# Speech 1NC Emory Rd 5 vs Scripps Ranch 1-29 10AM

#### The role of the ballot is to *evaluate the desirability of resolutional action under the best normative framework*. Prefer: (a) AC / NC is structurally reciprocal since both sides have access to two routes to the ballot (b) it’s key to framework clash and phil ed is the only reason LD debate exists.

#### Constructive empiricism is a litmus test – observable phenomenon ensures ethical statements are grounded in verifiable truths.

#### A] Tangibility- it’s the only thing that affects us tangibly and we recognizably prove causal linkages because we see external forces affecting us which O/w on verifiability.

#### B] Actualization- the only way to verify or actualize internal motivation is via action with the external world which means only external forces can guide action

#### C] Pre-requisite- external objects and markers influence internal drives i.e. me seeing ice cream in the external world prompts me to have an internal desire to eat it

#### Thus, ethics must be revisionary – theories cannot be grounded in unmovable principles because we are in a constant state of learning. Historical moral progress proves we radically shift our norms but only theories that are adaptable can withstand the test of time. Survivability underlies ethics – if rules don’t exist, then they aren’t action guiding.

#### Constructivism is true –

#### 1] Temporality – moral questions take time to answer. It is not possible to construct perfect theories because they’re debunked by the future when we realize it doesn’t perfectly fit our way of life; however, endorsing a process of perpetual addition circumvents restarting from scratch.

#### 2] Epistemology – meta-ethics should not just be concerned with the process of creating rules, but rather the ways that we think. Formulating correct theories requires that we understand the mind and how subjects cohere moral knowledge which means the construction of knowledge over time is valuable.

#### 3] Subject Formation – experiences shape identity because we construct our personalities and attitudes based on how we feel about particular things. Schemas are formed and modified through experience.

University at Buffalo Center for Educational Innovation **(U@Buffalo CEI)**. (**2020**, December 08). Constructivism. Retrieved April 14, 2021, from http://www.buffalo.edu/ubcei/enhance/learning/constructivism.html

**Constructivism** is the theory that **says learners construct knowledge rather than** just **passively take in information.** **As people experience the world and reflect** upon those experiences, **they build their own representations and incorporate new information into their pre-existing knowledge (schemas).**

Related to this are the processes of assimilation and accommodation.

* **Assimilation** refers to the process of taking new information and fitting it into an existing schema.
* **Accommodation** refers to using newly acquired information to revise and redevelop an existing schema.

**For example, if I believe** that **friends are always nice, and meet a** new **person who is** always **nice to me I may call this person a friend, assimilating them into my schema.** **Perhaps, however, I meet a different person who sometimes pushes me to try harder and is not always nice.** **I may decide to change my schema to accommodate** this person by deciding a friend doesn’t always need to be nice if they have my best interests in mind. **Further, this may make me reconsider whether the first person still fits into my friend schema.**

Consequences of constructivist theory are that:

* Students learn best when engaged in learning experiences rather passively receiving information.
* Learning is inherently a social process because it is embedded within a social context as students and teachers work together to build knowledge.
* Because knowledge cannot be directly imparted to students, the goal of teaching is to provide experiences that facilitate the construction of knowledge.

This last point is worth repeating. A traditional approach to teaching focuses on delivering information to students, yet constructivism argues that you cannot directly impart this information. Only an experience can facilitate students to construct their own knowledge. Therefore, the goal of teaching is to design these experiences.

**This commits us to practical deliberation as the method of moral inquiry   
Serra 09**Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member. https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/905

This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that ethics is valuable as a science in a broad sense. But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, through the examination of past actions and the self-correction of the self in view of future action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life can be lived. In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his system, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct (or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re- search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, moral inquiry is performed in a deliberative way, weighing up argumentations, beliefs and principles, and comparing them either with their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as well as possible experiences that can be forceful or impinge upon the deliberative subject in such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint- ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and thought experiments... Such responsiveness is part of what it is to make a moral decision and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)3. Likewise, this same deliberative activity implies an effort to acquire habits, beliefs and principles that contribute to a truly free deliberation which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas- ticity and receptiveness to experience4. Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi- ment carried out within imagination that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef- forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con- crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even more, according to Peirce, the activity takes the form of experimentation in the inner world; and the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. The real and living logical conclusion is that habit (CP 5.491, 1907). Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided (CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in- fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative subject.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with pragmatic deliberation.

#### 1] impacts cannot be isolated from their history and the only way to test the validity of truth is through application.

