# Speech 1NC Glenbrooks Rd 2 vs Peninsula 11-20 11AM

## 1

#### Interp: The affirmative must specify the jurisdiction the right to strike is recognized within a delimited text in the 1AC.

#### Jurisdiction is flexible and has too many interps– normal means shows no consensus.

Leyton Garcia 17 [Jorge Andrés Leyton García (Postgraduate Research Student / Assistant Teacher en University of Bristol). “THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT: RECOGNITION AND LIMITATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW”. Revista Chilena de Derecho, vol. 44, núm. 3, 2017, pp. 781-804. Accessed 6/24/21. <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1770/177054481008.pdf> //Xu]

The fi eld in which these pages will revolve is indeed complex and full of paradoxes. The right to strike has been recognized in diverse forms in different international and national legal systems. In some cases it has been expressly recognized in the text of conventions and treaties (European Social Charter), while in others the recognition has been achieved through the principled work of supervisory or jurisdictional bodies (like it has been the case in the ILO and the ECHR), not without diffi culties and doubts, as we shall see in the following pages. The analysis that follows will show, however, that the form of recognition does not necessary defi ne the scope and extent of the right. 1.1. THE ILO Despite being the most important source of labor standards, there is no defi nition of the right to strike in any of the ILO binding instruments. The right to strike is not mentioned in the ILO Constitution or in the Declaration of Philadelphia, and Convention N°87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise contains no specifi c reference to it. There is no textual recognition and no canonical defi nition in any of the Conventions and Recommendations that constitute the ILO’s body of norms. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that throughout the history of the ILO there has been a wide consensus among its members regarding the existence of a right to strike which emanates from the dispositions of Convention N°87 as a fundamental aspect of Freedom of Association. As Janice Bellace has pointed out: “Over the past 60 years the ILO constituents have recognized that there is a positive right to strike that is inextricably linked to – and an inevitable corollary of – the right to freedom of association”3 .

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement. We lose access to Readiness DA’s, Unions DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### 2] Real World – Policy makers will always define the entity that they are recognizing which proves its core topic literatyure

#### JSpec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from recognition policies that require enforcement to function.

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose advocacy texts and advantage areas thirty minutes before round.

#### Violation: screenshots

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### Standards:

#### 1] Clash- Not disclosing incentivizes surprise tactics and poorly refined positions that rely on artificial and vague negative engagement to win debates. Negatives are forced to rely on generics instead of smart contextual strategies destroying nuanced argumentation.

#### 2] Reciprocity – They get an infinite amount of time to frontline their aff to write the most efficient and effective answers to anything we could say against it while we get only four minutes in round.

#### 3] Shiftiness- Not knowing enough about the affirmative coming into round incentivizes 1ar shiftiness about what the aff is and what their framework/advocacy entails. That means even if we could read generics or find prep, they’d just find ways to recontextualize their obscure advocacy in the 1ar.

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact

#### Accessibility – psychic violence is a prereq to being in debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### DTD – its key to deter future abuse

#### No RVI’s- a) chilling effect – people will be too scared to read theory because RVI’s encourage baiting theory b) clash – people go all in on theory which decks substance engagement

## 3

#### Interp and violation – 1ACs must use the three-tier process to justify the plan – they haven’t

Reid-Brinkley 8[SHANARA ROSE REID-BRINKLEY- “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” Under the Direction of CHRISTINE HAROLD <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf> 2008] VHS AI

In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledgemaking practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making 83 practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59 Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the doubleocto-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.”60 The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions 84 prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education.61 The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks. Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.

#### Vote for limits – there are an infinite amount of potential plans so you cherry-pick affs with no neg ground and I must prep all affs while they prep one which pigeonholes me to generics but there is a limited amount of ways bodies could affirm.

#### TVA – defend your advocacy but focus on the way the politics you defend are influenced by your identity

## 4

#### All Capitalism is Racial Capitalism – the modern system of labor cannot sustain itself without disposable populations.

Burden-Stelly 20 [Bracketed for women to womxn. Footnote 14 is inserted below the paragraph it’s cited in, other footnotes excluded for readability. Charisse Burden-Stelly (Visiting Scholar in the Race and Capitalism Project at the University of Chicago. She is currently an African-American Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science at Carleton College). “Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism: Some Theoretical Insights”. The Monthly Review, Volume 72, Number 3. 7/1/20. Accessed 11/3/21. <https://monthlyreview.org/2020/07/01/modern-u-s-racial-capitalism/> //Xu]

Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization. [Footnote 14]: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51. My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24 Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29 Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33 Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition. In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism. War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat. Here, Du Bois’s 1915 essay, “The African Roots of War,” is instructive.34 Though he does not directly analyze the United States, he nonetheless demonstrates how racism, white supremacy, and the plunder of Africa underpinned the capitalist imperialist war that engulfed the world from July 1914 to November 1918—a war that catapulted the United States into the center of the capitalist world system. Using Du Bois’s own words, Hubert Harrison, the father of Harlem radicalism, makes the direct link: But since every industrial nation is seeking the same outlet for its products, clashes are inevitable and in these clashes beaks and claws—armies and navies—must come into play. Hence beaks and claws must be provided beforehand against the day of conflict, and hence the exploitation of white men in Europe and America becomes the reason for the exploitation of black and brown and yellow men in African and Asia. And, therefore, it is hypocritical and absurd to pretend that the capitalist nations can ever intend to abolish wars.… For white folk to insist upon the right to manage their own ancestral lands, free from the domination of tyrants, domestic and foreign, is variously described as “democracy” and “self-determination.” For Negroes, Egyptians and Hindus to seek the same thing is impudence.… Truly has it been said that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the ‘Color Line.'” And wars are not likely to end; in fact, they are likely to be wider and more terrible—so long as this theory of white domination seeks to hold down the majority of the world’s people under the iron heel of racial oppression.35 For Du Bois, the imperialist rivalry for the booty on offer in Africa drove Berlin’s efforts to consolidate its place in the sun by displacing London in particular. While Vladimir Lenin understood that “the war [was] a product of half a century of development of world capitalism and of billions of threads and connections,” Du Bois expanded this analysis by providing a critique of the racial foundations of capitalist expansion.36 He held that the struggle to the death during the Great War for African resources and labor had begun to “pay dividends” centuries earlier through the enslavement of African peoples, the subsequent conflation of color and inferiority, and the reduction of what was routinely referred to as the “Dark Continent” to a space of backwardness ideally suited for dispossession. He further noted that “with the waning possibility of Big Fortune…at home, arose more magnificently the dream of exploitation abroad,” especially in Africa—a dream shared by white labor and the ruling class.37 In other words, this “democratic despotism” allowed for the white working class to “share the spoil of exploiting ‘chinks and niggers,'” and facilitated the creation of “a new democratic nation composed of united capital and labor” that perpetuated racial capitalism across class lines.38 Moreover, this national unity was strengthened through the disrespect and dehumanization of the racialized toilers and peasants in the plundered colonies that mitigated the exploitation and impoverishment of the white working class in imperial countries. This superexploitation allowed white workers to get a share, however pitiful, of “wealth, power, and luxury…on a scale the world never saw before” and to benefit from the “new wealth” accumulated from the “darker nations of the world” through cross-class consent “for governance by white folk and economic subjection to them”—a consensus solidified through the doctrine of “the natural inferiority of most men to the few.”39 Given the entanglement of racialization and capitalist exploitation, Du Bois averred, “Racial slander must go. Racial prejudice will follow…the domination of one people by another without the other’s consent, be the subject people black or white, must stop. The doctrine of forcible economic expansion over subject people must go.” Insofar as this admonishment applied as much to the United States as to European imperialists, beyond the international proletariat, it was the darker peoples and nations of the world who would challenge racial capitalism, not least “the twenty-five million grandchildren of the European slave trade…and first of all the ten million black folk in the United States.”40 Imperialist accumulation denotes the rapacious conscription of resources and labor for the purpose of superprofits through violent means that are generally reserved for populations deemed racially inferior. On the precipice of the Great Depression, the prominent Black communist James Ford beautifully explicated imperialist accumulation. In his 1929 report on the Second World Congress of the League Against Imperialism, he explained that the extant political economy constituted the consolidation of Africa’s partition and the “complete enslavement of its people”; the arresting of its industrialization, which hindered the development of the “toiling masses”; and the relegation of the continent to a source of raw material, a market for European goods, and a dumping ground for accumulated surplus capital. In the U.S. South, the Black poor were dehumanized by Wall Street, “white big business,” and the “rising Negro bourgeoisie” whose condition of possibility was the subjection of the Black working class. This oppression was exacerbated by rigid racial barriers, disenfranchisement, and lynching. Ford further argued that the West Indies, subjected to U.S. militarism and occupation on behalf of Wall Street, were largely transformed into a marketplace for U.S. goods. Moreover, throughout Africa, the U.S. South, and the Caribbean, Black workers were impressed into forced labor, laying railroads, building roads and bridges, and working in mines; were entrapped on plantations through peonage; and were subjected to convict leasing. In addition, they suffered intolerable working conditions and routinized violence.41 Expropriation by domination designates the seizure and confiscation of land, assets, property, bodies, and other sources of material wealth set to work by relations of economic dependence. This relationship exists both between nations and between groups. A quintessential enunciation of expropriation by domination between groups is We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government Against the Negro People, edited by the Black Communist William Patterson (with significant help from his wife and comrade Louise Thompson Patterson) and submitted to the United Nations by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951.42 The petition meticulously documented the past and present expropriation of Black people by the ruling class of modern U.S. racial capitalism through consistent and persistent discrimination in employment, unfair wages, forced ghettoization, inequitable and inferior accommodation and services, and the denial of justice in the courts. It further argued that this process was sustained by genocidal terror, white supremacist law, and the drive of monopoly capitalists for superprofits. Importantly, We Charge Genocide noted that, for primarily economic reasons, the historical and geographical locus of anti-Black genocide was the “Black Belt” of the Southern United States, a region expropriated by the Northern industrial capitalists and by Southern landowners alike. This was due in large part to plantation systems of sharecropping and peonage—legacies of slavery—in which Black political and economic rights were virtually nonexistent, Black laborers were inexorably tied to the land through debt, and the threat of violence and death precluded demands for justice. For Patterson, such expropriation by domination was the basis of “racist contamination that has spread throughout the United States.”43 We Charge Genocide further conveyed that expropriation by domination, a central element of modern U.S. racial capitalism, was more than a domestic concern because such practices “at home must inevitably create racist commodities for export abroad—must inevitably tend toward war.”44 Labor superexploitation can be understood as an economic relationship in which the intensity, form, and racial basis of exploitation differs little from slavery. Its effects are so extreme that it pushes racialized, particularly Black, labor effectively below the level of sheer physical subsistence. As Harrison explained, in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism, Black workers “form a group that is more essentially proletarian than any other American group” because enslaved Africans were brought to the “new world” to be ruthlessly exploited. This reality fixed their social status as the most despised group, which in turn intensified their subjection.45 Likewise, organizations like the American Negro Labor Congress and the Anti-Imperialist League analyzed that the racial capitalist superexploitation of Black nations like Haiti in the first quarter of the twentieth century for the purposes of consolidating Wall Street control over land, commercial relations, and production was accompanied by the brutalization of Black labor, the export of Jim Crow practices, military occupation, and political repression.46 In effect, superexploitation results from the conjuncture of white supremacy, racialization, and the “badge of slavery,” which exacerbates the conditions of exploitation to which white working classes are subjected. As the Black Marxist Harry Haywood argued in 1948, “the stifling effects of the race factor are most strikingly illustrated by the drastic differences in the economic and cultural status of Negroes and whites.… Beyond all doubt, the oppression of the Negro, which is the basis of the degradation of the ‘poor whites,’ is of separate character demanding a special approach.”47 Superexploitation, he explained further, constitutes a combination of direct exploitation, outright robbery, physical violence, legal coercion, and perpetual indebtedness. It stifles “the free economic and cultural development” of the Black masses “through racist persecution as a basic condition for maintaining” virtual enslavement.48 The entrapment of Black [womxn] women in domestic labor throughout the twentieth century—a function of their “triple oppression”—is perhaps the most glaring example of labor superexploitation under modern U.S. racial capitalism. In 1936, the lifelong Black radical Louise Thompson explained that Black women’s superexploitation in the capitalist mode of production was based on their race, sex, and subordination in the labor market.49 That same year, Black militants Marvel Cooke and Ella Baker published an article titled “The Bronx Slave Market” in which they studied triple oppression as it related to Black domestic workers. Cooke and Baker explained that the entanglements of racism, sex-based labor subordination, and structural poverty were deeply intensified by the Great Depression and forced Black domestic workers to pauperize their labor for the abysmal wage of less than thirty cents an hour. This form of labor exploitation was unique to the female sex because domestic work was conventional “women’s work,” and it was racialized insofar as the denigration of Black people fitted this group of women for low-wage, unprotected, and contingent labor.50

#### The simulation of policymaking is the logistical appropriation of synaptic labor into Racial Capitalism – they can’t actualize their skills before the impact happens.

