# Speech 1AC Harvard RR Rd 3 vs Strake 2-17 1PM

## 1AR

#### Their scholarship is hateful and a reason to lose the round—their author endorsed pedophilia and actively advocated for pedophilic content.

Moen 15 [Moen, O. M. (Professor of Ethics at Oslo Metropolitan University). “The ethics of pedophilia”. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 9(1), 111-124. 2015-05-09. Accessed 2/2/2022. <https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/1718> //CHO]

If my arguments in this article are sound, then being a pedophile—in the sense of having a sexual preference for children—is neither moral nor immoral. Engagement in adult-child sex is immoralbecause it exposes children to a significant risk of serious harm, butit is perhaps not always blameworthy to the extent that we intuitively assume. Finally, the enjoyment of fictional stories and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content is, in and of itself, morally acceptable. If these conclusions are correct, what practical implications follow? A central implication is that in dealing with pedophilia, our aim should not be to find outlets for our disgust and outrage, but rather, to minimize what is the real problem: harm to children. On the least revisionist side, the aim of reducing harm provides us with a good justification for upholding current bans on adult-child sex and child pornography. There are, however, also a number of more revisionist implications. One revisionist implication is that we should stop the outright condemnation of pedophiles. Condemning pedophiles for being pedophiles is unjust, and non-offending pedophiles, rather than deserving condemnation for their pedophilia, deserve praise for their admirablewillpower.4 Possibly, today’s condemnation also prevents pedophiles from telling health professionals about their attraction to children, and insofar as detection and counseling can help prevent abuse, this is very unfortunate. To prevent harm to future children, we would also be well advised to start teaching high school students not just what to do in case they are victims of sexual abuse (which, thankfully, we have started telling them over the last few decades), but also what to do in case they themselves are pedophiles. A certain percentage of high school students either are or will become pedophiles, and currently they are not given any advice on how to handle their sexuality. The production, distribution, and enjoyment of texts and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content should almost certainly be made legal. Until or unless it can be shown that such texts and graphics lead to more adult-child sex, the justification for today’s widespread ban is weak.

#### Drop the debater—academic spaces have way too many sympathizers who ignore violence against children, and every act must be challenged in the most unflinching terms because anything else reinforces the epistemic bias in favor of rationalizing disgusting behavior.

Grant 18 [Alec Grant (Independent Scholar, retired from the Uiversity of Brighton where he was a Reader in Narrative Mental Health). “Sanitizing Academics and Damaged Lives” Mad In The UK, 12 April 2018. https://www.madintheuk.com/2018/12/sanitizing-academics-and-damaged-lives/ // Cho Recut

Academics who sympathize with paedophilia constitute its intellectual public relations arm. Their role is to make child-adult sex presentable, more acceptable to the public, fit for polite society, sugar-coated, glossed with a scholarly veneer, sanitized. Snapshots of sanitizing academic activity from the last 40 years show how this seeps into and contaminates public policy, education and practice in insidious ways. This is done via the workings of power, privilege, perverse cronyism, and, as Pilgrim (2018) argues, as a result of widespread moral stupor and denial. It’s astonishing that this happens in the face of the psychological and development features of complex post-trauma which are often a consequence of child sexual abuse. By pathologizing adult survivors, often with the ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’ (BPD) tag, mainstream psychiatric business-as-usual plays out its role in suppressing the truth about the consequences of paedophilia among adult survivors. Pilgrim (2018) reminds us that care and mutuality are core ethical features of all sexual practices. As someone who was for many years associated with cognitive therapy, I’m interested in ‘cognitive, or thought distortions’, which are used by people in rationalising their behaviour in self-serving ways. We know from Pilgrim and many other writers, researchers and practitioners about the rationalisations of perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation. They include: Children are not victims but willing participants; They want it; They enjoy it; It’s about friendship; It’s about love; It helps children develop and mature. According to Pilgrim (2018), the ‘heyday’ period of academic versions of such rationalisations was the 1970s. 1977 was the year of an unsuccessful lobby by French intellectuals to defend intergenerational sex. Included among these were the otherwise well-respected philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Jaques Derrida, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. These figures were at the forefront of the use of academic authority to lobby governments to liberalise and decriminalise adult-child sexual contact. In 1978, Foucault took part in a France-Culture broadcast with two other gay theorists, Hocquengham and Danet, to discuss the legal aspects of sex between adults and children. They wanted a repeal of the law preventing this because they took the view that in a liberal (they really meant libertarian) society, sexual preferences generally should not be the business of the law. Foucault, Hocquengham and Danet made the following assertions: that children can, and have the capacity to, consent to such relations without being coerced into doing so; that abuse and post-abuse trauma isn’t real; that the law is part of an oppressive and repressive heteronormative social control discourse which unfairly targets sexual minorities; that children don’t constitute a vulnerable population; that children can and are capable of making the first move in seducing adults (they introduced here the category of ‘the seducing child’); that the laws against sexual relations between children and adults actually function to protect children from their own desires, making them an oppressed and repressed group; that – in the language of the sociologist Stanley Cohen – international public horror about sexual relations between adults and children is a form of moral panic which feeds into constructing the ‘paedophile’ as a folk devil, in turn provoking public vigilantism; that sex between adults and children is actually a trivial matter when compared with ‘real crimes’ such as the murder of old ladies; that many members of the judiciary and other authority figures and groups don’t actually believe paedophilia to be a crime; and that consent should be a private contractual matter between the adult and the child. Fast forward to 1981. The Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE) has been active for seven years. This was a pro-paedophile activist group, founded in the UK in 1974 and officially disbanded in 1984. The group, an international organisation of people who traded in obscene material, campaigned for the abolition of the age of consent. Dr Brian Taylor, the research director and member of PIE, and sociology lecturer at the University of Sussex produced the controversial book Perspectives on Paedophilia, which had the aim of enlightening social workers and youth workers about the benefits of paedophilia. Taylor, who identified as gay, advocated ‘guilt-free pederasty’ (sexual relations between two males, one of whom is a minor). He argued that people generally are hostile to paedophilia only because they don’t understand it, and If they did wouldn’t be so against it. So it was simply a matter of clearing up prejudice and ignorance.

## 1AC

### FW

#### Ethics must be certain and nonarbitrary –

#### 1] Logic – Arbitrariness justifies contradictions since we can justify arguments without reason, for instance affirm because the sky is blue and o/w since logic is a litmus test for arguments.

#### 2] Predictability – defending theories with illogical assumptions guts predictability since any possible wrong thing can emerge that we aren’t prepared to contest.

#### 3] Bindingness – blurry guidelines for ethics allows agents to arbitrarily opt out of ethics which renders any action permissible.

#### Ethics must be derived from the a priori world –

#### 1] External Worlds Skepticism –

Chapman summarizes 14 [Andrew Chapman (lecturer in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder). “External World Skepticism”. 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. 6 FEBRUARY 2014. Accessed 12/11/21. <https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/> //Xu]

You’re being deceived by a very powerful evil demon right now. This demon has the ability to manipulate your sensory impressions such that it will seem to you that things are some way when they are not that way at all. Accordingly, things are actually nothing like P. For example, suppose it seems to you as though you are in a room with a table and chair in it and that you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (1) is true, then you actually are in a room with a table and chair in it and you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, then you are not in a room with a table and chair in it and you are not reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, things are very different from how they seem to you to be.1

\*Footnote 1\*

1 If the evil demon scenario is too far-fetched for you, imagine that you are dreaming or that you are hallucinating or even that you are in a laboratory and your visual cortex is being stimulated by electrodes.

