# Speech 1NC Colleyville Rd 2 vs Coppell 2-4 5PM

## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose affirmative frameworks, advocacy texts, and advantage areas thirty minutes before round if they haven’t read the affirmative before

#### Violation: They didn’t – screenshots

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### Standards:

#### 1] Clash- Not disclosing incentivizes surprise tactics and poorly refined positions that rely on artificial and vague negative engagement to win debates. The shell is offense under their ROTB- Breaking this aff new without disclosing parts of it means they intentionally want to bracket engagement against their strategy and it means their movement is only accessible to them.

#### 2] Reciprocity – They get an infinite amount of time to frontline their aff to write the most efficient and effective answers to anything we could say against it while we get only four minutes in round.

#### 3] Shiftiness- Not knowing enough about the affirmative coming into round incentivizes 1ar shiftiness about what the aff is and what their framework/advocacy entails. That means even if we could read generics or find prep, they’d just find ways to recontextualize their obscure advocacy in the 1ar.

#### 4] Surprises are ableist- limited coping skills makes responding to new affirmatives contribute to stress and anxiety disorders that disproportionately affect populations with intellectual disability

**Miller 2008** (Michael L., Ph.D., university of Wyoming, “Teaching Relaxation Skills to Adults with Intellectual Disability and Generalized Anxiety Disorder” pg. 2)

Anxiety and Intellectual Disability **Emotional regulation** difficulties likely contribute to higher rates of psychopathology among people with intellectual disability in comparison to the typically developing population (Holden & Gitlesen, 2004). **The development and use of emotion regulation skills are strongly influenced by neurological, cognitive, and behavioral factors** (Calkins, 1994). People with intellectual disability are inherently susceptible to emotion regulation problems due to diffuse neurological damage (Becker, Armstrong, & Chan, 1986; Moser, 1999), cognitive impairment (APA, 2000), and **limited coping skills** (Gualtieri, Matson, & Keppel, 1989). Combined, **these deficits likely contribute to repeated experiences of stress, fear, confusion, and self-control problems** (Rojahn & Tasse, 1996). Not surprisingly**, people with intellectual disability exhibit anxiety disorders at higher rates than the general population** (Donaldson & Menolascino, 1977). In fact, approximately 25% of people with mild intellectual disability experience clinically significant levels of anxiety on a regular basis (Fahs, 1989; Menolascino, Levitas, & Greiner, 1986).

#### 5] Disclosing the aff before the round means we can better prepare to analyze the paradigm by which their aff takes place – the way whiteness operates is by concealing itself. This turns the aff into navel-gazing rather than the scholarship that they claim.

Baldwin 12 Dr. Andrew Baldwin- Lecturer at Durham University- “Whiteness and futurity: Towards a research agenda”-Progress in Human Geography, 36(2), 172–187

This paper argues that research on whiteness and geography is oriented almost exclusively around some notion of the past. While this is perhaps to be expected given that whiteness studies builds off two past-oriented bodies of scholarship – US labour studies (Roediger, 1991) and postcolonial theory (Said, 1994) – the argument is that privileging the past when researching geographies of whiteness risks overlooking the ways in which whiteness and hence various forms of racism are configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. In pressing this claim, the argument is not to suggest that history is irrelevant for understanding the politics of whiteness. Analysing the past remains indispensable for understanding the numerous forms whiteness can take. Instead, the argument is that analysing discourses of ‘the future’ can reveal important insights about the ways in which white geographies are configured that might otherwise be foreclosed if the past is privileged as the exclusive time-space through which such geographies are produced and maintained. As such, any politics seeking to challenge whitenesses and their hold on racist social imaginaries may benefit by analysing how the future is invoked in articulations of white identity and how such future-oriented articulations shape geographies of all kinds. Why the future? By future I refer to an imagined time that is yet-to-come. The future can be understood to follow sequentially from a past-present trajectory, or it can be understood as a form of absent presence. From tropes of uncertainty, Utopia, apocalypse, prophesy, hope, fear, possibility and potentiality, the future shapes the present in all manner of ways. For instance, in politics, rights are often suspended to safeguard against future events of insurrection, catastrophe and terror. In religion, moral judgements in the present are shaped by a concern for one’s safe passage into a future afterlife, and, in finance, the pricing of securities necessarily entails some calculation of future risk. Given the ubiquity of the future in the present, it is perhaps no surprise that the future is an important object of inquiry in contemporary thought (see, for example, Adams and Groves, 2007; Anderson, 2010b; Jameson, 2005; Luhmann, 1993). Ben Anderson (2010a) provides a useful sketch of this research in a recent article in this journal. His point is that the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination and performance) and, in turn, intervenes on the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, preemption and preparedness). So, too, others have made the case that pre-empting the future is now a common feature of contemporary political life (Braun, 2007; Cooper, 2006). Futurity is also an important feature of the affective dimensions of daily life. Take, for instance, fear (Pain, 2009) and hope (Anderson, 2006; Anderson and Holden, 2008). Both are simultaneously embodied experiences and atmospheric qualities animated by imagined futures: one fears the yet-to-come and the other hopes for better things to come. In both, the here-and-now of the psyche or of collective mood is shaped by the yetto-come. Or, as Brian Massumi (2002) argues, affect occurs precisely in the overlap between the actual and the virtual, which I take to mean an overlap between that which is and a very specific form of the virtual – the yet-to-come. By virtual I refer to things that are real but not actual (Shields, 2003); in this way, the future is exemplary of the virtual. It can be known and hence real, as Anderson suggests, but because it can never be fully actualized as the future, the future remains a permanent virtuality. Thus, analysing atmospheres of fear and hope, for instance, may tell us something about the way politics takes shape through the conjugation of the actual and the virtual, or at the threshold of the future event. But the future as an object or orientation of inquiry is not limited to the affective, and nor is it confined to an actual-virtual binary. Hegel, for instance, paid considerable attention to transactions of the actual and the possible. For Hegel, the dialectic is made possible by the actual-possible relation where the dialectical movement of the actual is the possible.1 So, too, Heidegger argued that the future is indispensable to meaning. For instance, the significance that attaches to certain kinds of information would vanish were it not for the anticipated (i.e. future) consequences that lay dormant in information. Currency exchange rates would matter little, for instance, were it not for the anticipated consequences of exchange rate volatility. Although radically different, the Hegelian and Heideggerian traditions share in common the idea not simply that politics take shape through the collision of social forces that gathered pace in the past, but that political contests are shaped by the future as well. This essay argues for a research agenda that situates the future at the centre of analyses of white geographies. It shows how the geographic literature on whiteness is past-oriented and suggests how this literature might benefit by attending to the ways in which white geographies are infused by notions of futurity. I develop this argument more fully below. For now let me offer a few preliminary thoughts about geographies of whiteness. By whiteness I refer to a racialized subject position that is remarkable for its seeming invisibility (Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Dyer, 1997). In this sense, whiteness is only partially about skin. More important, whiteness plays a foundational role in racist epistemology by serving as the norm against which others come to be viewed as different (Dwyer and Jones, 2000; Kobayashi and Peake, 2000). As such, whiteness does not name a set of stereotypes, so much as a set of ‘narrative structural positions, rhetorical tropes and habits of perception’ (Dyer, 1997: 12) that stand in for the normal. This makes defining whiteness almost impossible but then, as Richard Dyer (1997) argues, the power of whiteness lies in its capacity for almost infinite variability (see also Kobayashi, 2003; Vanderbeck, 2006). For myself, the power of racisms rest in their capacity to normalize their corresponding whitenesses (Kobayashi and Peake, 2000).

## 2

#### Interp and violation – 1ACs must use the three-tier process to justify the plan – they haven’t – distancing and accessibiltiy

Reid-Brinkley 8 [SHANARA ROSE REID-BRINKLEY- “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” Under the Direction of CHRISTINE HAROLD <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf> 2008] VHS AI

The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence. As Green argues, their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”57 In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledgemaking practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making 83 practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59 Jones argues that without the three tier process debate claims are based on singular perspectives that privilege those with institutional and economic power. The Louisville debaters do not reject traditional evidence per se, instead they seek to augment or supplement what counts as evidence with other forms of knowledge produced outside of academia. As Green notes in the doubleocto-finals at CEDA Nationals, “Knowledge surrounds me in the streets, through my peers, through personal experiences, and everyday wars that I fight with my mind.”60 The thee-tier process: personal experience, organic intellectuals, and traditional evidence, provides a method of argumentation that taps into diverse forms of knowledge-making practices. With the Louisville method, personal experience and organic intellectuals are placed on par with traditional forms of evidence. While the Louisville debaters see the benefit of academic research, they are also critically aware of the normative practices that exclude racial and ethnic minorities from policy-oriented discussions because of their lack of training and expertise. Such exclusions 84 prevent radical solutions to racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia from being more permanently addressed. According to Green: bell hooks talks about how when we rely solely on one perspective to make our claims, radical liberatory theory becomes rootless. That’s the reason why we use a three-tiered process. That’s why we use alternative forms of discourse such as hip hop. That’s also how we use traditional evidence and our personal narratives so you don’t get just one perspective claiming to be the right way. Because it becomes a more meaningful and educational view as far as how we achieve our education.61 The use of hip hop and personal experience function as a check against the homogenizing function of academic and expert discourse. Note the reference to bell hooks. Green argues that without alternative perspectives, “radical libratory theory becomes rootless.” The term rootless seems to refer to a lack of grounded-ness in the material circumstances that academics or experts study. In other words, academics and experts by definition represent an intellectual population with a level of objective distance from that which they study. For the Louisville debaters, this distance is problematic as it prevents the development of a social politic that is rooted in the community of those most greatly affected by the status of oppression.

#### 1] limits – there are an infinite amount of potential plans so you cherry-pick affs with no neg ground and I must prep all affs while they prep one which pigeonholes me to generics but there is a limited amount of ways bodies could affirm.

