# Speech 1NC Harvard Rd 4 vs Iowa 2-19 12AM

## 1

#### Interp: The affirmative debaters must tell the negative debater what changes are in the aff

#### Violation: screenshots

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

#### Standards

#### A~ Pre round prep- Hiding changes mean that pre round neg prep was skewed—4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update our answers to the aff

#### B~ academic integrity – disclosing changes is key to ensure that new evidence isn't miscut and we have an idea of what analytics will look like

## 2

#### Interp – Debaters must have recordings of their speeches and send them if requested

#### Violation – They didn't

#### Prefer

#### 1] Cheating – debaters can fake internet drop offs and then steal prep which decks reciprocity. O/Ws since it destroys competitive incentives and educational value since they are structurally ahead

#### 2] Accidents possible, external conditions like power going out, wifi dropping off, or excessive background noise make it impossible to hear in real time, recordings ensure that a speech isn’t given twice, which allows them to remodify and change their strat or incite judge intervention which is the worst violation of procedural fairness

#### 3] Key to check clipping cards and make cheaters lose with literal proof

## 3

#### **Interp – If debaters defend the categorical imperative, they must delineate which branch they endorse in explicit text in the 1AC**

#### Violation – they don’t

#### Three different formulations.

Massey No Date [David Massey (Indian Hills Community College). “Kantianism”. PHI 105: Introduction to Ethics. No Date. Accessed 8/2/21. <https://www.indianhills.edu/_myhills/courses/PHI105/documents/lu08_kantianism.pdf> //Xu]

The categorical imperative is the centerpiece of Kant’s ethical theory. The term categorical imperative, basically means “absolute command.” Kant is referring to, what he sees as, an exceptionless obligation to perform the action dictated by the categorical imperative. Perhaps the best way to understand the categorical imperative is to look at how Kant used it. It was his means for determining which action was the morally correct action in any given circumstance. According to Kant, there is only one categorical imperative, which he presents in three different formulations that we will explore in a moment. However, many ethicists believe that these three formulations are not the same but are really distinct from one another, and that they are all three needed to fully understand and apply Kant’s ethical theory. Categorical Imperative – Formulation #1: The Principle of the Law of Nature The first formulation of the categorical imperative is called the principle of the law of nature. It’s also known as the law of universalizability, because it argues that if an action is morally right, then it must apply consistently to everyone. We should act as if our actions will become a universal law of nature. In other words, if anyone else were to be in similar circumstances to ours, they would be required to act in exactly the same manner. For example, a Kantian borrows money from another person and promises to pay that money back. When deciding whether to keep his promise, the Kantian must consider whether his action could be universalized. His thinking might go something like this, “I could lie and break my promise. However, what would happen if everyone who borrows money, promising to repay it, later decides to lie and break their promise? Very quickly, promises would come to mean nothing. People wouldn’t trust one another, and would not be willing to loan money to each other. This would clearly not be good for society. Therefore, it is morally wrong to lie.” A critic could argue that Kant is actually expressing some form of consequentialism, because in order to determine whether an action should be universalized, he resorts to considering what the results of that action would be in such circumstances. Another thing to keep in mind is that the action is only being universalized for those in similar circumstances. The level of specificity applied to the universal law (or “maxim,” as Kant calls it) is determined by the individual. For example, the universal law or maxim, based on the above scenario, might say, “Everyone who borrows money, promising to repay it, should lie and break their promise to repay.” However, what if the individual and his family were homeless and starving, with no means to repay the loan. Then, the maxim might be adjusted to say, “Everyone who borrows money, promising to repay it, who later is unable to repay the money due to severe impoverishment, should lie and break their promise to repay.” Whether one agrees with this statement or not, it clearly places a limitation on the first form of the maxim by making it more specific. Only under specific circumstances is it morally acceptable to act in a certain manner. This can make it easier to universalize. Kant puts it this way: “Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature.” Categorical Imperative – Formulation #2: The Principle of Ends The second formulation of the categorical imperative, called the principle of ends, states: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end and never as merely a means.” In short, it’s saying that we should always treat human beings, including ourselves, as if they are an end in and of themselves, and never only as means to an end. In other words, we should respect and value others, and not simply use or manipulate them to accomplish our own purposes. This formulation arises from Kant’s view that, due to their rational nature – or ability to reason – human beings have immense intrinsic value. People do not simply have instrumental value, but are valuable in and of themselves. As such, they are to be respected and not merely used. The word “merely” is important in understanding what this means. For example, you are using your professors as a means to gain knowledge, skills, and perhaps a degree. You’re using your professors for your own ends or purposes. Does that make what you are doing morally wrong? No, because you aren’t merely (or only) using your professors. You are also valuing your professors and treating them as ends in and of themselves, by paying tuition, which enables the college to pay your professors so that they can feed themselves and their families. Both parties benefit from the arrangement. On the other hand, if you deceive someone, manipulate them into giving you something, or otherwise use them without respect, then Kant would consider that to be morally wrong, as it violates the principle of ends. Categorical Imperative – Formulation #3: The Principle of Autonomy The third formulation of the categorical imperative is the principle of autonomy, which says we are not dependent upon others to tell us what is right and wrong, but that we are free and able to discover this for ourselves through the use of reason. We won’t spend as much time on this one, since it doesn’t as clearly assist us in the process of determining what is morally right or wrong. However, it’s important to note that, for Kant, the responsibility for discovering and performing the morally right action rests firmly with each individual. We are to use our ability to reason to help us apply the categorical imperative to moral questions, and make our own decisions, rather than relying on someone else to tell us what to do. For Kant, the excuse “I was only following orders,” does not excuse anyone from doing something morally wrong. Kant puts it this way: “So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxims.”

