# Speech 1NC Colleyville Quarters vs Dulles 2-5 4PM

#### **The world relies on the fundamental opposition to disability to exist – disabled bodies are modeled as the inverse reflection to the normate which drives the internal ableism and desire to eliminate disabled bodies.**

**Hughes 12** [Bill Hughes (professor of Sociology at Glasgow Caledonian University, BA in sociology from the University of Stirling, PhD in political philosophy from the University of Aberdeen). 2012. Accessed 8/9/20. “Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People.” <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137023001_2> //Xu]

The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. The body produced by ableism is equivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as invulnerable and definitive. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’ (Shildrick, 2002: 51). It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’ (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), the epitome of civilisation, closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’ (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). Through ableism, modernity has been able to structure disability as uncivilised, outside or on the margins of humanity. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’ (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat. Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existen- tial basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death ... that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communica- tion and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness).

#### New affss bad-limited coping skills makes responding to new affirmatives contribute to stress and anxiety disorders that disproportionately affect populations with intellectual disability

**Miller 2008** (Michael L., Ph.D., university of Wyoming, “Teaching Relaxation Skills to Adults with Intellectual Disability and Generalized Anxiety Disorder” pg. 2)

Anxiety and Intellectual Disability **Emotional regulation** difficulties likely contribute to higher rates of psychopathology among people with intellectual disability in comparison to the typically developing population (Holden & Gitlesen, 2004). **The development and use of emotion regulation skills are strongly influenced by neurological, cognitive, and behavioral factors** (Calkins, 1994). People with intellectual disability are inherently susceptible to emotion regulation problems due to diffuse neurological damage (Becker, Armstrong, & Chan, 1986; Moser, 1999), cognitive impairment (APA, 2000), and **limited coping skills** (Gualtieri, Matson, & Keppel, 1989). Combined, **these deficits likely contribute to repeated experiences of stress, fear, confusion, and self-control problems** (Rojahn & Tasse, 1996). Not surprisingly**, people with intellectual disability exhibit anxiety disorders at higher rates than the general population** (Donaldson & Menolascino, 1977). In fact, approximately 25% of people with mild intellectual disability experience clinically significant levels of anxiety on a regular basis (Fahs, 1989; Menolascino, Levitas, & Greiner, 1986).

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#### The 1AC’s understanding of intelligibility operates on the terrain of fluency – crip failure forefronts disability as dysfluency in an unintelligible frame that interrupts those hegemonic processes.

St. Pierre 17 [Joshua St. Pierre, co-founder of the Did I Stutter Project, philosophy at University of Alberta. 2017. Accessed 11/30/20. “Becoming Dysfluent: Fluency as Biopolitics and Hegemony.” <https://online.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/abs/10.3828/jlcds.2017.26> //Xu]

