# Speech 1NC Strake Finals vs Southlake Carroll 12-19 11AM

## 1

#### Interp and violation – 1ACs must use the three-tier process to justify the plan – they haven’t – distancing and accessibility

Reid-Brinkley 8[SHANARA ROSE REID-BRINKLEY- “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” Under the Direction of CHRISTINE HAROLD <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf> 2008] VHS AI

In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledgemaking practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making 83 practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59 Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the doubleocto-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.”60 The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions 84 prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education.61 The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks. Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.

#### 1] limits – there are an infinite amount of potential plans so you cherry-pick affs with no neg ground and I must prep all affs while they prep one which pigeonholes me to generics but there is a limited amount of ways bodies could affirm.

#### 2] Burnout –

Harney 14 [Note – I do not support the ableist language used in the evidence. Stefano Harney (Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University). “HAPTICALITY IN THE UNDERCOMMONS, OR FROM OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT TO BLACK OPS”. CUMMA PAPERS #9. 2014. Accessed 11/13/21. <https://cummastudies.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/cumma-papers-9.pdf> //Xu]

This may sound surprising to say there are no subjects in the social factory or that indeed the rhythm of work is omnipresent today. We face millions without work or not enough work in Europe and amongst the migrants seeking to reach Europe. We are told that the future of work in Europe is subjective, creative, professional, and most of all managerial, not rhythmic. And at any rate from more reliable sources like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri we understand that we are living in an era when immaterial labour – cognitive and affective labour - dominates and commands other forms of labour, even if factories are still widespread in Bangladesh or China. But this should not make us deaf to the rhythms we hear no matter where we go, the rhythms that break and kill humans. We have heard a lot from business about how we can become entrepreneurial, or how we can transform ourselves into leaders, of how we can become responsible for our own careers. And again from our comrades we have received a more accurate picture: conceptions of the artist, of the bohemian, of the researcher, and of the performer have been twisted by business to make us work harder, to convince us we can fulfil ourselves through work. Andrew Ross’s work is excellent here. Christian Marazzi has written about the way our bodies are today a kind of constant capital, machines for which we are responsible, which we must upkeep because they are the site of production. He is right. Franco Berardi speaks of the way our psyche and our souls descend into work as if engulfing our whole being, and Emma Dowling of the way even our affect is measured and managed, brought into metrics. It is easy to feel that work for those who have it is about the risk of having your subjectivity and your talents swallowed whole, about having your virtuosity consumed as Paolo Virno might put it. But a factory is neither a collection of machines nor a collection of workers however skilled, however virtuoso. A factory is a line. OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT The area of management studies concerned with the factory is Operations Management. Operations management has always been pretty clear about what a factory is, and however much it has expanded its understanding of the factory, this definition has not wavered. This is business ‘knowledge,’ with all its ideological limits, but it can be helpful to our own considerations here. For Operations Management, the factory is the scene of a process. This is process in the sense of procession, of movement. Inputs go into the factory to move along a process, a line, and outputs come out of the factory. Most importantly what machines and especially workers do, according to operations management, is work on the process not the product. In contemporary operations management theory this has meant improving that process. This is often designated by the Japanese term ‘kaizen’ originally associated with workers and managers devoting themselves to the continuous improvement of the line’s efficiency in Toyota factories. Soon kaizen expanded throughout service, extraction, information, and other sectors. Rather than attention to the product, including the immaterial product, which remains as much as ever the purview of a small fraction of the workforce, most workers are subjected to increased attention to the ‘assembly’ line. For management science, this is what a factory is: a line, a process, a procession, a movement, a rhythm through from inputs to outputs. And this too is what the social factory is. Its name is accurate even if we have sometimes been distracted by everything from the propaganda of creative classes to the critical discourse of the precariat. But that is not all. Kaizen has been accompanied by another development in the line. This is the extension of the management of inputs and outputs, of the extension to supply chains understood as part of the line, not just as raw clusters of labour, natural resources and machines waiting outside the door of the factory. And with logistics and reverse logistics this line is expanding exponentially, or rather, algorithmically. Logistics and supply chain management extend the metrics of line in both directions, toward inputs and outputs which now have their own work rhythms. SYNAPTIC LABOUR This algorithmically expanding line means the outside of the factory is measured like the inside, aligned with the processual inside. And when the factory is virtual, Post-Fordist, a social factory, the algorithms of the line extend the rhythm of production, of assembly across our lives. The two meanings of assembly, or perhaps two modes of assembly, begin to merge, to assemble is both to come together and to make, anywhere, anytime. But what is made when we assemble and re-assemble is the line itself first and foremost, not a product or a service. This is our work today. We take inventories of ourselves for components not the whole. We produce lean efforts to transconduct. We look to overcome constraints. We define values through metrics. These are all terms from operations management but they describe work far better than recourse to the discourse of subject formation. Creativity itself, supposedly at the heart of the battle for the subject today, is nothing but what operations management calls variance in the line, a variance that may lead to what is in turn called a kaizen event, an improvement, and is then assimilated back into an even more sophisticated line. Today ours is primarily the labour of adapting and translating, being commensurate and flexible, being a conduit and receptacle, a port for information but also a conductor of information, a wire, a travel plug. We channel affect toward new connections. We do not just keep the flow of meaning, information, attention, taste, desire, and fear moving, we improve this flow continuously. We must remain open and attuned to the rhythm of the line, to its merciless variances in rhythm. This is primarily a neurological labour, a synaptic labour of making contact to keep the line flowing, and creating innovations that help it flow in new directions and at new speeds. The worker operates like a synapse, sparking new lines of assembly in life. And she does so anywhere and everywhere because the rhythm of the line is anywhere and everywhere. The worker extends synaptic rhythms in every direction, every circumstance. With synaptic work, it is access not subjects that the line wants, an access, as Denise Ferreira da Silva reminds us, that was long at the heart of the abuse of the affected ones, the ones who granted access out of love, out of necessity, out of the consent not to be one, even before that granting was abused. GROUNDATIONS The rule of the line persists beyond the factory in time and space, and its rhythm makes the time and space of our lives. There is no outside to the line, or rather we might say the line runs through the outside promised in Fordism and supposed to be so heterogeneous in Post-Fordism. A rhythm that tears us apart, a rhythm that obliterates and wrecks our brain. In some places the line is all that is left of the factory, and logistics in this expanded sense is all that is left of production. The science of operations management becomes the science of society, the common sense of our lives.

#### TVA – defend your advocacy but focus on the way the politics you defend are influenced by your identity

## 2

#### Interp – debaters must disclose all theory interpretations.

#### Violation – you don’t disclose 1ARs at all including theory – round reports other people’s wiki prove read it

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#### 1] norming – a] scope b] qualitative

#### 2] predictability – a] shiftiness b] substance crowdout

#### RR –

#### Fairness – you conceded the judge will fairly evaluate your argument

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact to debate

#### Accessibility – prereq

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms

#### b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### Neg theory is drop the debater – a) Prep skew – infinite prep means they frontline every shell enough to be efficient at DA and skew substance enough

#### b) 1AR Flex –you moot 6 min of my offense and restart on unpredictable layers while kicking the args.

#### No RVI’s- a) logic – you shouldn’t win for being fair

#### b) clash – people go all in on theory which decks substance engagement

#### c) chilling effect – people will be too scared to read theory because RVI’s encourage baiting theory

#### d] Norm-setting—I shouldn’t be forced to keep advocating for a bad norm if I realize it’s bad in the middle of the round.