Harney 14 [Note – I do not support the ableist language used in the evidence. Stefano Harney (Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University). “HAPTICALITY IN THE UNDERCOMMONS, OR FROM OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT TO BLACK OPS”. CUMMA PAPERS #9. 2014. Accessed 11/13/21. <https://cummastudies.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/cumma-papers-9.pdf> //Xu]

This may sound surprising to say there are no subjects in the social factory or that indeed the rhythm of work is omnipresent today. We face millions without work or not enough work in Europe and amongst the migrants seeking to reach Europe. We are told that the future of work in Europe is subjective, creative, professional, and most of all managerial, not rhythmic. And at any rate from more reliable sources like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri we understand that we are living in an era when immaterial labour – cognitive and affective labour - dominates and commands other forms of labour, even if factories are still widespread in Bangladesh or China. But this should not make us deaf to the rhythms we hear no matter where we go, the rhythms that break and kill humans. We have heard a lot from business about how we can become entrepreneurial, or how we can transform ourselves into leaders, of how we can become responsible for our own careers. And again from our comrades we have received a more accurate picture: conceptions of the artist, of the bohemian, of the researcher, and of the performer have been twisted by business to make us work harder, to convince us we can fulfil ourselves through work. Andrew Ross’s work is excellent here. Christian Marazzi has written about the way our bodies are today a kind of constant capital, machines for which we are responsible, which we must upkeep because they are the site of production. He is right. Franco Berardi speaks of the way our psyche and our souls descend into work as if engulfing our whole being, and Emma Dowling of the way even our affect is measured and managed, brought into metrics. It is easy to feel that work for those who have it is about the risk of having your subjectivity and your talents swallowed whole, about having your virtuosity consumed as Paolo Virno might put it. But a factory is neither a collection of machines nor a collection of workers however skilled, however virtuoso. A factory is a line. OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT The area of management studies concerned with the factory is Operations Management. Operations management has always been pretty clear about what a factory is, and however much it has expanded its understanding of the factory, this definition has not wavered. This is business ‘knowledge,’ with all its ideological limits, but it can be helpful to our own considerations here. For Operations Management, the factory is the scene of a process. This is process in the sense of procession, of movement. Inputs go into the factory to move along a process, a line, and outputs come out of the factory. Most importantly what machines and especially workers do, according to operations management, is work on the process not the product. In contemporary operations management theory this has meant improving that process. This is often designated by the Japanese term ‘kaizen’ originally associated with workers and managers devoting themselves to the continuous improvement of the line’s efficiency in Toyota factories. Soon kaizen expanded throughout service, extraction, information, and other sectors. Rather than attention to the product, including the immaterial product, which remains as much as ever the purview of a small fraction of the workforce, most workers are subjected to increased attention to the ‘assembly’ line. For management science, this is what a factory is: a line, a process, a procession, a movement, a rhythm through from inputs to outputs. And this too is what the social factory is. Its name is accurate even if we have sometimes been distracted by everything from the propaganda of creative classes to the critical discourse of the precariat. But that is not all. Kaizen has been accompanied by another development in the line. This is the extension of the management of inputs and outputs, of the extension to supply chains understood as part of the line, not just as raw clusters of labour, natural resources and machines waiting outside the door of the factory. And with logistics and reverse logistics this line is expanding exponentially, or rather, algorithmically. Logistics and supply chain management extend the metrics of line in both directions, toward inputs and outputs which now have their own work rhythms. SYNAPTIC LABOUR This algorithmically expanding line means the outside of the factory is measured like the inside, aligned with the processual inside. And when the factory is virtual, Post-Fordist, a social factory, the algorithms of the line extend the rhythm of production, of assembly across our lives. The two meanings of assembly, or perhaps two modes of assembly, begin to merge, to assemble is both to come together and to make, anywhere, anytime. But what is made when we assemble and re-assemble is the line itself first and foremost, not a product or a service. This is our work today. We take inventories of ourselves for components not the whole. We produce lean efforts to transconduct. We look to overcome constraints. We define values through metrics. These are all terms from operations management but they describe work far better than recourse to the discourse of subject formation. Creativity itself, supposedly at the heart of the battle for the subject today, is nothing but what operations management calls variance in the line, a variance that may lead to what is in turn called a kaizen event, an improvement, and is then assimilated back into an even more sophisticated line. Today ours is primarily the labour of adapting and translating, being commensurate and flexible, being a conduit and receptacle, a port for information but also a conductor of information, a wire, a travel plug. We channel affect toward new connections. We do not just keep the flow of meaning, information, attention, taste, desire, and fear moving, we improve this flow continuously. We must remain open and attuned to the rhythm of the line, to its merciless variances in rhythm. This is primarily a neurological labour, a synaptic labour of making contact to keep the line flowing, and creating innovations that help it flow in new directions and at new speeds. The worker operates like a synapse, sparking new lines of assembly in life. And she does so anywhere and everywhere because the rhythm of the line is anywhere and everywhere. The worker extends synaptic rhythms in every direction, every circumstance. With synaptic work, it is access not subjects that the line wants, an access, as Denise Ferreira da Silva reminds us, that was long at the heart of the abuse of the affected ones, the ones who granted access out of love, out of necessity, out of the consent not to be one, even before that granting was abused. GROUNDATIONS The rule of the line persists beyond the factory in time and space, and its rhythm makes the time and space of our lives. There is no outside to the line, or rather we might say the line runs through the outside promised in Fordism and supposed to be so heterogeneous in Post-Fordism. A rhythm that tears us apart, a rhythm that obliterates and wrecks our brain. In some places the line is all that is left of the factory, and logistics in this expanded sense is all that is left of production. The science of operations management becomes the science of society, the common sense of our lives.

#### They don’t spread democracy, they spread the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie – their call for democratic engagement belies a subtext of American imperialism that makes true political engagement impossible and cements instability

Gurukkal 18  
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Democracy has always been considered a goal which is a long way off, ever since the onset of differentiated economy and stratified society. Throughout history, we took oligarchy for democracy and always believed that bourgeois democracy could be transformed into real democracy through constitutional reforms. One liberal political scientist even contemplated the globalisation of Western liberal democracy and the subsequent “end of history”1 as imminent (Fukuyama 1992). Expectedly, a total rebuttal of the end of history thesis came, with reference to the reawakening of history under the revolutionary force of the people (Badiou 2012). Hope for a people’s resurgence in the form of survival struggles does make sense, and it may be reasonable to dream of the European lower middle class resuscitating their revolutionary democratic values and passions of 1789 or 1848. However, few expect the North American elites to endorse a renewed call for liberty and equality, as in 1776. Capitalism and Democracy Capitalism denotes the means, forces and relations of production, facilitating transformation of money into capital, through industrial production and profit-maximising exchange. Capitalist development means the enhanced accumulation of capital (Marx 1867). Its juridico–political devices were manifested in the post-feudal polities of constitutional monarchy and patriarchy. Colonisation of the new world was an early landmark of capitalist development. It was after the American war of independence in 1776 and the birth of the United States (US), that the patriarchal juridico–political system was transformed into bourgeois democracy. Since then, capitalist development has depended upon the democratic state, run by the bourgeoisie. The rise of a new Europe following the French Revolution of 1789 tended to democratise beyond the middle class, but the middle-class alliance with the bourgeoisie sabotaged this process, substituting it with an absolutist state under Napoleon Bonaparte. Capitalism developed through competitive colonisation, often turning state power into imperialism, by waging wars globally. Anti-colonial struggles and the constitution of liberal democratic nation states as well as dictatorships emerged in Asia, where capitalism developed in alliance with both. Nevertheless, capitalists were constrained to fight dictatorships for economic reasons, while they tried to retain bourgeois democracy, also called liberal democracy—guaranteeing in its rhetoric, the freedom of the press and speech, and the right of habeas corpus—for ensuring a laissez-faire state. Both,people’s democracy and the free market, are part of the rhetoric of capitalism, for its inexorably hidden “real” has never been anything short of oligarchy and monopoly. Capitalists instigated anti-communist bourgeois democratic struggles, promoted liberal democratic states, and put up a sustained resistance against communism. However, communist revolutions gave birth to socialist dictatorships in Russia first, and subsequently, in China, where capitalism was yet to develop. In due course, capitalism developed even in communist countries by transforming socialism into state capitalism. In spite of the contrasts between state capitalism and transnational capitalism, capitalism has continued its inevitable development into global capitalism. Under it, perhaps the only relatively appreciable democratic state since the world wars might be the Nordic model in the Scandinavian countries. However, their social democracy based on privatised Keynesianism has proven unsustainable, demanding enhanced collective responsibility (Crouch 2009; Castells et al 2017).2 The fate of democracy under capitalist development has never been a topic of serious debate, despite the fact that Karl Marx’s theory of capitalism, as applied by Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1999) to state power, had brought about the thesis of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism.3 Rosa Luxemburg found imperialism to be a theoretical inevitability in the process of development of the capitalist mode of production, through global-level capital export and extension of accumulation under monopoly capital (Luxemburg 1913; Wolfe 2001). Under capitalism, the life of democracy is positioned as “being-toward-death,” in reference to what Martin Heidegger said about human death: an inevitable and imminent possibility, which everybody ignores.