Fluency as hegemony is constitutively wider than communicative practices, depicting the way that bodies are compelled to live within linear and uni-directional time that has no becoming. Yet communication highlights the sorts of oppressions that can result from fluent processes. Ableist “choreographies” of communication (St. Pierre “Distending”) regulate access to the present and shape who gets to participate within encounters. For example, Autistic people often process language at different rates and in different modes and are thus unable to “keep up” with the pace of fluent conversation in everyday social encounters. Without hitting the right cues and interjecting at the appropriate times, dysfluent and slow speakers are excluded from meaningful participation in shared time (see Paterson; St. Pierre “Construction”). From this perspective, disability politics are always, in part, a question of heterogeneous temporalities and differential rates of access that have been swept up in an unsustainable ableist beat. With this being said, dysfluency offers a critical response by questioning who can access, participate, and even belong within collective time. Tanya Titchkosky writes that “access is a way to orient to, and even come to wonder about, who, what, where, and when we find ourselves to be in social space” (3) and we might extend this analysis into a temporal register. Dysfluency calls from our relations not better communication skills, nor “understanding,” nor simply “more time,” but what we might term “responsiveness”: a reorientation towards the other through the body. The stubborn materiality of disability offers a resource for becoming responsive to one another and to our social situation, and responsiveness thus offers a way to imagine access as relation alongside the needed flexibility of crip time. Yet while the accelerated temporality of fluency has worrisome overt consequences in itself, it also hides a distinctly hegemonic function: fluency works to close the present moment such that nothing, in the existential sense, happens. Arendt is helpful at this junction, since her theory of “action,” by which she means the human capacity to begin something new, spontaneous, and thus transformative in the world, resonates in fruitful ways with dysfluency and crip politics. What defines the intersubjective process of action is precisely its unpredictability and its capacity to interrupt hegemonic social processes with a chain of unforeseeable consequences. Arendt, in this way, reads modern politics as an impulse toward closure and stability: The attempt to eliminate action because of its uncertainty and to save human affairs from their frailty by dealing with them as though they were or could become the planned products of human making has first of all resulted in channeling the human capacity for action…into an attitude toward nature which up to the latest stage of the modern age had been one of exploring natural laws and fabricating objects out of natural material. (230–31) Arendt has in mind the reduction of political action to bureaucratic management and the “fabrication” of the nation-state. Yet in a move that she would likely resist, we might also consider the chrononormative politics that seek to render action and its uncertainty inert within our intersubjective relations. During my daily commute a couple years ago a high school-aged girl with Down’s seated herself beside me on the crowded subway. As we started talking she quickly became aware of my dysfluent speech and accordantly asked if I, like her, had an aid in school. I was aware of the onlookers acutely uncomfortable with our public display of dysfluency that was rupturing the normalized social field and of the fluent impulse to disavow our relation: to reassert fixed identities and to align myself with able-bodiedness—“Why would I have an aid? My speech does not make me like you.” Instead, we just talked. Our shared dysfluency opened something new: a site of kinship and solidarity that modified an ableist social field and hegemonic ways of relating to ourselves and others. Fluency channelizes the human capacity for action within our communicative bodies to mitigate the possibilities of something aporetic interrupting the tractable passage of time. Yet what might happen if fluency didn’t govern our time and interactions? The impulse towards closure, the collapse of polyvocal access and engagement within the encounter, is ultimately an effort to render the present and its possibility for rupture utterly inert.4 I have suggested that neoliberal and postindustrial subjects are rendered governable and productive in part through technologies of closure that seek to collapse the encounter through a series of sutures enacted upon and through the body. Only by inscribing social order in our bodies and smoothing over/ disavowing the site of politics can compulsory able-bodiedness manifest as a stable, seamless, and natural field—everywhere and nowhere at once. “Compulsory able-bodiedness,” once again, “functions by covering over, with the appearance of a choice, a system in which there actually is no choice” (McRuer 8). While paraded around in discourses and practices like liberal eugenics, this “choice” is in fact covered by fluent processes that both disavow thick moments of collective access and judgment and that regulate and streamline the encounter to effectively exclude uncertainty and the voices of those most affected by ableist and eugenic logic. Ableist and eugenic ideology contribute to this “common ground” of disability oppression, the apparent consensus on the desirability of able-bodiedness, but ideology is always a secondary inscription: an echo of the material in the sphere of representation. Attention to fluency complicates strategies of resistance to hegemony. For example, while expanding the limits of subjective intelligibility (such as widening “sex” to account for non-dimorphic sexed bodies; or seeking cultural representation of disability) is a critical political intervention, we must recognize that intelligibility is always already a function of biopower. Foucault famously claimed that “the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are” (“The Subject and Power,” 134; emphasis added), and we must soberly ask whether we can refuse subjectivization fluently and whether fluency can unmake fluent, ableist ontologies. Is a “becoming-minority” or a “becoming-crip” possible without a “becoming-dysfluent”?5 Or in Foucault’s terms again, to “promote new forms of subjectivity [and intersubjectivity] through the refusal of this kind of individuality that has been imposed on us for centuries” (134) perhaps requires that we think beyond the individualizing effects of clarity, intelligibility, and closure that restrict the possibilities of crip lives and render us functions of fluent time. Dysfluency as Escape In conclusion, we might consider that for McRuer, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “disability” can refer to “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of bodily, mental, or behavioral functioning aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” (156–57). An attention to dysfluent voices as material enunciations offers one specific way to think about this crip excess, particularly as resistance to hegemony. Fluent voices presume to signify monolithically and thus anticipate and linearly sustain the givenness of what is—fluency must be decomposed for a crip politic to flourish. Yet while fluency may have the first word (my speech arrives always a hesitation), it certainly never has the last—the impulse of fluency is totalizing but “something always escapes!” (Beasley-Murray xxi). Chris Eagle has written that an attention to dysfluency within disability studies would “understand mastery over language as always already tenuous, fragile, and partial” (6) and we might in this way begin to imagine dysfluency not as a communicative “breakdown” but as a type of escape or, in Deleuzio-Guattarian terms, flight. In Lexicon of the Mouth: Poetics and Politics of the Voice and the Oral Imaginary, Brandon LaBelle suggests that by “considering interrupted speech, we enter into a politics of the mouth. By tripping over the word, stuttering evidences the deep performative drive of the mouth under the spell of the linguistic. It stumbles precisely over a syllable, a grammar, a phoneme; the mouth gasps along the fault lines of a given vocabulary, to lisp over words, and in doing so, raises the volume on the very question as to what constitutes ‘proper speech’” (139; emphasis added). I have always imagined LaBelle’s offhanded remark a playful engagement with the Germanic fable the “Pied Piper.” In many versions of this classic tale, the piper leads all but three of the entranced village children into the river to drown. These are three crips, in fact: the first, physically disabled who could not keep pace; the second, deaf, who like Odysseus who could not hear the piper’s song; and the third, blind. Only those transformed by disability could resist the irresistible, the linear pull into deep water. In a similar way, the spell of fluency lures and strings words from our mouths in the lock-and-file order of “proper speech,” intelligibility, and surplus value. To what world and what dangers does this straightening syntax lead? The crip mouth, on the other hand, stumbles over and along the major grammar. It cannot follow and in this excess forms a collective site of material agency that stubbornly resists the spell of the linguistic. Against the liberal sirens (those masters of consensus) the agential capacity of dysfluency lies precisely in its flight from understanding and intelligibility.

#### The fantasy of “fair play” and an “educational common” is an extension on eugenicist control masked under the guise of normalcy that enacts compulsory ablebodiedness that marks disabled bodies as unfit.

St. Pierre ’17 [Joshua St. Pierre, co-founder of the Did I Stutter Project, philosophy at University of Alberta. 2017. “Becoming Dysfluent: Fluency as Biopolitics and Hegemony.” <https://online.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/abs/10.3828/jlcds.2017.26> //Xu]