#### Violation: They don’t

#### Standards

#### 1] Shiftiness-They can shift out of my turns based on whatever theory of the good they operate under due to the nature of a vague standard. Especially true because the warrants for their standard could justify different versions of Kantianism coming first and I wouldn’t know until the 1ar which gives them access to multiple contingent standards. CX can’t resolve this impact and is independently bad because A] Not flowed B] skews 6 min of prep during the aff C] They can proactively lie and there’s no way to check D] debaters can be intentionally shady.

#### 2] Real World- Philosophers need to be as specific as possible when delineating their theory since there are so many nuances and contextual applications of philosophy that require us to understand the core differences within the philosophy. That outweighs since debate has no pedagogical value without portable application.

#### This spec shell isn’t regressive- it literally determines what framework the affirmative defends and how to link offense back to it

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation and substantive engagement

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact and why schools fund debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### Neg theory is drop the debater – a) Prep skew – infinite prep means they frontline every shell enough to be efficient at DA and skew substance enough b) 1AR Flex –you moot 6 min of my offense and restart on unpredictable layers while kicking the args.

#### No rvi

#### [a] Baiting—they’ll bait the theory debate and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse since they’ll get away with unacceptable practices

#### [b] 1AR all-outs—they’ll collapse entirely to theory which crowds out substance and kills education.

#### [c] Chilling effect—people will be scared to read theory since they can lose off of it, so no one will check abuse.

#### [d] Norm-setting—I shouldn’t be forced to keep advocating for a bad norm if I realize it’s bad in the middle of the round.

#### [e] Flex—RVIs make theory uncondo so I always have to go for that route to the ballot, but both debaters should get multiple relevant layers and collapse options.

#### [f] Illogical—doesn’t make sense to win just for being fair.

#### 1NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea since the shell was read earlier. Norming

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

## 4

The logistical project necessitates a para-ontological relationship with blackness – creations of unity drive the myth of transcendental control over space-time that renders politics and civil society damning.

Moten 13 [Brackets original. Fred Moten (Professor of Performance Studies at New York University). “Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh): Just Friends”. The South Atlantic Quarterly 112:4, Fall 2013. Accessed 1/2/22. <http://raumstation.cc/content/archiv/poetiken_der_existenz/Moten-blackness-and-nothingness-mysticism-in-the-flesh.pdf> //Recut Xu]