#### e] Flex—RVIs make theory uncondo so I always have to go for that route to the ballot, but both debaters should get multiple relevant layers and collapse options.

#### 1NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy

#### 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea since the shell was read earlier

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense

#### B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

## 3

#### Subjectivity is defined through self-reflection – the confrontation with disability leads to ego death, which culminating in ontological lash-out.

**Mollow 15**[Anna Mollow(Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar, UC Dissertation-Year Fellow, coeditor of Sex and Disability and the co-editor of DSM-CRIP). “The Disability Drive.” University of California at Berkeley. Pg 85-88. Spring 2015. Accessed 3/6/20. <https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf> //Recut Xu from BL]

Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; 74 such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people‟s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism‟s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject‟s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject‟s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one‟s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud‟s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud‟s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I‟d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable.

#### Communicative spaces are structured to exclude disabled bodies- speech has come to constitute the boundary of Humanism, to which disability forms the constitutive negative as a disruption of such networks.

**St. Pierre 15** [Bracketed for crip to disabled. Joshua St. Pierre (BA in humanities from Briercrest College, Master of Arts in philosophy from the University of Alberta). “Cripping Communication: Speech, Disability, and Exclusion in Liberal Humanist and Posthumanist Discourse.” Communication Theory. Vol 25, Issue 3. Pages 330-348. 3/31/15. Accessed 8/29/20. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/comt.12054> // Xu]

