## 1 – Disclosure

#### Interpretation: At all TOC bid distributing tournaments, debaters must disclose all constructive speech docs.

#### Violation – only disclosed one round at harvard, half of Columbia, and apple valley elims

Table

Description automatically generated

#### A. Debate resource inequities—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs who don’t have access to big coaching squads.

#### B. Depth of clash – open source allows debaters to come up with more nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate

## 2

#### Interp – solely the resolution should determine aff and neg ground.

#### Violation – they say they a] defend the topic through Ethnofuturism b] its not just private - Ethnofuturist works disrupting the oftentimes de facto futures of Outer Space and asteroid mining. C] also about discourse

#### Extra t is a voter – limits and ground

#### Tva – analyze it w/o the additional ef stuff

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation and substantive engagement

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact and why schools fund debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### DTD – its key to deter future abuse and the abuse has already occurred

#### No RVI’s- a) chilling effect – people will be too scared to read theory because RVI’s encourage baiting theory b) clash – people go all in on theory which decks substance engagement c] logic shouldn’t win for being fair

## 3 – K

#### We endorse the entirety of the affirmative except for the call for a ballot. Instead I imagine an ethnofuture where white people do not win for performative virtue signaling.

#### The perm is violent – their forefronts themselves as the leader of the movement and denotes us as followers that is paternalistic and turns solvency in which Whiteness always takes over and include themselves.

**Tomkin, 20** [Anastasia Reesa Tomkin, (Anastasia Tomkin is a radical thinker, organizer and cake enthusiast. She serves as the Direct Service Coordinator of Common Justice, an alternative to incarceration program based in Brooklyn, New York. Born and raised in Trinidad and Tobago, she holds a Bachelor's degree in French and Spanish from the University of the West Indies. An avid writer, she is currently working on her second book following the self-published poetry collection, "Delusions of Grandeur.")]. "Unpacking the False Allyship of White Racial Justice Leaders." Non Profit News | Nonprofit Quarterly, 12-14-2020, Accessed 2-11-2022. https://nonprofitquarterly.org/unpacking-the-false-allyship-of-white-racial-justice-leaders/ // duongie

Let’s be honest: white racial justice leaders are experts at performative allyship. When you forge a fulfilling career out of being a great ally, public image is everything. You must appear to know all the current and classic anti-racist literature. (You don’t have to read them, just know about them.) You must quickly adapt to all the new rules about socially acceptable jargon. You must ensure that you are surrounded by black or POC [people of color] executive staff who are willing to take a bullet for you at any given moment. And you must always, always appear completely oblivious to the fact that you yourself are the embodiment of white supremacy. Not Donald Trump. Not Rudy Giuliani. Heck, not even Robert E. Lee. You. The aforementioned names are obviously also white supremacy. But this isn’t about them. This isn’t about the Klansmen we can identify. It’s about the ones who masquerade as saviors and friends, while reaping all the benefits of being a privileged white person who pretends to care about racial equality. “When liberal whites fail to understand how they can and/or do embody white supremacist values and beliefs even though they may not embrace racism as prejudice or domination (especially domination that involves coercive control), they cannot recognize the ways their actions support and affirm the very structure of racist domination and oppression that they wish to see eradicated.”—bell hooks As per usual, bell hooks hits it right on the nose. But perhaps the piece of the puzzle that we’re missing is that the vast majority of liberal whites do not actually want to eradicate “the very structure of racist domination and oppression.” What else can be said for the incongruence of their words and their actions? When their Trumper uncle claims that equality would mean less for white people, they might counter it with the idea that “there’s enough for everyone.” And while there may indeed be enough for everyone, Uncle could have a point. To rectify hundreds of years of advantage, true equality could mean sacrifice on white people’s part in several key areas. Economically—with regard to who holds and manages wealth and resources Socially—the shifting of power dynamics in social and professional spaces Psychologically—erasing the norm that white people’s comfort is paramount In spite of the strides that have been made in the civil rights movement, white supremacy is still prevalent in these three categories. White liberals who are heads of nonprofits targeting black communities, or leaders within racial justice spaces, are just as deeply committed to protecting their economic, social, and psychological supremacy as the worst of the far-right figures. Until this truth is unveiled, not just in theory, but in the appraisal and exposure of individuals that it applies to, the movement for racial equality will be held back by the Trojan horse of unfit and hypocritical leadership. … White liberals who spearhead racial justice initiatives are often driven by the three P’s—Power, Profit, and Prestige. Power The issue of power is multilayered. Simply put, it is the ability to get what you want. In the context of the workplace, for example, it is easy to identify those with tangible power; it manifests in the ability to call for things to happen and have people obey those commands. The people with “role power” make decisions and shape policies. A white racial justice leader is fully aware of their own position of power. In fact, they refuse to let it go. In her book The Power Manual, author [and NPQ senior editor] Cyndi Suarez writes that “Leaders seek to decide the level of decision-making; they understand that participation in decision-making is power, and the extent to which they want to share power determines the level of decision-making they attempt to set. Often, civic protest is aimed at fighting to be part of a higher level of decision-making.” White racial justice leaders tend to meet this civic protest with resistance. If you were to ask whether they would work in the lowliest title if it meant they would be most useful to “the cause,” just imagine the response. For them, all the fun of it is wrapped up in the fact that they get to make their creative dreams happen, to make people do what they are told, and to expand their own sense of power and control in life. It is less about the principle and morality of racial justice than it is about feeling powerful. Of course, they would deny it bitterly, so I propose we ask them one thing: to step down, to move out of the way. To have their input be of equal or lesser value than ours, rather than the deciding factor on any given issue. The reluctance would be astounding. And if they were to explain that reluctance, we would clearly see the arrogance of a white ego that believes itself entitled to power. White people cannot come to terms with the fact that they should not hold the reins, particularly on matters affecting black and brown communities. They refuse to accept the fact that black people want true autonomy and not a better slave master. If the workspace were a plantation, most liberals of today would be Northerners wanting slavery reform instead of abolition. They want to see how they can be better slave masters in order to have happier slaves, and thus a more pleasant self-perception. When you tell them you simply don’t want them as a master, they reply, in a very polite and calm white supremacist voice, “I’m sorry, this is the way things are.” Then when you call them out on it, you’re the irrational angry black person who doesn’t know how to conduct themselves in professional spaces. Racist stereotypes that they claim to oppose become useful to them in moments when their authority is questioned. Their own racism emerges and is weaponized for their self-preservation. Their allyship is a sham. Profit Next, there is the motivation for Profit. In recent years, there has been more and more pressure for white people and organizations to expand their literacy in anti-racism. White people who can talk the talk get money thrown at them. They get book deals, speaking engagements, platforms, Twitter followers, requests to do workshops, and the list goes on. Many of them manage to integrate their academic anti-racism into their career, thus strengthening the legitimacy of their claim to power. The racial wealth gap is in the back of their minds. The median wealth between black families and white families is worsening nowadays, rather than improving, in spite of the fact that there is so much awareness about it. White leaders may publicly support the idea of reparations—as long as it doesn’t come out of their pocket. They are content to watch conversations about reparations ebb and flow on the political stage. It may well drag on for several more decades, while the same white people shake their heads in pity at how poor we are. The thought of contributing to black people’s wealth by giving up a significant amount of their own is preposterous. You see, they may be ready to acknowledge that they benefit from racial inequalities, but that’s all in theory. They are not prepared to sacrifice their own money to do something about it. They prefer to donate occasionally to the predatory charities and 501c3s (and write it off on taxes!), and then be all chummy with the black people around them, as though we aren’t all living breathing manifestations of a very real wealth gap. It was always about money. Slavery was about economic profit. The white liberal’s surface allyship is also about economic profit. At least the Republicans are honest about wanting to hoard all the wealth to themselves because they “earned” it. Liberals only pretend to want economic equality. The fine print is “as long as it doesn’t come from my pocket, or mean that there would be less for me.” Imagine, a prominent white racial justice leader once told me we couldn’t achieve racial pay equity because it was against the law to pay people according to race. She then went on to try to deliver the economic racial equity we asked for by raising everybody’s salaries—resulting in the white managers making over $100,000. Since the inception of the United States, the law economically favored white people. A few decades ago, it became “illegal” to “discriminate by race,” and now white liberals are comfortable with the idea that black people would never get economic advantages simply for being black, even though white people did for centuries. How do we rectify racial economic inequity without intentionally injecting funds into the black community precisely because they are black? White leaders don’t know, and neither do they care, once their own bag is secured. They prefer to merely “thank” people of color for educating them on anti-racism. They prefer to invite us to write for them for free, speak on their platforms for free, contribute to their personal development for free, all against the backdrop of a wealth gap they are fully aware of. Prestige Finally, we will delve into the merits of Prestige. Prestige is twofold, referring both to one’s reputation in society and to one’s perception of self, which are equally important. The white racial justice leader lives for admiration and respect—not by the brown masses, but by other influential figures in the movement. They want to be endorsed by the most prominent characters, they want a spot on Trevor Noah, they want to be on a panel with other distinguished game-changers. Their job is a revolutionary theater. A real revolution, run by those actually impacted and with the goal of empowering the brown masses, would render them irrelevant. Then, God forbid, they would have to find another field to conquer, one that doesn’t easily scoop them up by virtue of being white and claiming to dislike racism. Powerful people in white supremacist spaces give them an ear because they are white and just edgy enough to be palatable. It is a mutually beneficial exchange: philanthropists, funders, corporations and media get to hear an inspirational spiel from somebody who looks like them, and they agree to fund this white person’s initiatives as their annual contribution to “social change.” The white person gets to be heralded as a voice to the voiceless, a saint who used their white privilege for good and just happened to make a name for themselves in the process. The most fascinating part of it all is that the white leader genuinely believes that all of this absolves them of whiteness. Their internal sense of prestige swells and feeds their ego. Dismantling the system under their own terms and conditions, with all the power, prestige, and money that they deserve is the definition of a truly fulfilling life. Any of us would sleep peacefully at night with the security of hundreds of thousands of dollars, white skin, and a golden reputation as an ally, though.

## 4

#### **The world relies on the fundamental opposition to disability to exist – disabled bodies are modeled as the inverse reflection to the normate which drives the internal ableism and desire to eliminate disabled bodies.**

**Hughes 12** [Bill Hughes (professor of Sociology at Glasgow Caledonian University, BA in sociology from the University of Stirling, PhD in political philosophy from the University of Aberdeen). 2012. Accessed 8/9/20. “Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People.” <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137023001_2> //Xu]

The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. The body produced by ableism is equivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as invulnerable and definitive. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’ (Shildrick, 2002: 51). It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’ (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), the epitome of civilisation, closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’ (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). Through ableism, modernity has been able to structure disability as uncivilised, outside or on the margins of humanity. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’ (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat. Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existen- tial basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death ... that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communica- tion and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness).

#### Communicative spaces are structured to exclude disabled bodies- speech has come to constitute the boundary of Humanism, to which disability forms the constitutive negative as a disruption of such networks.