Within this framework blackness and antiblackness remain in brutally antisocial structural support of one another like the stanchions of an absent bridge of lost desire over which flows the commerce and under which flows the current, the logistics and energy of exclusion and incorporation, that characterizes the political world. Though it might seem paradoxical, the bridge between blackness and antiblackness is “the unbridgeable gap between Black being and Human life” (Wilderson 2010: 57). What remains is the necessity of an attempt to index black existence by way of what Chandler (2007: 41) would call paraontological, rather than politico-ontological, means. The relative nothingness of black life, which shows up for political ontology as a relation of nonrelation or counterrelation precisely in the impossibility of political intersubjectivity, can be said both to obscure and to indicate the social animation of the bridge’s underside, where the im/possibilities of political intersubjectivity are exhausted. Political ontology backs away from the experimental declivity that Fanon and Du Bois were at least able to blaze, each in his own way forging a sociological path that would move against the limiting force, held in the ontological traces, of positivism, on the one hand, and phenomenology, on the other, as each would serve as the foundation of a theory of relations posing the nothingness of blackness in its (negative) relation to the substance of subjectivity-as-nonblackness (enacted in antiblackness). On the one hand, blackness and ontology are unavailable for one another; on the other hand, blackness must free itself from ontological expectation, must refuse subjection to ontology’s sanction against the very idea of black subjectivity. This imperative is not something up ahead, to which blackness aspires; it is the labor, which must not be mistaken for Sisyphean, that blackness serially commits. The paraontological distinction between blackness and blacks allows us no longer to be enthralled by the notion that blackness is a property that belongs to blacks (thereby placing certain formulations regarding non/relationality and non/communicability on a different footing and under a certain pressure) but also because ultimately it allows us to detach blackness from the question of (the meaning of) being. The infinitesimal difference between pessimism and optimism lies not in the belief or disbelief in descriptions of power relations or emancipatory projects; the difference is given in the space between an assertion of the relative nothingness of blackness and black people in the face, literally, of substantive (antiblack) subjectivity and an inhabitation of appositionality, its internal social relations, which remain unstructured by the protocols of subjectivity insofar as mu—which has been variously translated from the Japanese translation of the Chinese wu as no, not, nought, nonbeing, emptiness, nothingness, nothing, no thing but which also bears the semantic trace of dance, therefore of measure given in walking/falling, that sustenance of asymmetry, difference’s appositional mobility—also signifies an absolute nothingness whose antirelative and antithetical philosophical content is approached by way of Nishida Kitaro¯’s enactment of the affinities between structures and affects of mysticism that undergird and trouble metaphysics in the “East” and the “West.” Indeed, the content that is approached is approach, itself, and for the absolute beginner, who is at once pilgrim and penitent, mu signals that which is most emphatically and lyrically marked in Édouard Glissant’s phrase “consent not to be a single being” and indicated in Wilderson’s and Mackey’s gestures toward “fantasy in the hold,” the radical unsettlement that is where and what we are. Unsettlement is the displacement of sovereignty by initiation, so that what’s at stake—here, in displacement—is a certain black incapacity to desire sovereignty and ontological relationality whether they are recast in the terms and forms of a Lévinasian ethics or an Arendtian politics, a Fanonian resistance or a Pattersonian test of honor. Unenabled by or in this incapacity, Nishida’s philosophy folds sovereignty in the delay that has always given it significance, putting it on hold, but not in the hold, where to be on hold is to have been committed to a kind of staging, a gathering of and for the self in which negation is supposed to foster true emergence in “a self-determination of that concrete place of the contradictory identity of objectivity and subjectivity” (Nishida 1987: 96). What I term, here, a delay is understood by Nishida as “the moment [that] can be said to be eternal . . . [wherein] consciously active individuals, encounter the absolute as its inverse polarity, its mirror opposite, at each and every step of our lives” (96). It is in echoing a traditional Buddhist teaching, which asserts the nonself even against what are considered foolish declarations of the nonexistence of self, that Nishida restages a standard ontotheological skit in which sovereignty—whether in the form of the consciously active indi- vidual or in that individual’s abstract and equivalent dispersion in the nation, “the mirror image of the Pure Land in this world” (123)—takes and holds the space-time, the paradoxically transcendental ground, of the everyday unreality of “the real world,” where the sovereign’s endless show carries a brutally material imposition. What remains to be seen is what (the thinking and the study of) blackness can bring to bear on the relation between the un/real world and its other(s). What if blackness is the refusal to defer to, given in the withdrawal from the eternal delay of, sovereignty? What if Nishida’s preparatory vestibule