#### The utilization of strikes is a reformist smokescreen that reinforces capitalist labor-relations – cx proves.

IP 16 [Note – the website cntrl c+v is really weird so there might be a misspelled word (like “down” to “clown”) or a misplaced comma or period. I’m not sure how to fix it but please let me know if you do! Internationalist Perspective (left-communist publication defending Marxism as a living theory and critiquing left-communist theory). “Trade unions: pillars of capitalism - Internationalist Perspective”. LibCom. 1/5/16. Accessed 11/12/21. <https://libcom.org/library/trade-unions-pillars-capitalism-internationalist-perspective> //Recut Xu from Majeed]

Most of us agree that the unions are an integral part of the capitalist system. Not just the corrupt ones and those with a heavy bureaucratic apparatus but also those who profess a belief in "grass roots democracy" or even in "revolution". The arguments given for that position have been mostly empirical. Indeed, time and time again, the unions have screwed the workers, contained and defanged their struggle, have spread capitalist ideology in the working class and acted as capital's police on the shop floor. But empirical arguments are not enough. Indeed, on the basis of past experience alone, one could very well conclude that global revolution is impossible, as Paul wrote. Some have argued that it's the union's function within the capitalist economy - to manage the sale of labor power- which inevitably ties it to the system and hence opposes it to the class whose fundamental interests are irreconciliable with those of that system. That is true but it's not sufficient either. One could argue that as long as the goals of the struggle don't go beyond obtaining better wages and working conditions, or preventing their deterioration, and as long as those goals are achievable within capitalism, the irreconcilability is not immediate and the existence of permanent institutions to negotiate a better price for variable capital remains in the interests of the workers. In short one could argue, as does Adam [Buick of the Socialist Party of Great Britain], that despite the empirical evidence and despite the integration of the unions in the structure of the capitalist economy, the existing unions are bad but unionism is good. Moreover, despite the widespread disillusion, many workers still see the unions as their (imperfect) organisations, and sometimes the most combative workers are active in them. And sometimes capitalists fight the unions and try to get rid of them. When they attack a union and the workers rise up to defend "their" organisation, should revolutionaries who understand the real role of the union tell them not to wage that fight, even though the attack is clearly meant to defeat the workers and have a free hand to impose more exploitation? What to do when the workers most willing to fight are shop stewards and others who ardently defend the unions - not the leadership but the organisation? Should we simply call upon workers to leave the unions? And what do we offer as alternative, not just in limes of open struggle but also when the conditions for collective struggle aren't ripe while the pressure from capital continues? Is the 'outside and against' directive more than an empty slogan when the only meetings where workers gather are those organised by the unions? To answer those and many other questions pertaining to the practical aspects of class struggle and the defense of workers' immediate interests, the question why unions are not just counter- revolutionary but against the working class in their daily practice, must be answered first. The answer is not that obvious. After all, it is a logical reaction of workers, who are utterly powerless as individuals towards their employers who seek to exploit them as much as possible, to band together in permanent organisations to defend the price of their labor power. The first unions were clearly created by the working class even though many did bear the corporatist imprints of the guilds (professional organisations from the pre-capitalist era). Their existence as permanent organisations was a necessity, not only because of the permanency of capitalist pressure, but also because of the need of permanent preparation for confrontations with the capitalists, confrontations which often look the form of wars of attrition which the workers were doomed to lose without this preparation (the build-up of strike funds etc). Likewise, the growth of unions into bigger organisations, operating on a national scale, reflected the need of workers to increase their power by extending their class solidarity. So the growth of the unions reflected and stimulated class consciousness. Capitalists feared and loathed them and fought them bitterly. Yet very soon, the permanency of these large organisations posed a problem. The class struggle goes through ups and clowns which reflect the contradictory tendencies to which the workers, as an exploited class, are subjected. The conditions of exploitation push the workers to fight collectively and thereby to assert itself as a class with interests separate and opposed to those of capital; but those same conditions also create competition among workers, atomisation, alienation, passivity, receptiveness to the ideology of the dominant class. Those two tendencies do not neutralize each other but give the class struggle a very non-linear character, with sudden advances and retreats, moments of rising class consciousness and stretches of 'social peace', as one or the other of those tendencies dominate. During those periods of no collective struggle, when atomisation and alienation prevail, these big permanent organisations cannot express what isn't there, a class collectively fighting. It does not mean they immediately become bourgeois but they inevitably acquire an autonomy from the class they are supposed to represent. As autonomous institutions they inevitably develop hierarchical, authoritarian attitudes and relations and come to have interests which are distinct from those of the class as a whole. Thus the source of conflict of interests between the working class and the unions is already potentially present in the permanence of unions as social institutions. I write 'potentially' because from this does not yet follow that these institutions must side with capital against the workers. For this to happen, these institutions must first become part of capital, absorbed into the social fabric weaved by the law of value. This did not happen immediately because the extension of the law of value throughout society was a slow, gradual process. ln the early stages of this process, the domination of capital over society was only 'formal'. The work process itself was at first not yet intrinsically capitalist, capitalism only squeezed as much surplus value as possible from it by making the working day as long as possible and keeping the wages as measly as possible. It look a long time for a specifically capitalist method of production (based on machinism, which reversed the relation worker-technology: the tool was an extension of the worker's hand but now the worker became an appendage of the machine) to develop and become dominant. The giant leaps in productivity which technology-based production unleashed created mass production and set the stage for capitalism to transform the totality of society in its own image, which meant that the law of value came to determine social relations not just in the sphere of production but also in distribution, education, entertainment, culture, media and every other aspect of human life. But before that process (called the transition to real domination of capital) amassed critical weight, there remained a large space within society that was not yet penetrated by the law of value. Therein, not only expressions of pre-capitalist classes survived but organisations of the fledging working class too could maintain a relative autonomy. Unions were not the only permanent workers organisations that flourished in that space: there were workers' cooperatives, mutual aid societies, political mass parties, cultural organisations, newspapers, etc. that were genuine expressions of the working class. The modest size of the bourgeois state apparatus also reflected the merely formal control of capital over society. The fact that the state's policy towards the unions was largely repressive shows that capital had not yet developed the means to organically integrate them; the unions were still by and large standing outside the state. As the real domination of capital progressed and the complexity, technification and interwovenness of the capitalist economy developed, the state gradually fused with the economy and its tentacles spread over civil society. It's striking how this transformation of the economy and the integration of the unions into the structure of capitalist society went hand in hand, in particular towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The test of that integration came when the interests of capitalism and those of the working class (and humanity) became diametrically opposed as never before. What was at issue was not the price of variable capital but its survival or destruction. In the first world war, many millions of proletarians were slaughtered and it happened with the active collaboration of the unions. This epochal event signalled a new paradigm in which both crisis and war meant something different than before: they became both catastrophic and global in nature as well as essential to the continuation of capitalist accumulation. Today more than ever, there cannot exist any large permanent institution outside of the fabric of capital. That is true not just for unions but also for churches, political parties, cultural institutions and so on. The market either absorbs them, accords them a specialized function within its overall operating structure, a niche according to what they can do for the valorisation of capital, or marginalizes them, makes them disappear. When the class struggle heats up , the market shifts, a demand is created for a company of management of 'human resources' that has a more radical market image, which is quickly filled, either by a new union or by a radicalisation of the existing ones. Neither represents a gain for the working class. Today, there are no longer any progressive factions of capital. The unions' interests are inextricably bound to those of capital, to those of the nation. The logic of capital makes them complicit in trying to impose the worst possible fate on the working class. In the revolutionary struggle, which is a defensive struggle, the working class will have to take on the entire capitalist machinery, including the unions. It is true that this does not mean that every act or every word of the unions are opposed to the immediate interests of the working class. The productivity-increases made possible by the progress of capital's real domination allowed capital to accord improvements of the living standards and to increase exploitation (increase the portion of the labor day that is unpaid) at the same time, at least in period of expansion. It doesn't like to do this, of course, since every wage gain is a profit loss, but over lime it came to realize that this can be in its own interests. The main reason is that the production process under real domination, with its huge assembly lines and increased specialisation and thus interdependency, became more vulnerable to interruptions, to class struggle. That was a powerful incentive, especially in the post-world war two period, to grant better wages and to give the unions a bigger say in the management of the economy. The unions have their own particular interests. As companies that manage the sale and the smooth exploitation of variable capital, they compete among themselves and have a market image to defend, both in regard to the workers the y seek to represent and in regard to the enterprises with whom they seek to negotiate. Their credibility is their most valuable asset and if it's necessary to protect it, they can sometimes drive a hard bargain with the buyers of labor power. The most intelligent capitalists realize that unions can only fulfil their capitalist function if they have some credibility as defenders of the workers and must do what they have to do to maintain it. The international waves of class struggle in the '60's and '70's which repeatedly broke through the dykes of unionism and did great damage to capitalist profits and to the myth of unions as defenders of the working class, was a powerful stimulant to the restructuring of the capitalist economy that followed it. The 'post-Fordism' in which it resulted, with its increased automation, the computerization of labor, the decentralisation of production, the explosion of outsourcing, subcontracting and temp work, the increased mobility of capital (vastly expanding the use layoffs and closings, and the threat thereof, as social weapons) decreased the vulnerability of production to industrial action considerably. By decreasing that vulnerability, capital also decreased its dependence on the unions. This allowed for more anti-unionism among capitalists, and led to a marked increase of 'union-busting'. But this also helped the unions to shore up. their credibility in the eyes of the workers somewhat, because the enemy of your enemy can seem to be your friend. The unions resisted the post-Fordist trend, in part to maintain their credibility in the eyes of the workers and in part because it was and is a threat to their own power. But since the trend reflected not a mere policy choice but the direction in which capitalism, of which they are a part, was going, their resistance was doomed to be ineffective. The alternative of the unions to this trend is conservative, to resist changes in capitalism. As this is impossible, they end up almost invariably defending 'capitalism lite', layouts, but less layoffs than the bosses are demanding, wage cuts, but with a percentage and a half shaved off. But, they need a culprit, a scapegoat for the worker's anger, and since they are tied to national capital, the scapegoat is usually foreign competition (foreign workers really). That makes the unions the most ardent defenders of protectionism. As an economic recipe that is plain stupid and sometimes really annoying to other factions of capital, but politically it is very useful to capital because it makes them work tirelessly to spread the nationalist poison into the working class.

**Resource competition and wealth extraction under Racial Capitalism produces fascism, endless war and environmental destruction**

Robinson 14(William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis*. Structural crises* reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of *social reproduction.* The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of *hegemony* and *domination.* National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanityI mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and **to** destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term *21st century fascism*.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism,extrememasculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

#### The alt is central planning - Red Innovation solve everything

Nieto & Mateo 20 [Maxi Nieto is a PhD is sociology from the University of Elche and writer for Ciber Comunismo and Juan Pablo Mateo is a visiting scholar in the department of Economics at The New School, New York and economics professor at the University of Valladolid (Spain). January 2020, “Dynamic Efficiency in a Planned Economy: Innovation and Entrepreneurship Without Markets”, Science & Society, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338327276\_Dynamic\_Efficiency\_in\_a\_Planned\_Economy\_Innovation\_and\_Entrepreneurship\_Without\_Markets //](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338327276_Dynamic_Efficiency_in_a_Planned_Economy_Innovation_and_Entrepreneurship_Without_Markets%20//)gbs jacobs & majeed]