The concept of normalization describes the movement towards an average or equilibrium, the levelling out of group differences according to a common denominator (Ewald 154). The analytical tools clustered around “the norm” have, for good reasons, become a central pillar of contemporary disability theory. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson offered the “normate” in the mid-1990s as a depiction of a cultures’ “collective, unmarked, normative characteristics” (Extraordinary Bodies, 8), while Davis parsed “normalcy” as a Foucauldian, biopolitical category that emerged through the statistical and eugenic technologies of the mid-nineteenth century. Almost twenty years later, the analytic of normalcy has settled comfortably into the discourse, taken to be a political categorization used to manage human difference through biomedical, cultural, and political discourses, practices, and institutions. As Davis, McRuer, and Shelley Tremain argue (to cite just a few), normalcy is a distinctly statistical and ideological abstraction impossible to enflesh—to live out within our bodies. The imperative to think, perceive, relate, move, and communicate in ways codified as “normal” can only ever be approximated, and thus transgressed. But while normalcy is an important tool for critical disability studies, it can lose its utility when stretched too thin, when we require too much of it. One cannot expect the logic of normalcy to map perfectly the complexity of embodied difference as governed within late-liberal societies. Without effacing the concept of normalcy, I thus seek to draw attention to “fluency” as an intertwined force at work in the construction of ableist worlds, one that is co-articulated through the discourses of biopower and hegemony. Biopower is Foucault’s term for the governance of the life of a population that within liberal and late-liberal societies has predominantly taken the form of normalization. Hegemony, on the other hand, is the notion derived from the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci that, as Beasley-Murray glosses, “the state maintains its dominance (and that of social and economic elites) thanks to the consent of those it dominates. Where it does not win consent, this theory suggests, the state resorts to coercion” (x). Whereas normalization levels out group differences from the bottom-up through, for example, a field of comparative gazes, hegemony marks a seemingly top-down movement toward closure in the social order, the total absence of dispute within political spaces. These two concepts follow different theoretical trajectories, are often understood to mobilize incompatible views of power, and thus be incompatible in themselves (see Kreps). Yet they nevertheless converge in complex systems of oppression: in the context of disability, what McRuer terms “compulsory able-bodiedness.” For McRuer, able-bodiedness, like heterosexuality, is a compulsory yet impossible demand on our desires, energies, and materialities that must continually be reenacted and maintained. Compulsory able-bodiedness mobilizes a performance of normalcy, but for McRuer, this mobilization is clearly structured by a type of Gramscian logic. “Like compulsory heterosexuality,” he writes, “compulsory able-bodiedness functions by covering over, with the appearance of a choice, a system in which there actually is no choice” (8). Compulsory able-bodiedness obscures its operations of assembling consent such that, while the desirability of able-bodiedness is predisposed, it is offered as a simple choice within, for example, able-nationalist discourses of “inclusion” (Mitchell and Snyder, Biopolitics) or liberal eugenics (Agar). This false choice is expressed for McRuer in the seemingly unanimous answer to questions like: “Wouldn’t you rather be hearing?” or “Wouldn’t you rather see?” As McRuer argues, “The culture asking such questions assumes in advance that we all agree: able-bodied identities, able-bodied perspectives are preferable and what we all, collectively, are aiming for” (9; emphasis added). In other words, the hegemonic force and momentum of systems that simultaneously produce and exclude subjects of disability issues from an apparent consensus on the undesirability of disability. What is this agreement? Given that compulsory able-bodiedness emanates from everywhere and nowhere, it is perhaps more fruitful to parse this consensus through the mode by which compulsory able-bodiedness circulates and is translated across different ideas, practices, and institutions rather than isolating the specific sites where this consensus, this hegemony, is produced. For McRuer, “the experience of the able-bodied need for an agreed-on common ground” is a common experience that “links all people with disabilities under a system of compulsory able-bodiedness” (8), and I suggest that this “common ground” of disability oppression is a how as much as a where or a what. That is, a common ground is never just found, but must be cleared away and maintained with effort through time. “Fluency” can accordingly be understood as a technology operating at the intersection of biopower and hegemony that smooths over and straightens discontinuous semiotics, temporalities, and materialities to eliminate frictions within productive, biopolitical systems and thus secure social order within the material realm. An attention to fluency moves beyond the orthodox focus on ideology as the essential vehicle of hegemony to locate, alongside Jon Beasley-Murray’s notion of “posthegemony,” the production of consensus and the security of social order not within the realm of representation but the governance of bodies and life itself. Fluency attempts to regulate and collapse not merely the time between encounters, but the embodied time of encounter and access and judgment. Fluency attempts to cover over political spaces—to mitigate (when it cannot eliminate) interruption and disruption—thus facilitating in one move the rationalization and naturalization of embodied difference that seems to emanate from everywhere and nowhere, as if everyone agrees. But whatever else it may be, fluency is first a process enacted and lived within the material and corporeal. Here I start from the semiotic and expand outwards. The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes, tempos, dictions, and (racialized or disabled) accents that constitute practices of aural “communication” have become the objective domain of the biomedicalizing industry of Speech-Language Pathology. Barry Guitar, in his well-used textbook on speech impediments, offers an exemplary definition of fluency: “simply as the effortless flow of speech” (13). Yet there is hardly anything simple about this definition, which is offered amid caveats and backtracking. Guitar readily admits (12) that fluency is difficult to pin down and that researchers within Speech-Language Pathology often focus on what it is not—namely, dysfluency. There are a few characteristics: Fluent speech is marked by a lack of hesitation, and Speech-Language Pathology is forced to make (dubious and highly arbitrary) distinctions between “normal” and “abnormal” hesitations (Goldman-Eisler) since breaks and hesitations crop up in all speech. Fluent speech is marked by rhythmical (read: thoroughly normalized) patterning. Fluent speech is similarly marked by the lack of “extra sounds” interjected into culturally dominant phonetic patterns. Fluency is defined by the overall rate of speech, which includes not just the rate of vocal flow but of information flow (Starkweather). And lastly, fluency is often defined by a lack of “effort” on the part of the speaker; a conceit of mastery over language that highlights the twinned meaning of “fluency.” Transposing this definition into a critical register, the “effortless flow of speech” can be read as a coordinated—yet often strained—performance of bending the energies and capacities of bodies toward stable and univocal futures. Autistics are compelled to restrict stimming, to sit on their hands (to have “quiet hands,” Bascom), and thereby reroute bodily capacities to the smooth performance of so-called intelligible communication. Dyslexic bodies that process information piecemeal and slowly are forced out of social time (Cosenza 7). As Zach Richter has argued, the facial tics and erratic gestures of dysfluent speakers are likewise never communicative inflections, but are made abject and cast out of the communicative realm altogether by what I am here calling technologies of fluency. Tics of loud cursing and grunting from a public speaker with Tourette’s are imagined as an interruption to communication. Dysfluencies are erased from closed captions and courtroom transcripts. What is thus left is a univocal and fluid semiotic operation that instrumentalizes our relations with others. Or more precisely, if fluency is a type of Foucauldian technology, then the function of this biopolitical strategy is to regulate and focus the communicative event toward specific, technical ends through the logic of optimization and closure.