for a general and infinite self-determination is pierced, rather than structurally supported, by (the very intimation of) the no-place to which it is opposed in his own work? When Nishida argues that “the human, consciously active volitional world makes its appearance from the standpoint of the paradoxical logic of the Prajnaparamita Sutra literature,” which offers us the phrase “Having No Place wherein it abides, this Mind arises,” he means to assert the legitimacy of an idea or image of the whole that takes “the form of the contradictory identity of the consciously active self and the world, of the volitional individual and the absolute” (95–96). What if (the thinking and the study of) blackness is an inhabitation of the hold that disrupts the whole in which the absolute, or absolute nothingness, is structured by its relation to its relative other? What if the nothing that is in question here moves through to the other side of negation, in “the real presence” of blackness, in and as another idea of nothingness altogether that is given in and as and to things? Both against the grain and by way of Fanon’s negation of the condition of relative nothingness, which is instantiated in what he takes to be the white man’s manufacture of the black, black study is attunement of and toward blackness as the place where something akin to the absolute nothingness that Nishida elaborates and a radical immanence of things that is not disavowed so much as it is unimagined in that same elaboration converge. This is to say that what remains unimagined by Nishida—not simply radical thingliness but its convergence with nothingness—is, nevertheless, made open to us by and in his thinking. Nishida helps prepare us to consider, even in the nationalist divigation of his own engagement with the heart of a teaching that has no center, that blackness is the place that has no place. “Having no place where it abides, this Mind [of the Little Negro Steelworker] arises.”1 Things are in, but they do not have, a world, a place, but it is precisely both the specificity of having neither world nor place and the generality of not having that we explore at the nexus of openness and confinement, internment and flight. Having no place wherein they abide, in the radically dispossessive no-place of the hold, in “Mutron,” Cherry and Blackwell touch intimacy from the walls. In that break, the architectonic intent of the hold as sovereign expression and recuperation breaks down. Feel the complete lysis of this morbid body/universe. Touch is not where subjectivity and objectivity come together in some kind of self-determining dialectical reality; beyond that, in the hold, in the basho (the place of nothingness, that underground, undercommon recess), is the social life of black things, which passeth (the) understanding. In the hold, blackness and imagination, in and as consent not to be a single being, are (more and less than) one. We are prepared for this generative incapacity by Wilderson’s work, where what distinguishes the sovereign, the settler, and even the savage from the slave is precisely that they share “a capacity for time and space coherence. At every scale—the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe—they can both practice cartography, and although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, their respective ‘mapness’ is never in question. This capacity for cartographic coherence is the thing itself, that which secures subjectivity for both the Settler and the ‘Savage’ and articulates them to one another in a network of connections, transfers and displacements” (Wilderson 2010: 181). Absent the “cartographic coherence [that] is the thing itself,” we must become interested in things, in a certain relationship between thingliness and nothingness and blackness that plays itself out—outside and against the grain of the very idea of self-determination—in the unmapped and unmappable immanence of undercommon sociality. This is fantasy in the hold, and Wilderson’s access to it is in the knowledge that he can have nothing and in the specific incapacity of a certain desire that this knowledge indexes. It remains for us to structure an accurate sense of what nothing is and what it constitutes in the exhaustion of home, intersubjectivity, and what Sexton calls “ontological reach” (Sexton 2011a). The truth of the formulation that the black cannot be among or in relation to his or her own is given in terminological failure. What’s at stake is how to improvise the declension from what is perceived as a failure to be together to the unmappable zone of paraontological consent. The promise of another world, or of the end of this one, is given in the general critique of world. In the meantime, what remains to be inhabited is nothing itself in its fullness, which is, in the absence of intersubjective relationality, high fantastical or, more precisely, given in the fugal, contrapuntal intrication that we can now call, by way of Mackey and Wilderson, fantasy in the hold, where the interplay of blackness and nothingness is given in an ongoing drama of force and entry. In a tradition of Buddhist teaching that goes back to the opening of The Gateless Gate, a thirteenth-century gathering of ko¯ans (case studies that take the form of stories, dialogues and/or questions meant to induce in the initiate dual intensities of doubt and concentration), that drama emerges as a deconstructive and deconstructed question, as exemplified in conventional presentations and interpretation of “Jo¯shu¯’s Dog.” The ko¯an reads: “A monk asked [Zen master] Jo¯shu¯ in all earnestness, ‘Does a dog have Buddha nature or not?’ Jo¯shu¯ said, ‘Mu!’” (Yamada 2004: 11). Even when we take into account Steven Heine’s warnings (Heine 2012) regarding the legitimacy of traditional attributions and interpretations of the Mu Ko¯an—which require us to consider both that it was not Jo¯shu¯ who responded to the question or that Jo¯shu¯’s response was the opposite of mu and that, therefore, the negative way that response is understood to open ought now to be closed—we are left with an ontotheological possibility that blackness may well exhaust. There is an appositional response, which this phantom query cannot properly be said to have called, that persists in and as an echoepistemology of passage, a sociotheology of the aneschaton, the instrumental interruption of telos by the universal (drum) machine, Blackwell’s prompt out to the study of the last things, the study carried out by the things that are last, by the least of these, whose movement constitutes a critique of the general and necessary relation between politics and death, a critique of the critique of judgment, a deconstruction of the opposition of heaven and hell. Cherry brings the noise of the end of the world in the invention of the earth. Though eschatology is understood to be a department, as it were, of theology, it has been both displaced by an administrative desire for the teleological and appropriated by a retributive desire for a kind of finality of and in sentencing, each in its commitment to sovereignty and the already existing structures that depend upon the very idea. But it’s not that I want to enclose things in the dialectical movement between beginning and end. Invention and passage denote an already existing alternative for which we are not constrained to wait. We are already down here on and under the ground, the water, as worked, unwrought nothingness working fleshly releasement in a privation of feasting, a fragility of healing. Mu is a practice of mysticism in the flesh; “Mutron,” the ritual Blackwell and Cherry perform, is their concentration meditation. It indexes the specific and material history of the drowned and burned, the shipped and held, as the condition for the release not just of the prevailing worldview but of the very idea of worldview, of transcendental standpoint and Pure Land. Cherry and Blackwell are initiates, who in turn initiate us, in what it is to abide in the social materiality of no place, of Having No Place, as a place for study. This shows up as a radical displacement of binary logic, moving through negation, because the way of the hold is no via negativa. Rather, the hold is distressed circuitry, an impedance or impediment of current, a placement of the self’s or the settler’s or the sovereign’s dyadic currency in kenotic abandon. “Mutron” is a way out of no way given in and as the exhaustion of what it is to abide, where the first and the last are neither first nor last. To remain in the hold is to remain in that set of practices of living together where antikinetic theorizing is both bracketed and mobilized by performative contemplation, as in the monastic sociality of Minton’s, where the hermetic absence of and from home is given in and as a playhouse, a funnyhouse, a madhouse. The club, our subcenobitic thing, our block chapel, is a hard row of constant improvisational contact, a dispossessive intimacy of rubbing, whose mystic rehearsal is against the rules or, more precisely, is apposed to rule, and is, therefore, a concrete social logic often (mis)understood as nothing but foolishness, which is, on the other hand, exactly and absolutely what it is. Foucault’s meditations point precisely in this direction: The ship of fools was heavily loaded with meaning, and clearly carried a great social force. . . . The madman on his crazy boat sets sail for the other world, and it is from the other world that he comes when he disembarks. This enforced navigation is both rigorous division and absolute Passage, serving to underline in real and imaginary terms the liminal situation of the mad in medieval society. It was a highly symbolic role, made clear by the mental geography involved, where the madman was confined at the gates of the cities. His exclusion was his confinement, and if he had no prison other than the threshold itself he was still detained at this place of passage. . . . A prisoner in the midst of the ultimate freedom, . . . he is the Passenger par excellence, the prisoner of the passage. It is not known where he will land, and when he lands, he knows not whence he came. His truth and his home are the barren wasteland between two lands that can never be his own. . . . The link between water and madness is deeply rooted in the dream of the Western man. (Foucault 2006: 10–11) Deleuze has seized on this dimension of Foucault’s thought to probe how for him “the inside [functions] as an operation of the outside.” Indeed, “in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside, as if the ship were a folding of the sea. . . . Thought has no other being than this madman himself. As Blanchot says of Foucault: ‘He encloses the outside, that is, constitutes it in an interiority of expectation or exception’” (Deleuze 1988: 81). Deleuze continues: Forces always come from the outside, from an outside that is farther away than any form of exteriority. So there are not only particular features taken up by the relations between forces, but particular features of resistance that are apt to modify and overturn these relations and to change the unstable diagram. . . . [This is] “where one can live and in fact where Life exists par excellence.” . . . [This is] life within the folds. This is the central chamber, which one need no longer fear is empty since one fills it with oneself. Here one becomes a master of one’s speed and, relatively speaking, a master of one’s molecules and particular features, in this zone of subjectivation: the boat as interior of the exterior. (Deleuze 1988: 100–101) Passage, which is to say this passage, which is to say the passage between these passages of Foucault and Deleuze, the passage between these and those of Wilderson and Mackey, is given in the hold that Cherry and Blackwell deconstructively reconstruct just so you’ll know that the music and its performance was never about transcendence unless transcendence is understood as immanence’s fugitive impurity. How would you recognize the antiphonal accompaniment to gratuitous violence—the sound that can be heard as if in response to that violence, the sound that must be heard as that to which such violence responds? Wilderson asks the question again so that it can be unasked; so that we can hear Cherry and Blackwell unask it in and as intimacy in dislocation. Unasking takes the form of a caesura, an arrhythmia of the iron system, that Blackwell presses into the interruptive, already interrupted New Orleans continuum of his roll whose distended rearticulation stretches out so you can go down in it enough to think about what it means somewhere you’re only supposed to be going through, to be contained in the atopic atemporality that propels you, as the immanence of the transcendental hallway of our endless preparation, our experimental trial, given as our ongoing study of how to speak, the terrible beauty of our imprisonment in the passage, our life in the folds. Blackwell asks a question that Cherry anticipates, but by which Cherry is driven and to which Cherry responds in the bent, appositional reflection that unasks it. This drama is revived in Wilderson’s questioning; the question is a seizure that moves us to unask it. That unasking is mu not because the question’s terms and assumptions are incorrect; not because the implied opposition of nothing and something—where nothingness is too simply understood to veil (as if it were some epidermal livery) (some higher) being and is therefore relative as opposed to absolute—doesn’t signify; but because nothing (this paraontological interplay of blackness and nothingness, this aesthetic sociality) remains to be explored; because we don’t know what we mean by it even when we recite or record its multiphonic swerve; because blackness is not a category for ontology or for phenomenological analysis. Wilderson’s question—“Would nothing ever be with nothing again”—precisely in its irreducible necessity, cannot be answered but can only be unasked in the lyricism of that ill logic that black monks incessantly, thelonially, perform, as difference without opposition, in “a black hole,” as Jay Wright says (Wright 2013: 56), “germ and terminal, expansive/in its nothingness.” What would it be for this drama to be understood in its own terms, from its own standpoint, on its own ground? This is not simply a question of perspective awaiting its unasking, since what we speak of is this radical being beside itself of blackness, its appositionality. The standpoint, the home territory, chez lui—Charles Lam Markmann’s insightful mistranslation of Fanon illuminates something that Richard Philcox obscures by way of correction, Among one’s own, signifies a relationality that displaces the already displaced impossibility of home and the modes of relationality that home is supposed to afford (Fanon 1967). Can this sharing of a life in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused and consent, this undercommon appositionality, be a place from which to know, a place out of which emerges neither self-consciousness nor knowledge of the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question? But not simply to be among one’s own; rather, also, to live among one’s own in dispossession, to live among the ones who cannot own, the ones who have nothing and who, in having nothing, have everything. To live, in other words, within the general commonness and openness of a life in Deleuze’s sense (hence the necessity of a philosophy of life; hence the necessity but also the rigor of a disbelief in social death, where social death is precisely understood as the imposition of the subject’s necessity rather than the refusal of the subject’s possibility, which, in any case, the imposition founds and enforces. At stake is the curve, the suppleness and subtlety, not only of contemplation on social life but of contemplative social life; at stake is the force of an extraphenomenological poetics of social life. And so we arrive, again and again, at a profound impulse in Fanon that—as Chandler indicates in his reading, which is the initial reading, of Du Bois—constitutes Du Bois’s horizon and which appears in the various forms of that question whose necessity is so fundamental that it must be unasked—the question of the meaning of (black) being, the question of the meaning of (black) things. We study in the sound of an unasked question. Our study is the sound of an unasked question. We study the sound of an unasked question. In the absence of the ame- nity (some pleasantness or pleasantry of welcome or material comfort), what is borne in the emptiness or nothingness of the amenity (of which love or soul is born, in exhaustion, as a society of friends), what are the other elements of mu? Chant and ko¯an and moan and Sprechgesang, and babble and gobbledygook, le petit nègre, the little nigger, pidgin, baby talk, bird talk, Bird’s talk, bard talk, bar talk, our locomotive bar walk and black chant, our pallet cries and shipped whispers, our black notes and black cant, the tenor’s irruptive habitation of the vehicle, the monastic preparation of a more than three-dimensional transcript, an imaginal manuscript we touch upon the walls and one another, so we can enter into the hold we’re in, where there is no way we were or are.