#### 2] Burnout –

Harney 14 [Note – I do not support the ableist language used in the evidence. Stefano Harney (Professor of Strategic Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University). “HAPTICALITY IN THE UNDERCOMMONS, OR FROM OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT TO BLACK OPS”. CUMMA PAPERS #9. 2014. Accessed 11/13/21. <https://cummastudies.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/cumma-papers-9.pdf> //Xu]

This may sound surprising to say there are no subjects in the social factory or that indeed the rhythm of work is omnipresent today. We face millions without work or not enough work in Europe and amongst the migrants seeking to reach Europe. We are told that the future of work in Europe is subjective, creative, professional, and most of all managerial, not rhythmic. And at any rate from more reliable sources like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri we understand that we are living in an era when immaterial labour – cognitive and affective labour - dominates and commands other forms of labour, even if factories are still widespread in Bangladesh or China. But this should not make us deaf to the rhythms we hear no matter where we go, the rhythms that break and kill humans. We have heard a lot from business about how we can become entrepreneurial, or how we can transform ourselves into leaders, of how we can become responsible for our own careers. And again from our comrades we have received a more accurate picture: conceptions of the artist, of the bohemian, of the researcher, and of the performer have been twisted by business to make us work harder, to convince us we can fulfil ourselves through work. Andrew Ross’s work is excellent here. Christian Marazzi has written about the way our bodies are today a kind of constant capital, machines for which we are responsible, which we must upkeep because they are the site of production. He is right. Franco Berardi speaks of the way our psyche and our souls descend into work as if engulfing our whole being, and Emma Dowling of the way even our affect is measured and managed, brought into metrics. It is easy to feel that work for those who have it is about the risk of having your subjectivity and your talents swallowed whole, about having your virtuosity consumed as Paolo Virno might put it. But a factory is neither a collection of machines nor a collection of workers however skilled, however virtuoso. A factory is a line. OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT The area of management studies concerned with the factory is Operations Management. Operations management has always been pretty clear about what a factory is, and however much it has expanded its understanding of the factory, this definition has not wavered. This is business ‘knowledge,’ with all its ideological limits, but it can be helpful to our own considerations here. For Operations Management, the factory is the scene of a process. This is process in the sense of procession, of movement. Inputs go into the factory to move along a process, a line, and outputs come out of the factory. Most importantly what machines and especially workers do, according to operations management, is work on the process not the product. In contemporary operations management theory this has meant improving that process. This is often designated by the Japanese term ‘kaizen’ originally associated with workers and managers devoting themselves to the continuous improvement of the line’s efficiency in Toyota factories. Soon kaizen expanded throughout service, extraction, information, and other sectors. Rather than attention to the product, including the immaterial product, which remains as much as ever the purview of a small fraction of the workforce, most workers are subjected to increased attention to the ‘assembly’ line. For management science, this is what a factory is: a line, a process, a procession, a movement, a rhythm through from inputs to outputs. And this too is what the social factory is. Its name is accurate even if we have sometimes been distracted by everything from the propaganda of creative classes to the critical discourse of the precariat. But that is not all. Kaizen has been accompanied by another development in the line. This is the extension of the management of inputs and outputs, of the extension to supply chains understood as part of the line, not just as raw clusters of labour, natural resources and machines waiting outside the door of the factory. And with logistics and reverse logistics this line is expanding exponentially, or rather, algorithmically. Logistics and supply chain management extend the metrics of line in both directions, toward inputs and outputs which now have their own work rhythms. SYNAPTIC LABOUR This algorithmically expanding line means the outside of the factory is measured like the inside, aligned with the processual inside. And when the factory is virtual, Post-Fordist, a social factory, the algorithms of the line extend the rhythm of production, of assembly across our lives. The two meanings of assembly, or perhaps two modes of assembly, begin to merge, to assemble is both to come together and to make, anywhere, anytime. But what is made when we assemble and re-assemble is the line itself first and foremost, not a product or a service. This is our work today. We take inventories of ourselves for components not the whole. We produce lean efforts to transconduct. We look to overcome constraints. We define values through metrics. These are all terms from operations management but they describe work far better than recourse to the discourse of subject formation. Creativity itself, supposedly at the heart of the battle for the subject today, is nothing but what operations management calls variance in the line, a variance that may lead to what is in turn called a kaizen event, an improvement, and is then assimilated back into an even more sophisticated line. Today ours is primarily the labour of adapting and translating, being commensurate and flexible, being a conduit and receptacle, a port for information but also a conductor of information, a wire, a travel plug. We channel affect toward new connections. We do not just keep the flow of meaning, information, attention, taste, desire, and fear moving, we improve this flow continuously. We must remain open and attuned to the rhythm of the line, to its merciless variances in rhythm. This is primarily a neurological labour, a synaptic labour of making contact to keep the line flowing, and creating innovations that help it flow in new directions and at new speeds. The worker operates like a synapse, sparking new lines of assembly in life. And she does so anywhere and everywhere because the rhythm of the line is anywhere and everywhere. The worker extends synaptic rhythms in every direction, every circumstance. With synaptic work, it is access not subjects that the line wants, an access, as Denise Ferreira da Silva reminds us, that was long at the heart of the abuse of the affected ones, the ones who granted access out of love, out of necessity, out of the consent not to be one, even before that granting was abused. GROUNDATIONS The rule of the line persists beyond the factory in time and space, and its rhythm makes the time and space of our lives. There is no outside to the line, or rather we might say the line runs through the outside promised in Fordism and supposed to be so heterogeneous in Post-Fordism. A rhythm that tears us apart, a rhythm that obliterates and wrecks our brain. In some places the line is all that is left of the factory, and logistics in this expanded sense is all that is left of production. The science of operations management becomes the science of society, the common sense of our lives.

#### TVA – defend your advocacy but focus on the way the politics you defend are influenced by your identity

#### A] Fairness is good and prior – debate’s a game that requires effective competition and negation, which makes their offense inevitable, it internal link turns clash and engagement.

#### B] Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters.

#### C] Can’t weigh the aff—it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### D] Inescapable – the AC conforms to every norm of debate – speed, speech times, ballots – proves they value playing the game and isolating T as the one bad rule is arbitrary.

#### E] Probability – ballots can’t shape our subjectivity or create broad political change but can rectify in-round skews.

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact

#### Accessibility – psychic violence is a prereq to being in debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### Drop the debater – 1. Deterrence – Prevents reading the abusive practice in the future since it’s not worth risking the loss which is k2 norm setting indefensible practices die out 2. TS – Otherwise you’ll read a bunch of abusive practices for the time trade off

#### No rvi

#### [a] Baiting—they’ll bait the theory debate and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse since they’ll get away with unacceptable practices

#### [b] 1AR all-outs—they’ll collapse entirely to theory which crowds out substance and kills education.

#### [c] Chilling effect—people will be scared to read theory since they can lose off of it, so no one will check abuse.

#### [d] Norm-setting—I shouldn’t be forced to keep advocating for a bad norm if I realize it’s bad in the middle of the round.

#### [e] Flex—RVIs make theory uncondo so I always have to go for that route to the ballot, but both debaters should get multiple relevant layers and collapse options.

#### [f] Illogical—doesn’t make sense to win just for being fair.

#### 1NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea since the shell was read earlier.

## 3

#### **The world relies on the fundamental opposition to disability to exist – disabled bodies are modeled as the inverse reflection to the normate which drives the internal ableism and desire to eliminate disabled bodies.**

**Hughes 12** [Bill Hughes (professor of Sociology at Glasgow Caledonian University, BA in sociology from the University of Stirling, PhD in political philosophy from the University of Aberdeen). 2012. Accessed 8/9/20. “Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People.” <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137023001_2> //Xu]

The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. The body produced by ableism is equivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as invulnerable and definitive. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’ (Shildrick, 2002: 51). It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’ (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), the epitome of civilisation, closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’ (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). Through ableism, modernity has been able to structure disability as uncivilised, outside or on the margins of humanity. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’ (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat. Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existen- tial basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death ... that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communica- tion and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness).

#### Communicative spaces are structured to exclude disabled bodies- speech has come to constitute the boundary of Humanism, to which disability forms the constitutive negative as a disruption of such networks. Informational assemblages are inaccessible to disabled bodies which form the instability that threatens the humanist circle.

**St. Pierre 15** [Bracketed for crip to disabled. Joshua St. Pierre (BA in humanities from Briercrest College, Master of Arts in philosophy from the University of Alberta). “Cripping Communication: Speech, Disability, and Exclusion in Liberal Humanist and Posthumanist Discourse.” Communication Theory. Vol 25, Issue 3. Pages 330-348. 3/31/15. Accessed 8/29/20. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/comt.12054> // Xu]