John Durham Peters has argued that “communication” is a modern invention, stirred by the late 19th century anxieties of isolation and longings for unmediated connection (2000). But while the elusive dream of forging minds together through signs and semantics may be an endemically modern problem, speech has long been a human problem. In particular, performing speech, like performing “the human,” is a risky affair with exclusionary consequences. Oral speech has occupied a dignified position within the humanist lineage, shaping central questions of what it means to be human, imbued with the power to persuade others, serve human affairs, and articulate truth; yet, this pedigree has come at a high cost: the exclusion of voices not deemed rational and intelligible. I propose bringing a disabled, or a crip, analysis to bear on speech communication within humanism and posthumanism. Focusing on the disabled speaker, I accordingly argue that the exclusion of nonnormative voices within liberal humanism results from a tension between the conception of speech as rational and universal, and its embodied particularity that erodes any claim to universality. As the sine qua non of rational human subjectivity, speech is an esteemed, yet volatile, performance that can easily go wrong. Rather than owning up to the necessarily embodied and unstable mediation of human identity, liberal humanism defers the tension immanent within speech by excluding nonnormative and disabled voices, judging them against what I term the “universal speaker,” in a Sisyphean attempt to shore up and contain the boundaries of the human. The ultimately futile movement to free rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principle mode of communication. Pursuing the stuttered trajectory of “rational discourse” in liberal humanism to its disembodied form of “information” in posthumanism, I suggest that speech is largely absent in posthumanist discourse not only because of the incongruity of speech with emerging models of information seemingly free from context, but perhaps more importantly because these discourses assume autoaffectivity and preclude [disabled]crip voices from analysis. Like its humanist predecessor, and contrary to much of its rhetoric, posthumanism shows signs of structural exclusion dependent on having the right sort of informational body: malleable and flexible. Tony Davis insists that “All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. . . . Their embrace suffocates those it does not ignore” (2008, p. 141). While this may ultimately place disabled voices within good company, it remains worrisome that the silencing itself has been largely underrepresented and untheorized. Even disciplines such as communication studies and disability studies, devoted to unearthing genealogies, articulating phenomenological structures, and exploring subaltern modes of existing together, have not paid enough attention to disabled speech. While these disciplines have had very little, if any, contact so far, they have much to offer each other. By bringing these two disciplines into dialogue and writing from disability, I propose that the disabled speaker is perhaps the cyborg par excellence, eschewing communicative purity, autonomy, and self-mastery. The disabled speaker can be employed to critique the latent ableism within humanist and posthumanist discourse, and communication theory more generally, while offering new modes of thinking about posthuman communication as an embodied activity based on noise, relationality, and reciprocity.1 Liberal humanism and speech Liberal humanism is a broad-based political and intellectual emergence within the Enlightenment, which gained full ascendency in the 19th and 20th centuries, valuing “open and undogmatic inquiry, freedom of the individual conscience” and aiming for a “respect for social justice, social and psychological utility, decency, [and] liberality” (Coates & White, 1970, p. 447). At its center, liberal humanism is a marriage between the long humanist tradition and liberal ideals: a dual commitment to “man” and “freedom.” However, in its effort to secure “man” as a completely autonomous being, liberal humanism must first transcend group differences and generalize attributes of humanity in a movement of essentialization. What defines a human in this tradition is accordingly not accidental attributes— for example race, gender, age—but the possession of rationality. The liberal subject, as Katherine Hayles has observed, identifies the self with the rational mind merely in possession of a body (1999, p. 4).This move is unquestionably overdetermined, yet can in large measure be traced back through Cartesian rationalism to the Discourse on the Method. Asserting the cogito, Descartes writes: from this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is solely to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this ‘I’— that is, the soul by which I am what I am—is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist (2009, p. 36, emphasis added). Distinct from the body and free from context, the existence of the rational “I” stands above the historical moment. While Descartes himself is not the brash dualist so often presumed, the methodological distinction between res extensa and res cogitans nevertheless sets the stage for the humanist erasure of embodiment that carries through into posthumanism. Compared to the axiomatically derived self-evidence of the rational self, the body is deemed epistemically untrustworthy, accidental, and historical. Transcribed through liberal humanism, this binary conceives the subject as an inner and universal rationality possessing an external and particular body. The liberal subject emerges as autonomous and unitary, yet as interior, in need of externalizing his/her social and political nature. It is here that speech takes on a significant, yet surprisingly underrepresented, role within liberal humanist discourse. In 1923, H. Wildon Carr, a former president of the Aristotelian Society, argued that the very idea of reason requires discourse because reason is an activity directed outwards. “The origin of speech,” said Carr, “is in the nature of human mentality. Reason in its human form would not and could not exist without speech” (1923–1924, p. 97). A similar position is taken up more recently by Frank E. X. Dance and Carl E. Larson who have contended that speech communication is a pedagogical initiation into humanity. “Speech communication,” they write, “functions so importantly in the life of a human being that the understanding and study of speech communication are at the very core of a liberal education” (1972, p. 6). Toeing the party line, Dance and Larson have maintained that speech communication has three functions: (a) linking the individual with his environment, (b) developing higher mental processes, and (c) regulating behavior (1972, p. 64). Speech is an enactment of reason and therefore of human identity, since “evolutionarily speaking, the hand is shaped by the labor in which it engages, man’s interiority simultaneously shapes and is shaped by speech communication” (1972, p. 71). For Carr, Dance, and Larson, then, speech is an extension of rationality, belonging not to the body, but to the articulation and formation of reason. The liberal humanist assessment of speech exemplified by Carr, Dance, and Larson relies on an ambiguity and slippage between the rational interior and embodied exterior. Speech is given in liberal humanism as a mode of rationality, yet the body is also needed for the enactment of speech. This duality raises troubling questions regarding the boundaries of reason and the self. Does speech modulate from a form of rationality to a conditional act as it passes through the lips? Where does the universal reason stop and contingent embodiment begin? While speech, mediating the threshold between the public and private and the universal and accidental, can be understood as the sine qua non of the liberal humanist subject, it simultaneously occupies an ambiguous position. This ambiguity translates as a fundamental instability in the rational self’s identity and boundary that can be detailed through the voice, chiastically hinging language and the body. The voice is dually constituted by the phonological and the phonetic: the meaning laden, immaterial aspect of the phoneme and its material, auditory support. While the existence of the phonological depends upon the phonetic (however short-lived its existence), the logic of phonocentrism permeating liberal humanism systematically obscures the phonetic as the trace of embodiment. “Requiring the intervention of no determinate surface in the world, being produced in the world as pure auto-affection, [the voice],” explains Derrida, “is a signifying substance completely at our disposition. For the voice meets no obstacle to its emission in the world precisely because it is produced as pure auto-affection” (1973, p. 79). This dominant tradition understands the phonetic, embodied aspect of the voice to be utterly passive and invisible, and thus “the voice” comes from within, circumventing the body, and directly expresses interiority. Yet, tying the signifier to the body, the voice is not so easily divorced from its embodied source. Somewhat overstated by the dysfluent speaker, the phonetic aspect of the voice often does not self-effacingly recede once the phonological function has been dutifully carried out, but rather lingers and stretches, drawing attention to itself and threatening to subvert its linguistic purpose. The voice of one who has cerebral palsy, for example, is decidedly not at his/her complete disposition precisely because the body obtrudes its continuous emission into the world. The conception of the voice as pure auto-affection can be maintained only by abstracting speech from lived experience. I accordingly argue that the rational human materializes himself through the voice precariously; the slippage is manifested both phonetically and affectively. Mladen Dolar (2006) contends that even though the phonetic voice does not contribute to meaning and is therefore inconspicuous when the semantic operation of speech is “properly” carried out, there is always something leftover, whether accent, individuality, or other tonal qualia. The role assigned to the remainder of the voice by Dolar is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, the remainder is an obstruction overcome when one becomes adjusted to a different accent, for example, and can focus simply upon the intended meaning. The voice in this regard is simply an impediment to the communicative operation of language. Yet on the other hand, Dolar notes that a voice devoid of any remainder would conflate with mechanical iterability and thus lose its human characteristic: Paradoxically, it is the mechanical voice which confronts us with the object voice, its disturbing and uncanny nature, whereas the human touch helps us keep it at bay. The obstacle it appears to present actually enhances the sense-making effect; the seeming distraction contributes to the better fulfillment of the goal (2006, p. 22). The phonetic side effect of the voice enables its recognizability and identification as a human voice. Implicit here is the narrow phonetic line sheltering the human voice in between the mechanical and noise—between merely iterating signifiers and chaotic distraction. At