\*Paragraph Following the First\*

Philosophers call (2) a skeptical scenario. In skeptical scenarios, you are radically misled, deceived, or bamboozled by your evidence in such a way that how things seem to you is different from how things actually are. Perhaps the most famous propounder of skeptical scenarios in the history of philosophy is René Descartes (1596-1650) in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). In the Meditations, Descartes considers that he might be dreaming or that he might be being deceived by the evil demon from our scenario (2) above. Hollywood has made much of skeptical scenarios in movies like Total Recall, The Matrix, and Inception. So back to our original question: Which of (1) or (2) is best supported or best justified by its seeming to you that P? If you’re being honest with yourself, you’ll conclude that how things seem equally well supports (1) and (2). From your internal, first-personal perspective, either of (1) or (2) could be true given how things seem to you. And if that weren’t bad enough, here comes the kicker: If both (1) and (2) are equally well supported by your evidence, how can you ever possibly know anything about the world outside your own skin? This is the problem of external world skepticism, perhaps the central problem of modern epistemology.

#### 2] Causal Determinism –

Korsgaard [Korsgaard, Christine (Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University). “Creating The Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations.” (p. 317-318). https://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.CKE.Essay.pdf]

Here one’s life is regarded as the phenomenal representation or expression of a single choice, the choice of one’s character or fundamental principle. This choice must be understood as occurring outside of time, in the noumenal world. The choice is the one described in the first book of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone: the choice of how incentives are to be ordered in one’s most fundamental maxim, the choice between morality and self-love. (R 36/31) As Kant sees it, human beings are subject to certain incentives - impulses which present themselves to us as candidates, so to speak, to be reasons for action. Among these are our desires and inclinations, as well as respect for the moral law. Kant believes that we are not free to ignore such incentives altogether. Instead, our freedom consists in our ability to rank the incentives, to choose whether our self-love shall be governed by morality or morality shall be subordinated to self-love. This fundamental choice then governs our choice of lower-order maxims. The fundamental choice is an act - in the Religion Kant calls it an intelligible act - and it is ultimately this intelligible act that is imputable to us, and makes our phenomenal actions imputable to us. (R 31- 32/26-27) When first exposed to Kant’s view, one may be tempted to try to picture how and where the choice of one’s character enters the processes which ultimately issue in action. Suppose, with violent oversimplification, that it is a law of nature that children raised in certain conditions of poverty and insecurity tend to become somewhat selfish as adults, and suppose that such a childhood has had this effect on Marilyn. Are we to say to her: “Your childhood insecurity gave you an incentive to be selfish, but it is still your own fault if you elevate that incentive into a reason?” Then we are thinking that Marilyn’s freedom inserts itself in between the causes in her background and their ultimate effect.xxiii Or are we supposed to think that, in her noumenal existence, Marilyn wills to be a selfish person? Or, to get even fancier, should we think that in her noumenal existence Marilyn wills the law of nature that deprived children become selfish adults? Obviously, if we try to picture how Marilyn's freedom is related to the forces that determine her, we must imagine it either inserting itself somewhere into the historical process, or standing behind the laws of nature from which this historical process necessarily follows. And both of these pictures seem crazy.xxiv And of course they are crazy. Kant’s response to this problem is to maintain that the question should not be asked. To ask how freedom and determinism are related is to inquire into the relation between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, a relation which it is in principle impossible to know anything about. But our understanding of what this response amounts to will depend on how we understand the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, and the related distinction between the two standpoints from which Kant says we may view ourselves and our actions. This is a large issue which I cannot treat here in a satisfactory way; I shall simply declare my allegiance. On a familiar but as I think misguided interpretation, the distinction between the two worlds is an ontological one; as if behind the beings of this world were another set of beings, which have an active and controlling relation to the beings of this world, but which are inaccessible to us because of the limits of experience. According to this view, we occupy both worlds, and viewing ourselves from the two standpoints we discover two different sets of laws which describe and explain our conduct in the two different worlds. We act on the moral law in the noumenal world, the law of self-love in the phenomenal world. This view gives rise to familiar paradoxes about how evil actions are even possible, and how we could ever be held responsible for them if they were.xxv

#### 3] Is-Ought Gap –

Gray 11 [James W. Gray (MA in philosophy from San Jose State University). "The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"" Ethical Realism. N.p., 19 July 2011. Web. 28 Oct. 2015. //Massa]

**The is/ought gap is a problem in moral philosophy where what is the case and what ought to be the case seem quite different, and it presents itself as the following question** to David Hume: **How do we *know* what morally ought to be the case from what is the case?** Hume posed the question in A Treatise of Human Nature Book III Part I Section I: In **every system of morality**, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs, when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change **is imperceptible**; but is, however, of the last consequence. **For as this ought**, or ought not, **expresses some new relation** or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, **for what seems altogether inconceivable**, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. It is here that Hume points out that **philosophers argue about** various **nonmoral facts, then somehow conclude what ought to be the case** (or what people ought to do) **based on** those facts (about **what is the case**). **For example, we might find out that arsenic is poisonous and conclude that we ought not consume it. But we need to know how nonmoral facts can lead to moral conclusions. These two things seem unrelated.** The is/ought gap doesn’t seem like a problem for nonmoral oughts—what we ought to do to accomplish our goals, fulfill our desires, or maintain our commitments. For example, we could say, “If you want to be healthy, you ought not consume arsenic.” However, it might be morally wrong to consume arsenic. If it is, we have some more explaining to do.

#### 4] Knowledge Argument –

Wikipedia summarizes Jackson ND [F.C. Jackson (Emeritus Professor in the School of Philosophy (Research School of Social Sciences) at Australian National University). “Qualia.” Wikipedia. No Date. Accessed 1/23/2022. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> //Xu]

F.C. Jackson offers what he calls the "knowledge argument" for qualia.[19] One example runs as follows:

Mary the color scientist knows all the physical facts about color, including every physical fact about the experience of color in other people, from the behavior a particular color is likely to elicit to the specific sequence of neurological firings that register that a color has been seen. However, she has been confined from birth to a room that is black and white, and is only allowed to observe the outside world through a black and white monitor. When she is allowed to leave the room, it must be admitted that she learns something about the color red the first time she sees it – specifically, she learns what it is like to see that color.

This thought experiment has two purposes. First, it is intended to show that qualia exist. If one accepts the thought experiment, we believe that Mary gains something after she leaves the room – that she acquires knowledge of a particular thing that she did not possess before. That knowledge, Jackson argues, is knowledge of the quale that corresponds to the experience of seeing red, and it must thus be conceded that qualia are real properties, since there is a difference between a person who has access to a particular quale and one who does not.