John Durham Peters has argued that “communication” is a modern invention, stirred by the late 19th century anxieties of isolation and longings for unmediated connection (2000). But while the elusive dream of forging minds together through signs and semantics may be an endemically modern problem, speech has long been a human problem. In particular, performing speech, like performing “the human,” is a risky affair with exclusionary consequences. Oral speech has occupied a dignified position within the humanist lineage, shaping central questions of what it means to be human, imbued with the power to persuade others, serve human affairs, and articulate truth; yet, this pedigree has come at a high cost: the exclusion of voices not deemed rational and intelligible. I propose bringing a disabled, or a crip, analysis to bear on speech communication within humanism and posthumanism. Focusing on the disabled speaker, I accordingly argue that the exclusion of nonnormative voices within liberal humanism results from a tension between the conception of speech as rational and universal, and its embodied particularity that erodes any claim to universality. As the sine qua non of rational human subjectivity, speech is an esteemed, yet volatile, performance that can easily go wrong. Rather than owning up to the necessarily embodied and unstable mediation of human identity, liberal humanism defers the tension immanent within speech by excluding nonnormative and disabled voices, judging them against what I term the “universal speaker,” in a Sisyphean attempt to shore up and contain the boundaries of the human. The ultimately futile movement to free rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principle mode of communication. Pursuing the stuttered trajectory of “rational discourse” in liberal humanism to its disembodied form of “information” in posthumanism, I suggest that speech is largely absent in posthumanist discourse not only because of the incongruity of speech with emerging models of information seemingly free from context, but perhaps more importantly because these discourses assume autoaffectivity and preclude [disabled]crip voices from analysis. Like its humanist predecessor, and contrary to much of its rhetoric, posthumanism shows signs of structural exclusion dependent on having the right sort of informational body: malleable and flexible. Tony Davis insists that “All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. . . . Their embrace suffocates those it does not ignore” (2008, p. 141). While this may ultimately place disabled voices within good company, it remains worrisome that the silencing itself has been largely underrepresented and untheorized. Even disciplines such as communication studies and disability studies, devoted to unearthing genealogies, articulating phenomenological structures, and exploring subaltern modes of existing together, have not paid enough attention to disabled speech. While these disciplines have had very little, if any, contact so far, they have much to offer each other. By bringing these two disciplines into dialogue and writing from disability, I propose that the disabled speaker is perhaps the cyborg par excellence, eschewing communicative purity, autonomy, and self-mastery. The disabled speaker can be employed to critique the latent ableism within humanist and posthumanist discourse, and communication theory more generally, while offering new modes of thinking about posthuman communication as an embodied activity based on noise, relationality, and reciprocity.1 Liberal humanism and speech Liberal humanism is a broad-based political and intellectual emergence within the Enlightenment, which gained full ascendency in the 19th and 20th centuries, valuing “open and undogmatic inquiry, freedom of the individual conscience” and aiming for a “respect for social justice, social and psychological utility, decency, [and] liberality” (Coates & White, 1970, p. 447). At its center, liberal humanism is a marriage between the long humanist tradition and liberal ideals: a dual commitment to “man” and “freedom.” However, in its effort to secure “man” as a completely autonomous being, liberal humanism must first transcend group differences and generalize attributes of humanity in a movement of essentialization. What defines a human in this tradition is accordingly not accidental attributes— for example race, gender, age—but the possession of rationality. The liberal subject, as Katherine Hayles has observed, identifies the self with the rational mind merely in possession of a body (1999, p. 4).This move is unquestionably overdetermined, yet can in large measure be traced back through Cartesian rationalism to the Discourse on the Method. Asserting the cogito, Descartes writes: from this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is solely to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this ‘I’— that is, the soul by which I am what I am—is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist (2009, p. 36, emphasis added). Distinct from the body and free from context, the existence of the rational “I” stands above the historical moment. While Descartes himself is not the brash dualist so often presumed, the methodological distinction between res extensa and res cogitans nevertheless sets the stage for the humanist erasure of embodiment that carries through into posthumanism. Compared to the axiomatically derived self-evidence of the rational self, the body is deemed epistemically untrustworthy, accidental, and historical. Transcribed through liberal humanism, this binary conceives the subject as an inner and universal rationality possessing an external and particular body. The liberal subject emerges as autonomous and unitary, yet as interior, in need of externalizing his/her social and political nature. It is here that speech takes on a significant, yet surprisingly underrepresented, role within liberal humanist discourse. In 1923, H. Wildon Carr, a former president of the Aristotelian Society, argued that the very idea of reason requires discourse because reason is an activity directed outwards. “The origin of speech,” said Carr, “is in the nature of human mentality. Reason in its human form would not and could not exist without speech” (1923–1924, p. 97). A similar position is taken up more recently by Frank E. X. Dance and Carl E. Larson who have contended that speech communication is a pedagogical initiation into humanity. “Speech communication,” they write, “functions so importantly in the life of a human being that the understanding and study of speech communication are at the very core of a liberal education” (1972, p. 6). Toeing the party line, Dance and Larson have maintained that speech communication has three functions: (a) linking the individual with his environment, (b) developing higher mental processes, and (c) regulating behavior (1972, p. 64). Speech is an enactment of reason and therefore of human identity, since “evolutionarily speaking, the hand is shaped by the labor in which it engages, man’s interiority simultaneously shapes and is shaped by speech communication” (1972, p. 71). For Carr, Dance, and Larson, then, speech is an extension of rationality, belonging not to the body, but to the articulation and formation of reason. The liberal humanist assessment of speech exemplified by Carr, Dance, and Larson relies on an ambiguity and slippage between the rational interior and embodied exterior. Speech is given in liberal humanism as a mode of rationality, yet the body is also needed for the enactment of speech. This duality raises troubling questions regarding the boundaries of reason and the self. Does speech modulate from a form of rationality to a conditional act as it passes through the lips? Where does the universal reason stop and contingent embodiment begin? While speech, mediating the threshold between the public and private and the universal and accidental, can be understood as the sine qua non of the liberal humanist subject, it simultaneously occupies an ambiguous position. This ambiguity translates as a fundamental instability in the rational self’s identity and boundary that can be detailed through the voice, chiastically hinging language and the body. The voice is dually constituted by the phonological and the phonetic: the meaning laden, immaterial aspect of the phoneme and its material, auditory support. While the existence of the phonological depends upon the phonetic (however short-lived its existence), the logic of phonocentrism permeating liberal humanism systematically obscures the phonetic as the trace of embodiment. “Requiring the intervention of no determinate surface in the world, being produced in the world as pure auto-affection, [the voice],” explains Derrida, “is a signifying substance completely at our disposition. For the voice meets no obstacle to its emission in the world precisely because it is produced as pure auto-affection” (1973, p. 79). This dominant tradition understands the phonetic, embodied aspect of the voice to be utterly passive and invisible, and thus “the voice” comes from within, circumventing the body, and directly expresses interiority. Yet, tying the signifier to the body, the voice is not so easily divorced from its embodied source. Somewhat overstated by the dysfluent speaker, the phonetic aspect of the voice often does not self-effacingly recede once the phonological function has been dutifully carried out, but rather lingers and stretches, drawing attention to itself and threatening to subvert its linguistic purpose. The voice of one who has cerebral palsy, for example, is decidedly not at his/her complete disposition precisely because the body obtrudes its continuous emission into the world. The conception of the voice as pure auto-affection can be maintained only by abstracting speech from lived experience. I accordingly argue that the rational human materializes himself through the voice precariously; the slippage is manifested both phonetically and affectively. Mladen Dolar (2006) contends that even though the phonetic voice does not contribute to meaning and is therefore inconspicuous when the semantic operation of speech is “properly” carried out, there is always something leftover, whether accent, individuality, or other tonal qualia. The role assigned to the remainder of the voice by Dolar is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, the remainder is an obstruction overcome when one becomes adjusted to a different accent, for example, and can focus simply upon the intended meaning. The voice in this regard is simply an impediment to the communicative operation of language. Yet on the other hand, Dolar notes that a voice devoid of any remainder would conflate with mechanical iterability and thus lose its human characteristic: Paradoxically, it is the mechanical voice which confronts us with the object voice, its disturbing and uncanny nature, whereas the human touch helps us keep it at bay. The obstacle it appears to present actually enhances the sense-making effect; the seeming distraction contributes to the better fulfillment of the goal (2006, p. 22). The phonetic side effect of the voice enables its recognizability and identification as a human voice. Implicit here is the narrow phonetic line sheltering the human voice in between the mechanical and noise—between merely iterating signifiers and chaotic distraction. At far ends of the spectrum, voices of intellectually disabled people are often read as subhuman at best, while voices with no inflection can be read as eerily mechanical or computerized. Depicting the former phenomenon, a vitriolic letter was recently sent to the caretaker of an autistic boy, in which the anonymous author complained, “You selfishly put your kid outside every day and let him be nothing but a nuisance and a problem to everyone else with that noise polluting whaling [sic] he constantly makes! That noise he makes when he is outside is DREADFUL [sic] . . . It scares the hell out of my normal children! . . . Do the right thing and move or euthanize him!” (“Hateful Letter,” 2013). This instance is repugnant and likely not representative in degree. However, inasmuch as speech and reason are tightly correlated through the linguistic function of the voice, performing the voice in any way that strays beyond codified vocalic boundaries and unsettles the effortless production of meaning calls into question the rationality of the performer “behind” the voice. More moderately disabled voices, like the stuttering voice, are in this regard not outright rejected as a signifying voice like the voices of the (presumed) intellectually disabled. However, recognition can nevertheless be denied in degree. The failure to signify in a quotidian manner results in a desperate struggle for the disabled voice to maintain a uniform performance of reason if the speaker wishes to be afforded the privileges of full participation given to those deemed rational. Speaking as a rational human is a delicate performance that can easily go sideways. The knife-edge of human vocality is honed even finer by taking into account normalized vocal affectivity. Joshua Gunn (2010) has argued that the affective power of the voice is culturally policed because it is fundamentally public; the phonetic aspect of the voice generates “public feelings” that communicate on their own accord. Rhetorical training aims to tame this affective power to match, support, and enliven the semiotic character of the voice. However, citing the public anxiety around “uncontrolled speech” that transgresses vocal norms, Gunn points out how easily the affective force can go awry, so much that he claims “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Gunn references the grunting of female tennis players and the unintentional yelps of politicians; yet, it would be helpful here to widen his observation of uncontrolled speech to include such voices as those belonging to the transgendered and the disabled.These voices accentuate the volatile affective power of the voice and the tenuous hold we possess over our bodies. As I have argued elsewhere, “In failing to live up to the ideals set by liberal individualism and capitalism, [dysfluent voices] act as a reminder of the fragile mastery we have of our bodies and of the social downturn that quickly follows the failure to uphold and project this ideal of mastery.” (2012, p. 16). The anxiety-riddled demand for control in public speech arises precisely because the affective power of speech exists in a metastable relation to the body. Rational speech, dispassioned, and disembodied, may at any moment be ruptured and must thus be constantly surveilled and managed. Articulating and simultaneously threatening to occlude rational human identity, the voice thus bears the full weight of the humanist anxiety concerning borders and membership. The “proper” performance of speech is accordingly strongly patrolled within liberal humanist discourse. The universal speaker Iris Young casts the liberal subject in his/her political context, arguing for a conception of “universal citizenship.” In her assessment, the liberal subject transcends his/her self-interested particularity through public discussion and decision making by which private interests can agree on a common good (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen is therefore homogenized, as “citizenship is an expression of the universality of human life; it is a realm of rationality and freedom as opposed to the heteronomous realm of particular need, interest, and desire” (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen transcends differences threatening impartiality and equality by essentializing himself or herself and projecting that self into the politicized public sphere. If to be truly human in liberal humanist discourse is to exercise autonomous reason, and if speaking realizes oneself as a rational and social agent within the public sphere, then having a voice has direct bearing on the universal citizen—so much so that I believe it possible to conceive of what might be termed a “universal speaker.” Because speech plays a pivotal role in the realization of the self as a rational agent, then if one is to speak, he/she must speak in a way that defends the universality of autonomous reason against embodied and historical particularity. Furthermore, the universal speaker, like the universal citizen, must be marked by impartiality. As stated by Young, “impartial reason aims to adopt a point of view outside concrete situations of action, a transcendental ‘view from nowhere’ that carries the perspective, attributes, character, and interests of no particular subject or set of subjects” (1990, p. 100). From this façade of impartiality, it is only a small step to judge who does and does not speak impartially and thereby qualifies as rational and human. To speak as a truly rational agent requires that one speak from nowhere and everywhere, becoming an invisible medium for communication. The universal speaker is a powerful homogenizing trope, for it defines what type of speech production