# Speech 1NC Harvard Doubles vs Scripps Ranch 2-20 6PM

## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose affirmative frameworks, advocacy texts, and advantage areas thirty minutes before round if they haven’t read the affirmative before

#### Violation: They didn’t

#### Standards:

#### 1] Clash- Not disclosing incentivizes surprise tactics and poorly refined positions that rely on artificial and vague negative engagement to win debates. Their interpretation discourages third- and fourth-line testing by limiting the amount of time we have to prepare and forcing us to generics instead of smart contextual strategies destroying nuanced argumentation.

#### 2] Reciprocity – They get an infinite amount of time to frontline their aff to write the most efficient and effective answers to anything we could say against it while we get only four minutes in round.

#### 3] Shiftiness- Not knowing enough about the affirmative coming into round incentivizes 1ar shiftiness about what the aff is and what their framework/advocacy entails. That means even if we could read generics or find prep, they’d just find ways to recontextualize their obscure advocacy in the 1ar.

## 2

#### Interp and violation – 1ACs must use the three-tier process to justify the plan – they haven’t

#### Voter for accessibility and ascetic tourism.

Reid-Brinkley 8 [SHANARA ROSE REID-BRINKLEY- “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” Under the Direction of CHRISTINE HAROLD <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf> 2008] VHS AI

The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence. As Green argues, their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”57 In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledgemaking practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making 83 practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59 Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the doubleocto-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.”60 The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions 84 prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education.61 The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks. Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.

#### Vote for limits – there are an infinite amount of potential plans so you cherry-pick affs with no neg ground and I must prep all affs while they prep one which pigeonholes me to generics but there is a limited amount of ways bodies could affirm.

#### TVA – defend your advocacy but focus on the way the politics you defend are influenced by your identity but they cannot solve their impacts before they control the levers of power

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation and substantive engagement

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact and why schools fund debate

#### Accessibility – psychic violence is a prereq to being in debate and has durable impacts

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### DTD – its key to deter future abuse and the abuse has already occurred

#### No RVI’s- a) chilling effect – people will be too scared to read theory because RVI’s encourage baiting theory b) clash – people go all in on theory which decks substance engagement

## 3

#### **The world relies on the fundamental opposition to disability to exist – disabled bodies are modeled as the inverse reflection to the normate which drives the internal ableism and desire to eliminate disabled bodies.**

**Hughes 12** [Bill Hughes (professor of Sociology at Glasgow Caledonian University, BA in sociology from the University of Stirling, PhD in political philosophy from the University of Aberdeen). 2012. Accessed 8/9/20. “Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People.” <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137023001_2> //Xu]

The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. The body produced by ableism is equivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as invulnerable and definitive. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’ (Shildrick, 2002: 51). It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’ (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), the epitome of civilisation, closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’ (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). Through ableism, modernity has been able to structure disability as uncivilised, outside or on the margins of humanity. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’ (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat. Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existen- tial basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death ... that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communica- tion and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness).

#### Poststructuralism overlooks material forces underpinning disability, delegitimizes essential tech, and discounts the embodied experience of disability, Feely 16

Michael Feely is an Assistant Professor of Social Work at Trinity Dublin College and has a Ph.D. from Queens University. “Disability studies after the ontological turn: a return to the material world and material bodies without a return to essentialism” in Disability & Society, Volume 31(7), p. 863-883 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09687599.2016.1208603?journalCode=cdso20 “///” indicates paragraphs Language edited NT 17

Poststructuralist approaches have been the subject of much critique within academia in general, and disability studies in particular. Critics regularly cite three problems: these approaches **overlook the (often inaccessible) material world** that disabled people inhabit; they are **unable to engage productively rather than critically with science** and technology; and **they discount the importance of embodied experience, including pain**. /// Regarding poststructuralism’s failure to deal with the realities of the material world, Shakespeare (2014, 52) suggests that ‘critical disability studies writers generally seem much **more interested in texts and discourses than** in the ordinary **lives of disabled people’**. Meanwhile, Wendell (1996, 45) notes that ‘in most postmodern cultural theorizing about the body, there is no recognition of – and, as far as I can see, no room for recognising – **the** hard physical realities **that are** faced bypeople with disabilities’ [disabled people]. Similarly, Barnes (2012, 23) argues that poststructuralist accounts ‘**downplay the material reality of disabled people’s lives’** and have served to de-radicalise disability **studies** by diverting **critical** attention from identifying and challenging material forces underpinning disablement ‘towards a politically benign focus onculture, language, anddiscourse’. /// Poststructuralism’s difficulty with discussing the material world also leads to problems engaging productively with the material sciences and new technologies. These shortcomings have been highlighted by philosophers, scientists and disability scholars. The philosopher Searle (1998, 38), for example, suggests that while cultural practices may be relative, treating the knowledge produced by material sciences as **simply** a social construction is foolish and **prevents meaningful engagement** with ‘the most successful system that the human intellect has ever produced for getting knowledge of how the world works’. Material scientists have voiced similar objections, sometimes in very creative ways. In 1996, for instance, the physicist Sokal submitted a spoof paper – which suggested quantum gravity was a social construction – to a postmodern journal, Social Text. The journal published the jargon-rich but utterly meaningless paper, prompting a gleeful Sokal (1996) to invite poststructuralists who believed gravity to be a social construction to jump from his apartment window. Poststructuralism’s ambivalent and often suspicious position on science and technology is also problematic **and limiting for disability studies**. To explain, from a **Foucauldian** perspective, a prosthetic arm might be treated with suspicion as a normalising device whilst overlooking[ignoring] its **positive** potential to increase **a body’s** capacities. Similarly, psychiatric medications might be understood as disciplinary technologies that produce docile patients whilst overlooking[ignoring] their capacity to reduce **mental** pain **and visceral suffering**. /// This brings us to a third common criticism of poststructuralist approaches: that they **fail to provide an account of embodied experience**. In Grosz’s (1994, 116) words: ‘The body remains primarily as a text to be marked, traced, written upon by various regimes of institutional, (discursive and non-discursive) power’. Meanwhile – in common with thesocial model – poststructuralist approaches remain relatively silent on the embodied and visceral aspects of impairment, including pain. Shakespeare makes this point by drawing on personal experience: /// I confess to a certain **discomfort** when it comes to **non-disabled researchers** … telling me, who has two rather **painful and disabling impairments, that impairment does not exist or is only the product of discourse** … **My problem is my physical embodiment** and my experience of negative symptoms arising from impairment. (2014, 66–67) /// Similarly, Vehmas and Watson (2014, 649) argue that certain impairments – for example, motor neuron disease and depression – are undesirable ‘not merely because of **the** cultural representations **attached** to them but because these **conditions …** cause suffering irrespective of one’s cultural environment’. Finally, Siebers (2008) suggests that – in overlooking visceral experience – poststructuralists offer wholly **inadequate solutions to** the problem of **impairment**, and their political strategy of refusing to identify as impaired is deeply flawed because it ultimately implies that ‘imagination can curewhat ailsthe body’ (2008, 76).

