# Speech 1NC Emory Rd 4 vs Lake High land 1-28 5PM

### 1

#### Interp: The affirmative must define “outer space” in a delimited text in the 1AC.

#### “Outer Space” is flexible and has too many interps –independently turns judicial application.

Leepuengtham 17 [Tosaporn Leepuengtham (Research Judge, Intellectual Property and International Trade Division, Supreme Court of Thailand). "International space law and its implications for outer space activities." 01-27-2017, Accessed 12-9-2021. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781785369612/06\_chapter1.xhtml // duongie

Those states which favor the precise demarcation of outer space support the spatial approach, whereas those who oppose to such demarcation prefer the functional approach, as the latter allows more flexibility in terms of the development of space technology.34 This lack of a definition and delimitation of outer space is problematic, since certain particular areas are neither explicitly defined as ‘air space’ or ‘outer space’. For example, it is vague whether an area located between 80 km and 120 km above sea level would be classified as either air space or outer space in the absence of demarcation, since 80 km is the maximum attitude for convention aircraft, and 120 km is the lowest attitude in which space activities could be carried out.35 Satellites which are stationed in a geostationary orbit are a good example of this ambiguity. Owing to this lack of any internationally recognized delimitation, equatorial states claim sovereignty over that part of the geostationary orbit which is located over their respective territories;36 whereas technologically developed countries believe that the geostationary orbit is an integral part of outer space.37 This uncertain status of areas leads to legal jurisdictional problems. According to international law, a state has sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.38 However, national sovereignty does not extend into outer space.39 Thus, it is necessary to determine where a state’s airspace ends to ensure that the appropriate legal regime is applied. One possible scenario which might occur and which is relevant to the subject of this book is the creation or infringement of an intellectual work is in just such an ambiguous location. This would cast doubt on the ‘legal’ location of creation or infringement, and the question of which applicable legal regime arises. Should we apply the law of the underlying state or is there no law to apply? For example, would satellite signals transmitted from a satellite stationed in a geostationary orbit located over equatorial countries be considered as works created or, if intercepted, be infringed, in outer space or in the sovereign air space of those respective countries? These hypothetical examples highlight why a boundary is necessary if unpredictability arising from different legal application is to be avoided. While it might be argued that this issue is being overemphasized at this stage, given increasing use of space technology, this problem is worth considering now rather than later.

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Vote for Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night – triggers presumption since the aff wasn’t subject to well researched scrutiny. We lose access to Tech Race DA’s, Asteroid DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### OSspec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from policies that require enforcement to function.

### 2

#### Interp and violation – 1ACs must use the three-tier process to justify the plan – they haven’t

Reid-Brinkley 8 [SHANARA ROSE REID-BRINKLEY- “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” Under the Direction of CHRISTINE HAROLD <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf> 2008] VHS AI

The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence. As Green argues, their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”57 In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledgemaking practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making 83 practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59 Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the doubleocto-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.”60 The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions 84 prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education.61 The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks. Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.

#### 1] Limits – there are an infinite amount of potential plans so you cherry-pick affs with no neg ground and I must prep all affs while they prep one which pigeonholes me to generics but there is a limited amount of ways bodies could affirm.

#### 2] Psychic Burnout –

Harney 14 [Note – I do not support the ableist language used in the evidence. Stefano Harney (Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University). “HAPTICALITY IN THE UNDERCOMMONS, OR FROM OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT TO BLACK OPS”. CUMMA PAPERS #9. 2014. Accessed 11/13/21. <https://cummastudies.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/cumma-papers-9.pdf> //Xu]

This may sound surprising to say there are no subjects in the social factory or that indeed the rhythm of work is omnipresent today. We face millions without work or not enough work in Europe and amongst the migrants seeking to reach Europe. We are told that the future of work in Europe is subjective, creative, professional, and most of all managerial, not rhythmic. And at any rate from more reliable sources like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri we understand that we are living in an era when immaterial labour – cognitive and affective labour - dominates and commands other forms of labour, even if factories are still widespread in Bangladesh or China. But this should not make us deaf to the rhythms we hear no matter where we go, the rhythms that break and kill humans. We have heard a lot from business about how we can become entrepreneurial, or how we can transform ourselves into leaders, of how we can become responsible for our own careers. And again from our comrades we have received a more accurate picture: conceptions of the artist, of the bohemian, of the researcher, and of the performer have been twisted by business to make us work harder, to convince us we can fulfil ourselves through work. Andrew Ross’s work is excellent here. Christian Marazzi has written about the way our bodies are today a kind of constant capital, machines for which we are responsible, which we must upkeep because they are the site of production. He is right. Franco Berardi speaks of the way our psyche and our souls descend into work as if engulfing our whole being, and Emma Dowling of the way even our affect is measured and managed, brought into metrics. It is easy to feel that work for those who have it is about the risk of having your subjectivity and your talents swallowed whole, about having your virtuosity consumed as Paolo Virno might put it. But a factory is neither a collection of machines nor a collection of workers however skilled, however virtuoso. A factory is a line. OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT The area of management studies concerned with the factory is Operations Management. Operations management has always been pretty clear about what a factory is, and however much it has expanded its understanding of the factory, this definition has not wavered. This is business ‘knowledge,’ with all its ideological limits, but it can be helpful to our own considerations here. For Operations Management, the factory is the scene of a process. This is process in the sense of procession, of movement. Inputs go into the factory to move along a process, a line, and outputs come out of the factory. Most importantly what machines and especially workers do, according to operations management, is work on the process not the product. In contemporary operations management theory this has meant improving that process. This is often designated by the Japanese term ‘kaizen’ originally associated with workers and managers devoting themselves to the continuous improvement of the line’s efficiency in Toyota factories. Soon kaizen expanded throughout service, extraction, information, and other sectors. Rather than attention to the product, including the immaterial product, which remains as much as ever the purview of a small fraction of the workforce, most workers are subjected to increased attention to the ‘assembly’ line. For management science, this is what a factory is: a line, a process, a procession, a movement, a rhythm through from inputs to outputs. And this too is what the social factory is. Its name is accurate even if we have sometimes been distracted by everything from the propaganda of creative classes to the critical discourse of the precariat. But that is not all. Kaizen has been accompanied by another development in the line. This is the extension of the management of inputs and outputs, of the extension to supply chains understood as part of the line, not just as raw clusters of labour, natural resources and machines waiting outside the door of the factory. And with logistics and reverse logistics this line is expanding exponentially, or rather, algorithmically. Logistics and supply chain management extend the metrics of line in both directions, toward inputs and outputs which now have their own work rhythms. SYNAPTIC LABOUR This algorithmically expanding line means the outside of the factory is measured like the inside, aligned with the processual inside. And when the factory is virtual, Post-Fordist, a social factory, the algorithms of the line extend the rhythm of production, of assembly across our lives. The two meanings of assembly, or perhaps two modes of assembly, begin to merge, to assemble is both to come together and to make, anywhere, anytime. But what is made when we assemble and re-assemble is the line itself first and foremost, not a product or a service. This is our work today. We take inventories of ourselves for components not the whole. We produce lean efforts to transconduct. We look to overcome constraints. We define values through metrics. These are all terms from operations management but they describe work far better than recourse to the discourse of subject formation. Creativity itself, supposedly at the heart of the battle for the subject today, is nothing but what operations management calls variance in the line, a variance that may lead to what is in turn called a kaizen event, an improvement, and is then assimilated back into an even more sophisticated line. Today ours is primarily the labour of adapting and translating, being commensurate and flexible, being a conduit and receptacle, a port for information but also a conductor of information, a wire, a travel plug. We channel affect toward new connections. We do not just keep the flow of meaning, information, attention, taste, desire, and fear moving, we improve this flow continuously. We must remain open and attuned to the rhythm of the line, to its merciless variances in rhythm. This is primarily a neurological labour, a synaptic labour of making contact to keep the line flowing, and creating innovations that help it flow in new directions and at new speeds. The worker operates like a synapse, sparking new lines of assembly in life. And she does so anywhere and everywhere because the rhythm of the line is anywhere and everywhere. The worker extends synaptic rhythms in every direction, every circumstance. With synaptic work, it is access not subjects that the line wants, an access, as Denise Ferreira da Silva reminds us, that was long at the heart of the abuse of the affected ones, the ones who granted access out of love, out of necessity, out of the consent not to be one, even before that granting was abused. GROUNDATIONS The rule of the line persists beyond the factory in time and space, and its rhythm makes the time and space of our lives. There is no outside to the line, or rather we might say the line runs through the outside promised in Fordism and supposed to be so heterogeneous in Post-Fordism. A rhythm that tears us apart, a rhythm that obliterates and wrecks our brain. In some places the line is all that is left of the factory, and logistics in this expanded sense is all that is left of production. The science of operations management becomes the science of society, the common sense of our lives.

#### 3] ressentiment –

**Antonio 95** (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,) / MM Rbacketed for ableist land

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that **persons** (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They **are so** thoroughly **absorbed in simulating** effective **role players that they have trouble being anything but actors**-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." **Integrity, decisiveness**, spontaneity, and pleasure **are undone by [freezing] paralyzing** **over concern about possible** causes, meanings, and **consequences** of acts **and** unending *internal dialogue* about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?  A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new **simulated versions**. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly **combination** of **desperate conforming** and overreaching **and** untrammeled **ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant** (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-

#### TVA – defend your advocacy but focus on the way the politics you defend are influenced by your identity

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact

#### Accessibility – psychic violence is a prereq to being in debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### DTD – its key to deter future abuse

#### No RVI’s- a) chilling effect – people will be too scared to read theory because RVI’s encourage baiting theory b) clash – people go all in on theory which decks substance engagement c] logic – you shouldn’t win forbeing fiar

### 3

#### OST Credibility is high now – no violations.

Stuart 17 Jill Stuart 1-27-2017 "The Outer Space Treaty has been remarkably successful – but is it fit for the modern age?" <https://theconversation.com/the-outer-space-treaty-has-been-remarkably-successful-but-is-it-fit-for-the-modern-age-71381> (Visiting Fellow, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science)//Elmer

Space exploration is governed by a complex series of international treaties and agreements which have been in place for years. The first and probably most important of them celebrates its 50th anniversary on January 27 – The Outer Space Treaty. This treaty, which was signed in 1967, was agreed through the United Nations, and today it remain as the “constitution” of outer space. It has been signed and made official, or ratified, by 105 countries across the world. The treaty has worked well so far but challenges have increasingly started to crop up. So will it survive another 50 years? The Outer Space Treaty, like all international law, is technically binding to those countries who sign up to it. But the obvious lack of “space police” means that it cannot be practically enforced. So a country, individual or company could simply ignore it if they so wished. Implications for not complying could include sanctions, but mainly a lack of legitimacy and respect which is of importance in the international arena. However it is interesting that, over the 50 years of it’s existence, the treaty has never actually been violated. Although many practical challenges have been made – these have always been made with pars of the treaty in mind, rather than seeking to undermine it entirely.