The second purpose of this argument is to refute the physicalist account of the mind. Specifically, the knowledge argument is an attack on the physicalist claim about the completeness of physical truths. The challenge posed to physicalism by the knowledge argument runs as follows:

1. Before her release, Mary was in possession of all the physical information about color experiences of other people.
2. After her release, Mary learns something about the color experiences of other people.

Therefore,

1. Before her release, Mary was not in possession of all the information about other people's color experiences, even though she was in possession of all the physical information.

Therefore,

1. There are truths about other people's color experience that are not physical.

Therefore,

1. Physicalism is false.

#### 5] Explanatory Gap –

Tye 21 [Michael Tye (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin). “Qualia”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Wed Aug 20, 1997; substantive revision Thu Aug 12, 2021. Accessed 1/23/22. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Explangap> //Xu]

Our grasp of what it is like to undergo phenomenal states is supplied to us by introspection. We also have an admittedly incomplete grasp of what goes on objectively in the brain and the body. But there is, it seems, a vast chasm between the two. It is very hard to see how this chasm in our understanding could ever be bridged. For no matter how deeply we probe into the physical structure of neurons and the chemical transactions which occur when they fire, no matter how much objective information we come to acquire, we still seem to be left with something that we cannot explain, namely, why and how such-and-such objective, physical changes, whatever they might be, generate so-and-so subjective feeling, or any subjective feeling at all.

#### Only practical reason is a priori.

Korsgaard [Korsgaard, Christine (Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University). “Creating The Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations.” (p. 317-318). https://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.CKE.Essay.pdf]

On what I take to be the correct interpretation, the distinction is not between two kinds of beings, but between the beings of this world insofar as they are authentically active and the same beings insofar as we are passively receptive to them. The “gap” in our knowledge exists not because of the limits of experience but because of its essential nature: to experience something is (in part) to be passively receptive to it, and therefore we cannot have experiences of activity as such.xxvi As thinkers and choosers we must regard ourselves as active beings, even though we cannot experience ourselves as active beings, and so we place ourselves among the noumena, necessarily, whenever we think and act. According to this interpretation, the laws of the phenomenal world are laws that describe and explain our behavior. But the laws of the noumenal world are laws which are addressed to us as active beings; their business is not to describe and explain at all, but to govern what we do.xxvii Reason has two employments, theoretical and practical. We view ourselves as phenomena when we take on the theoretical task of describing and explaining our behavior; we view ourselves as noumena when our practical task is one of deciding what to do.xxviii The two standpoints cannot be mixed because these two enterprises - explanation and decision - are mutually exclusive.xxix These two ways of understanding the noumenal/phenomenal distinction yield very different interpretations of Kant’s strictures against trying to picture the relation between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. On the ontological view, the question how the two worlds are related is one which, frustratingly, cannot be answered. On the active/passive view, it is one which cannot coherently be asked. There is no question that is answered by my descriptions of how Marilyn’s freedom interacts with the causal forces that determine her. For freedom is a concept with a practical employment, used in the choice and justification of action, not in explanation or prediction; while causality is a concept of theory, used to explain and predict actions but not to justify them.xxx There is no standpoint from which we are doing both of these things at once, and so there is no place from which to ask a question that includes both concepts in its answer.

#### O/W – A] Infinite Regress – certainty must answer “why” because it would otherwise allow agents to infinitely question why it’s true – other frameworks allow agents to question every part of it, but questioning reason concedes its authority which proves its inescapable. B] Action Theory – any action can be broken down into an infinite number of sub-actions. Without an account of what an action is, it’s impossible to ask questions about which actions are good. Practical reason solves – the intent to follow through on a maxim unites subactions into a full actions.

#### That justifies universal laws of morality.

#### 1] Principle of Equality – there’s no distinction between practical reasoners – its incoherent to claim that 1+1=2 just for me.

#### 2] Particularism justifies treating agents differently and not valuing their moral worth – justifies any norm which fails as a guide to action.

#### **Without the state and in the state of nature, there is nothing that can ensure rights will be enforced because of the problem of assurance.**

Ripstein 04 [Arthur Ripstein, (University Professor of Law and Philosophy, [University of Toronto](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_org&hl=en&org=8515235176732148308)) "Authority and Coercion" Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32: 2–35, 2004, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, DOA:12-16-2017 // WWBW]

Kant explains the need for the three branches of government in Rousseau’s vocabulary of the “general will.” Kant finds this concept helpful, since it manages to capture the way in which the specificity of the law and the monopoly on [the law’s] its enforcement do not thereby make it the unilateral imposition of one person’s will upon another. Instead, it is what Kant calls an “omnilateral” will, since all must agree to set up procedures that will make right possible. All must agree, because without such procedures, equal freedom is impossible, and so the external freedom of each is impossible. But the sense in which they must agree is not just that they should agree; it is that they cannot object to being forced to accept those procedures, because any objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force against others unilaterally. Once the concept of the General Will is introduced, it provides further constraints on the possibility of a rightful condition, and even explains the ways in which a state can legitimately coerce its citizens for reasons other than the redress of private wrongs. Kant’s treatment of these issues of “Public Right” has struck many readers as somewhat perfunctory, especially after his meticulously detailed, if not always transparent, treatment of private right. He treats these issues as he does because he takes them to follow directly from the institution of a social contract. The details of his arguments need not concern us here, because he does not claim that these exhaust the further powers of the state. Instead, he puts them forward as additional powers a state must have if it is to create a rightful condition, and it is the structure of that argument that is of concern here.

#### Thus, the standard is *consistency the omnilateral will* – actions are ethical insofar as willing it doesn’t infringe on the ability to will it.

#### 1] Performativity – when you enter debate, you presume that you will be free to set and pursue ends in the round because of a system of reciprocally enforced constraints.

#### 2] Ideal Theory Good – a] end point – we’d constantly be fixing injustices as a precondition to ethical action so we never get to the bottom of what is actually ethical b] relevance – every society has different injustices that occur – the resolution is a universal values statement which means you cannot universalize any theory under nonideal theory.

#### 3] Epistemic Confidence – a] modesty is arbitrary in calculating ethical value which can’t serve as a guide to action b] self-defeating – you wouldn’t take two different pills because a doctor recommended one and a stranger another.

#### 4] Ethical frameworks are topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified. A] resource disparaties b] phil ed

#### 5] Isolating unconditional worth within the other is uniquely liberatory and the basis from which other theories begin, so my offense turns and outweighs yours.

Farr 02

[Arnold Farr(Black Professor of philosophy at University of Kentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. Vol. 33, No. 1. Spring 2002.]

Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.

