts from hegemonic elites and their ideologies. Worldism-as-analysis draws on the struggles and learning undertaken in worldist daily life to emphasize: (a) accountability as a hallmark of worldist inquiry that ensures (b) an internal criticality to question, contest, and challenge hegemony, so that we may (c) arrive at emancipatory construction even as we critique and resist. The critical reader may interject: Couldn’t “agency” and “accountabil- ity” in worldism be taken as a fancy way of blaming the victim? Are Jews, for example, responsible for the Holocaust; slaves for their enslavement; or any oppressed people for their oppression? Worldism as a politics of multiple relations subsumes this liberal, individualist understanding of responsibility. Multiple relations produce a web of effects and consequences to any kind of decisions and/or set of practices. Accountability in worldism asks: Who’s involved, under what conditions, and through which processes can we redress or transform the violence? What kinds of understanding are generated to account for these relations and/or to make them invisible? Without the painful concession that all of us, “abusers,” “victims,” and “innocent bystanders” alike, contribute to the production of hegemonic violence, whether it results in domestic abuse (see Adler and Ling 1995) or state violence (see Ling 1994), we may never realize how violence is conceived, generated, and sustained. By extension, we will never understand ways to end it. Instead, in our injuries and (self ) alienation, we may reproduce time and again the same conditions of violence or hegemony that afflicted us in the past and which seems the only option for the present. Suspended political ideals, in this case, could also block us from action and change. Worldist agency and accountability compel us to face the complicities (including our own) that sustain violence in the making of history, so that we may, as Marx exhorted, change it. Where do these ideas come from?, our reader may ask. Let us delineate the intellectual precedents to worldism. INTELLECTUAL PRECEDENTS Worldism draws on constructivism and postmodernism but also differs from them. Worldism shares with constructivism its emphasis on intersubject- ivity, and with postmodernism its insights on asymmetrical difference: that is, the norms, institutions, practices, and behaviors that set up certain subjects and subjectivities as more privileged and protected than others. Power, then, cannot be reduced to an objectified, reified condition of who’s “on top” or who “has more” but instead results from agents contributing to macro-political structures like ideology, organization, and capitalist relations. Power redefined in these terms stems from an intersubjective consensus within a context of material conditions and relations. The crux here lies in the framing. Since narration as a process is never complete, the story can always change.3 However, worldism departs from constructivism by asking: What kinds of intersubjectivity are constructed, by whom, and for what purpose, and how do theories of subjectivity restructure the world “otherwise”? And is this how we want the world to be? Not probing into the social relations of intersubjectivity, according to worldism, effectively erases the power politics of meaning, including the political economy behind such constructions. And unlike postmodernism, worldism distinguishes power from the resistance it induces. Contra Foucault (1994), we differentiate between the colonizer and colonized in their experiences of colonial power (see Stoler 2002) and the entwinements that follow, both reinforcing and conflicting complicity (see Ling 2002b). Not doing so implicitly reinforces the imperialist assertion that “this is the way the world is”: that is, it is not open to alternative concepts, discourses, strategies, or ways of being. These gaps in constructivism and postmodernism return us to the conventional treatment of power as domination, pure and simple. Ronen Palan (2000), for instance, finds a strain of conservative realism in Alexander Wendt’s “naturalist” version of constructivism, primarily because he claims to offer a method only, and not an interpretation, of politics. Wendt (2005) himself admits as much. For similar reasons, Samir Amin (2004) calls postmodernism an “ideological accessory” to elite, bourgeois interests just as Aijaz Ahmad (1992) considers post-structuralist theories serve as alibis for imperialism. Both post- modernism and poststructuralism value critique and deconstruction over political action, thereby keeping de facto power intact. We note that although critical theories like postmodernism and con- structivism open up spaces to think about shifting power politics, they fall short of transforming the very asymmetries they critique. Inattention to structural, material interest and lack of integrating the Other analytically – that is, as a substantive maker of the world – undermines their claims of emancipatory social theory. Ultimately, the Other becomes a repository of raw materials for hegemonic actors and sites in the North to process. Worldism acknowledges a deep intellectual debt to postcolonial studies. Here, race, gender, sexuality, class, and nationality serve as analytics and substance in examinations of power relations. Postcolonial studies demystify empire’s boast, like Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden,” that the imperial Self makes the world for all Others. And that world is unidimensional (top- down state power), unilateral (center dominates periphery), and unilinear (past–present–future). Postcolonial studies record a more nuanced and multiple history by problematizing the ways colonial power is imposed on the colonized. That is, colonization involves more than a unilateral and mechanical domination of the subjugated by colonizers and their states. As documented by postcolonial studies, tensions and contradictions emerge from these relations (Said 1979; Spivak 1999), leading to adaptations and integrations between hegemonic selves and subaltern others. From this inter- action, “colonizers” and “colonized” produced something together over the course of time that neither anticipated nor perhaps desired but which all learned to live with, and eventually called their own. Divides along lines of property, race, class, language, religion, and ideology did not disappear. They fused, rather, into hybrid, creole, or mélange cultures that, nonethe- less, contested these categories constantly (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1995; Lewis and Mills 2003). In recognizing that colonizer and colonized mutually construct their sub- jectivities, postcolonial studies attribute to both the legacies of power that we face today. Note, for example, Britain’s principal instrument of colonial and imperial power: the East India Company. Sudipta Sen (1998) shows that, contrary to claims that the British brought capitalism to India, the East India Company had to adjust to pre-existing market structures and political relations to gain access to the thriving trade already in place in northern India.4 Only through this kind of entry could the East India Company later redirect the trade to its favor. L.H.M. Ling (2002b) traces how institutional elites in East Asia learned syncretically and “interstitially” between two world orders – the agrarian-based, cosmo-moral universe of Confucian governance and the Westphalian inter-state system of commerce and trade – to cumulate into what we know as Asian capitalism today. Walter Mignolo (2000) highlights the “gnosis” of thought and action, Self and Other, that comes from centuries of transgressing and reformulating the colonial boundaries that comprise Latin America. Of course, those subjected to hegemony must accommodate others more than those who perpetrate it. Yet hegemony’s very asymmetry highlights the resilience and creativity of the marginalized. Ordinary people can journey across subjectivities to engage syncretically with others, even under conditions of poverty and inequality, to rebuild, reconstruct, and reorganize communities. Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua (1983) characterize their straddling of multiple worlds as life on the “borderlands.” Typically, they point out, women of color from the South must bear the biggest burden of negotiating the multiple worlds of language, culture, class, and gender to survive white- majority society in the North despite systemic discrimination and obstacles. Still, they are able to exercise internal reserves of freedom, thought, and action to sort through hegemony, not simply surrender to it. Similarly, the indigenous populations of the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand have entered into treaties with their white majorities to retain aspects of indigenous ontologies by formalizing them in Western institutions (Shilliam 2008).