# Speech 1AC TOC Rd 2 vs Strath Haven 4-23 12AM

### FW

#### Ethics cannot detach from the human condition – only theories based on the nature of the subject are applicable and can guide action because the lived experience and physiology is a side constraint.

#### Thus, the meta-ethic is egoism –

#### 1] Opacity – individuals can’t access another’s perspective – we can never fully understand who someone else is or what they think so actions are based off individual desire and self-interest. Bindingness o/w – it’s the only way to determine if an ethic can motivate agents to act consistently and anything else fails as a guide to action.

#### 2] Linguistics – moral truths aren’t extrinsic facts to be discovered but indeterminate linguistic categories of artificial creation.

Parrish 05 [Rick Parrish (assistant professor of Political Science at West Texas A&M University). "Derrida’s Economy of Violence in Hobbes’ Social Contract," John Hopkins University Press, Volume 7, Issue 4. 2005. Accessed 7/29/21. [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119/](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119//) //Xu]

Perhaps the single most telling quote from Hobbes on this point comes from The Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (usually known by its Latin name, De Cive), in which he states that “to know truth, is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words.”[24](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f24) “For Hobbes truth is a function of logic and language, not of the relation between language and some extralinguistic reality,”[25](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f25) so the “connections between names and objects are not natural.”[26](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f26) They are artificially constructed by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms “are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves.”[27](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f27) Since “there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil,”[28](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f28) these labels are placed upon things by humans in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts. Elaborating on this, Hobbes writes that “the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice.”[29](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f29) A more simplistic understanding of the brutality of the state of nature, which David Gauthier calls the “simple rationality account,”[30](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f30) has it that mere materialistic competition for goods is the cause of the war of all against all, but such rivalry is a secondary manifestation of the more fundamental competition among all persons to be the dominant creator of meaning. Certainly, Hobbes writes that persons most frequently “desire to hurt each other” because “many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword.”[31](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f31) But this competition for goods only arises as the result of the more primary struggle that is inherent in the nature of persons of meaning creators. In the state of nature, “where every man is his own judge,”[32](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f32) persons will “mete good and evil by diverse measures,”[33](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119" \l "f33) creating labels for things as they see fit, based on individual appetites. One of the most significant objects that receives diverse labels in the state of nature is 'threat'. Even if most people happen to construe threat similarly, there will be serious disagreement regarding whether or not a specific situation fits a commonly-held definition.”

#### 3] Psychology – fMRI studies prove there’s not unified temporal identity – we can only care about our current self-interests.

Opar 14 [Alisa Opar (features editor at Audubon magazine). “Why We Procrastinate”. Nautilus. August 14, 2014. Accessed 7/31/21. <https://nautil.us/issue/16/nothingness/why-we-procrastinate> //Recut Xu]

The British philosopher Derek Parfit espoused a severely reductionist view of personal identity in his seminal book, Reasons and Persons: It does not exist, at least not in the way we usually consider it. We humans, Parfit argued, are not a consistent identity moving through time, but a chain of successive selves, each tangentially linked to, and yet distinct from, the previous and subsequent ones. The boy who begins to smoke despite knowing that he may suffer from the habit decades later should not be judged harshly: “This boy does not identify with his future self,” Parfit wrote. “His attitude towards this future self is in some ways like his attitude to other people.” Parfit’s view was controversial even among philosophers. But psychologists are beginning to understand that it may accurately describe our attitudes towards our own decision-making: It turns out that we see our future selves as strangers. Though we will inevitably share their fates, the people we will become in a decade, quarter century, or more, are unknown to us. This impedes our ability to make good choices on their—which of course is our own—behalf. That bright, shiny New Year’s resolution? If you feel perfectly justified in breaking it, it may be because it feels like it was a promise someone else made. “It’s kind of a weird notion,” says Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. “On a psychological and emotional level we really consider that future self as if it’s another person.” Using fMRI, Hershfield and colleagues studied brain activity changes when people imagine their future and consider their present. They homed in on two areas of the brain called the medial prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, which are more active when a subject thinks about himself than when he thinks of someone else. They found these same areas were more strongly activated when subjects thought of themselves today, than of themselves in the future. Their future self “felt” like somebody else. In fact, their neural activity when they described themselves in a decade was similar to that when they described Matt Damon or Natalie Portman. And subjects whose brain activity changed the most when they spoke about their future selves were the least likely to favor large long-term financial gains over small immediate ones. Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton, has come to similar conclusions in her research. In a 2008 study, Pronin and her team told college students that they were taking part in an experiment on disgust that required drinking a concoction made of ketchup and soy sauce. The more they, their future selves, or other students consumed, they were told, the greater the benefit to science. Students who were told they’d have to down the distasteful quaff that day committed to consuming two tablespoons. But those that were committing their future selves (the following semester) or other students to participate agreed to guzzle an average of half a cup. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person.