#### The Kantian telos of the self-determined agent is a project of degrading logistics.

Harney et al 18 [Bracketed for g-lang. Stephen Matthias HARNEY (Professor of Strategic Management at Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University), Mattia FRAPORTTI (Singapore Management University), and Niccolo CUPINI (researcher at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Southern Switzerland). “Logistics Genealogies: A dialogue with Stefano Harney”. Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. March 2018. Accessed 1/5/22. <https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7227&context=lkcsb_research> //Xu]

We could begin the next chapter of logistics with Kant. He says famously that we should treat [others] men as ends and not means. It’s true. It’s in all the business ethics textbooks! This would appear at fi­rst sight to run counter to the history of logistics, where people seem to be treated as means to an end. At fi­rst people and things seem to be mobilized as means to the end of profi­t through war and conquest, and then with the Atlantic slave trade and settler colonialism mobilization of people and things is for the end of pro­fit through racial capitalism. Logistics delivers humans, animals, energy, earthly materials to an end, to a point, the point of production. But this includes, crucially, the point of production of the settler, the pro duction of the entrepreneur, the banker, the slave trader, and the investor. These ­figures I mention are produced as ends. So it is not that Kant does not mean what he says, or that logistics is in con‑flict with what he wants. It is just that what he understands is this: that [agent] man is an end when [they are] he is this kind of ­figure, a ­figure who posits himself as self-made, self-suffi­cient, and self-determined. Kant may want this for everyone. But his very formulation, seeking this self-possessed man as an end, this man who has come out of the tutelage of someone else this kind of “man” requires the rise of logistics. Because the only way to create this kind of man as an end — or any kind since this man is Man — is to mobilize and deliver resources that allow for this false and indeed delusional claim of independence to appear plausible, at least to this man and men like him, such as Kant. These means are utilized for but one end: the production of profi­t and cispatriarchy that support and make possible this illusion of self-authored man who can declare himself an end. This end of man is, in other words, a degradation of means. Indeed, if I were asked to give a short definition of logistics, I would call it the general degradation of means. This is how Fred and I understand modern logistics. Other histories, other ways of living, might suggest to us that not being capable of being an end in oneself, indeed, of every fully being oneself, is in fact a way to disabuse this “oneself” delusion and place the incomplete self in the hands of others for use, for service, for love. Here means are enlarged, enriched, and entangled for each other. You may hear echoes of Agamben on use here, but let’s be cautious about that. We would have to do something for our comrade he will not do for himself, any more than Hegel would. We would have to bring him out of the ancient world of master and slave, because we are not talking here about countering logistics with a mutuality of means that allows all of us to reach a more balanced individuation, as in Agamben’s forgotten preclassical world. And more importantly, all that we have developed historically in the fugitivity of use — history and future in the present of logisticality and hapticality — all of this Agamben has chosen not to inherit by his willful disregard of the black radical tradition. We need only recall Fanon here on the difference of the colonial relationship of master and slave to see that the break or escape must be with recognition (of an end) itself, with both subject and object, and indeed, we should perhaps read Fanon as saying revolt and revolution are laboratories of a means without ends. In other words, when Fred and I speak about hapticality we are talking about a materialism beneath materialism, under materialism, an undercommon materialism, what our friend Denise Ferreira da Silva calls difference without separability. Our ability to be in the feel of each other is historical and magical, painful and beautiful. It emerges in its strongest form — from a thousand rivers — in the nautical event, the­ first horrible logistics dedicated to the ends of man/Man. An event that is the dispersion of event, its shoreless strand. It’s a way we inherit — or we can inherit — an experimental undermaterialism of sound, feel, taste, touch, including at a spooky distance. This is an undercommon materialism that, having been denied an end, already rejects that end for this spooky means. This includes what Cedric Robinson calls the capacity “to retrieve things that presumably no longer existed.” And if it has a theory — like Marx’s early theoretical senses — it is a theory that somehow, always, escapes. This hapticality is the fugitive call-and-response in the face of logistics, that degradation of means to produce [one] man as an end. The call-and-response and the ring shout are sonars of logisticality. It’s our endless revolution, and again as Robinson says, revolution is magic because it should be impossible.