#### 6] Formal logic requires the imperative ought to be universal

Peetz, V. (1981). Imperative inference--an addendum. Analysis, 41(1), 54–55. doi:10.1093/analys/41.1.54//vp

I AM sorry that Professor Hare (ANALYSIS, 39.4, October 1979, p. 161, footnote 1) thinks that I misrepresented him when I said ('Imperative inference\*, ANALYSIS, 39.2, March 1979) that he had suggested that there are imperative inferences whose premisses are all indicatives. The precise reference in The Language of Morals, which as Hare rightly says I should have given, is page 33, line 25, where Hare says \*. . . there is one kind of imperative conclusion which can be entailed by a set of purely indicative premisses.' Now, of course, Hare is here talking about hypothetical imperatives which he regards as somewhat different from the ordinary imperatives which he had discussed in the previous chapter, but, from my point of view, what I say about imperative inference will also include these hypothetical imperatives. I did mention that Hare had given rules for imperative inference, but I did not say what these rules were and I am sorry if I thereby gave an unbalanced view of what Hare had said. What I should have said, but did not, is that Hare's rules for imperative inference, namely (1) No indicative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which cannot be validly drawn from the indicatives among them alone. (2) No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not contain at least one imperative, will apply in a modified form to inferences containing descriptions of imperatives. The modified form will be something like (1') No indicative conclusion which does not contain a description of an imperative can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which cannot be validly drawn from the indicatives among them, which do not contain descriptions of imperatives, alone. (2') No conclusion describing an imperative can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not contain at least one description of an imperative. **The modified form of these rules will apply also to ought** if it is regarded as descriptive of a prescription and that they do apply is at least part of what is meant by saying that an ought cannot be derived from an is. I would like to suggest that such an ought is sufficient for Hare's needs.As Hare says, the use of a specific ought implies or presupposes a 54 at University of Bath Library & Learning Centre on July 12, 2015 http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from IMPERATIVE INFERENCE AN ADDENDUM 5 5 **universal ought**, so that when one says 'You ought to do X', this presupposes an argument such as Everyone ought always to do X in circumstances C You are now placed in circumstances C Therefore, you ought to do X now (where ought is being used in a descriptive sense). Now according to Grice's conversational maxim (H. P. Grice, 'Logic and Conversation' in Syntax and Semantics Vol. 9, ed. P. Cole, Academic Press, N.Y., 1978) that one ought not to say more or less than one needs to, it would seem that, if the use of ought presupposes an argument such as the one above, then 'You ought to do X' conversationally implies that the speaker subscribes to the prescription, although not actually uttering a prescription himself. If he wants to show that he does not subscribe to the prescription, then he has to deny it specifically: 'You ought to do X, but do not do X'. So, while Hare's rules (in their modified form) are necessary for inferences involving descriptions of imperatives (including oughts). Hare does not need inferences involving explicit imperatives for his moral theory.

#### 7] The existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth—that means we must treat others as ends in themselves.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

### Offense

#### I affirm Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. Spec and definitions in doc.

The – “used to point forward to a following qualifying or defining clause or phrase”. Google. <https://www.google.com/search?q=the+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=the+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i64j69i61j69i60l2.2103j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

Appropriation – “an act or instance of appropriating something”. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/appropriation>

Of – “indicating an association between two entities, typically one of belonging”. <https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60.1494j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

Outer Space – “the physical universe beyond the earth's atmosphere”. <https://www.google.com/search?q=outer+space+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=outer+space+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60.2363j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

By – “identifying the agent performing an action.”. <https://www.google.com/search?q=by+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=by+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59.1433j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

Private Entity – “(A) In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.”. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501>

Unjust – “not morally right; not fair”. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust>

#### The aff identifies appropriation as unjust

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE dialectal present tense first-person and third-person singular of BE dialectal present tense plural of BE

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, , "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)



#### 1] Private outer space appropriation isn’t universalizable and disrespects extra-terrestrial agential ends.

Segobaetso 18 [Brackets Original. Benjamin Segobaetso. “Ethical Implications of the Colonization, Privatization and Commercialization of Outer Space”. Major research paper submitted to the Faculty of Human Sciences and Philosophy, School of Public Ethics, Saint Paul University, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Ethics. May, 2018. Accessed 12/11/21. <https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/38318/1/Benjamin_Segobaetso_2018.pdf> //Xu]

It can be argued through Kantian ethics that our record here on Earth paints a picture of neoliberal and capitalist policies with tendencies to favour the highest bidder at the exclusion of the under privileged and puts profit first at the expense of the environment. For Kantians, there are two questions that we must ask ourselves whenever we decide to act: (i) Can I rationally will that everyone act as I propose to act? If the answer is no, then we must not perform the action. (ii) Does my action respect the goals of human beings? Again, if the answer is no, then we must not perform the action. Kantian ethicists would argue that extending to space neoliberal and capitalist policies is immoral because these systems create economic disparities and life threatening environmental injustices; therefore, they are set up in a way that we could not rationally will everyone to act the way they act either here on Earth or in space. Also, Kantian ethicists would ask whether the action of extending neoliberal and capitalist policies to space would respect the goals of extra-terrestrial intelligent life if any rather than merely using them for humans’ own purposes? If the answer is no, then the participating agent must not perform the action. Kant wrote on the possible existence of extra-terrestrial intelligent species in the final pages of the last book that he published, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht] (1978). In this publication, Kant hinted that the highest concept of the Alien species may be that of a terrestrial rational being [eines irdischen vernünftigen ]; however, he argued that it will be difficult to describe its characteristics because there is no knowledge available of a non-terrestrial rational being [nicht irdischen Wesen] which could be used as a reference in regards to its properties and ultimately classify that terrestrial being as rational. This dilemma will continue until extraterrestrial intelligent life is discovered because comparing two species of rational beings has to be on the basis of experience, but that experience has not been possible yet (Kant, 237-238). In applying Kant’s deontological moral theory, it must first be recognized that Kant visualized a kind of respect in which we all can recognize every rational being exists as an end in itself (1) as being not fully comprehensible by any human understanding, (2) as being an end in him- or herself, and (3) as being a potential source of moral law (Kant, 2012). In this regard, since Kant insinuated that the highest concept of the extraterrestrial intelligent species may be that of a terrestrial rational being [eines irdischen vernünftigen ]; that implies any encounter with extra-terrestrial intelligent life will compel us under the deontological moral theory to recognize that life as being not fully comprehensible by any human understanding, as being an end in itself, and as being a potential source of moral law (Kant, 2012). It must be realized that Kant’s deontology theory does not go without criticism by critical theorists who believe in dismantling all systems of oppression.

#### 2] Property rights are necessarily universalizable and must support global cosmopolitanism which runs contrary to the appropriation of space.

Walla 16 [Brackets Original. (Alice Pinheiro, Department of Philosophy at Trinity College Dublin) “Common Possession of the Earth and Cosmopolitan Right” Kant-Studien Volume 107 Issue 1, 2016] TDI