#### 4] Empirics – Best studies prove ethical differences are inevitable

Polzler and Wright 19[Thomas Pölzler and Jennifer Cole Wright- “Empirical research on folk moral objectivism” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6686698/> NCBI. Published July 5th 2019] UT AI

Examining these studies' results more closely, however, makes it less clear whether this interpretation is appropriate (Pölzler, 2018b). Take again Goodwin and Darley's study. In this study, almost 30% of subjects' responses to the disagreement measure and almost 50% of their responses to the truth‐aptness measure fell on the option that the researchers took to be indicative of subjectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, pp. 1347, 1351). Moreover, while some moral statements were dominantly classified as objective (e.g., the above statement about robbery), many others were dominantly classified as nonobjective (e.g., the stem cell research statement). This suggests that subjects in Goodwin and Darley's study may have actually favored what Wright, Grandjean, and McWhite (2013) called “metaethical pluralism,” i.e., they sometimes sided with objectivism and other times with nonobjectivism. More recent studies have by and large confirmed this hypothesis of folk metaethical pluralism. Wright et al. (2013) and Wright, McWhite, and Grandjean (2014), for example, replicated Goodwin and Darley's results, using the exact same measures, but letting subjects classify the presented statements as moral and nonmoral themselves. Objectivity ratings for statements that were dominantly self‐classified as moral varied between as little as 5% and as much as 85%. Research based on different measures yielded high proportions of intrapersonal variation as well (e.g., Beebe, 2014; Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Fisher, Knobe, Strickland, & Keil, 2017; Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, 2017; Wright, 2018; Zijlstra, forthcoming‐a).2

#### Absent a unifying force, competing truth claims are irresolvable and collapses into the State of Nature –

#### 1] Ambiguity – individuals assert differing perspectives and culminates in irresolvable conflict absent a unifying mediator which renders truth and ethics indeterminate through unending contestation.

#### 2] Violence – individuals must act in self-preservation. Without a force to provide protection, each person acts violently to defend themselves, resulting in infinite uncontrolled violence.

#### Only a unified contractarian system of mutually recognizing absolute sovereignty can resolve the State of Nature –

#### 1] Culpability – the only reason ethical questions are asked is because of mutual recognition. Otherwise, selfishness overdetermines concerns for others.

#### 2] Inevitability – even in the State of Nature, people are their own sovereigns – it’s a question of choosing between a stable sovereign or multiple, conflicting sovereigns.

#### 3] Individuals cede their rights to a sovereign that preserves order and can disobey the sovereign only when alienated from self-preservation.