is natural, who gets the right to speak, what speech needs to be taken seriously, and what speech gets to be heard at all. If one is to speak with agency or efficacy, one must speak in the right way; hence the burden within this tradition is to find and retain the “right voice.” In Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream, for example, Carl Elliott (2004) notes an anxiety in the struggle of transgendered people to match gendered vocal norms, the accent-reduction clinics in the American south, and the difficult adjustment of disabled speakers to voice synthesizers. At the heart of liberal humanism’s claim to universality and equality, an ugly structure of exclusion of those who are not “universal” shows itself, an exclusion that I argue results from the tension between (a) the desire to conceive of oral communication as rational/universal and (b) the embodied particularity of speech that threatens to undermine its universality. For while speech is peddled as a rational, universal, and nonspatial medium within liberal humanism, the particularity of embodied speech casts a threatening shadow over this claim. Returning to the example of the stuttering voice, Marc Shell argues that having the “right voice” is a necessary sign of membership to a particular group of persons. If you cannot speak, he wryly explains, you are likely not human. If you can somewhat speak you may be human, and if you cannot speak in my particular way, you do not belong to my tribe (2005, p. 50). For the stutterer, however, “all words are test words, passwords, or catchphrases whereby one gains or loses social acceptance or credibility. . . . The concern is not his inability to pronounce some word or phrase fast enough; it is one’s ability to say any word fluently in any language” (2005, p. 51). Shell is quite clearly stating the boundary conditions of the universal speaker. However, just as the vocal markers of ethnic boundaries are contingent, historical, and laden with colonial power, so can the supposed universality of rational human speech be unraveled. Disability studies convincingly challenge the pathologization of individual bodies by articulating the sociocultural structures of ableism that normalize and exclude certain forms of human variation.2 “Disability” is no more self-evident, natural, or stable a concept than “able-bodiedness”: Both are understood through disability studies as a function of contingent sociocultural anxieties and oppressions. Disability circumscribes the human by negation. Following in this vein, we might likewise fray the boundaries of the universal speaker by deterritorializing disabled speech. Consider again Gunn’s claim that “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Ubiquitous stutters and vocalic gaffes occur to everyone on a daily basis precisely because communication is fundamentally unstable: the act of carving out meaning from indeterminacy and noise as opposed to a pure and rational articulation of Being. The so-called disabled speech permeates all speech. The delimitation of the disabled speaker is thus necessarily arbitrary: the construction of a deviant and pathologized Other to prop up the universal speaker. More specifically, pathologization individuates “nonrational” speech production and thereby maintains and polices the public/private divide. Disabled speech is conceived as a private affair marked by particularity and embodiedness, while the rational speech of the universal citizen belongs to the public realm. Yet, resituating disability as a distinctly public structure of oppression unmasks “universality” as simply the norms of unmarked and dominant groups. What counts as a particular and impartial voice is a function of conglomerate sexist, classist, racist, and ableist determinations obscured by their dominant positions within society. Vocally passing as universal is a stacked game favoring those who discursively control the boundaries of rationality and the human. To transgress norms of unmarked dominant groups is to risk great social punishment and exclusion. To speak “in the wrong way” not only reveals the speaker to be connected to his/her body, particularity, and context, but also risks blurting out that the emperor is naked— the emperor speaks from a body. In rupturing the mythos of speech, the disabled speaker thus throws darkness within the humanist circle, threatening the ostensibly stable conditions of a generalized and “universal” identity and provoking violence in attempts to shore up the boundaries of the human. Excluding “hyperembodied voices” is thus a dogged mechanism of deferring the tension inherent in liberal humanist speech between universality and particularity, rational autonomy, and embodiment. The (failed) movement to free communication as rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principal mode of communication. Cripping posthumanism There is no single bridge spanning humanism to posthumanism. There are certainly stories to tell about the antihumanism of the 1960s and 1970s, of feminism, cybernetics, Hans Moravec, late capitalism, and of the cascading death of God, man, and the author. Yet, as Donna Haraway duly reminds us, the cyborg is a bastard. Any attempt to pin down its origins is always already a fabrication, a sanitation, an attempt to tell a crooked story straight. Neil Badmington further muddies the water, adapting for posthumanism the Lyotardian-Derridean line that a system always contains the conditions for its critique. Rather than construing humanism and posthumanism as distinct entities in a linear, temporal relation, Badmington argues—akin to Lyotard’s reading of modernism and postmodernism— that “the writing of the posthumanist condition should . . . take the form of a critical practice that occurs inside humanism, consisting not of the wake but the working-through of humanist discourse” (2003, p. 22). Posthumanism has always ghosted humanism, and posthumanism is never a clean break (if it can be called a break at all) from humanism. Just as there is no single nor a complete shift from humanism to posthumanism, so are there many posthumanisms. My affinity toward posthumanism as a generative source for rethinking disabled speech does not extend to them all, insofar as some remain bedded with humanism more than others. For example, early cybernetics remained fixated on defining and maintaining borders of an autonomous and autopoietic subject. In a related vein, transhumanists hoist the banner of human progress with pride. Often conflated with posthumanism, transhumanism has wormed its way into the cultural imaginary with grand ameliorative visions of biotechnology improving the human condition through augmentation and newgenics. Transhumanism, as Cary Wolfe defines it, is simply an “intensification of humanism” (2009, p. xv), a technological extension of the dream of perfectibility that sees bodily limitations as a hurdle to transcend. Disabled speech (and disability more broadly) is accordingly irksome problem for transhumanists to fix, in time, through technology. The posthumanism I intend to redeploy takes its cue from Nayar, who defines what he terms critical posthumanism as “the radical decentering of the traditional sovereign, coherent and autonomous human in order to demonstrate how the human is always already evolving with, constituted by and constitutive of multiple forms of life and machines” (2014, p. 2). The posthuman under this reading cannot be understood in terms of a single locus or a unitary ontology of presence. Rather, he/she is dynamically coconstituted within ecological, technological, and informational networks—a congealing of “heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3). Subjectivity is an emergent feature of sympoietic systems (Haraway, 2014), necessarily constrained by and dispersed within the exchanges between systems and environments. “The Human” thus cedes its transcendental status long enjoyed within the Anthropocene. Yet, at the same time, in relinquishing this status, the (post)human no longer needs to frantically police the borders within which it (ostensibly) ruled autonomously. Rather, critical posthumanism recognizes that the borders of the human have always been porous. Owning up to our sympoietic constitution produces a vantage from which the ableist construction and policing of human borders, bodies, and communicative practices can be politicized and critiqued. With the cyborg bastard fully in mind, I suggest that the disabled body is useful in parsing a necessarily crooked and partial transition to posthuman communication. Interrogating the familial tradition of rhetoric from the perspective of disability, Jay Dolmage is here instructive: The body of history has been shaped to look like an idealized human body: proportional, inviolable, autonomous, upright, forward facing (white and masculine). But if you find the rhetorical body, you find tension, trial, and trouble. . . . [W]riting from bodies we would do history differently, not just be recognizing ‘other’ bodies, but also because our histories and rhetorics might more closely represent the difference and diversity of our bodies themselves (2014, p. 16). Reading posthumanism and posthuman communication through disability is accordingly a means of not only recognizing bodies that are often excluded in communication theory (relegated, e.g., to the insulated domain of speech-pathology) but also cripping communication itself. Like the stuttering body, there is perhaps much to gain from resisting the straight and most direct communicative and discursive path. Consider in this regard that for disability theorist Alison Kafer, the cyborg is appealing not in spite of but because of its “multiple, and often contradictory, deployments” (2013, p. 116). To look for and expect disability in posthumanism and communication theory is to invoke a heuristic of instability and indeterminacy that generates multiple meanings and relations. Conscious of the multivariate affinity and inconsonance between humanism and posthumanism, I wish to pull on a few threads to (a) appreciate the transition and reconstitution of the humanist logic excluding disabled speech within posthumanism and (b) redeploy posthumanism to imagine the disabled speaker otherwise. One thin place between humanism and posthumanism that provides an early historical reference point for the cripped movement to posthuman communication is the abstraction of “information” from context and the body by cybernetics and information theory. The work of cybernetic and informational theorists Norbert Wiener and Claude Shannon famously recast communication in terms of pattern/randomness rather than presence/absence. Within this paradigm, similar to within both structuralism and poststructuralism, information is not the one-to-one correlation of a signifier and signified, but, following Saussure, is rather the differentiation between arbitrary relations. By extracting information from the presence/absence binary, immateriality can be constructed on the basis of pattern/randomness. Hayles argues that because a universal informational code can be recognized as underwriting everything that exists, information and materiality can be conceived of as discrete entities, with information occupying the dominant role (1999, p. 11). In this configuration, information is differential insofar as the probabilities of a message alone determine its content. The “meaning” of a message is self-contained and its value is therefore unaffected by situation and context outside the closed information system. “Shannon and Wiener,” remarks Hayles, “wanted information to have a stable value as it moved from one context to another. If it was tied to meaning, it would potentially have to change values every time it was embedded in a new context, because context affects meaning” (1999, p. 53). As such, in “information,” the liberal humanist subject finds a release from the constraints of the body and the context of its production. In Hayles estimation, early cybernetics was thus a means to extend, not subvert, humanist conceptions of man as autopoietic, autonomous, and self-directed. This was accomplished by demonstrating that machines could function like a man and correspondingly that man is essentially an information-processing entity akin to intelligent machines (1999, p. 7). One might argue more specifically, in relation to communication theory, that the effort by Shannon and Weiner to distill information from context resonates with the liberal humanist desire to free rational discourse from the body. By disentangling information from materiality and context, cybernetics somewhat ironically remains tethered to humanist anxieties. Yet, it is worth noting that at the same historical moment, even poststructuralism, putatively motivated by a wariness of immediacy characteristic of humanism, blots out speech in favor of writing. While Derrida and his progeny favor writing inasmuch as speech ostensibly bypasses any impediment to self-presence, the fact that both cybernetics and poststructuralism converge in the erasure of speech is telling. That is, these divergent projects take as their starting point an idealized communicative body; an idealization that adopts the humanist assumption of vocal autoaffectivity. In an ironic twist, even Derrida effaces bodies in the effort to highlight the trace, the body. Working in the poststructuralist lineage, Haraway similarly brackets speech in her articulation of dirty, noisy, posthuman communication. “Cyborg politics,” she writes, “is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution.” (1990, p. 176).This support for the embodied disruption of communication is curiously prefaced by an insistence that “writing is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs” (1990, p. 176; my emphasis). For all her rhetoric of embodiment and insistence on the centrality of communication, Haraway seems not to consider speech as an intimate form of embodied communication that resists perfect translation. Hayles as well, setting her sights on theorists such as Wiener and Shannon, intends to reinstitute embodiment in posthumanism, yet never discusses speech as a creative source of noise in the evolution of material-informational systems. Even if interpreted as vestigial poststructuralist anxiety, this puzzling lacuna in posthumanist discourse around speech betrays an ableist presumption of self-presence and resonates with the exclusionary logic of the universal speaker. Yet, if one follows Dolmage in writing from bodies in their diversity, (post) humanism can be read against the grain. Thinking from the perspective of disability not only highlights the points of tension in the stuttered movement toward posthuman communication (as evidenced by both Haraway and Hayles) but also suggests new ways of thinking about speech as embodied and affective, and the relation between communication and the posthuman. Posthumanism and communication Reimagining the stuttering cyborg requires a more nuanced articulation of posthumanism’s relation with both disability and communication. Starting with the former, in decentering the human subject from its position as the transcendental explanans, posthumanism renders “ability” as an emergent aspect of human situatedness within politicized networks. Able-bodiedness is accordingly not an immanent feature of “the body” (as if it could be decoupled from its environment) but is a dynamic index of architectural, economic, industrial, biomedical, discursive, material, informational, affective, political, and sociocultural assemblages. More specifically, able-bodiedness identifies the congruence of these networks with putatively “normal” bodies. As Nayar helpfully points out, networks are inherently political, put in place, and optimized “for certain kinds of bodies to tap into and connect with—and this is what en-ables these bodies.” Bodies marked as disabled are accordingly, and conversely, those “that do not fit into available systems and institutionally created structures” (2014, p. 107). Put simply, disabled bodies are for Nayar those for which networks do not exist. While Nayar’s analysis is helpful, it is perhaps better to say that disabled bodies occupy subaltern networks, because deworlding (to put the phenomenon in Heideggerian parlance) is rarely, if ever, absolute.3 Disability is not a simple aggregate of network conditions, but is constituted in part by feedback loops. That is, disabled people—edged out of, or exploited by, dominant systems—regularly produce new networks that rewire connections between each other and their environments in politically subversive and generative ways. Disabled communities often supplant the neoliberal and meritocratic ideals of productivity, individualism, and self-sufficiency with an ethos of care, interdependency, and slowness. Cripping communication might likewise be understood as a criticoethical practice of reimagining the relations between informational bodies and systems, remapping disabled speech in ways that privilege noise, indeterminacy, affectivity, and sympoiesis.