#### Normal Means requires amending the OST – that causes a runaway amendment convention.

Vedda 18 Jim Vedda May 2018 <https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/OuterSpaceTreaty.pdf> (senior policy analyst, PhD in Political Science at University of Florida)//Elmer

Treaty Amendment. If decisionmakers conclude that the Outer Space Treaty isn’t broken but is just showing its age, targeted changes are an obvious solution—especially in the areas of orbital debris, space salvage, and resource rights, as noted earlier; however, the process of reaching consensus on changes would entail years of diplomatic effort, with no guarantee that the end result would be better than (or as good as) what exists today. The amendment process may not remain limited to the one or two issues that prompted it. The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has 84 member countries,11 any of which could bring up its own amendments, which could be objectionable to the major stakeholders. Several countries, including China and Russia, have proposed treaty language that would ban all weapons in space,12 a position opposed by the United States. There is a strong possibility that similar language would be submitted as an amendment if the treaty were to be opened for revision. This could bog down the process and derail prospects for achievement in the specific areas originally targeted. In May 2017, the Senate space subcommittee held a hearing on the Outer Space Treaty,13 specifically asking whether it needed amendment to remove roadblocks to space commerce. All seven witnesses—with backgrounds in law, business consulting, and space entrepreneurship—testified that there is no need to amend the treaty, and attempting to do so could leave industry worse off. They described the treaty as minimally burdensome, and emphasized that priority should be given instead to making the U.S. licensing and regulation regime for space commerce more stable, predictable, and transparent. This is not to suggest that amendments should never be attempted, but rather that the amendment process must be undertaken with eyes wide open. The Outer Space Treaty and other space agreements exist in a dynamic environment. Technology continues to advance, and the amount and type of space activity keeps changing— so treaties may need periodic updating. But at present, higher priority should be assigned to development of a well-reasoned and comprehensive national space strategy.

#### That wrecks the OST.

Melroy 17 Pamela Melroy 5-23-2017 “Reopening the American Frontier: Exploring How the Outer Space Treaty Will Impact American Commerce and Settlement in Space” <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=807259> (Retired NASA Astronaut)//Elmer

There are many exciting activities and proposals in commercial space. With respect to the Outer Space Treaty, I am deeply concerned that we would be opening a Pandora’s Box by attempting to change it. My concern is that the likely outcome would be a lack of consensus, resulting in no amendments. Instead, we will have a weakened dedication to the Principles of the Treaty and the sustainability of space. Great changes are occurring and many countries are developing capabilities that previously were the purview of only a few nation states. Our ability to compete both economically and technologically in space is crucial. These Principles form the basis for the dialog that we have with other countries about what is appropriate and what is not. Without them, the dialog becomes chaos.

#### Credible OST solves Space War.

Johnson 17 Christopher Johnson 1-23-2017 “The Outer Space Treaty at 50” , <http://thespacereview.com/article/3155/1> (graduate of Leiden University’s International Institute of Air and Space Law and the International Space University)//Elmer

As mentioned, many of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty were borrowed from previous UN General Assembly resolutions. But as resolutions alone, these documents were non-binding and did not require states to alter their behavior. And while UN General Assembly resolutions are not normally law-making exercises, they do record the commonly-held expression of intentions by the states in the General Assembly, and make political recommendations to UNGA Members (or to the UN Security Council). UNGA Resolutions can also set priorities and mold opinion for inclusion in subsequent treaties. The prohibition on the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space or their installation on celestial bodies was taken from UNGA Resolution 1884 of 1963. The resolution: [s]olemnly calls upon all States… [t]o refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner. This prohibition was transferred to the Outer Space Treaty, and thereby remade into international treaty law. As President Johnson pointed out in his recommendation to Congress to ratify the Outer Space Treaty, “the realms of space should forever remain realms of peace.”5 He continued: We know the gains of cooperation. We know the losses of the failure to cooperate. If we fail now to apply the lessons we have learned, or even if we delay their application, we know that the advances into space may only mean adding a new dimension to warfare. If, however, we proceed along the orderly course of full cooperation we shall, by the very fact of cooperation, make the most substantial contribution toward perfecting peace.6 The agreement contained in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty reflects an agreement between the US and the USSR, as obligations restricting their freedom of action. Why would a state intentionally place a restriction on itself? Isn’t it better to merely keep outer space as unregulated as possible? Since there were only two states then capable of venturing into outer space, why did either state agree to rules governing its actions? It may seem counterintuitive, but the deeper rationale behind security arrangements like this is that the parties actually benefit in the long-term from placing mutual restrictions on their behavior. Agreeing to restrict your freedom of action has deep links to the usefulness or utility of law itself. Consider driving a car: in order to get a license, you agree to observe certain rules, and the license signals your obligation to obey these rules. However, sometimes adhering to those rules is not only inconvenient (such as stopping at stop signs when there’s nobody else at the intersection), it is also against your short term-interests (you have an appointment or will otherwise suffer from observing the rules.) However, agreeing to operate within a system where your freedoms are sometimes restricted can have the effect of actually increasing your freedom over the long term. Wouldn’t you rather live in a state where traffic laws exist, and other drivers agree to observe them? Isn’t that system preferable to living in a state without traffic rules? Indeed, a system with traffic rules increases not just freedom in general, but overall safety and orderliness. Consequently, because the system with rules is preferable to the system without rules, your willingness to use the roads allows you to travel with greater security and ease. You are better assured of the likelihood that you will get to your intended destination without some other driver crashing into you. Knowing that safe travel is likely, you are more willing to take trips more often, and to farther destinations. Your freedom is actually increased over the long term because you are willing to suffer temporary, short-term restrictions such as inconvenient red lights. Long-term rationality warrants adherence to efficient systems of law. Correctly-balanced rules help increase long-term benefits (like safety and security) that would otherwise be unattainable without a system of rules. It is this rationale that also underpins international treaty-making. Today, the current absence of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space attests to the bargain struck in the Outer Space Treaty being a successful one, where security (and the liberty and freedom possible with security) were furthered by the mutual exchange of restrictions that states placed upon themselves. The more than 50 years of peaceful uses of outer space, including cooperation between states who remain rivals elsewhere, are the rich long-term gains resulting from the Outer Space Treaty.

#### Space War cause Nuclear War.

Gallagher 15 “Antisatellite warfare without nuclear risk: A mirage” <http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346> (interim director of the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland, previous Executive Director of the Clinton Administration’s CTBT Treaty Committee, an arms control specialist at the State Dept., and a faculty member at Wesleyan)//Elmer

In recent decades, however, as space-based reconnaissance, communication, and targeting capabilities have become integral elements of modern military operations, strategists and policy makers have explored whether carrying out antisatellite attacks could confer major military advantages without increasing the risk of nuclear war. In theory, the answer might be yes. In practice, it is almost certainly no. Hyping threats. No country has ever deliberately and destructively attacked a satellite belonging to another country (though nations have sometimes interfered with satellites' radio transmissions). But the United States, Russia, and China have all tested advanced kinetic antisatellite weapons, and the United States has demonstrated that it can modify a missile-defense interceptor for use in antisatellite mode. Any nation that can launch nuclear weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles has the latent capability to attack satellites in low Earth orbit. Because the United States depends heavily on space for its terrestrial military superiority, some US strategists have predicted that potential adversaries will try to neutralize US advantages by attacking satellites. They have also recommended that the US military do everything it can to protect its own space assets while maintaining a capability to disable or destroy satellites that adversaries use for intelligence, communication, navigation, or targeting. Analysis of this sort often exaggerates both potential adversaries’ ability to destroy US space assets and the military advantages that either side would gain from antisatellite attacks. Nonetheless, some observers are once again advancing worst-case scenarios to support arguments for offensive counterspace capabilities. In some other countries, interest in space warfare may be increasing because of these arguments. If any nation, for whatever reason, launched an attack on a second nation's satellites, nuclear retaliation against terrestrial targets would be an irrational response. But powerful countries do sometimes respond irrationally when attacked. Moreover, disproportionate retaliation following a deliberate antisatellite attack is not the only way in which antisatellite weapons could contribute to nuclear war. It is not even the likeliest way. As was clearly understood by the countries that negotiated the Outer Space Treaty, crisis management would become more difficult, and the risk of inadvertent deterrence failure would increase, if satellites used for reconnaissance and communication were disabled or destroyed. But even if the norm against attacking another country’s satellites is never broken, developing and testing antisatellite weapons still increase the risk of nuclear war. If, for instance, US military leaders became seriously concerned that China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack, pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack against Chinese or Russian strategic forces. Should a satellite be struck by a piece of space debris during a crisis or a low-level terrestrial conflict, leaders might mistakenly assume that a space war had begun and retaliate before they knew what had actually happened. Such scenarios may seem improbable, but they are no more implausible than the scenarios that are used to justify the development and use of antisatellite weapons.

#### Nuke War t/ FALC

#### 1] sequencing

#### 2] probability

#### 3] objectivity

### 4

#### The 1AC is an ideological fantasy constructed by relentless planning at the expense of scapegoated identities, all for recognition from the Other in an attempt to fill the lack.