#### The impact is internalized ableism and psychological violence

Campbell 2008 (Fiona Kumari Campbell, disability author and professor at Griffith University, “Exploring internalized ableism using critical race theory” Disability and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, March 2008, 151–162 some words are edited within []) DR 16

**Foucault’s (1976; 1980) theorisation of power as productive may provide some offerings from which to build a conversation about internalised ableism**. I am not so much interested in the ‘external’ effects of that power, but for the moment wish to concentrate on what Judith Butler aptly refers to as **the ‘psychic life’ of power.** She describes this dimension: … an account of subjection, it seems, must be traced in the turns of psychic life. More specifically, **it must be traced in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes place in acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in tandem with processes of social regulation** (Butler, 1997b, p.19). In other words, **the processes of subject formation cannot be separated from the subject** him/**herself who is brought into being though those very subjectifying processes**. **The consequences of taking into oneself negative subjectivities not only regulate and continually form identity (the disabled citizen) but can transcend and surpass the strictures of ableist authorizations.** Judith **Butler describes this process of the “carrying of a mnemic trace**”: One need only consider the way in which **the history of having been called an injurious name is embodied, how the words enter the limbs, craft the gesture, bend the spine …how these slurs accumulate over time, dissimulating their history, taking on the semblance of the natural, configuring and restricting** the doxa that counts as “**reality**”. (Butler, 1997b, p. 159) The work of Williams and Williams-Morris (2000) links racism experienced by African Americans to the effects of hurtful words and negative cultural symbols on mental health, especially when **marginalized groups embrace negative societal beliefs about themselves.** They cite an international study by Fischer et al (1996) which inter alia links poor academic performance with poor social status. Although using different disciplinary language Wolfensberger (1972) in his seven core themes of SRV, identified role circularity as a significant obstacle to be overcome by disabled people wanting socially valued roles. **Philosopher** **Linda Purdy contends** it is important to resist conflating disability with the disabled person. She writes **My disability is not me**, no matter how much it may affect my choices. With this point firmly in mind, **it should be possible mentally to separate my existences from the existence of my disability**. (Purdy, 1996, p. 68). The problem with **Purdy’s conclusion** is that it is psychically untenable, not only because it **is posited around a type of Cartesian dualism that simply separates being-ness from embodiment**, **but also because this kind of reasoning disregards the dynamics of subjectivity formation** to which Butler (1997a; 1997b) has referred. **Whilst the ‘outputs’ of subjectivity are variable the experience of impairment within an ableist context can and does effect formation of self – in other words ‘disability is me’, but that ‘me’ does not need to be enfleshed with negative ontologies of subjectivity**. **Purdy’s ~~bodily~~ [fleshly] detachment appears locked into a loop that is filled with internalised ableism, a state with negative views of impairment, from which the only escape is ~~disembodiment~~; the penalty of denial is a flight** 12 **from her [flesh] ~~body~~.** **This finds agreement in the reasoning of** Jean **Baudrillard** (1983) **who posits that it is the simulation, the appearance (**representation) **that matters. The subject simulates what it is to be ‘disabled’ and by inference ‘abled’ and whilst morphing ableist imperatives, in effect performs a new hyper reality of be-ing disabled. By unwittingly performing ableism disabled people become complicit in their own demise – reinforcing impairment as an outlaw ontology.**

**The pragmatist conception of the commons is an extension on eugenicist control masked under the guise of normalcy that enacts compulsory ablebodiedness that marks disabled bodies as unfit for deliberation.**

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Biopower is Foucault’s term for the governance of the life of a population that within liberal and late-liberal societies has predominantly taken the form of normalization. Hegemony, on the other hand, is the notion derived from the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci that, as Beasley-Murray glosses, “the state maintains its dominance (and that of social and economic elites) thanks to the consent of those it dominates. Where it does not win consent, this theory suggests, the state resorts to coercion” (x). Whereas normalization levels out group differences from the bottom-up through, for example, a field of comparative gazes, hegemony marks a seemingly top-down movement toward closure in the social order, the total absence of dispute within political spaces. These two concepts follow different theoretical trajectories, are often understood to mobilize incompatible views of power, and thus be incompatible in themselves (see Kreps). Yet they nevertheless converge in complex systems of oppression: in the context of disability, what McRuer terms “compulsory able-bodiedness.” For McRuer, able-bodiedness, like heterosexuality, is a compulsory yet impossible demand on our desires, energies, and materialities that must continually be reenacted and maintained. Compulsory able-bodiedness mobilizes a performance of normalcy, but for McRuer, this mobilization is clearly structured by a type of Gramscian logic. “Like compulsory heterosexuality,” he writes, “compulsory able-bodiedness functions by covering over, with the appearance of a choice, a system in which there actually is no choice” (8). Compulsory able-bodiedness obscures its operations of assembling consent such that, while the desirability of able-bodiedness is predisposed, it is offered as a simple choice within, for example, able-nationalist discourses of “inclusion” (Mitchell and Snyder, Biopolitics) or liberal eugenics (Agar). This false choice is expressed for McRuer in the seemingly unanimous answer to questions like: “Wouldn’t you rather be hearing?” or “Wouldn’t you rather see?” As McRuer argues, “The culture asking such questions assumes in advance that we all agree: able-bodied identities, able-bodied perspectives are preferable and what we all, collectively, are aiming for” (9; emphasis added). In other words, the hegemonic force and momentum of systems that simultaneously produce and exclude subjects of disability issues from an apparent consensus on the undesirability of disability. What is this agreement? Given that compulsory able-bodiedness emanates from everywhere and nowhere, it is perhaps more fruitful to parse this consensus through the mode by which compulsory able-bodiedness circulates and is translated across different ideas, practices, and institutions rather than isolating the specific sites where this consensus, this hegemony, is produced. For McRuer, “the experience of the able-bodied need for an agreed-on common ground” is a common experience that “links all people with disabilities under a system of compulsory able-bodiedness” (8), and I suggest that this “common ground” of disability oppression is a how as much as a where or a what. That is, a common ground is never just found, but must be cleared away and maintained with effort through time. “Fluency” can accordingly be understood as a technology operating at the intersection of biopower and hegemony that smooths over and straightens discontinuous semiotics, temporalities, and materialities to eliminate frictions within productive, biopolitical systems and thus secure social order within the material realm. An attention to fluency moves beyond the orthodox focus on ideology as the essential vehicle of hegemony to locate, alongside Jon Beasley-Murray’s notion of “posthegemony,” the production of consensus and the security of social order not within the realm of representation but the governance of bodies and life itself. Fluency attempts to regulate and collapse not merely the time between encounters, but the embodied time of encounter and access and judgment. Fluency attempts to cover over political spaces—to mitigate (when it cannot eliminate) interruption and disruption—thus facilitating in one move the rationalization and naturalization of embodied difference that seems to emanate from everywhere and nowhere, as if everyone agrees. But whatever else it may be, fluency is first a process enacted and lived within the material and corporeal. Here I start from the semiotic and expand outwards. The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes, tempos, dictions, and (racialized or disabled) accents that constitute practices of aural “communication” have become the objective domain of the biomedicalizing industry of Speech-Language Pathology. Barry Guitar, in his well-used textbook on speech impediments, offers an exemplary definition of fluency: “simply as the effortless flow of speech” (13). Yet there is hardly anything simple about this definition, which is offered amid caveats and backtracking. Guitar readily admits (12) that fluency is difficult to pin down and that researchers within Speech-Language Pathology often focus on what it is not—namely, dysfluency. There are a few characteristics: Fluent speech is marked by a lack of hesitation, and Speech-Language Pathology is forced to make (dubious and highly arbitrary) distinctions between “normal” and “abnormal” hesitations (Goldman-Eisler) since breaks and hesitations crop up in all speech. Fluent speech is marked by rhythmical (read: thoroughly normalized) patterning. Fluent speech is similarly marked by the lack of “extra sounds” interjected into culturally dominant phonetic patterns. Fluency is defined by the overall rate of speech, which includes not just the rate of vocal flow but of information flow (Starkweather). And lastly, fluency is often defined by a lack of “effort” on the part of the speaker; a conceit of mastery over language that highlights the twinned meaning of “fluency.” Transposing this definition into a critical register, the “effortless flow of speech” can be read as a coordinated—yet often strained—performance of bending the energies and capacities of bodies toward stable and univocal futures. Autistics are compelled to restrict stimming, to sit on their hands (to have “quiet hands,” Bascom), and thereby reroute bodily capacities to the smooth performance of so-called intelligible communication. Dyslexic bodies that process information piecemeal and slowly are forced out of social time (Cosenza 7). As Zach Richter has argued, the facial tics and erratic gestures of dysfluent speakers are likewise never communicative inflections, but are made abject and cast out of the communicative realm altogether by what I am here calling technologies of fluency. Tics of loud cursing and grunting from a public speaker with Tourette’s are imagined as an interruption to communication. Dysfluencies are erased from closed captions and courtroom transcripts. What is thus left is a univocal and fluid semiotic operation that instrumentalizes our relations with others. Or more precisely, if fluency is a type of Foucauldian technology, then the function of this biopolitical strategy is to regulate and focus the communicative event toward specific, technical ends through the logic of optimization and closure.