far ends of the spectrum, voices of intellectually disabled people are often read as subhuman at best, while voices with no inflection can be read as eerily mechanical or computerized. Depicting the former phenomenon, a vitriolic letter was recently sent to the caretaker of an autistic boy, in which the anonymous author complained, “You selfishly put your kid outside every day and let him be nothing but a nuisance and a problem to everyone else with that noise polluting whaling [sic] he constantly makes! That noise he makes when he is outside is DREADFUL [sic] . . . It scares the hell out of my normal children! . . . Do the right thing and move or euthanize him!” (“Hateful Letter,” 2013). This instance is repugnant and likely not representative in degree. However, inasmuch as speech and reason are tightly correlated through the linguistic function of the voice, performing the voice in any way that strays beyond codified vocalic boundaries and unsettles the effortless production of meaning calls into question the rationality of the performer “behind” the voice. More moderately disabled voices, like the stuttering voice, are in this regard not outright rejected as a signifying voice like the voices of the (presumed) intellectually disabled. However, recognition can nevertheless be denied in degree. The failure to signify in a quotidian manner results in a desperate struggle for the disabled voice to maintain a uniform performance of reason if the speaker wishes to be afforded the privileges of full participation given to those deemed rational. Speaking as a rational human is a delicate performance that can easily go sideways. The knife-edge of human vocality is honed even finer by taking into account normalized vocal affectivity. Joshua Gunn (2010) has argued that the affective power of the voice is culturally policed because it is fundamentally public; the phonetic aspect of the voice generates “public feelings” that communicate on their own accord. Rhetorical training aims to tame this affective power to match, support, and enliven the semiotic character of the voice. However, citing the public anxiety around “uncontrolled speech” that transgresses vocal norms, Gunn points out how easily the affective force can go awry, so much that he claims “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Gunn references the grunting of female tennis players and the unintentional yelps of politicians; yet, it would be helpful here to widen his observation of uncontrolled speech to include such voices as those belonging to the transgendered and the disabled.These voices accentuate the volatile affective power of the voice and the tenuous hold we possess over our bodies. As I have argued elsewhere, “In failing to live up to the ideals set by liberal individualism and capitalism, [dysfluent voices] act as a reminder of the fragile mastery we have of our bodies and of the social downturn that quickly follows the failure to uphold and project this ideal of mastery.” (2012, p. 16). The anxiety-riddled demand for control in public speech arises precisely because the affective power of speech exists in a metastable relation to the body. Rational speech, dispassioned, and disembodied, may at any moment be ruptured and must thus be constantly surveilled and managed. Articulating and simultaneously threatening to occlude rational human identity, the voice thus bears the full weight of the humanist anxiety concerning borders and membership. The “proper” performance of speech is accordingly strongly patrolled within liberal humanist discourse. The universal speaker Iris Young casts the liberal subject in his/her political context, arguing for a conception of “universal citizenship.” In her assessment, the liberal subject transcends his/her self-interested particularity through public discussion and decision making by which private interests can agree on a common good (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen is therefore homogenized, as “citizenship is an expression of the universality of human life; it is a realm of rationality and freedom as opposed to the heteronomous realm of particular need, interest, and desire” (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen transcends differences threatening impartiality and equality by essentializing himself or herself and projecting that self into the politicized public sphere. If to be truly human in liberal humanist discourse is to exercise autonomous reason, and if speaking realizes oneself as a rational and social agent within the public sphere, then having a voice has direct bearing on the universal citizen—so much so that I believe it possible to conceive of what might be termed a “universal speaker.” Because speech plays a pivotal role in the realization of the self as a rational agent, then if one is to speak, he/she must speak in a way that defends the universality of autonomous reason against embodied and historical particularity. Furthermore, the universal speaker, like the universal citizen, must be marked by impartiality. As stated by Young, “impartial reason aims to adopt a point of view outside concrete situations of action, a transcendental ‘view from nowhere’ that carries the perspective, attributes, character, and interests of no particular subject or set of subjects” (1990, p. 100). From this façade of impartiality, it is only a small step to judge who does and does not speak impartially and thereby qualifies as rational and human. To speak as a truly rational agent requires that one speak from nowhere and everywhere, becoming an invisible medium for communication. The universal speaker is a powerful homogenizing trope, for it defines what type of speech production is natural, who gets the right to speak, what speech needs to be taken seriously, and what speech gets to be heard at all. If one is to speak with agency or efficacy, one must speak in the right way; hence the burden within this tradition is to find and retain the “right voice.” In Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream, for example, Carl Elliott (2004) notes an anxiety in the struggle of transgendered people to match gendered vocal norms, the accent-reduction clinics in the American south, and the difficult adjustment of disabled speakers to voice synthesizers. At the heart of liberal humanism’s claim to universality and equality, an ugly structure of exclusion of those who are not “universal” shows itself, an exclusion that I argue results from the tension between (a) the desire to conceive of oral communication as rational/universal and (b) the embodied particularity of speech that threatens to undermine its universality. For while speech is peddled as a rational, universal, and nonspatial medium within liberal humanism, the particularity of embodied speech casts a threatening shadow over this claim. Returning to the example of the stuttering voice, Marc Shell argues that having the “right voice” is a necessary sign of membership to a particular group of persons. If you cannot speak, he wryly explains, you are likely not human. If you can somewhat speak you may be human, and if you cannot speak in my particular way, you do not belong to my tribe (2005, p. 50). For the stutterer, however, “all words are test words, passwords, or catchphrases whereby one gains or loses social acceptance or credibility. . . . The concern is not his inability to pronounce some word or phrase fast enough; it is one’s ability to say any word fluently in any language” (2005, p. 51). Shell is quite clearly stating the boundary conditions of the universal speaker. However, just as the vocal markers of ethnic boundaries are contingent, historical, and laden with colonial power, so can the supposed universality of rational human speech be unraveled. Disability studies convincingly challenge the pathologization of individual bodies by articulating the sociocultural structures of ableism that normalize and exclude certain forms of human variation.2 “Disability” is no more self-evident, natural, or stable a concept than “able-bodiedness”: Both are understood through disability studies as a function of contingent sociocultural anxieties and oppressions. Disability circumscribes the human by negation. Following in this vein, we might likewise fray the boundaries of the universal speaker by deterritorializing disabled speech. Consider again Gunn’s claim that “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Ubiquitous stutters and vocalic gaffes occur to everyone on a daily basis precisely because communication is fundamentally unstable: the act of carving out meaning from indeterminacy and noise as opposed to a pure and rational articulation of Being. The so-called disabled speech permeates all speech. The delimitation of the disabled speaker is thus necessarily arbitrary: the construction of a deviant and pathologized Other to prop up the universal speaker. More specifically, pathologization individuates “nonrational” speech production and thereby maintains and polices the public/private divide. Disabled speech is conceived as a private affair marked by particularity and embodiedness, while the rational speech of the universal citizen belongs to the public realm. Yet, resituating disability as a distinctly public structure of oppression unmasks “universality” as simply the norms of unmarked and dominant groups. What counts as a particular and impartial voice is a function of conglomerate sexist, classist, racist, and ableist determinations obscured by their dominant positions within society. Vocally passing as universal is a stacked game favoring those who discursively control the boundaries of rationality and the human. To transgress norms of unmarked dominant groups is to risk great social punishment and exclusion. To speak “in the wrong way” not only reveals the speaker to be connected to his/her body, particularity, and context, but also risks blurting out that the emperor is naked— the emperor speaks from a body. In rupturing the mythos of speech, the disabled speaker thus throws darkness within the humanist circle, threatening the ostensibly stable conditions of a generalized and “universal” identity and provoking violence in attempts to shore up the boundaries of the human. Excluding “hyperembodied voices” is thus a dogged mechanism of deferring the tension inherent in liberal humanist speech between universality and particularity, rational autonomy, and embodiment. The (failed) movement to free communication as rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principal mode of communication. Cripping posthumanism There is no single bridge spanning humanism to posthumanism. There are certainly stories to tell about the antihumanism of the 1960s and 1970s, of feminism, cybernetics, Hans Moravec, late capitalism, and of the cascading death of God, man, and the author. Yet, as Donna Haraway duly reminds us, the cyborg is a bastard. Any attempt to pin down its origins is always already a fabrication, a sanitation, an attempt to tell a crooked story straight. Neil Badmington further muddies the water, adapting for posthumanism the Lyotardian-Derridean line that a system always contains the conditions for its critique. Rather than construing humanism and posthumanism as distinct entities in a linear, temporal relation, Badmington argues—akin to Lyotard’s reading of modernism and postmodernism— that “the writing of the posthumanist