4.1. Innovation and social property. Innovation occurs as a result of a long and complex accumulation process of knowledge and creativity, where very rarely is a single individual solely responsible. This is an essentially social process in which a plurality of actors and institutions contribute in very different spheres and circumstances. The Austrian School presents an idealized image of innovation in capitalist economies, attributing it exclusively to the figure of the enterprising entrepreneur — whether in a disruptive sense (Schumpeter), or in a strictly coordinating sense (Kirzner). In fact, the entrepreneurial function develops within specific institutional frameworks and organized structures, both at the micro and macro levels. In this sense, a socialist economy has significant advantages for developing technological and business innovation, as opposed to a capitalist economy: i) socialism allows for greater and more efficient allocation of resources to R&D&I activities, thanks to centralized control of the surplus and the absence of sumptuous consumption and a rentier population; ii) there are no obstacles (property rights) to the free dissemination of new products and techniques; iii) the equal distribution of resources (which guarantees that no basic needs go unmet) allows for discovery and fuller development of talent, which likewise occurs when work is undertaken through tasks that are more balanced for the majority and less routine; iv) in allocating investment, more information is available and the criteria are more varied than mere expectation of profit; v) social ownership is more inclusive and participatory than capitalist enterprise in terms of generating and mobilizing knowledge (tacit or not) and encouraging innovation; vi) socialism does not impose short-term innovation cycles looking to generate products that can be commercialized in, say, four to six months, as is typical in capitalist economies. Under these favorable general conditions, the development of innovation in a socialist economy would unfold in three fundamental areas: i) Strategic planning: this traces the main lines of scientific, technological, and innovation research. Here would enter programs for the development of new technologies and infrastructures, as well as visionary projects that explore eventualities and future scenarios. This sort of research is carried out in universities, scientific academies, technological institutes, and other specialized centers in coordination with the business world. The process would consist in testing different alternative productive projects or techniques in order to verify results, in connection with the companies and sectors being served. ii) Companies: research, design, and innovation departments. iii) Business entrepreneurship: individuals and teams put forward proposals in hopes of securing financing. For any of these three areas, material incentives would exist that reward the degree to which the freely programmed objectives are achieved, in addition to purely social or moral incentives such as social recognition or professional and personal fulfilment. In the next section, we focus on how socialist entrepreneurship — something that the Austrian School considers impossible — would ostensibly work. 4.2. Ecosystems for innovation and entrepreneurship. In today’s most dynamic capitalist economies, entrepreneurship and business innovation are developed mainly in the so-called innovation ecosystems, which are institutional environments dedicated to promoting symbiotic interaction among the different actors involved in the process of creating and transforming companies and industries. This sort of institutional framework represents the antithesis of the liberal mythology where the individual capitalist–entrepreneur operates in a purely commercial environment, since these ecosystems are based on public institutions and resources as well as procedures that are not strictly mercantile.9 An efficient and dynamic socialist economy needs institutional environments capable of fostering and channeling the initiative of individuals with special talents to translate innovative ideas into business projects. It must be clear that an ecosystem of socialist innovation does not substitute for, but instead complements, the innovations developed by particular state institutions and programs (such as the transition to a new source of energy, new materials, etc.) as well 9 In the case of Spain, think tanks and capitalist consultants openly admit that “there is not enough private capital to invest in new companies, either through individual investment or through venture capital funds” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2015, 32). as innovations taking place in the industrial design departments of businesses. The actors involved in such an ecosystem are essentially the same as those participating in the equivalent ecosystems of the current capitalist economies. Principal differences would lie in the form of interaction among them (in the absence of mercantile links), their decision-making capacity (since no private property rights adhere), and the types of rules in force (including the incentive system). Among the main actors would be the following:

#### Black Ball technology produced by capitalism produces extinction – try or die for Leninist tech regulation

Bostrom 19 [Nick Bostrom (philosopher at Oxford and founding director of the Future of Humanity Institute). The Vulnerable World Hypothesis”. Global Policy Volume 10. Issue 4. November 2019. Accessed 11/1/8/21. <https://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/vulnerable.pdf> //Recut Xu from EM]