Lopata 73 [Bracketed for Gendered Language. Benjamin B. Lopata (B.Phil from Balliol College, Oxford). “Property Theory in Hobbes.” Political Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May, 1973), pp. 203-218. Accessed 7/31/2021. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/191194?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents> //Xu]

Hobbes is preeminently a philosopher of peace. He sees self-preser- vation, the protection of one's life, as the basic human aim-the summum bonum; his political philosophy is an attempt to indicate the optimum conditions which lead to the preservation of life. Hobbes believes in the necessity of an absolute sovereign, a conclusion which he reaches by considering the condition of man in the state of nature, a logical precondition of civil society. The state of nature is not a historical condition; rather, it is a situation in which there is no supreme power to impose the order necessary for self-preservation. It is, as Watkins (1965: 72) notes, "an 'ideal' or limiting case." Hobbes (1958: 106) characterizes the state of nature as "a war of every man against every man," a condition in which the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes, 1958: 107). There are three principle causes of quarrel in the state of nature: "first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory" (Hobbes, 1958: 106). Hobbes believes that men, in their pursuit of felicity, their constant competition for power after power have the right to all things in the state of nature; this condition is conducive to war, since, as Goldsmith (1966: 88) notes, In such a state of nature, although A and B do not necessarily have a right to the same thing, they may have. B's right does not exclude A's right; in a state of nature, no man can acquire an exclusive right to anything. A may claim what B currently has. Furthermore, since men are naturally diffident, or fearful of one another, each will be likely to preserve his safety by attacking his neighbor, since he fears his neighbor might well do the same to him. Finally, men are vain and constantly seek glory; each views himself as superior to other man and wants others to recognize this fact. Men will, according to Hobbes (1958: 106), use violence "for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of under-value." These motivations, coupled with the natural equality of all men-an equality predicated on the ability of the weakest to kill the strongest-are the parameters which explain the continuous state of war in the Hobbesian state of nature. Hobbes believes that man is a creature who is primarily motivated by his passions; reason cannot tell men what to desire but only how best to gratify their passions. Indeed, for Hobbes (1958: 109), it is as a result of mcn's passions that the move from the state of nature to civil society is effected: "The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them." Of these passions, it is fear which is the predominant spur to peace, as Professor Plamenatz (1963: 12) notes: "And where there is anarchy, the passion which will make men submit once again to law and government will not be a passion weakened by anarchy but a passion which anarchy makes strong. And that passion, as Hobbes says, is fear." Men desire peace; it is a reason which suggests the laws of nature which make peace achievable, laws which are in effect conditional maxims of prudence, rather than divinely inspired duties binding on all men. Hobbes' laws of nature, as John Dewey (1918: 110) observes, "are equivalent to the counsels and precepts of prudence, that is to say, of judgment as to the proper means for attaining the end of a future enduring happiness." The basic law of nature is "to seek peace and follow it" (Hobbes, 1958: 110), a maxim which in turn, for Hobbes, spawns the other precepts which make that peace a reality. In accordance with the laws of nature, all [people] men covenant with each other to transfer their "power and strength" (Hobbes, 1958: 142) to a third person: "I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that you give up your right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner." Hobbes believes that it is only when all [people] men transfer their rights to a sovereign, thereby enabling [the sovereign] him to enforce [its] his will as law, that the goal of peace will be achieved. Consequently, Hobbes' sovereign is absolute, individual [people] men retaining only the right to disobey the sovereign if [it] he threatens their self-preservation; self-preservation is, in the final analysis, the very motivation which impels [people] men to form a commonwealth and cannot, therefore, be alienated. For Hobbes, then, as Michael Oakeshott (1946: xvi) has observed, civil society offers the removal of some of the circumstances that, if they are not removed, must frustrate Felicity. It is a negative gift, merely making not impossible that which is desirable. Here in civil society is neither fulfillment nor wisdom to discern fulfillment, but peace, a Pax Romana, a tranquilitas.

#### Thus, the standard is *consistency with absolute sovereignty*.

#### Impact Calc – its procedural – we embody the position of the sovereign and use its decision-making procedure – to clarify, consequences are a sequencing question.