#### the idea that epistemic resistance is all we need erases the material conditions of disability

Siebers 06 (Tobin, Prof of Literary and Cultural Criticism at the U of Michigan, “Disability Studies and the Future of Identity Politics”) DR 16

**The attack on identity by social constructionists is designed to liberate individuals constrained by unjust stereotypes and social prejudices. The example of disability in particular reveals with great vividness the unjust stereotypes imposed on identity by cultural norms and languages as well as the violence exercised by them.** It also provides compelling evidence for the veracity of the social model**. Deafness was not, for instance, a disability on Martha’s Vineyard for most of the eighteenth century because 1 in 25 residents was deaf and everyone in the community knew how to sign**. Deaf villagers had the same occupations and incomes as people who could hear.3 This example shows to what extent **disability is socially produced.** In fact, **it is tempting to see disability exclusively as the product of a bad match between society and some human bodies because it is so often the case. But disability also frustrates theorists of social construction because the disabled body and mind are not easily aligned with cultural norms and codes. Many disability scholars have begun to insist that the social model either fails to account for the difficult physical realities faced by people with disabilities or presents their body and mind in ways that are conventional, conformist, and unrecognizable to them. These include the habits of privileging pleasure over pain, making work a condition of independence, favoring performativity to corporeality, and describing social success in terms of intellectual achievement, bodily adaptability, and active political participation.** David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder have noticed that **the push to link physical difference to cultural and social constructs, especially ideological ones, has actually made disability disappear** from the social model. They cite a variety of recent studies of the body that use “corporeal aberrancies” to emblematize social differences, complaining that “physical difference” within common critical methodologies “exemplifies the evidence of social deviance even as the constructed nature of physicality itself fades from view.”4 As Davis puts it, **cultural theory abounds with “the fluids of sexuality, the gloss of lubrication, the glossary of the body as text,** the heteroglossia of the intertext, the glossolalia of the schizophrenic. **But almost never the body of the differently abled.”5 Recent theoretical emphases on “performativity,” “heterogeneity,” and “indeterminancy” privilege a disembodied ideal of freedom, suggesting that emancipation from social codes and norms may be achieved by imagining the body as a subversive text. These emphases are not only incompatible with the experiences of people with disabilities; they mimic the fantasy, often found in the medical model, that disease and disability are immaterial as long as the imagination is free. Doctors and medical professionals have the habit of coaxing sick people to cure themselves by thinking positive thoughts, and when an individual’s health does not improve the failure is ascribed to mental weakness**. Sontag was perhaps the first to understand the debilitating effects of **describing illness as a defect of imagination or will power**. She traces the notion that disease springs from individual mental weakness to Schopenhauer’s claim that “recovery from a disease depends on the will assuming ‘dictatorial power in order to subsume the rebellious forces’ of the body” (43-44). **She also heaps scorn on the idea that the disabled or sick are responsible for their disease concluding that “theories that diseases are caused by mental states and can be cured by will power are always an index of how much is not understood about the physical terrain of a disease**” (55**). The rebellious forces of the body and the physical nature of disease represent a reality untouched by metaphor.** Sontag insists that “the reality has to be explained” (55).

#### The impact is internalized ableism and psychological violence

Campbell 2008 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, disability author and professor at Griffith University, “Exploring internalized ableism using critical race theory” Disability and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, March 2008, 151–162 some words are edited within []) DR 16

**Foucault’s (1976; 1980) theorisation of power as productive may provide some offerings from which to build a conversation about internalised ableism**. I am not so much interested in the ‘external’ effects of that power, but for the moment wish to concentrate on what Judith Butler aptly refers to as **the ‘psychic life’ of power.** She describes this dimension: … an account of subjection, it seems, must be traced in the turns of psychic life. More specifically, **it must be traced in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes place in acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in tandem with processes of social regulation** (Butler, 1997b, p.19). In other words, **the processes of subject formation cannot be separated from the subject** him/**herself who is brought into being though those very subjectifying processes**. **The consequences of taking into oneself negative subjectivities not only regulate and continually form identity (the disabled citizen) but can transcend and surpass the strictures of ableist authorizations.** Judith **Butler describes this process of the “carrying of a mnemic trace**”: One need only consider the way in which **the history of having been called an injurious name is embodied, how the words enter the limbs, craft the gesture, bend the spine …how these slurs accumulate over time, dissimulating their history, taking on the semblance of the natural, configuring and restricting** the doxa that counts as “**reality**”. (Butler, 1997b, p. 159) The work of Williams and Williams-Morris (2000) links racism experienced by African Americans to the effects of hurtful words and negative cultural symbols on mental health, especially when **marginalized groups embrace negative societal beliefs about themselves.** They cite an international study by Fischer et al (1996) which inter alia links poor academic performance with poor social status. Although using different disciplinary language Wolfensberger (1972) in his seven core themes of SRV, identified role circularity as a significant obstacle to be overcome by disabled people wanting socially valued roles. **Philosopher** **Linda Purdy contends** it is important to resist conflating disability with the disabled person. She writes **My disability is not me**, no matter how much it may affect my choices. With this point firmly in mind, **it should be possible mentally to separate my existences from the existence of my disability**. (Purdy, 1996, p. 68). The problem with **Purdy’s conclusion** is that it is psychically untenable, not only because it **is posited around a type of Cartesian dualism that simply separates being-ness from embodiment**, **but also because this kind of reasoning disregards the dynamics of subjectivity formation** to which Butler (1997a; 1997b) has referred. **Whilst the ‘outputs’ of subjectivity are variable the experience of impairment within an ableist context can and does effect formation of self – in other words ‘disability is me’, but that ‘me’ does not need to be enfleshed with negative ontologies of subjectivity**. **Purdy’s ~~bodily~~ [fleshly] detachment appears locked into a loop that is filled with internalised ableism, a state with negative views of impairment, from which the only escape is ~~disembodiment~~; the penalty of denial is a flight** 12 **from her [flesh] ~~body~~.** **This finds agreement in the reasoning of** Jean **Baudrillard** (1983) **who posits that it is the simulation, the appearance (**representation) **that matters. The subject simulates what it is to be ‘disabled’ and by inference ‘abled’ and whilst morphing ableist imperatives, in effect performs a new hyper reality of be-ing disabled. By unwittingly performing ableism disabled people become complicit in their own demise – reinforcing impairment as an outlaw ontology.**

#### The 1AC’s understanding of intelligibility operates on the terrain of fluency which sutures neoliberal governance and compulsory ability on the level of subjectivity – vote negative to forefront disability as dysfluency as an unintelligible frame that interrupts those hegemonic processes.