#### The Role of the Ballot is to endorse a critical cripistemology – you should invert disabled success into a failure to become normate. Pre fiat offense comes first, weigh ableism as the foremost impact, and the ROB comes before theory.

Mitchell et al ‘14

(David Mitchell, Sharon Snyder, Linda Ware. ““[Every] Child Left Behind” Curricular Cripistemologies and the Crip/Queer Art of Failure” Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies Volume 8, Issue 3, 2014) sbb rc/pat r/c Xu]

Most indicators point to the fact that inclusionist practices have resulted in new kinds of exclusion as opposed to integration. For example, while students with disabilities make up 13% of student populations, those labeled with intellectual disabilities receive a diploma only 36.6% of the time; 22% drop out. The rest (59%) finish their schooling but receive no diploma and, over the course of their education, spend time with non-disabled peers only in art, gym, or music classes (Smith 4–5). In other words, inclusionism’s primary purpose of molding crip/queer bodies into tolerated neoliberal normativities scores a less than passing mark. This article may be understood, then, as a companion to recent disability studies in education (DSE) efforts regarding the ongoing critique of inclusionist practices that leave all children behind. If one can be included only by passing as non-disabled then much of the value of crip/queer experiences is lost in traditional pedagogical practices. In undertaking this exposure of pedagogical heteronormativities we seek to accomplish three specific tasks: 1) engage disability studies in a dialogue with Judith Halberstam’s important recent work on “the queer art of failure” (147); 2) draw out how queer theorizing of the last decade can be productive for disability studies even though, as Robert McRuer and Anna Mollow point out, a more direct engagement with disability has been slow in coming within queer studies (3); and 3) pursue what may seem, at first, to be a counter-intuitive argument in the best interests of actively promoting a certain kind of failure in the context of curricular cripistemologies. All of these objectives emerge in our recent teacher training projects to more effectively address shortcomings foundational to inclusionist methodologies now operative in most public schools across the U.S. To accomplish the alternative crip/queer goals of curricular cripistemologies we intend to explain why failure is necessary when educational inclusion operates as an exclusionary undertaking in, perhaps, the most entrenched, neoliberal, and common sense institution of all: public education. By neoliberal we mean to define education as part of a newly emergent “tolerance” of multicultural differences. In particular, our critique centers on inclusionism as a neoliberal gloss of diversity initiatives that get some disabled students in the door while leaving the vast majority of crip/queer students behind. Neoliberal educational practices cultivate further funding opportunities by advancing claims of successful normalization rather than drawing upon crip/queer differences as sources of alternative insight. Curricular cripistemologies, in contrast, openly advocate for the productive potential of failing normalization [End Page 299] practices (if they were ever obtainable in the first place) because such goals entail erasing recognitions of the alternative values, practices, and flexible living arrangements particular to crip/queer lives. Whereas the administrative platform of former President George W. Bush pushed for U.S. educational reforms around the promotion of standardized testing to “leave no child behind,” we, in turn, present an argument for recognizing standardization of curricula as ultimately “leaving every child behind,” or at least promoting a certain type of norm-fulfilling child in whose name most students turn up wanting. This curricular abandonment of difference in the name of assimilation occurs primarily through an incapacity (or, perhaps, unwillingness) to adapt the lessons of systemically in-built accommodations and crip/queer content designed to address the range of learning differences comprising today’s classroom demographics. The neoliberal school attempts to resolve the accommodation of disability through downplaying rather than drawing from people’s differences. Through the promotion of active abandonment of crip/queer differences, neoliberal standards guide educational reforms saturated in the questionable values of ableism and normalization. In order to double back on this process, practitioners of curricular cripistemologies undertake critical examinations of “compulsory able-bodiedness” (McRuer 31) and “compulsory able-mindedness” (Kafer 16). Thus, what appears on the surface as disabled students’ incapacity to keep up with their normative peers, turns out to be a purposeful failure to accomplish the unreal (and, perhaps, unrealizable) objectives of normalization. Within the multiplying paradoxes of neoliberal inclusionism, crip success is, paradoxically, to fail to become normate. In The Queer Art of Failure Halberstam advocates a concept of “failure [that] allows us [crip/queer people] to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods” (3). This queer studies inversion of ways to read non-normative lives as failing standards of heteronormative expectations enables crip/queer people to pursue other modes of existence as alternates to sanctioned social roles. These alternative strategies of living pass by largely undetected because educational assessments measure only the degree to which students clear the bar of normalization. By applying this crip/queer deployment of “failure,” curricular cripistemologies undertake pedagogical practices suppressed (or, at least, devalued) by normative neoliberal educational contexts. In adopting a strategically counter-intuitive slogan such as “every student left behind,” then, the critique of inclusionism acknowledges the increasingly disciplinarian nature of public education’s normalizing objectives. Inclusion [End Page 300] has taught teachers a dangerous lesson in what appears to be a failed model of adaptation: crip/queer students cannot effectively compete with their non-disabled peers. The pedagogical assessment of the distance that exists between crip/queer and normal students by standardized testing regimes is now part and parcel of the wider cultural abandonment of non-normativity. But what if a “failure to thrive” in pre-determined educational roles is understood as the product of active refusal (that which Halberstam refers to as a “rejection of pragmatism” [89] and Herbert Kohl terms “willed not-learning” [134]) to “fit” disability paradigms reductively dictated by normative institutional expectations? We could take seriously the findings of DSE scholars such as Phil Smith, who points out in Whatever Happened to Inclusion? that education has actually lost ground in terms of including students with more significant disabilities in recent years (28). Within this context, the objectives accomplished by public relations-driven educational “creaming practices” proliferate. They operationalize inclusionist claims to success wherein the normative accomplishments of the most “able disabled students” eclipse the struggles of those left behind.1 Inclusionism, in other words, covers over an unethical promotion of the successes of the few based upon normative standards of achievement for the inadequacies of the many. Within curricular cripistemologies disability metamorphoses from successful normalization into lesser versions of the ableist self into a meaningful alternative site for transforming pedagogical practices and failed social identities.