#### the idea that epistemic resistance through the 1AC’s prioritization of signs over materiality erases the material conditions of disability

Siebers 06 (Tobin, Prof of Literary and Cultural Criticism at the U of Michigan, “Disability Studies and the Future of Identity Politics”) DR 16

**The attack on identity by social constructionists is designed to liberate individuals constrained by unjust stereotypes and social prejudices. The example of disability in particular reveals with great vividness the unjust stereotypes imposed on identity by cultural norms and languages as well as the violence exercised by them.** It also provides compelling evidence for the veracity of the social model**. Deafness was not, for instance, a disability on Martha’s Vineyard for most of the eighteenth century because 1 in 25 residents was deaf and everyone in the community knew how to sign**. Deaf villagers had the same occupations and incomes as people who could hear.3 This example shows to what extent **disability is socially produced.** In fact, **it is tempting to see disability exclusively as the product of a bad match between society and some human bodies because it is so often the case. But disability also frustrates theorists of social construction because the disabled body and mind are not easily aligned with cultural norms and codes. Many disability scholars have begun to insist that the social model either fails to account for the difficult physical realities faced by people with disabilities or presents their body and mind in ways that are conventional, conformist, and unrecognizable to them. These include the habits of privileging pleasure over pain, making work a condition of independence, favoring performativity to corporeality, and describing social success in terms of intellectual achievement, bodily adaptability, and active political participation.** David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder have noticed that **the push to link physical difference to cultural and social constructs, especially ideological ones, has actually made disability disappear** from the social model. They cite a variety of recent studies of the body that use “corporeal aberrancies” to emblematize social differences, complaining that “physical difference” within common critical methodologies “exemplifies the evidence of social deviance even as the constructed nature of physicality itself fades from view.”4 As Davis puts it, **cultural theory abounds with “the fluids of sexuality, the gloss of lubrication, the glossary of the body as text,** the heteroglossia of the intertext, the glossolalia of the schizophrenic. **But almost never the body of the differently abled.”5 Recent theoretical emphases on “performativity,” “heterogeneity,” and “indeterminancy” privilege a disembodied ideal of freedom, suggesting that emancipation from social codes and norms may be achieved by imagining the body as a subversive text. These emphases are not only incompatible with the experiences of people with disabilities; they mimic the fantasy, often found in the medical model, that disease and disability are immaterial as long as the imagination is free. Doctors and medical professionals have the habit of coaxing sick people to cure themselves by thinking positive thoughts, and when an individual’s health does not improve the failure is ascribed to mental weakness**. Sontag was perhaps the first to understand the debilitating effects of **describing illness as a defect of imagination or will power**. She traces the notion that disease springs from individual mental weakness to Schopenhauer’s claim that “recovery from a disease depends on the will assuming ‘dictatorial power in order to subsume the rebellious forces’ of the body” (43-44). **She also heaps scorn on the idea that the disabled or sick are responsible for their disease concluding that “theories that diseases are caused by mental states and can be cured by will power are always an index of how much is not understood about the physical terrain of a disease**” (55**). The rebellious forces of the body and the physical nature of disease represent a reality untouched by metaphor.** Sontag insists that “the reality has to be explained” (55).

#### The impact is internalized ableism and psychological violence

Campbell 2008 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, disability author and professor at Griffith University, “Exploring internalized ableism using critical race theory” Disability and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, March 2008, 151–162 some words are edited within []) DR 16

**Foucault’s (1976; 1980) theorisation of power as productive may provide some offerings from which to build a conversation about internalised ableism**. I am not so much interested in the ‘external’ effects of that power, but for the moment wish to concentrate on what Judith Butler aptly refers to as **the ‘psychic life’ of power.** She describes this dimension: … an account of subjection, it seems, must be traced in the turns of psychic life. More specifically, **it must be traced in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes place in acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in tandem with processes of social regulation** (Butler, 1997b, p.19). In other words, **the processes of subject formation cannot be separated from the subject** him/**herself who is brought into being though those very subjectifying processes**. **The consequences of taking into oneself negative subjectivities not only regulate and continually form identity (the disabled citizen) but can transcend and surpass the strictures of ableist authorizations.** Judith **Butler describes this process of the “carrying of a mnemic trace**”: One need only consider the way in which **the history of having been called an injurious name is embodied, how the words enter the limbs, craft the gesture, bend the spine …how these slurs accumulate over time, dissimulating their history, taking on the semblance of the natural, configuring and restricting** the doxa that counts as “**reality**”. (Butler, 1997b, p. 159) The work of Williams and Williams-Morris (2000) links racism experienced by African Americans to the effects of hurtful words and negative cultural symbols on mental health, especially when **marginalized groups embrace negative societal beliefs about themselves.** They cite an international study by Fischer et al (1996) which inter alia links poor academic performance with poor social status. Although using different disciplinary language Wolfensberger (1972) in his seven core themes of SRV, identified role circularity as a significant obstacle to be overcome by disabled people wanting socially valued roles. **Philosopher** **Linda Purdy contends** it is important to resist conflating disability with the disabled person. She writes **My disability is not me**, no matter how much it may affect my choices. With this point firmly in mind, **it should be possible mentally to separate my existences from the existence of my disability**. (Purdy, 1996, p. 68). The problem with **Purdy’s conclusion** is that it is psychically untenable, not only because it **is posited around a type of Cartesian dualism that simply separates being-ness from embodiment**, **but also because this kind of reasoning disregards the dynamics of subjectivity formation** to which Butler (1997a; 1997b) has referred. **Whilst the ‘outputs’ of subjectivity are variable the experience of impairment within an ableist context can and does effect formation of self – in other words ‘disability is me’, but that ‘me’ does not need to be enfleshed with negative ontologies of subjectivity**. **Purdy’s ~~bodily~~ [fleshly] detachment appears locked into a loop that is filled with internalised ableism, a state with negative views of impairment, from which the only escape is ~~disembodiment~~; the penalty of denial is a flight** 12 **from her [flesh] ~~body~~.** **This finds agreement in the reasoning of** Jean **Baudrillard** (1983) **who posits that it is the simulation, the appearance (**representation) **that matters. The subject simulates what it is to be ‘disabled’ and by inference ‘abled’ and whilst morphing ableist imperatives, in effect performs a new hyper reality of be-ing disabled. By unwittingly performing ableism disabled people become complicit in their own demise – reinforcing impairment as an outlaw ontology.**

#### The alternative is to embrace crip failure as a method of rupturing abled temporalities and mapping crip horizons.

**Kolářová 14** [Brackets Original. Kateřina Kolářová (Assistant Professor of Cultural Studies in the Department of Gender Studies at Charles University in Prague, PhD in Anglo-American Literary Studies and an MA in History and English and American Studies and History from Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague). “The Inarticulate Post-Socialist Crip: On the Cruel Optimism of Neoliberal Transformations in the Czech Republic.” [Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies](https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/456). [Liverpool University Press](https://muse.jhu.edu/search?action=browse&limit=publisher_id:105). Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 257-274. 2014. Accessed 8/13/20. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/558367/pdf> //Xu]

The impossibility of seeing and envisioning crip(topias) in the situation of (post-)shameful identity illustrates not only the harmful and utterly disabling work of certain affective attachments, it also and as vividly illustrates the equally harmful impacts/effects of attachments to affects, in particular attachments to affects of positivity, affects that seemingly are necessary to foster self-embracing identity and subjectivity. In other words, the post-socialist crip challenges Western-developed theories of (disabled) identity that argue that positive affects are necessary to foster self-embracing and affirmative understandings of disability and disabled subjectivity. The symbolic violence embedded in recuperative positivity offers us the opportunity to think about crip failure and crip negativity. The violence also points toward conditions that (could) make (some forms of) failure useful for cripistemologies and that (could) map crip horizons. Cripness is already rich with failure; cripness is infused with negativity that sustains. The crip negativity I plead for is a critical strategy rupturing ideologies of cure, rehabilitation and overcoming, ideologies that inflict hurt and violence (not only) on crips. I wish to initiate a discussion about crip negativity as a political practice working towards (if never reaching) crip utopian horizons. Still, the post-socialist crip opens other and new questions about what crip failure would mean if it were to foster and sustain life, what forms of crip negative energies would allow for crip utopias and make possible the desire for crip survival. J. Jack Halberstam’s theory of failure elucidates how the compulsory positive nature of optimism, hope, pride, and success precludes the realisation that failure can be a form of sustenance and strategy of critique/survival. In failing the normative prescriptions of compulsory heterosexuality (and ablebodiedness), failure “imagines other goals for life, for love, for art, and for being” (Halberstam 88). And coming back to the image of the women failing/ surviving with AIDS at the post-socialist Odessa hospice, failure also imagines signs of crip solidarity and sustenance where the visions of an optimistic future create spaces of abandonment for subjects who will never be offered a fantasy of the ‘good life.’ Despite its lack of substantial attention to cripness that would surpass the level of metaphorics, Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure does offer some lines along which to also think crip failures. The most helpful to my current analysis of post-socialist affects would seem to be Halberstam’s discussion of the failure to remember. Forgetting, losing, looping between past and future are the techniques of resistance to normative temporalities. Such failures at temporalities of progressive and curative futurity, I argue, could offer forms of sustenance (for the post-socialist crip). The failure to remember would produce a rupture into the dominant narratives of shame (of a failed socialism) and the futurity of ‘getting better.’ It would forget visions of pride based on overcoming the failed socialist crip, and it would loosen/lose the compulsory vision of optimism of (neoliberal) humanism. It would forget the ideologies that we have seen to hurt and violate crips and our futures. Cripping, disjointing the normative forms of (linear) knowing about the past-present-future, could offer resistance to the cruel hope that directs our desires into (an evacuated) future, while foreclosing the negotiation of difficult yet important relationships past and the present. The rejection of the curative and always already deferred future opens up a space for developing a more complicated relationship with failed pasts. Queer theorist Heather Love devises the politics of ‘feeling backwards/backwards feelings’ as an affective strategy of resistance to liberal understandings of the repressive hypothesis and emancipation (see Love). Her concept is both a corrective to the deeply problematic progressivism of ‘gay pragmatism’ with its compulsorily positive futurity of ‘getting better’, as well as an affective reaching backwards to legacies of difficult pasts. As she puts it, “[b]ackward feelings serve as an index to the ruined state of the social world; they indicate continuities between the bad gay past and the present; and they show up the inadequacy of queer narratives of progress” (Love 27); I wish to add, they show up continuities between crip pasts and presents obscured by the undisputedly “good intentions” of rehabilitation (McRuer, Crip 110). Halberstam for his part appreciates the strategies of backward feeling as a way of recovering the past of queer and racially marked subjects erased in the tidy versions of the past, “[w]hile liberal histories build triumphant political narratives with progressive stories of improvement and success, radical histories must content with a less tidy past, one that passes on legacies of failure and loneliness as the consequence of [ableist] homophobia and racism and xenophobia” (Halberstam 98). To retrieve lives undone by ideologies of ableism, homophobia, racism and xenophobia, and practices of institutionalisation, forced sterilisation, ethnic segregation, and on and on, we need backward-feelings. The project of “reformulated histories” (see Kafer’s discussion of Halberstam 42-44) feels backwards to past forms of crip survivals and past experiences that have been erased. Alongside this move, I also want to ‘feel backwards’ to the hurt caused by the shame of the bad past itself. This is not a naïve reclamation of the idealised communist past ignorant of the violence committed by the communist regime (violence and hurt inflicted on disabled people still remains mostly undocumented, unspoken, and unanalysed). What I argue is that the notion of the bad and failed past is too comfortable and too tidy and serves only the ideology of capitalist recovery that prescribes only one version of futurity, a futurity – I argue – that is constructed upon abjection of cripness. To open critical discussion I propose that we need to continue to produce untidy, crooked, queer, twisted, bent, crip versions of pasts. Only they will provide for more generous horizons of the present and future.

#### No perms in a method debate – a] It assumes fiat which doesn’t make sense. Their ROB forefronts the performance and method which a perm steals away b] non-T affs can defend anything – the burden is on them to prove their advocacy is the best solution to their problem c] you should hold them to the method they defended in the 1AC since anything else is severance which endorses bad scholarship as it’s a debate of methods.

#### D] it omits disability as an identity and attempts to accommodate disability cements its position as an afterthought while replicating the logic of fast capitalism.