Gunder 05 Michael Gunder, 2005, “The Production of Desirous Space: Mere Fantasies of the Utopian City?” Planning Theory 2005 4: 173, DOI: 10.1177/1473095205054604, all brackets were in the original text, SJBE

Jouissance is one of the four structuring elements of social discourse,4 or social interactions, links and relationships, where synchronic language meets diachronic speech to evoke an effect on the Other (Lacan, 2004: 3). Zupancic (2004) associates Lacan’s (2004) theory of the Four Discourses (see Gunder, 2003a, 2004; Hillier and Gunder, 2005) with the Marxian theory of commodification and surplus-value via Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). Lacan (2004: 111) contends that surplusvalue and surplus-enjoyment are historically equivalent, especially in the situation of the Master’s injunction of ‘No!’ in the emerging early phase of Calvinistic repressive capitalism. In contrast to the historical authority and rationality of the Master’s repressive command, late capitalism is structured under a rationality of the university or bureaucracy. Now knowledge and technology, not the Master’s injunction, become ‘agency expressing a logic of governmentality and expertise (including that of planning) that does not prohibit enjoyment, but rather channels jouissance in ways that produces a “bio-politics” (after Foucault) of an alienated subject that has no option, but to enjoy and be satisfied’ (Hillier and Gunder, 2005; McGowan, 2004; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b; Zupancic, 2004). In this regard, ‘a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths [or fantasies] that structure these practices’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1993: 202). This is taken further by the barely challenged international hegemonic discourse of global capitalization and the fantasies it induces in externally structuring the nation state’s very enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 63; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 61). Even the ruling British Labour government, with its ‘Third Way’, in contrast to its tradition of socialism, has placed ‘economic globalisation’ as ‘the most significant factor in shaping Labour Party thinking since the early 1990s’ (Allmendinger, 2003: 326). As McGowan (2004) observes: we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism. The alternatives, which once seemed to be just around the corner, have become unimaginable today. The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority. Only by coming to understand this obedience to the dictates of global capitalism as obedience can we hope to break out of it. Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon simply because we have not properly recognized our own investment in sustaining it. We see it as unsurpassable because we don’t want to lose it – and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. (McGowan, 2004: 193) Illusion resides under this global fantasy of capital where ‘the basic feature of’ this dominant cultural imperative ‘no longer operates on the level of ideals and identifications, but directly on the level of regulating jouissance’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 113). Even in Lefebvre’s day, this was a capitalism where surplus-value was synonymous with surplus-enjoyment supporting the injunction: ‘you must enjoy!’. In this light, the role of planning is to facilitate enjoyment by sustainably providing the correct space – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – where enjoyment can be effectively materialized and maximized under the imperative of global capitalism. Consequently: urbanism is nothing more than an ideology that claims to be either ‘art’ or ‘technology’ or ‘science’, depending on the context. This ideology pretends to be straightforward, yet it obfuscates, harbours things unsaid: which it covers, which it contains, as a form of will tending towards efficiency. Urbanism is doubly fetishistic. First, it implies the fetishism of satisfaction. What about vested interests? They must be satisfied, and therefore their needs must be understood and catered to, unchanged . . . Second, it implies the fetishism of space. Space is creation. Whoever creates space creates whatever it is that fills space. The place engenders the thing and the good place engenders good things. (Lefebvre, 2003: 159) This is exacerbated further in the current milieu of consumerist post-democracy personified by the master signifier: global capitalism. ‘Post-democracy is founded on an attempt to exclude the political awareness of lack and negativity from the political domain, leading to a political order which retains the token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralizes the centrality of political antagonism’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 59). In response to the dominant ‘logic’ of global competitiveness, the technocrats and experts including planners, shape, contextualize and implement public policy in the interest of the dominant hegemonic bloc. This is constructed under the logics and knowledges of university discourses (see Gunder, 2004), with an objective to remove existing or potential urban blight,‘dis-ease’ and dysfunction detracting from local enjoyment and global competitiveness (Gunder, 2005; McGuirk, 2004). Of course, the hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debate as to what constitutes desired enjoyment and what is lacking in urban competitiveness. In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of planning remedy. This is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness, is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Planners, programmers, and users want solutions. For what? To make people happy. To order them to be happy. It is a strange way of interpreting happiness. The science of the urban phenomenon cannot respond to these demands without the risk of validating external restrictions imposed by ideology and power. (Lefebvre, 2003: 141) Yet this lack and its resolution are more often technical in nature, rather than political. As a consequence, the technocrats in partnership with their ‘dominant stakeholders’ can ensure the impression of happiness for the many, while, not to mention, achieving the stakeholders’ specific interests. Material happiness for all but that evil other Lacanian theory suggests that a subject’s jouissance is given freest rein when an act of desire contains a dimension of transgression. It is the ‘little sin’ that gives the most pleasure; it is the prohibition as such which elevates a common everyday object into an object of desire (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 177). The bio-politics of contemporary planning are predicated on enjoyment – you will enjoy! – not the prior duality of repression/freedom of the Weberian capitalist master’s injunction: ‘No you cannot do that!’. The achievements of traditional utopian goals were ones of freedom to act against the repression of the negative injunction. Contemporary injunctions are to enjoy – or at least to sustain our happiness – regardless of what we actually desire. Happiness is not a class of truth, but one of an ontological class of being where: ‘happiness’ relies on the subject’s inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desires. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we ‘officially’ desire. Happiness is thus hypocritical: it is the happiness dreaming about things we do not really want. (Zˇ izˇek, 2002a: 59–60) Planning continues to succeed because it underpins the primal desire of most subjects in society for a conflict-free, safe and assured happy future, even if it can only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario of material happiness, rather than as an impossible reality that actually sates all desires (Gunder, 2003a, 2003b). This is a fantasy predicated on an obedience to a shallow consumptive quantitative imperative to be materially happy, which often occurs at the expense of our actual qualitative psychic desires. In our contemporary global society the ‘moral law’ is no longer the imperative that acts as a limitation, stopping us from enjoying too much. Instead, the cultural imperative, the now dominant moral Law itself, in its injunction for us to enjoy becomes ‘the ultimate “transgression”’ should one wish to pursue a life of moderation (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 174). Further, ‘the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social world can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder . . . a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated, but instead must be eliminated’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 108). This is the stranger, the Other that is not us that can act as the ‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised as the one who is blamed for our lack, the Evil force that stole our precious jouissance’ and stopped the fantasy from achieving its utopian vision (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 58). Even our ‘“complex” contemporary societies rely on the basic divide between included and excluded’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 86). Zˇ izˇek (2004b: 86) continues: in any society ‘there is a multitude within the system and a multitude of those excluded, and simply to encompass them both within the scope of the same notion amounts to the same obscenity as equating starvation with dieting.’ It is continually this Other that permits the delusion of harmony in our identity defining groups and for this to transpire we require an Other, external to the group for the group to define itself. We require a disparity, or gap, to allocate a degree of difference to an Other to conceptualize the group identification as who we are not and on this Other we can attribute all the signs of disharmony that jeopardize our shared fantasy (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 5). Difference is essential to complete our fantasy of harmony, but only by providing the sacrificial Other on which we can blame the disappointment of the fantasy to deliver (Zˇ izˇek, 2004a: 158–9). In this light, planning,‘as part of the apparatus of the modern state, makes its own imprint, has its own powers for good and evil’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). This is especially so as planning identifies, or at least names and legitimizes, what constitutes an urban pathology that detracts from what is desirous of the globally competitive city. Planning then sets out to remedy this lack or deficiency. Civil society, i.e. the public stage, and media of information dissemination are central to this process. Of course, our media are not ideologically neutral. As a consequence, media access for putting forth particular tropes of desire constitutes a central component of social, as well as economic, capital. This is well documented by Flyvbjerg (1998a) where the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce controlled the editorial content of the local newspaper. This argument is central to that of Chomsky’s (2003) multinational corporate steering of mass media content in the, so-called, ‘free’ press. This is where the mass media are free to publish almost anything, provided, of course, they do not alienate their corporate clients who provide their majority of income and profits via their advertising payments. Gunder (2003b) documented how planning actors and their affiliated partners gained public agreement via the rhetorical use of culturally shared ‘master signifiers’ and their related metonymies and metaphors. Here each signifier was linked to associations in the public’s unconscious that induced a conscious expression of desire for a particular set of values or specific consequential actions. Effective deployment of rhetorical tropes can seduce subjects ‘to relinquish previous desires (including identifications and embrace new ones) – or alternatively, to invest all the more completely in old ones’ (Bracher, 1993: 51–2). For example, does anyone wish to live in a city that is losing enjoyment to other locations because it lacks the fitness to compete? In Lacan, the construction of reality is continuous with the field of desire. Desire and reality are intimately connected . . . The nature of their link can only be revealed in fantasy . . . when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62–3) This is where, from a Lacanian outlook, by accepting rationalization as the means to fulfil a desire for completeness – via the utilization of falsifying words – ‘man does not adapt himself to reality; he adapts reality to himself’ (Roudinesco, 1997: 114). Ideological fantasies as to what constitutes an enjoyable and satisfying city are deployed to hide the dysfunctions and unpredictabilities that are ubiquitous throughout all social spheres, particularly for those lacking in sufficient capital to offset adversity. Social reality ‘is sustained by the “as if”, the fantasy of what things are like’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Rationalization, or realrationalität as Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls it, exists between the everyday activities of social life and the held universal ideals or values of what ought to be, even if it is not so, in social reality. The belief that planning is not political, but technical ‘allows the myths of objectivity, value neutrality, and technical reason to persist, and thereby fosters a certain delusion about planning practice’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). Sandercock (2004: 134) continues: planning ‘helps to redefine political debate, producing new sources of power and legitimacy, changing the force field in which we operate’. Lefebvre suggests that planning is based on a strategy of mixing scientificity and rationality with ideology. ‘Here, as elsewhere, scientificity is an ideology, an excrescence grafted onto real, but fragmentary, knowledge’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 166). In particular, Lefebvre argues that quantitative expertise including the technology of urban planning is largely a myth. This is because planning administrators: and bad administrators at that, rarely use much actual technology. However, they have the ability to persuade the people as a whole that because these are technological decisions they should be accepted. In other words, a large part of Lefebvre’s criticism [of planners] is not that technocrats are technocrats, but that they are precisely the opposite. Technology should be put to the service of everyday life, of social life rather than being precisely the condition of its suppression and control. Urbanism, for example, is an ideology that operates under the cover of this myth of technology. (Elden, 2004: 145) Social reality can only exist in the symbolic and imaginary registries as it is composed, that is constructed, as a ‘result of a certain historically specific set of discursive practices and power mechanisms’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 66). Flyvbjerg (1998a) illustrates this well in his exposé of the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce’s intervention in that city’s planning process. Here this grouping of dominant business people is given hegemonic voice to determine what constitutes acceptable transportation modes and spatial development in Aalborg’s town centre. In this example the planner’s technical facts, by themselves, produced the weaker argument. This was perhaps because the dissemination of these facts and their implications for planning action were ineffectively articulated to the public, if at all, via the local information media controlled by the Chamber of Commerce. In contrast, in Sydney, McGuirk (2004) documented how planners actively participated in and facilitated the dominant network of actors successfully pushing for a series of local, regional and national policies supporting Sydney’s global competitiveness. It appeared to be of little consequence that these policies induced adverse effects on the rest of the country, not to mention many of Sydney’s residents. Not dissimilarly, the Auckland case cited in the introduction illustrates how the planners actively consulted the dominant commercial stakeholders in developing their growth strategy, yet failed to have direct consultation with the Region’s actual residents (ARGF, 1999; Gunder, 2003a). Planners and their governance forum of dominant stakeholders appeared to inherently know what is in the best interests of their region’s residents. Planning as agonistic ethics Notwithstanding the ‘full rendering of the antagonisms which traverse our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic whole, kept together by forces of solidarity and co-operation’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 6). Planning is one such instrument that shapes and justifies the governing ideals of utopian desire and in this ‘sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is dominant’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 110). The subtle and not so subtle application of power defines truth, reason and rationality and this particularly comprises the deployment of power in our planning and related practices (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). Moreover, a Lacanian line of reasoning about knowledge and truth indicates that the constituting components of these induced fantasies of truth and rationality are mediated on the wants and needs of actors with the capacity to inflict their desires and wants on the Other and, as if, these desires belong to those who have been imposed on. This is via assertions of unquestionable ‘truth’, which are often supported and empowered by selected ‘distorted’ knowledge, practices and language put forward by their ideological supporters, employed professional experts and controlled media. Further, in this light traditional Kantian and related enlightenment ‘ethics is nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology that tries to pass off its own commandments as authentic, spontaneous, and “honorable” inclinations of the subject’ (Zupancic, 1998: 41). In contrast to traditional ethics, Lacan’s (1992) theorizing may provide an alternative way to develop new values beyond those already constituted by society as traditional morals of good or evil shaping acceptable behaviours. Traditional ethics is predicated on a reality principle as to what is possible without transgression in social reality. As Zupancic (2003: 77) observes, this ‘reality principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself as empirical factor or (biological, economic . . .) necessity.’ This ‘beyond good or evil’ does not have to lead to postmodern nihilism, rather Lacan lays a groundwork for an ethics of the Real, where through acknowledgement of this Real that we cannot know or articulate we can establish new ‘truths’ in relationship to the ‘good’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b; Zupancic, 2000, 2003). This is through a mechanism of ethical sublimation where we create ‘a certain space, scene, or “stage” that enables us to value something that is situated beyond the reality principle, as well as beyond the principle of common good’ (Zupancic, 2003: 78). It is the space, or stage, created when the planner, or other actor, makes the ethical decision to recommend an action or permission that is contrary to existing regulations, precedence, professional expectations, or cultural imperatives. This is perhaps because somehow for the planner, perhaps simply driven by strong feelings, the ‘correct’ and expected action is perceived as not being the right thing to do. From the Lacanian perspective of the ethics of the Real, to make the sensed wrong into a rightness is the ethically correct task, even if this requires the agent to act against what he/she thinks society expects of that actor. This act of transcending the reality principle, and being true to the actor’s desires,5 makes possible a new good, a new potential, it changes the rules as to what is possible (Gunder and Hillier, 2004: 230). ‘The ethical, then, is the constellation of events in which the subject frees herself from the symbolic law (“freedom”), commits herself to an act (“agency”), and thereby makes it possible for the law to be rethought’ (Kay, 2003: 109). The ethical ‘act is an “excessive”, trans-strategic intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 81). Viewed from this perspective, Kant’s categorical imperative must be rethought itself as purely transgressive: the ethical act proper is a transgression of the legal norm – a transgression which, in contrast to a simple criminal violation, does not simply violate the legal norm, but redefines what is a legal norm. The moral law does not follow the Good – it generates a new shape of what counts as ‘Good’. (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 170) This is a transgression that introduces new spaces for what can be considered ‘good’ and hence a wider space for jouissance, beyond that of mere technically produced materialist satisfaction. Of course, a key question becomes: how can a credible planner, or other actor, transcend the accepted norms and expectations of a society to create a new space for a new concept of ‘good’? Further, how can one effectively and reasonably mobilize such an ethics of the Real in everyday life when it is so contrary to the consensual instrumental rationality of the modern project and its ready-made solutions, that are, arguably planning’s purpose and foundations? Planning theorists (e.g. Gunder and Hillier, 2004; Pløger, 2004) and researchers in other disciplines (e.g. Mouffe, 1999, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2003a; Thrift, 2004a, 2004b) are currently attempting to address these complex issues that essentially require new insight and perhaps even profound change in our very relationships towards social reality, itself. Further, they are attempting to do so in a manner that does not simply impose a new intransigent set of ideals to replace our late-modern cultural imperatives, but rather to encourage diverse opportunities for multiple opening in which imminence may continually occur (after Deleuze). Coherent and implementable means to achieve this desired state are yet to emerge as new knowledges and practices, if they can ever do so. Yet, this author suggests that mere awareness and articulation of the impossible implications that the Lacanian Real has on traditional rationality are perhaps one of many points of commencement. Of course, this discourse also may fall into the trap leading to transcendental idealism, i.e. a process of identifying a lack, or void, in our knowledge and practices and then presenting a hegemonic solution that must be implemented, regardless of effect and affect! This author suggests that to change social reality, to begin to question and where necessary traverse our norms and laws, while avoiding the imperative of idealism, calls for a return to agonism that reawakens the political awareness of lack and negativity in place of the technical injunction: you will enjoy! This permits a space for an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism that does not exclude the Others’ voice attempting to articulate their desires and wants in response to the ‘irreducibility of the Real’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b: 331). Rather this re-politicization of the planning problematic from that of the technical, quantified, solution is one that values Lacan’s Real and Lefebvre’s lived space by making the ‘key “jump from quantity to quality”, from antagonisms subordinated to differences to the predominant role of antagonism’ as pure agonism (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 92). In Lefebvre’s city ‘unconscious desires and passions lay dormant, dormant beneath the surface of the real, within the surreal . . . waiting for . . . the day they can be realized in actual conscious life’ (Merrifield, 2000: 178). In this regard, rather than continuing to fill the lack generating the urban problematic and produce a largely phallic enjoyment, Stavrakakis (2003b: 332) reminds us that in Lacan’s later teachings he spoke of another form ‘of jouissance – female or feminine jouissance – which values this lack per se as something that entails a different kind of enjoyment.’ Perhaps this feminine jouissance may be more appropriate to politicize the needs and wants of lived space. Yet, to do so would require a politics that acknowledges the impossibility of the Lacanian Real. In contrast to the notion that what is meant by an utopia is an imagined ‘ideal society; what characterizes utopia is literally the construction of a u-topic space, a social space outside the existing parameters, the parameters of what appears to be “possible” in the existing social universe’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 123). This proposed utopia is one that may permit, at least aspects of Lefebvre’s ‘lived space’ of the qualitative to be both visible and articulated in conscious life. Rather than contestant cities and regions competing globally under one cultural imperative to attract and retain finite capital and resources via one ‘logic’ and vision, this article calls for a planning ethos that encourages diverse groups within cities and regions to actively contest their perspectives and desires without threat of exclusion. To achieve such a state requires planning ‘to find ways of working with agonism without automatically recurring to procedures, voting, representativity, forced consensus or compromises’ that inherently exclude (Pløger, 2004: 87). This requires a planning ethos predicated on a central awareness of the irreducible Real. This is an understanding that any forced resolution always excludes a remainder, what cannot be articulated or perceived. Further, this remainder will continue to have unconscious effect in terms of what drives our materialized actions. This suggests an overt democratic planning process, representative of a society that is explicitly and overtly hegemonic for all participants, not tacitly hegemonic in its privileging of specific groups with access to power and technocratic justification that is constituted under a logic implicitly desiring social order (Critchley, cited in Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 95). This is in contrast to the existing social reality, where political processes, such as planning, appear to strive for public participation culminating in an harmonious public consensus, when of course this is but an ideological foil that excludes in the name of a ‘general interest’ defined by a privileged few and legitimized by technocratic ‘reason’. In contrast, a strong society ‘places conflict and power at its centre’ by guaranteeing the very ‘existence of conflict’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998b: 229). Our current dominating fantasy of harmony is sustained by the illusion of continued consumer abundance produced and brought by the cornucopia of global capitalism, at least for the first world. This enjoyment of global capitalism ‘constitutes a (partial) reality with hegemonic appeal, a horizon sustained by the hegemony of an administration of desire with seemingly unlimited resources’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 61). Of course, resources and global carrying capacities are axiomatically finite. So perhaps must be our desires, for they can never be sated. Traversing our fundamental fantasy for harmony: a start, not a conclusion! Lacan and his followers, such as Stavrakakis, Zˇ izˇek or Zupancic, produce valid arguments for a psychoanalytically derived philosophy of reality and ideology ‘capable of theorizing the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices of domination’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Revealing and transversing the ideological constructs that shape and structure our social reality is inadequate in itself as a mere academic critical exercise of knowledge production. This author argues that we must radically challenge our underlying beliefs for ourselves, and, in particular, not externalize them to ‘larger cultural practices and technologies’ so that hegemonic networks, or partnerships, of dominant actors, including intellectuals and bureaucratic professionals, can do our believing and desiring for us through planning and related diverse agencies of social guidance (Dean, 2001: 628). To do so we must traverse our fundamental fantasies that seek harmony and security. This article’s application of Lacan, augmented with some of Lefebvre’s urban insights, gives us a combination of Freudian and Marxist thought that is considerably at odds to that conjured up by the Frankfurt School’s vision of society as ‘a liberated collective culture’ with little space for the individual histories of unique subjects (Jameson, 2003: 8). The latter is the School, or project, drawing on Marx and Freud, which eventually created the Habermasian product of communicative rationality. This is a rationality that sought as its seldom if ever achieved ideal, to produce undistorted (ideologically free) speech acts ‘based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensiveness, truth, truthfulness, and rightness’ constituting a basis for consensually agreement as to how we should act (Habermas, 1979: 3). Yet, as Hillier (2003) illustrates, this is an ideal of undistorted speech that is an impossibility because of the Lacanian Real and the incompleteness it always induces in language, not to mention the impossibility of absolute truth. Yet, this author would agree with Habermas’ call for the supremacy of discourse over mere technical reason. Habermas’ last two validity claims of truthfulness to our desires and the need to act in regard of what our unconscious feeling says is rightness, even if this sense is perhaps not readily justifiable with symbolic knowledge and reasoned argument, should be given due regard through our discourses. In contrast to Habermas’ validity claims of truth and comprehensiveness, Lacan’s theorizing suggests a much more fundamental contextualization of urban ideology based on the fantasies we construct to paper over the lack induced by the Real. This is a perspective that situates our very social reality, including space and social interaction, as principally constituted and composed of ideological fantasy constructs, misrecognitions and misunderstandings (see Hillier, 2003). As Jameson (2003: 37–8) observes, we owe to Lacan ‘the first new and as yet insufficiently developed concept of the nature of ideology since Marx’. Drawing on Althusser, Jameson (2003: 37–8) continues that ideology is ‘the “representation” of the Imaginary relationships of individuals to their Real conditions of existence’, so that ‘the individual subject invents a “lived” relationship with collective systems.’ This is a symbolic, materialized, relationship of practices and rituals (Krips, 2003: 149). Here, it is the desire of this Other that we fundamentally seek and wish to please as we constantly strive to return to our idealized primordial desire for infant maternal security and contentment (Hillier and Gunder, 2005). So we construct and share illusions and fantasies – ideologies – that we are somehow achieving this impossible task. It is the aggregate of these Others, and the illusions we generate about them and ourselves, that constitutes the social reality that is our lived space.