Let us introduce the hypothesis that the urn of creativity contains at least one black ball. We can refer to this as the vulnerable world hypothesis (VWH). Intuitively, the hypothesis is that there is some level of technology at which civilization almost certainly gets destroyed unless quite extraordinary and historically unprecedented degrees of preventive policing and/or global governance are implemented. More precisely: VWH: If technological development continues then a set of capabilities will at some point be attained that make the devastation of civilization extremely likely, unless civilization sufficiently exits the semianarchic default condition. By the ‘semi-anarchic default condition’ I mean a world order characterized by three features12 : 1. Limited capacity for preventive policing. States do not have sufficiently reliable means of real-time surveillance and interception to make it virtually impossible for any individual or small group within their territory to carry out illegal actions – particularly actions that are very strongly disfavored by > 99 per cent of the population. 2. Limited capacity for global governance. There is no reliable mechanism for solving global coordination problems and protecting global commons – particularly in high-stakes situations where vital national security interests are involved. 3. Diverse motivations. There is a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives represented by a large population of actors (at both the individual and state level) – in particular, there are many actors motivated, to a substantial degree, by perceived self-interest (e.g. money, power, status, comfort and convenience) and there are some actors (‘the apocalyptic residual’) who would act in ways that destroy civilization even at high cost to themselves.3 The term ‘devastation of civilization’ in the above definition could be interpreted in various ways, yielding different versions of VWH. For example, one could define an existential-risk vulnerable world hypothesis (x-VWH), which would state that at some level of technology, by default, an existential catastrophe occurs, involving the extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent blighting of our future potential for realizing value. However, here we will set the bar lower. A key concern in the present context is whether the consequences of civilization continuing in the current semi-anarchic default condition are catastrophic enough to outweigh reasonable objections to the drastic developments that would be required to exit this condition. If this is the criterion, then a threshold short of human extinction or existential catastrophe would appear sufficient. For instance, even those who are highly suspicious of government surveillance would presumably favour a large increase in such surveillance if it were truly necessary to prevent occasional region-wide destruction. Similarly, individuals who value living in a sovereign state may reasonably prefer to live under a world government given the assumption that the alternative would entail something as terrible as a nuclear holocaust. Therefore, we stipulate that the term ‘civilizational devastation’ in VWH refers (except where otherwise specified) to any destructive event that is at least as bad as the death of 15 per cent of the world population or a reduction of global GDP by > 50 per cent per cent lasting for more than a decade.13 It is not a primary purpose of this paper to argue that VWH is true. (I regard that as an open question, though it would seem to me unreasonable, given the available evidence, to be at all confident that VWH is false.) Instead, the chief contribution claimed here is that VWH, along with related concepts and explanations, is useful in helping us surface important considerations and possibilities regarding humanity’s macrostrategic situation. But those considerations and possibilities need to be further analyzed, and combined with other considerations that lie outside the scope of this paper, before they could deliver any definitive policy implications. A few more clarifications before we move on. This paper uses the word ‘technology’ in its broadest sense. Thus, in principle, we count not only machines and physical devices but also other kinds of instrumentally efficacious templates and procedures – including scientific ideas, institutional designs, organizational techniques, ideologies, concepts, and memes – as constituting potential technological black balls.14 We can speak of vulnerabilities opening and closing. In the ‘easy nukes’ scenario, the period of vulnerability begins when the easy way of producing nuclear explosions is discovered. It ends when some level of technology is attained that makes it reasonably affordable to stop nuclear explosions from causing unacceptable damage – or that again makes it infeasible to produce nuclear explosions (because of technological regress).15 If no protective technology is possible (as in, e.g., the case of nuclear weapons it may not be) and technological regress does not occur, then the world becomes permanently vulnerable. We can also speak of the world being stabilized (with respect to some vulnerability) if the semi-anarchic default condition is exited in such a way as to prevent the vulnerability from leading to an actual catastrophe. The ways in which the semi-anarchic default condition would have to be altered in order to achieve stabilization depend on the specifics of the vulnerability in question. In a later section, we will discuss possible means by which the world could be stabilized. For now, we simply note that VWH does not imply that civilization is doomed. Typology of vulnerabilities We can identify four types of civilizational vulnerability. Type-1 (‘easy nukes’) The first type is one where, as in the ‘easy nukes’ scenario, it becomes too easy for individuals or small groups to cause mass destruction: Type-1 vulnerability: There is some technology which is so destructive and so easy to use that, given the semi-anarchic default condition, the actions of actors in the apocalyptic residual make civilizational devastation extremely likely. Note that in determining whether a scenario presents a Type-1 vulnerability, there is an inverse relationship between the ease with which it becomes possible to cause an incident and the destructiveness of incident. The greater the destructiveness of a single incident, the less easy it needs to be to cause such an incident in order for us to diagnose the presence of a Type-1 vulnerability. Thus, consider a ‘very easy nukes’ scenario, in which any halfwit can create an easily portable thermonuclear weapon at the kitchen sink over the course of an afternoon: this would definitely qualify as a civilizational vulnerability. Contrast this with a ‘moderately easy nukes’ scenario, in which it takes a five-person team of semi-skilled individuals toiling for an entire year to produce a single bulky few-kiloton device: that might not quite rise to the level of a civilizational vulnerability. It seems possible, in the ‘moderately easy nukes’ scenario, that the great majority of cities would escape destruction, although the threat posed by a well- resourced terrorist organization, such as Aum Shinrikyo anno 1995 or Al-Qaeda anno 2001, would increase substantially. However, consider yet another scenario, ‘moderately easy bio-doom’, in which again it requires a semi-skilled five-person team working for a year to put the black-ball technology into effect, except that this time it is a biological agent, a single point release of which is sufficient to kill billions. In ‘moderately easy bio-doom’, the threshold for a Type-1 vulnerability would be reached. If destroying civilisation required only that a single group succeed with a task at the moderately-easy level, civilization would probably be destroyed within a few years in the semi-anarchic default condition. Indeed, both Aum Shinrikyo and Al-Qaeda sought to obtain nuclear and biological weapons, and would likely have chosen to use them (see e.g. Danzig et al., 2011; Olson, 1999; Mowatt-Larssen and Allison, 2010). So a Type-1 vulnerability exists if it is either extremely easy to cause a moderate amount of harm or moderately easy to cause an extreme amount of harm.16 The reason why a black-ball technology that enables only moderate amounts of harm per incident could count as a Type-1 vulnerability is that – if the technology is sufficiently easy to use – a large number of such incidents would be almost certain to occur. Take the scenario where it is easy for an average individual to make a metropolis-busting H-bomb. This is not necessarily a scenario in which a single individual could devastate civilization. Building hundreds of bombs and transporting them to hundreds of cities without getting caught would still be a formidable endeavor even if making a single bomb were fairly easy. The ‘easy nukes’ scenario nevertheless presents a civilizational vulnerability because it is plausible that there would in fact be hundreds of individuals who would each destroy at least one city under those circumstances. That this is so almost follows from the law of large numbers combined with the plausible assumption that for any randomly selected person there is some small but appreciable chance that they would be motivated to trigger this kind of destruction – whether out of ideological hatred, nihilistic destructiveness, revenge for perceived injustices, as part of some extortion plot, or because of delusions or mental illness, or perhaps even just to see what would happen. Given the diversity of human character and circumstance, for any ever so imprudent, immoral, or self-defeating action, there is some residual fraction of humans who would choose to take that action. This is especially plausible if the action in question represents a culturally salient affordance – as it everywhere would after one such nuke attack had taken place. In other words, ‘easy nukes’ is an illustration of a vulnerable world because it looks like the apocalyptic residual has a large enough intersection with the set of empowered actors that one would expect a civilization-devastating amount of destruction to result. Type-2a (‘safe first strike’) A technology that ‘democratizes’ mass destruction is not the only kind of black ball that could be hoisted out of the urn. Another kind would be a technology that strongly incentivizes powerful actors to use their powers to cause mass destruction. Again we can turn to nuclear history for illustration. After the invention of the atomic bomb and a short-lived American nuclear monopoly, an arms race ensued between the US and the USSR. The rival superpowers amassed staggering arsenals, topping out at 70,000 nuclear warheads in 1986, more than enough to devastate civilization (Norris and Kristensen, 2010). While public awareness of the perils of the Cold War seems to have faded since its peaceful conclusion in 1991, the academic community – benefiting from the opening of formerly classified archives and the testimony of retired policy makers, officers, and analysts – has uncovered a disconcerting array of practices and incidents which seem to have repeatedly brought the world to the brink.17 Just how close we came remains a topic of dispute. Some scholars have argued that it was only thanks to a good deal of luck that nuclear holocaust was avoided.18 Whether surviving the Cold War required much luck or just a little, we can easily imagine a counterfactual in which the odds of avoiding a nuclear conflagration would be substantially worse. This holds even if we assume that nuclear weapons can be produced only by large technologically advanced states (thus distinguishing the case from the type1 vulnerability of ‘easy nukes’). The counterfactual could involve changes in the technological possibility frontier that would have made the arms race less stable. For example, it is widely believed among nuclear strategists that the development of a reasonably secure secondstrike capability by both superpowers by the mid-1960s created the conditions for ‘strategic stability’ (Colby and Gerson, 2013). Prior to this period, American war plans reflected a much greater inclination, in any crisis situation, to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal. The introduction of nuclear submarinebased ICBMs was thought to be particularly helpful for ensuring second-strike capabilities (and thus ‘mutually assured destruction’) since it was widely believed to be practically impossible for an aggressor to eliminate the adversary’s boomer fleet in the initial attack.19 Other strategies for ensuring a second-strike capability could also be employed, but they had drawbacks. For example, one option, briefly used by the United States, was to have a contingent of long-range nuclear bombers on continuous airborne alert (Sagan, 1995). This program was very costly and increased the risk of accidental or unauthorized attacks. Another option was to build hardened land-based missile silos: in sufficient numbers, these could in principle provide the assurance of a second-strike capability to one side; however, such a large arsenal would then threaten to provide the capacity of a safe first strike against the other side, thus again destabilizing any crisis. Road-mobile ICBM launchers, which are harder to attack than silo-based missiles, eventually provided some stabilization when they were deployed by the Soviet Union in 1985, a few years before the end of Cold War (Brower, 1989). So consider a counterfactual in which a preemptive counterforce strike is more feasible. Imagine some technology that makes it easy to track ballistic missile submarines. We can also imagine that nuclear weapons were a bit more fragile, so that the radius within which a nuclear weapon would be destroyed by the detonation of another nuclear weapon was substantially larger than it actually is.20 Under those circumstances, it might have been impossible to ensure a second-strike capability. Suppose, further, that technology had been such as to make it very hard to detect missile launches, rendering a launch-on-warning strategy completely unworkable. The crisis instability of the Cold War would then have been greatly amplified. Whichever side struck first would survive relatively unscathed (or might at least have believed that it would, since the possibility of a nuclear winter was largely ignored by war planners at the time; Badash, 2001; Ellsberg, 2017).21 The less aggressive side would be utterly destroyed. In such a situation, mutual fear could easily trigger a dash to all-out war (Schelling, 1960). Other technological parameter changes could similarly increase the probability of attacks. In the real world, the main ‘attraction’ of a nuclear first strike is that it would alleviate the fear that one might otherwise oneself become the victim of such a strike; but we can imagine a counterfactual in which there are also benefits to nuclear aggression, beyond the removal of a negative. Suppose it were somehow possible to derive great economic gains from initiating a large-scale nuclear assault.22 It might be hard to see how this could be the case, yet one can imagine some automated manufacturing technology or energy technology making physical resources more valuable; or technology-enabled population growth could again make agricultural land a more vital resource (Drexler, 1986)). Some international relations scholars believe that the net economic benefits of conquest have declined substantially in the post-industrial era and that this decline has been a major contributor to peace.23 If powerful national economic motives were again added to other causes for war (such as concern for one’s own security, disputes over non-economic values, maintenance of national reputation, influence of particularly bellicose special interest groups, inter alia) then armed conflicts might become more common and large-scale nuclear war more likely. In these examples, the vulnerability arises not from destruction getting easier, but from the actions leading to destruction coming to be supported by stronger incentives. We shall call these Type-2 vulnerabilities. Specifically, a scenario like ‘safe first strike’, in which some enormously destructive action becomes incentivized, we shall refer to as Type-2a: Type-2a vulnerability: There is some level of technology at which powerful actors have the ability to produce civilization-devastating harms and, in the semi-anarchic default condition, face incentives to use that ability. We will see some more examples of Type-2a vulnerabilities below, where the ‘civilization-devastating harms’ take the form of risk externalities. Type-2b (‘worse global warming’) There is yet another way in which the world could be vulnerable; one that we can illustrate with a counterfactual related to climate change. In the real world, we observe a secular rise in global mean temperature, widely believed to be driven primarily by human-caused emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide (Stocker et al., 2014).Projections vary, depending on the emissions scenario and modelling assumptions, but forecasts that imply an average temperature rise of between 3o C and 4.5o C in 2100 (compared to 2000), in the absence of any significant action to reduce emissions, are quite typical (See Stocker et al. (2014, table 12.2)). The effects of such warming – on sea levels, weather patterns, ecosystems, and agriculture – are usually expected to be net negative for human welfare (See Field et al. (2014, figure 10-1)). Greenhouse gases are emitted by wide range of activities, including in industry, transport, agriculture, and electricity production, and from all around the world, though especially from industrialized or industrializing countries. Efforts to curb emissions have so far failed to achieve much global-scale impact (Friedlingstein et al., 2014)). Now, we could imagine a situation in which the problem of global warming would be far more dire than it actually seems to be. For example, the transient climate sensitivity (a measure of the medium-term change in mean global surface temperature of the Earth that results from some kind of forcing, such as a doubling of atmospheric CO2) could have turned out to be much greater than it is (Shindell, 2014). If it had been several times larger than its actual value, we would have been in for a temperature rise of, say, 15o or 20o C instead of 3o – a prospect with far greater civilization-destroying potential than the actual expectation.24 We can also imagine other deviations from reality that would have made global warming a worse problem. Fossil fuels could have been even more abundant than they are, and available in more cheaply exploitable deposits, which would have encouraged greater consumption. At the same time, clean energy alternatives could have been more expensive and technologically challenging. Global warming could also have been a worse problem if there were stronger positive feedback loops and nonlinearities, such as an initial phase in which the atmosphere is gradually loaded up with greenhouse gases without much observable or detrimental effect, followed by a second phase in which temperatures shoot up abruptly. To get a truly civilizational threat from global warming, it may also be necessary to stipulate, counterfactually, that mitigation through geoengineering is infeasible. The vulnerability illustrated by such a ‘worse global warming’ scenario is different from that of a Type-2a scenario like ‘safe first strike’. In a Type-2a vulnerability, some actor has the ability to take some action – such as launching a nuclear first strike – that is destructive enough to devastate civilization. In the ‘worse global warming’ scenario, no such actor need exist. Instead, in what we will call a Type-2b vulnerability, there is a large number of individually insignificant actors who is each incentivized (under the semianarchic default condition) to take some action that contributes slightly to what cumulatively becomes a civilizationdevastating problem: Type-2b vulnerability: There is some level of technology at which, in the semi-anarchic default condition, a great many actors face incentives to take some slightly damaging action such that the combined effect of those actions is civilizational devastation. What Type-2a and Type-2b have in common is that, in both cases, the damage-capable actors face incentives that would encourage a wide range of normally motivated actors in their situation to pursue the course of action that leads to damage. Global warming would not be a problem if only some small fraction of those actors who can drive cars or chop down a few trees chose to do so; the problem arises only because many actors make these choices. And in order for many actors to make those choices, the choices must be supported by incentives that have wide appeal (such as money, status, and convenience). Similarly, if only one in a million actors who could launch a nuclear first strike would actually choose to do so, then it would not be so alarming if there are a handful of actors possessing that capability; but it does get worrisome if launching a nuclear strike is strongly supported by incentives that appeal to normally-motivated actors (such as the motive of preempting a strike by one’s adversary). This is in contrast to a Type-1 vulnerability, where the problem arises from the very widespread proliferation of destructive capability. Only an actor with quite unusual values would choose, at great cost and risk to himself, to blow up a city or unleash a doomsday pathogen; the trouble in that case is that if sufficiently many actors possess such a capability, then the subset of them who also have apocalyptic motives is not empty. Type-0 (‘surprising strangelets’) In 1942, it occurred to Edward Teller, one of the Manhattan scientists, that a nuclear explosion would create a temperature unprecedented in Earth’s history, producing conditions similar to those in the center of the sun, and that this could conceivably trigger a self-sustaining thermonuclear reaction in the surrounding air or water Rhodes, 1986). The importance of Teller’s concern was immediately recognized by Robert Oppenheimer, the head of the Los Alamos lab. Oppenheimer notified his superior and ordered further calculations to investigate the possibility. These calculations indicated that atmospheric ignition would not occur. This prediction was confirmed in 1945 by the Trinity test, which involved the detonation of the world’s first nuclear explosive.25 In 1954, the US carried out another nuclear test, the Castle Bravo test, which was planned as a secret experiment with an early lithium-based thermonuclear bomb design. Lithium, like uranium, has two important isotopes: lithium-6 and lithium-7. Ahead of the test, the nuclear scientists calculated the yield to be 6 megatons (with an uncertainty range of 4–8 megatons). They assumed that only the lithium-6 would contribute to the reaction, but they were wrong. The lithium-7 contributed more energy than the lithium-6, and the bomb detonated with a yield of 15 megaton – more than double of what they had calculated (and equivalent to about 1,000 Hiroshimas). The unexpectedly powerful blast destroyed much of the test equipment. Radioactive fallout poisoned the inhabitants of downwind islands and the