In the Doctrine of Right, Kant derives nations’ original community of the land from the fact that the possession of individuals (to which they have an original right), can be thought as a part of a determinate whole. National borders in connection with an internal civil condition make the extent of individual possessions relatively determinate. Borders delineate the scope of individual acquisition in a way which, although not peremptory until the institution of a cosmopolitan condition of distributive justice, is closer to the idea of right than leaving individuals to determine the limits of their acquisition in a wholly unilateral way (as in the state of nature). Unlike Locke, Kant has no theoretical resources for establishing the content (Inhalt) of occupation; the prior occupans must decide according to her own judgment if her possession is being infringed upon and consequently have a conception of the extent of her possession. Only the civil condition is able to provide relatively legitimate conditions for determining the scope of acquisition. This necessity makes Kant’s theory far more dependent on the institutionalization of right than Locke’s theory. The territorial rights of states can thus be understood as a necessary step towards a cosmopolitan condition of distributive justice. As Kant formulates in Perpetual Peace, “cosmopolitan rights shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality”. This is a right to offer oneself for commerce (Verkehr) with one another, be the subjects of these rights individuals or nations. As cosmopolitan right makes clear, the idea of common ownership of the earth presents itself under two different modes:(1) as basis of the acquired right of host peoples to their territory, enabling them to decline voluntary interaction, and (2) as the basis for the original right of individual citizens of the world or nations to offer themselves for interaction with foreign nations. In Perpetual Peace Kant called this right “right to visit”, which is neither a right to settle (ius incolatus ) nor to be a guest in the foreign land (kein Gastrecht ). As Kant stresses, host nations retain a right to reject the visitor on the condition that this can be done “without causing his destruction”. Although visitors have no claim to enter the foreign territory, they should not be treated with hostility by the inhabitants, if they behave peacefully. However, the original community of the earth also imposes constraints on the acquired right of host nations to control their borders. Kant makes clear that host nations have the right to reject visitors whenever their reason for interaction is voluntary. Similarly to the original right to a place on the surface of the earth, the right to admission in a foreign territory obtains only under the condition of involuntary occupation of space. Just as the occupation of space by virtue of one’s entry in the world is independent of one’s will, rejecting an involuntary visitor when this would harm or destroy her is incompatible with the original community of the earth. As Kant stresses, in principle no one has more claim to a specific area of the earth than another person. The global distribution of land is thus wholly contingent. Today’s nations can be seen as “permitted” to control a certain territory to the exclusion of others because borders are helpful for determining the extent of individual acquisition, at least within that territory. However, to deny life-saving occupation of space to another being, who is in principle just as entitled as anyone else to any place of the earth would be to contradict the very justification for the territorial rights of states. This is because the permission to control territory and the right of the involuntary visitor to be admitted are based on the same legal foundation or Rechtsgrund, namely, the original community of the earth. Kant could easily have insisted that the acquired right of nations to their territory not only has priority but trumps the original right of persons to occupy space. It is worthy of attention that he did not accept this in the case of involuntary occupation of space. My view is that cosmopolitan right signalizes a contradiction of the right to occupy space with itself under different modalities: on the one hand as the original right of individuals or nations to “be somewhere” (as belonging to the lex iusti) and on the other, the acquired right of peoples to their land (belonging to the lex iuridica). Kant distinguishes between three leges or conditions of justice: lex iusti, lex iuridica and lex iustitiae . The distinction is essential for understanding the relationship between Right as a system of external laws a priori and the subsequent developments of right. As Byrd and Hruschka stressed, the three leges correspond to three categories of modality in the Critique of Pure Reason: possibility (Möglichkeit), reality (Dasein) and necessity (Notwendigkeit ). They can be seen as different “modes” of the same idea of right: original right as the pure rational concept of right (possibility), acquired right as arising from concrete deeds or relations between agents (reality) and peremptory right as legitimized and enforced by a public court of justice (necessity). Although there is a positive development in the transition from the lex iusti, through the lex iuridica, to thelex iustitaedistributivae in the civil condition, the lex iusti is not made superfluous in the civil condition, but is still the source of the normativity, and consequently, of the legitimacy, of all further developments of right. The need for maintaining the compatibility of the development of right with its a priori normative source is what gives rise to cosmopolitan right. In this sense, cosmopolitan right in Kant’s theory has a similar function to the right of necessity in Grotius and imperfect rights and duties in Pufendorf’s theory. They are needed to avoid scenarios which would contradict the rationale for introducing certain rights. While Grotius, following the natural law tradition, appeals to the need of individuals as a basis for the original use right to land and natural resources, Kant does not make the need of individuals the basis of cosmopolitan right. Kant replaces the natural law idea that fundamental needs of human beings provide the content of natural law with the idea of the external exercise of freedom and the impact that unregulated interaction can have for the external freedom of individuals, assuming they have equal juridical status and thus an equal right to non-interference. While Grotius’ right of necessity excuses what would otherwise constitute violations of private property, Kant leaves private property untouched. He restricts himself to limitations to the rights of states to refuse entrants in their territory in case of involuntary occupation of space. Kant does not recognise a right of necessity. As he puts it in the Common Saying, to preserve one’s life is a conditional duty, that is, to be observed if this can be done without injustice (Verbrechen). Although it may seem too inflexible to insist upon the inviolability of private property, property rights are too central in Kant’s legal theory to be compromised. Therefore, the closest Kant comes to imposing limitations on acquired rights is cosmopolitan right. It is important to note how Kant replaces the natural law idea of human fundamental needs with occupation of space. The notion of original communityis used to justifya right to occupy a particular place in the earth. The mere existence of our bodies entails the occupation of a separate area in the world (Separatbesitz), which Kant considers an original right. Original acquisition of space (land) entails acquisition of natural resources, without the appeal to human needs. Further, the kind of community generated by the original right to occupy space is a radically different one from Grotius and Pufendorf. It is constituted by the unity of all potential places individuals can come to occupy on the earth . These potential places are considered disjunctively . Concretely, this means that no one is entitled to any specific area but only to a place on the surface of the earth. Everyone can, in principle, possess this or that place on the earth. The right to occupy a place on the earth is thus a disjunctively universal right(disjunctiv-allgemein). It is therefore only a contingent fact that persons (and consequently nations) have come to occupy a particular place on the earth, for instance, the present territory of France. This contingency plays an important role for Kant’s argument that there is a right to be admitted in case of involuntary interaction. Further, the community of the earth must also be understood as collectively universal (collectiv-allgemein) insofar as it is constituted by the idea of the union of all possible places on the earth . It is therefore not a community in the sense of a joint use of the earth, but a community constituted malgré soi, in virtue of the interconnectedness of all points within the closed spherical surface of the planet. The spatial relations between individuals are what constitute the global community, not God’s gift of the earth to humanity. However, one should not think, as Flikschuh argued, that Kant moved from “the fact of individual acquisition to the idea of original common possession” and thereby “inverted” the natural law sequence from common possession to individual acquisition. This would mean to take the original community to be constituted by empirically given facts. Kant is clear enough that the original community is an idea of reason and not acommunity that was “instituted” (gestiftete Gemeinschaft ). This failure to realize the rational (i.e., original) character of the idea of community of the earth is precisely what Kant takes to be the failure of Grotius’ and Pufendorf’s “primitive community” (uranfängliche Gemeinschaft, communio primaeva ). Kant’s departure from natural law theory is therefore not in an “inversion” of the sequence of ideas, but in his redefinition of central concepts of the natural law in terms of external freedom.