Dolmage ‘13

[Jay, English at University of Waterloo. June 2013. “Disability Time-Space Economy.” <http://disabilitycapitalism.wordpress.com/author/drjaydolmage/>] rc/Pat

The steep steps metaphor describes how the University has been constructed as a place for the very able. University campuses have lots of steep steps – but the entire university experience can also be metaphorized as a movement up steep steps. The University pulls some people slowly up the stairs, and it arranges others at the bottom of this steep incline. The university also "steps" our society, reinforcing hierarchies and divisions. For instance, people with disabilities have been traditionally seen as objects of study in higher education, rather than as teachers or students. And disability has been a rhetorically-produced stigma which could be applied to other marginalized groups to keep them out of the university (and away from access to resources and privileges). My second spatial metaphor is the retrofit. A retrofit, like a ramp on a building or a new air filter on a car, is often forced or mandated. Another aspect of the retrofit is that it is a stop-gap measure—this leads to the entailment that a retrofit can, in fact should, be given low priority. Thus, as a building is retro-fitted to accommodate disability, as per the ‘specs’ of disability law, ramps are added onto the side of a building, or around back, instead of at the main entrance. The law calls for reasonable accommodation. Common reason then seems to dictate that disability is supplemental to society, that it is an after-thought or an imposition. In some cases, a retro-fitting can be useful, —just as an elevator or a ramp might enable mobility. It is important, however, to recognize that the retrofit is often only an ‘after-the-fact’ move because ‘the facts’ refuse to recognize disability as a reality, or ‘the factors’ cast disability as a strategy, or ‘the benefactors’ claim accessibility not as everyone’s right, but as their opportunity to provide charity, or even as an opportunity to construct people with disabilities as drains on resources. So, I'd suggest that the steep steps are an apt metaphor for industrial capitalism. We compete to get to the top. The stairs describe the class structure that capitalist production creates. We believe that if we work hard we will be rewarded, or at least we will accumulate wealth. And so on. Well, let me suggest that the retrofit is a logic of late capitalism. That is, the retrofit points up the inadequacy of capitalism’s ability to deal with various crises of its own making and other long-term structural problems, even as capitalism forever adapts. The retrofit is also a logic of fast capitalism – fast capitalism is the tendency of capitalism to extract surplus value with as little investment as necessary for the greatest return, while adding as little to the real economy as possible, often by means of financial speculation and the quickening of production. Yet what gets produced gets less and less tangible, harder to measure. This fast capitalism is seen by some as the necessary consequence of capitalism – it keeps speeding up, keeps extracting value, keeps becoming more efficient, and continues to exact more and more affective and embodied – and environmental – costs. Like fast capitalism, the retrofit marketizes philanthropy and charity – the industry of temporarily correcting or normalizing disability is massive, one of the largest and fastest growing industries in our modern world, encompassing global pharmaceutical and biotechnology corporations, as well as architects and lawyers and even educational “specialists.” Like fast capitalism, the retrofit offers only a quick and temporary fix to critical socio-political and economic conditions, and it does so with a fix that offers next-to-nothing of practical use. Ironically, the embodied result of fast capitalism is often a slow, durational, diffuse form of disablement. In terms of rights and access for those other bodies that our society has deemed marginal, the retrofit as a logic of late capitalism might actually ensure what Lauren Berlant calls “slow death”: “a zone of temporality [...] of ongoingness, getting by, and living on, where the structural inequalities are dispersed, the pacing of their experience intermittent, often in phenomena not prone to capture by a consciousness organized by archives of memorable impact" (759). In plainer language, slow death keeps people stuck, keeps us asking for small concessions, while the impact and cost of injustice remains invisible. Slow death through “accommodation” and the supplemental logic of the retrofit would not be a way of “defining a group of individuals merely afflicted with the same ailment, [but rather] slow death describes populations marked out for wearing out" (Berlant 760). This also connects to what Rob Nixon calls "slow violence." The economics of slow violence are as follows: "practices have heightened capitalism's innate tendency to abstract in order to extract, intensifying the distancing mechanisms that make the sources of environmental violence harder to track" (41). Scholars of environmental justice have shown, for instance, that the world is not polluted equally, and the impacts of pollution and contamination are often difficult to track and quantify; others like Stacy Alaimo have shown how capitalistic consumption itself, in its quest for the new, have turned even affluent domestic spaces toxic; and we have new data showing how directly connected disability is to things like food insecurity. We have a very complicated, very slow drama unfolding in which people with disabilities are marked out for wearing out by fast capitalism – but also in which late capitalism disables other groups who are also marked out. I am going to argue that we need to connect these ideas of late capitalist "slow death" or environmental "slow violence" also to the idea of abeyance. Abeyance comes from an old French word that means "gaping." Abeyance is a state of temporary suspension, a position of waiting and of being without. Ephraim Mizruchi, in his landscape work Regulating Society, shows how abeyance organizations have certain properties that allow them to absorb, control, and expel personnel according to the number of status positions available in the larger society (17). The continued struggle to fight for small accommodations for people with disabilities also ensures that people with disabilities are held in abeyance, held in a holding pattern. What we have seen over the past 150 years of disability history is that, during periods of economic collapse or downturn, people with disabilities are the first to be constructed as drains or threats – Susan Schweik's work on Ugly Laws, or David Serlin's history of postwar prosthetics shows how industrial capitalism picked up or put down disabled bodies according to its needs. The ways in which disability is socially constructed in contemporary society can also be seen as, from top-to-bottom, in service of or at least very useful for this capitalist abeyance: disability is an object of charity rather than part of the social contract, the disabled body must be made productive or expendable, exhibited or warehoused for profit, the disability itself must be easily monetized – all of these things ensure that disability can be easily controlled in order absorb or expel citizens from status positions. Liat Ben Moshe's work on disability and incarceration powerfully shows one such way this abeyance works from below. And the Canadian University is another perfect example of such an abeyance organization utilizing disability abeyance, ostensibly "from above." Each of the following facts contribute to this function, in a large tangle: Only 11% of Canadians with disabilities have postsecondary degrees, half of the national average. So the University sorts the population by ability already. This leads to the next fact… Universities always-already function as abeyance mechanisms for the entire population – keeping certain groups of individuals out of the work force and away from status positions, and not just through admissions. For instance, when joblessness rises, more students go to grad school or add second and third degrees or specialized skills. The University is a sorting gate but also a holding pen. This leads to the next fact… Because this abeyance impact is doubled for students with disabilities because it takes them at least 25% longer to complete the same degree requirements as non-disabled students. And of course this statistic is skewed because this only accounts for the students who receive accommodations. The stat I'd really like to see (that I'm sure we'd all like to see) is the overall retention rate for all students with disabilities regardless of documentation or accommodation, and the amount of extra time and effort it takes to seek accommodations or create them yourself. This leads to the next fact… Those who do seek accommodations are likely to have up to 60% more student debt by the time they do graduate. This leads to the next fact… Only 2% of Canadian students actually seek disability accommodations and – unbelievably – 8% of Canadian colleges or universities have reported having no students with disabilities at all. The simple extrapolation tells us that at least 100,000 and probably more like 200,000 Canadian postsecondary students need accommodations but never seek them. And this connects to the next fact… Those who do seek accommodations are twice as likely to do so only in their third or fourth year of school. And this all needs to be connected to the fact that… There are barely more than 200 professionals employed to provide disability accommodations at Canadian colleges and universities, and so the rough staff-to-student ratio or "caseload" is somewhere between 1:125 to 1:250. This also tells the rest of the University that disability doesn't matter. At my own University there are five times as many counsellors to help students find the right co-op placements as there are actual counsellors for student mental health. But the structural details are just one part of this picture – the abeyance mechanisms reach down into the everyday as well – because the process of seeking accommodations for those students who actually do try to do so is also a form of slow academic death or "wearing out." For most students who seek accommodations for our classes, they aren't allowed to know what the actual range of accommodations might be. Instead, they have to go into Disability Services, offer up their diagnosis, and have that diagnosis matched with a stock set of accommodations. In other exchanges, students might be asked by disability services to "tell us what you need" – and again students have to guess. Just imagine how much further this disadvantages students from other cultures, first-generation college and university students, and other students who might not fully understand the culture of higher education. As an aside, a student once summarized the accommodation process as being like the game Battleship – you can't see what's on the other side of the board, because there is a barrier there, and so you have to just keep trying to guess where the other player's ships are – or where the relevant accommodations are, if they exist. I think that is a great metaphor. As another aside, another game I have associated with the retrofitted accommodation is Whack-a-Mole. Whack-a-Mole is a carnival game in which the player has a hammer. In front of the player, there is a table full of holes. The object of the game is to literally whack the small furry animatronic moles that pop up in the holes in front of us. Well, disability has become the Whack-a-Mole of higher education. When disability pops up, we slap it with a quick accommodation, and we just hope it doesn't pop up again. When a student seeks accommodations, we treat them according to the cliché about Las Vegas: what accommodations happen for this student, stay with this student; what accommodations happen in this class, stay in this class. The nature of the “retrofitted” accommodation requires that we make no lasting changes to our pedagogy or to the culture of the university. Just whack it whenever it pops up. When disability is seen as something "suffered" by a very few, and otherwise invisible and non-present, then disability can never change the culture of higher education, and higher education will continue to wear out students with disabilities, and even to hold disability itself in abeyance. Here is a provocative question: what if the college or university is the key space, the key economic mechanism, where disability is delayed, discouraged, and diverted from changing the world?

#### Debate mandates endless ability checks, internalized ableism and psychic violence. The ROB is to reject ableism – we have to upset standards.

Richter 15. Zahari Richter is a Policy Debate Coach, is a Ph.D. Candidate in Communications and has a Master’s in Disability Studies. <https://stimstammersandwinks.blogspot.com/2015/01/conditions-of-judgment-ableist-ranking.html> “[Conditions of Judgment: Ableist ranking structures in educational and political environments](https://stimstammersandwinks.blogspot.com/2015/01/conditions-of-judgment-ableist-ranking.html)” “///” indicates paragraphs Language edited NT 17