crew of a Japanese fishing boat, causing an international incident. We may regard it at as lucky that it was the Castle Bravo calculation that was incorrect, and not the calculation of whether the Trinity test would ignite the atmosphere. Counterfactually, if the atmosphere had been susceptible to ignition by a nuclear detonation, and if this fact had been relatively easy to overlook – let us say as easy as it was to overlook the contribution of the lithium-7 in the Castle Bravo test – then the human story (and that of all terrestrial life) would have come to an end in 1945. We can call this scenario ‘Castle Bravissimo’. Whenever we pull a ball from the urn of invention, there could conceivably be a possibility of accidental devastation. Usually, this risk is negligible; but in some cases it could be significant, especially when the technology in question generates some kind of novel perturbation of nature or introduces historically unprecedented conditions. This suggests that we should add to our typology one more category, that of technology-fated accidental civilizational devastation: Type-0 vulnerability: There is some technology that carries a hidden risk such that the default outcome when it is discovered is inadvertent civilizational devastation.26 It is instructive to note, however, that ‘Castle Bravissimo’ is not a perfect illustration of a Type-0 vulnerability. Suppose that careful calculations had shown that there was a 1 per cent probability that a nuclear detonation would ignite the atmosphere and the oceans and thereby extinguish life on Earth. Suppose, further, that it had been known that to resolve the matter further and prove that the chance was zero (or alternatively, that the chance was one) would take another 10 years of meticulous study. It is unclear, under those circumstances, what the leaders of the Manhattan project would have decided. They would presumably have thought it greatly desirable that humanity hold off on developing nuclear weapons for at least another 10 years.27 On the other hand, they would have feared that Germany might have an advanced bomb project and that Hitler maybe would not pull the breaks because of a 1 per cent risk of destroying the world.28 They might have concluded that the risk of testing a nuclear bomb was worth taking in order to reduce the probability of Nazi Germany ending up with a nuclear monopoly. In this version of ‘Castle Bravissimo’, civilization gets blown up by accident: nobody sought to cause a destructive event. Yet the key actors were locked in a strategic situation that incentivized them to proceed despite the risk. In this respect, the scenario fits as a Type-2a vulnerability; only, the civilization-devastating harm it involves is probabilistic. When nuclear technology becomes possible, powerful actors face incentives, in the semi-anarchic default condition, to use that technology in ways that produce civilization-destroying harms (which here take the form of risk externalities).29 Accordingly, in order for us to diagnose a Type-0 vulnerability, we require that a stronger condition be met than merely that the key actors did not intend destruction. We stipulate that ‘inadvertent’ should here mean that the adverse outcome sprang from bad luck, not coordination failure. In a Type-0 vulnerability, the key actors would, even if they were adequately coordinated, decide to proceed with using the technology, in the belief that the benefits would outweigh costs – but they would be wrong, and the costs would be larger than expected, enough so as to cause civilizational devastation.30 Since ‘Castle Bravissimo’ only ambiguously satisfies this criterion (it being unclear in the original counterfactual to what extent the disaster would have resulted from coordination failure and to what extent from miscalculation/bad luck), it may be useful to introduce a cleaner example of a Type-0 vulnerability. Thus, consider a ‘surprising strangelets’ scenario in which some modern high-energy physics experiment turns out to initiate a self-catalyzing process in which ordinary matter gets converted into strange matter, with the result that our planet is destroyed. This scenario, and variations thereof in which accelerator experiments generate stable black holes or trigger the decay of a metastable vacuum state, have been analyzed in the literature (Jaffe et al., 2000; Tegmark and Bostrom, 2005). Such outcomes would indeed be very surprising, since analysis indicates that they have a completely negligible chance of occurring. Of course, with sufficiently bad luck, a negligiblechance event could occur. But alternatively (and far more likely in this case), the analysis could have a hidden flaw, like the Castle Bravo calculations did; in which case the chance might not be so negligible after all (Ord et al., 2010).31 Achieving stabilization The truth of VWH would be bad news. But it would not imply that civilization will be devastated. In principle at least, there are several responses that could stabilize the world even if vulnerability exists. Recall that we defined the hypothesis in terms of a black-ball technology making civilizational devastation extremely likely conditional on technological development continuing and the semi-anarchic default condition persisting. Thus we can theoretically consider the following possibilities for achieving stabilization: 1. Restrict technological development. 2. Ensure that there does not exist a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. 3. Establish extremely effective preventive policing. 4. Establish effective global governance. We will discuss (3) and (4) in subsequent sections. Here we consider (1) and (2). We will argue they hold only limited promise as ways of protecting against potential civilizational vulnerabilities. Technological relinquishment In its general form, technological relinquishment looks exceedingly unpromising. Recall that we construed the word ‘technology’ broadly; so that completely stopping technological development would require something close to a cessation of inventive activity everywhere in the world. That is hardly realistic; and if it could be done, it would be extremely costly – to the point of constituting an existential catastrophe in its own right (Namely, ‘permanent stagnation’ (Bostrom, 2013)). That general relinquishment of scientific and technological research is a non-starter does not, however, imply that limited curtailments of inventive activities could not be a good idea. It can make sense to forego particularly perilous directions of advancement. For instance, recalling our ‘easy nukes’ scenario, it would be sensible to discourage research into laser isotope separation for uranium enrichment (Kemp, 2012). Any technology that makes it possible to produce weapons-grade fissile material using less energy or with a smaller industrial footprint would erode important barriers to proliferation. It is hard to see how a slight reduction in the price of nuclear energy would compensate. On the contrary, the world would probably be better off if it somehow became harder and more expensive to enrich uranium. What we would ideally want in this area is not technological progress but technological regress. While targeted regress might not be in the cards, we could aim to slow the rate of advancement towards risk-increasing technologies relative to the rate of advancement in protective technologies. This is the idea expressed by the principle of differential technological development. In its original formulation, the principle focuses on existential risk; but we can apply it more broadly to also encompass technologies with ‘merely’ devastational potential: Principle of Differential Technological Development. Retard the development of dangerous and harmful technologies, especially ones that raise the level of existential risk; and accelerate the development of beneficial technologies, especially those that reduce the existential risks posed by nature or by other technologies Bostrom, 2002). The principle of differential technological development is compatible with plausible forms of technological determinism. For example, even if it were ordained that all technologies that can be developed will be developed, it can still matter when they are developed. The order in which they arrive can make an important difference – ideally, protective technologies should come before the destructive technologies against which they protect; or, if that is not possible, then it is desirable that the gap be minimized so that other countermeasures (or luck) may tide us over until robust protection become available. The timing of an invention also influences what sociopolitical context the technology is born into. For example, if we believe that there is a secular trend toward civilization becoming more capable of handling black balls, then we may want to delay the most risky technological developments, or at least abstain from accelerating them. Even if we suppose that civilizational devastation is unavoidable, many would prefer it to take place further into the future, at a time when maybe they and their loved ones are no longer alive anyway.32 Differential technological development doesn’t really make sense in the original urn-of-creativity model, where the color of each ball comes as a complete surprise. If we want to use the urn model in this context, we must modify it. We could stipulate, for example, that the balls have different textures and that there is a correlation between texture and color, so that we get clues about the color of a ball before we extract it. Another way to make the metaphor more realistic is to imagine that there are strings or elastic bands between some of the balls, so that when we pull on one of them we drag along several others to which it is linked. Presumably the urn is highly tubular, since certain technologies must emerge before others can be reached (we are not likely to find a society that uses jet planes and flint axes). The metaphor would also become more realistic if we imagine that there is not just one hand daintily exploring the urn: instead, picture a throng of scuffling prospectors reaching in their arms in hopes of gold and glory, and citations. Correctly implementing differential technological development is clearly a difficult strategic task (Cf. Collingridge, 1980). Nevertheless, for an actor who cares altruistically about long-term outcomes and who is involved in some inventive enterprise (e.g. as a researcher, funder, entrepreneur, regulator, or legislator) it is worth making the attempt. Some implications, at any rate, seem fairly obvious: for instance, don’t work on laser isotope separation, don’t work on bioweapons, and don’t develop forms of geoengineering that would empower random individuals to unilaterally make drastic alterations to the Earth’s climate. Think twice before accelerating enabling technologies – such as DNA synthesis machines – that would directly facilitate such ominous developments.33 But boost technologies that are predominantly protective; for instance, ones that enable more efficient monitoring of disease outbreaks or that make it easier to detect covert WMD programs. Even if it is the case that all possible ‘bad’ technologies are bound to be developed eventually, it can still be helpful to buy a little time.34 However, differential technological development does not on its own offer a solution for vulnerabilities that persist over long periods – ones where adequately protective technologies are much harder to develop than their destructive counterparts, or where destruction has the advantage even at technological maturity.35 Preference modification Another theoretically possible way of achieving civilizational stabilization would be to change the fact that there exists a large population of actors representing a wide and recognizably human distribution of motives. We reserve for later discussion of interventions that would reduce the effective number of independent actors by increasing various forms of coordination. Here we consider the possibility of modifying the distribution of preferences (within a more or less constant population of actors). The degree to which this approach holds promise depends on which type of vulnerability we have in mind. In the case of a Type-1 vulnerability, preference modification does not look promising, at least in the absence of extremely effective means for doing so. Consider that some Type-1 vulnerabilities would result in civilizational devastation if there is even a single empowered person anywhere in the world who is motivated to pursue the destructive outcome. With that kind of vulnerability, reducing the number of people in the apocalyptic residual would do nothing to forestall devastation unless the number could be reduced all the way to zero, which may be completely infeasible. It is true that there are other possible Type-1 vulnerabilities that would require a somewhat larger apocalyptic residual in order for civilizational devastation to occur: for example, in a scenario like ‘easy nukes’, maybe there would have to be somebody from the apocalyptic residual in each of several hundred cities. But this is still a very low bar. It is difficult to imagine an intervention – short of radically re-engineering human nature on a fully global scale – that would sufficiently deplete the apocalyptic residual to entirely eliminate or even greatly reduce the threat of Type-1 vulnerabilities. Note that an intervention that halves the size of the apocalyptic residual would not (at least not through any firstorder effect) reduce the expected risk from Type-1 vulnerabilities by anywhere near as much. A reduction of 5 per cent or 10 per cent of Type-1 risk from halving the apocalyptic residual would be more plausible. The reason is that there is wide uncertainty about how destructive some new blackball technology would be, and we should arguably use a fairly uniform prior in log space (over several orders of magnitude) over the size of apocalyptic residual that would be required in order for civilizational devastation to occur conditional on a Type-1 vulnerability arising. In other words, conditional on some new technology being developed that makes it easy for an average individual to kill at least one million people, it may be (roughly) as likely that the technology would enable the average individual to kill one million people, ten million people, a hundred million people, a billion people, or every human alive. These considerations notwithstanding, preference modification could be helpful in scenarios in which the set of empowered actors is initially limited to some small definable subpopulation. Some black-ball technologies, when they first emerge from the urn, might be difficult to use and require specialized equipment. There could be a period of several years before such a technology has been perfected to the point where an average individual could master it. During this early period, the set of empowered actors could be quite limited; for example, it might consist exclusively of individuals with bioscience expertise working in a particular type of lab. Closer screening of applicants to positions in such labs could then make a meaningful dent in the risk that a destructive individual gains access to the biotech black ball within the first few years of its emergence.36 And that reprieve may offer an opportunity to introduce other countermeasures to provide more lasting stabilization, in anticipation of the time when the technology gets easy enough to use that it diffuses to a wider population. For Type-2a vulnerabilities, the set of empowered actors is much smaller. Typically what we are dealing with here are states, perhaps alongside a few especially powerful nonstate actors. In some Type-2a scenarios, the set might consist exclusively of two superpowers, or a handful of states with special capabilities (as is currently the case with nuclear weapons). It could thus be very helpful if the preferences of even a few powerful states were shifted in a more peaceloving direction. The ‘safe first strike’ scenario would be a lot less alarming if the actors facing the security dilemma had attitudes towards one another similar to those prevailing between Finland and Sweden. For many plausible sets of incentives that could arise for powerful actors as a consequence of some technological breakthrough, the prospects for a non-devastational outcome would be significantly brightened if the actors in question had more irenic dispositions. Although this seems difficult to achieve, it is not as difficult as persuading almost all the members in the apocalyptic residual to alter their dispositions. Lastly, consider Type-2b. Recall that such a vulnerability entails that ‘by default’ a great many actors face incentives to take some damaging action, such that the combined effects add up to civilizational devastation. The incentives for using the black-ball technology must therefore be ones that have a grip on a substantial fraction of the world population – economic gain being perhaps being the prime example of such a near-universal motivation. So imagine some private action, available to almost every individual, which saves each person who takes it a fraction X of his or her annual income, while producing a negative externality such that if half the world’s population takes the action then civilization gets devastated. At X = 0, we can assume that few people would take the antisocial action. But the greater X is, the larger the fraction of the population that would succumb to temptation. Unfortunately, it is plausible that the value of X that would induce at least half of the population to take the action is small, perhaps less than 1 per cent.37 While it would be desirable to change the distribution of global preferences so as to make people more altruistic and raise the value of X, this seems difficult to achieve. (Consider the many strong forces already competing for hearts and minds – corporate advertisers, religious organizations, social movements, education systems, and so on.) Even a dramatic increase in the amount of altruism in the world – corresponding, let us say, to a doubling of X from 1 per cent to 2 per cent – would prevent calamity only in a relatively narrow band of scenarios, namely those in which the private benefit of using the destructive technology is in the 1–2 per cent range. Scenarios in which the private gain exceeds 2 per cent would still result in civilizational devastation. In sum, modifying the distribution of preferences within the set of actors that would be destructively empowered by a black-ball discovery could be a useful adjunct to other means of stabilization, but it can be difficult to implement and would at best offer only very partial protection (unless we assume extreme forms of worldwide re-engineering of human nature).38 Some specific countermeasures and their limitations Beside influencing the direction of scientific and technological progress, or altering destruction-related preferences, there are a variety of other possible countermeasures that could mitigate a civilizational vulnerability. For example, one could try to: • prevent the dangerous information from spreading; • restrict access to requisite materials, instruments, and infrastructure; • deter potential evildoers by increasing the chance of their getting caught; • be more cautious and do more risk assessment work; and • establish some kind of surveillance and enforcement mechanism that would make it possible to interdict attempts to carry out a destructive act It should be clear from our earlier discussion and examples that the first four of these are not general solutions. Preventing information from spreading could easily be infeasible. Even if it could be done, it would not prevent the dangerous information from being independently rediscovered. Censorship seems to be at best a stopgap measure.39 Restricting access to materials, instruments, and infrastructure is a great way to mitigate some kinds of (gray-ball) threats, but it is unavailing for other kinds of threats – such as ones in which the requisite ingredients are needed in too many places in the economy or are already ubiquitously available when the dangerous idea is discovered (such as glass, metal, and batteries in the ‘easy nukes’ scenario). Deterring potential evildoers makes good sense; but for sufficiently destructive technologies, the existence of an apocalyptic residual renders deterrence inadequate even if every perpetrator were certain to get caught. Exercising more caution and doing more risk assessment is also a weak and limited strategy. One actor unilaterally deciding to be more cautious may not help much with respect to a Type-2a vulnerability, and would do basically nothing for one of Type-2b or Type-1. In the case of a Type0 vulnerability, it could help if the pivotal actor were more cautious – though only if the first cautiously tiptoeing actor were not followed by an onrush of incautious actors getting access to the same risky technology (unless the world had somehow, in the interim, been stabilized by other means).40 And as for risk assessment, it could lower the risk only if it led to some other countermeasure being implemented.41 The last countermeasure in the list – surveillance – does point towards a more general solution. We will discuss it in the next section under the heading of ‘preventive policing’. But we can already note that on its own it is not sufficient. For example, consider a Type-2b vulnerability such as ‘worse global warming’. Even if surveillance made it possible for a state to perfectly enforce any environmental regulation it chooses to impose, there is still the problem of getting a sufficient plurality of states to agree to adopt the requisite regulation – something which could easily fail to happen. The limitations of surveillance are even more evident in the case of Type-2a vulnerability, such as ‘safe first strike’, where the problem is that states (or other powerful actors) are strongly incentivized to perform destructive acts. The ability of those states to perfectly control what goes on within their own borders does not solve this problem. What is needed to reliably solve problems that involve challenges of international coordination, is effective global governance. Governance gaps The limitations of technological relinquishment, preference modification, and various specific countermeasures as responses to a potential civilizational vulnerability should now be clear. To the extent, therefore, that we are concerned that VWH may be true, we must consider the remaining two possible ways of achieving stabilization: 1. Create the capacity for extremely effective preventive policing. Develop the intra-state governance capacity needed to prevent, with extremely high reliability, any individual or small group – including ones that cannot be deterred – from carrying out any action that is highly illegal; and 2. Create the capacity for strong global governance. Develop the inter-state governance capacity needed to reliably solve the most serious global commons problems and ensure robust cooperation between states (and other strong organizations) wherever vital security interests are at stake – even where there are very strong incentives to defect from agreements or refuse to sign on in the first place.

