# Speech 1NC Harvard RR Rd 5 vs Dulles 2-17 3PM

#### Prag cant solve construviksm –

#### 1] bindingness- even if procedures create truth, ppl are stil not obligated to use or belive it they don’t tell us what to do with that truth and means that your theory can’t guide action

#### 2] induction fails – proves pragmatic analysis fails

Black’s quotes Hume [Brackets Original. David Hume (Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, historian, economist, librarian and essayist). “The Paradox of Induction”. Black’s Academy. No Date. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://www.blacksacademy.net/pages/px-015-pxqekj-paradox-induction.php> //Xu]

The paradox of induction is the problem that in all scientific reasoning we form conclusions, called laws, that are of a general nature; however, the evidence we have for those laws is based upon particular experiences. For example, we form the conclusion that all rays of light will be bend as the pass from air into glass, but we have only ever observed a finite number of instances of this law. On further reflection we see that there is no necessary connection between something happening on one occasion and the same thing happening in like circumstances on another occasion. We are not directly acquainted with the “power” behind events that ensures the uniformity of nature throughout space and time.

Another illustration of this might concern the uniformity of space. Imagine that a space mission is about to be sent to the nearest star, Alpha Centuri. People might be queuing up to volunteer to be the first people to witness life on a distant planet. On the other hand, there might be anxious reluctant passengers, desperate not to be dragged on the fool-hardy mission. Why? Because there is no guarantee that the laws of nature operate in the same way in outer space as they do in our solar system. It is entirely conceivable that once the space ship passes beyond the perimeter of our solar system, that entirely different laws of physics will apply, and the space ship could be destroyed by chaotic forces that cannot be anticipated. We have no way at present of being sure that universe is uniform. We have only sampled physical nature in our own limited portion of the universe. We might regard the fear of the passengers as outlandish, but it is not an irrational fear. Just because things have happened at one point of space and at a given time in a certain way is no guarantee that they always will happen that way.

#### 3] egoism

#### 4] empirically proven

#### 5] there’s no end point to determine when to stop deliberating which makes ends indeterminate since it needs to be in constant flux which makes ethics fail as a guide to action since obligaitons can shift in the future

#### 6] its infinitely regressive since you need a pragmatic method to determine the best pragmatic method which means theres no way to determine the best pragmatic method

#### 7] instead, they are simply categories of language created by us.

**Parrish 05**[Rick Parrish (Author of Violence Inevitable). "Derrida’s Economy of Violence in Hobbes’ Social Contract," John Hopkins University Press, Volume 7, Issue 4. 2005. Accessed 9/25/19. [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119/](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119//) Recut Houston Memorial DX]

Perhaps the single most telling quote from Hobbes on this point comes from *The Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society* (usually known by its Latin name, *De Cive*), in which he states that “to *know truth*, is the same thing as to *remember* that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words.”[24](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f24) “For Hobbes **truth is a function of** logic and **language, not** of the relation between language and some **extralinguistic reality,”**[25](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f25) so the “**connections between names and objects are not natural**.”[26](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f26) They are **artificially constructed** by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms “are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, **there being nothing** simply and absolutely so, nor any common **rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves**.”[27](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f27) Since “**there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil,**”[28](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f28) **these labels are placed upon** things **by humans** in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts. Elaborating on this, Hobbes writes that “the nature, disposition, and **interest of the speaker,** such as are the names of virtues and vices; **for one man call**eth **wisdom**, what **another call**eth **fear;** and one crueltywhat anotherjustice.**”****[29](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f29)** A more simplistic **understanding of** the **brutality of the state of nature,** which David Gauthier calls the “simple rationality account,”[30](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f30) **has it that** mere **materialistic competition for goods** **is the cause of the war of all against all,** **but such rivalry** **is a secondary** manifestation **of the more fundamental competition among all persons** **to be the dominant creator of meaning**. Certainly, Hobbes writes that **persons** most frequently “**desire to hurt each other**” **because** “**many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing**; which yet **very often** they **can neither enjoy in common**, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword.”[31](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f31) But this **competition for goods only arises as the result of the more primary struggle that is inherent in the nature of persons of meaning creators.** In the state of nature, “where every man is his own *judge*,”[32](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f32) **persons will** “mete good and evil by diverse measures,”[33](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f33) **creating labels for things as they see fit**, based on individual appetites.

#### Absent unification, constructivism collapses into the State of Nature –

#### 1] Ambiguity – individuals assert differing perspectives and culminates in irresolvable conflict absent a mediating force which renders truth and ethics indeterminate.

#### 2] Violence – individuals must act in self-preservation. Without a force to provide protection, each person acts violently to defend themselves, resulting in infinite uncontrolled violence.

#### To escape the state of nature, people unite to imbue a sovereign with absolute authority to define ethics and enforce them at will. The sovereign is the only binding ethical force – Absent the sovereign, ethics fail, since everyone has competing conceptions of the good.