St. Pierre 17 [Joshua St. Pierre, co-founder of the Did I Stutter Project, philosophy at University of Alberta. 2017. Accessed 11/30/20. “Becoming Dysfluent: Fluency as Biopolitics and Hegemony.” <https://online.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/abs/10.3828/jlcds.2017.26> //Xu]

Fluency as hegemony is constitutively wider than communicative practices, depicting the way that bodies are compelled to live within linear and uni-directional time that has no becoming. Yet communication highlights the sorts of oppressions that can result from fluent processes. Ableist “choreographies” of communication (St. Pierre “Distending”) regulate access to the present and shape who gets to participate within encounters. For example, Autistic people often process language at different rates and in different modes and are thus unable to “keep up” with the pace of fluent conversation in everyday social encounters. Without hitting the right cues and interjecting at the appropriate times, dysfluent and slow speakers are excluded from meaningful participation in shared time (see Paterson; St. Pierre “Construction”). From this perspective, disability politics are always, in part, a question of heterogeneous temporalities and differential rates of access that have been swept up in an unsustainable ableist beat. With this being said, dysfluency offers a critical response by questioning who can access, participate, and even belong within collective time. Tanya Titchkosky writes that “access is a way to orient to, and even come to wonder about, who, what, where, and when we find ourselves to be in social space” (3) and we might extend this analysis into a temporal register. Dysfluency calls from our relations not better communication skills, nor “understanding,” nor simply “more time,” but what we might term “responsiveness”: a reorientation towards the other through the body. The stubborn materiality of disability offers a resource for becoming responsive to one another and to our social situation, and responsiveness thus offers a way to imagine access as relation alongside the needed flexibility of crip time. Yet while the accelerated temporality of fluency has worrisome overt consequences in itself, it also hides a distinctly hegemonic function: fluency works to close the present moment such that nothing, in the existential sense, happens. Arendt is helpful at this junction, since her theory of “action,” by which she means the human capacity to begin something new, spontaneous, and thus transformative in the world, resonates in fruitful ways with dysfluency and crip politics. What defines the intersubjective process of action is precisely its unpredictability and its capacity to interrupt hegemonic social processes with a chain of unforeseeable consequences. Arendt, in this way, reads modern politics as an impulse toward closure and stability: The attempt to eliminate action because of its uncertainty and to save human affairs from their frailty by dealing with them as though they were or could become the planned products of human making has first of all resulted in channeling the human capacity for action…into an attitude toward nature which up to the latest stage of the modern age had been one of exploring natural laws and fabricating objects out of natural material. (230–31) Arendt has in mind the reduction of political action to bureaucratic management and the “fabrication” of the nation-state. Yet in a move that she would likely resist, we might also consider the chrononormative politics that seek to render action and its uncertainty inert within our intersubjective relations. During my daily commute a couple years ago a high school-aged girl with Down’s seated herself beside me on the crowded subway. As we started talking she quickly became aware of my dysfluent speech and accordantly asked if I, like her, had an aid in school. I was aware of the onlookers acutely uncomfortable with our public display of dysfluency that was rupturing the normalized social field and of the fluent impulse to disavow our relation: to reassert fixed identities and to align myself with able-bodiedness—“Why would I have an aid? My speech does not make me like you.” Instead, we just talked. Our shared dysfluency opened something new: a site of kinship and solidarity that modified an ableist social field and hegemonic ways of relating to ourselves and others. Fluency channelizes the human capacity for action within our communicative bodies to mitigate the possibilities of something aporetic interrupting the tractable passage of time. Yet what might happen if fluency didn’t govern our time and interactions? The impulse towards closure, the collapse of polyvocal access and engagement within the encounter, is ultimately an effort to render the present and its possibility for rupture utterly inert.4 I have suggested that neoliberal and postindustrial subjects are rendered governable and productive in part through technologies of closure that seek to collapse the encounter through a series of sutures enacted upon and through the body. Only by inscribing social order in our bodies and smoothing over/ disavowing the site of politics can compulsory able-bodiedness manifest as a stable, seamless, and natural field—everywhere and nowhere at once. “Compulsory able-bodiedness,” once again, “functions by covering over, with the appearance of a choice, a system in which there actually is no choice” (McRuer 8). While paraded around in discourses and practices like liberal eugenics, this “choice” is in fact covered by fluent processes that both disavow thick moments of collective access and judgment and that regulate and streamline the encounter to effectively exclude uncertainty and the voices of those most affected by ableist and eugenic logic. Ableist and eugenic ideology contribute to this “common ground” of disability oppression, the apparent consensus on the desirability of able-bodiedness, but ideology is always a secondary inscription: an echo of the material in the sphere of representation. Attention to fluency complicates strategies of resistance to hegemony. For example, while expanding the limits of subjective intelligibility (such as widening “sex” to account for non-dimorphic sexed bodies; or seeking cultural representation of disability) is a critical political intervention, we must recognize that intelligibility is always already a function of biopower. Foucault famously claimed that “the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are” (“The Subject and Power,” 134; emphasis added), and we must soberly ask whether we can refuse subjectivization fluently and whether fluency can unmake fluent, ableist ontologies. Is a “becoming-minority” or a “becoming-crip” possible without a “becoming-dysfluent”?5 Or in Foucault’s terms again, to “promote new forms of subjectivity [and intersubjectivity] through the refusal of this kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for centuries” (134) perhaps requires that we think beyond the individualizing effects of clarity, intelligibility, and closure that restrict the possibilities of crip lives and render us functions of fluent time. Dysfluency as Escape In conclusion, we might consider that for McRuer, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “disability” can refer to “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of bodily, mental, or behavioral functioning aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” (156–57). An attention to dysfluent voices as material enunciations offers one specific way to think about this crip excess, particularly as resistance to hegemony. Fluent voices presume to signify monolithically and thus anticipate and linearly sustain the givenness of what is—fluency must be decomposed for a crip politic to flourish. Yet while fluency may have the first word (my speech arrives always a hesitation), it certainly never has the last—the impulse of fluency is totalizing but “something always escapes!” (Beasley-Murray xxi). Chris Eagle has written that an attention to dysfluency within disability studies would “understand mastery over language as always already tenuous, fragile, and partial” (6) and we might in this way begin to imagine dysfluency not as a communicative “breakdown” but as a type of escape or, in Deleuzio-Guattarian terms, flight. In Lexicon of the Mouth: Poetics and Politics of the Voice and the Oral Imaginary, Brandon LaBelle suggests that by “considering interrupted speech, we enter into a politics of the mouth. By tripping over the word, stuttering evidences the deep performative drive of the mouth under the spell of the linguistic. It stumbles precisely over a syllable, a grammar, a phoneme; the mouth gasps along the fault lines of a given vocabulary, to lisp over words, and in doing so, raises the volume on the very question as to what constitutes ‘proper speech’” (139; emphasis added). I have always imagined LaBelle’s offhanded remark a playful engagement with the Germanic fable the “Pied Piper.” In many versions of this classic tale, the piper leads all but three of the entranced village children into the river to drown. These are three crips, in fact: the first, physically disabled who could not keep pace; the second, deaf, who like Odysseus who could not hear the piper’s song; and the third, blind. Only those transformed by disability could resist the irresistible, the linear pull into deep water. In a similar way, the spell of fluency lures and strings words from our mouths in the lock-and-file order of “proper speech,” intelligibility, and surplus value. To what world and what dangers does this straightening syntax lead? The crip mouth, on the other hand, stumbles over and along the major grammar. It cannot follow and in this excess forms a collective site of material agency that stubbornly resists the spell of the linguistic. Against the liberal sirens (those masters of consensus) the agential capacity of dysfluency lies precisely in its flight from understanding and intelligibility.