**St. Pierre 15** [Bracketed for crip to disabled. Joshua St. Pierre (BA in humanities from Briercrest College, Master of Arts in philosophy from the University of Alberta). “Cripping Communication: Speech, Disability, and Exclusion in Liberal Humanist and Posthumanist Discourse.” Communication Theory. Vol 25, Issue 3. Pages 330-348. 3/31/15. Accessed 8/29/20. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/comt.12054> // Xu]

John Durham Peters has argued that “communication” is a modern invention, stirred by the late 19th century anxieties of isolation and longings for unmediated connection (2000). But while the elusive dream of forging minds together through signs and semantics may be an endemically modern problem, speech has long been a human problem. In particular, performing speech, like performing “the human,” is a risky affair with exclusionary consequences. Oral speech has occupied a dignified position within the humanist lineage, shaping central questions of what it means to be human, imbued with the power to persuade others, serve human affairs, and articulate truth; yet, this pedigree has come at a high cost: the exclusion of voices not deemed rational and intelligible. I propose bringing a disabled, or a crip, analysis to bear on speech communication within humanism and posthumanism. Focusing on the disabled speaker, I accordingly argue that the exclusion of nonnormative voices within liberal humanism results from a tension between the conception of speech as rational and universal, and its embodied particularity that erodes any claim to universality. As the sine qua non of rational human subjectivity, speech is an esteemed, yet volatile, performance that can easily go wrong. Rather than owning up to the necessarily embodied and unstable mediation of human identity, liberal humanism defers the tension immanent within speech by excluding nonnormative and disabled voices, judging them against what I term the “universal speaker,” in a Sisyphean attempt to shore up and contain the boundaries of the human. The ultimately futile movement to free rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principle mode of communication. Pursuing the stuttered trajectory of “rational discourse” in liberal humanism to its disembodied form of “information” in posthumanism, I suggest that speech is largely absent in posthumanist discourse not only because of the incongruity of speech with emerging models of information seemingly free from context, but perhaps more importantly because these discourses assume autoaffectivity and preclude [disabled]crip voices from analysis. Like its humanist predecessor, and contrary to much of its rhetoric, posthumanism shows signs of structural exclusion dependent on having the right sort of informational body: malleable and flexible. Tony Davis insists that “All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. . . . Their embrace suffocates those it does not ignore” (2008, p. 141). While this may ultimately place disabled voices within good company, it remains worrisome that the silencing itself has been largely underrepresented and untheorized. Even disciplines such as communication studies and disability studies, devoted to unearthing genealogies, articulating phenomenological structures, and exploring subaltern modes of existing together, have not paid enough attention to disabled speech. While these disciplines have had very little, if any, contact so far, they have much to offer each other. By bringing these two disciplines into dialogue and writing from disability, I propose that the disabled speaker is perhaps the cyborg par excellence, eschewing communicative purity, autonomy, and self-mastery. The disabled speaker can be employed to critique the latent ableism within humanist and posthumanist discourse, and communication theory more generally, while offering new modes of thinking about posthuman communication as an embodied activity based on noise, relationality, and reciprocity.1 Liberal humanism and speech Liberal humanism is a broad-based political and intellectual emergence within the Enlightenment, which gained full ascendency in the 19th and 20th centuries, valuing “open and undogmatic inquiry, freedom of the individual conscience” and aiming for a “respect for social justice, social and psychological utility, decency, [and] liberality” (Coates & White, 1970, p. 447). At its center, liberal humanism is a marriage between the long humanist tradition and liberal ideals: a dual commitment to “man” and “freedom.” However, in its effort to secure “man” as a completely autonomous being, liberal humanism must first transcend group differences and generalize attributes of humanity in a movement of essentialization. What defines a human in this tradition is accordingly not accidental attributes— for example race, gender, age—but the possession of rationality. The liberal subject, as Katherine Hayles has observed, identifies the self with the rational mind merely in possession of a body (1999, p. 4).This move is unquestionably overdetermined, yet can in large measure be traced back through Cartesian rationalism to the Discourse on the Method. Asserting the cogito, Descartes writes: from this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is solely to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this ‘I’— that is, the soul by which I am what I am—is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist (2009, p. 36, emphasis added). Distinct from the body and free from context, the existence of the rational “I” stands above the historical moment. While Descartes himself is not the brash dualist so often presumed, the methodological distinction between res extensa and res cogitans nevertheless sets the stage for the humanist erasure of embodiment that carries through into posthumanism. Compared to the axiomatically derived self-evidence of the rational self, the body is deemed epistemically untrustworthy, accidental, and historical. Transcribed through liberal humanism, this binary conceives the subject as an inner and universal rationality possessing an external and particular body. The liberal subject emerges as autonomous and unitary, yet as interior, in need of externalizing his/her social and political nature. It is here that speech takes on a significant, yet surprisingly underrepresented, role within liberal humanist discourse. In 1923, H. Wildon Carr, a former president of the Aristotelian Society, argued that the very idea of reason requires discourse because reason is an activity directed outwards. “The origin of speech,” said Carr, “is in the nature of human mentality. Reason in its human form would not and could not exist without speech” (1923–1924, p. 97). A similar position is taken up more recently by Frank E. X. Dance and Carl E. Larson who have contended that speech communication is a pedagogical initiation into humanity. “Speech communication,” they write, “functions so importantly in the life of a human being that the understanding and study of speech communication are at the very core of a liberal education” (1972, p. 6). Toeing the party line, Dance and Larson have maintained that speech communication has three functions: (a) linking the individual with his environment, (b) developing higher mental processes, and (c) regulating behavior (1972, p. 64). Speech is an enactment of reason and therefore of human identity, since “evolutionarily speaking, the hand is shaped by the labor in which it engages, man’s interiority simultaneously shapes and is shaped by speech communication” (1972, p. 71). For Carr, Dance, and Larson, then, speech is an extension of rationality, belonging not to the body, but to the articulation and formation of reason. The liberal humanist assessment of speech exemplified by Carr, Dance, and Larson relies on an ambiguity and slippage between the rational interior and embodied exterior. Speech is given in liberal humanism as a mode of rationality, yet the body is also needed for the enactment of speech. This duality raises troubling questions regarding the boundaries of reason and the self. Does speech modulate from a form of rationality to a conditional act as it passes through the lips? Where does the universal reason stop and contingent embodiment begin? While speech, mediating the threshold between the public and private and the universal and accidental, can be understood as the sine qua non of the liberal humanist subject, it simultaneously occupies an ambiguous position. This ambiguity translates as a fundamental instability in the rational self’s identity and boundary that can be detailed through the voice, chiastically hinging language and the body. The voice is dually constituted by the phonological and the phonetic: the meaning laden, immaterial aspect of the phoneme and its material, auditory support. While the existence of the phonological depends upon the phonetic (however short-lived its existence), the logic of phonocentrism permeating liberal humanism systematically obscures the phonetic as the trace of embodiment. “Requiring the intervention of no determinate surface in the world, being produced in the world as pure auto-affection, [the voice],” explains Derrida, “is a signifying substance completely at our disposition. For the voice meets no obstacle to its emission in the world precisely because it is produced as pure auto-affection” (1973, p. 79). This dominant tradition understands the phonetic, embodied aspect of the voice to be utterly passive and invisible, and thus “the voice” comes from within, circumventing the body, and directly expresses interiority. Yet, tying the signifier to the body, the voice is not so easily divorced from its embodied source. Somewhat overstated by the dysfluent speaker, the phonetic aspect of the voice often does not self-effacingly recede once the phonological function has been dutifully carried out, but rather lingers and stretches, drawing attention to itself and threatening to subvert its linguistic purpose. The voice of one who has cerebral palsy, for example, is decidedly not at his/her complete disposition precisely because the body obtrudes its continuous emission into the world. The conception of the voice as pure auto-affection can be maintained only by abstracting speech from lived experience. I accordingly argue that the rational human materializes himself through the voice precariously; the slippage is manifested both phonetically and affectively. Mladen Dolar (2006) contends that even though the phonetic voice does not contribute to meaning and is therefore inconspicuous when the semantic operation of speech is “properly” carried out, there is always something leftover, whether accent, individuality, or other tonal qualia. The role assigned to the remainder of the voice by Dolar is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, the remainder is an obstruction overcome when one becomes adjusted to a different accent, for example, and can focus simply upon the intended meaning. The voice in this regard is simply an impediment to the communicative operation of language. Yet on the other hand, Dolar notes that a voice devoid of any remainder would conflate with mechanical iterability and thus lose its human characteristic: Paradoxically, it is the mechanical voice which confronts us with the object voice, its disturbing and uncanny nature, whereas the human touch helps us keep it at bay. The obstacle it appears to present actually enhances the sense-making effect; the seeming distraction contributes to the better fulfillment of the goal (2006, p. 22). The phonetic side effect of the voice enables its recognizability and identification as a human voice. Implicit here is the narrow phonetic line sheltering the human voice in between the mechanical and noise—between merely iterating signifiers and chaotic distraction. At far ends of the spectrum, voices of intellectually disabled people are often read as subhuman at best, while voices with no inflection can be read as eerily mechanical or computerized. Depicting the former phenomenon, a vitriolic letter was recently sent to the caretaker of an autistic boy, in which the anonymous author complained, “You selfishly put your kid outside every day and let him be nothing but a nuisance and a problem to everyone else with that noise polluting whaling [sic] he constantly makes! That noise he makes when he is outside is DREADFUL [sic] . . . It scares the hell out of my normal children! . . . Do the right thing and move or euthanize him!” (“Hateful Letter,” 2013). This instance is repugnant and likely not representative in degree. However, inasmuch as speech and reason are tightly correlated through the linguistic function of the voice, performing the voice in any way that strays beyond codified vocalic boundaries and unsettles the effortless production of meaning calls into question the rationality of the performer “behind” the voice. More moderately disabled voices, like the stuttering voice, are in this regard not outright rejected as a signifying voice like the voices of the (presumed) intellectually disabled. However, recognition can nevertheless be denied in degree. The failure to signify in a quotidian manner results in a desperate struggle for the disabled voice to maintain a uniform performance of reason if the speaker wishes to be afforded the privileges of full participation given to those deemed rational. Speaking as a rational human is a delicate performance that can easily go sideways. The knife-edge of human vocality is honed even finer by taking into account normalized vocal affectivity. Joshua Gunn (2010) has argued that the affective power of the voice is culturally policed because it is fundamentally public; the phonetic aspect of the voice generates “public feelings” that communicate on their own accord. Rhetorical training aims to tame this affective power to match, support, and enliven the semiotic character of the voice. However, citing the public anxiety around “uncontrolled speech” that transgresses vocal norms, Gunn points out how easily the affective force can go awry, so much that he claims “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Gunn references the grunting of female tennis players and the unintentional yelps of politicians; yet, it would be helpful here to widen his observation of uncontrolled speech to include such voices as those belonging to the transgendered and the disabled.These voices accentuate the volatile affective power of the voice and the tenuous hold we possess over our bodies. As I have argued elsewhere, “In failing to live up to the ideals set by liberal individualism and capitalism, [dysfluent voices] act as a reminder of the fragile mastery we have of our bodies and of the social downturn that quickly follows the failure to uphold and project this ideal of mastery.” (2012, p. 16). The anxiety-riddled demand for control in public speech arises precisely because the affective power of speech exists in a metastable relation to the body. Rational speech, dispassioned, and disembodied, may at any moment be ruptured and must thus be constantly surveilled and managed. Articulating and simultaneously threatening to occlude rational human identity, the voice thus bears the full weight of the humanist anxiety concerning borders and membership. The “proper” performance of speech is accordingly strongly patrolled within liberal humanist discourse. The universal speaker Iris Young casts the liberal subject in his/her political context, arguing for a conception of “universal citizenship.” In her assessment, the liberal subject transcends his/her self-interested particularity through public discussion and decision making by which private interests can agree on a common good (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen is therefore homogenized, as “citizenship is an expression of the universality of human life; it is a realm of rationality and freedom as opposed to the heteronomous realm of particular need, interest, and desire” (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen transcends differences threatening impartiality and equality by essentializing himself or herself and projecting that self into the politicized public sphere. If to be truly human in liberal humanist discourse is to exercise autonomous reason, and if speaking realizes oneself as a rational and social agent within the public sphere, then having a voice has direct bearing on the universal citizen—so much so that I believe it possible to conceive of what might be termed a “universal speaker.” Because speech plays a pivotal role in the realization of the self as a rational agent, then if one is to speak, he/she must speak in a way that defends the universality of autonomous reason against embodied and historical particularity. Furthermore, the universal speaker, like the universal citizen, must be marked by impartiality. As stated by Young, “impartial reason aims to adopt a point of view outside concrete situations of action, a transcendental ‘view from nowhere’ that carries the perspective, attributes, character, and interests of no particular subject or set of subjects” (1990, p. 100). From this façade of impartiality, it is only a small step to judge who does and does not speak impartially and thereby qualifies as rational and human. To speak as a truly rational agent requires that one speak from nowhere and everywhere, becoming an invisible medium for communication. The universal speaker is a powerful homogenizing trope, for it defines what type of speech production is natural, who gets the right to speak, what speech needs to be taken seriously, and what speech gets to be heard at all. If one is to speak with agency or efficacy, one must speak in the right way; hence the burden within this tradition is to find and retain the “right voice.” In Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream, for example, Carl Elliott (2004) notes an anxiety in the struggle of transgendered people to match gendered vocal norms, the accent-reduction clinics in the American south, and the difficult adjustment of disabled speakers to voice synthesizers. At the heart of liberal humanism’s claim to universality and equality, an ugly structure of exclusion of those who are not “universal” shows itself, an exclusion that I argue results from the tension between (a) the desire to conceive of oral communication as rational/universal and (b) the embodied particularity of speech that threatens to undermine its universality. For while speech is peddled as a rational, universal, and nonspatial medium within liberal humanism, the particularity of embodied speech casts a threatening shadow over this claim. Returning to the example of the stuttering voice, Marc Shell argues that having the “right voice” is a necessary sign of membership to a particular group of persons. If you cannot speak, he wryly explains, you are likely not human. If you can somewhat speak you may be human, and if you cannot speak in my particular way, you do not belong to my tribe (2005, p. 50). For the stutterer, however, “all words are test words, passwords, or catchphrases whereby one gains or loses social acceptance or credibility. . . . The concern is not his inability to pronounce some word or phrase fast enough; it is one’s ability to say any word fluently in any language” (2005, p. 51). Shell is quite clearly stating the boundary conditions of the universal speaker. However, just as the vocal markers of ethnic boundaries are contingent, historical, and laden with colonial power, so can the supposed universality of rational human speech be unraveled. Disability studies convincingly challenge the pathologization of individual bodies by articulating the sociocultural structures of ableism that normalize and exclude certain forms of human variation.2 “Disability” is no more self-evident, natural, or stable a concept than “able-bodiedness”: Both are understood through disability studies as a function of contingent sociocultural anxieties and oppressions. Disability circumscribes the human by negation. Following in this vein, we might likewise fray the boundaries of the universal speaker by deterritorializing disabled speech. Consider again Gunn’s claim that “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Ubiquitous stutters and vocalic gaffes occur to everyone on a daily basis precisely because communication is fundamentally unstable: the act of carving out meaning from indeterminacy and noise as opposed to a pure and rational articulation of Being. The so-called disabled speech permeates all speech. The delimitation of the disabled speaker is thus necessarily arbitrary: the construction of a deviant and pathologized Other to prop up the universal speaker. More specifically, pathologization individuates “nonrational” speech production and thereby maintains and polices the public/private divide. Disabled speech is conceived as a private affair marked by particularity and embodiedness, while the rational speech of the universal citizen belongs to the public realm. Yet, resituating disability as a distinctly public structure of oppression unmasks “universality” as simply the norms of unmarked and dominant groups. What counts as a particular and impartial voice is a function of conglomerate sexist, classist, racist, and ableist determinations obscured by their dominant positions within society. Vocally passing as universal is a stacked game favoring those who discursively control the boundaries of rationality and the human. To transgress norms of unmarked dominant groups is to risk great social punishment and exclusion. To speak “in the wrong way” not only reveals the speaker to be connected to his/her body, particularity, and context, but also risks blurting out that the emperor is naked— the emperor speaks from a body. In rupturing the mythos of speech, the disabled speaker thus throws darkness within the humanist circle, threatening the ostensibly stable conditions of a generalized and “universal” identity and provoking violence in attempts to shore up the boundaries of the human. Excluding “hyperembodied voices” is thus a dogged mechanism of deferring the tension inherent in liberal humanist speech between universality and particularity, rational autonomy, and embodiment. The (failed) movement to free communication as rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principal mode of communication. Cripping posthumanism There is no single bridge spanning humanism to posthumanism. There are certainly stories to tell about the antihumanism of the 1960s and 1970s, of feminism, cybernetics, Hans Moravec, late capitalism, and of the cascading death of God, man, and the author. Yet, as Donna Haraway duly reminds us, the cyborg is a bastard. Any attempt to pin down its origins is always already a fabrication, a sanitation, an attempt to tell a crooked story straight. Neil Badmington further muddies the water, adapting for posthumanism the Lyotardian-Derridean line that a system always contains the conditions for its critique. Rather than construing humanism and posthumanism as distinct entities in a linear, temporal relation, Badmington argues—akin to Lyotard’s reading of modernism and postmodernism— that “the writing of the posthumanist condition should . . . take the form of a critical practice that occurs inside humanism, consisting not of the wake but the working-through of humanist discourse” (2003, p. 22). Posthumanism has always ghosted humanism, and posthumanism is never a clean break (if it can be called a break at all) from humanism. Just as there is no single nor a complete shift from humanism to posthumanism, so are there many posthumanisms. My affinity toward posthumanism as a generative source for rethinking disabled speech does not extend to them all, insofar as some remain bedded with humanism more than others. For example, early cybernetics remained fixated on defining and maintaining borders of an autonomous and autopoietic subject. In a related vein, transhumanists hoist the banner of human progress with pride. Often conflated with posthumanism, transhumanism has wormed its way into the cultural imaginary with grand ameliorative visions of biotechnology improving the human condition through augmentation and newgenics. Transhumanism, as Cary Wolfe defines it, is simply an “intensification of humanism” (2009, p. xv), a technological extension of the dream of perfectibility that sees bodily limitations as a hurdle to transcend. Disabled speech (and disability more broadly) is accordingly irksome problem for transhumanists to fix, in time, through technology. The posthumanism I intend to redeploy takes its cue from Nayar, who defines what he terms critical posthumanism as “the radical decentering of the traditional sovereign, coherent and autonomous human in order to demonstrate how the human is always already evolving with, constituted by and constitutive of multiple forms of life and machines” (2014, p. 2). The posthuman under this reading cannot be understood in terms of a single locus or a unitary ontology of presence. Rather, he/she is dynamically coconstituted within ecological, technological, and informational networks—a congealing of “heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3). Subjectivity is an emergent feature of sympoietic systems (Haraway, 2014), necessarily constrained by and dispersed within the exchanges between systems and environments. “The Human” thus cedes its transcendental status long enjoyed within the Anthropocene. Yet, at the same time, in relinquishing this status, the (post)human no longer needs to frantically police the borders within which it (ostensibly) ruled autonomously. Rather, critical posthumanism recognizes that the borders of the human have always been porous. Owning up to our sympoietic constitution produces a vantage from which the ableist construction and policing of human borders, bodies, and communicative practices can be politicized and critiqued. With the cyborg bastard fully in mind, I suggest that the disabled body is useful in parsing a necessarily crooked and partial transition to posthuman communication. Interrogating the familial tradition of rhetoric from the perspective of disability, Jay Dolmage is here instructive: The body of history has been shaped to look like an idealized human body: proportional, inviolable, autonomous, upright, forward facing (white and masculine). But if you find the rhetorical body, you find tension, trial, and trouble. . . . [W]riting from bodies we would do history differently, not just be recognizing ‘other’ bodies, but also because our histories and rhetorics might more closely represent the difference and diversity of our bodies themselves (2014, p. 16). Reading posthumanism and posthuman communication through disability is accordingly a means of not only recognizing bodies that are often excluded in communication theory (relegated, e.g., to the insulated domain of speech-pathology) but also cripping communication itself. Like the stuttering body, there is perhaps much to gain from resisting the straight and most direct communicative and discursive path. Consider in this regard that for disability theorist Alison Kafer, the cyborg is appealing not in spite of but because of its “multiple, and often contradictory, deployments” (2013, p. 116). To look for and expect disability in posthumanism and communication theory is to invoke a heuristic of instability and indeterminacy that generates multiple meanings and relations. Conscious of the multivariate affinity and inconsonance between humanism and posthumanism, I wish to pull on a few threads to (a) appreciate the transition and reconstitution of the humanist logic excluding disabled speech within posthumanism and (b) redeploy posthumanism to imagine the disabled speaker otherwise. One thin place between humanism and posthumanism that provides an early historical reference point for the cripped movement to posthuman communication is the abstraction of “information” from context and the body by cybernetics and information theory. The work of cybernetic and informational theorists Norbert Wiener and Claude Shannon famously recast communication in terms of pattern/randomness rather than presence/absence. Within this paradigm, similar to within both structuralism and poststructuralism, information is not the one-to-one correlation of a signifier and signified, but, following Saussure, is rather the differentiation between arbitrary relations. By extracting information from the presence/absence binary, immateriality can be constructed on the basis of pattern/randomness. Hayles argues that because a universal informational code can be recognized as underwriting everything that exists, information and materiality can be conceived of as discrete entities, with information occupying the dominant role (1999, p. 11). In this configuration, information is differential insofar as the probabilities of a message alone determine its content. The “meaning” of a message is self-contained and its value is therefore unaffected by situation and context outside the closed information system. “Shannon and Wiener,” remarks Hayles, “wanted information to have a stable value as it moved from one context to another. If it was tied to meaning, it would potentially have to change values every time it was embedded in a new context, because context affects meaning” (1999, p. 53). As such, in “information,” the liberal humanist subject finds a release from the constraints of the body and the context of its production. In Hayles estimation, early cybernetics was thus a means to extend, not subvert, humanist conceptions of man as autopoietic, autonomous, and self-directed. This was accomplished by demonstrating that machines could function like a man and correspondingly that man is essentially an information-processing entity akin to intelligent machines (1999, p. 7). One might argue more specifically, in relation to communication theory, that the effort by Shannon and Weiner to distill information from context resonates with the liberal humanist desire to free rational discourse from the body. By disentangling information from materiality and context, cybernetics somewhat ironically remains tethered to humanist anxieties. Yet, it is worth noting that at the same historical moment, even poststructuralism, putatively motivated by a wariness of immediacy characteristic of humanism, blots out speech in favor of writing. While Derrida and his progeny favor writing inasmuch as speech ostensibly bypasses any impediment to self-presence, the fact that both cybernetics and poststructuralism converge in the erasure of speech is telling. That is, these divergent projects take as their starting point an idealized communicative body; an idealization that adopts the humanist assumption of vocal autoaffectivity. In an ironic twist, even Derrida effaces bodies in the effort to highlight the trace, the body. Working in the poststructuralist lineage, Haraway similarly brackets speech in her articulation of dirty, noisy, posthuman communication. “Cyborg politics,” she writes, “is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution.” (1990, p. 176).This support for the embodied disruption of communication is curiously prefaced by an insistence that “writing is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs” (1990, p. 176; my emphasis). For all her rhetoric of embodiment and insistence on the centrality of communication, Haraway seems not to consider speech as an intimate form of embodied communication that resists perfect translation. Hayles as well, setting her sights on theorists such as Wiener and Shannon, intends to reinstitute embodiment in posthumanism, yet never discusses speech as a creative source of noise in the evolution of material-informational systems. Even if interpreted as vestigial poststructuralist anxiety, this puzzling lacuna in posthumanist discourse around speech betrays an ableist presumption of self-presence and resonates with the exclusionary logic of the universal speaker. Yet, if one follows Dolmage in writing from bodies in their diversity, (post) humanism can be read against the grain. Thinking from the perspective of disability not only highlights the points of tension in the stuttered movement toward posthuman communication (as evidenced by both Haraway and Hayles) but also suggests new ways of thinking about speech as embodied and affective, and the relation between communication and the posthuman. Posthumanism and communication Reimagining the stuttering cyborg requires a more nuanced articulation of posthumanism’s relation with both disability and communication. Starting with the former, in decentering the human subject from its position as the transcendental explanans, posthumanism renders “ability” as an emergent aspect of human situatedness within politicized networks. Able-bodiedness is accordingly not an immanent feature of “the body” (as if it could be decoupled from its environment) but is a dynamic index of architectural, economic, industrial, biomedical, discursive, material, informational, affective, political, and sociocultural assemblages. More specifically, able-bodiedness identifies the congruence of these networks with putatively “normal” bodies. As Nayar helpfully points out, networks are inherently political, put in place, and optimized “for certain kinds of bodies to tap into and connect with—and this is what en-ables these bodies.” Bodies marked as disabled are accordingly, and conversely, those “that do not fit into available systems and institutionally created structures” (2014, p. 107). Put simply, disabled bodies are for Nayar those for which networks do not exist. While Nayar’s analysis is helpful, it is perhaps better to say that disabled bodies occupy subaltern networks, because deworlding (to put the phenomenon in Heideggerian parlance) is rarely, if ever, absolute.3 Disability is not a simple aggregate of network conditions, but is constituted in part by feedback loops. That is, disabled people—edged out of, or exploited by, dominant systems—regularly produce new networks that rewire connections between each other and their environments in politically subversive and generative ways. Disabled communities often supplant the neoliberal and meritocratic ideals of productivity, individualism, and self-sufficiency with an ethos of care, interdependency, and slowness. Cripping communication might likewise be understood as a criticoethical practice of reimagining the relations between informational bodies and systems, remapping disabled speech in ways that privilege noise, indeterminacy, affectivity, and sympoiesis.