#### The misrecognition of desire is the root cause of accumulation and capitalism- they try to destroy the symptoms of desire but we control the root cause- desire will always manifest itself.

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Capitalist ideology aims at producing subjects who experience their existence as dissatisfied and simultaneously invest themselves completely in the ideal of happiness or complete satisfaction.15 This idea manifests itself not just in the everyday workings of capitalism but in its most serious theorists — from Adam Smith and David Ricardo to Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. According to Adam Smith, society can attain the satisfaction of true prosperity as long as it unleashes humanity’s natural propensity for accumulation. He writes: “The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions.”16 The desire to accumulate enables capitalist subjects to overcome barriers and obtain happiness. For Smith and others, there is no question of an insurmountable barrier and no possibility of enjoying the barrier itself. Capitalism survives on the basis of the same misrecognition that plagues Freud’s neurotic: the mistaking of desire for drive, the inability to see satisfaction in the act of not getting the object. Without engendering this collective misrecognition, capitalism could not sustain itself as capitalism. Capitalist subjects structurally fail to see their own inherent self-satisfaction, and it is this failure that keeps them going as capitalist subjects. Freud’s thought reveals this, and it reveals that there is a beyond of the capitalist subject — a beyond that is the death drive. The emancipatory politics of psychoanalysis is thus inherently anticapitalist insofar as the functioning of capitalism depends on the idea of obtaining the object. Capitalism feeds off of desire’s perpetual dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction leads to efforts to accumulate more capital, attempts to increase productivity, 61 The Economics of the Drive and the introduction of new commodities into the market — in short, every aspect of capitalist economics. Marketers in capitalist society are bent upon producing desire in subjects and blinding them to the drive. In the Grundrisse Marx describes the way capitalism perpetuates desire through the production of needs: “Production not only supplies a material for the need, but it also supplies a need for the material. . . . The need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. The object of art — like every other product — creates a public which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty. Production thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object.”17 Capitalism functions by sustaining — and even increasing — a sense of dissatisfaction commensurate with desire. This explains capitalism’s infatuation with the new. Capitalism constantly seeks out and embraces what is new, because the new keeps desire going by helping to create a sense of lack. The new holds the promise of a future enjoyment that will surpass whatever the subject has experienced before. Th is promise is the engine behind capitalism’s creation of ever more needs. The more represents a constant lure, the next more — at least from afar — always seems to be it, the object that would provide the elusive enjoyment. A portrayal of the inherent dissatisfaction that capitalism requires even among the wealthy occurs near the end of Roman Polanski’s Chinatown (1974). In the fi lm’s penultimate scene, Jake Gitt es ( Jack Nicholson) reproaches Noah Cross ( John Huston) for continuing a patt ern of ruthless accumulation despite having already obtained a vast fortune. The ir conversation makes clear the insatiable nature of the imperative to accumulate. Jake asks, “How much are you worth?” Cross, sensing the possibility of buying Jake off , says, “I have no idea. How much do you want?” But Jake doesn’t want money; he wants to know what keeps Cross going. Jake continues, “No, I just want to know what you’re worth. Over ten million?” Cross responds, “Oh my, yes.” The n Jake asks, “Why are you doing it? How much bett er can you eat? What can you buy that you can’t already aff ord?” Cross gives an answer emblematic of the capitalist subject: “The future, Mr. Getz [sic], the future.” Cross’s appeal to the “future” indicates that he believes in the promise of capitalism — that the future holds the lost enjoyment that always eludes us today. Despite his millions, his emphasis on the future demonstrates that Cross cannot recognize his own inherent satisfaction.18 62 Subjectivity Capitalism leaves individual subjects with a constant sense of their own dissatisfaction, but it also holds out the lure of future enjoyment, which prompts both the capitalist to create a new commodity and the consumer to buy it. Just as the capitalist hopes that every newly created commodity will be it, so does the consumer. However, no new commodity can ever provide the lost enjoyment for either the capitalist or the consumer, no matt er how successful the commodity is, because the enjoyment has only an imaginary status. Once the commodity is realized for each (put on the market, in the case of the capitalist, or purchased, in the case of the consumer), it necessarily loses its enjoyment value. In this sense, capitalism depends upon the dynamic of the child at Christmas time. On Christmas Eve all the presents under the tree offer the promise of a future enjoyment, but by aft ernoon on Christmas Day the child ends up bored and desiring once again, not having found the elusive enjoyment in any of the opened packages. Th is boredom isn’t just the sign of the child’s narcissism or that it has been spoiled by overindulgent parents; it is, rather, a structural necessity within the desiring world of capitalism. The cycle of the promise of future enjoyment and then the inevitable dissatisfaction that follows can only perpetuate itself as long as capitalist subjects continue to hope, that is, to believe in the promise that the new commodity holds out. More than anything else, hope keeps capitalism going. Giving up hope — and yet continuing on, enjoying continuing on — moves us from desire to the drive. Th is type of transformation also entails the end of the capitalist subject: capitalist subjects without hope are no longer capitalist subjects. What holds us back from this possibility is our inability to discover a way of finding satisfaction satisfying. Th is failure, perhaps even more than its human costs, is what most disturbs Marx about capitalism. The points in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts at which Marx seems to slip into humanism as he recounts the eff ects of capitalism are the points at which he tries to articulate, though he wouldn’t put it this way, the capitalist system’s resistance to the death drive: capitalism doesn’t allow us to find satisfaction in our satisfaction. Its logic is one that Marx calls “self-renunciation.” As he puts it in perhaps the most famous passage from the Manuscripts, “The less you eat, drink and buy books; the less you go to the theater, the dance hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, 63 The Economics of the Drive etc., the more you save — the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor dust will devour — your capital. The less you are, the less you express your own life, the greater is your alienated life, the more you have, the greater is the store of your estranged being.”19 What Marx describes here as “alienated life” is not a life made unnatural by capitalism but a life where satisfaction is not satisfying, a life stuck within the capitalist logic of desire.

#### Their political fantasy is doomed to failure —They reestablish the master narrative by posing their utopic vision as the ultimate societal goal and paper over the lack that structurally determines the structure they critique

Stavrakakis [Yannis Stavrakakis(Professor in Department of Political Science at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki). "Lacan and The Political" Routledge, 1999. Accessed 2/13/20. <https://www.routledge.com/Lacan-and-the-Political/Stavrakakis/p/book/9780415171878>]

The field of social construction and **political reality is the field in which the symbolisation of this real is attempted.** Chaitin is correct when asserting that symbolisation has the creative power to produce cultural identities, but at a price, the cost of covering over the fundamental nothingness that forms its foundation. It is **culture**, not nature, that **abhors** a vacuum, above all that of **its own contingency** (Chaitin, 1996:4- 5), of **its ultimate inability to master and symbolise the impossible real: there is a structural lack in the symbolic, which means that certain points of the real can’t be symbolised in a definite manner.** The unmitigated real provokes anxiety, and this in turn gives rise to never-ending, defensive, imaginary constructs (Verhaeghe, 1994:60). Following from this, **all human productions** [Society itself, culture, religion, science] **can be understood in the light of that structural failure of the symbolic in relationship to the real** (ibid.: 61). It is the moment of this failure, the moment of our encounter with the real, that is revealed as the moment of the political par excellence in our reading of Lacan. It is the constitutivity of this moment in Lacanian psychoanalysis that proves our fantasmatic conception of the socio-political institution of society as a harmonious totality to be no more than a mirage. It is this traumatic moment of the political qua encounter with the real that initiates again and again a process of symbolisation, and initiates the ever-present hegemonic play between different symbolisations of this real. **This play leads to the emergence of politics, to the political institution of a new social fantasy** (or of many antagonistic fantasies engaged in a struggle for hegemony**) in the place of the dislocated one, and so on and so forth.** In this light, Lacan’s insistence on the centrality of the real, especially in the latter part of his teaching, acquires major political importance. Lacan himself, in his seminar on The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis uses noise and accident as metaphors or examples of our encounter with the real. It might be possible to add the political to this chain of equivalences. Lacan’s schema of **socio-political life is** that of a play, **an unending circular play between possibility and impossibility, between construction and destruction**, representation and failure, articulation and dislocation, reality and the real, politics and the political. It is this constitutive play which can help illuminate a series of political questions and lead to a novel approach to political analysis. As an illustration let us examine a concrete problem of political analysis. How are we, for example, to account for the emergence and the hegemonic force of apartheid discourse in South Africa? Is this emergence due to a positively defined cause (class struggle, etc.)? What becomes apparent now, in light of the structural causality of the political, is that the reasons for the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s are not to be found in some sort of objective conditions (Norval, 1996:51). **Apartheid can be traced back to the dislocations that conditioned the emergence of this Afrikaner nationalist discourse** (associated, among others, with the increasing capitalisation of agriculture, the rate of urbanisation and events such as the Great War). The articulation of a **new political discourse can only make sense against the background of the dislocation of the preceding socio-political order or ideological space. It is the lack created by dislocation that causes the desire for a new discursive articulation. It is this lack created by a dislocation of the social which forms the kernel of the political** as an encounter with the Lacanian real. Every dislocatory event leads to the antagonistic articulation of different discourses that attempt to symbolise its traumatic nature, to suture the lack it creates. In that sense the political stands at the root of politics, dislocation at the root of the articulation of a new sociopolitical order, an encounter with the real moment of the political at the root of our symbolisation of political reality. Underlying Lacan’s importance for political theory and political analysis is his insistence on the split, lacking nature of the symbolic, of the socio-political world per se. Our **societies are never harmonious ensembles. This is** only **the fantasy through which they attempt to constitute and reconstitute themselves. Experience shows that this fantasy can never be fully realised. No social fantasy can fill the lack around which society is always structured. This lack is re-emerging with every resurfacing of the political**, with every encounter with the real. We can speak about the political exactly because there is subversion and dislocation of the social. The level of social construction, of human creativity, of the emergence and development of socio-political institutions, is the level in which the possibility of mastering the real makes itself visible but only to be revealed as a chimera unable to foreclose a moment of impossibility that always returns to its place. Given this context, **the moment of the political should be understood as emerging at the intersection of our symbolic reality with this real, the real being the ontological horizon of every play between political articulation and dislocation, order and disorder, politics and the political.** 2

#### Negate to engage in the death drive- the aff’s attempt to fill the loss will perpetually fail. Instead, enjoy the lost object and to reproduce the loss.