#### Nothing has triggered it, but presumption and permissibility affirm

#### a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false ie if I told you my name is Daniel you would believe me

#### b) Unjust[[1]](#footnote-1) is “not morally right; not fair” and permissibility disproves the positive obligation which is aff ground

#### c) empirics

Shah 19[Shah, Sachin. “A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC.” NSD Update, National Symposium of Debate, 16 Feb. 2019, http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/.] //LHPSS

As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds **from** 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (**2017 – 2019** YTD), **the neg**ative **won 52.99% of ballots** (**p-value < 0.0001)** and 54.63% of upset rounds (p-value < 0.0001). **This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics.**

### Adv

#### Commercial Space Industry requires an enormous increase in launches – that causes pollutants and warming.

Gammon 21 Katharine Gammon 7-19-2021 "How the billionaire space race could be one giant leap for pollution" <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/jul/19/billionaires-space-tourism-environment-emissions> (I’m an award-winning independent science journalist based in Santa Monica, California. My interests range from culture and nature in public lands to the lives of scientists to the complexity of baby brains. Before I became a professional journalist, I served in the Peace Corps in Bulgaria, and attended MIT and Princeton University.)//Elmer

Last week Virgin Galactic took Richard Branson past the edge of space, roughly 86 km up – part of a new space race with the Amazon billionaire Jeff Bezos, who aims to make a similar journey on Tuesday. Both very wealthy businessmen hope to vastly expand the number of people in space. “We’re here to make space more accessible to all,” said Branson, shortly after his flight. “Welcome to the dawn of a new space age.” Already, people are buying tickets to space. Companies including SpaceX, Virgin Galactic and Space Adventures want to make space tourism more common. The Japanese billionaire Yusaku Maezawa spent an undisclosed sum of money with SpaceX in 2018 for a possible future private trip around the moon and back. And this June, an anonymous space lover paid $28m to fly on Blue Origin’s New Shepard with Bezos – though later backed out due to a “scheduling conflict”. But this launch of a new private space industry that is cultivating tourism and popular use could come with vast environmental costs, says Eloise Marais, an associate professor of physical geography at University College London. Marais studies the impact of fuels and industries on the atmosphere. When rockets launch into space, they require a huge amount of propellants to make it out of the Earth’s atmosphere. For SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket, it is kerosene, and for Nasa it is liquid hydrogen in their new Space Launch System. Those fuels emit a variety of substances into the atmosphere, including carbon dioxide, water, chlorine and other chemicals. The carbon emissions from rockets are small compared with the aircraft industry, she says. But they are increasing at nearly 5.6% a year, and Marais has been running a simulation for a decade, to figure out at what point will they compete with traditional sources we are familiar with. “For one long-haul plane flight it’s one to three tons of carbon dioxide [per passenger],” says Marais. For one rocket launch 200-300 tonnes of carbon dioxide are split between 4 or so passengers, according to Marais. “So it doesn’t need to grow that much more to compete with other sources.” Right now, the number of rocket flights is very small: in the whole of 2020, for instance, there were 114 attempted orbital launches in the world, according to Nasa. That compares with the airline industry’s more than 100,000 flights each day on average. But emissions from rockets are emitted right into the upper atmosphere, which means they stay there for a long time: two to three years. Even water injected into the upper atmosphere – where it can form clouds – can have warming impacts, says Marais. “Even something as seemingly innocuous as water can have an impact.” Closer to the ground, all fuels emit huge amounts of heat, which can add ozone to the troposphere, where it acts like a greenhouse gas and retains heat. In addition to carbon dioxide, fuels like kerosene and methane also produce soot. And in the upper atmosphere, the ozone layer can be destroyed by the combination of elements from burning fuels. “While there are a number of environmental impacts resulting from the launch of space vehicles, the depletion of stratospheric ozone is the most studied and most immediately concerning,” wrote Jessica Dallas, a senior policy adviser at the New Zealand Space Agency, in an analysis of research on space launch emissions published last year. Another report from 2019 penned by the Center for Space Policy and Strategy likened the space emissions problem to that of space debris, which the authors say creates an existential risk to the industry. “Today, launch vehicle emissions present a distinctive echo of the space debris problem. Rocket engine exhaust emitted into the stratosphere during ascent to orbit adversely impacts the global atmosphere,” they wrote. “We just don’t know how large the space tourism industry could become,” says Marais. A new market report estimates that the global suborbital transportation and space tourism market is estimated to reach $2.58bn in 2031, growing 17.15% each year of the next decade. “The major driving factor for the market’s robustness will be focused efforts to enable space transportation, emerging startups in suborbital transportation, and increasing developments in low-cost launching sites,” the report says. In the past, most space transportation has been focused on cargo supply missions to the International Space Station and satellite launch services, but currently, this focus has shifted to in-space transportation, planetary explorations, crewed missions, suborbital transportation and space tourism. Several companies, including SpaceX, Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic, have been focusing on developing platforms such as rocket-powered suborbital vehicles that will enable the industry to carry out suborbital transportation and space tourism. People have pointed out that the money these billionaires have poured into space technology could be invested in making life better on our planet, where wildfires, heatwaves and other climate disasters are becoming more frequent as the globe warms up in the climate crisis. “Is anyone else alarmed that billionaires are having their own private space race while record-breaking heatwaves are sparking a ‘fire-breathing dragon of clouds’ and cooking sea creatures to death in their shells?” the former US Labor Secretary Robert Reich tweeted last week. Marais says that there is always an element of excitement to new developments in space – but it’s still possible to be responsible while doing something exciting. She urges caution as the space tourism industry grows, and says there are currently no international rules around the kinds of fuels used and their impact on the environment. “We have no regulations currently around rocket emissions,” she says. “The time to act is now – while the billionaires are still buying their tickets.”

#### unregulated commercialization triples debris and renders satellites unusable.

Fabian 19 (Christopher; January 2019; B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy, thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a M.S. from the University of North Dakota, approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee and in coordination with Dr. Michael Dodge, David Kugler, and Brian Urlacher; University of North Dakota Scholarly Commons, “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy,” <https://commons.und.edu/theses/2455/>)