**Parrish** [Rick Parrish (Author of Violence Inevitable). "Derrida’s Economy of Violence in Hobbes’ Social Contract," John Hopkins University Press, Volume 7, Issue 4. 2005. Accessed 9/25/19. [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119/](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119//) Houston Memorial DX]

All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the **sovereign’s** first and most **fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer**. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes’ theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace “is possible only if the **ambiguity and disagreement** that pervade general thinking and acting **are eliminated by** the stipulations of **a sovereign.**”[57](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f57) Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes’ mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that “one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the primary terms in which men try to conduct their social lives.”[58](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f58) “The whole *raison d’être* of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes,”[59](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f59) **without which** **humans would “fly off in all directions”****[60](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f60) and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition.** It is not surprising that so many noted students of Hobbes have reached this conclusion, given how prominently he himself makes this claim. According to Hobbes, “**in the state of nature,** where **every man is his own judge**, and differeth from others concerning the names and appellations of things, **and** from those **differences arise quarrels and breach of peace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things, that might fall in controversy.**”[61](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f61) The main categories of **the sovereign’s** tasks are “to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, [and] to know and judge of all controversies,”[62](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f62) but each of these duties is a subspecies of its **ultimate duty to be the sole and ultimate definer** in matters of public importance. **It is** only **through the sovereign**’s effective continued accomplishment of this duty **that the people of a commonwealth avoid the definitional problems that typify the state of nature…** Judging controversies, which Hobbes lists as the third main task of the sovereign, is the duty most obviously about being the ultimate definer. In fact, Hobbes declares it a law of nature that “**in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein**.”[63](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f63) As I repeatedly alluded to above, this **agreement to abide by the decision of a third party arbitrator, a sovereign** in the commonwealth, **is necessary because of the fundamentally perspectival and relative nature of persons’ imputations of meaning and value** into the situations they construct. Hobbes understands this problem, as evidenced by his claim that “**seeing right reason is not existent, the reason of some man or men must supply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power”****[64](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f64) to dictate meanings that will be followed by all.**

#### I negate and defend the squo –

#### 1] Partnerships exist between private entities and the sovereign.

Martinez 21 [Katherine Latimer Martinez (Seattle University School of Law). “Lost in Space: An Exploration of the Current Gaps in Space Law”. Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental & Innovation Law: Vol. 11 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. 5-7-2021. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=sjteil> //Xu]

No company is able to operate in a purely private capacity and without State partnerships because of a need for government funding and the government’s need for additional research due to decreases in funding and resources.138 Private companies fall into two categories: (1) those focused on commercial space travel and (2) those focused on mining and space resources.

#### 2 implications – a] proves the sovereign supports private space appropriation because it provides funds and resources b] as the only source of ethics and order, the sovereign willed the status quo where private entities appropriate outer space which means placing an obligation on the sovereign is illegitimate and fails inevitably c]

#### 2] Incorporation and appropriation by private entities contribute to the commonwealth.

Claassen summarizes in 21 [R.J.G. Claassen (Professor of Political Philosophy and Economic Ethics at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies of Utrecht University). “Hobbes Meets the Modern Business Corporation”. Polity. Volume 53, Number 1. January 2021. Accessed 1/24/2022. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/712231> //Xu]

Hobbes acknowledges that the trading companies in the monopolistic form they took in his day were problematic, but at the same time he accepts there can in principle exist an economic form of the corporation which would be in the legitimate interest of the commonwealth. This implies that the orientation to private gain can be compatible with the status of a political body, under the right (non-monopolistic) economic conditions. In contemporary terms, even commercially operating businesses contribute to the public purpose of the maximization of social wealth. This term is recognized to be the corporate purpose in the most prominent handbook of corporate law.87 Hobbes’s analysis at this point prefigures the debate in economic theory started by Mandeville and Adam Smith in the eighteenth century when they characterized the market sphere as one where “private interests” (Smith) or even “private vices” (Mandeville) could lead to “public benefits.” The underlying view is one where the market sphere is an organized competition commissioned by government to procure consumer goods at maximally competitive prices. Private parties are being used for such procurement, but this doesn’t make the market less of a public space. Just as Roman authorities organized a competition between gladiators because they considered such a competition a public good (“bread and games”) for the Roman people, so market competition is created to maximize the public good of social wealth. In this line of thought, the current laws granting freedom of incorporation do contain a public mandate, even though they do not state it explicitly: to maximize social wealth. This is consistent with the description of Alfred Chandler, who explains the emergence of large business corporations as a response to newly created possibilities for economies of scale in production88; or with the reconstruction of North, Wallis, and Weingast, who argue that freedom of incorporation was crucial to establish open-access economic orders.89 Historical interpretations such as these reconstruct a general public purpose (realizing economies of scale, or open access orders) as lying behind the general incorporation laws of the nineteenth century, which were still confined to particular lines of activity, hence specific public purposes. This general public purpose was then assumed to be present in any economic activity in this line and, in the twentieth century incorporation, in any legally allowed activity whatsoever.