**McGowan** [Todd McGowan (Professor in the Department of English at the University of Vermont). “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis.” [Symploke Studies in Contemporary Theory](https://www.jstor.org/bookseries/j.ctt1d98863). Pg 13-14. 2013. Accessed 1/30/20. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1ddr7nv//> Xu]

The death drive is neither (contra Marcuse) aggressiveness nor an impulse to return to an inorganic state (as Freud’s metaphor in Beyond the Pleasure Principle might imply) but an impetus to return to an originary traumatic and constitutive loss. The death drive emerges with subjectivity itself as the subject enters into the social order and becomes a social and speaking being by sacrificing a part of itself. This sacrifice is an act of creation that produces an object that exists only insofar as it is lost. This loss of what the subject doesn’t have institutes the death drive, which produces enjoyment through the repetition of the initial loss. Subjects engage in acts of self-sacrifice and self-sabotage because the loss enacted reproduces the subject’s lost object and enables the subject to enjoy this object. Once it is obtained, the object ceases to be the object. As a result, the subject must continually repeat the sacrificial acts that produce the object, despite the damage that such acts do to the subject’s self-interest. From the perspective of the death drive, we turn to violence not in order to gain power but in order to produce loss, which is our only source of enjoyment. Without the lost object, life becomes bereft of any satisfaction. The repetition of sacrifice, however, creates a life worth living, a life in which one can enjoy oneself through the lost object. The repetition involved with the death drive is not simply repetition of any particular experience. The repetition compulsion leads the subject to repeat specifically the experiences that have traumatized it and disturbed its stable functioning. The better things are going for the subject, the more likely that the death drive will derail the subject’s activity.

#### The rob is to vote for best debater – anything else is self serving and arbitrary

# AC

### Case

#### Negate on presumptiopn

What parts of the 1AC were transformative or anti-capitalist? The parts where they read established scholars, using standard citational practices? Or the parts where they organized cards into a conventional 1AC and used NSDA Campus’s servers to broadcast?

Ballot not key---competitive incentives dilute solvency and permit affirming LHP’s scholarship without tying it to external action. Nothing leaves Zoom Room 104 other than a winner and a loser

#### Missing internal link – how we access it

#### No evidence for the power of the ballot – debate specific – negate on presumption.

Ritter 13 [Michael, JD UTexas Law, B.A. cum laude Trinity University. September 2013. “Overcoming the Fiction of ‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s to Learn From 2Pac’s Changes?” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9896ec\_8b2b993ec42440ecaab1b07645385db5.pdf]

Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “competitive interscholastic debate” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, none of the many academics who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support the social change fiction. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted.

## Adv

#### Cosmobiopolitics constitutes the governance of Outer Space as a shared resource mean to be used to further Human Progress. The Aff’s managerial at “saving” space merely sustains space as a common good in Bastani 3’s claim that Space is indeed the province of us all to further exploitation.

Damjanov 15, Katarina. "The matter of media in outer space: Technologies of cosmobiopolitics." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33.5 (2015): 889-906. (Faculty of Arts, University of Western Australia)//Elmer