b. Defect/Defect The ubiquity of space technology has also yielded the negative externality of overcrowding the space domain. Despite its seemingly unlimited size, there are a limited number of useful earth-centric orbits to optimize terrestrial coverage. It is projected that there are over 300,000 medium sized objects capable of causing catastrophic failure of a satellite upon collision currently in earth’s orbit.159 Of these objects, 20,000 are actively tracked by the comparatively robust space surveillance network (SSN) of the United States Air Force, only 1,000 are active payloads, and even fewer have maneuver capability.160 Recent trends indicate that the problem of orbital congestion will only worsen in the coming decades as the barriers to entry are reduced. Launch service cost is rapidly decreasing due to an increased number of service providers and technology revolutions such as reusable rockets. Also, the miniaturization and simplification of satellite payloads further reduces the cost and infrastructure needed to be a spacefairing nation.161 This is evidenced by the near doubling of state operated satellites from 27 in 2000 to over 50 in 2012, coupled with a near doubling in total space objects from 1997 to 2007.162 The accumulation of space debris is a vital concern to the sustainable development of the space environment due to the increased probability of conjunction between active payloads and all other objects that results from crowded orbits. This increase in collision probability occurs proportionally to the number of objects in a given orbital domain. The tripling of orbital debris projected to occur in the next century, due to routine use and accumulation alone, would cause a tenfold increase in the probability of collision. In the event of a catastrophic collision between two objects, the resulting debris cloud could cause a cascading effect. Each successive collision increases the probability of another occurrence in a given orbit until an instability threshold is reached. At this threshold, debris removal due to decay would be negligible compared to debris created by subsequent collisions. As the propagation of debris continues, the cost of launching a satellite would eventually outweigh the benefits received due to the probability of that asset being destroyed by errant debris, effectively rendering the given orbit unusable. This debris propagation model and the dangers associated with it are colloquially referred to as the Kessler Syndrome. Kessler asserts unstable regions of low earth orbit (LEO) currently exist and that, barring the addition of more debris, a major collision would occur once every 10-20 years. If debris doubles, as it has in the last decade, the collision rate would increase to 2.5 years. Although most models’ time scales are on the order of centuries, it is widely accepted that the current rate of debris accumulation will render critical orbits unusable unless immediate measures are taken to return stability.163 There is near universal acceptance of the danger space debris presents, yet little substantive action has been taken to solve the problem. Current debris accumulation and propagation models show that earth orbiting domains are finite resources. Continued unsustainable development moving forward may preclude future usage, making earth orbits rivalrous goods.164 Furthermore, orbital domains are made a non-excludable good by the OST which states, “Outer space… shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind.”165 As a non-excludable public good, space succumbs to the tragedy of the commons where the privately beneficial strategy of space utilization differs significantly from the socially optimal strategy promoting orbital stability.166 Understandably, most analysis has focused on solving the problem of orbital instability by addressing the market failure responsible for debris creation. The current reasoning suggests that if actors creating space debris internalize the cost of their actions, a solution can arise. Proposed solutions run the gamut of ideologies from free market tax incentives, to command and control legislation, to restructuring orbital property rights. Scientific solutions have also been proposed, but technological feasibility and cost remain major problems. Furthermore, analogous environments susceptible to the tragedy of the commons have been examined in hopes that they may prove applicable to the problem of orbit instability.167 This analysis is ultimately useful if the problem is to be solved under nominal conditions, but there is an underlying problem that needs to be addressed before any of these proposed solutions can realistically be enacted.

#### Debris causes ecological destruction because of environmental contamination.

Stockwell 20 [Samuel Stockwell (Research Project Manager, the Annenberg Institute at Brown University). “Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space Companies”. E-International Relations. Jul 20 2020. Accessed 12/7/21. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/> //Xu]

Space debris can be defined as non-purposeful man-made objects that reside in space; made up of inactive parts from former space operations and fragmentations of spacecraft, there are nearly 30,000 pieces of debris in the Earth’s orbit (Pellegrino & Stang, 2016: 25). Despite most debris being centimetres or millimetres in size satellites often travel at the speed of a bullet, meaning that a collision between the two could be catastrophic in terms of environmental, mechanical and financial damage (Black & Butt, 2010: 1). Since the development of the Kessler Syndrome thesis in 1978 – which predicted that space debris may become so dense as to trigger a chain reaction of major collisions – space debris is considered more of a threat to security operations in the near-term than military space activity (Quintana, 2017: 95). Difficulty over determining whether a collision was accidental or a purposeful act further exacerbates this problem, given that “every object in orbit is a threat to everything else in orbit, regardless of its intended function” (Faith, 2012: 86). Such developments have led to the US administration increasingly adopting a securitisation discourse around orbital debris (Bowen, 2014: 47), which may cause concerns as to whether policymakers may react to future American satellite collisions in a militarised manner. A number of NewSpace actors are likely to complicate these worries even further through recent satellite proposals. Whilst Boeing is proposing a constellation of up to 3,000 satellites, SpaceX has even grander goals of creating a constellation consisting of 4,425 satellites, eventually expanding to 12,000 satellites in the near-future (Kosiak, 2019: 7). Putting this into context, there are currently just around 1,400 active satellites in orbit around the Earth, highlighting the scale of these projects. The collision between a single US privately-owned Iridium satellite and state-owned Russian Cosmos satellite in 2009 underscored not only the sheer amount of debris caused by these collisions – over 1,500 pieces – but also foreshadowed the possible geopolitical tensions that may arise from them (Wang, 2010: 87-88). Given the number of various commercial satellite constellations possibly going into orbit in the near-future, this raises questions over the possibly devastating security hazards they could pose once in orbit or when they eventually become defunct. Yet the proliferation of these commercial satellite plansalso pose significant environmental issues. Article IX of the OST asserts that: “States shall pursue activities of outer space in a manner that avoids any harmful contamination or adverse environmental changes on Earth” (UN, 1967). However, the use of terms like ‘harmful’ or ‘adverse change’ underscores the lack of specificity over what exactly constitutes environmental damage, or for whom it must refrain from harming. There is also a failure to address the explicit problem of space debris since the discourse is primarily concentrated on chemical effluent pollution, undermining attempts to facilitate the removal of floating wreckage(Gupta, 2016: 26). The inability of the OST to properly promote environmental considerations in space has been mirrored in the NewSpace community, where there has been a woeful lack of ecological consideration: “The hundreds of articles and books on outer space resource development seldom mention that such actions may adversely affect the environment in ways that will potentially disadvantage their enterprises and the humans that will be required to implement them” (Kramer, 2017: 136). Such images evoke the types of difficulties that private firms have encountered on Earth reconciling capital with the environment in a way that doesn’t damage profit margins (Magdoff & Foster, 2011: 61-66). Yet in doing so, this neglect is only likely to result in the proliferation of extra-terrestrial debris that the UN OST failed to address. Indeed, despite its vastness there is only a narrow region of orbital space that is either useable or beneficial for prolonged human missions (Brearley, 2005: 2), meaning that the increase in space debris from these massive commercial satellite constellations will likely be at the detriment of developing nations who have yet fostered spacefaring capabilities. Elon Musk’s SpaceX company has already caused complications for Earth-bound astrologists. The brightness of his recent ‘Starlink’ satellite constellation system in comparison to other satellites has been obscuring telescopic images (see Grush, 2020). More concerningly, Starlink may be much more visible during twilight hours which could be problematic in identifying potentially hazardous asteroids in a timely manner (The Verge, 2020). In this sense, whilst private space entrepreneurs are able to increase their profitability from being able to establish constellations, such endeavours are spoiling the scientific work of researchers on Earth that may complicate the monitoring of Earth-based asteroid impacts.