condition should . . . take the form of a critical practice that occurs inside humanism, consisting not of the wake but the working-through of humanist discourse” (2003, p. 22). Posthumanism has always ghosted humanism, and posthumanism is never a clean break (if it can be called a break at all) from humanism. Just as there is no single nor a complete shift from humanism to posthumanism, so are there many posthumanisms. My affinity toward posthumanism as a generative source for rethinking disabled speech does not extend to them all, insofar as some remain bedded with humanism more than others. For example, early cybernetics remained fixated on defining and maintaining borders of an autonomous and autopoietic subject. In a related vein, transhumanists hoist the banner of human progress with pride. Often conflated with posthumanism, transhumanism has wormed its way into the cultural imaginary with grand ameliorative visions of biotechnology improving the human condition through augmentation and newgenics. Transhumanism, as Cary Wolfe defines it, is simply an “intensification of humanism” (2009, p. xv), a technological extension of the dream of perfectibility that sees bodily limitations as a hurdle to transcend. Disabled speech (and disability more broadly) is accordingly irksome problem for transhumanists to fix, in time, through technology. The posthumanism I intend to redeploy takes its cue from Nayar, who defines what he terms critical posthumanism as “the radical decentering of the traditional sovereign, coherent and autonomous human in order to demonstrate how the human is always already evolving with, constituted by and constitutive of multiple forms of life and machines” (2014, p. 2). The posthuman under this reading cannot be understood in terms of a single locus or a unitary ontology of presence. Rather, he/she is dynamically coconstituted within ecological, technological, and informational networks—a congealing of “heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3). Subjectivity is an emergent feature of sympoietic systems (Haraway, 2014), necessarily constrained by and dispersed within the exchanges between systems and environments. “The Human” thus cedes its transcendental status long enjoyed within the Anthropocene. Yet, at the same time, in relinquishing this status, the (post)human no longer needs to frantically police the borders within which it (ostensibly) ruled autonomously. Rather, critical posthumanism recognizes that the borders of the human have always been porous. Owning up to our sympoietic constitution produces a vantage from which the ableist construction and policing of human borders, bodies, and communicative practices can be politicized and critiqued. With the cyborg bastard fully in mind, I suggest that the disabled body is useful in parsing a necessarily crooked and partial transition to posthuman communication. Interrogating the familial tradition of rhetoric from the perspective of disability, Jay Dolmage is here instructive: The body of history has been shaped to look like an idealized human body: proportional, inviolable, autonomous, upright, forward facing (white and masculine). But if you find the rhetorical body, you find tension, trial, and trouble. . . . [W]riting from bodies we would do history differently, not just be recognizing ‘other’ bodies, but also because our histories and rhetorics might more closely represent the difference and diversity of our bodies themselves (2014, p. 16). Reading posthumanism and posthuman communication through disability is accordingly a means of not only recognizing bodies that are often excluded in communication theory (relegated, e.g., to the insulated domain of speech-pathology) but also cripping communication itself. Like the stuttering body, there is perhaps much to gain from resisting the straight and most direct communicative and discursive path. Consider in this regard that for disability theorist Alison Kafer, the cyborg is appealing not in spite of but because of its “multiple, and often contradictory, deployments” (2013, p. 116). To look for and expect disability in posthumanism and communication theory is to invoke a heuristic of instability and indeterminacy that generates multiple meanings and relations. Conscious of the multivariate affinity and inconsonance between humanism and posthumanism, I wish to pull on a few threads to (a) appreciate the transition and reconstitution of the humanist logic excluding disabled speech within posthumanism and (b) redeploy posthumanism to imagine the disabled speaker otherwise. One thin place between humanism and posthumanism that provides an early historical reference point for the cripped movement to posthuman communication is the abstraction of “information” from context and the body by cybernetics and information theory. The work of cybernetic and informational theorists Norbert Wiener and Claude Shannon famously recast communication in terms of pattern/randomness rather than presence/absence. Within this paradigm, similar to within both structuralism and poststructuralism, information is not the one-to-one correlation of a signifier and signified, but, following Saussure, is rather the differentiation between arbitrary relations. By extracting information from the presence/absence binary, immateriality can be constructed on the basis of pattern/randomness. Hayles argues that because a universal informational code can be recognized as underwriting everything that exists, information and materiality can be conceived of as discrete entities, with information occupying the dominant role (1999, p. 11). In this configuration, information is differential insofar as the probabilities of a message alone determine its content. The “meaning” of a message is self-contained and its value is therefore unaffected by situation and context outside the closed information system. “Shannon and Wiener,” remarks Hayles, “wanted information to have a stable value as it moved from one context to another. If it was tied to meaning, it would potentially have to change values every time it was embedded in a new context, because context affects meaning” (1999, p. 53). As such, in “information,” the liberal humanist subject finds a release from the constraints of the body and the context of its production. In Hayles estimation, early cybernetics was thus a means to extend, not subvert, humanist conceptions of man as autopoietic, autonomous, and self-directed. This was accomplished by demonstrating that machines could function like a man and correspondingly that man is essentially an information-processing entity akin to intelligent machines (1999, p. 7). One might argue more specifically, in relation to communication theory, that the effort by Shannon and Weiner to distill information from context resonates with the liberal humanist desire to free rational discourse from the body. By disentangling information from materiality and context, cybernetics somewhat ironically remains tethered to humanist anxieties. Yet, it is worth noting that at the same historical moment, even poststructuralism, putatively motivated by a wariness of immediacy characteristic of humanism, blots out speech in favor of writing. While Derrida and his progeny favor writing inasmuch as speech ostensibly bypasses any impediment to self-presence, the fact that both cybernetics and poststructuralism converge in the erasure of speech is telling. That is, these divergent projects take as their starting point an idealized communicative body; an idealization that adopts the humanist assumption of vocal autoaffectivity. In an ironic twist, even Derrida effaces bodies in the effort to highlight the trace, the body. Working in the poststructuralist lineage, Haraway similarly brackets speech in her articulation of dirty, noisy, posthuman communication. “Cyborg politics,” she writes, “is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution.” (1990, p. 176).This support for the embodied disruption of communication is curiously prefaced by an insistence that “writing is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs” (1990, p. 176; my emphasis). For all her rhetoric of embodiment and insistence on the centrality of communication, Haraway seems not to consider speech as an intimate form of embodied communication that resists perfect translation. Hayles as well, setting her sights on theorists such as Wiener and Shannon, intends to reinstitute embodiment in posthumanism, yet never discusses speech as a creative source of noise in the evolution of material-informational systems. Even if interpreted as vestigial poststructuralist anxiety, this puzzling lacuna in posthumanist discourse around speech betrays an ableist presumption of self-presence and resonates with the exclusionary logic of the universal speaker. Yet, if one follows Dolmage in writing from bodies in their diversity, (post) humanism can be read against the grain. Thinking from the perspective of disability not only highlights the points of tension in the stuttered movement toward posthuman communication (as evidenced by both Haraway and Hayles) but also suggests new ways of thinking about speech as embodied and affective, and the relation between communication and the posthuman. Posthumanism and communication Reimagining the stuttering cyborg requires a more nuanced articulation of posthumanism’s relation with both disability and communication. Starting with the former, in decentering the human subject from its position as the transcendental explanans, posthumanism renders “ability” as an emergent aspect of human situatedness within politicized networks. Able-bodiedness is accordingly not an immanent feature of “the body” (as if it could be decoupled from its environment) but is a dynamic index of architectural, economic, industrial, biomedical, discursive, material, informational, affective, political, and sociocultural assemblages. More specifically, able-bodiedness identifies the congruence of these networks with putatively “normal” bodies. As Nayar helpfully points out, networks are inherently political, put in place, and optimized “for certain kinds of bodies to tap into and connect with—and this is what en-ables these bodies.” Bodies marked as disabled are accordingly, and conversely, those “that do not fit into available systems and institutionally created structures” (2014, p. 107). Put simply, disabled bodies are for Nayar those for which networks do not exist. While Nayar’s analysis is helpful, it is perhaps better to say that disabled bodies occupy subaltern networks, because deworlding (to put the phenomenon in Heideggerian parlance) is rarely, if ever, absolute.3 Disability is not a simple aggregate of network conditions, but is constituted in part by feedback loops. That is, disabled people—edged out of, or exploited by, dominant systems—regularly produce new networks that rewire connections between each other and their environments in politically subversive and generative ways. Disabled communities often supplant the neoliberal and meritocratic ideals of productivity, individualism, and self-sufficiency with an ethos of care, interdependency, and slowness. Cripping communication might likewise be understood as a criticoethical practice of reimagining the relations between informational bodies and systems, remapping disabled speech in ways that privilege noise, indeterminacy, affectivity, and sympoiesis.