#### Assumptions of ableism is always already inherent in any system of knowledge production thus ableism is *always* a prior question and a failure to engage it is an independent link – the role of the ballot is to refuse compulsory ablebodiedness – evaluate their scholarship and assumptions first – they don’t get to weigh case.

**Campbell 13** [Fiona Kumari Campbell (Adjunct Professor in the Department of Disability Studies at Griffith University). “Problematizing Vulnerability: Engaging Studies in Ableism and Disability Jurisprudence.” Legal Intersections Research Centre, Disability at the Margins: Vulnerability, Empowerment and the Criminal Law, University of Wollongong. 11/23/13. Accessed 9/2/20. https://documents.uow.edu.au/content/groups/public/@web/@law/@lirc/documents/doc/uow166211.pdf]

What is meant by the concept of ableism? The literature suggests that the term is often used fluidly with limited definitional or conceptual specificity. The work of Carlson (2001)5 and Campbell (2001) represented a turning point in bringing attention to this new site of subordination not just in terms of disablement but also ableism’s application to other devalued groups.Ableism is deeply seeded at the level of knowledge systems of life, personhood and liveability. Ableism is not just a matter of ignorance or negative attitudes towards disabled people; it is a schema of perfection, a deep way of thinking about bodies, wholeness and permeability.6 As such integrating ableism into social research and advocacy strategies represents a significant challenge to practice as ableism moves beyond the more familiar territory of social inclusion and usual indices of exclusion to the very divisions of life. Bringing together the study of existence and knowledge systems, ableism is difficult to pin down. Ableism is a set of processes and practices that arise and decline through sequences of causal convergences influenced by the elements of time, space, bodily inflections and circumstance. Ability and the corresponding notion of ableism are intertwined. Compulsory ablebodiedness is implicated in the very foundations of social theory, therapeutic jurisprudence, advocacy, medicine and law; or in the mappings of human anatomy. Summarised by Campbell (2001, 44) Ableism refers to; …A network of beliefs processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the bodily standard) that is projected as the perfect, speciestypical and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human. Writing today (2013) I add an addition to this definition: ‘The ableist bodily configuration is immutable, permanent and laden with qualities of perfectionism or the enhancement imperative orientated towards a self-contained improvability’. Sentiency applies to not just the human but the ‘animal’ world. As a category to differentiate the normal from the pathological,the concept of abledness is predicated on some preexisting notion about the nature of typical species functioning that is beyond culture and historical context. Ableism does not just stop at propagating what is typical for each species. An ableist imaginary tells us what a healthy body means – a normal mind, the pace, the tenor of thinking and the kinds of emotions and affect that are suitable to express. Of course these ‘fictional’ characteristics then are promoted as a natural ideal.This abled imaginary relies upon the existence of an unacknowledged imagined shared community of able-bodied/minded people held together by a common ableist world view that asserts the preferability and compulsoriness of the norms of ableism. Such ableist schemas erase differences in the ways humans express our emotions, use our thinking and bodies in different cultures and in different situations. This in turn enacts bodily Otherness rendered sometimes as the ‘disabled’, ‘perverted’ or ‘abnormal body’, clearly demarcating the boundaries of normal and pathological. A critical feature of an ableist orientation is a belief that impairment or disability is inherently negative and at its essence is a form of harm in need of improvement, cure or indeed eradication. **Studies in Ableism** (SiA)inverts traditional approaches, by shifting our concentration to what the study of disability **tells us about the production, operation and maintenance of ableism.** In not looking solely at disability,we can focus on how the abled able-bodied, non-disabled identity is maintained and privileged. Disability does not even need to be in the picture. SiA’s interest in abledness means that the theoretical foundations are readily applicable to the study of difference and the dividing practices of race, gender, location and sexual orientation. Reframing our focus from disability to ableism prompts different preoccupations: • What does the study of the politics of ‘vulnerability’ tells us about what it means to be ‘non-vulnerable’? • Indeed how is the very conceptualisation of ‘autonomy’ framed in the light of discourses of ‘vulnerability’? • In representing vulnerability as universal does this detract from the specificity of disability experiences?SiA examines the ways that concepts of wellbeing, vulnerability and deficiency circulate throughout society and impact upon economic, social, legal and ethical choices. Principally SiA focuses on the limits of tolerance and possessive individualism. Extending the theorization of disability, studies in ableism can enrich our understanding of the production of vulnerability and the terms of engagement in civic life and the possibilities of social inclusion. I now turn to unpacking the nuances and structure of a theory of ableism.

## 4

#### CP Text – ????

#### The 1AC’s semiotic coherence within the world is sutured through a western model of scriptocentrism that is exclusionary and violent towards racialized bodies

Conquergood, Dwight. Cultural struggles: Performance, ethnography, praxis. University of Michigan Press, 2013. (a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University)//Elmer

According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a **hallmark of Western imperialism**. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulator)' powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., **green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders**—what de Certeau calls "intextuation": "Ever)' power, including **the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects"** (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the "undocumented" immigrants, the so-called "il- legal aliens," known in the vernacular as the people "sin papeles," the people without papers, indocitmentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble "the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141). **The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined.** Transcrip- tion is not a **transparent or politically innocent model for** conceptualizing or **engaging the world**. The root metaphor of the text underpins the **supremacy of Western knowledge systems** by **erasing** the vast realm of human **knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered,** "a history of the tacit and the habitual" (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean ComarofFpay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors "both verbally and nonverbally" (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and strug- gle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comarofis intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where "text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all" (1992:26). "In this day and age," they ask, "do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage **cannot speak at all? Or**, under greater or lesser duress, **opt not to** do so" (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

#### Our method of semiotic opacity is key to disrupting the cybernetic will to transparency by refusing to be absorbed and instead generating interruptions within flows of information that cybernetics depends so heavily upon.