**Dewey 02** [John Dewey (head of the Philosophy Department at the University of Chicago). “The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality: II. Its Significance for Conduct.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Jul., 1902), pp. 353-371. Accessed 12/31/20. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2176470.pdf> //Recut Xu]

The problem of the best method of arriving at correct judg- ments on points of moral worth, necessarily traverses ground covered by the time-honored and time-worn theories of intuition- alism and empiricism. Even at the risk of threshing old straw, it will be advisable to compare the evolutionary method with these other points of view. In such a comparison, however, it is to be borne in mind that the sole point under review is that of the log- ical relationship of the theory examined to the meaning and sanc- tion of our moral judgments. The question is not whether or no there are intuitions; whether or no they can be utilized in special cases, or whether or no all supposed intuitions can be accounted for as products of associative memory. The problem is not one of fact but of value. It is a logical problem. If we suppose such necessary and universal beliefs as go by the name of ' intuition' to exist, does such existence settle anything regarding the valid- ity of what is believed, either in general or in part? It is a question of the relation of the intuition to fact -to the moral order in reality. Under what conditions alone, and in what measure or degree, are we justified in arguing from the existence of moral intuitions as mental states and acts to facts taken to correspond to them ? The reply already hinted at is that the mere existence of a belief, even admitting that as a belief it cannot in any way be got rid of, determines absolutely nothing regarding the objectivity of its own content. The worth of the intuition depends upon genetic considerations. In so far as we can state the intuition in terms of the conditions of its origin, development, and later career, in so far we have some criterion for passing judgment upon its pretentions to validity. If we can find that the intuition is a legitimate response to enduring and deep-seated conditions, we have some reason to attribute worth to it. If we find that historically the belief has played a part in maintaining the integrity of social life, and in bringing new values into it, our belief in its worth is additionally guaranteed. But if we cannot find such historic origin and functioning, the intuition remains a mere state of consciousness, a hallucination, an illusion, which is not made more worthy by simply multiplying the number of people who have participated in it. Put roughly we may say that intuitionalism, asordinarily conceived, makes the ethical belief a brute fact, because unrelated. Its very lack of genetic relationship to the situation in which it appears condemns it to isolation. This isolation logically makes it impossible to credit it with objective validity. The intuitionalist, in proclaiming the necessity of his content, proclaims thereby its objective reference; but in asserting its non-genetic character he denies any reference whatsoever. The genetic theory holds that the content embodied in any so-called intuition is a response to a given active situation: that it arises, develops, and operates somehow in reference to this situation. This functional reference establishes in advance some kind of relationship to objective conditions, and hence some presumption of validity. If the ' intuition' persists, it is within certain limits because the situation persists. If the particular moral belief is really inexpugnable, it is just because the conditions which require it are so enduring as to persistently call out an attitude which is relevant to them. The probability is that it continues in existence simply because it continues to be necessary in function.

#### 2] Pluralistic Materialism – other theories rely on minimalistic criteria; our framework understands knowledge as changing and uses experience to base social change and revise ideas. Glaude 7Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the African-American chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (5-7)

In a Shade of Blue is my contribution to the tradition I have just sketched. My aim is to think through some of the more pressing conceptual problems confronting African American political life, and I do so as a Deweyan prag-matist. I should say a bit about what I mean by this self-description. John Dewey thought of philosophy as a form of cultural and social criticism. He held the view that philosophy, properly understood as a mode of wis-dom, ought to aid us in our efforts to overcome problematic situations and worrisome circumstances. The principal charge of the philosopher, then, is to deal with the problems of human beings, not simply with the problems of philosophers. For Dewey, over the course of his long career, this involved bridging the divide between science, broadly understood, and morals—a divide he traced to a conception of experience that has led philosophers over the centuries to tilt after windmills. Dewey declared, “The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.”9Dewey bases this conclusion on several features of his philosophy: (1) anti foundationalism, (2) experimentalism, (3) contextualism, and (4) soli-darity.10 Antifoundationalism, of course, is the rejection of foundations of knowledge that are beyond question. Dewey, by contrast, understands knowledge to be the fruit of our undertakings as we seek “the enrichment of our immediate experience through the control over action it exercises.”11He insists that we turn our attention from supposed givens to actual consequences, pursuing a future fundamentally grounded in values shaped by experience and realized in our actions. This view makes clear the experimental function of knowledge. Dewey emphasized that knowledge entails efforts to control and select future experience and that we are always con-fronted with the possibility of error when we act. We experiment or tinker, with the understanding that all facts are fallible and, as such, occasionally afford us the opportunity for revision.12Contextualism refers to an understanding of beliefs, choices, and actions as historically conditioned. Dewey held the view that inquiry, or the pursuit of knowledge, is value-laden, in the sense that we come to problems with interests and habits that orient us one way or another, and that such pursuits are also situational, in the sense that “knowledge is pursued and produced somewhere, some when, and by someone.”13Finally, solidarity captures the associational and cooperative dimensions of Dewey’s thinking. Dewey conceives of his pragmatism as “an instrument of social improvement” aimed principally at expanding democratic life and broadening the ground of individual self-development.14Democracy, for him, constitutes more than a body of formal procedures; it is a form of life that requires constant attention if we are to secure the ideals that purportedly animate it. Individuality is understood as developing one’s unique capacities within the context of one’s social relations and one’s community. The formation of the democratic character so important to our form of associated living involves, then, a caring disposition toward the plight of our fellows and a watchful concern for the well-being of our democratic life.