#### 1] Intentions First – a] sovereignty is formed when individuals cede their intrinsic rights to the sovereign, not some consequence or historical condition b] intent is the only part of the action internal to the subject, so it’s the only thing we can be held ethically responsible for under egoism

#### 2] No Extinction Calculus – a] the sovereign can’t address 1% scenarios since actions always have a chance of extinction on either side which freezes action b] empirical circumstances are interpreted differently which makes impact calculus a matter of conflicting interests but only united through the sovereign

Williams 96 Williams, Michael C. (Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa). “Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration.” International Organization, Volume 50, Number 2, pgs. 218-220. Spring 1996. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2704077>. Cho recut from PZ

By themselves, the laws of nature are not enough, not because rational actors cannot trust each other enough to enter into a social contract but because in the condition of epistemological indeterminacy that Hobbes portrays as natural, this universality is at best a partial step. For even if all were to agree on the right to self-preservation, all need not necessarily agree on what comprised threats to that preservation, how to react to them, or how best to secure themselves against them. Conflict is not simply intrinsic to humanity's potential for aggression; nor can it be resolved directly through the utilitarian calcula- tions of competing and conflicting interests. On the contrary, Hobbes believes that the answer lies in recognizing the problem: namely, the inability to resolve objectively the problem of knowing facts and morals in any straightforward manner. Once this is recognized, the stage is set for Hobbes's solution, a solution that lies not-as Donald Hanson has argued-in a flight from politics but rather in an appeal to politics.19 Or, put another way, Hobbes tries to show how rational certainty and skepticism can be paradoxically combined into a solution for politics and a solution by politics. To escape the state of nature, individuals do not simply alienate their "right to everything" to a political authority.20 More fundamentally, what is granted to that authority is the right to decide among irresolvably contested truths: to provide the authoritative criteria for what is and thus to remove people from the state of epistemic and ethical anarchy that form the basis of the state of nature. Hobbes uses his skepticism both to show the necessity of his solution and to destroy (what he views as dogmatic) counterclaims to political authority based upon unsupportable (individual) claims to truth. In arguing against what he views as seditious individual claims against the authority of the sovereign in De Cive, Hobbes puts it in the following way: "the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by equal right, and has not by any mutual pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, [proved it] ... [But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown. . .] that the civil laws were the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil. "21 Earlier in the same work, he phrased the argument even more unequivocally, noting that since "the opinions of men differ concerning meum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evil, honest and dishonest, and the like; which every man esteems according to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evel; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life." It follows that for Hobbes: "All judgment therefore, in a city, belongs to him who hath the swords; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority."22 These are the fundamental reasons why the sovereign must be unchallenge- able; to rebel is to return to the subjectively relative claim to know and the conflict that this inevitably entails. They also explain why the sovereign ultimately must control language (which defines what is) and clarify Hobbes's repeated stress on the importance of education rather than coercion as the essential element in a successful sovereign's rule.23 Interpretive dissent leads to political dissension and to conflict. In the words of Hobbes's patron, the Earl of Newcastle, "controversy Is a Civil Warr with the Pen which pulls out the sorde soon afterwards. "24

#### 3] Injustice is defined as

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/injustice> CHO

absence of justice: violation of right or of the rights of another : UNFAIRNESS 2: an unjust act : WRONG

#### Three impacts –

#### A] The sole aff burden is to prove that the appropriation of private entities in the squo is unjust

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which means material consequences don’t link

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### B] Side constraint – the resolution is a question of whether a particular system violates justice i.e. rights of fairness. That means that the aff doesn’t and shouldn’t defend anything beyond this question. The Neg burden is to prove that private appropriation in the squo doesn’t violate any rights and thus is just and fair.