#### the idea that epistemic resistance is all we need erases the material conditions of disability

Siebers 06 (Tobin, Prof of Literary and Cultural Criticism at the U of Michigan, “Disability Studies and the Future of Identity Politics”) DR 16

**The attack on identity by social constructionists is designed to liberate individuals constrained by unjust stereotypes and social prejudices. The example of disability in particular reveals with great vividness the unjust stereotypes imposed on identity by cultural norms and languages as well as the violence exercised by them.** It also provides compelling evidence for the veracity of the social model**. Deafness was not, for instance, a disability on Martha’s Vineyard for most of the eighteenth century because 1 in 25 residents was deaf and everyone in the community knew how to sign**. Deaf villagers had the same occupations and incomes as people who could hear.3 This example shows to what extent **disability is socially produced.** In fact, **it is tempting to see disability exclusively as the product of a bad match between society and some human bodies because it is so often the case. But disability also frustrates theorists of social construction because the disabled body and mind are not easily aligned with cultural norms and codes. Many disability scholars have begun to insist that the social model either fails to account for the difficult physical realities faced by people with disabilities or presents their body and mind in ways that are conventional, conformist, and unrecognizable to them. These include the habits of privileging pleasure over pain, making work a condition of independence, favoring performativity to corporeality, and describing social success in terms of intellectual achievement, bodily adaptability, and active political participation.** David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder have noticed that **the push to link physical difference to cultural and social constructs, especially ideological ones, has actually made disability disappear** from the social model. They cite a variety of recent studies of the body that use “corporeal aberrancies” to emblematize social differences, complaining that “physical difference” within common critical methodologies “exemplifies the evidence of social deviance even as the constructed nature of physicality itself fades from view.”4 As Davis puts it, **cultural theory abounds with “the fluids of sexuality, the gloss of lubrication, the glossary of the body as text,** the heteroglossia of the intertext, the glossolalia of the schizophrenic. **But almost never the body of the differently abled.”5 Recent theoretical emphases on “performativity,” “heterogeneity,” and “indeterminancy” privilege a disembodied ideal of freedom, suggesting that emancipation from social codes and norms may be achieved by imagining the body as a subversive text. These emphases are not only incompatible with the experiences of people with disabilities; they mimic the fantasy, often found in the medical model, that disease and disability are immaterial as long as the imagination is free. Doctors and medical professionals have the habit of coaxing sick people to cure themselves by thinking positive thoughts, and when an individual’s health does not improve the failure is ascribed to mental weakness**. Sontag was perhaps the first to understand the debilitating effects of **describing illness as a defect of imagination or will power**. She traces the notion that disease springs from individual mental weakness to Schopenhauer’s claim that “recovery from a disease depends on the will assuming ‘dictatorial power in order to subsume the rebellious forces’ of the body” (43-44). **She also heaps scorn on the idea that the disabled or sick are responsible for their disease concluding that “theories that diseases are caused by mental states and can be cured by will power are always an index of how much is not understood about the physical terrain of a disease**” (55**). The rebellious forces of the body and the physical nature of disease represent a reality untouched by metaphor.** Sontag insists that “the reality has to be explained” (55).