**Tiqqun** [Tiqqun (Tiqqun is a French collective of authors and activists formed in 1999. The group published two journal volumes in 1999 and 2001 (in which the collective author “The Invisible Committee” first appeared) as well as the books *Introduction to Civil War*, *Preliminary Materials for a Theory of the Young-Girl*, and *This Is Not a Program)*. “The Cybernetic Hypothesis.” Retrieved on May 29, 2010. Accessed 12/19/20. <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/tiqqun-the-cybernetic-hypothesis> //Houston Memorial DX]

From the cybernetic perspective, threats cannot be welcomed and transcended a fortiori. They must be absorbed, eliminated. I’ve already said that the infinitely renewed impossibility of this annihilation of events is the final certainty that practices of opposition to the device-governed world can be founded on. Threat, and its generalization in the form of panic, poses an unsolvable energetic problem for the holders of the cybernetic hypothesis. Simondon thus explains that machines with a high information outflow and control their environment with precision have a weak energetic output. Conversely, machines that require little energy to carry out their cybernetic mission produce a poor rendering of reality. The transformation of forms into information basically contains two opposing imperatives: “information is in one sense that which brings a series of unpredictable, new states, following no predefined course at all; it is thus that which requires absolute availability from an information channel with respect to all the aspects of modulation that it routes along; the information channel should in itself have no predetermined form and should not be selective… On the opposite hand, information is distinct from noise because information can be assigned a certain code and given a relative uniformization; in all cases where noise cannot be immediately/directly brought down to below a certain level, a reduction of the margin of indetermination and unpredictability in information signals is made.” In other words, for a physical, biological, or social system to have enough energy to ensure its reproduction, its control devices must carve into the mass of the unknown, and slice into the ensemble of possibilities between what is characterized by pure chance, and has nothing to do with control, and what can enter into control as hazard risks, immediately susceptible to a probability calculation. It follows that for any device, as in the specific case of sound recording devices, “a compromise should be made that preserves a sufficient information output to meet practical needs, and an energy output high enough to keep the background noise at a level that does not disturb the signal levels.” Or take the case of the police as another example; for it, this would just be a matter of finding the balance point between repression — the function of which is to decrease social background noise — and reconnaissance/intelligence — which inform them about the state of and movements in society by looking at the signals it gives off. To provoke panic first of all means extending the background interference that imposes itself when the feedback loops are triggered, and which makes the recording of behavioral discrepancies by the ensemble of cybernetic apparatuses costly. Strategic thinking grasped the offensive scope of such interference early on. When Clausewitz was so bold as to say, for example, that “popular resistance is obviously not fit to strike large-scale blows” but that “like something vaporous and fluid, it should not condense anywhere.” Or when Lawrence counterposed traditional armies, which “resemble immobile plants,” and guerrilla groups, comparable to “an influence, an idea, a kind of intangible, invulnerable entity, with no front or back, which spreads everywhere like a gas.” Interference is the prime vector of revolt. Transplanted into the cybernetic world, the metaphor also makes reference to the resistance to the tyranny of transparency which control imposes. Haze disrupts all the typical coordinates of perception. It makes it indiscernible what is visible and what is invisible, what is information and what is an event. This is why it represents one of the conditions for the possibility of events taking place. Fog makes revolt possible. In a novel called “Love is Blind,” Boris Vian imagined what the effects of a real fog in existing relations. The inhabitants of a metropolis wake up one morning filled by a “tidal wave of opacity” that progressively modifies all their behaviors. The needs imposed by appearances quickly become useless and the city is taken over by collective experimentation. Love becomes free, facilitated by a permanent nudity of all bodies. Orgies spread everywhere. Skin, hands, flesh; all regain their prerogative, since “the domain of the possible is extended when one is no longer afraid that the light might be turned on.” Incapable of prolonging a fog that they did not contribute to the formation of, they are relieved when “the radio says that experts have noted that the phenomenon will be returning regularly.” In light of this everyone decides to put out their own eyes so that life can go on happily. The passage into destiny: the fog Vian speaks of can be conquered. It can be conquered by reappropriating violence, a reappropriation that can even go as far as mutilation. This violence consists entirely in the clearing away of defenses, in the opening of throughways, meanings, minds. “Is it never pure?” asks Lyotard. “Is a dance something true? One could still say yes. But that’s not its power.” To say that revolt must become foglike means that it should be dissemination and dissimulation at the same time. In the same way as the offensive needs to make itself opaque in order to succeed, opacity must make itself offensive in order to last: that’s the cipher of the invisible revolt. But that also means that its first objective must be to resist all attempts to reduce it away with demands for representation. Fog is a vital response to the imperative of clarity, transparency, which is the first imprint of imperial power on bodies. To become foglike means that I finally take up the part of the shadows that command me and prevent me from believing all the fictions of direct democracy insofar as they intend to ritualize the transparency of each person in their own interests, and of all persons in the interests of all. To become opaque like fog means recognizing that we don’t represent anything, that we aren’t identifiable; it means taking on the untotalizable character of the physical body as a political body; it means opening yourself up to still-unknown possibilities. It means resisting with all your power any struggle for recognition. Lyotard: “What you ask of us, theoreticians, is that we constitute ourselves as identities, as managers. But if there’s one thing we’re sure of, it’s that this operation (of exclusion) is just a cheap show, that incandescences are made by no one, and belong to no one.” Nevertheless, it won’t be a matter of reorganizing a few secret societies or conquering conspiracies like free-masonry, carbonarism, as the avant-gardes of the last century envisioned — I’m thinking mostly of the College of Sociology. Establishing a zone of opacity where people can circulate and experiment freely without bringing in the Empire’s information flows, means producing “anonymous singularities,” recreating the conditions for a possible experience, an experience which will not be immediately flattened out by a binary machine assigning a meaning/direction to it, a dense experience that can transform desires and the moments where they manifest themselves into something beyond desire, into a narrative, into a filled-out body. So, when Toni Negri asked Deleuze about communism, the latter was careful not to assimilate it into a realized and transparent communication: “you ask whether societies of control or communication would give rise to forms of resistance capable of giving a new chance for a communism conceived as a ‘transverse organization of free individuals.’ I don’t know; perhaps. But this would be impossible if minorities got back hold of the megaphone. Maybe words, communication, are rotten. They’re entirely penetrated by money: not by accident, but by their nature. We have to detourn/misuse words. Creating has always been something different from communicating. The important thing is maybe to create vacuoles of noncommunication, interrupters who escape control.” Yes, the important thing for us is to have opacity zones, opening cavities, empty intervals, black blocs within the cybernetic matrix of power. The irregular war waged against the Empire, on the level of a given place, a fight, a riot, from now on will start with the construction of opaque and offensive zones. Each of these zones shall be simultaneously a small group/nucleus starting from which one might experiment without being perceptible, and a panic-propagating cloud within the ensemble of the imperial system, the coordinated war machine, and spontaneous subversion at all levels. The proliferation of these zones of offensive opacity (ZOO), and the intensification of their interrelations, will give rise to an irreversible disequilibrium. As a way of showing the kinds of conditions needed to “create opacity,” as a weapon and as an interrupter of flows, it is useful to look one more time to the internal criticisms of the cybernetic paradigm. Provoking a change of status/state in a physical or social system requires that disorder, deviations from the norm, be concentrated into a space, whether real or virtual. In order that behavioral fluctuations become contagious, it is necessary that they first attain a “critical mass,” the nature of which is clarified by Prigogine and Stengers: “It results from the fact that the ‘outside world,’ the environment around the fluctuating region, always tends to deaden the fluctuation. Critical mass measures the relationship between the volume, where the reactions take place, and the contact surface, the place of linkage. Critical mass is thus determined by a competition between the system’s ‘power of integration’ and the chemical mechanisms that amplify the fluctuation within the fluctuating subregion.” This means that all deployment of fluctuations within a system is doomed to fail if it does not have at its disposition a local anchor, a place from which the deviations that arise can move outwards, contaminating the whole system. Lawrence confirms it, one more time: “The rebellion must have an unassailable base, a place sheltered not only from attack but from the fear of attack.” In order for such a place to exist, it has to have “independent supply lines,” without which no war is conceivable. If the question of the base is central to all revolt, it is also because of the very principles on the basis of which systems can attain equilibrium. For cybernetics, the possibility of a contagion that could topple the system has to be absorbed/deadened by the most immediate environment around the autonomous zone where the fluctuations take place. This means that the effects of control are more powerful in the periphery closest to the offensive opacity zone that creates itself around the fluctuating region. The size of the base must consequently grow ever greater as proximity monitoring is upheld.