#### C] Util is a theory of practical decision making and consequently fails as a theory of justice – it just doesn’t negate the rez

Austin 15 [Michael W. Austin (Ph.D., is a professor of philosophy at Eastern Kentucky University. His latest book is God and Guns in America. Austin has published numerous books and journal articles related to ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of the family, and philosophy of sport. He speaks on these and a variety of other topics related to the connections between character and human fulfillment). , 6-8-2015, "What's Wrong With Utilitarianism?," Psychology Today, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/ethics-everyone/201506/whats-wrong-utilitarianism> CHO

However, there are some weaknesses in this theory. Utilitarianism's primary weakness has to do with justice. A standard objection to utilitarianism is that it could require us to violate the standards of justice. For example, imagine that you are a judge in a small town. Someone has committed a crime, and there has been some social unrest resulting in injuries, violent conflict, and some rioting. As the judge, you know that if you sentence an innocent man to death, the town will be calmed and peace restored. If you set him free, even more unrest will erupt, with more harm coming to the town and its people. Utilitarianism seems to require punishing the innocent in certain circumstances, such as these. It is wrong to punish an innocent person, because it violates his rights and is unjust. But for the utilitarian, all that matters is the net gain of happiness. If the happiness of the many is increased enough, it can justify making one (or a few) miserable in service of the rest. Utilitarianism requires that one commit unjust actions in certain situations, and because of this it is fundamentally flawed. Some things ought never to be done, regardless of the positive consequences that may ensue.

#### Prefer

#### 1] Performativity – the reason rounds have a winner and loser is because of the judge’s sovereign power to reconcile argumentative clash. Every framework collapse because they all require argumentative evaluation that is our framework.

#### 2] TJFs – morality’s a definition of the word ‘ought’ which means it can be evaluated as a topicality issue

#### a] Resolvability – other debates create a mess of weighing and link turns, but using Hobbes is easily resolvable because it becomes a question of what the sovereign believes.

#### b] Political Education – politicians have to understand the social contract in order to know what powers they have and what they have to provide citizens and debating about Hobbes helps us learn about that.

#### c] Resource Disparities – philosophical frameworks ensure big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity and require a higher level of analytic thinking that small schools have.

#### 3] Liberation – only a direct approach to absolute sovereignty allows agents to understand the relationship between self-preservation and governance – other systems insist on their own foundations but the aff is a better model for constructing a institution that must interact with its agents.

#### 4] Root Cause – conflicts arise between antagonistic positions due to multiple perspectives absent a mediating force. Only the sovereign can recognize different ethical viewpoints and resolve violence.

#### 5] Moral realism fails because there’s no reason why our minds would grow to track moral facts. Instead it’s more likely that moral judgments are psychological adaptations made in favor of reproductive success.

Street 6

Sharon Street. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Phil. Studies 127:109-166, 2006.

The tracking account obviously posits something extra that the adaptive link account does not, namely independent [moral] evaluative truths (since it is precisely these truths that the tracking account invokes to explain why making certain evaluative judgments rather than others conferred advantages in the struggle to surviv[al]e and reproduce). The adaptive link account, in contrast, makes no reference whatsoever to evaluative truth; rather, it explains the advantage of making certain evaluative judgments directly, by pointing out how they got creatures who made them to act in ways that tended to promote reproductive success. Thus, the adaptive link account explains the widespread presence of certain values in the human population more parsimoniously, without any need to posit a role for evaluative truth.

### Advocacy

#### 1] The property rights of private entities are incoherent under absolute sovereignty.

Lopata 73 [Brackets Original and for Gendered Language. Benjamin B. Lopata (B.Phil from Balliol College, Oxford). “Property Theory in Hobbes.” Political Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May, 1973), pp. 203-218. Accessed 7/31/2021. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/191194?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents> //Xu]