While **rhetorical arenas are** commonly **cast as equalizing playing fields**, there is a way in which even the socratic can **yield to the authoritarian**. If we think of disability as a relationship defined in part by the terrain of normativity and in part by individual traits, one must recognize how **the entrance of an impaired body into an elitist highly competitive academic space necessarily entails the focusing of micro-aggressions onto such a body**, both in the structure of normative communications and in the framing of intellectual worth by efficiency. /// If one considers the design of political and scholarly competitive environments, one imagines two gazes through which players are evaluated. The first type of evaluation considers the intellectual performance of the player. The second evaluation monitors interpersonal conduct. /// I will call the first evaluative frame "pedagogical judgment" to reference how performance of ability as well as intellect are measured according to valuable and worthlessness. /// The second frame will be called "interpersonal judgment" to reference how performances of normative sociality are graded according to their closeness to pregiven notions of how the social should be played in various instances. /// The dual conditions of pedagogical and interpersonal judgment, as a **grids of meaning that are projected across bodies** as a function of a designed organizational structure, cooperate in the production of educational spaces as gesturally normative as well as intellectually normative. /// **Gestural as well as intellectual normativities** act as a net around which **atypical** or disruptive **embodiments are captured and disciplined**. On a social level, the truth of intellect is captured in good habits and appearances, but the multiplicity of types of intelligence may be forgotten about. Similarly, the standardization of gestural economies is a well known falsity, as different cultures require different emotional responses to situations. /// Conditions of **judgment set a value to bodies**, based on their ability to pass an inspection or to fulfill a given criteria. A condition of judgment can thus only isolate one aspect or strand of the complexity of human functioning. A condition of judgment is necessary to grade someone accord to hierarchies, but it is also a condition of peril. Competitions thrive on failure: the loss of a debater feeds **debate as an elite culture**. **To exist in debate is to constantly answer numerous ability checks positively**. /// It may thus be possible to view [understand] conditions of judgment as an **ableist emanation from the origin of professionalism**, which raised the rank of professionals whose bureaucratic trials achieved apparent value. In a condition of judgment, the body becomes paralyzed **[incapacitated] by** two sets of **institutional limitations**. Disablement is not merely a spatial or economic process but is a process in teaching limbs and lips and bodies to move properly. **Disabled bodies must labor** **to** ensure that their voices, their bodies, their words will **not fall out of synch.** To **suppress the wildness that hides in the body**, in such instances, the containment of the self is an additional extra labor and **the appearance of** **disability connotes a debt**. **Self-containment is** thus an additional **endless debt that disables impaired bodies**. In having to pay penance for our burdensome conditions, we learn to accept less than ideal circumstances. /// Multiple modes of subversion exist. One of such normative ways of rebelling is disaffiliation. In abandoning and repatriating from the intellectual or interpersonal standards, it may be possible to self-represent in the opposite standards or unevenly distribute resources to gain an advantage. **The most resistant option is to** endeavor to **change the terms of the standards themselves**, the bars that **force a representation of ableness for entrance into normativities**. In the speech or **invocation of other possible worlds**, if it can be heard, others may gather. The establishment of a communal stake in a new group identity upsets the apparatus by which integration appears as the only option. **Upsetting ableist assimilation** will bring many others who resigned to hermetically life in opposition into a possible alliance with you. ///

## 4

#### CP Text – ????

#### The 1AC’s semiotic coherence within the world is sutured through a western model of scriptocentrism that is exclusionary and violent towards racialized bodies

Conquergood, Dwight. Cultural struggles: Performance, ethnography, praxis. University of Michigan Press, 2013. (a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University)//Elmer

According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a **hallmark of Western imperialism**. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulator)' powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., **green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders**—what de Certeau calls "intextuation": "Ever)' power, including **the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects"** (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the "undocumented" immigrants, the so-called "il- legal aliens," known in the vernacular as the people "sin papeles," the people without papers, indocitmentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble "the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141). **The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined.** Transcrip- tion is not a **transparent or politically innocent model for** conceptualizing or **engaging the world**. The root metaphor of the text underpins the **supremacy of Western knowledge systems** by **erasing** the vast realm of human **knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered,** "a history of the tacit and the habitual" (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean ComarofFpay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors "both verbally and nonverbally" (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and strug- gle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comarofis intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where "text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all" (1992:26). "In this day and age," they ask, "do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage **cannot speak at all? Or**, under greater or lesser duress, **opt not to** do so" (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

#### Our method of opacity refuses the trade of images which disrupts the semiocapitalist drive towards hypervisualization.

**Steinmann 15** [Catherine A. Steinmann (THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA). “Visceral Exposure: Melanie Gilligan, Hito Steyerl, and the Biopolitics of Visibility”. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies (Art History) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver). March 2015. Accessed 11/29/20. <https://open.library.ubc.ca/media/download/pdf/24/1.0135689/1> //Houston Memorial DX]

In her 2007 essay “Documentary Uncertainty,” Hito Steyerl recounts a story in which she watched a CNN broadcast during the first days of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In that segment, a correspondent riding in an armored vehicle jubilantly held a broadcast cell phone camera out the window, exclaiming that this type of live broadcast had never before been seen. He was right, Steyerl avers, but only because the low-resolution images showed nothing more than largely illegible green and brown blotches slowly moving across the screen. For Steyerl, what she calls the “abstract documentarism” of these blurred, poor images mirrors the uncertain reality of contemporary life: Actually, the picture looked like the camouflage of combat fatigues; a military version of abstract expressionism. What does this type of abstract documentarism tell us about documentarism as such? It points at a deeper characteristic of many contemporary documentary pictures: the more immediate they become, the less there is to see. The closer to reality we get, the less intelligible it becomes.112 For Steyerl, poor images such as these embody the “uncertainty principle of modern documentarism,”113 a genre that generates meaning more through how it is organized and how it circulates than what it represents—a form of abstract documentarism appropriate for an era in which political representation has become abstract and blurred. In her later essay “In Defense of the Poor Image” (2009), Steyerl elaborates on the poor image. For her, the poor image is a low-res image, a compressed, corrupted copy of a copy, always in motion, gradually deteriorating. Because it is constantly ripped, reproduced, remixed, reformatted, and re-edited, “the poor image tends towards abstraction,” she writes. “It is a visual idea in its very becoming.”114 Although Steyerl, who often refers to critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin as inspiration in her written work, does not mention Benjamin in “In Defense of the Poor Image,” her essay clearly owes a debt to his text The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility (1936), in which Benjamin considers originals in relation to copies, to copies of copies, and subsequent iterations. As Daniel Rourke notes, for Benjamin, the copy detracts from the aura of the original, yet the copy’s own aura, as it propagates, remains stable, “actually heightened in a system of ever-poorer repetitions and redisplays.”115 At one level, Steyerl’s defense of the blurred or poor image, much like her Strike videos, appears as a critique of increasingly oppressive regimes of visual representation—for example, of the slick, smooth surfaces of the images of high-end advertising. It also anticipates the collective desire the artist would articulate yet another two years later, in her 2012 essay “The Spam of the Earth: Withdrawal from Representation” (as we saw in chapter two), to become invisible in an era of mass paparazzi and exhibitionist voyeurism in which “the flare of photographic flashlights turns people into victims, celebrities, or both.”116 Her championing of the low-res, degraded image also can be interpreted as a protest against the larger regime that information-rich images participate in—the regime that, since mid-2013, when Edward Snowden first came forward in public with revelations about NSA surveillance and data collection, has been popularly called “Big Data”; 117 this is a regime always seeking to learn more, to gather more information, to represent us as so many data points. In a sentence that brings to mind both the breaking down of human subjects into the data sets and the fractal-recombinant info-commodities that, as we have seen, Franco “Bifo” Berardi describes as the building blocks of semiocapital, Steyerl writes: “As we register at cash tills, ATMs, and other checkpoints—as our cellphones reveal our slightest movements and our snapshots are tagged with GPS coordinates—we end up not exactly amused to death but represented to pieces.”118 Reading between the lines in Steyerl’s text, we see that the poor image thus suggests a second kind of abstraction. If the poor image is in the first place formally abstract in being blurred or in containing less data, in the second, it also enacts a strategy of withdrawal in the spirit of the Latin abstrahere, which, as curator Maria Lind notes, means “to withdraw”: It tends toward a politically useful opacity that resists a culture of open surveillance, of oppressive transparency.119 Here, abstraction embodies the principle of “less data,” and the withdrawal and visual opacity it entails emerge as a subset of a larger impulse that can be observed among artists working in today’s milieu of ultraefficient data gathering and transmission: to reject the culture of “information”— information that describes, represents, and constitutes the contemporary subject, thereby controlling it. As the writer and curator Anthony Huberman observes in his essay “I (not love) information,” whereas conceptual artists in the 1960s and 1970s, attracted to “the raw blankness of information, which they saw as a powerful opponent to the tyranny of ‘content’,” embraced information as a means of stepping away from the modernist project,120 artists working in the period of late post-Fordism seek instead to disrupt information, “to compromise the way information clings to their practice and identities.”121 Today, Huberman holds, information has become poisonous. Instead of offering us freedom, it has become an addiction: “Like all drugs, information takes hold of everything, surrounds it, swallows it, clings to it, bludgeons it and spits it back out.”122 In formulating abstraction as a kind of opacity or retreat from hypervisualization, Steyerl’s work thus can be situated within a larger contemporary trajectory of flight from description. At yet another level, Steyerl’s 2009 “defense of the poor image” points to both the image that can no longer claim to represent and to a reality that cannot be represented in traditionally indexical images. The poor image is less about what the image shows than what it does, how it moves, what encounters it has. This is an image that no longer refers to “the real thing—the originary original,” she writes. “Instead, it is about its own real conditions of existence: about swarm circulation, digital dispersion, fractured and flexible temporalities. It is about defiance and appropriation just as it is about conformism and exploitation. In short: it is about reality.”123 Once again reading between the lines in Steyerl’s text, we can consider the poor image abstract in a third sense: It has been wrested—in other words, abstracted— from its original contexts of production and use and thrust into circulation, and its indexical role is lost. It now functions as what Berardi refers to as a fractal-recombinant fragment of semiocapital. In his book After the Future, Berardi argues that fragmentation and recombination (which I discussed in chapter two) are both abstract and biopolitical, with profound implications for the subject: Recombination is the (informational and biopolitical) technique that transforms the activity of individual brains in an abstract productive continuum. The individual brain can act effectively only through the recombinant modality: functional recombination of fragments of cognitive labor scattered in time and space, but functionally unified inside the Net.124 In the new globalized network of semiocapital, he asserts, workers have been replaced with “an infinite brain-sprawl, an ever-changing mosaic of fractal cells of available nervous energy.” Here, the worker or “person” is reduced to mere precarious residue.125

## 5

#### We advocate for the entirety of the aff absent their citateion of Baudrillard.

#### Baudrillard has consistently displayed orientalist and racist representations of Asian peoples.

**Krishna 93**, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 1993 [Sankaran, Alternatives, Summer, p. 403-404]

Consider Baudrillard. Besides his facile equation of "traditional" with "primitive" in his discussion of the Third World,'" he also notes the following: The [womxn] women of Thailand are so beautiful that they have become the hostesses of the Western world, sought after and desired everywhere for their grace, which is that of a submissive and affectionate femininity of nubile slaves—now dressed by Dior—an astounding sexual come-on in a gaze which looks you straight in the eye and a potential acquiescence to your every whim. In short, the fulfillment of Western men's dreams. Thai women seem spontaneously to embody the sexuality of the Arabian Nights, like the Nubian slaves in ancient Rome. Thai men, on the other hand, seem sad and forlorn; their physiques are not in tune with world chic.... What is left for these men but to assist in the universal promotion of their [womxn]women for high- class prostitution?" The Orientalist and racist nature of this passage hardly deserves elaboration." Similarly the "Third World" is a largely forgotten area in the writings of a Lyotard whose essentialized distinctions between Orient and Occident in terms of "the most highly developed societies" versus the primitive societies serve as an example of such a politics of forgetting."

# AC

### Presumption

#### 1. Vote neg to vote aff – I know this is an awful argument, but it destroys the semiotic economy of debate –they’re gonna say “vote aff to vote neg to vote aff” – but

#### a. their automative response to this shows they can’t escape the normative debate techne, which is another double turn with Baudrillard’s idea of communicative exchange as the mode of production

#### b. any attempt to create exclusivity of their position is an attempt to draw a distinction between signifier and signified which links back into systems of meaning they critique.

#### c. voting aff is an active action – requiring the judge to rationalize their RFD and contradicts the passivity in the face of communication. Instead, vote for me and just don’t give an RFD.