#### extinction.

Sears 21 (, N., 2021. Great Powers, Polarity, and Existential Threats to Humanity: An Analysis of the Distribution of the Forces of Total Destruction in International Security. [online] ResearchGate. Available at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350500094> [Accessed 22 November 2021] Nathan Alexander Sears is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at The University of Toronto. Before beginning his PhD, he was a Professor of International Relations at the Universidad de Las Américas, Quito. His research focuses on international security and the existential threats to humanity posed by nuclear weapons, climate change, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence. His PhD dissertation is entitled, “International Politics in the Age of Existential Threats”)-re-cut rahulpenu

Climate Change Humanity faces existential risks from the large-scale destruction of Earth’s natural environment making the planet less hospitable for humankind (Wallace-Wells 2019). The decline of some of Earth’s natural systems may already exceed the “planetary boundaries” that represent a “safe operating space for humanity” (Rockstrom et al. 2009). Humanity has become one of the driving forces behind Earth’s climate system (Crutzen 2002). The major anthropogenic drivers of climate change are the burning of fossil fuels (e.g., coal, oil, and gas), combined with the degradation of Earth’s natural systems for absorbing carbon dioxide, such as deforestation for agriculture (e.g., livestock and monocultures) and resource extraction (e.g., mining and oil), and the warming of the oceans (Kump et al. 2003). While humanity has influenced Earth’s climate since at least the Industrial Revolution, the dramatic increase in greenhouse gas emissions since the mid-twentieth century—the “Great Acceleration” (Steffen et al. 2007; 2015; McNeill & Engelke 2016)— is responsible for contemporary climate change, which has reached approximately 1°C above preindustrial levels (IPCC 2018). Climate change could become an existential threat to humanity if the planet’s climate reaches a “Hothouse Earth” state (Ripple et al. 2020). What are the dangers? There are two mechanisms of climate change that threaten humankind. The direct threat is extreme heat. While human societies possesses some capacity for adaptation and resilience to climate change, the physiological response of humans to heat stress imposes physical limits—with a hard limit at roughly 35°C wet-bulb temperature (Sherwood et al. 2010). A rise in global average temperatures by 3–4°C would increase the risk of heat stress, while 7°C could render some regions uninhabitable, and 11–12°C would leave much of the planet too hot for human habitation (Sherwood et al. 2010). The indirect effects of climate change could include, inter alia, rising sea levels affecting coastal regions (e.g., Miami and Shanghai), or even swallowing entire countries (e.g., Bangladesh and the Maldives); extreme and unpredictable weather and natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes and forest fires); environmental pressures on water and food scarcity (e.g., droughts from less-dispersed rainfall, and lower wheat-yields at higher temperatures); the possible inception of new bacteria and viruses; and, of course, large-scale human migration (World Bank 2012; Wallace-Well 2019; Richards, Lupton & Allywood 2001). While it is difficult to determine the existential implications of extreme environmental conditions, there are historic precedents for the collapse of human societies under environmental pressures (Diamond 2005). Earth’s “big five” mass extinction events have been linked to dramatic shifts in Earth’s climate (Ward 2008; Payne & Clapham 2012; Kolbert 2014; Brannen 2017), and a Hothouse Earth climate would represent terra incognita for humanity. Thus, the assumption here is that a Hothouse Earth climate could pose an existential threat to the habitability of the planet for humanity (Steffen et al. 2018., 5). At what point could climate change cross the threshold of an existential threat to humankind? The complexity of Earth’s natural systems makes it extremely difficult to give a precise figure (Rockstrom et al. 2009; ). However, much of the concern about climate change is over the danger of crossing “tipping points,” whereby positive feedback loops in Earth’s climate system could lead to potentially irreversible and self-reinforcing “runaway” climate change. For example, the melting of Arctic “permafrost” could produce additional warming, as glacial retreat reduces the refractory effect of the ice and releases huge quantities of methane currently trapped beneath it. A recent study suggests that a “planetary threshold” could exist at global average temperature of 2°C above preindustrial levels (Steffen et al. 2018; also IPCC 2018). Therefore, the analysis here takes the 2°C rise in global average temperatures as representing the lower-boundary of an existential threat to humanity, with higher temperatures increasing the risk of runaway climate change leading to a Hothouse Earth. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change set the goal of limiting the increase in global average temperatures to “well below” 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C. If the Paris Agreement goals are met, then nations would likely keep climate change below the threshold of an existential threat to humanity. According to Climate Action Tracker (2020), however, current policies of states are expected to produce global average temperatures of 2.9°C above preindustrial levels by 2100 (range between +2.1 and +3.9°C), while if states succeed in meeting their pledges and targets, global average temperatures are still projected to increase by 2.6°C (range between +2.1 and +3.3°C). Thus, while the Paris Agreements sets a goal 6 that would reduce the existential risk of climate change, the actual policies of states could easily cross the threshold that would constitute an existential threat to humanity (CAT 2020).

#### It's the most probable scenario for Extinction – you can’t negotiate with the environment.

Wagner and Weitzman 15 (Gernot Wagner, Ph.D. Student in Political Economy and Government, Harvard University & Martin Weitzman Professor of Economics at Harvard University, “How does climate stack up against other worst-case scenarios?”, Excerpt from “Climate Shock”)

What then, if anything, still distinguishes climate change from the others remaining: biotechnology, nanotechnology, nukes and pandemics? For one, the relatively high chance of eventual planetary catastrophe. In Climate Shock, we zero in on eventual average global warming of 6°C (11°F) as the final cutoff few would doubt represents a true planetary catastrophe. Higher temperatures are beyond anyone’s grasp. Yet our current path doesn’t exclude eventual average global warming above 6°C. In fact, our own analysis puts the likelihood at around 10 percent, and that’s for an indisputable global catastrophe. Climate change would trigger plenty of catastrophic events with temperatures rising by much less than 6°C. Many scientists would name 2°C (3.6°F) as the threshold, and we are well on our way to exceeding that, unless there is a major global course correction. Second, the gap between our current efforts and what’s needed on climate change is enormous. We are no experts on any of the other worst-case scenarios, but there at least it seems like much is already being done. Take nuclear terrorism. The United States alone spends many hundreds of billions of dollars each year on its military, intelligence and security services. That doesn’t stamp out the chance of terrorism. Some of the money spent may even be fueling it, and there are surely ways to approach the problem more strategically at times, but at least the overall mission is to protect the United States and its citizens. It would be hard to argue that U.S. climate policy today benefits from anything close to this type of effort. As for mitigating pandemics, more could surely be spent on research, monitoring and rapid response, but here too it seems like needed additional efforts would plausibly amount to a small fraction of national income. Third, climate change has firm historical precedence. There’s ample reason to believe that pumping carbon dioxide into the atmosphere is reliving the past — the distant past, but the past nonetheless. The planet has seen today’s carbon dioxide levels before: over 3 million years ago, with sea levels some 20 meters higher than today, and camels roaming the high Arctic. There are considerable uncertainties in all of this, but there’s little reason to believe that humanity can cheat basic physics and chemistry. Contrast the historical precedent of climate change with that of biotechnology, or rather the lack of it. The fear that bioengineered genes and genetically modified organisms will wreak havoc in the wild is a prime example. They may act like invasive species in some areas, but a global takeover seems unlikely, to say the least. Much like climate change, historical precedent can give us some guidance. But unlike climate change, that same historical precedent gives us quite a bit of comfort. Nature itself has tried for millions of years to create countless combinations of mutated DNA and genes. The process of natural selection all but guarantees that only a tiny fraction of the very fittest permutations has survived. Genetically modified crops grow bigger and stronger and are pesticideresistant. But they can’t outgrow natural selection entirely. None of that yet guarantees that scientists wouldn’t be able to develop permutations that could wreak havoc in the wild, but historical experience would tell us that the chance is indeed slim. In fact, the best scientists working on biotechnology seem to be much less concerned about the dangers of “Frankenfoods” and GMOs than the general public. The reverse holds true for climate change. The best climate scientists appear to be significantly more concerned about ultimate climate impacts than the majority of the general public and many policy makers. That alone should give us pause.

1. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust

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