Hobbes makes the sovereign absolute and self-perpetuating because he believes that it is only such a wide grant of power to the ruler that will enable him effectively to make and enforce law, thereby preventing a return to the state of nature in which life and security are so tenuous. Hobbes necessarily believes that it is the sovereign who determines property rights, since, in the state of nature, men have the right to all things, a prime cause of strife and war. In what is perhaps Hobbes' definitive statement on property, he notes (Hobbes, 1958: 148) that the sovereign possesses the whole power of prescribing the rules whereby every man may know what goods he may enjoy and what actions he may do without being molested by any of his fellow subjects; and this is it men call propriety [sic]. For before constitution of sovereign power, as has already been shown, all men had a right to all things, which necessarily causes war; and therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace and depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power in order to the public peace [sicl. These rules of propriety. or meum and tuum, and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects, are the civil law. The vital fact, for Hobbes, is that the state of nature is a condition in which no property rights exist; since Schlatter (1951: 140) observes, "All men have a right to everything, it is impossible to conceive of this political authority as protecting men's natural rights to property." The evidence considered points to the realization that, unlike the classical liberal, who views the state as protecting natural rights to private property, Hobbes considers the sovereign as the very institution which determines all property relations. There is no private property in the absence of sovereignty; the Leviathan and private property are necessarily concomitant. One need not turn only to Leviathan to find support for this position. In De Cive, Hobbes (1949: 74) writes that since "the opinions of men differ concerning meum and tuum," it "belongs to the chief power to make some common rules for all men and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's." Again, in A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, written toward the end of his life, Hobbes observes: Lawmakers were before that which you call own, or property of goods and lands ... for without statute-law, all men have right to all things.... You see then that no private [individual] man can claim a propriety in any lands, or other goods, from any title from any other man but the King, or them that have the sovereign power [Schlatter, 1951: 140J.

#### 2] Appropriation means exclusive and limits nations’ access – proves private entities act in conflict with the access of the sovereign.

Trapp 13, Timothy Justin. "Taking up Space by Any Other Means: Coming to Terms with Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty." U. Ill. L. Rev. (2013): 1681. (JD Candidate at UIUC Law School)//Re-cut by Elmer

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217

[\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]

The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were try3ing to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### 3] Companies are only legitimate if they act for the Commonwealth.

Claassen summarizes in 21 [R.J.G. Claassen (Professor of Political Philosophy and Economic Ethics at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies of Utrecht University). “Hobbes Meets the Modern Business Corporation”. Polity. Volume 53, Number 1. January 2021. Accessed 1/24/2022. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/712231> //Xu]

Second, Hobbes talks more elaborately about the economic aspect of the companies of merchants. He tells us that they possess a double monopoly in selling and buying, both at home and abroad. He criticizes this monopoly for not being maximally profitable for the Common-wealth: Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry, and handyworks of the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all foraign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. ... Such Corporations therefore are no other then Monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in forraigne Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.’ 85 While Hobbes does not explicitly declare the monopolistic character of the companies of merchants to be sufficient reason to abolish them, he clearly does introduce in this passage a public point of view: the profitability of the company for the commonwealth as a whole. This is a public purpose which is internally connected to the private purpose of this specific type of corporation—namely, the profitability of the merchants themselves. Private citizens may strive to attain their private profits, but only in such a way that it is compatible with the profitability of the commonwealth. The latter concern introduces a specific angle to look at the legitimacy of these corporations, which is additional to the general requirements of public law which hold for all citizens.

#### Private entities “A private entity relies on a small group of chosen investors in order to grow and fund their business. This could be employees, colleagues, friends, family, or even large institutional investors. Interested parties are able to support the private entity in order to help the company grow.” i.e. for private profit and not for the commonwealth.