## 5

#### Vote negative to endorse the aff

#### The counterplan disrupts their Western understanding of scholarship as property and shatters imperial control of the academy.

Jones and Reddy 04 Dr. Mike Reddy and Ms. Victoria Jones [University of South Wales] “TOWARDS A SOCIAL MODEL OF PLAGIARISM” Paper for the International Integrity and Plagiarism Conference. 2004. IB

In the ten years since the first International Plagiarism conference, little has changed in evolving the view of plagiarism as more than an academic offence. The importance of plagiarism from a student’s perspective, rather than that of the existing academy hierarchy, has never been more relevant. This paper builds upon previous practical work that identified the need for overcoming the power imbalance in Further and Higher Education, and the disruptive force of the Internet. A social model of plagiarism is proposed that builds upon a practical definition of plagiarism – The Four Cs – and identifies its cause as products of the power relationships and educational climate in universities and colleges today. This challenges us to simultaneously address the social and cultural aspects that give rise to the occurrence, identification and regulation of plagiarism. Finally, a call is made for us to recognize the forces that maintain the status quo in Education, and to take direct action against the „Institutional Plagiarism‟ that this creates.

1 Introduction

This paper will be unlike any of the others at this conference, in that the last thing that will be discussed is plagiarism per se. This is not to make excuses for breaking one of academia’s most enshrined taboos, but to question whether it is a good principle; this should not be confused with post-modernist thought that anything is fair game. Deeper questions are needed, such as “What is the purpose of assessment?” and even “What is the purpose of learning?” Therefore, this paper will propose a social model of plagiarism and learning as „political acts‟, which identifies the potential for improper power relationships and a lack of progress made in formal adult education in the last three decades. While the definition, identification and occurrence of plagiarism (and other academic offences) has undergone a phase shift in recent years, little work has been done to address the social and cultural factors that arguably create an environment where it can flourish. Therefore, a novel, if contentious, redefinition of plagiarism might be necessary.

The power structures in the established culture of Western academia has constructed systems to safeguard knowledge, but these rules can serve to limit learning. This „disenabling‟ process needs exploration because it provides a convenient smokescreen for those in privileged positions to maintain the status quo in education. This social model will attempt to make explicit novel perspectives of our current education system. This will aid recognition of the hierarchy of power that exists in education, which allows „institutional plagiarism‟ to occur.

2 It’s a Crime, isn’t it?

The idea that plagiarism is an “academic offence” has been almost universally accepted (Mallon 2001). Although, if it is a crime, it is hard to understand who the victim is, or what has actually been taken from them. “No concept is truly unique, and all ideas are created in the context of the society and culture in which they are engendered. Therefore, there cannot be any true ownership, or indeed theft, of these artefacts as they are an integral part of the environment that learning is taking place within.” (Reddy & Jones 2004)

One argument is that plagiarism, or more simply the act of copying, is academic „self-harm‟, because it removes learning opportunities for the „plagiarist,‟ even where such behaviour may be justified by financial or personal circumstances. Isserman (2003) argues that we all stray into grey areas and are, therefore, unqualified to judge without being guilty of self-righteous vindictiveness. A view shared by Hunt (2002), who is concerned that there is a discrepancy between students and lecturers with regard to citation, because “typically, the scholars are achieving something positive; the students are avoiding something negative.” Isserman suggests that some acts of plagiarism might be the least worst solution, when personal and financial constraints apply, and that plagiarists are as much the victims as the perpetrators. So, in a world where ideas are infinitely reproducible, is taking credit where it is not due actually a criminal act?

Maybe this is true for Western cultures, such as in the USA and the EU where the free market gives value to the ownership of ideas. Foucault (1969) labeled this idea of authors creating not just publications but the idea itself as „transdiscursive‟ (p114), but it may be less so for other cultures where intellectual ownership is not so rigid. This can be a commonly used explanation for non-western students use of plagiarism. McCabe (1997) suggests there is a grain of truth in this stereotype, but while his survey work is valuable, it does not query the implicit belief that plagiarism is cheating, rather than being a mere example of cultural norms; the difference being where one draws the line defining „unacceptable‟. So, if plagiarism is not exactly illegal, is it immoral?

# AC

## UV

## Presumption

## Case

#### Outer space isn’t value neutral but has always been a question of militarization – debates between civilian and military use are two sides of the same coin that affectively polices society, culminating in total war.