#### Their approach to collectivity is beset by a “1AC Giroux 2 that action without knowledge is blind.36” ” paradigm that operationalizes ability as a precursor to communal inclusion. Reading and interpreting affect is fundamentally tied to a subject’s corporeal existence which means their attempt at bodily interpolation can only ever produce intra-communal violence.

Slaby 2012 (Jan[Professor of philosophy at Free University Berlin, Germany. PhD thesis in Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück. Thesis on the world-directedness of emotion; German title: Gefühl und Weltbezug; Grade: summa cum laude. MA Thesis in Philosophy from Humboldt University], April 2012,  “Affective Self-Construal and the Sense of Ability” Freie Universität Berlin, Germany Emotion Review Vol. 4, No.2, sagepub, accessed 10/11) JA

Corporealization and Self-Construal in Depression It makes sense to combine the idea of a changeable existential background with the notion of self-feeling and with the idea that the basic “location” of affective self-construal is in the 154 Emotion Review Vol. 4 No. 2 vicinity of a person’s active engagement with the world. The basic sense of ability and agency, intimately tied to an agent’s corporeal existence—the lived body as the medium of one’s acting and being acted upon—comprises the basic dimension of affective self-relatedness from which all other dimensions originate. It is here where we have to look for the contents and processes relevant to affective self-construal, and it is this dimension that seems particularly vulnerable to pathological modification. Affective changes occurring in depressive illness seem to pertain to this dimension of corporeal–agentive self-feeling, as many autobiographic patient narratives vividly illustrate.7 Depending on my sense of ability and (potential or actual) agency—a sense that is surely varied and multiple—and as a consequence thereof, the world appears as a space of specific possibilities and as devoid of other possibilities, or as something removed and unreachable, or as a site of impending disaster, of threat and danger. Likewise, my sense of other people as people depends upon my felt ability to connect, to make contact, to engage in interactions and also on my capacity to be reached or affectively touched by others, and my sense of being part of interpersonal relations or arrangements such as a certain group or community. And when I feel fundamentally unable to connect, other people will as a consequence come to seem awkward, alien, probably even hostile and dangerous, appearing like strangers, and in the end even as not being persons at all but instead as mere “dummies” or “soulless automata.” Reflected back to myself, this profound disconnectedness from others might in turn lead to feelings of solitude and aloneness as there are no longer, in a certain sense, any others with whom one could make contact or be together. With this, we have moved right into the core dimension of the experiential world described by sufferers from severe depression. Even more intimate than the relations described thus far is the link between the sense of ability and the feelings that one has of one’s own body. Once we understand the body phenomenologically as the active and affectively responsive lived body, we see that there is no gap between our sense of ability and our sense of the body. When the body, as part of a pathological process, ceases to be experienced as a smoothly operating medium of potential engagement with the world, it will increasingly turn into what is felt as a mere object—a transformation that has been called “corporealization” (Fuchs, 2003, 2005). In many depressed patients, the lived body seems to “rigidify” and turn into something resistant, into an obstacle and hindrance to one’s projected engagements and activities. One’s taken-for-granted relatedness to the world is altered completely as one no longer finds oneself within a context of seamless activity and amidst routinely encountered possibilities. The objectified, dysfunctional body amounts to a break between oneself and the world. Obviously, this marks a fundamental alteration in self-feeling: What we have here are bodily feelings of being trapped within oneself, feelings of being isolated from one’s formerly meaningful surroundings. This might give rise to feelings of being encaged or imprisoned and of being unable to reach out to make contact with the world or with other people. As a further consequence, feelings of estrangement, of depersonalization, even of not being bodily existent in the world any more might ensue—amounting to a fundamental sense of self-alienation. This dimension of self feelings—feelings of inability that are inextricable from severely modified, alienated corporeal experience and thus also from a radically altered sense of the reality of the world and of other people—seems to comprise the most basic level of self-related feelings in depression. One last dimension presumably resulting from the affective changes under discussion is the experience of time. Depressed patients often complain about a radical disruption of everyday temporality. Most notably, the patients’ orientation towards the future as a temporal dimension potentially different from the present seems profoundly distorted. Often, time seems to stand still, as the very idea of a potential change of the current state seems absent from experience. Again, the distortion of the patients’ sense of capability might account for this pathological change. Finding oneself unable to act and thus unable to effect any change in the world undermines the practical basis of the very idea of a change of situation (and correlatively, of a change of one’s own state). Being unable to act amounts to one’s being tied to the current state of affairs and thus to the present moment. The experienced present may in this way extend indefinitely and turn into what Heidegger has called a “standing now” (cf. Heidegger, 1995, pp. 123–126). In light of this it is not surprising that this altered experience can give rise to strong feelings of dread and despair—emotions quite often reported by depressed persons.8 Thus, in all, *the condition of clinical depression seems to present an encompassing “mirror image” of human affectivity*. Depression marks a distortion of the root dimension of our affective orientation in the world and therefore can help us gain insight into the complex structure of human feelings. With regard to affective self-awareness and self-construal, depressive experience seems to confirm the suggestion that a basic form of self-awareness comes in view as a modification of a person’s sense of ability and capacity, a sense that, in nonpathological cases, is often not distinct from action itself—in that case, it is a fundamental sense of agency. However, in depression, the capacity to act is severely distorted, leaving the patient with a debilitating sense of inability and impossibility. This sense of incapacity and impossibility then “infects” other practical and experiential dimensions, negatively affecting the depressed person’s relationship to the world in general, to other people, and certainly to her own embodied existence—it is always a distorted awareness of oneself.

#### Link Wall

#### 1AC Kellner –

**transcend the established state of** affairs

#### losing the ability to discover more liberating possibilities

#### 1AC Arendt

can be diagnosed theoretically as an innate incapacity

#### 1AC Minniyakhmetova

**intellectual and creative capacity of the inhabitants**

#### The 1AC’s belief of a better future becomes complicit in the logic of rehabilitative futurism that consistently renders the disabled body as ontologically negative. Imagining a better future is threatened by the notion of disabled child – these notions of futurism necessitate the cure or elimination of disability.

**Mollow 15**[Anna Mollow(Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar, UC Dissertation-Year Fellow, coeditor of Sex and Disability and the co-editor of DSM-CRIP). “The Disability Drive.” University of California at Berkeley. Pg 85-88. Spring 2015. Accessed 3/6/20. <https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf> //Recut Xu from UTDD]

Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future‟s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the innocent‟Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists‟ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You‟re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman‟s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman‟s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### 1AC Jones 3

**distorting the ability to imagine futures**

#### The 1AC’s call for ongoing flight through science fiction assumes a universal mobility both metaphorically and literally. Their search for an escape within infrastructure designed to deny movement encourages individual capacitation as a resourse to capitalist violence.

Franks 19 (Matt Franks – Professor in the [Department of English and Philosophy](https://www.westga.edu/academics/coah/english/index.php), [College of Arts and Humanities](https://www.westga.edu/academics/coah/index.php) at the University of West Georgia. “Breeding Aliens, Breeding AIDS Male Pregnancy, Disability, and Viral Materialism in ‘Bloodchild’” Chapter in *The Matter of Disability: Materiality, Biopolitics, and Crip Affect* pgs. 194-197. DOA: 11/15/19, kbb)

“Bloodchild” showcases how HIV/AIDS is fundamentally racialized, as the humans in the story are described as having “brown flesh” (14). The story mirrors Alexander Weheliye’s argument that “the politicization of the biological always already represents a racializing assemblage” (12). More specifically, Julie Minich stresses that disability is “highly racialized— both in the sense that disability is disproportionately concentrated within communities of color, which receive unequal health care and experience elevated risk of experiencing workplace injuries, environmental contamination, and state violence, and in the sense that disability is often used rhetorically to reinforce white supremacy” (para. 7). HIV/AIDS is a prominent manifestation of how disability is racialized in material ways: as Nirmala Erevelles demonstrates, just as black women’s bodies were used in the reproduction of slaves, the “construction of African American women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity continues to manifest itself in policies representing African American women with HIV/AIDS as both dependent and diseased and, thus, ineligible for resources needed for survival” (“Color of Violence” 122). The state allows the virus to disproportionately infect and kill people of color, who are excluded from treatment and prevention efforts that rely on racist notions of black bodies as already diseased and disabled. To read “Bloodchild” as an HIV/AIDS narrative entails seeing virality as a metaphoric and material mode of bodily difference that is interwoven with historical practices of racism. Neel Ahuja argues that, in the expansion of the US empire over the long twentieth century, “the purported universality of imperial public health was betrayed by its circulation of racial fears of disease. This made the microscopic bodies of viruses and bacteria into the very matter of racial differentiation, the lively conduits of debility and death that threatened a dangerous intimacy between species and social groups in a globalizing world of empire” (5). Such dangers called for biomedical management techniques that would insulate against the risk of racial and species mixing on a material level, to ensure prolonged life in a racially stratified order. “Bloodchild” repre- sents this order in an enslaved human population who are trained to participate in their own enslavement, as Elys Weinbaum argues. Gan and his family are forcefully “implanted” with alien DNA and then subject to the imperatives of “care” and disposability dictated by their alien overlords. In terms of HIV/AIDS, the story illuminates that, as Shahani argues, “the attempts to manage ‘risk’ only place queer communities of color in greater proximity to death and disposability” (26). In other words, Butler demonstrates how the modes of biological control over black bodies that were developed in slavery have adapted to the racialized micropowers of HIV/AIDS biopolitics. As an allegory about slavery coded in terms of male pregnancy, “Bloodchild” makes apparent how disability is materially produced on the flesh to institute racial control. As Pickens argues about the protagonist Dana in Butler’s novel Kindred, “Her disability remains tethered to historical black experiences of enslavement in America. So, disability moves beyond metaphor or narrative prosthesis to foreground Dana’s embodiment as testimony about the reality of having social and political ideology emblazoned on one’s flesh” (170). In other words, slave owners mutilated black bodies, producing physical and social disabilities as a technique of controlled dependence. And, like the Tlic, slave owners forcibly impregnated female slaves, raping them in order to ensure a steady supply of future slave generations. Erevelles argues that “slave women were utilized not only to meet the Master’s sexual needs, but also in a very concrete way to reproduce the labor force in the slave economy” (Disability and Difference 57). Erevelles and Pickens demonstrate the materiality of disability as it was inscribed on black flesh under slavery, tracing how6 masters enforced ownership over slaves by physical disabling them as a way of administering their dependence and obliterating black kinship structures. In “Bloodchild,” the Tlic similarly produce disability on and in the bodies of their human reproductive hosts. They implant material dependence into the “brown flesh” of their slaves, since the pregnant humans will die if unattended by Tlic care. As Elyce Helford argues, “T’Gatoi, like slavemasters of the antebellum South, attempts to win cooperation through coercion and contentment through narcotics” (267). “Bloodchild” makes apparent the thread that connects the narcotic, sexual, physical, and mental control over black slaves with the current exposure of black populations to HIV/AIDS. Butler highlights the sinister nature of this system of dependence by describing how the Tlic eggs are “anchored” into the human host’s blood vessels with “hooks,” suggesting not only the parasitic nature of the alien brood but also the fact that killing or removing them would also kill the host (18). While disability theorists insist that dependence is a common feature to all human life, disabled people and people of color are particularly vulnerable to the manipulation of dependence when the biopolitical state hooks them to its own institutional lifelines. As Mitchell and Snyder demonstrate, for example, “Contemporary bodies find themselves increasingly colonized by ‘big pharma’ through a process that segments body parts into insufficiencies, ailments, and shortcomings in need of chemical and surgical interventions” (40). Such economies of dependence are also part of the afterlife of slavery: as Christina Sharpe argues, slavery “simultaneously exhausted the lungs and bodies of the enslaved even as it was imagined and operationalized as that which kept breath in and vitalized the Black body,” and we are now “living in the wake” of such managed forms of “aspiration” (112–13). The state reduces the autonomy of people with disabilities and people of color by enforcing dependence on state institutions in ways that prevent alternate forms of community support. Within its context of slavery, “Bloodchild” demonstrates how the management of disability was, and continues to be, central to the management of black bodies—not only because slaves were literally disabled via amputation, torture, and forced physical and reproductive labor, but also because disability was inscribed on black flesh to ensure dependence on white masters and on the state.12 Resistance to such forms of enforced dependency has often tended to reassert black able-bodiedness. But, as “Bloodchild” crucially demonstrates, such recourse to rehabilitation is destined to fail. Resistance, Butler’s text insists, can only be achieved by forging new relations of dependence through crip/queer/black practices of taking ownership over one’s communal and individual risk, precarity, and dependence rather than attempting to purge disability from blackness. As Ellen Samuels argues, from the slave era to today, critics have been “deeply invested in the recuperation of the black body from a pathologizing and dehumanizing racism that often justified enslavement with arguments that people of African descent were inherently unable to take care of themselves—in other words, disabled” (30). The tight bind between disability and blackness in the time and afterlife of slavery means that in attempting to fight to regain bodily and symbolic freedom, resistance has often denigrated disability and attempted to assert the able-bodied, able-minded independence of black individuals, communities, and populations.13 In “Bloodchild” Gan’s brother, Qui, represents how such strategies of recuperating the debilitated black body to resist enslavement are destined to fail. Qui’s strategy is to run—an able-bodied activity that represents his determination to escape from being enslaved by using his individual, capable body to flee his Tlic masters. But in an enclosed, prison- and plantation-like compound on an alien planet, there is literally nowhere to run. The very ground and infrastructure is set up to deny him mobility: “He began running away— until he realized there was no ‘away’” (19). By attempting to recuperate his individual, able-bodied, masculine independence, Qui only further entrenches his enslavement. In contrast to Qui’s running, Butler insists that unofficial, non-statesponsored forms of crip community care, like Lien’s, are the only potentially empowering ones for crip/queer/black people, because individual rehabilitation and institutional state care are always disciplinary and many crip/queer/black subjects are barred access to them. “Bloodchild” is rife with imagery of cages that represent the enfolding protection offered by the state, but also the entrapment that they learn not to see, or to see as a comfort rather than an institutional structure of enslavement and incarceration. The insect-like limbs of the Tlic represent this comforting imprisonment. Gan, who was “first caged within T’Gatoi’s many limbs only three minutes after [his] birth,” finds it comfortable and secure to be enclosed in them (8). But the other members of his family, who did not experience this “embrace” until they were older, “said it made them feel caged” (6). The Tlic cage humans to foster passivity and make them adapt to and even grow to love their imprisonment.14 In the afterlife of slavery, moreover, this aspect of the story demonstrates how the mass incarceration of black people in prisons continues to materially segregate racialized populations.