That’s QT Company 20 [“What Are Private Entities?”. Quest Trust Company (custodian of self-directed IRAs located in Houston, Austin, and Dallas, Texas with clients Nationwide. Quest Trust Company, is the leading provider of self-directed retirement account administration services. Quest Trust Company has been in business since 2003 with over $2 Billion in assets under management. As a neutral party, Quest Trust Company does not offer any investments and therefore has no conflicts of interest with what our clients want to do with their IRAs). September 28, 2020. Accessed 12/17/21. <https://www.questtrustcompany.com/2020/09/28/what-are-private-entities/> //Xu]

### Method

#### 3] Presumption and permissibility affirm –

#### a) logic – if its permissible to do P, then you don’t have an obligation to do not P by definition.

Paraphrasing McNamara[Paul McNamara (Associate Professor of Philosophy @ the University of New Hampshire). “Deontic Logic.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Tue Feb 7, 2006; substantive revision Wed Apr 21, 2010. Accessed 11/16/19. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic//> Xu]

The five normative statuses of the Traditional Scheme are:[[4](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/notes.html#4)] it is obligatory that (OB) it is permissible that (PE) it is impermissible that (IM) it is omissible that (OM) it is optional that (OP) The first three are familiar, but the fourth is widely ignored, and the fifth has regularly been conflated with “it is a matter of *indifference* that p” (by being defined in terms of one of the first three), which is not really part of the traditional scheme (more below). Typically, one of the first two is taken as basic, and the others defined in terms of it, but any of the first four can play the same sort of purported defining role. The most prevalent approach is to take the first as basic, and define the rest as follows: PEp ↔ ~OB~p IM*p* ↔ OB~*p* OM*p* ↔ ~OB*p* OP*p* ↔ (~OB*p* & ~OB~*p*).

#### Thus, if you do not have an obligation to do not P, then you have an obligation to do P by the Law of Double Negation.

#### b) empirics

**Shah 19,**[Shah, Sachin. “A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC.” NSD Update, National Symposium of Debate, 16 Feb. 2019, <http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/> ]//LHPSS accessed 9/4/19

As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds **from** 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (**2017 – 2019** YTD), **the neg**ative **won 52.99% of ballots** (**p-value < 0.0001)** and 54.63% of upset rounds (p-value < 0.0001). **This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics.**

#### 4] Ideal theory is good – it promotes advocacy skills and helps us envision what we want structural reforms to do for the world.

Stemplowska and Swift ‘12

Stemplowska, Zofia, and Adam Swift. “Ideal and Nonideal Theory.” Oxford Handbooks Online, 2012, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195376692.013.0020. <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195376692.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195376692-e-20>. [Stemplowska is an Associate Professor of Political Theory and a former lecturer in Political Theory and Political Philosophy. Adam Swift is a professor of Political Theory at the University of Warwick and the Founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Social Justice at Oxford.]

“Suppose our ideal theory correctly identifies the long-term goal we want to achieve. We know from Rawls that this goal is realistic, in the sense that it is achievable, if only in the long, perhaps very long, run. As he says, ideal theory probes ‘the limits of practicable political possibility’ (2001, 4, 13). Why would knowing this long-term goal be irrelevant to us here and now? It would be irrelevant if we were simply not interested in long-term goals, but this seems implausible. Or it would be irrelevant if we had reason to believe that all roads led, equally quickly and efficiently, to the long-term goal. But, for any given long-term goal, it seems very unlikely that it would be equally well pursued by all incremental short-term reforms. And in any case, how could we have reason to believe that all roads led to it if we had not yet identified what the long-term goal was? As A. J. Simmons (2010) has argued, without knowing our long term goal, a course of action that might appear to advance justice, and might indeed constitute a shortterm improvement with respect to justice, might nonetheless make less likely, or perhaps even impossible, achievement of the long-term goal. There is, then, some ambiguity in what it means for a reform to constitute an improvement with respect to, or progress toward, the ideal. In mountaineering, the climber who myopically takes immediate gains in height wherever she can is less likely to reach the summit than the one who plans her route carefully. The immediate gains do indeed take her higher—with respect to altitude she is closer to the top—but they may also be taking her away from her goal. The same is true of normative ideals. To eliminate an injustice in the world is surely to make the world more just, but it could also be to take us further away from, not closer toward, the achievement of a just society. Rawls, as we have seen, sees ideal theory as having both a ‘target’ role and an ‘urgency’ role, each of which can guide us when we engage in nonideal theory: It tells us where we are trying to get to in the long run, but it also informs our justice-promoting attempts here and now by providing the basis on which to evaluate the relative importance or urgency of the various ways in which the world deviates from the ideal. Even if Sen is right that we do not need ideal theory to do the latter, Simmons is right that we do need it for the former.”