#### Interp – the 1AC is an object of research - the role of the neg is to refuse that object. I meet 3 tier politics – I forwarded a form of scientific Maoist analysis, forwarded a model of debate that forces debates over methods to achieve radical change and done extensive research outside of the round.

Williams 18 [Carine, 7/30/18, “Why Black People Need Maoism in 2018”, *The Hampton Institute*, <http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/why-black-people-need-maoism.html#.XWwv7ZNKh0s> // KZaidi]

When they hear Maoism, many people think of China, Peru, and the Philippines. They picture peasants "surrounding the cities from the countryside." This is, of course, understandable, but a mistake. Maoism is not simply "everything that Mao did," or "everything that happened in China between 1949 and now." I have spent a great deal of my time writing working to dispel these sorts of myths, some peddled in an unprincipled fashion by anti-Maoists. Maoism is a living, breathing science. By science we mean something with universal principles that can be taken and applied by all who have a material interest in making revolution. In the United States, this is Black people, or the New Afrikan nation. It was not by accident that the original Black Panther Party (BPP) developed close relations with the revolutionary leadership of the People's Republic of China. Huey didn't go to China to play; he went to study and learn things that could be applied back home. Of course, he eventually degenerated in political line and practice, taking a right opportunist course along with Bobby Seale (always a centrist) and Elaine Brown (who guided the party, in his absence, into a mainstream political force that led into the arms of the Democratic Party). This opportunism in the highest expression of revolutionary sentiment, practice, and force in this country to date needs to be studied and ruthlessly criticized, yet we should be careful. We must place things in their historical context and ensure that we are able to divide one into two, meaning see the beneficial as well as the negative aspects of a thing but also realize that one aspect must be primary. The BPP was destroyed by a combination of factors: lack of a really scientific method of analysis and cohesive program of political education, failure to promote and apply the Marxist-Leninist principle of Democratic Centralism (debate inside the party, formation of a political line through this debate, and the upholding of this decision by all party members and organs), and a culture of liberalism that ended with comrades fighting comrades, thus opening the door for external factors (the FBI and other LE agencies) to play havoc and get cadre railroaded into prison and killed. We must study and learn all of these lessons, because when we develop another organization with the prestige, mass base, and power that the Panthers had, and we will, they will come for us all again. So, why do we need Maoism? Because we are against the most brutal, bloody, and vicious empire known to humankind. This country is looting and enslaving our class siblings all over the world. To overturn this order of things, to smash it and rebuild it in the interests of the revolutionary proletariat of the entire world, we must apply the synthesis of 200 years of systematic, organized class struggle, which is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism: the continuity of the revolutionary project that was Marxism-Leninism, with a rupture from the dogmatism and revisionism. Maoists do not uphold "Actually Existing Socialism" because a scientific analysis rooted in the principles laid down by the revolutionary movements and projects that gave us Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao would demonstrate that stealing food from Filipino fisherfolk, like the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been doing, is 100% non-Marxist. This is in disagreement with many Marxist-Leninist organizations today, which uphold these things and other imperialist depredations carried out under the faded red banner of China. The Maoist argument is that Marxist-Leninist terrain has been spent, and the 21st century must learn from Maoism. "You haven't seized state power yet!" others cry. Indeed, and there has never been a truly Maoist party that has initiated armed struggle in the imperialist metro poles. This doesn't mean that Maoist principles cannot be applied to these countries, this means that we must be ever more creative in our application and ever more disciplined in our party-building efforts. Party building in the USA requires the careful and thorough cultivation of a mass base. Tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of people must depend on and follow this party and participate in mass organizations before it can even begin to call itself a vanguard. This is what many who came out of the New Communist Movement of the mid-late 1970s failed to realize. The days of endless squabbling sects that fight over "mass bases" of a handful of other activists must be put to an end, and we must have a truly mass perspective. There is optimism in the spread of For the People (FTP) organizations and the development of the Organizing Committee for a Maoist Communist Party (MCP-OC) which has a more mass orientation and places primacy on the development of a class analysis and political line in the USA that is based in painstaking investigation and rooted in the aspirations and struggles of the most oppressed, along with a record of seeking to develop international solidarity and prison work. This, I believe, is the best hope for New Afrikan Maoists in the United States and I wholeheartedly encourage Black comrades to develop FTP-type organizations in their own communities under OC guidance. Even if this isn't done, at the very least studies in Maoism, studies in Maoist revolutions, and studies in Maoist theory are beneficial. After and during these studies, think about how it can be applied on your block and in your community. Learn about and be like Fred Hampton. Time is up for spinning our wheels; we must get together, unite on a principled and unshakeable basis, and mount a formidable resistance against decades and centuries-old oppression based in capitalism and white supremacy. I also encourage support and donation to the Hampton Institute as an invaluable resource in promoting revolutionary ideology and practice in the finest Marxist tradition.

# AC

## FW

#### 1] Revolutionary Suicide and willing to risk total extinction to abolish racial capitalism is a prior to ethics and value itself

Pinkard 13 [2013, Lynice Pinkard, “Revolutionary Suicide: Risking Everything to Transform Society and Live Fully”, Tikkun 2013 Volume 28, Number 4: 31-41, http://tikkun.dukejournals.org/content/28/4/31.full]

I’d like to present an alternative to conventional identity politics, one that requires that we understand the way that capitalism itself has grown out of a very particular kind of identity politics — white supremacy — aimed at securing “special benefits” for one group of people. It is not sufficient to speak only of identities of race, class, and gender. I believe we must also speak of identities in relation to domination. To what extent does any one of us identify with the forces of domination and participate in relations that reinforce that domination and the exploitation that goes with it? In what ways and to what extent are we wedded to our own upward mobility, financial security, good reputation, and ability to “win friends and influence people” in positions of power? Or conversely, do we identify (not wish to identify or pretend to identify but actually identify by putting our lives on the line) with efforts to reverse patterns of domination, empower people on the margins (even when we are not on the margins ourselves), and seek healthy, sustainable relations? When we consider our identities in relation to domination, we realize the manifold ways in which we have structured our lives and desires in support of the very economic and social system that is dominating us. To shake free of this cycle, we need to embrace a radical break from business as usual. We need to commit revolutionary suicide. By this I mean not the killing of our bodies but the destruction of our attachments to security, status, wealth, and power. These attachments prevent us from becoming spiritually and politically alive. They prevent us from changing the violent structure of the society in which we live. Revolutionary suicide means living out our commitments, even when that means risking death. When Huey Percy Newton, the cofounder of the Black Panther Party, called us to “revolutionary suicide,” it appears that he was making the same appeal as Jesus of Nazareth, who admonished, “Those who seek to save their lives will lose them, and those who lose their lives for the sake of [the planet] will save them.” Essentially, both movement founders are saying the same thing. Salvation is not an individual matter. It entails saving, delivering, rescuing an entire civilization. This cannot be just another day at the bargain counter. The salvation of an entire planet requires a total risk of everything — of you, of me, of unyielding people everywhere, for all time. This is what revolutionary suicide is. The cost of revolutionary change is people’s willingness to pay with their own lives. This is what Rachel Corrie knew when she, determined to prevent a Palestinian home in Rafah from being demolished, refused to move and was killed by an Israeli army bulldozer in the Gaza Strip. This is what Daniel Ellsberg knew when he made public the Pentagon Papers. It’s what Oscar Schindler knew when he rescued over 1,100 Jews from Nazi concentration camps, what subversive Hutus knew when they risked their lives to rescue Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide. This call may sound extreme at first, but an unflinching look at the structure of our society reveals why nothing less is enough. Before returning to the question of revolutionary suicide and what it might mean in each of our lives, let’s look at what we’re up against.