#### This regime turns disability into narrative prosthesis – discourse of liberal inclusion facilitate interventions on the body to augment or eliminate disability so as to restore wholeness – that requires the exclusion of bodies outside of an acceptable degree of difference.

Mitchell and Snyder ‘1

[David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder, Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois-Chicago. 2001. “Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse.”] pat – ask me for the PDF

The controlling concept of this volume, narrative prosthesis, situates the experience and representational life of disability upon the ironic grounding of an unsteady rhetorical stance. In a literal sense a prosthesis seeks to accomplish an illusion. A body deemed lacking, unfunctional, or inappropriately functional needs compensation, and prosthesis helps to effect this end. Yet the prosthesizing of a body or a rhetorical figure carries with it ideological assumptions about what is aberrant. The judgment that a mechanism is faulty is always already profoundly social. The need to restore a disabled body to some semblance of an originary wholeness is the key to a false recognition: that disabilities extract one from a social norm or average of bodies and their corresponding (social) expectations. To prostheticize, in this sense, is to institute a notion of the body within a regime of tolerable deviance. If disability falls too far from an acceptable norm, a prosthetic intervention seeks to accomplish an erasure of difference all together; yet, failing that, as is always the case with prosthesis, the minimal goal is to return one to an acceptable degree of difference.

It is important to state at the outset that this argument does not deny the reality of physical incapacity or cognitive difference. Rather, we set out the coordinates of the social reception and literary representation of those labeled deviant on ideological as well as physical planes. David Wills defines prosthesis as a term that mediates between the realm of the literary and the realm of the body. In relation to the latter, Wills argues that, far from signifying a deficiency, the prostheticized body is the rule, not the exception. All bodies are deficient in that materiality proves variable, vulnerable, and inscribable. The body is first and foremost a linguistic relation which cannot be natural or average. The textual nature of language, be it oral or print, lacks the very physicality that it seeks to control or represent. A normal body, as Lennard Davis has demonstrated, is a theoretical premise from which all bodies must, by definition, fall short. The body is up against an abstraction with which it cannot compete because the norm is an idealized quantitative and qualitative measure that is divorced from (rather than derived from) the observation of bodies, which are inherently variable. This false model of an ideal body also fails to consider the contingencies of bodies functioning within specific social and historical contexts. It is, in other words, a body divorced of time and space—a thoroughly artificial affair.

Consequently, to return to Wills's fluid notion of prosthesis, the deficient body, by virtue of its insufficiency, serves as baseline for the articulation of the normal body: "the prosthetic body will not be an exception but the paradigm for the body itself. If you will, it is by means of prosthesis that I wish to insist on the non-originary status of the body" (137). The relation between a body and the language used to describe it is unstable, an alien alliance: materiality is not language, and language cannot be material, although each strives to conform to the terms of the other. We engage our bodies in efforts to make their stubborn materiality "fit" ideals. Likewise, words give us the illusion of a fix upon the material world that they cannot deliver.

#### The alternative is unwavering pessimism – only a refusal of the world can disrupt the current notion of optimism – voting neg is a refusal of progress.

**Selck 16**[Michael L Selck(B.S., Southern Illinois University – Carbondale). “Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn’t.” Southern Illinois University Carbondale. Jan 2016. Accessed 3/16/20. <https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1845&context=gs_rp> //Recut Xu]