#### 5] Universalism and ideal values are radical because they are accessible – ideal theory is a way to rework the status quo and direct it towards radical reforms.

Holmstrom ‘12

Holmstrom, Nancy. “Response to Charles Mills's ‘Occupy Liberalism!".” Radical Philosophy Review, vol. 15, no. 2, 2012, pp. 325–330., doi:10.5840/radphilrev201215223. <https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=radphilrev&id=radphilrev_2012_0015_0002_0325_0330>. [Professor Emeritus and former chair of the Philosophy Department at Rutgers University.]

“We have to speak to people where they are, he says, and that means appealing to core values of liberalism: individualism, equal rights and moral egalitarianism. Against what he calls the conventional wisdom among radicals, he argues that there is no inherent incompatibility between these values and a radical agenda. If these values are suitably interpreted, I think he is absolutely right. Over two hundred years ago, Mary Wollstonecraft and Toussaint Louverture took the abstract universalistic principles of the French Revolution and extended them to groups they were intended to exclude. Gradually and incompletely women and blacks and landless men have achieved the democratic rights promised to all (in words) by the anti-feudal revolution. So I agree with Charles that such universalistic principles have great value; even if usually applied in self-serving ways, they have a deeply radical potential and it would be foolish of radicals to reject them, any more than we should reject all of the technological developments of the Industrial Revolution which also developed with the rise of capitalism. In fact, few American radicals have rejected these aspects of liberalism in their political practice but have been their strongest champions since the Revolution; socialists of all kinds helped to build the labor and civil rights movements.”

#### 6] Ideal theory and concrete perspectives are not an either/or choice – it’s only through their integration that ethics becomes truly accessible.

Benhabib ‘94

Benhabib, Seyla. “In Defense of Universalism. Yet Again! A Response to Critics of Situating the Self.” New German Critique, no. 62, 1994, pp. 173–189. JSTOR, JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/488515](http://www.jstor.org/stable/488515). [Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale. Internationally lauded author who has written many books on the integration of normative and material worlds.]

“In their generous and illuminating comments on Situating the Self, by contrast, James Sterba and Iris Young do not focus on what may be termed meta-ethical issues concerning the logic of normative justification, as Peter Dews has done. On the basis of broad agreement with a dialogically reformulated universalist ethics, they analyse the same central issue: my attempt to give a different account of the dialogical ethical standpoint from both Rawls's contractualism and Habermas's restrictive ‘ideal speech situation.’ Sterba as well as Young remark that the integration of the standpoints of the ‘generalized’ and ‘concrete other’ is central to this reformulation. According to the standpoint of the generalized other, each individual is a moral person endowed with the same moral rights as ourselves; s/he is capable of a sense of justice, of formulating a vision of the good, and of engaging in activity to pursue the latter. The standpoint of the concrete other, however, enjoins us to view every moral person as a unique individual, with a certain life history, disposition, and endowment, as well as needs and limitations. I envision the relationship of the standpoints of the generalized and the concrete other along the model of a continuum. In the first place, there is the universalist commitment to considering every human individual as a being worthy of moral respect. This norm is institutionalized in a democratic polity through the recognition of civil, legal, and political rights. The standpoint of the concrete other, by contrast, is implicit in those ethical relationships in which we are always already immersed in the lifeworld. To stand in such an ethical relationship as a parent, sister, brother, or spouse means that as concrete individuals we know what is expected of us by virtue of the kinds of social bonds which tie us to the other.”