# Speech 1AC Glenbrooks Rd 4 vs Millburn 11-20 5PM

## 1AR

#### Interp – at the Yale 2021 Invitational, debaters must keep their cameras on for the duration of the round.

Glenbrooks Tab [“RULES, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES”. 2021. <https://www.tabroom.com/index/tourn/index.mhtml?webpage_id=14418&tourn_id=20143> //Xu]

Debaters are required to have their cameras on during the time that they are speaking. Judges are required to have their cameras on while students are speaking, while sharing who they voted for, and while explaining their decision.

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

#### Comes first –

#### 1] Jurisdiction – they broke rules which is a side constraint on the ballot – judging contracts implicitly consent to all tournament rules to decide a round.

#### 2] Risk of DQs O/W – debaters could be kicked out of the tournament which is the highest impact and a prereq.

#### Violation – theirs is off – SS

#### 1] Cheating – cameras-off incentives calling outside coaches but cameras-on allows competitors to verify there’s no oral communication take debates out of individuals hands – renders every claim false since we don’t know if they’re doing the better debating.

#### 2] Community – cameras-off environment renders debate impersonable – psychic violence o/w since it’s a side constraint on the pedagogical values of debate and durability since it affects debaters outside of round.

Terada 21 [Youki Terada (Research and Standards Editor @ Edutopia). “The Camera-On/Camera-Off Dilemma”. Edutopia. February 5, 2021. Accessed 9/9/21. <https://www.edutopia.org/article/camera-oncamera-dilemma> //Xu]

Students, too, benefit from being able to see each other onscreen. In the study, a majority indicated that “using videoconferencing helped build trust and rapport with other students and helped them to develop a sense of identification with others in their group.” The social context of living classrooms—the often-invisible human connection that reinforces learning—was missing for students, who insisted “that being able to hear and see each other in real time helped construct a ‘more complete picture’ of their peers.”

## AC

Theory paradigm after phil

Note – some of my cards don’t have page numbers cuz they are websties so it doesn’t exixt

### FW

#### Perspectivism is true –

#### 1] Opacity – we can never access another person’s perspective because we can never fully understand who someone else is or what they think. Every truth I create cannot be universalized because I can’t guarantee that they will create the same truth because they do what they want.

#### 2] Resolvability – Centuries of moral debate proves we can’t come to an objectively correct answer so it has to be indexed to individual subjects. High school debaters can’t come to a correct conclusion on their own and moral dilemmas are too complicated to “solve” in 45 minutes, so you should prefer a perspectivist account.

#### 3] The theory of relativity proves that objective reality does not exist but only in the reference to the observer.

**Berghofer 20** [Philipp Berghofer (a graduate student at University of Graz, Institute of Philosophy). “Scientific perspectivism in the phenomenological tradition”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science volume. 16 June 2020. Accessed 4/17/21. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13194-020-00294-w> //Xu]

Concerning general relativity, Merleau-Ponty states: The physics of relativity confirms that absolute and final objectivity is a mere dream by showing how each particular observation is strictly linked to the location of the observer and cannot be abstracted from this particular situation; it also rejects the notion of an absolute observer. We can no longer flatter ourselves with the idea that, in science, the exercise of a pure and unsituated intellect can allow us to gain access to an object free of all human traces, just as God would see it. This does not make the need for scientific research any less pressing; in fact, the only thing under attack is the dogmatism of a science that thinks itself capable of absolute and complete knowledge. We are simply doing justice to each of the variety of elements in human experience and, in particular, to sensory perception. (Merleau-Ponty 2004, 44f.) It is to be noted that Merleau-Ponty’s remark is misleading since in the theory of relativity observation is not linked to the location of the observer but to the frame of reference of the observer.Footnote21 The principle of relativity implies that there is no privileged frame of reference; the laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames of reference. Special relativity is built upon the principle of relativity (first postulate) and the postulate that in a vacuum the speed of light is constant for all observers. Together, these two postulates have several implications that show that some of the facts that we usually consider to be “objective” are in fact observer-dependent. For instance, special relativity implies the relativity of simultaneity: It depends on the observer’s frame of reference whether two events separated in space occur at the same time. There is no objective or absolute sense in which we could tell that two spatially separate events take place simultaneously. When we turn to general relativity, we see that space and time are not absolute, not a fixed background, but that the geometry of spacetime itself is influenced by what is going on within spacetime, namely by the energy-momentum of matter. This means that there is a reciprocal relationship between spacetime and what it contains (including the embodied observer).Footnote22