The disabled are dying and with them dis/abled culture is being eradicated. In the time between formulating this project and its completion already too many disabled souls have been taken from this world, including pivotal disability studies influences for this research. I barely had enough time to mourn the loss of disability advocate and inspiration porn critic Stella Young before grieving the loss of disability studies exemplar Tobin Siebers. Attached to the grief I feel as a result of the fading disability studies community is the perpetual grief I harbor since my disabled Father’s suicide and in turn the grief concomitant to the claiming of a disabled identity. I choose to start out this project with grief because it communicates the tenor of this research; this is not the disability studies project of inspiration or utopia. My entry point to the disability studies dialogue is riddled with grief, anger, and pain and it is as such that this project plots a course of disability research that attempts to make a space free from the ideological constraints of optimism. The language surrounding dis/ability is highly political. Entire words, phrases, and identities are stretched between, in, and out of the nexus of dis/ability. The choice, for instance, to include a backslash in the word dis/ability represents for Goodley (2014) a desire to delineate and expand each of the categories in the face of global neoliberalism. My initial research inquired about the impact of dis/abled terms and phrases. I went to interrogate rhetoric like “special education”, “handicapable”, and one of the most glaringly overused insults in the American education system “retard”. The scholarship I was coming up with was plentiful but was for the most part located entirely outside of intercultural communication programs like the one I was attending. For the most part the few and far between intercultural communication projects about dis/ability I was able to locate were without modal complexity and didn’t bear semblance to so many of my own experiences. I was beginning to notice a layer of optimism that has been communicatively imprinted upon the negotiation of dis/abled identity. The angst started to manifest as I questioned if I was in the correct field or if dis/ability even was ‘cultural’. I felt a very real cultural erasure of dis/ability in academia and ultimately that glaring lack of consideration is what pushed me to performance studies. I first worked to close the apparent research gap by crafting a collaborative performance titled Under the Mantle (UTM), which put dis/ability, communication scholarship, and pessimist philosophy on stage. The larger purpose of this research report is to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability from communication studies by autoethnographically analyzing the crip-pessimist performance art project Under The Mantle. This research report will first detail the components of the theoretical work that was drawn on to create UTM. Next I offer a literature review to demonstrate the combination of optimism and neglect dis/ability has undergone in intercultural communication models. Following that section I mark my shift to performance methods as I explain how narrative autoethnography can illuminate cultural misconceptions regarding the dis/abled. In the last sections of this report I offer a textual analysis of the performance UTM and analyze three significant arguments of the instillation before concluding. Contextualizing Critical Dis/Ability Theory Often used interchangeably, critical disability theory (CDT) and critical disability studies (CDS) contest dis/ablism (Goodley, 2011, 2014; Devlin & Pothier, 2006; Hosking, 2008). There are several unique additions made to CDS with every new instantiation. Scholars in European countries and Canada attend to the theory, with United States academics often underrepresented. There are three concurrent themes of CDT that I will synthesize in this section with some dis/ability studies authors claiming there are as many as seven themes of CDT (Hosking, 2008). In the introduction to their edited collection of dis/ability essays, Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier (2006) present three themes of CDT as, first, to highlight the unequal status to which persons with disabilities are confined; second, to destabilize necessitarian assumptions that reinforce the marginalization of persons with disabilities; and third, to help generate the individual and collective practical agency of persons with disabilities in the struggles for recognition and redistribution. (p. 18, emphasis mine) Already the connections between the CDT and the critical communication paradigm are visible as each respectively forefronts notions of power, privilege, identity, and agency. Outlined in more detail, the first theme of CDT argues that there is systemic micro and macro level discrimination against bodies with disabilities. To some critical communication scholars, this theme might be obvious, but it seldom is when “the resulting exclusion of those who do not fit able-bodied norms may not be noticeable or even intelligible” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). As the bumper sticker on my laptop proudly disclaims, “Not all disabilities are visible,” which necessarily adds a level of nuance and complexity to the way that dis/ability studies attend to the prospect of discrimination and violence. Often times, “social organization according to able-bodied norms is just taken as natural, normal, inevitable, necessary, even progress” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). It might be true that the lack of collaborative work between critical communication studies and dis/ability studies is because neoliberalism is supremely effective at rebranding marginalized oppression as a marker of its progress. The implications of this assertion are dire but essential to the basis of crip-pessimism. Theoretical approaches based in pessimism and skepticism are often necessary to distinguish the instruments of self destruction that have been mistaken for those of self betterment. Thus, a key question remains, what is regarded as progress and to whom does it count? The politics of progress call for the second tenet of CDT, which is a destabilization of neoliberal practices that strip power and agency from bodies with disabilities. Devlin and Pothier (2006) use the language of “anti-necessitarian” (p. 2), which refers to the efficacy of social organizations and an unflinching skepticism of liberalism. For Shildrick and Price (1999), “disabled bodies call into question the ‘giveness’ of the ‘natural body’ and, instead, posit a corporeality that is fluid in its investments and meanings” (p. 1). Anti-necessitarian logics ask questions that remain innocuous to the critical communication paradigm. Can the architectural proliferation of stairs and multiple levels on buildings be attributed to neoliberalism and active disablism? If stairs seem to focus too exclusively on physical impairments, then what about the sensitivity of the building’s lighting, acoustics, and spatiality? Finally, if neoliberalism fights to protect its grand narrative of progress then is the social exclusion of bodies with disabilities necessary for the day-to-day operation of our globalized world? As Donaldson (2002) posits: “theories of gendered, raced, sexed, classed, and disabled bodies offer us critical languages for ‘denaturalising’ impairment’” (p. 112) at the level of the subjective and inter-subjective. The third theme of CDT is to attend to the agency of bodies with disabilities in the struggle for recognition. One key element of extending agency to the disabled is the use of social experience. Experience is subjective “but experience remains intimately connected to political and social existence, and therefore individuals and societies are capable of learning from their experiences” (Siebers, 2008, p. 82). Though absolutely necessary, it is not enough to write treatises on the oppression of the disabled over time. Academics, theorists, intercultural trainers, and storytellers alike should be aware of the constant risks of representation. Representation and context are at the core of critical disability studies. The notion of agency is as unstable as the notions of dis/ability. There is no one-size-fits-all human rights based approach that will be suitable to address all disabled experiences, as the theoretical call for crip-pessimism will remind us. Instead of a universal abstract Rawlsian concept of social justice, CDS “attend(s) to the relational components of dis/ablism” (Goodley, 2011, p. 159). By a Rawlsian concept of social justice I mean a model that relies on distributive justice with utopist equality at its core. Where utopist equality projects highlight human sameness to the point of purity. CDT unavoidably invites a discussion about difference into the folds as postmodern and post-structural thinkers position the self as defined constantly in relation to others. Therein lies the difference between an equality model and a justice model of social identity. Often in the attempt to open up spaces for reconsidering self and other, CDS celebrates disability as a positive identity marker. This essay offers a strong argument of caution that the inclusion of CDS in critical communication studies might rely too heavily on celebrations of disabled identity. Nothing better demonstrates that reliance on celebrating identity than the myriad language choices used to describe a disabled identity including: differently-abled, special needs, person with disability, disabled person, temporarily able-bodied, and others. Often, ablebodied audiences have a tendency to sensationalize the presence of disability in a space that has not traditionally welcomed it. Examples of this are highlighted by the increasingly popular discussion of ‘inspiration porn’ (Young, 2014) and Hollywood’s representation of disability. The tendency is to inspirationalize the disabled for achieving tasks that would not be celebrated if they were accomplished by an unimpaired body. Crossing the street, showing up on time, entering a building by oneself are all tasks profoundly routine to the non-disabled and yet simultaneously cherished as markers of progress for the disabled. Philosophical pessimism is articulated next as a way to temper the risk of sensationalizing dis/ability. The theories ultimately fuse together like orchids and wasps to generate the larger theme of crip-pessimism. Philosophical Pessimism Throughout the 19th century pessimism was one of the most popular intellectual and philosophical strains, crossing countries and continents. Authors such as Rousseau, Leopardi, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche overwhelmingly created and lead the spirit of pessimism. Contemporarily however, the word ‘pessimism’ is pejorative and describes a body’s emotional discontent rather than intellectual engagement with the world. Dienstag (2009) writes, “Since pessimism is perceived more as a disposition than as a theory, pessimists are seen primarily as dissenters from whatever the prevailing consensus of their time happens to be, rather than as constituting a continuous alternative” (p. 3). Power is responsible for ontological shifts, and during shifts some populations benefit while others are harmed. The turn in thinking about pessimism from an intellectual position to an emotional state has been particularly gratuitous for bodies with disabilities. I come to pessimism because of my experience with disability. My anxiety disorder comes with an exteriority of anti-social behavior that has branded me pessimistic. The concern for my anxiety in public situations is often commented on as overly critical, negative, narcissistic, and most often pessimistic. I experience an anxious state of becoming different, and after years of failing to rehabilitate my sameness to able-bodied standards, I have come to a comfort with pessimism. I choose to include pessimism as a theoretical crutch to avoid communication studies’ sensationalism of disability. I imagine that when critical communication studies does bridge the dis/ability research gap that it might, at least initially, extend some neoliberal logics at the expense of CDS. This might manifest by scholars simply asserting disabled personhood where it does not institutionally, culturally, or individually exist. I find that CDT and philosophical pessimism combine in unique and valuable ways, particularly around tensions of personhood, abstract ideal humanism, and neoliberalism. Neoliberalism should be understood as “the superiority of individualized, market-based competition over other modes of organization. This basic principle is the hallmark of neo-liberal thought— one with old roots that lay partly in Anglo economics and partly in German schools of liberalism” (Mudge, 2008, p. 706-707). There are four components of pessimism outlined by Joshua Foa Dienstag (2006) in his book Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit that I wish to explore difference through. They are as following that: (1) time is a burden, (2) history is ironic, (3) human existence is absurd, and finally (4) resignation or affirmation. To write about pessimism necessarily involves questions of time, temporality, and history. The development of philosophical pessimism, specifically, the theories regarding the burden of time-consciousness, begins with difference. For the pessimist, the concept of time begets a differentiation between human and animal. Being a dog-owner myself, I have heard the colloquial aphorism that dogs, as all animals, have no concept of time. Pessimists understand time consciousness as a unique, but ultimately loathsome, trait of the human condition. Even in projects that appear to be geared toward sameness there are always unperceived and neglected populations. For example, even the U.S. constitution alleges persons of color were (and still are often) racially subjugated as property instead of considered to be fully human. The notion of difference is at the center of the pessimist’s position on time-consciousness because the philosophy accepts that the conditions of our existence are subject to relentless unpredictable change. “To the pessimists, however, the human condition is existentially unique— its uniqueness consisting precisely in the capacity for time-consciousness” (Dienstag, 2009, p. 20). For the pessimist nothing is ever the same, everything is always different, and to inhabit linear time means that everything in existence is always rushing off into the past. The advent of human time consciousness is also what leads the pessimist to find the course of history to be ironic. History is ironic for the pessimist because progress is always related to a greater set of unperceived consequences. As suggested above, philosophical pessimism acknowledges that change occurs; technologies develop and improve over time. Pessimists ask if those improvements are related to a greater set of costs that are not immediately recognizable. (Dienstag, 2006, p. 25) Similar to critical disability theory, pessimism interrogates power and privilege. Pessimists rely on the logic of difference to chart consequences. Consequences go unperceived because they occur across populations with disproportionate access to power, populations that are often culturally unintelligible. For instance, the massive boom in mobile technologies like cell phones and laptops has created vast pits of ‘e-waste’ in Africa, surges in child labor, and conflict over rare earth minerals (Vidal, 2013). Pessimists use difference to tease out the distinction between the instruments of suffering and those of betterment. The third philosophical pessimistic position is that human existence is absurd. The absurdity of existence “is illustrated by the persistent mismatch between human purposes and the means available to achieve them: or again, between our desire for happiness and our capacity to encounter or sustain it” (Dienstag, 2006, p. 32). Difference is built upon exanimations of power, which is both fluid and transferable but ultimately permanent. Classical western philosophy has an optimistic pragmatism built into it that posits there must be an answer to our questions. Alternatively, the pessimist embraces uncertainty, ambiguity, and intersubjectivity. Pessimism encourages a sense of comfort around the idea of multiple, coexistent, and perhaps competing histories. Neoliberal optimism is the logic of conflict as materially reconcilable, rather than antagonistically irreconcilable. The fourth and final tenet of pessimism that we are to examine asks what we are to do about our dire human condition. There are multiplicities of rationales that ultimately inform the pessimistic dualism to either resign from life or affirm it entirely. I defer to an existential or Nietzschean pessimism that recognizes suffering is inevitable for two reasons. First, human time-consciousness necessitates an awareness of our impending death. Second, mutually assured value systems will always intersubjectively exist. The choice to affirm life in its entirety is a pessimistic choice. Embracing life as both miserable and beautiful, fleeting and enduring, validates the perpetually fragmented subject seeking a world that exists beyond good and evil and instead just is.

#### alt solves case

#### 1AC Jones

**production’ and the ability to ‘work’ a resource**

**‘waste’ their potential and deprive future generations**

## Case

### OV

#### Rob – better debater

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems- the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better framework blocks.

#### 2] Spillover- they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – judges vote on [x] all the time and nothing happens.

#### 3] Competition- debate is the wrong forum for change and competition moots any ethical value of the aff. Winning rounds just makes it seem like you want to win and a loss is internalized as a technical mistake.

#### 4] no cookies –

#### Presumption negates

#### 1] refuse positive affects like the 1ac

#### 2] less change from squo means safer

### University K

#### The myth of the University as a site of objective reason is a farce. The wheels of the academic machine built on the fantasy of transparent communication now point only toward military ends. Critiques that attempt to be point of systemic implosion.

Hoofd, 10 [Assistant Professor in the Communications and New Media Programme at the National University of Singapore, “*The accelerated university: Activist-academic alliances and simulation of thought,*” Ephemera Journal, vol. 10 no. 1]