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#### Space Commercialization drives Tech Innovation in the Status Quo – it provides a unique impetus.

Hampson 17 Joshua Hampson 1-25-2017 “The Future of Space Commercialization” <https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf> (Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center)//Elmer

The size of the space economy is far larger than many may think. In 2015 alone, the global market amounted to $323 billion. Commercial infrastructure and systems accounted for 76 percent of that 9 total, with satellite television the largest subsection at $95 billion. The global space launch market’s 10 11 share of that total came in at $6 billion dollars. It can be hard to disaggregate how space benefits 12 particular national economies, but in 2009 (the last available report), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimated that commercial space transportation and enabled industries generated $208.3 billion in economic activity in the United States alone. Space is not just about 13 satellite television and global transportation; while not commercial, GPS satellites also underpin personal navigation, such as smartphone GPS use, and timing data used for Internet coordination.14 Without that data, there could be problems for a range of Internet and cloud-based services.15 There is also room for growth. The FAA has noted that while the commercial launch sector has not grown dramatically in the last decade, there are indications that there is latent demand. This 16 demand may catalyze an increase in launches and growth of the wider space economy in the next decade. The Satellite Industry Association’s 2015 report highlighted that their section of the space economy outgrew both the American and global economies. The FAA anticipates that growth to 17 continue, with expectations that small payload launch will be a particular industry driver.18 In the future, emerging space industries may contribute even more the American economy. Space tourism and resource recovery—e.g., mining on planets, moons , and asteroids—in particular may become large parts of that industry. Of course, their viability rests on a range of factors, including costs, future regulation, international problems, and assumptions about technological development. However, there is increasing optimism in these areas of economic production. But the space economy is not just about what happens in orbit, or how that alters life on the ground. The growth of this economy can also contribute to new innovations across all walks of life. Technological Innovation Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation. In terms of technology, the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins. Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities. Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects. Lightweight 21 nanotubes, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development. Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point can provide new perspectives to old industries. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.

#### Pragmatic recognizes the world’s fallible which requires constant experimentation to reconstruct “foundational” truths.

Wu 14 [Tim Wu (Julius Silver Professor of Law, Science and Technology at Columbia University). “Intellectual Property Experimentalism By Way of Competition Law”. Columbia Law School. 2014. Accessed 8/16/21. <https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2843&context=faculty_scholarship> //Xu]

Experimentalism is not a word that attorneys use very often. At its most general, the idea of legal experimentalism is to apply the scientific method of hypothesis, experiment, and observation of consequence to challenging legal and policy problems. It is, as such, closely related to a “pragmatist” legal philosophy.5 John Dewey is usually credited with laying a philosophical foundation for policy experimentalism in his writings in the 1910s and 1920s. Dewey, whose background was in education, believed that a successful democracy needed the capacity to learn and improve itself. The key to learning, he believed, was the processing of experiences, or in his words the “reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.”6 As relevant to the legal system, Dewey thought policy and “proposals for social action” should be subject to the experimental method. Policy-making, he said, should be a constant process of learning from experience, rather than relying on rigid or foundational truths. “Policies,” Dewey argued, should be “experimental in the sense that they will be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences they entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision in the light of observed consequences.”7 As understood here we can describe legal experimentalism as comprising three main principles. First, for the experimentalist, laws are simply instruments meant to achieve some end and useful only to the extent they do so. A law has no intrinsic value, and its existence should not necessarily count in favor of its retention. Second, every law should be thought of as an ongoing experiment. That is to say, every enactment, regu- lation or judicial opinion must be seen as that moment’s best guess as to what a rule should be, in light of imperfect information and human fallibility. Borrowing Dewey’s language, policies should be thought of as a “working hypothesis, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and executed.”8 Given the imperfect nature of law-making, policy should be subject to revision when faced with new information or changed conditions. The law must also be able to learn and improve itself based on observation of consequences, intended or otherwise.