**This commits us to practical deliberation as the method of moral inquiry   
Serra 09**Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member. https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/905

This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that ethics is valuable as a science in a broad sense. But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, through the examination of past actions and the self-correction of the self in view of future action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life can be lived. In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his system, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct (or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re- search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, moral inquiry is performed in a deliberative way, weighing up argumentations, beliefs and principles, and comparing them either with their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as well as possible experiences that can be forceful or impinge upon the deliberative subject in such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint- ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and thought experiments... Such responsiveness is part of what it is to make a moral decision and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)3. Likewise, this same deliberative activity implies an effort to acquire habits, beliefs and principles that contribute to a truly free deliberation which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas- ticity and receptiveness to experience4. Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi- ment carried out within imagination that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef- forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con- crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even more, according to Peirce, the activity takes the form of experimentation in the inner world; and the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. The real and living logical conclusion is that habit (CP 5.491, 1907). Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided (CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in- fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative subject.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with pragmatic deliberation.

#### Impact Calc – deliberation is procedural, which means that agents ought to act in a deliberative fashion by employing the pragmatic procedure of deliberation, not the substance or conditions where deliberation can arise. To clarify, consequences are a sequencing question.

#### 1] impacts cannot be isolated from their history and the only way to test the validity of truth is through application.

**Dewey 02** [John Dewey (head of the Philosophy Department at the University of Chicago). “The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality: II. Its Significance for Conduct.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Jul., 1902), pp. 353-371. Accessed 12/31/20. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2176470.pdf> //Recut Xu]

The problem of the best method of arriving at correct judg- ments on points of moral worth, necessarily traverses ground covered by the time-honored and time-worn theories of intuition- alism and empiricism. Even at the risk of threshing old straw, it will be advisable to compare the evolutionary method with these other points of view. In such a comparison, however, it is to be borne in mind that the sole point under review is that of the log- ical relationship of the theory examined to the meaning and sanc- tion of our moral judgments. The question is not whether or no there are intuitions; whether or no they can be utilized in special cases, or whether or no all supposed intuitions can be accounted for as products of associative memory. The problem is not one of fact but of value. It is a logical problem. If we suppose such necessary and universal beliefs as go by the name of ' intuition' to exist, does such existence settle anything regarding the valid- ity of what is believed, either in general or in part? It is a question of the relation of the intuition to fact -to the moral order in reality. Under what conditions alone, and in what measure or degree, are we justified in arguing from the existence of moral intuitions as mental states and acts to facts taken to correspond to them ? The reply already hinted at is that the mere existence of a belief, even admitting that as a belief it cannot in any way be got rid of, determines absolutely nothing regarding the objectivity of its own content. The worth of the intuition depends upon genetic considerations. In so far as we can state the intuition in terms of the conditions of its origin, development, and later career, in so far we have some criterion for passing judgment upon its pretentions to validity. If we can find that the intuition is a legitimate response to enduring and deep-seated conditions, we have some reason to attribute worth to it. If we find that historically the belief has played a part in maintaining the integrity of social life, and in bringing new values into it, our belief in its worth is additionally guaranteed. But if we cannot find such historic origin and functioning, the intuition remains a mere state of consciousness, a hallucination, an illusion, which is not made more worthy by simply multiplying the number of people who have participated in it. Put roughly we may say that intuitionalism, asordinarily conceived, makes the ethical belief a brute fact, because unrelated. Its very lack of genetic relationship to the situation in which it appears condemns it to isolation. This isolation logically makes it impossible to credit it with objective validity. The intuitionalist, in proclaiming the necessity of his content, proclaims thereby its objective reference; but in asserting its non-genetic character he denies any reference whatsoever. The genetic theory holds that the content embodied in any so-called intuition is a response to a given active situation: that it arises, develops, and operates somehow in reference to this situation. This functional reference establishes in advance some kind of relationship to objective conditions, and hence some presumption of validity. If the ' intuition' persists, it is within certain limits because the situation persists. If the particular moral belief is really inexpugnable, it is just because the conditions which require it are so enduring as to persistently call out an attitude which is relevant to them. The probability is that it continues in existence simply because it continues to be necessary in function.