#### The Kantian abstraction away from aesthetic blackness pathologizes racialized subjects and cannot ground ethics.

Lloyd 20 [Brackets original. David Lloyd (distinguished professor of English at the University of California, Riverside). The social life of black things: Fred Moten’s consent not to be a single being”. Radical Philosophy. Spring 2020. Accessed 1/5/22. <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/rp207_lloyd.pdf> //Xu]

To put things this way is to acknowledge, as Moten everywhere does, that the aesthetic tradition furnishes not only, and not so much, a theory of art as a theory of freedom and of the subject, which, taken together, constitute the conditions of possibility for any modern concept of the political. The aesthetic is an expressly regulative faculty for Kant, both in the technical sense that its concepts necessarily have no constitutive or determinative force and in the sense that Moten elaborates, its will to regulate the ‘lawless freedom of the imagination’. But it is also regulative in the sense of establishing the terms in and through which freedom and the autonomy of the subject are thought as properties of the universal human. If, in one regard, aesthetic freedom is compensatory for restraint felt elsewhere in the system, a reserve of ‘free play’ to the side of the constraints of labour and the unfreedom of political life, its larger concept exemplifies and prepares human freedom in and through identification with the Subject whose abstraction from particular material properties and interests grounds its universal claims. Such a formal conception of freedom as the autonomy of the subject and as categorical for human being requires in the first place the subject’s indifference to its own materiality and to any enjoyment of its object. Likewise, the judgment of taste is obliged to let go, ‘so far as possible … of the element of matter, i.e., sensation, in our general state of representation’, and reflect solely upon the ‘formal peculiarities’ of that representation.5 The formal freedom of the subject is, for Kant, at once the condition and the product of that ‘public or common sense’ without which no realm of liberal political subjecthood could be imagined. But the autonomous subject is necessarily set over and against another human that Kant elsewhere designates the pathological subject. This is the human subjected to necessity, whether in the form of external forces or of internal needs and desires, the human as material being, capable perhaps of approaching freedom but only at the price of being subjected to formation. This formal freedom is both closely regulated and regulative of a disposition of human beings and their relative value along a scale that ranges from the representative universal and free subject to humans subjected to matter and necessity. A whole history of cultural pedagogy or Bildung instituted in and by liberal states through the apparatus of education stems from this exemplary model of freedom and continues to play out to this day.6 Accordingly, as Moten points out, ‘The regulative discourse on the aesthetic that animates Kant’s critical philosophy is inseparable from the question of race as a mode of conceptualising and regulating human diversity, grounding and justifying inequality and exploitation … ’ [SL 2]. As a counter-aesthetic of life-in-common, rather than a universal common sense that finds its ultimate representation in the state ‘as a kind of degraded representation of commonness’ [SL 8], the black radical tradition, in Moten’s reinscription of it, deconstructs this Kantian regulative discourse at every turn. This is in part because blackness can be read as the ‘anteKantian’ as much as the antiKantian instantiation of that ‘lawless freedom of the imagination’ whose wings and whose flight aesthetic judgment is tasked with clipping. Blackness historically becomes the object of an aesthetic regulation in ‘a set of brutally discursive maneuvers’ that critically exceed any of the longstanding phenomena that concern historians and sociologists, that is, the deployment of racial difference in the disciplining of coerced labour or the segmentation of the labour force and its political counterpart, a militant working class. ‘This is so even as what is continually revealed, if not confessed, is that what is now, in the wake of those maneuvers, called blackness makes those very maneuvers possible and – for and as eternally thwarted and dispersed sovereignty – necessary’ [SL 3]. What is revealed across the extended terrain of consent not to be a single being is that the aesthetics that is and is of the black radical tradition is consubstantial with the practices of an alternative sociality or life form that ‘animaterialises’ both a constant underpresence,‘the dynamic hum of blackness’s facticity’ [SL 10], and the white racial fantasies and projections that constitute the series of figures for sensuality and indiscipline. Those figures ‘have always been inseparable from a “natural” history of inequality’, calling forth and legitimating ‘a predispositional servitude, a captivity in which the embodiment of the need for constraint … precisely insofar as she [the black (woman)] is supposed to be incapable of self-regulation, is given over to the ultimate form of governance, namely that phantasmatic and im/possible condition of being wholly for another’ [SL 13].

Reps come first –

1. It frames the way we approach topics and it shapes the way we interpret them, so it precedes reality – we wouldn’t have invaded Iraq if we didn’t think that Al Qaeda was based there.

2. Proximity – it’s the only thing that happens in round, so in-round discourse is the only real takeaway we have from a debate round. Holding debaters accountable for their reps is key to accessibility which comes first because otherwise debaters leave if they feel like the space is violent.