#### The 1AC is a form of loco parentis – their action of governing the actions of other nations through Ilaw-esque PTD creates a distinction between ourselves as “full and smart subjects” versus the other “irrational and crazy nations” who will engage in bad actions.

**Mills and Lefrançois 18** [China Mills( [The University of Sheffield](https://sheffield.academia.edu/), [School of Education](https://sheffield.academia.edu/Departments/School_of_Education/Documents), Faculty Member) and Brenda A. Lefrançois(Professor @ School of Social Work for [Memorial University of Newfoundland](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_org&hl=en&org=17452456186544668394)). “Child As Metaphor: Colonialism, Psy-Governance, and Epistemicide.” The Journal of New Paradigm Research. Volume 74, 2018 - [Issue 7-8: Transdisciplinary Child and Youth Studies](https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/gwof20/74/7-8). Pages 503-524. 17 Dec 2018. Accessed 3/18/20. [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02604027.2018.1485438 //](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02604027.2018.1485438%20//) Recut Xu from BL]

For Ashis Nandy (2007), the Western worldview of childhood as an imperfect transitional state on the way to adulthood is embedded in ideologies of colonialism and modernity, meaning “the use of the metaphor of childhood [is] a major justification of all exploitation” (p. 59). Accordingly, parentification – or even in loco parentis – has been used to justify, and to deem benevolent, interventions used by the powerful to “protect” those who are “childlike”. Not so hidden from the surface are the vested capitalist interests as well as the social, political, and psychological agendas of power and control taken on by those in the parental role within these socially constructed and contrived “parent-child” relations. The developmental logic that underlies these power relations legitimizes various regimes of ruling that promote the subordination of certain groups in the name of benevolence. In this article, we demonstrate the ways in which these forced paternalistic encounters, and the infantilization that characterize them, serve not only to debase and erase racialized/colonized, psychiatrized and/or disabled adults and children as knowers, but also serve to reinscribe children themselves as incompetent and inferior. Colonial logics intersect with medical and psychiatric logics that enable not just the marking of certain individual bodies as sub-human but also the global categorizing of whole groups of people as being undeveloped, underdeveloped and/or wrongly developed. Correspondingly, we understand the importance placed within mainstream corporate academia upon the subfields of developmental studies within political science, international development, international relations, economics, geography, child psychology, and medicine, all which serve the same function of maintaining the status quo of (white) supremacy whilst (re)producing majority world people, children, psychiatrized and/or disabled people as childlike (Blaut, 1993). We expose and contest such debasement whilst also disputing the essentialized and adultist meanings contained within the very concept of childlike, a concept which emanates from dominant Eurowestern and adult-centric constructions of childhood. Metaphor is “pervasive in everyday life”, and is classically understood as structuring the way we think and act, and enabling us to understand and experience “one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 3–5). Yet many concepts may not be separate as such, and may be historically entangled with one another. Metaphors are contextually bound and have a performative aspect in that they structure what action we can take (Kövecses, 2015). Understanding something through metaphor may hide aspects of a concept that are not consistent with that metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and thus metaphors can be used to do political and ideological work. We are interested in how certain groups of peoples (colonized, racialized, mad and crip)2 come to be understood, talked about and acted upon through the metaphor of childhood. Specifically, the pervasive, entangled and co-constitutive nature of metaphors of the child, colony/“savage”, mad and crip are explored. The intersections of these metaphors call for an approach attuned to overlaps and not constricted by disciplinary boundaries. We engage in this analysis through a creative transdisciplinary inquiry that is not discipline-specific but instead brings together knowledges that are rarely understood to coexist and that may at times be in tension with each other (Augsburg, 2014; Leavy, 2006; Mitchell & Moore, 2015; Montuori, 2013). Transdisciplinarity – as contingent and non-essentialized – alerts us to and rejects the politics of differentiation and exclusion, key to the bordering and disciplining practices of social scientific knowledge and their beginnings in the codification of Enlightenment rationality used to justify slavery, colonialism and apartheid (Sehume, 2013). Following Nicolescu (2008), we understand transdisciplinary inquiry to be a form of meaning-making that breaks down the academic hierarchy of epistemological relationships, that is open to different forms of logic including that which is unknown (Augsburg, 2014), and that strives to eliminate epistemic injustice (Leblanc & Kinsella, 2016) or epistemicide (Santos, 2014). Further, our inquiry is informed by mad studies, critical disability studies, critical childhood studies, as well as critical race, transnational and post-colonial theories. Mad studies transgresses the academy and its disciplines, with its beginnings being located outside the academy and within mad social movements (Gorman & LeFrançois, 2017; LeFrançois et al., 2013; Russo & Sweeney, 2016). A transdisciplinarity lens is consistent with Mad studies, in that it is not only inquiry based but also questions the logics and the very form in which that inquiry may take (Augsburg, 2014), whilst Mad studies may further rebelliously challenging enlightenment and eurocentric notions of rationality (Blaut 1993) which underpins and structures knowledge emanating from academic disciplines (Sehume 2013). That is, at times, Mad studies may be at odds with rationalism as the basis of knowledge production and as the basis of the formation of the academy. As Bruce (2017) notes, “(r)ationalist readers may fear that such a mad study…detrimentally reinforces myths of black savagery and subrationality. Such investment in rationalism presumes that Reason is paramount for fully realized modern personhood” (p. 307). Like Bruce (2017), we reject such investments and presumptions, and our work instead interrogates the adultist, disableist, saneist, colonial and racist logics that often underpin the conventional academic imaginary. However, debasement of mad people’s knowledges does not just occur within the academy but also within the general public (Leblanc & Kinsella, 2016). Mad studies produces knowledge where the meaning-making of mad people is centred, but where other meanings emanating from other sources – academic or otherwise – also can be considered and deconstructed, incorporated or rejected. So too do we argue that critical childhood studies should also be seen as not only transdisciplinary (Mitchell & Moore, 2015) and as a direct challenge on ‘Reason’ as key for children’s entrance into a fully realized personhood, given the ways adultist notions of children’s inherent irrationality, lack of reason, rule by passion, animism (Scott and Chrisjohn, forthcoming), and their supposed lack of contribution as productive members of (capitalist) society is conventionally inscribed on their bodies and minds in the West. According to Rollo (2018, 61) this denigration and subordination of children – misopedy –was in ancient Greece a “form of social and political hierarchy”. Here the child functions as the ontological other to reason and politics; children as a group for whom there was seen to be a moral obligation to assist but for whom political claims were seen as impossible. It was this that made possible the framing of violence as necessary and legitimated as being in children’s ‘best interests’. As these dominant notions of children and childhood not only exist but also shut down discussions of the social construction of childhood within most academic disciplines (child psychology, sociology, social work, medicine, psychiatry, etc), understanding (critical) childhood studies as a direct challenge to this denotes the desire to disrupt and break away from “the governing strictures found within academic modes of dominant knowledge production that both center and reproduce privileged and constraining notions of reason and productivity” (LeFranc¸ois and Voronka forthcoming). For the most part, the academy neither acknowledges the existence of nor includes knowledge production emanating from children themselves, whether such contributions mirror dominant (adult) discourses or not, as the concept of “children’s contributions” is read through an adultist lens. This is not to imply that the heterogeneous accounts of children and/or mad people are innocent; it is instead about radically calling into question what the academy counts as knowledge. For those contributions deemed childlike, whether they emanate from children, colonized and racialized peoples, psychiatrized or disabled people, transdisciplinarity coupled with Mad studies may provide a platform for ensuring epistemic justice through both the deconstruction of dominant, racist, sanist and ableist strictures but also by opening up a wider space for meaning-making beyond such adultist and Euro-western positivism. We argue that the use of child as metaphor operates as a form of epistemicide – what Santos (2014) terms, a “failure to recognise the different ways of knowing by which people across the globe provide meaning to their existence” (p. 111), including different ways of knowing children. This operates as a form “cognitive injustice” often followed by attempts to destroy epistemological diversity with a single story that claims to be universal (Santos, 2014), including a single developmental story about children and those deemed childlike. These concepts are mostly used by Santos in reference to the violent eradication of Indigenous knowledge systems enabled through a colonial framing of irrationality. Yet cognitive injustice is also at work in the dismissal of alternative experiences of reality and alternative cognitions that are classified as ‘mad’ and intellectually disabled respectively, and hence, marked as incompetency and irrationality. We are interested in how the child functions as a metaphor for colonized, racialized, psychiatrized and disabled peoples. Literature on the iconography of childhood usually makes a distinction between metaphorical or symbolic and actual “flesh and blood” children (Burman, 2016; Morrigan, 2017). We also make this distinction here by exploring the performative nature of “child as metaphor” for those deemed childlike, and for actual children. However, in making this distinction we do not seek to reify a naturalized and essentialized developmental child. Sánchez-Eppler (2005) notes the entanglement of “childhood as a discourse and childhood as persons”, particularly in Euro-western affective deployments of childhood (p. xxiii). Furthermore, we recognize that given the “societally as well as intrapsychically invested character of childhood, arguably all appeals to ‘the child’ are metaphorical” (Burman, 2016, p. 2; Stainton Rogers & Stainton Rogers, 1992). Our point of departure, then, is the analytic task outlined by Burman (2016) to render “explicit the work done by the rhetorical appeal to childhood” (p. 2), and the task in this article is to trace the work done by the metaphorical appeal to childhood, specifically in relation to colonialism, madness and disability. While we are concerned with the effects of metaphor, we are cognizant that the conceptual basis on which “child as metaphor” functions is largely a Euro-western construction of childhood as an early rung on a linear developmental ladder and a stage marked by a lack of intellectual capacity, dependency, irrationality, animism, emotionality, – or “rule by passion”, and economic unproductivity (Blaut, 1993). This is an evolutionary and developmentalist narrative globalized by the West as a universal standard (Nieuwenhuys, 2009) and, as we shall see, a narrative that is deeply entangled with colonialism (Blaut, 1993) and epistemicide (Santos, 2014).