Craven 19 [Brackets Original. Matt Craven (Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom). “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space”. European Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 2, May 2019, Pages 547–572, Accessed 1/12/22. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/30/2/547/5536739> //Xu]

There was little doubt to any of the observers of the launch of Sputniks I and II in 1957 that, despite their overtly ‘scientific’ purposes, the arms race had taken a decisive new turn. The exploration of outer space clearly offered a range of potential benefits; alongside the possibility of research into the physics of the atmosphere, it also would facilitate the collection of a host of meteorological, geophysical and cartographic data, enable enhanced capacity for radio communication and television broadcasting, facilitate safe navigation and, finally, open up the possibility of experimental flights to the moon and beyond. No one, however, was blind to the military implications.60 Within the USA, in particular, there was a widespread belief that command over outer space was an imperative that could not be missed: ‘[W]hoever controls outer space’, it was often said, ‘controls the world’.61 In the wilder speculations, thus, it was imagined that a nuclear power might be in a position to launch guided missiles from a space platform to any point on earth with barely any possibility of response, that outer space would be filled with ‘orbiting bombers’ or that the moon would become the site of military rocket installations. ‘Control’ of outer space, thus, was immediately conceived as being vital as a matter of security. Such concerns seemed to place a premium upon ensuring that the ‘use’ of outer space was exclusively peaceful – a view that seemed to be affirmed not merely by the establishment of COPUOS and successive proposals put to the UN by both the USA and Soviet Union. It was also recognized in the US National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which created a civilian space agency (NASA) and declared, in the process, that ‘it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind’.62 This theme was carried through into the code for outer space – UN General Assembly Resolution 1962 recognizing ‘the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes’ and the Outer Space Treaty that added in Article 4 that states should not place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in orbit and that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes’ (military bases and fortifications, in particular, being prohibited). Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson described the Outer Space Treaty as ‘the most important arms-control development since the limited test-ban treaty of 1963’.63 In an immediate sense, then, outer space was configured as a space radically distinct from atmospheric space and was placed at once beyond the field of both sovereignty and of war. These, however, were by no means co-terminous. The preferred analogy when discussing the status of outer space was often that of the high seas – like the seas, outer space should be marked by the principle of freedom of access and movement, a res communis incapable of being ‘enclosed’. In fact, this was the analogy used by the USA when defending its use of satellites for reconnaissance purposes; ‘reconnaissance’ from space, it was argued, was the functional equivalent of surveillance from the high seas.64 It is clear, however, that this analogy was problematic precisely because the high seas themselves were not immune from being brought within the field of military conflict.65 And, with that in mind, alternative modes of analysis were often proffered to ensure that the ‘commons’ was not to be equated with a potential field of battle.66 Nevertheless, there was always a certain equivocation running through discussions within the UN and elsewhere as to whether the military/non-military distinction was one that could be effectively held in place. Not only were the Declaration on Outer Space and Outer Space Treaty silent on certain vital matters – on the equipping of satellites, for example, with conventional weaponry or the militarization of the ‘extracelestial void’ – but the inclusion of Article 3, which instructed states to ‘carry on activities’ in accordance with international law and the UN Charter ‘in the interest of maintaining international peace and security’, gave expression to the idea, vaunted at various moments, that outer space may nevertheless be the site of military action in self-defence.67 ‘Peaceful’ use, on such a measure, was not to be calibrated by reference to the equipment or personnel put into space – whether military or civilian – but, rather, by reference to the ends or motivation of the actors in question.68 In the case of the USA, this was to resolve itself in the idea that ‘peaceful use’ should not be equated with ‘non-military use’ but, instead, with ‘non-aggressive’ use. As Senator Albert Gore was to put it, when speaking before the UN First Committee in 1962: [i]t is the view of the United States that outer space should be used only for peaceful – that is, non-aggressive and beneficial – purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both environments we must continue our efforts for general and complete disarmament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of any space activities must not be whether it is military or non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations of law.69 The same general tenor was maintained in the discussion over Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty concerning the demilitarization of the moon and celestial bodies. In this treaty, it was admitted that the use of military personnel ‘for scientific research or other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited’, largely in recognition of the fact that for both space powers it was the military, not civilian agencies, who were responsible for developing rocket and other outer space capabilities. What one might see in this is a straightforward determination, on the part of both space powers, to continue the practice of exploiting outer space for purposes of defence whilst holding on, at the same time, to the general idea that outer space was a space of peaceful endeavour. Defensive militarization, here, was to be conceptualized as the functional equivalent of total demilitarization. Yet ‘defence’ was also an unstable category in circumstances of a bipolar military standoff that depended upon a balance of forces. For not only might an effective defence depend upon first strike capability (as the doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ was to suggest),70 but also, as was later to become evident following the announcement of the US Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983,71 even the construction of an overtly ‘defensive’ system could assume an offensive cast if only one party possessed that capacity.72 There was, however, also a much deeper problematic at work here, which related to the persistence of a governmental rationality that was held over from the earlier decades of the 20th century, that understood the necessity of bringing all social resources – economic, technical, scientific and human – to bear in defence of the state against an existential threat. This was articulated in the interwar years in the theories of total war developed by the likes of Erich Ludendorff73 and Ernst Jünger,74 but was carried forward, well into the aftermath of World War II.75 Even if, at Nuremberg, the tribunal had associated the practice of total war with the pathologies of National Socialism,76 as the likes of Georg Schwarzenberger and Josef Kunz were to observe, it was a method of waging war that was only, in small part, to be associated with the problem of totalitarianism. For both, the phenomenon of total warfare was a much more general one – associated with technological developments in arms, indiscriminate modes of warfare and the mobilization of the civilian population – and was as much in play in the 1950s as it had been in earlier decades.77 If the prospect of nuclear annihilation meant that no element of society would be spared, so also, it seemed to follow, no element of society should be excluded from preparations to ward off that eventuality. Whilst, in the case of the Soviet Union, the ethos of centralized planning and a party bureaucracy equipped with an ideology of collective ownership and class warfare naturally dissolved any operative distinctions between the civil and the military establishment,78 the same was also apparent in the USA where, as was recognized as early as 1945, the ongoing development of new technologies of offence and defence, in conditions of competition, would require ‘the participation of every element of the civilian population’ and, in particular, the enlistment of the countries research capabilities.79 Alongside the development of what Dwight Eisenhower later described as a ‘military-industrial complex’, guided by a ‘scientific-technological elite’,80 the rationalities of the Cold War were to envelop US society in a much more profound way – from the mobilization of the media in defence of free thought, the enlistment of corporations, unions and research establishments in defence of national security and the co-option of cultural institutions (from Hollywood to the universities81) in the affective management and policing of public life.82 The significance of this in the context of outer space was the almost total loss of any way to distinguish effectively between military and civilian activities. Just as the requirements of resourcing a technologically dependent military armature increasingly depended upon a civilian infrastructure of research, industry and economic management,83 so also was it clear that prospective civilian and scientific activities in space (such as meteorology, remote sensing, navigation systems and telecommunications) all had military dimensions. If, for example, developments in meteorological knowledge and environmental science seemed to open up the possibility of weather control for the purposes of combating drought, improving agriculture or the avoidance of natural disasters, so also could that same science assist in the development of military communications and ballistic missile capability (which depended upon information about the lower and upper atmosphere, ionospheric behaviour, geodesy and geomagnetism).84 Such knowledge also opened up new possibilities for manipulating weather systems in order to procure military advantage (such as the manipulation of thunderstorms to disable communication systems or the creation of fog or cloud).85 But it was not just about scientific knowledge enabling new avenues of military innovation; it was also about the purposes to which the same technology might be put. Thus, for example, the camera-equipped satellite programmes (Tiros, CORONA), with the auxiliary systems of information recovery and reproduction, were virtually identical (give or take a few degrees of resolution) whether they were used for the purposes of geodetic measurement and weather prediction or military reconnaissance. In some cases, furthermore – such as the US Galactic Radiation Background satellite – intelligence-gathering electronics was incorporated within the same instrument used for the measurement of solar radiation.86