#### Debate mandates endless ability checks, internalized ableism and psychic violence.

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While **rhetorical arenas are** commonly **cast as equalizing playing fields**, there is a way in which even the socratic can **yield to the authoritarian**. If we think of disability as a relationship defined in part by the terrain of normativity and in part by individual traits, one must recognize how **the entrance of an impaired body into an elitist highly competitive academic space necessarily entails the focusing of micro-aggressions onto such a body**, both in the structure of normative communications and in the framing of intellectual worth by efficiency. /// If one considers the design of political and scholarly competitive environments, one imagines two gazes through which players are evaluated. The first type of evaluation considers the intellectual performance of the player. The second evaluation monitors interpersonal conduct. /// I will call the first evaluative frame "pedagogical judgment" to reference how performance of ability as well as intellect are measured according to valuable and worthlessness. /// The second frame will be called "interpersonal judgment" to reference how performances of normative sociality are graded according to their closeness to pregiven notions of how the social should be played in various instances. /// The dual conditions of pedagogical and interpersonal judgment, as a **grids of meaning that are projected across bodies** as a function of a designed organizational structure, cooperate in the production of educational spaces as gesturally normative as well as intellectually normative. /// **Gestural as well as intellectual normativities** act as a net around which **atypical** or disruptive **embodiments are captured and disciplined**. On a social level, the truth of intellect is captured in good habits and appearances, but the multiplicity of types of intelligence may be forgotten about. Similarly, the standardization of gestural economies is a well known falsity, as different cultures require different emotional responses to situations. /// Conditions of **judgment set a value to bodies**, based on their ability to pass an inspection or to fulfill a given criteria. A condition of judgment can thus only isolate one aspect or strand of the complexity of human functioning. A condition of judgment is necessary to grade someone accord to hierarchies, but it is also a condition of peril. Competitions thrive on failure: the loss of a debater feeds **debate as an elite culture**. **To exist in debate is to constantly answer numerous ability checks positively**. /// It may thus be possible to view [understand] conditions of judgment as an **ableist emanation from the origin of professionalism**, which raised the rank of professionals whose bureaucratic trials achieved apparent value. In a condition of judgment, the body becomes paralyzed **[incapacitated] by** two sets of **institutional limitations**. Disablement is not merely a spatial or economic process but is a process in teaching limbs and lips and bodies to move properly. **Disabled bodies must labor** **to** ensure that their voices, their bodies, their words will **not fall out of synch.** To **suppress the wildness that hides in the body**, in such instances, the containment of the self is an additional extra labor and **the appearance of** **disability connotes a debt**. **Self-containment is** thus an additional **endless debt that disables impaired bodies**. In having to pay penance for our burdensome conditions, we learn to accept less than ideal circumstances. /// Multiple modes of subversion exist. One of such normative ways of rebelling is disaffiliation. In abandoning and repatriating from the intellectual or interpersonal standards, it may be possible to self-represent in the opposite standards or unevenly distribute resources to gain an advantage. **The most resistant option is to** endeavor to **change the terms of the standards themselves**, the bars that **force a representation of ableness for entrance into normativities**. In the speech or **invocation of other possible worlds**, if it can be heard, others may gather. The establishment of a communal stake in a new group identity upsets the apparatus by which integration appears as the only option. **Upsetting ableist assimilation** will bring many others who resigned to hermetically life in opposition into a possible alliance with you. ///

#### What does it mean to engage in debate- abled norms will always exclude disabled bodies and a failure to do so imagines alternative possibilities of survival.