#### The alternative is to embrace crip failure as a method of rupturing abled temporalities and mapping crip horizons.

**Kolářová 14** [Brackets Original. Kateřina Kolářová (Assistant Professor of Cultural Studies in the Department of Gender Studies at Charles University in Prague, PhD in Anglo-American Literary Studies and an MA in History and English and American Studies and History from Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague). “The Inarticulate Post-Socialist Crip: On the Cruel Optimism of Neoliberal Transformations in the Czech Republic.” [Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies](https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/456). [Liverpool University Press](https://muse.jhu.edu/search?action=browse&limit=publisher_id:105). Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 257-274. 2014. Accessed 8/13/20. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/558367/pdf> //Xu]

The impossibility of seeing and envisioning crip(topias) in the situation of (post-)shameful identity illustrates not only the harmful and utterly disabling work of certain affective attachments, it also and as vividly illustrates the equally harmful impacts/effects of attachments to affects, in particular attachments to affects of positivity, affects that seemingly are necessary to foster self-embracing identity and subjectivity. In other words, the post-socialist crip challenges Western-developed theories of (disabled) identity that argue that positive affects are necessary to foster self-embracing and affirmative understandings of disability and disabled subjectivity. The symbolic violence embedded in recuperative positivity offers us the opportunity to think about crip failure and crip negativity. The violence also points toward conditions that (could) make (some forms of) failure useful for cripistemologies and that (could) map crip horizons. Cripness is already rich with failure; cripness is infused with negativity that sustains. The crip negativity I plead for is a critical strategy rupturing ideologies of cure, rehabilitation and overcoming, ideologies that inflict hurt and violence (not only) on crips. I wish to initiate a discussion about crip negativity as a political practice working towards (if never reaching) crip utopian horizons. Still, the post-socialist crip opens other and new questions about what crip failure would mean if it were to foster and sustain life, what forms of crip negative energies would allow for crip utopias and make possible the desire for crip survival. J. Jack Halberstam’s theory of failure elucidates how the compulsory positive nature of optimism, hope, pride, and success precludes the realisation that failure can be a form of sustenance and strategy of critique/survival. In failing the normative prescriptions of compulsory heterosexuality (and ablebodiedness), failure “imagines other goals for life, for love, for art, and for being” (Halberstam 88). And coming back to the image of the women failing/ surviving with AIDS at the post-socialist Odessa hospice, failure also imagines signs of crip solidarity and sustenance where the visions of an optimistic future create spaces of abandonment for subjects who will never be offered a fantasy of the ‘good life.’ Despite its lack of substantial attention to cripness that would surpass the level of metaphorics, Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure does offer some lines along which to also think crip failures. The most helpful to my current analysis of post-socialist affects would seem to be Halberstam’s discussion of the failure to remember. Forgetting, losing, looping between past and future are the techniques of resistance to normative temporalities. Such failures at temporalities of progressive and curative futurity, I argue, could offer forms of sustenance (for the post-socialist crip). The failure to remember would produce a rupture into the dominant narratives of shame (of a failed socialism) and the futurity of ‘getting better.’ It would forget visions of pride based on overcoming the failed socialist crip, and it would loosen/lose the compulsory vision of optimism of (neoliberal) humanism. It would forget the ideologies that we have seen to hurt and violate crips and our futures. Cripping, disjointing the normative forms of (linear) knowing about the past-present-future, could offer resistance to the cruel hope that directs our desires into (an evacuated) future, while foreclosing the negotiation of difficult yet important relationships past and the present. The rejection of the curative and always already deferred future opens up a space for developing a more complicated relationship with failed pasts. Queer theorist Heather Love devises the politics of ‘feeling backwards/backwards feelings’ as an affective strategy of resistance to liberal understandings of the repressive hypothesis and emancipation (see Love). Her concept is both a corrective to the deeply problematic progressivism of ‘gay pragmatism’ with its compulsorily positive futurity of ‘getting better’, as well as an affective reaching backwards to legacies of difficult pasts. As she puts it, “[b]ackward feelings serve as an index to the ruined state of the social world; they indicate continuities between the bad gay past and the present; and they show up the inadequacy of queer narratives of progress” (Love 27); I wish to add, they show up continuities between crip pasts and presents obscured by the undisputedly “good intentions” of rehabilitation (McRuer, Crip 110). Halberstam for his part appreciates the strategies of backward feeling as a way of recovering the past of queer and racially marked subjects erased in the tidy versions of the past, “[w]hile liberal histories build triumphant political narratives with progressive stories of improvement and success, radical histories must content with a less tidy past, one that passes on legacies of failure and loneliness as the consequence of [ableist] homophobia and racism and xenophobia” (Halberstam 98). To retrieve lives undone by ideologies of ableism, homophobia, racism and xenophobia, and practices of institutionalisation, forced sterilisation, ethnic segregation, and on and on, we need backward-feelings. The project of “reformulated histories” (see Kafer’s discussion of Halberstam 42-44) feels backwards to past forms of crip survivals and past experiences that have been erased. Alongside this move, I also want to ‘feel backwards’ to the hurt caused by the shame of the bad past itself. This is not a naïve reclamation of the idealised communist past ignorant of the violence committed by the communist regime (violence and hurt inflicted on disabled people still remains mostly undocumented, unspoken, and unanalysed). What I argue is that the notion of the bad and failed past is too comfortable and too tidy and serves only the ideology of capitalist recovery that prescribes only one version of futurity, a futurity – I argue – that is constructed upon abjection of cripness. To open critical discussion I propose that we need to continue to produce untidy, crooked, queer, twisted, bent, crip versions of pasts. Only they will provide for more generous horizons of the present and future.

#### The 1AC’s belief of a better future becomes complicit in the logic of rehabilitative futurism that consistently renders the disabled body as ontologically negative. Imagining a better future is threatened by the notion of disabled child – thus the ROB is to disrupt notions of progress.