#### 2. The only reason negation is good is because it can’t be exchanged within economies of meaning – but they ask for a ballot as recognition by the judge or topic – you can vote neg to subtract the ballot from the 1AC even if you think the aff is a good idea.

#### 3. Nothing about the aff is new or interesting – half these cards were stolen from Mich KM who were knockoffs of Loyola EM– there’s no endpoint

4. What parts of the 1AC were transformative or anti-capitalist? The parts where they read established scholars, using standard citational practices? Or the parts where they organized cards into a conventional 1AC and used NSDA Campus’s servers to broadcast?

5. Ballot not key---competitive incentives dilute solvency and permit affirming Coppell’s scholarship without tying it to external action. Nothing leaves Zoom Room 104 other than a winner and a loser

#### 6. No evidence for the power of the ballot – debate specific – negate on presumption.

Ritter 13 [Michael, JD UTexas Law, B.A. cum laude Trinity University. September 2013. “Overcoming the Fiction of ‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s to Learn From 2Pac’s Changes?” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9896ec\_8b2b993ec42440ecaab1b07645385db5.pdf]

Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “competitive interscholastic debate” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, none of the many academics who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support the social change fiction. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted.

#### 7] cx was embarrassing

### Proper

#### Baudrillard’s relativism justifies ignoring atrocities – conflict is real, denying it is worse.

Every ‘7

[Peter, Department of Computing at Coventry University. “The Fascination Payload: Cultural Studies and the first Gulf War.” <http://www.academia.edu/6175231/The_Fascination_Payload_Cultural_Studies_and_the_First_Gulf_War>] pat

Jean Baudrillard chose the occasion of the Gulf Conflict to extend his thesis that global society is so caught in the grip of media simulation that its connection with reality has, once and for all, been severed: “Just a couple of days before war broke out in the Gulf, one could find Baudrillard regaling readers of the Guardian newspaper with an article which declared that this war would never happen, existing as it did only as a figment of mass media simulation, war‐games rhetoric or imaginary scenarios beyond all limits of real‐world, factual possibility” (Norris: 11) In choosing to concentrate on the undeniably manifest talk of war and foregrounding the role of strategic simulation whilst, simultaneously, refusing to engage in an account of events beyond the media, Jean Baudrillard was able to construct the case that a war conducted at a distance would be, of necessity, a matter of pure speculation and simulation: “Exchanging war for the signs of war” (Baudrillard 1994: 62). Written in to this article, almost as a fail‐safe device against the collapse of his contention, was an interdiction against the ability of anyone to make a claim to know the truth of the situation. For, in Baudrillard’s eyes, such a claim would be “banking on a realist ontology that clung to some variant of the truth/falsehood or fact/fiction dichotomy” (Norris: 13). A claim that would be forever stuck in nostalgia for some ultimate truth telling discourse (or metalanguage) ‐ offering a delusory refuge from the “knowledge that we are nowadays utterly without resources in the matter of distinguishing truth from falsehood” (ibid: 13). This is akin to Richard Rorty’s position in “Contingency, Irony and Solidarity” in which: “To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human language, and that human languages are human creations. Truth cannot be out there ‐ cannot exist independently of the human mind ‐ because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there”. (q.v. Sprinkler: 125) The ethical consequences of such linguistic relativism can be seen when one compares Baudrillard or Rorty’s position to that of revisionist historian Robert Faurrison. Faurrison claimed that as there were no surviving ‘eye witnesses’ to Nazi gas chambers there would, ultimately, be no way of confirming those chamber’s existence. These consequences became more evident as events unfolded in the Gulf. Outbreaks of the real – Virilio’s ‘interruptions’ – such as the bombing of the El Almiriyah air raid shelter (no matter how mediated or explained away by military spokespeople) could not disguise the fact that people, civilians, actually died. There were eye‐witness survivors. Baudrillard’s take on the fact/fiction dichotomy began to look decidedly sickening: “There will be nobody in a position to know what they are seeing, reading or hearing is not some fictive ‘simulacrum’ of the real, conjured up by the ubiquitous propaganda machine or the various techniques of media disinformation” (Norris: 12) To go down the road, like Baudrillard, of a fictive conspiracy theory in which images of death at El Almiriyah were nothing more than the a highly competent, cinematically constructed, simulation is surely stretching the limits of credibility. If contemporary truth is, according to this post‐modern critical line, only a matter of rhetorical or suasive force then El Almiriya was the point at which Baudrillard’s “(un)truth claim” lost its own persuasive appeal – breaking the bounds of virtually every consensual notion of reality. Despite this, following the conflict, Baudrillard was minded to publish an article entitled “La Guerre du Golfe n’a pas en lieu” (The Gulf War did not take place) in Liberation ‐ An extract of which was published in The Guardian. In the article he conceded that “this ‘simulated’ war has not been entirely a product of mass media illusionist techniques; that large numbers of Iraqi conscripts and civilians had been killed by the Allied aerial bombardment; that massive damage had been inflicted on the country’s infrastructure” (Norris: 192). Nevertheless, none of the ‘facts’ had persuaded him to drop his original contention that the war had predominantly existed as a virtual construct: “If we have no practical knowledge of this war ‐ and such knowledge is out of the question ‐ then let us at least have the sceptical intelligence to reject the probability of all information, of all images whatever their source. To be more ‘virtual’ than the events themselves, not to re‐establish some criterion of truth ‐ for this we lack the means” (q.v. Norris 194). With this Baudrillard maintains a strict adherence to the notion of the impossibility of veridical knowledge. And herein lays his paradox ‐ that in the same article he can admit the ‘facts’ as regards casualties whilst denying any means of ascertaining their truth. Admitting knowledge and the impossibility of knowledge, in the same breath, is a logical error ‐ both cannot be true.

#### Baudrillard over-totalizes and is western centric

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One limit to Baudrillard’s theory is his tendency to over-totalise. Baudrillard is talking about tendential processes, but he often talks as if they are totally effective. There are still, for instance, a lot of uncharted spaces, a lot of unexplained events, a lot of things the system can’t handle. While Baudrillard is describing dominant tendencies in the present, these tendencies coexist with older forms of capitalism, in a situation of uneven development. The persistence of the system’s violence is a problem for Baudrillard’s perspective: the smooth regime of neutralisation and inclusive regulation has notended older modalities of brutality. At times, Baudrillard exaggerates greatly the extent to which the old authoritarian version of capitalism has been replaced by subtle regimes of control. He exaggerates the extent to which contemporary capitalism is tolerant, permissive and ‘maternal’. This may be because his works were mostly written in France in the 1970s-80s, when the dominant ethos was still largely social-democratic. What Baudrillard recognises as the retrograde version of capitalism associated with the right-wing was to return with a vengeance, especially after 911. Another problem is a lack of a Southern dimension. Like many Northern authors, Baudrillard’s approach mainly applies to the functioning of capitalism in the North. The penetration of the code is substantially less in countries where information technology is less widespread. In parts of Africa, even simple coding exercises such as counting votes or recording censuses are extremely difficult. This is for the very reasons of respondent reflexivity which Baudrillard highlights. People will under-record themselves to stay invisible, or over-record themselves to obtain benefits. And without massive resources to put into its bureaucracies, the system is unable to find enough people who will act as transmitters for the code. Instead, people use their power to extract what they can from the system. Explosions still happen regularly in the South. Furthermore, a contracting system ‘forcibly delinks’ large portions of the globe. Its power on the margins is lessened as its power at the core is intensified. As the system becomes ever more contracted and inward-looking, liberated zones may appear [around the edges](http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/Anonymous__Desert.html). Without an element of border thinking, Baudrillard tends to exaggerate the system’s completeness and effectiveness. Baudrillard assumes that any excess is everywhere absorbed into the code. He ignores the persistence of borderlands. And when he talks about the South, he admits that the old regime of production might still exist here: people still work seeking betterment; colonial wars are fought to destroy persisting symbolic exchange; Saddam was not playing the Gulf War by the rules of deterrence. The Arab masses are still able to become inflamed by war or non-war; Iran and Iraq can still fight a real war, not a simulated non-war. So perhaps only a minority, only thse included layers within the North, are trapped within simulation and the ‘masses’. Perhaps reality has not died, but been displaced to the South. It seems, therefore, premature to suggest that the system has encompassed all of social life in the code. To be sure, its reach has expanded, but it has also forcibly delinked large areas of the globe. The penetration of simulated reality into everyday life varies in its effectiveness. At the limit, as in Somalia, simulated states collapse under their own irrelevance. In other cases, an irrelevant state hovers over a largely autonomous society. And the struggle Baudrillard advocated in his early works against subordination as labour-power is not simply theoretical. In fact, there is a constant war, fought at various degrees of intensity, between the system and its others, especially in highly marginal parts of the global South: Chiapas, Afghanistan, the Niger Delta, Somalia, West Papua, rural Colombia, Northeast India, the Andes.

#### Hyper-Reality isn’t true, it’s unfalsifiable, and the Alt Fails

TlMOTHY W. LUKE 91 [\*], Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Power and politics in hyperreality: The critical project of Jean Baudrillard. By: Luke, Timothy W., Social Science Journal, 03623319, 1991, Vol. 28, Issue 3, Ebsco //Elmer

Baudrillard's critical project clearly outlines a fascinating and innovative appraisal of the often confusing and contradictory tendencies in contemporary society that are usually labelled as "postmodernity." Nonetheless, there are considerable weaknesses as well as great strengths in Baudrillard's system of analysis. The tenacity of "reality" or "modernity" in several spheres of everyday life, for example, often still overshadows "hyperreality." Thus, it seems that Baudrillard's major flaw is mistaking a handful of incipient developments or budding trends for a full-blown or completely fixed new social order. The total break with all past forms of social relations cannot be verified either from within or from outside of Baudrillard's frameworks. While he denies finding much systematicity in hyperreal capitalism and sees the end of "production" and "power" in the rise of seduction, Baudrillard still clings to the image of a powerful exploitative system in his call to the masses to recognize "that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic."( n21) This twist in his thinking raises important questions. Why does a social order that no longer really exists need his theoretical intervention to be transformed by mass resistance **if it is not real**, powerful or productive? Likewise, if the history of power and production has ended, then why does Baudrillard envision today's best radical opposition to capital and the state assuming the form of hyperconformity by pushing "the system" into a hyperlogical practice of itself to induce the crisis that might abolish it?¶ On the other hand, Baudrillard's strategy of "hyperconformity," as a means of radical resistance, does not seriously challenge the consumerist modes of domination intrinsic to transnational corporate capitalism. Moreover, its ties to consumer subjectivity do not even begin to address other possible strategies of resistance following lines drawn by gender, race, ethnicity, language or ecology. Unlike Lyotard, he does not advance any new conceptions of postmodern justice or articulate alternative principles to represent meaningful narratives about values in hyperreality. Thus, Baudrillard also can be tarred with the brush of neoconservatism, like many other postmodernist critics of society.( n22) Baudrillard tends to misplace the concreteness of the relations that he is investigating, lumping everything into the category of "seduction" which, in turn, totally subsumes such complex factors as power, production, sex, and economy into one universal force. He claims somewhat contradictorily that "seduction . . . does not partake of the real order." Yet, at the same time, "seduction envelops the whole real process of power, as well as the whole real order of production, with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation--without which neither power nor production would even exist."( n23) While Baudrillard makes these claims, he never really demonstrates definitely how this all works with carefully considered evidence.