Long before the beginning of the Space Age, humans used the regions above the globe to facilitate mediation practices; electromagnetic waves, for example, were emitted across airspace and into the atmosphere to enable radio communication decades before the first artificial satellite confirmed its arrival in the planet’s orbit on 4 October 1957. With its possible roots in early societies’ use of the celestial bodies visible from the earth’s surface for temporal and spatial orientation, the ‘media history’ of the human use of outer space reaches a watershed moment with the launch of Sputnik. This basketball-sized metal sphere, equipped with radio transmitter and four external antennas, was the first solid object, the first functional media artefact that humans had placed outside their own world. This is not to say that Sputnik marks the event in which human mediation practices begun to materially impact outer space, erasing its original, ‘natural’ state – the radio signals that penetrated the layers of the troposphere and ionosphere, although intangible, left their own material traces, environmental alterations comparable with the material results of atmospheric pollution triggered by industrial progress. These early uses of space have entangled it in a gamut of processes of techno-mediation, initiating the extraterrestrial unfolding of a historical trajectory which Jussi Parikka (2011: 3) terms ‘medianature’ – they have extended this ‘continuum between mediatic apparatuses and their material contexts in the exploitation of nature’ into outer space. However, Sputnik’s orbital presence does represent a steppingstone in the extraterrestrial progression of human medianature: it indicates the species’ acquired ability to purposefully introduce an object of technical media into outer space. As such, Sputnik epitomises a shift in the use of non-terrestrial spaces; no longer were they incidental and remote to human media exploits, they were instead made central and essential. What the first signal that Sputnik sent to its ground control announced was that humanity’s techno-logic aspirations to transform the material world and advance its productive capacity through the logic of acquisition, investment and destruction – an intrinsic human impulse described by Karl Marx (1964) as our essence of species-being – are no longer earth-bound. Sputnik and all media devices that followed it have been gradually converting outer space into a living milieu, reinforcing it as a material–social setting of human circumstances and relations. The concept of ‘milieu’ is important for understanding the complexities involved in the cosmobiopolitical transformation of outer space. In Foucault’s work and in other influential texts such as those of his mentor Georges Canguilhem (2008) and Simondon (1980) and Stiegler (1998), although employed in different contexts, the term ‘milieu’ essentially designates a site which simultaneously conditions and is itself conditioned by the productive forces of human life – whether biological, social or technical. Courses of medianature in outer space sharpen such perspectives on mutually transforming relations between humans and their milieu, providing biopolitical focus to Simondon’s and Stiegler’s perspectives on technology as fundamental in constituting human life. Stiegler’s view of progress as human technological evolution frames technical objects as a prosthesis in whose creation humans embed their ‘interiors’ and through which they further exteriorise and mould their living milieu, a process which has been changing the idea of what it is to be human (Stiegler, 1998: 17). In the Stieglerian sense, the human ‘exteriorisation’ in technical media that are sent into space not only imbues the earth’s exterior with a reflection of the human, but itself reconstitutes the human and reconfigures human ways of life. These technologies thus radically enhance the capacity for species-being, becoming a vital part of our biopolitical capital: while altering our apparently otherwise lifeless planetary exterior into a malleable and thus governable locus of life, their mediatic operations assist humans to overcome their biological and geographical limitations and proceed as a collective towards becoming more-than-human. Our medianature has been continuously adjusting to its extraterrestrial conditions and the acceleration of our technological ‘exteriorisation’ in space has necessitated the development of an attendant governmental framework. The landmark attempt to arrange the increasing multiplicity of human relationships with outer space was to define them through the rule of law – a juridical prefiguration which, as Foucault and Giorgio Agamben (1998) suggest, is a prerequisite for governing life. In 1967, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (United Nations, 2002), or, The Outer Space Treaty (OST) entered into force. In lieu of the pending human landing on the Moon, this international legal agreement established outer space as the shared domain of a global commons, which is to be explored and used by all nation-states, but which itself is to stay outside the vagaries of territorial claims and property rights. A pre-emptive gesture aimed at securing politico-economic codification of the extraterrestrial milieu before human arrival, the OST did not specify where the administrative borders of outer space are – the border between terrestrial and extraterrestrial space has been unofficially assigned to the Ka´rma´n line, a region about 100 km above the planetary surface, where objects sent into space do not fall back but remain in orbit. Nevertheless, the Treaty designates its inhuman expanses as the precinct of human governance, and behind such legal coding stood the same politico-economic rationalities which Foucault identified as pivotal for the institution of the doctrine of the ‘Freedom of the Seas’ as a foundation of international maritime law in the seventeenth century. This legal principle that identified the ocean’s strategic importance as a jointly used resource and set it free from territorial claims, symptomatically announced two interrelated entrances onto the world stage – the rise of global capitalism and the birth of biopolitics, while its replication in the OST marked the next phase in their development. In one of his lectures at the Colle`ge de France, Foucault (2008: 51–73) provided a brief account of how the history of international law echoed the emergence of modern approaches to governance, where the primary emphasis upon territory becomes augmented with the objective to secure the vitality of the shared market. He described how the Treaty of Westphalia’s reinforcement of borders around sovereign states in 1598, which strengthened their inner autonomy yet limited their external reach, instituted each of them as a part of a collective of states gathered around the common interest of progress. This territorial reform aimed to end devastating wars between the states and ensure their political and economic stability, but it imposed the need for new domains of competition in which each of them could independently acquire and prosper, and all them could together be in a ‘state of permanent collective enrichment’ (Foucault, 2008: 55). These spaces, Foucault suggested, were inaugurated with the ‘Freedom of the Seas’ in 1609, which opened the ocean as a space which all states could use to advance through economic competition rather than rivalry over territory. While specifically related to the agenda of European colonial expansions, the establishment of the seas as shared commons was indicative of the awareness that the unlimited accumulation of wealth requires the infinitely free space of the global market. Freedom of the seas was, as Foucault (2008: 56) described, born out of this ‘new form of global rationality... a new calculation on the scale of the world’ and it marked the start of economic globalisation. The interplay between the finite room of territories and infinite possibilities for circulation and accumulation of capital was sustained indefinitely by asserting the global freedom, the commonality of the seas. Through the commons of the seas, capitalism assumed its global latitudes; while the historical enclosure of wastelands that were shared as ‘commons’ enabled the initial, ‘primitive’ accumulation of capital, the creation of the ocean’s commons enabled capitalism to articulate its processes at a global scale. This legal manoeuvre to defend territory by rethinking the spaces of the market institutes the idea of shared commonality as an Archimedean point for the governance of human societies, preparing the terrain for a biopolitical system of governance based upon its abstraction into a method of subsuming ‘life itself’ to the massifying logic of averages and estimates. The institution of the OST and its associated Agreements and Conventions2 from the mid-twentieth century was an outcome of yet another spatial crisis; it was an attempt to negotiate the many tensions that the arrival of the Space Age stirred within global affairs. It was at the time of Cold War and states’ political polarisation, in a world where rapid industrialisation and massive population increases were coupled with anxieties about limits to economic growth, that outer space was identified as a potential site of military conflicts, competing claims of sovereignty and a rapacious race for resources. The looming possibility of still deeper crisis necessitated another repositioning of states and markets around their vital assets, and a restoring of the global equilibrium of powers. Here the OST drew upon the juridical principle of a ‘common heritage’ of humankind – a concept previously employed in the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 for comparable arrangements of international regimes of governance – and took the idea of the commons outside the globe. The treaty expanded the conceptual borders of ‘the scale of the world’ into extraterrestrial space, prescribing that its exploration ‘shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries’ and that it ‘shall be the province of all mankind’ (OST, article 1). Once again, international law established a space of commons whose exploration and exploitation would proceed as a joint enterprise through which all states could freely advance and prosper both individually and as a part of collective. Just as the ‘Freedom of the Seas’ opened routes for ships sailing in the name of nations, the OST unlocked flightpaths for spaceships and other technologies, stimulating states’ techno-scientific interests and competition and ensuring that the emerging mode of ‘high-tech’ capitalism had from its beginnings an extra-planetary, infinite prospect. This trans-national legal netting codified an idea of global commonality and framed the inhuman regions of outer space as the ‘province of all mankind’, drawing them into its global system of governance. The OST thus provided the juridical platform from which to articulate a cosmobiopolitical order; it offered a governmental framework for enacting a vision of the human race as a species-power, which will, through the techno-mediated exploration of space, direct its own cosmic progress. Almost a half century after the OST, media technologies remain crucial to the transformation of outer space into a human province. The voracious neoliberal drive of the state-industry nexus that conditions global biopolitics is so dependent upon them, that they become a target of the same systems of governance they catalyse. Their construction, launches and distribution are the subject of careful calculation, meticulous planning and complex logistics, their condition and movements are continuously being monitored, assessed and managed, and this transfer of governmental rationalities from living humans to inanimate objects changes the biopolitical approach to human species-being. If biopower emerged as concerned with bodies of human individuals and populations, and pressing environmental concerns about the ‘global body of the Earth’ augmented its application ‘from human to planetary bodies’ (Bryld and Lykee, 2000: 92–94), then space-based media technologies mark a subsequent phase in the development of its architecture. They trigger the transposition of life management onto the bodies and populations of media technologies and it is this shift which inaugurates the object-centred coordinates of the cosmobiopolitical: the governance of the human without actual humans. The legal basis of cosmobiopolitics, the OST respectively preserves the status of outer space as a globally shared domain and permits its occupation by technical media that are the legal province of particular terrestrial entities, thus accommodating the contradictory tenets of their governance. However, these governmental rationalities are defined by codes of law and ‘the law’ as Foucault (2007: 47) notes ‘works at the level of the imaginary’, and it can only imagine things which can and cannot be done; like the 0s and 1s of digital code, it only prescribes a state of presence or absence of things. It is the very presence of media technologies in outer space (and the absence of humans) which contradictorily makes possible and disturbs the cosmobiopolitical imaginary. Their remote position situates them beyond the reach of juridical rule and the policing-power of states, literally placing them outside of the ‘global grid’ of governance. While they are used as apparatus through which to enable human terrestrial enterprises, these objects themselves carry the essence of terra and of the absent presence of the human beyond the globe. The media technologies in outer space do not only reduce the incompatibility between the human and the extraterrestrial, but also introduce frictions within their exchanges. This disturbance suggests that their material realities disrupt the imaginaries implied by law and instead assert their own force, reinforcing these objects somewhat absurdly as the non-governable markers of extraterritoriality in the commons, as the non-human emissaries of humanity, and as a non-living population of objects which are managed as if they were alive. In outer space, the matter of media itself becomes code through which to define what can be propertied and what remains commons, what can be governed and what poses itself as ungovernable, where the human ends and the non-human begins, where the boundaries that distinguish governance of the living from the non-living lie and when biopolitics transmutes into a cosmobiopolitics. The media apparatus that support the metamorphosis of biopolitics in outer space are varied, and the milieus in which they function require a range of different performances. The following sections of this paper consider a number of the varying ways specific media technologies perform this extra-planetary extension of the impulse to govern life by focusing on satellites and their debris, and on the prospects of an interplanetary Internet. None of these specimens provides a complete picture of the ways in which media technologies inspire the advent of a cosmobiopolitics. Rather, each offers a different angle from which to consider the shifts in material and social arrangements that are demanded by forays beyond the earth, signs that herald a radical shift in the way humanity conceives of life and articulates its governance. What follows is a series of initial steps, the first paces in a far larger survey that aims to chart the natality of the emergent cosmic traits of biopolitics. I offer here a series of sketches, an outline of tentative trajectories suggested by contemporary mediatic excursions into outer space. By exploring how we manage an over-population of functional and defunct media objects in orbital space and imagine the utilities of interplanetary Internet networks, I suggest that human extraterrestrial medianatures necessitates a profound alteration in our relationship with the technologies, and the reframing of governmental obsessions with discourses of territory, security, and population.

### Mining

#### No space mining – it’s just not profitable.

**Fickling 20** [David Fickling, David Fickling is a Bloomberg columnist covering commodities, as well as industrial and consumer companies. He has been a reporter for Bloomberg News, Dow Jones, the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times and the Guardian. 12-21-2020, "We’re Never Going to Mine the Asteroid Belt," Bloomberg, [https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-12-21/space-mining-on-asteroids-is-never-going-to-happen accessed 12/10/21](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-12-21/space-mining-on-asteroids-is-never-going-to-happen%20accessed%2012/10/21)] Adam

It’s wonderful that people are shooting for the stars — but those who declined to fund the expansive plans of the nascent space mining industry were right about the fundamentals. Space mining won’t get off the ground in any foreseeable future — and you only have to look at the history of civilization to see why.

One factor rules out most space mining at the outset: gravity. On one hand, it guarantees that most of the solar system’s best mineral resources are to be found under our feet. Earth is the largest rocky planet orbiting the sun. As a result, the cornucopia of minerals the globe attracted as it coalesced is as rich as will be found this side of Alpha Centauri.

Gravity poses a more technical problem, too. Escaping Earth’s gravitational field makes transporting the volumes of material needed in a mining operation hugely expensive. On Falcon Heavy, the large rocket being developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, transporting a payload to the orbit of Mars comes to as little as [$5,357 per kilogram](https://www.spacex.com/media/Capabilities&Services.pdf) — a drastic reduction in normal launch costs. Still, at those prices just lofting a single half-ton drilling rig to the asteroid belt would use up the annual exploration budget of a small mining company.

Power is another issue. The international space station, with 35,000 square feet of solar arrays, generates up to 120 kilowatts of electricity. That drill would need a [similar-sized power plant](https://www.rocktechnology.sandvik/en/products/exploration-drill-rigs-and-tools/compact-core-drill-rigs/) — and most mining companies operate multiple rigs at a time. Power demands rise drastically once you move from exploration drilling to mining and processing. Bringing material back to Earth would raise the costs even more. Japan’s [Hayabusa2 satellite spent six years](https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft/display.action?id=2014-076A#:~:text=Total%20cost%20of%20the%20mission,yen%20(roughly%20%24150%20million%20U.S.)) and 16.4 billion yen ($157 million) recovering a single gram of material from the asteroid Ryugu and returning it to Earth earlier this month.

#### Space mining fails – no tech and profits won’t last.

**Dorminey 21** [Bruce Dorminey, Bruce is a science journalist who covers aerospace and astronomy. Previously, he worked as the Hong Kong bureau chief for Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine. He was also the former technology correspondent for the Financial times and won the 1998 Royal Aeronautical Society’s Aerospace Journalist of the year Award. 8-31-2021, "Does Commercial Asteroid Mining Still Have A Future?," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucedorminey/2021/08/31/does-commercial-asteroid-mining-still-have-a-future/?sh=4506f12e1a93> accessed 12/10/21] Adam

* This card is good against affs with uq cards about asteroids having billions in rare earth minerals

By some estimates a 100-meter diameter metallic asteroid might contain PGMs worth as much as $12 billion.

And if PGMs are ever imported back to Earth, as Kargel told me in a Forbes post nearly a decade ago, “Metals used sparingly because of their high prices would suddenly become much more available for applications that we might not even dream of now.”

Thus, Kargel says that commercial mining of PGM asteroids may still have a future but refuses to put a date on when he thinks it will finally happen. It’s going to take an Elon Musk-type figure to either kill the idea or proceed with the idea, he says.

Kargel says note only will asteroid mining require additional new advances in both spacecraft technology and launch capability, it will need someone with deep pockets to fund serious space-mining development in a way that enables them to absorb losses of billions of dollars year after year until the technology and mining operations can be scaled up to be profitable.

Then unless the metals mined from the asteroids are only used for offworld construction and resources, there’s a potential problem with the economics of importing innumerable quantities of PGMs back to Earth.

Paradoxically, what was extraordinarily precious may become extraordinarily cheap. While that may lead to new ingenious and more economical uses of PGMs on earth, it would probably make a space-mining operation’s balance sheet insolvent.

If the PGM price per troy ounce is driven down on earth due to this new cornucopia of asteroid metals, says Kargel, prices for space metals would be driven down to such an extent that launch and space operational costs would again make space-mining untenable. “That to me is a conundrum,” said Kargel.