But far from an ‘a-disciplinary self-constitution’ that supposedly overcomes any fictitious distinction, Investigacció for one relies heavily on the common fictitious distinction between activism and academia to validate their praxis. By contrasting their initiative to the false objectivity of academicism, they validate their own knowledge production by claiming to be in the margins as opposed to the ‘ivory tower’, as if the latter is a stable area from which one can detach oneself from the outside world and hence objectively analyse. Also, one could wonder to what extent one is actually speaking from the margins when one has the time, technologies, spaces and connections to organise an evepoont like Investigacció. The desire to generate knowledge from ‘one’s own subjectivity, without limitations’ (2005: 3) is analogous to the mythical humanist narrative of breaking with and improving upon previous knowledge – a form of knowledge-innovation that the academic institution is also infused with. The university of excellence as well as its doublings into projects like Investigacció are therefore an effect of its repetitions (with a difference) into the neo-liberal mythical space of progress and acceleration. The creation of more and more ‘spaces and mechanisms of production, exchange and collective reflection’ (2005: 3) is indeed precisely what late-capitalism seeks to forge, as long as such reflection generates an intensification of production. The idea that subjectivities from social movements are in any way less produced by neo-liberal globalisation is highly problematic. In fact, such an idea suggests a rather positivist notion of the subject – similar to that supposedly objective academic individual Investigacció seeks to dethrone. Investigacció then somewhat nostalgically narrates a subject untainted by power structures and technologies. In fact, the Investigaccióinitiative displays how the subject of activist research empowers her- or himself throughrecreating the fictitious distinction between activism and academia. S/he does so by reproducing this opposition, which in turn co-creates and accelerates these ‘new spaces’ – spaces that were created with the goal of facilitating global capitalism and its speed-elite, and that allow for the perfection of military power through technologies of surveillance. The call for participants to become active and productive in co-organising the international event – of course, without any monetary remuneration – is also much present in Investigacció’s rhetoric. They suggest that participants should engage with one another not only at the meeting, but especially through the online spaces Investigacció has created for the purpose of generating activist research. ‘Take action!’ says their flyer, ‘[...] make it so the conference is yours!’ This seductive appeal to the subject-individual as the centre of creative production is very common to neo-liberal consumerism and its emphasis on cybernetic interactivity. But it is also false in that it gives the participants a sense of control over Investigacció that they actually do not have – eventually, the main organisers (have already) set the agenda and handed out the stakes. In short, the organisers fail to situate themselves by pretending everyone is on the same level of privilege – for example, not requiring monetary compensation – in this project, and this failure is strangely an effect of their attempt at reviving a more democratic academic structure. Information Initially, one could think that Baudrillard’s assessment confirms my analytical suspicion regarding activist-research projects. In ‘The Implosion’, Baudrillard starts from the premise that the increase of information in our media-saturated society results in a loss of meaning because it ‘exhausts itself in the act of staging communication’. New media technologies exacerbate the subject’s fantasy of transparent communication, while increasingly what are communicated are mere copies of the same, a ‘recycling in the negative of the traditional institution’ (Baudrillard, 1994: 80). New technologies are simply the materialisation of that fantasy of communication, and the ‘lure’ (1994: 81) of such a technocratic system resides in the requirement of active political engagement to uphold that fantasy. This translates in a call to subjectivise oneself – to be vocal, participate, and to ‘play the [...] liberating claim of subjecthood’ (1994: 85). The result of the intensifying circular logic of this system, he says, is that meaning not only implodes in the media, but also that the social implodes in the masses – the construction of a ‘hyperreal’ (1994: 81). Contra the claim of Glocal Research Space that such praxes of alliance are ‘without an object’ (Glocal Research Space, 2003: 19), this does not mean that objectification does not take place at all. Instead, and in line with Baudrillard’s argument, the urge to subjectivise oneself and the objectification of the individual go hand in hand under speed-elitism – a double bind that locks the individual firmly into her or his technocratic conditions. Indeed, the argument in ‘Activist Research’ that ‘research [should be] like an effective procedure [which is] in itself already a result’ (2003: 19) describes the conditions of Readings’ ‘university of excellence’ where any research activity, thanks to technological instantaneity, translates immediately into the capitalist result of increased information flow (Readings, 1996: 22). Active subjects and their others become the cybernetic objects of such a system of information flow. The insistence in ‘Activist Research’ on free, travelling and nomadic research simply makes sure that this logic of increased flow is repeated. Because of this desire for increased flow and connection, activist-research projects are paradoxically highly exclusivist in advocating the discourses and tools of the speed-elite. The problem with projects like Edu-Factory or the productive cross-over of activism and academia is therefore not only that their political counter-information means just more information (and loss of meaning) as well as more capitalist production, but that it puts its faith in precisely those technologies and fantasies of control, communication and of ‘being political’ that underlie the current logic of overproduction. It is at this point that John Armitage and Joanne Roberts in ‘Chronotopia’ contend that such a ‘cyclical repetition’ (Armitage and Roberts, 2002: 52) is particularly dangerous because the fantasy of control remains exactly that, a fantasy. At the same time, this increasingly forceful repetition can only eventually give way to ‘the accident’ because chronotopian speed-spaces are fundamentally and exponentially unstable. Armitage and Roberts’ idea of ‘cyclical repetition’ through chronotopianism does thus not mean an exact repetition of the speed-elite’s quest for mastery – instead, I would argue that it is this immanent quality of difference in repetition, of the ‘essential drifting due to [a technology’s] iterative structure cut off from […] consciousness as the authority of the last analysis’ as Derrida calls it in ‘Signature Event Context’ (Derrida, 1982: 316) that allows for the accident or true event to appear. The difference through technologically sped-up repetition appears then perhaps as a potential, but only precisely as a growing potential that cannot be willed – in this sense, it will be an unanticipated event indeed. One could then speak of an intensification of politics in what is perhaps too hastily called the neo-liberal university, opening up unexpected spaces for critique in the face of its neo-liberalisation, which in turn points to the fundamental instability of its enterprise. Activist-research projects add to this intensification by virtue of their techno-acceleration. This intensification of politics is no ground for univocal celebration, since it remains also the hallmark of the neo-liberal mode of production of knowledge through the new tele-technologies as excellent, regardless of its critical content. The current university’s instability mirrors and aggravates the volatility of a capitalism marked by non-sustainability, a growing feminisation of poverty, the rise of a new global upper class, and highly mediated illusions of cybernetic mastery. This nonetheless also opens up new forms of thought, if only appearing as ‘accidents’. Derrida hints at this, but also at the university’s elusiveness, in ‘Mochlos, or: the Conflict of the Faculties’, when he claims that he ‘would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology’ (Derrida, 1993: 5, emphasis mine). Almost, but never quite – here then emerges the possibility of truly subversive change. But this change will not be brought about by the mere content of the critique, but by the way it pushes acceleration to the point of systemic disintegration or implosion. In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard calls this the ‘fatal strategy’ that contemporary theory must adopt: a sort of conceptual suicide attack which aims at pulling the rug out from under the speed-elitist mobilisation of semiotic oppositions, and which shows the paradox behind any attempt at structural predictions. In ‘The Final Solution’, Baudrillard relates this intensification of the humanist obsession with dialectics, mastery, and transparency – the quest for immortality that is at the basis of techno-scientific research – to destruction and the death drive through the metaphor of and actual research around cloning, which strangely resonates well with Derrida’s investigation of the tele-technological archive in Archive Fever. I read Baudrillard’s ‘Final Solution’ here as a metaphor for the duplication (cloning) of thought into virtual spaces outside the university walls proper. If contemporary research seeks to make human cloning possible, argues Baudrillard, then this endeavour is equivalent to cancer: after all, cancer is simply automatic cloning, a deadly form of multiplication. It is of interest here to note that the possibility of creating an army of clones has likewise garnered much military interest, just as academia today more and more serves military ends. As the logic of cloning as automatic multiplication is typical of all current technological and humanist advancements, the exacerbation of this logic can only mean more promise and death. At this point my argument mirrors the apocalyptic tone of the activist-research projects. In the final analysis, the problem with Edu-Factory, Facoltà di Fuga, Investigacció, Universidad Nómada, Ricercatori Precari, and Glocal Research Space is that these projects entail a very specific form of subjugation with dire consequences for the slower and less techno-genic classes. Techno-scientific progress entails a regress into immortality, epitomised by a nostalgia typical of the current socio-technical situation, for when we were ‘undivided’ (Baudrillard, 2000: 6). I contend that Baudrillard refers not only to the lifeless stage before humans became sexed life forms, but also makes an allusion to psycho-analytic readings of the ‘subject divided in language’ and its nostalgia for wholeness and transparent communication. The desire for immortality, like archive fever, is therefore the same as the Freudian death drive, and we ourselves ultimately become the object of our technologies of scrutiny and nostalgia. The humanist quest of totally transparency of oneself and of the world to oneself that grounds the idea of the modern techno-scientific university, is ultimately an attempt at (self-)destruction, or in any case an attempted destruction of (one’s) radical difference [alterity]. The urgent political question, which Stiegler problematically avoided in Disorientation, then becomes: which selves are and will become caught up in the delusion of total self-transparency and self-justification, and which selves will be destroyed? And how may we conceive of an ‘ethic of intellectual inquiry or aesthetic contemplation’ that ‘resists the imperatives of speed’, as Jon Cook likewise wonders in ‘The Techno-University and the Future of Knowledge’ (Cook, 1999: 323)? It is of particular importance to note here that the very inception of this question and its possible analysis, like the conception of the speed-elite, is itself again a performative repetition of the grounding myth of the university of independent truth, justice and reason. Therefore, in carrying forward the humanist promise, this analysis is itself bound up in the intensification of the logic of acceleration and destruction, and that is then also equally tenuous. This complicity of thought in the violence of acceleration itself in turn quickens the machine of the humanist promise, and can only manifest itself in the prediction of a coming apocalypse – whether it concerns a narrative of the death of thought and the university, or of a technological acceleration engendering the Freudian death drive. We are then simply the next target in the technological realisation of complete γνωθι σαυτον (know thyself) – or so it seems. Because after all, a clone is never an exact copy, as Baudrillard very well knows; and therefore, the extent to which activist-research projects hopefully invite alterity can thankfully not yet be thought.

#### We have reached the end of production- reality is dead and communication is dissuasive. The sign is not exchanged with the real but exchanged with other signs, lacking any meaning.

**Pawlett 07** [William Pawlett (senior lecturer in Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Wolverhampton). “Jean Baudrillard: Against Banality.” Routledge. 2007. Accessed 11/14/20. //Houston Memorial DX]

According to Baudrillard we have now reached the ‘end’ of production. Production still takes place of course, but it leads an increasingly shadowy, obscure existence: banished to the third world, operating within closed and guarded compounds, non-unionised, off the radar (see, for example, Klein, 2001: 195–229). But Baudrillard’s ‘end’ of production is not only geo-political but also epistemological. The sign-code or ‘structural law of value’ signals the end of production: the structural configuration of value simply and simultaneously puts an end to the regimes of production, political economy, representation and signs. With the code, all this collapses into simulation. Strictly speaking, neither the ‘classical’ economy not the political economy of the sign ceases to exist: they lead a secondary existence becoming a sort of phantom principle of dissuasion. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 8) So, for Baudrillard the logic of economic production, analysed by Marx, and the logic of representation, analysed by Saussure, follow the same form: they establish principles of equivalence. Equivalence establishes regulated, ordered exchange, linear development and accumulation. In the economic sphere money is the abstract principle of equivalence: everything has a price and that price is directly comparable with the price for anything else. An academic, for example, is paid twice as much as a nurse, a doctor or lawyer three times as much as an academic and so on. Similarly, in the sphere of language or representation a relation of equivalence between signifier and signified, and between sign and referent, enables ‘meaning’ to be produced, exchanged and accumulated. The signifier ‘tree’ invokes the same ‘thing’ whether it is used by a child, a horticulturist or a poet. This Baudrillard dubs the ‘classical’ representation or ‘the second order of Simulacra’ (1993a: 53–7). The spheres of economy and of representation are linked by the same underlying form, but at the level of content they are distinct, they can be distinguished, and Baudrillard terms this a relation of ‘determinate’ equivalence. The ‘end’ of production occurs with the shift from determinate to increasingly ‘indeterminate’ equivalence. Signs circulate in the code and are able to do so because they tend to become detached from determinate signifieds. As the relationship between signifiers and signifieds is weakened the ‘referential dimension’ of meaning is undermined because it was the signified that supposedly ‘captured’ meaning out there in the world (the referent). Of course we do not live in a world of free-floating signs or signifiers that mean nothing, or alternatively anything (Callinicos, 1989: 145). This is a ludicrous misreading of Baudrillard given his emphasis on the constraining power of the code and his deconstruction of individual ‘needs’ and ‘wants’. Signifiers simulate the effect of meaning and reference: a ‘reality-effect’ is crucial to the operation of the capitalist system. It might be objected that signifiers have only ever simulated the effect of meaning and reference. In a sense, this is not far off the mark, since Baudrillard insists that the world is illusion, is simulacrum (1996c: 16–19, 2005d: 39–46). But there are, he asserts, meaningful, qualitative differences within simulacra, different and distinguishable orders of simulacra that have direct, meaningful and theorisable effects on lived relations and social experience. Baudrillard’s approach is, then, more sociological than is acknowledged, at least given a broad definition of the sociological!8 With the phase of simulation, equivalence is established through the sign: it is internal to the play of signifiers. Signifiers circulate without the possibility of dialectical negation (or critique) because the signifiers refer to each other rather than to a ‘real’, or referent. A ‘hyperreality’ of simulations is far less susceptible to critique based, as it is, on contrasting the true and the false, the real and the unreal: signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real . . . they do so on condition that they are no longer exchanged against the real.... Neither Saussure nor Marx had any presentiment of this: they were still in the golden age of the dialectic of the sign and the real... the ‘classical’ period of capital and value. Their dialectic is in shreds. (Baudrillard, 1993a: 7) The tensions, contradiction, oppositions and sheer unpredictability of the dialectic tend to be neutralised by simulation, although Baudrillard is clear that the dialectic does not disappear, nor of course is it transcended or obliterated. It endures, as do aspects of the first order of simulacra, but in tattered, fragmented form in the firmament of ideas that have had their moment but do not die (see also Baudrillard, 1994b: 21–7). This, in itself, is a paradoxical, other-than-dialectical process because, according to dialectics, one state is supposed to be definitely raised, resolved and transcended by another state. The dialectic rolls on, but it no longer captures our imagination. In a characteristic reversal strategy, directed at Marxist theory, Baudrillard argues that capitalism, rather than being ‘transcended’ by socialism, has actually leapt over the dialectic as it ‘substitutes the structural form of value, and currently controls every aspect of the system’s strategy’ (1993a: 7). Given this metamorphosis, Baudrillard asks whether we are we still living within capitalism. ‘Hyper-capitalism’ may be a more accurate term, he suggests, but what is not in doubt is that ‘the structural law of value is the purest, most illegible form of social domination . . . it no longer has any references within a dominant class or a relation of forces’ (1993a: 10–11). These are bold claims, yet Baudrillard, at this stage in his thought, does offer considerable substantiation in a discussion of the effects of the sign on labour, on wages and on strikes. Instead of labour we have signs of labour. In other words, labour as living historical agency, as force with the power to transform social relations, becomes a ‘dead’ abstraction in the economic calculations of capitalism. This process was well under way in Marx’s time and Marx produced the concepts of abstract labour and commodity fetishism to describe the way in which the living force of labour is hidden behind finished commodities. But, for Baudrillard, the living agency of labour is not just hidden or reified into commodities, it is also rendered symbolically dead – it is less and less a living principle of exchange. In an age of structural, permanent high unemployment, labour cannot be exchanged for employment, for a salary or for a comfortable life: Labour power is instituted on death. A man must die to become labour power... the economic violence capital inflicted on him in the equivalence of the wage and labour power is nothing next to the symbolic violence inflicted on him by his definition as a productive force. (1993a: 39) Labour, then, is a slow death; it is neutralisation by slow death, by ‘total conscription’. Labour no longer possesses a determinate relationship to production, having no meaningful equivalence in wages. Further, production no longer exists in a determinate relationship to profit or surplus value. There is in political economy, Baudrillard contends, a general loss of representational equivalence: ‘the monetary sign is severed from every social production and enters a phase of speculation’ (1993a: 21). In this new reign of indeterminacy there is ‘nothing with which to fight capital in determinate form’ (1993a: 19; see also 1993b: 26–35). Capital flows in global, deregulated money markets without reference to labour, work, production – without equivalence in terms of a ‘gold standard’. Similarly, Baudrillard contends, strikes once functioned within a binary system of equivalence held in dialectical tension, that of labour and capital, unions and management. But this notion of the strike is now ‘dead’ because striking cannot affect capitalism as ‘the reproduction of the form of social relations’ (1993a: 24). Capitalism can endure the lowering of profit margins, strike disruption and even the collapse of share values. These ‘contents’ are no longer fundamental to its operation. Capital need only impose itself as form in order to reproduce itself endlessly and it achieves this by investing all individuals with needs, wants and desires – the apparatus of the active consumer. Any ‘gains’ won by unions, such as pay increases or improvements in working conditions, are immediately realised as benefits to the functioning of the system; for example, as wages poured into consumer spending or in proliferating signs of an attractive progressive workplace. Baudrillard allows that new fractures and instabilities emerge. He gives the example of non-unionised immigrant workers destabilising the game of signs carried out by managers and unions. However, such instabilities are quickly neutralised by strategies of incorporation and assimilation. Increasingly management is able to appeal directly to workers without the intermediary of unions; such strategies, Baudrillard argues, were central to the events of May 1968 when unions backed down, compromising with management to maintain their role as representatives of labour. Nevertheless, Baudrillard never suggests that the integrated, coded system is complete or invulnerable. Quite the reverse! The system’s construction of the person as individual, productive, rational unit never really convinces anyone and is ‘beginning to crack dangerously’. Further, the system is constantly under threat from symbolic challenges, as we shall see in the next chapter. Finally, wages, Baudrillard argues, do not measure the amount we produce in our jobs, as both liberal and Marxist theories proclaim; instead, they are now ‘a sacrament, like a baptism (or the Extreme Unction)’ (1993a: 19). They mark us as full and genuine citizens of the consumer capitalist system. Workers today are less producers of measurable, determinate value than consumers, and their wage is access to the world of consumerism. Moreover, achieving wage status makes one a ‘purchaser of goods in the same way that capital is the purchaser of labour’ (1993a: 19). We are, according to Baudrillard, invested, colonised, occupied by capital, and apply a ‘capitalist mentality’ to all affairs. Wages do not guarantee any ‘thing’ in particular – that you are able to support yourself, afford somewhere to live, afford to have children – they simply insert us within the system of consumption. Consumption – the understanding of oneself as consumer and of the system around us as consumerist – becomes ‘obligatory’ and so is a symbolic relation.