**Campbell 12** [Brackets Original. Fiona Kumari Campbell (Adjunct Professor in the Department of Disability Studies at Griffith University). "Stalking Ableism: Using Disability to Expose 'Abled' Narcissism." In the book "Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions." Palgrave McMillan, 2012. Accessed 9/21/20. <https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230243255> //Xu]

Antisociality: Rupturing ableist hegemony [For liminal subjects] … style is both the sign of their exclusion and the mode by which they survive nonetheless. (Halberstam, 2005: 153) Difference can be a vexed issue even within modern liberal societies. The tendency for many people is still to emulate or at least appear to refashion normative ways of being. Much of the intellectual traffic for the rethinking of disability in terms of anti-sociality has emerged through debates about the merits of social inclusion and liberal notions of equality and resilience strategies to break the abled stranglehold. Legal theorists like Ruth Colker who argues that anti-subordination rather than integration should be the measure of equality are the exception (Colker, 2006). There is limited work within disability studies, especially in approaches influenced by the social model of disability or social role valorisation theory, that take a trans-integration or post-normalisation perspective. What if we turned our backs on ‘fitting in’ – what would be the opportunities, the consequences and maybe dangers, to give ‘attention to the lived intricacies of embodiment offer[ing] alternatives to normalization efforts aimed at homogenizing social outsiders (Snyder & Mitchell, 2010, 113)’? For this imaginative undertaking it is necessary to turn to the theoretical work by other ‘outsider’ groups – queer theorists. Spearheading the critique of the ‘different but same’ stance of social justice formulations are ‘anti-social’ queer theorists (Bersani, 1986, 1996; Edelman, 2004; Halberstam, 2005, 2008; Muñoz, 2007). This section will outline some of the conceptual drivers of the anti-social argument and their adoption for developing an anti-sociality posture of disability. Leo Bersani’s seminal work (1986, 1996) formulated an anti-social, negative and anti-relational theory of sexuality. These works along with the writings of Edelman (2004), Halberstam (2005, 2008) and Muñoz (2007) set the stage for the decoupling of queer marginality from the liberal projects of tolerance and social inclusion. Before moving into a consideration of how certain conceptual renderings may be applied to the disability situation, it is useful to familiarise ourselves with how the neologism queer is understood by anti-social theorists. Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive does not indicate the parameters of queer, but concludes that ‘queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one’ (2004: 17). Queer, while originating from the purview of diverse sexualities, easily extends to other kindred forms of ontological and corporeal aberrancies and ambiguities (such as disability). So it is right for Halberstam (2005: 6) to embrace a more elastic connotation of queer which refers to ‘non-normative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment and activity in space and time’. From this reckoning, the disabled person is already queered. Queer, then is antitheoretical to the regime of ableist translation. In a world that makes claims to integrity using the argument based on equality as sameness (we are normal, we are everyday people), it would seem a bit bold or offensive to suggest that people with disability are different from the run-of-mill ableist norm emulators. Ahmed (2006) points to an alternate prism, a ‘migrant orientation’ to capture a disorientation faced by queer folk which I extend to include disabled people. The disorientation, a form of radical estrangement propels a lived experience of facing at least two directions: towards a home that has been lost (the desire to emulate ableist norms), and to a place that is not yet home. Regimes of ableism have produced a depth of disability negation that reaches into the caverns of collective subjectivity to the extent that disability negativity is seen as a ‘naturalized’ reaction to an aberration. Not negating queerness or disability can cultivate alternate kinds of liberty that de-identify with the rhetoric of social inclusion. A key marker of the anti-social turn is temporality – contemporarity and futurity – an explication of the current marginal stance and the vision for future. It is this orientation of predicament and utopianism that can speak to the disability realm. For disability, utopianism is a conflicted zone – there is no future existence, disability dreaming is expunged and the utopian drive is a device for promise (of curability), hence extinction of the impairment state. Jose Esteban Muñoz (2007: 453) in speculating about the absence of a queer imagination elicits a desire to engage in a queer horizon, a utopian hermeneutics where re-imagining futurity requires that ‘the not quite conscious is the realm of potentiality that must be called upon’. The distance between imagination and potentiality means that ‘queerness is not quite here’. Our imaginations are not yet exhausted. Muñoz explains: to argue that we are not quite queer yet, that queerness, what we will know as queerness, does not yet exist. I suggest that holding queerness, in a sort of ontologically humble state, under a conceptual grid wherein we do not claim to always already know queerness in the world, potentially staves off the ossifying effects of neoliberal ideology. (Muñoz, 2007: 454) How does an alternative horizon for disabled people come to be formulated? Living in the now and not yet, as outsiders, not quite inside, requires a disposition or habit of contemporariness. Contemporariness signifies a relationship with the present but also a distance, a critical space from it. As Agamben explains: Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. They are in this sense irrelevant [inattuale]. But precisely because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own time. (2009: 40) Disabled people are called to live as contemporaries. The queering or cripping of contemporariness is the grasping and holding tight to ambivalence and obscurity so fundamental to the alternate lifestyle which is obtained through fixing the gaze not on our era’s light but the underbelly, or in Agamben’s language ‘darkness’ – which shines into the staree. In this sense, the contemporary queered and cripped person, in touching an elusive imaginary, sees the now and the emergent not as a death drive, but in terms of unlivedness: The present is nothing other than this unlived element in everything that is lived. That which impedes access to the present is precisely the mass of what for some reason … we have not managed to live. The attention to this ‘unlived’ is the life of the contemporary. (Agamben, 2009: 51) The matter of re-imagining a disability or cripped horizon, a future without the stain of ableism, although elusive and out of grasp, is nonetheless fundamental in order to move to hopefulness and capture that unlived possibility in the lives of many with disability. Can the so-called shadows of a disabled life be sites of invigoration? What is ‘unlived’ in our lives? Crippin’ the human involves a differential gaze – where sometimes signs and gestures predominate, where there is a different mind style such as Tourette’s syndrome or autism, or a centring on visuality or tactility. A grounded earthiness can be ‘different’ through echolocation and waist heightedness. Halberstam (2008) speaks of acts of unbecoming. Through what she describes as ‘wilfully eccentric modes of being’, it is worth conjuring and queering concepts of passivity held against disabled people, as a refusal to live