#### 2] Scope Util is an all-lives matter framing that denies ongoing genocide in favor of an always short term extinction threat - In this debate you should flip that calculus and begin with the bodies that exist outside the registers of liberalism as the only ethical impact calculus

Mignolo ‘7 (Walter, argentinian semiotician and prof at Duke, “The De-Colonial Option and the Meaning of Identity in Politics” online)

The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—the perpetuation of the logic of coloniality, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human livesfrom the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5

#### 3] the aff is a reproductive project which makes macro-level violence inevitable - independent 2NR option

Baedan 12 (baedan is a journal composed by a collective of anonymous queer negativists, Summer 2012, “Baedan 1: Journal of Queer Nihilism,” pp 17-9) gz

It should be obvious through Edelman’s treatment of the relationship of politics to the Child that the cathexis which captures all political ambition is a drive toward the future. The social order must concern itself with the future so as to create the forward-moving infrastructure and discourse to proliferate itself. Edelman’s name for this insistence on the Child as the future is reproductive futurism. Reproductive futurism is the ideology which demands that all social relationships and communal life be structured in order to allow for the possibility of the future through the reproduction of the Child, and thus the reproduction of society. The ideology of reproductive futurism ensures the sacrifice of all vital energy for the pure abstraction of the idealized continuation of society. Edelman argues that “futurity amounts to a struggle for Life at the expense of life; for the Children at the expense of the lived experiences of actual children.” If queerness is a refusal of the symbolic value of the Child as the horizon of the future, queerness must figure as being against the future itself. To be specific, our queer project must also pose itself as the denial of the future of civilization. Edelman argues that “the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form.” He locates this queer anti-futurity as being the primary fantastic justification for anti-queer violence: “If there is no baby and, in consequence, no future, then the blame must fall on the fatal lure of sterile, narcissistic enjoyments understood as inherently destructive of meaning and therefore as responsible for the undoing of social organization, collective reality, and, inevitably, life itself.” He invokes the anti-queer interpretations of the Biblical destruction of Sodom to describe the ways in which the collective imaginary is still haunted by the notion that a proliferation of queerness can only result in a persistent threat of societal apocalypse. Thus in the name of the Child and the future it represents, any repression, sexual or otherwise, can be justified. The Child, immured in an innocence seen as continuously under siege, condenses a fantasy of vulnerability to the queerness of queer sexualities precisely insofar as that Child enshrines, in its form as sublimation, the very value for which queerness regularly find itself condemned: an insistence on sameness that intends to restore an Imaginary past. The Child, that is, marks the fetishistic fixation of heteronormativity: an erotically charged investment in the rigid sameness of identity that is central to the compulsory narrative of reproductive futurism. And so, as the radical right maintains, the battle against queers is a life-and-death struggle for the future of a Child whose ruin is pursued by queers. Indeed, as the Army of God made clear in the bomb-making guide it produces for the assistance of its militantly “pro-life” members, its purpose was wholly congruent with the logic of reproductive futurism: to “disrupt and ultimately destroy Satan’s power to kill our children, God’s children.” Edelman goes on to cite the ways in which reproductive futurism is intrinsic to white supremacist ideology and white nationalism; bound as the Child is to notions of race and nation: Let me end with a reference to the “fourteen words,” attributed to David Lane, by which members of various white separatist organizations throughout the United States affirm their collective commitment to the cause of racial hatred: “we must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.” So long as “white” is the only word that makes this credo appalling, so long as the figural children continue to “secure our existence” through the fantasy that we survive in them, so long as the queer refutes that fantasy, effecting its derealization as surely an encounter with the Real, for just so long must [queerness] have a future after all. To bolster his argument about the repressive nature of reproductive futurism, Edelman cites Walter Benjamin in describing the way in which the fantasy of the future was intrinsic to the spread of fascism in Europe. Edelman, via Benjamin, describes “the fascism of the baby’s face,” a phrase meant to illustrate the absolute power afforded to the ideology of reproductive futurism. This fascism of the baby’s face serves to reify difference and thus to secure the reproduction of the existent social order in the form of the future. No atrocity is out of the question if it is for the Child; no horrible project of industry should precluded if it will serve to hasten the future of industrial civilization. Armies of men, imperial and revolutionary alike, have always lined up to the slaughter in the name of the Child. But we needn’t look any further than today’s headlines to see the symbolic power the Child’s face deploys in the service of the social order. This year, the nation has been captivated by two horrific examples of the death-regime of white supremacy in the United States. Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida and Bo Morrison in Slinger, Wisconsin: two black youth murdered at the hands of racist vigilantes. While the systematic murder and imprisonment of black people is so commonplace that it cannot make headlines, these stories have swept the nation particularly because of the way they intersect with the narratives of innocence and childhood. Specifically in the case of Trayvon Martin, whose future was taken from him at the age of seventeen, a debate is raging centered around his character and his innocence with regard to his symbolic place as the Child. One side of this debate circulates a “angelic” picture of his face to assure society of his child-like nature. The other side circulates a doctored picture of him wearing a grill as a kind of racialized testament to his adultness. Each side feverishly examines the ‘evidence’ to argue whether or not he had attacked his murderer before he died. What’s at stake in this debate is Trayvon’s symbolic position as the Child: if he represents the Child, his murder is the atrocious destruction of his future (and by extensions everyone’s). If he is not the Child, then his killer acted out of the need to protect the future of his own community (and the children within it) from a perceived (even if falsely) threat. While politicians as high-ranking as the President invest Trayvon with the burden of carrying the futurity of their own children, others continue to assert their second amendment right to own weapons so they may protect theirs. Bo Morrison was also murdered by a racist homeowner, and his killer continues on with impunity because he can claim that he needed to eliminate any threat to his children. Young black men who figured, like the queer, as threats to the family were destroyed in the Child’s name. In each instance, the entire discourse is centered on the Child while entirely obscuring the reality of the actual young individuals executed in the Child’s name. Pundits articulate the measures that could be taken by parents and the state to restore the promise of the future: a ban on guns, more responsible gun ownership, the removal of ‘hoodies’ from children’s wardrobes, neighborhood watch, more policing, “justice.” These horrific killings demonstrate that there truly is no future. It is this truth which young people everywhere are awakening to. They are swarming the streets en masse, hoods up, to outrun the police and snare the flows of the cities. They are walking out of school — that banal prison of futurity — in order to loot stores and be with their friends. They are preparing and coordinating, so that the next time one of them is burned at the stake for the sake of the Future, they’ll make the city burn in kind. The fires of Greece, London and Bahrain hint toward the consequences of such an awakening.

## Case

#### Unions are vulnerable to right-wing populism – the plan creates divisions

Gruenberg 21 [Mark Gruenberg is head of the Washington, D.C., bureau of People's World. He is also the editor of Press Associates Inc. (PAI), a union news service in Washington, D.C. that he has headed since 1999. Previously, he worked as Washington correspondent for the Ottaway News Service, as Port Jervis bureau chief for the Middletown, NY Times Herald Record, and as a researcher and writer for Congressional Quarterly. Mark obtained his BA in public policy from the University of Chicago and worked as the University of Chicago correspondent for the Chicago Daily News. "Worldwide, union leaders grapple with members backing right-wing ‘populists’." https://peoplesworld.org/article/worldwide-union-leaders-grapple-with-members-backing-right-wing-populists/]

WASHINGTON—For years, union leaders on both sides of “The Pond”—also known as the Atlantic Ocean—have faced a problem: Right-wing ideologues’ “populist” rhetoric sways millions of their members to vote against their own interests.

And then once those putative plutocrats achieve public office, they show their true colors, by enacting and enforcing repressive pro-corporate anti-worker laws.

The problem is visible in the U.S., where 40% of union members and their families backed former GOP Oval Office occupant Donald Trump in 2020. But it’s not just Trump.

Over the years, millions supported other right-wing Republicans such as Sens. Mitch McConnell (Ky.), Ted Cruz (Texas), various U.S. representatives, Gov. Greg Abbott (Texas), and former Govs. Bruce Rauner (Ill.) and Scott Walker (Wis.).

All of them, especially Trump and Cruz, spout populist bombast and claim to represent workers—and then enact edicts benefiting the corporate class.

“Trump’s policies favored the rich and the well-connected. But four in ten union voters wanted to give him a second term” last November, said Knut Pankin, moderator of a late-March panel discussion on Right-Wing Populism As An Anti-Worker Agenda. “Why?”

The dilemma exists in other democracies, too. Some unionists heeded anti-immigrant screeds from Germany’s extreme right Alternative for Deutschland, Marine LePen’s French National Rally (formerly the National Front), Norbert Hofer’s Austrian Freedom Party, Hungarian Prime Minister/strongman Viktor Orban of Fidesz, and Poland’s Law and Justice Party, panelists said.

Once those blocs won power in Austria, Poland, and Hungary, or influenced elections in France, mainstream politicians followed their lead, cracking down on workers as well as targeting migrants. The pols feared they would otherwise lose more votes to the right.

The panel, sponsored by Georgetown University’s Kalmanovitz Initiative for Labor and the Working Poor, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a foundation set up to foster U.S.- German relations, tried to figure out why workers vote that way—and how to reorient them.

That’s not to say panelists Vonda McDaniel, president of the Nashville, Tenn., Central Labor Council, Prof. Federico Finchelstein, an expert on East European politics at New York’s New School for Social Research, and Prof. Thomas Greven of the Free University of Berlin reached a conclusion. They offered some reasons for the rightward shift and some solutions.

All those parties, including the GOP, “started as bourgeois, middle-class, shopkeeper-oriented” organizations, but have since pivoted to right-wing populism, Greven explained.

“Cruz at the Conservative Political Action Conference was trying to be the inheritor of the white working class who supported Trump,” he contended. The Texan proclaimed the GOP “the party of steelworkers, construction workers, police officers, firefighters, and waitresses.”

Nationalism, protectionism, and racism

“But one common denominator” is the GOP and the other right-wing parties, plus the workers they appeal to, “have a radicalized response” that “is nationalist, protectionist and nativist…to all facets of globalization,” he said. Those facets include corporate export of workers’ jobs to low-wage nations and resentment of refugees and migrants, often people of color whom white nativists in Europe and the U.S. view as a threat.

“’Us versus them’ is much easier to sell to working-class constituents. Union status doesn’t inoculate people versus right-wing populism,” Greven said. While populists’ pro-worker rhetoric is “a charade,” and progressives’ answer, “tax the rich,” is not enough, he added.

## Fw add ons

#### Emergency Politics DA –

Jackson 12 (Richard, Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Otago. Former. Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, “The Great Con of National Security,” 8/5/12 <http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/05/the-great-con-of-national-security/>)

It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you’ve been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons – among others.¶ The facts are simple and irrefutable: you’re far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called ‘national security issues’, the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of ‘security theatre’ designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious.¶ And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won’t notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of wom[x]n and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won’t notice how much structural violence there is in the world.¶ More than this, they are hoping that you won’t notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for wom[x]n and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate.¶ Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don’t want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence.¶ Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along.¶ Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don’t want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don’t believe the hype: you’re much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.

#### Capitalism is a sequencing question and the focus on minimizing pain destroys the ability to embrace pleasure

Berardi 20 Franco “Bifo” Berardi February 2020 "Desire, Pleasure, Senility, and Evolution" <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/106/312516/desire-pleasure-senility-and-evolution/> e-flux Journal #106 (Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan)//Elmer

Now, in my old age I have come to (painfully) appreciate the difference between desire and pleasure, and I understand that capitalism is, in fact, based on **an endless postponement of pleasure**, and simultaneously on the permanent excitement of desire. Virtual capitalism—what I call semiocapitalism—is an intensification of both these conditions, postponing pleasure and exciting desire. Another catalyst for my realization of how they differ is feeling physically, personally that growing old essentially means losing the ability to access certain spheres of pleasure, while desire continues undisturbed. Beyond my personal experience, and its suggestion of a larger condition, there is something more interesting, and more disturbing, in the relationship between the two. This relationship—between the permanent burning of desire and the inaccessibility, the unattainability of pleasure—has something to do with the present historical moment of transition, the present step in human evolution. Why are older people so nervous? Cantankerous even? I don’t even know the meaning of this word, but it sounds right. Why are old people so malignant? I have two answers. The first has to do with the disappearance of neurons and synapses in old age: the **reduction in the ability to process information**, the loss of subtlety, the loss of definition in the relationship between sensibility and experience. The second is that we—we humans, old humans in particular—tend to cling to life because we think it is our private property. This life is mine, and I don’t want to lose this property. The denial of death is deeply inscribed in the modern mind. As the world’s white population grows old, this has provoked something resembling a social psychosis, an aggressive grasping among the old for all that is left: naked life, putrescent life. At the end of his beautiful book The Order of Time, Carlo Rovelli writes that the fear of death is a mistake of evolution. It is an error provoked by the inability to think the world without one’s own presence within it, an inability to think the world without me. **Modern culture emphasizes the individual** in continuous competition with other individuals, and consequently erases a sense of community among people. Thus, it has turned death into something that cannot be thought, said, or psychically elaborated. Death is systematically denied, which in turn **leaves the individual alone in an infinite desert of sadness**, and ultimately unable to see the continuity among the individual and the community, among me and you. Furthermore, modern capitalism is based on an idolatry of energy. It is based on an obsession with growth, expansion, productivity, acceleration—futurist obsessions that have made senility unthinkable. Why am I writing about these strange and slightly scary subjects?