### Part 1

#### AT Giroux

#### 1] cooption DA – capitalists profit off of critical pedagogy

#### 2] infiltration da – reading it in a capitalist environment means they know who to target

#### 3] uq o/w solvency – article published in 2016, and they already banned crt – you can do nothing

#### AT One Dimensional Thought –

#### 1] it’s the expansion of profit – ie reidentifying what is considered living – proven by commodification

#### 2] self defeating – means I have to be open to every potential/possibility

#### 3] give us the ballot – disrupt one dimensional thought in debate to short cirui

### Part 2

#### Outer space isn’t value neutral but has always been a question of militarization – debates between civilian and military use are two sides of the same coin that affectively polices society, culminating in total war.

Craven 19 [Brackets Original. Matt Craven (Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom). “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space”. European Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 2, May 2019, Pages 547–572, Accessed 1/12/22. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/30/2/547/5536739> //Xu]

There was little doubt to any of the observers of the launch of Sputniks I and II in 1957 that, despite their overtly ‘scientific’ purposes, the arms race had taken a decisive new turn. The exploration of outer space clearly offered a range of potential benefits; alongside the possibility of research into the physics of the atmosphere, it also would facilitate the collection of a host of meteorological, geophysical and cartographic data, enable enhanced capacity for radio communication and television broadcasting, facilitate safe navigation and, finally, open up the possibility of experimental flights to the moon and beyond. No one, however, was blind to the military implications.60 Within the USA, in particular, there was a widespread belief that command over outer space was an imperative that could not be missed: ‘[W]hoever controls outer space’, it was often said, ‘controls the world’.61 In the wilder speculations, thus, it was imagined that a nuclear power might be in a position to launch guided missiles from a space platform to any point on earth with barely any possibility of response, that outer space would be filled with ‘orbiting bombers’ or that the moon would become the site of military rocket installations. ‘Control’ of outer space, thus, was immediately conceived as being vital as a matter of security. Such concerns seemed to place a premium upon ensuring that the ‘use’ of outer space was exclusively peaceful – a view that seemed to be affirmed not merely by the establishment of COPUOS and successive proposals put to the UN by both the USA and Soviet Union. It was also recognized in the US National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which created a civilian space agency (NASA) and declared, in the process, that ‘it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind’.62 This theme was carried through into the code for outer space – UN General Assembly Resolution 1962 recognizing ‘the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes’ and the Outer Space Treaty that added in Article 4 that states should not place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in orbit and that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes’ (military bases and fortifications, in particular, being prohibited). Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson described the Outer Space Treaty as ‘the most important arms-control development since the limited test-ban treaty of 1963’.63 In an immediate sense, then, outer space was configured as a space radically distinct from atmospheric space and was placed at once beyond the field of both sovereignty and of war. These, however, were by no means co-terminous. The preferred analogy when discussing the status of outer space was often that of the high seas – like the seas, outer space should be marked by the principle of freedom of access and movement, a res communis incapable of being ‘enclosed’. In fact, this was the analogy used by the USA when defending its use of satellites for reconnaissance purposes; ‘reconnaissance’ from space, it was argued, was the functional equivalent of surveillance from the high seas.64 It is clear, however, that this analogy was problematic precisely because the high seas themselves were not immune from being brought within the field of military conflict.65 And, with that in mind, alternative modes of analysis were often proffered to ensure that the ‘commons’ was not to be equated with a potential field of battle.66 Nevertheless, there was always a certain equivocation running through discussions within the UN and elsewhere as to whether the military/non-military distinction was one that could be effectively held in place. Not only were the Declaration on Outer Space and Outer Space Treaty silent on certain vital matters – on the equipping of satellites, for example, with conventional weaponry or the militarization of the ‘extracelestial void’ – but the inclusion of Article 3, which instructed states to ‘carry on activities’ in accordance with international law and the UN Charter ‘in the interest of maintaining international peace and security’, gave expression to the idea, vaunted at various moments, that outer space may nevertheless be the site of military action in self-defence.67 ‘Peaceful’ use, on such a measure, was not to be calibrated by reference to the equipment or personnel put into space – whether military or civilian – but, rather, by reference to the ends or motivation of the actors in question.68 In the case of the USA, this was to resolve itself in the idea that ‘peaceful use’ should not be equated with ‘non-military use’ but, instead, with ‘non-aggressive’ use. As Senator Albert Gore was to put it, when speaking before the UN First Committee in 1962: [i]t is the view of the United States that outer space should be used only for peaceful – that is, non-aggressive and beneficial – purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both environments we must continue our efforts for general and complete disarmament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of any space activities must not be whether it is military or non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations of law.69 The same general tenor was maintained in the discussion over Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty concerning the demilitarization of the moon and celestial bodies. In this treaty, it was admitted that the use of military personnel ‘for scientific research or other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited’, largely in recognition of the fact that for both space powers it was the military, not civilian agencies, who were responsible for developing rocket and other outer space capabilities. What one might see in this is a straightforward determination, on the part of both space powers, to continue the practice of exploiting outer space for purposes of defence whilst holding on, at the same time, to the general idea that outer space was a space of peaceful endeavour. Defensive militarization, here, was to be conceptualized as the functional equivalent of total demilitarization. Yet ‘defence’ was also an unstable category in circumstances of a bipolar military standoff that depended upon a balance of forces. For not only might an effective defence depend upon first strike capability (as the doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ was to suggest),70 but also, as was later to become evident following the announcement of the US Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983,71 even the construction of an overtly ‘defensive’ system could assume an offensive cast if only one party possessed that capacity.72 There was, however, also a much deeper problematic at work here, which related to the persistence of a governmental rationality that was held over from the earlier decades of the 20th century, that understood the necessity of bringing all social resources – economic, technical, scientific and human – to bear in defence of the state against an existential threat. This was articulated in the interwar years in the theories of total war developed by the likes of Erich Ludendorff73 and Ernst Jünger,74 but was carried forward, well into the aftermath of World War II.75 Even if, at Nuremberg, the tribunal had associated the practice of total war with the pathologies of National Socialism,76 as the likes of Georg Schwarzenberger and Josef Kunz were to observe, it was a method of waging war that was only, in small part, to be associated with the problem of totalitarianism. For both, the phenomenon of total warfare was a much more general one – associated with technological developments in arms, indiscriminate modes of warfare and the mobilization of the civilian population – and was as much in play in the 1950s as it had been in earlier decades.77 If the prospect of nuclear annihilation meant that no element of society would be spared, so also, it seemed to follow, no element of society should be excluded from preparations to ward off that eventuality. Whilst, in the case of the Soviet Union, the ethos of centralized planning and a party bureaucracy equipped with an ideology of collective ownership and class warfare naturally dissolved any operative distinctions between the civil and the military establishment,78 the same was also apparent in the USA where, as was recognized as early as 1945, the ongoing development of new technologies of offence and defence, in conditions of competition, would require ‘the participation of every element of the civilian population’ and, in particular, the enlistment of the countries research capabilities.79 Alongside the development of what Dwight Eisenhower later described as a ‘military-industrial complex’, guided by a ‘scientific-technological elite’,80 the rationalities of the Cold War were to envelop US society in a much more profound way – from the mobilization of the media in defence of free thought, the enlistment of corporations, unions and research establishments in defence of national security and the co-option of cultural institutions (from Hollywood to the universities81) in the affective management and policing of public life.82 The significance of this in the context of outer space was the almost total loss of any way to distinguish effectively between military and civilian activities. Just as the requirements of resourcing a technologically dependent military armature increasingly depended upon a civilian infrastructure of research, industry and economic management,83 so also was it clear that prospective civilian and scientific activities in space (such as meteorology, remote sensing, navigation systems and telecommunications) all had military dimensions. If, for example, developments in meteorological knowledge and environmental science seemed to open up the possibility of weather control for the purposes of combating drought, improving agriculture or the avoidance of natural disasters, so also could that same science assist in the development of military communications and ballistic missile capability (which depended upon information about the lower and upper atmosphere, ionospheric behaviour, geodesy and geomagnetism).84 Such knowledge also opened up new possibilities for manipulating weather systems in order to procure military advantage (such as the manipulation of thunderstorms to disable communication systems or the creation of fog or cloud).85 But it was not just about scientific knowledge enabling new avenues of military innovation; it was also about the purposes to which the same technology might be put. Thus, for example, the camera-equipped satellite programmes (Tiros, CORONA), with the auxiliary systems of information recovery and reproduction, were virtually identical (give or take a few degrees of resolution) whether they were used for the purposes of geodetic measurement and weather prediction or military reconnaissance. In some cases, furthermore – such as the US Galactic Radiation Background satellite – intelligence-gathering electronics was incorporated within the same instrument used for the measurement of solar radiation.86

#### Their distinction btw public and private has 2 impacts – a] subversion b] gov fillin

#### the aff assumes private companies can only use outer space in ONE WAY, but private non-profits are working to benefit the environment.

**Duren:** Duren, Riley. [Research Scientist at the University of Arizona and an Engineering Fellow at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory.] "In Partnership with UArizona, New Nonprofit to Launch Satellite Program to Track Greenhouse Gas Emissions" *UArizona.* April 15, 2021. TB

**In a first-of-its-kind coalition to accelerate climate change action**, and with help from UArizona researchers, **a** new **nonprofit organization called Carbon Mapper is launching a program to improve scientific understanding of global methane and carbon dioxide emissions**. Carbon Mapper, a new nonprofit organization partnering with the University of Arizona, today announced a groundbreaking program **to help improve understanding of and accelerate reductions in global methane and carbon dioxide emissions.** The **Carbon Mapper** consortium also **announced plans to deploy a satellite constellation to pinpoint, quantify and track methane and carbon dioxide emissions.** "This decade represents an all-hands-on-deck moment for humanity **to make critical progress in addressing climate change**," said Riley Duren, research scientist in the UArizona Office of Research, Innovation and Impact and CEO of Carbon Mapper. "**Our mission is to** help **fill gaps in the emerging global ecosystem of methane and CO2 monitoring systems by delivering data that's timely, actionable and accessible for science-based decision making**." **Current approaches to measuring** methane and carbon dioxide **emissions** at the scale of individual facilities – particularly intermittent activity – **present challenges, especially in terms of transparency, accuracy, scalability and cost.** **Carbon Mapper** – which also is **partnering with** the state of California, **NASA**'s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Planet, Arizona State University, High Tide Foundation and RMI – **will help overcome these technological barriers and enable accelerated action by making publicly available high emitting methane and carbon dioxide sources quickly and persistently visible** at the facility level. The data collected by the Carbon Mapper constellation of satellites will provide more complete, precise and timely measurement of methane and carbon dioxide source level emissions as well as more than 25 other environmental indicators. **Through the** Carbon Mapper-**UArizona partnership**, Duren and other UArizona **researchers offer scientific leadership** of the methane and carbon dioxide emissions data delivery **including developing new algorithms** and analytic frameworks **for testing** them with an ongoing research program. "Time is of the essence when it comes to understanding and mitigating methane and CO2 emissions," said Senior Vice President for Research and Innovation Elizabeth "Betsy" Cantwell. "Partnering with **Carbon Mapper will give** University of Arizona **researchers the tools needed to** not only see emissions hot spots, but to **understand their causes and develop actionable plans** for reducing or eliminating these sources." **Carbon Mapper, in collaboration with its public and private partners, is developing the satellite constellation** in three phases. The initial study phase, now complete, included two years of preliminary engineering development and manufacturing. **The first phase is underway and includes development of the first two satellites** by Planet and JPL, **scheduled for launch in 2023**, accompanying data processing platforms, and ongoing cooperative methane mitigation pilot projects using aircraft in California and other U.S. states. P;’

#### Jones 4 proves – we can redirect it for atlerantive ends