up to ableist expectations of performativity: [I]n a performance of radical passivity, we witness the willingness of the subject to actually come undone, to dramatise unbecoming for the other so that the viewer does not have to witness unbecoming as a function of her own body. (Halberstam, 2008: 151) This radical passivity, for disabled people, would indeed have to be radical, as disabled people already live under the enormous weight of being characterised as passive. It is a tough ask to claw back and produce a cripped notion of passivity. Sunny Taylor does this in her quest for the right not to work: I have a confession to make: I do not work. I am on SSI [social security benefit]. I have very little work value (if any), and I am a drain on our country’s welfare system. I have another confession to make: I do not think this is wrong, and to be honest, I am very happy not working. Instead I spend the majority of my time doing the activity I find the most rewarding and valuable, painting. (Taylor, 2004: 30) Such strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules present alternative temporalities which disability studies scholars have all along known, disrupt the parameters of the human (Halberstam, 2005; Campbell, 2009; McRuer, 2006). Having said this, it is all the more extraordinary that disabled people have not yielded to this repression but have resisted docility and engaged in transgressive ways of living disability. Ableism is founded on a utopian hermeneutics of the desirable and the disgusting and therefore it is, as Halberstam (2008: 153) puts it, necessary to inculcate alternative political imaginaries. McRuer (2008) drew my attention to the way Halberstam’s perspective can incorporate disability as also outside the lifecycle: I try to use the concept of queer time to make clear how respectability, and notions of the normal on which it depends, may be upheld by a middle-class logic of reproductive temporality. And so, in Western cultures, we chart the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation; and we create longevity as the most desirable future, applaud the pursuit of long life (under any circumstances), and pathologize modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity. Within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be desirable, and people who live in rapid bursts (drug addicts, for example) are characterized as immature and even dangerous. (Halberstam, 2005: 4–5) Cripped time can be staggered, frenzied, coded, meandering and be the distance between two events. Some of our time is shaped according to another’s doing – service time – the segmenting and waiting on assistive agencies. Aside from service time, there is a transient time whereby our cripped selves rub up against biology, environmental barriers and relationality. Like queerness, the lifecycle refuses patterning – there is a different vision with localised goals. Instead of proposing argument based on normalisation and similarity to the heteronormative (and by extension ableist normativity), Edelman (2004) proposes a politics of negativity, on the basis that queers, as outsiders, are embodied differently having counter-intuitive, queered forms of negative knowing (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Edelman implores queers to be norm resisters, to come out from normative shadows and fess up to futurist ‘inability’: ‘instead of fighting this characterization by dragging queerness into recognition, he proposes that we embrace the negativity’ (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Relinquishing the norm as a lost cause enables an outlaw flowering of beingness that is anti-social. Disability as perverse and anti-social The disabled life puts out fear and possibility. This is a conflict over liminality that many disabled people experience. How does the person with a disability negotiate the expectations and compulsions of ableism? In other words, do they choose to conform to or hypermimic ableism or do they go it alone and explore alternative ways of being? People with impairments have impairment – mediated proprioceptive ways of experiencing being in the world. In contrast there is the unspeakability of communality and commonality where disabled people can, as Overboe does in his spasms ‘give [him] great joy… [becoming] a life-affirming presence’ (2007, 221). Elsewhere I have argued that disabled people ‘are in effect strangers in ableist homelands – who because of their strangeness have the possibility of a new vision or orientation’ (Campbell, 2009: 161). Reading ‘disability’ in a positive (anti-social) light requires an apriori negotiation with what Foucault (1976) refers to as the effects of the ‘implantation of perversions’, the consolidation of erratic desiring. Foucault’s’ thinking about desire suggests that a desire towards emulation of the ableist subject mitigates against the development of an anti-social framing of disability outside the realms of the perverse. The challenge then is to take up these ‘implantation of perversions’, to develop as Foucault puts it ‘the thought of the outside’, a thought at the queer margins: A thought that stands outside subjectivity, setting its limits as though from within, articulating its end, making its dispersion shine forth, taking in only its invincible absence; and that, at the same time, stands at the threshold of all positivity, not in order to grasp its foundations or justification but in order to regain the space of its unfolding, the void serving as its site, the distance in which it is constituted and into which its immediate certainties slip the moment they are glimpsed. (1998, Orig 1966: 150) Slippages in certainties do create precariousness but also the possibility to (re)imagine the circumstances of disability. It is in between these conflicted traces of subjectivity that the perverse inkling of anti-social disability, an outlaw ontology, lurks. For Foucault, ‘the thought of the outside’ contains a double imperative: (negative) desire reaches into our (disabled) interiority, the emptiness, and the state of be-ing outside: ‘the fact that one is irremediably outside the outside … infinitely unfold[ing] outside any enclosure’ (Foucault, 1998: 154). Director Hara Kazuo’s 1972 film Goodbye CP, a stark black and white portrayal of Green Lawn, a Japanese activist group of people with cerebral palsy, includes a scene where the central character Yokota Hiroshi who walks on his knees because it is faster than a wheelchair is followed, in handing out leaflets. Hiroshi remarks: I walk slow and look pathetic. What’s wrong with that? ... We are outsiders. We really are. We can never be insiders. Those who think they are insiders may end up being outsiders. Why don’t they realize that? That’s the point we are trying to make. (Hiroshi, in Kazuo, 1972) Foucault is correct that we can never really ‘know’ the outside, the liminal margins because its ‘essence’ remains inherently unknowable and ambiguous. To step outside the normative trajectories of negativity not only destabilises the conception of disability, but also confuses and disrupts the processes of subjectification by confronting the ‘goodness’ of disability. Hiroshi is emblematic of the anti-sociality stance of disability. Such an act is subversive as Hiroshi positions his impaired body as queered and perverse. He is perverse because Hiroshi in effect does not ‘give a damn’ about presumed appearances – he is his own man in his embrace of outsiderness. I propose that at an ontological level the disabled body as a body is perverse; it is in effect anti-social in its departure from ableist normativity. A word of caution, in rejecting norm emulation the anti-social body still exists and lives under normative shadows. Anti-sociality can be about being on guard, reminding of, removing, resisting and rectifying the consequences of ableism.