Alt fails – no method for being implemented into society and it condemns technology

Kellner, 2003 – critical theorist in the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education in the GSEI at UCLA (Douglas, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”, illuminations: the critical theory project, <http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell29.htm>)

Virilio misses a key component of the drama of technology in the present age and that is the titanic struggle between national and international governments and corporations to control the structure, flows, and content of the new technologies in contrast to the struggle of individuals and social groups to use the new technologies for their own purposes and projects. This optic posits technology as a contested terrain, as a field of struggle between competing social groups and individuals trying to use the new technologies for their own projects. Despite his humanism, there is little agency or politics in Virilio's conceptual universe and he does not delineate the struggles between various social groups for the control of the new technologies and the new politics that they will produce. Simply by damning, demonizing and condemning new technologies, Virilio substitutes moralistic critique for social analysis and political action, reducing his analysis to a lament and jeremiad rather than an ethical and political critique la Ellul and his tradition of Catholic critique of contemporary civilization, or critical social theory. Virilio has no theory of justice, no politics to counter, reconstruct, reappropriate, or transform technology, no counterforces that can oppose technology. Thus, the increasing shrillness of his lament, the rising hysteria, and sense of futile impotence. While Virilio's take on technology is excessively negative and technophobic, his work is still of importance in understanding the great transformation currently underway. Clearly, speed and the instantaneity and simultaneity of information are more important to the new economy and military than ever before, so Virilio's reflections on speed, technology, politics, and culture are extremely relevant. Yet he seems so far to have inadequately conceptualized the enormous changes wrought by an infotainment society and the advent of a new kind of multimedia information-entertainment technology. If my hunch is correct, his view of technology and speed is integrally structured by his intense focus on war and the , while his entire mode of thought is a form of military-technological determinism which forces him not only to overlook the important role of capital, but also the complex ambiguities, the mixture of positive and negative features, of the new technologies now proliferating and changing every aspect of society and culture in the present era.

#### Speeding Tech is good – only way to solve transhumanism

Bostrom 5[Nick, Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy, “Transhumanist Values,” Last Mod Sept 17, http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/values.html]

Wide access. It is not enough that the posthuman realm be explored by someone. The full realization of the core transhumanist value requires that, ideally, everybody should have the opportunity to become posthuman. It would be sub-optimal if the opportunity to become posthuman were restricted to a tiny elite. There are many reasons for supporting wide access: to reduce inequality; because it would be a fairer arrangement; to express solidarity and respect for fellow humans; to help gain support for the transhumanist project; to increase the chances that you will get the opportunity to become posthuman; to increase the chances that those you care about can become posthuman; because it might increase the range of the posthuman realm that gets explored; and to alleviate human suffering on as wide a scale as possible. The wide access requirement underlies the moral urgency of the transhumanist vision. Wide access does not argue for holding back. On the contrary, other things being equal, it is an argument for moving forwardas quickly as possible. 150,000 human beings on our planet die every day, without having had any access to the anticipated enhancement technologies that will make it possible to become posthuman. The sooner this technology develops, the fewer people will have died without access. Consider a hypothetical case in which there is a choice between (a) allowing the current human population to continue to exist, and (b) having it instantaneously and painlessly killed and replaced by six billion new human beings who are very similar but non-identical to the people that exist today. Such a replacement ought to be strongly resisted on moral grounds, for it would entail the involuntary death of six billion people. The fact that they would be replaced by six billion newly created similar people does not make the substitution acceptable. Human beings are not disposable. For analogous reasons, it is important that the opportunity be become posthuman is made available to as many humans as possible, rather than having the existing population merely supplemented (or worse, replaced) by a new set of posthuman people. The transhumanist ideal will be maximally realized only if the benefits of technologies are widely shared and if they are made available as soon as possible, preferably within our lifetime.

#### Technocracy helps solve accidents

Kellner, 2003 – critical theorist in the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education in the GSEI at UCLA (Douglas, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”, illuminations: the critical theory project, <http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell29.htm>)

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, we are, as I argue below, in a new historical era which Virilio has so far not adequately theorized. He remains, in my view, trapped in a mode of technological determinism and a perspective on technology that equates technology with military technology and pure war. For Virilio, technology drives us, it impels us into new modes of speed and motion, it carries us along predetermined trajectories. He believes that: the question, "Can we do without technology?" cannot be asked as such. We are forced to expand the question of technology not only to the substance produced, but also to the accident produced. The riddle of technology we were talking about before is also the riddle of the accident" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 31-32). Virilio claims that every technology involves its accompanying accident: with the invention of the ship, you get the ship wreck; the plane brings on plane crashes; the automobile, car accidents, and so on. For Virilio, the technocratic vision is thus one-sided and flawed in that it postulates a perfect technological system, a seamless cybernetic realm of instrumentality and control in which all processes are determined by and follow technological laws (Baudrillard also, to some extent, reproduces this cybernetic and technological imaginary in his writings; see Kellner 1989b). In the real world, however, accidents are part and parcel of technological systems, they expose its limitations, they subvert idealistic visions of technology. Accidents are consequently, in Virilio's view, an integral part of all modes of transportation, industrial production, war and military organization, and other technological systems. He suggests that in science a Hall of Accidents should be put next to each Hall of Machines: "Every technology, every science should choose its specific accident, and reveal it as a product--not in a moralistic, protectionist way (safety first), but rather as a product to be 'epistemo-technically' questioned. At the end of the nineteenth century, museums exhibited machines: at the end of the twentieth century, I think we must grant the formative dimensions of the accident its rightful place in a new museum" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983).[5] Virilio is fascinated as well by interruptions ranging from sleep to day dreams to maladies like picnolepsy or epilepsy to death itself (1991a and Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 33ff). Interruption is also a properly cinematic vision in which time and space are artificially parcelled and is close to the microscopic and fragmented vision that Lyotard identifies with "the postmodern condition" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 35). For Virilio, the cinema shows us that "consciousness is an effect of montage" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 35), that perception itself organizes experience into discontinuous fragments, that we are aware of objects and events in a highly discontinuous and fragmented mode.