**Mollow 15**[Anna Mollow(Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar, UC Dissertation-Year Fellow, coeditor of Sex and Disability and the co-editor of DSM-CRIP). “The Disability Drive.” University of California at Berkeley. Pg 85-88. Spring 2015. Accessed 3/6/20. <https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf> //Recut Xu from UTDD]

Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the innocent‟Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman‟s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

# AC

## FW

### Hijack

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted – there’s alwahys an institutional DA to going through Congress c) ought[[1]](#footnote-1) means “moral obligation” so the lack of that obligation means the aff hasn’t fulfilled their burden

#### The standard is *intending to maximize expected well-being*.

#### Consequentialist frameworks are contingent on events that are ever-changing, so they can’t be the basis of consistent duty. Outweighs – (a) butterfly effect means unforeseen consequences are inevitable (b) utility monster – you wouldn’t be culpable for making the world a better place if a satanic creature derived infinite pleasure from human suffering (c) Endpoints – Consequences cause infinite other consequences – the decision to stop calculating at some point is an intention.

#### Negate – they say states don’t have intentions which triggers permissibility as it makes util incoherent.

### LBL

#### The litmus test for ethics is certainty and non-arbitrariness –

#### 1] Predictability – defending theories with illogical assumptions guts predictability since any possible wrong thing can emerge that we aren’t prepared to contest.

#### 2] Bindingness – blurry guidelines for ethics allows agents to arbitrarily opt out of ethics which renders any action permissible.

#### External Worlds Skepticism –

Chapman summarizes 14 [Andrew Chapman (lecturer in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder). “External World Skepticism”. 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. 6 FEBRUARY 2014. Accessed 12/11/21. <https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/> //Xu]

You’re being deceived by a very powerful evil demon right now. This demon has the ability to manipulate your sensory impressions such that it will seem to you that things are some way when they are not that way at all. Accordingly, things are actually nothing like P. For example, suppose it seems to you as though you are in a room with a table and chair in it and that you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (1) is true, then you actually are in a room with a table and chair in it and you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, then you are not in a room with a table and chair in it and you are not reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, things are very different from how they seem to you to be.1

\*Footnote 1\*

1 If the evil demon scenario is too far-fetched for you, imagine that you are dreaming or that you are hallucinating or even that you are in a laboratory and your visual cortex is being stimulated by electrodes.

\*Paragraph Following the First\*

Philosophers call (2) a skeptical scenario. In skeptical scenarios, you are radically misled, deceived, or bamboozled by your evidence in such a way that how things seem to you is different from how things actually are. Perhaps the most famous propounder of skeptical scenarios in the history of philosophy is René Descartes (1596-1650) in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). In the Meditations, Descartes considers that he might be dreaming or that he might be being deceived by the evil demon from our scenario (2) above. Hollywood has made much of skeptical scenarios in movies like Total Recall, The Matrix, and Inception. So back to our original question: Which of (1) or (2) is best supported or best justified by its seeming to you that P? If you’re being honest with yourself, you’ll conclude that how things seem equally well supports (1) and (2). From your internal, first-personal perspective, either of (1) or (2) could be true given how things seem to you. And if that weren’t bad enough, here comes the kicker: If both (1) and (2) are equally well supported by your evidence, how can you ever possibly know anything about the world outside your own skin? This is the problem of external world skepticism, perhaps the central problem of modern epistemology.

#### Bonini paradox means modeling the brain is physically and empirically impossible

Wikipedia summarizes Dutton and Starbuck [Brackets Original. John M. Dutton (He enrolled in Harvard Business School in 1955, graduated with an M.B.A. in 1957, and embarked on an academic career that culminated as professor of business administration. He stayed on at Harvard as a research associate and taught at Northeastern University. He taught at Purdue University Krannert School of Industrial Engineering in Lafayette, IN from 1960 to 1968. His research included organizational behavior, computer simulation of human behavior, history of business technology, progress-principal studies, and strategic changes in the energy industry. He was elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. He was the Lucas Visiting Professor at the University of Birmingham in England from 1963 to 1964. He went on to teach at Southern Methodist University Business School in Dallas, TX from 1968 to 1971. In 1971 he moved to Manhattan where he taught and was Associate Dean at New York University, Stern Graduate School of Business Administration retiring in 1998. While at NYU he helped develop and teach the executive M.B.A. programs in France and Japan). William Haynes Starbuck (graduated from Harvard University and the Carnegie Institute of Technology. He is an organizational scientist who has held professorships in social relations, sociology, business administration, and management). “Bonini's paradox”. Wikipedia. No Date. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonini%27s_paradox> //Houston Memorial DX]

In modern discourse, the paradox was articulated by John M. Dutton and William H. Starbuck[2] "As a model of a complex system becomes more complete, it becomes less understandable. Alternatively, as a model grows more realistic, it also becomes just as difficult to understand as the real-world processes it represents".[3] This paradox may be used by researchers to explain why complete models of the human brain and thinking processes have not been created and will undoubtedly remain difficult for years to come. This same paradox was observed earlier from a quote by philosopher-poet Paul Valéry, "Ce qui est simple est toujours faux. Ce qui ne l’est pas est inutilisable".[4] ("A simple statement is bound to be untrue. One that is not simple cannot be utilized."[5]) Also, the same topic has been discussed by Richard Levins in his classic essay "The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology", in stating that complex models have 'too many parameters to measure, leading to analytically insoluble equations that would exceed the capacity of our computers, but the results would have no meaning for us even if they could be solved.[6] (See Orzack and Sober, 1993; Odenbaugh, 2006)

#### Evolution link - biological ability to access morality excludes disabled people – and Richard Dawkins supports eugenics

It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness

#### PATHOLOGIZATIOIN LINK - blum says that people who don't experience pleasure properly are mentally ill and need to be cured which re-rentrenches normative violence

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust.

#### The human brain undergoes evolution at changes in structure which proves that the brain is malleable.

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Sousa et al. [[50](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R50)] also found differences in much older areas, including an ancient structure called the cerebellum. Accordingly, an ancient part of the human brain seems to have very recent change. It will take years to understand more fully what all the changes mean, but this finding could eventually help divulge what makes the human brain unique, and even what goes wrong in a range of brain disease states. The role of dopamine in brain function has been well established throughout many decades of research and merited the Nobel Prize in 2000. Continued work by one of us (KB) and the late Ernest P. Noble, showed the role of dopamine genetics in severe alcoholism. Also work by Mark Gold and Charles Dackis with regard to the “dopamine depletion hypothesis” and cocaine, as well the work of Elman et al. on both RDS and anti-reward, suggest the real need for balancing brain dopamine to induce homeostasis [[53](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R53)–[56](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R56)]. The new findings by Sousa et al., [[50](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R50)] also call for the importance of dopamine homeostasis through genetic addiction risk (GARS) testing and Pro-dopamine regulation (KB220PAM), as pointed out by Gold and associates many years ago [[57](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R57)–[59](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R59)]. While we applaud the elegant work of Berridge and associates in disentangling pleasure from incentive salience and learning signals in brain reward circuitry in animal models, new consideration especially as it relates to humans is required.

1. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought [↑](#footnote-ref-1)