#### Space colonization causes ET contact---they’ll be hostile and spark a war.

Kovic ’18 (Marko; writer at the Zurich Institute of Public Affairs Research; June 12th; “Political, moral, and security challenges of space colonization”; <https://zipar.org/discussion-paper/political-moral-security-challenges-space-colonization/#security>; accessed 7/14/19; MSCOTT)

4.2 Extraterrestrial (existential) risks

Space colonization will increase the probability of discovering and coming into contact with extraterrestrial intelligence, either biological or artificial (in the sense of hypothetical advanced artificial general intelligence52). That prospect poses some moral challenges, as argued in subsection 3.3. However, it might also pose a security challenge if an extraterrestrial intelligence more technologically advanced than humankind has goals and preferences that go against the goals and preferences of humankind.

In general, there are three categories of attitudes an extraterrestrial intelligence can have towards humankind53. First, an extraterrestrial intelligence can be benevolent. A benevolent extraterrestrial intelligence is one that would change its goals and preferences upon learning of humankind. Humankind is a benevolent intelligence: If we, for example, came into contact with an extraterrestrial civilization, we would obviously take the goals and preferences of that civilization into account and update our own goals and preferences, since we are morally advanced enough to do so.

Second, an extraterrestrial intelligence can be apathetic. An apathetic extraterrestrial intelligence is one that does not at all change its goals and preferences upon learning of humankind. An apathetic intelligence would neither try to accommodate humankind, nor would it react in some non-friendly way. It would not care at all. The attitude of an apathetic intelligence is similar to the attitude we humans have when it comes to some random microbial life form on Earth: We might understand that that life form exists, but we do not care either way.

Third, an extraterrestrial intelligence can be hostile. Hostility in a general sense means that an intelligence reacts to learning of humankind by regarding its own goals and preferences as categorically more important than humankind’s. A hostile extraterrestrial intelligence is not necessarily a security threat to humankind; hostility in this context does not mean hostility in the Hollywood kind but hostility in the sense of active disregard of humankind’s goals and preferences. That, however, might still represent a tremendous security risk. For example, a hostile intelligence might prefer humankind not to exist because our mere existence is perceived as a slight discomfort to the extraterrestrial intelligence. Hostile extraterrestrial intelligence thus represents a form of existential risk.

#### Independently, that causes contact with ETAI, which is uniquely unsafe and hostile---ensures extinction.

Miletic ’15 (Tomislav; expert on Artificial Intelligence; Extraterrestrial artificial intelligences and humanity’s cosmic future: *Answering the Fermi paradox through the construction of a Bracewell-Von Neumann AGI; Journal of Evolution and Technology - Vol. 25 Issue 1 – June 2015 - pgs 56-73*; <https://jetpress.org/v25.1/miletic.pdf>; accessed 7/27/19; MSCOTT)

It is safe to presume that the ETAI would not be hostile to its own creator race if functioning optimally, since it would be in every civilization’s interest not to destroy itself by its creations. Because an AI is capable of incidentally destroying or assimilating valued structures while searching for additional resources – or by following goals that might prove to be unintentionally incompatible with the creator race’s wellbeing – an ETAI’s goals would need to include the preservation of intelligent life in the entirety of its ecosystem. The possibility of a hostile ETAI is, nonetheless, real since an ETAI could be programmed to preserve only the existence of its creator race. This could happen if it were initially built mainly for war purposes. For example, two life sustaining planets in the same solar system might utilize AIs to wage war with each other. This possibility could be labeled as hostile by design.

In addition, there is the possibility that an ET civilization fails in its efforts to create a safe AI and the resulting ETAI becomes violent. It might, in consequence, destroy, enslave, or subjugate the creator civilization. It is difficult to say whether the ETs would view their subjugation as a bad thing, since we cannot say how an ET civilization would view the notion of freedom. Perhaps they would welcome the coming of superior minds – a theme often explored in science fiction, most notably, perhaps, in Jack Williamson’s novel The Humanoids (1949) or in a classic short story by Isaac Asimov, “The Evitable Conflict” (1950).

Even if such scenarios are not realized, ETAI probes might suffer from software or hardware malfunctions. These program mutations could conceivably create berserker-like machines, “self- replicating life extinguishing robotic entities which might seem garish or sensational… but not inconsistent with the currently observed state of silence” (Webb 2011, 438).

Additionally, a software mutation that “want[s] to acquire as many resources as possible so that these resources can be transformed and put to work for the satisfaction of the AI’s final and instrumental goals” (Muehlhauser and Salamon 2012, 28) could spawn such an entity. It is possible that we might encounter a probe that awaits our technological upheaval merely to harvest our knowledge and resources, as was depicted in the Babylon 5 episode “A Day in a Strife” (1995).

#### Mars colonization causes intergalactic war---humans will speciate and wage wars against each other.

Torres ’18 (Phil; Project for Future Human Flourishing; *Space colonization and suﬀering risks: Reassessing the “maxipok rule”*; Futures 100 (2018) 74-85; MSCOTT)

The very same question can and must be asked about our posthuman descendants—indeed, it may be all the more urgent given the cognitive-emotional diversiﬁcation of lifeforms during the deep space diaspora. The picture that emerges from such considera- tions is one in which there will exist at least some, and potentially many, civilizations that are inclined toward violence. Some will engage in violence for imperialistic reasons—for gain—while the impetus for others will be religious, apocalyptic, pro-mortalist, anti- posthumanist, environmentalist, or “psychopathological” in nature. The existence of Machiavellian actors will, in turn, give others a strong incentive to engage in preventive or preemptive strikes against potential predators. To quote Levy and Thompson in Causes of War (2010), “a preventive war is motivated by the perception of a rising adversary, a shift in power, and by the fear that once the adversary is stronger it will attempt to exploit its advantage through coercion or war … and is driven by ‘better-now-than-later’ logic.” In contrast, “preemption involves a military attack in response to the virtual certainty that the adversary is about to strike and by the motivation of gaining the advantages of striking ﬁrst.”

Even more, the motivation to strike ﬁrst need not involve a Machiavellian actor at all; it could involve two or more Tuckerian actors with no malicious inclinations whatsoever. The crucial idea here is what international relations scholars refer to as the security dilemma, whereby, in sum: anarchy generates uncertainty about the present and future intentions of other actors; this leads to fear, resulting in the accumulation of weapons arsenals, etc. for “defensive” purposes; this increases the fear of other actors uncertain of one’s true intentions, thereby producing a spiral eﬀect, or vicious positive feedback cycle, that can foment conﬂict, as other actors increase their own arsenals for “defensive” purposes as well (see Tang, 2009). In other words, two peaceable civilizations could end up warring due merely to a spiral of escalating militarization given a lack of mutual trust. A related concept is Schelling’s dilemma, also known as the “Hobbesian trap,” whereby one actor engages in a ﬁrst strike against a second actor due to a fear of being imminently attacked by the ﬁrst actor. Again, neither might harbor malign goals (although one could), yet they engage in war for purely game theoretic reasons. The classic illustration of this involves a robber with a gun who breaks into a house intending only to steal jewelry; the owner wakes up and confronts the robber with a gun. Neither wishes to shoot the other, yet each fear that they will be shot if they don’t shoot ﬁrst. The result is tragedy.

There is another version of this situation that doesn’t pertain to each actor’s intentions with respect to others. Rather, it arises from a combination of (a) fallibility, and (b) technological capability. For example, civilization A might decide, after suﬃcient deliberation, that civilization B poses no malign threat; yet it might also worry that B is not responsible enough to possess its technological power. Perhaps B is conducting high-powered physics experiments that could produce a dangerous black hole or some other catastrophic phenomenon that would aﬀect A. If eﬀorts by A to convince B not to run such experiments fail, it could be in A’s preservational self-interest to invade, conquer, and/or destroy B. Thinking about this situation in the context of a galaxy of potentially billions of civilizations, it could be in any given civilization’s best interest to annihilate all other civilizations in the universe, just in case they were to cause a galactic- or cosmic-scale disaster by accident. Put diﬀerently, error as well as terror could fuel inter-civilizational conﬂicts.

Even more, the security dilemma/Hobbesian trap predicaments could be exacerbated by potential diﬃculties in interspecies communication, which would further vitiate the trust needed for civilizations not to attack each other. First, the Quinian “in- determinacy of translation” suggests that contact between civilizations could fail to convey the intended meaning, possibly leading to trouble (see Jebari & Olsson-Yaouzis, in press). Second, if two species come to have diﬀerent cognitive spaces or emotional repertoires, this could make understanding the other fundamentally impossible, thereby fueling suspicions about the beliefs, desires, and capacity for deception of the proverbial “Other.” Indeed, the lack of common “ontological ground” could also lead to breakdowns of empathy: trying to understand how an action X makes another species “feel” would be like a human trying to understand “what it’s like to be a bat.” More dangerously, it might not even be clear to species A that species B can have conscious experiences of pain in the ﬁrst place. “So,” A might reason, “why would it be unethical to harm species B?” Species in such situations are not merely aliens to each other but, more signiﬁcantly, alienated from each other.

Yet another issue worth mentioning is that future space weapons could not only enable civilizations to obliterate each other, but phenomena like mind-uploading and life-extension could enable captors to inﬂict “eternal punishment”—that is, until the entropic death of the universe14 —on those captured, thus greatly increasing the stakes of conﬂict. For example, civilization A might not only worry about the aggressive, expansionist proclivities of civilization B, but fear that if it were to resist B’s demands and subsequently succumb to its military advances, the surviving individuals of A would be cast into an artiﬁcial perdition of interminable suﬀering. This could give A an even greater incentive to launch a ﬁrst strike against B—to eliminate the dual threats of dying in war and living in hell.15

To summarize so far: expansion into space will generate phylogenetic and ideological diversity that could yield profoundly disparate types of civilizations. The species who comprise these civilizations could have entirely diﬀerent normative preferences, moral tendencies, and even scientiﬁc institutions. Some will almost certainly be violence-inclined, thus giving others an incentive to strike ﬁrst. Even more, diversity with respect to cognition, emotionality, and language will undercut the mutual trust needed for otherwise irenic civilizations to avoid spirals of militarization or defect in prisoner’s dilemma predicaments. Thus, a colonized cosmos would be an arena poised and spring-loaded for violence. But is there a way to prevent conﬂict from breaking out?