#### 2] Pluralistic Materialism – other theories rely on minimalistic criteria; our framework understands knowledge as changing and uses experience to base social change and revise ideas. Glaude 7Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the African-American chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (5-7)

In a Shade of Blue is my contribution to the tradition I have just sketched. My aim is to think through some of the more pressing conceptual problems confronting African American political life, and I do so as a Deweyan prag-matist. I should say a bit about what I mean by this self-description. John Dewey thought of philosophy as a form of cultural and social criticism. He held the view that philosophy, properly understood as a mode of wis-dom, ought to aid us in our efforts to overcome problematic situations and worrisome circumstances. The principal charge of the philosopher, then, is to deal with the problems of human beings, not simply with the problems of philosophers. For Dewey, over the course of his long career, this involved bridging the divide between science, broadly understood, and morals—a divide he traced to a conception of experience that has led philosophers over the centuries to tilt after windmills. Dewey declared, “The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.”9Dewey bases this conclusion on several features of his philosophy: (1) anti foundationalism, (2) experimentalism, (3) contextualism, and (4) soli-darity.10 Antifoundationalism, of course, is the rejection of foundations of knowledge that are beyond question. Dewey, by contrast, understands knowledge to be the fruit of our undertakings as we seek “the enrichment of our immediate experience through the control over action it exercises.”11He insists that we turn our attention from supposed givens to actual consequences, pursuing a future fundamentally grounded in values shaped by experience and realized in our actions. This view makes clear the experimental function of knowledge. Dewey emphasized that knowledge entails efforts to control and select future experience and that we are always con-fronted with the possibility of error when we act. We experiment or tinker, with the understanding that all facts are fallible and, as such, occasionally afford us the opportunity for revision.12Contextualism refers to an understanding of beliefs, choices, and actions as historically conditioned. Dewey held the view that inquiry, or the pursuit of knowledge, is value-laden, in the sense that we come to problems with interests and habits that orient us one way or another, and that such pursuits are also situational, in the sense that “knowledge is pursued and produced somewhere, some when, and by someone.”13Finally, solidarity captures the associational and cooperative dimensions of Dewey’s thinking. Dewey conceives of his pragmatism as “an instrument of social improvement” aimed principally at expanding democratic life and broadening the ground of individual self-development.14Democracy, for him, constitutes more than a body of formal procedures; it is a form of life that requires constant attention if we are to secure the ideals that purportedly animate it. Individuality is understood as developing one’s unique capacities within the context of one’s social relations and one’s community. The formation of the democratic character so important to our form of associated living involves, then, a caring disposition toward the plight of our fellows and a watchful concern for the well-being of our democratic life.

#### 3] Best studies prove pluralistic tendencies are inevitable

Polzler 19[Thomas Pölzler and Jennifer Cole Wright- “Empirical research on folk moral objectivism” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6686698/> NCBI. Published July 5th 2019]

Examining these studies' results more closely, however, makes it less clear whether this interpretation is appropriate (Pölzler, 2018b). Take again Goodwin and Darley's study. In this study, almost 30% of subjects' responses to the disagreement measure and almost 50% of their responses to the truth‐aptness measure fell on the option that the researchers took to be indicative of subjectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, pp. 1347, 1351). Moreover, while some moral statements were dominantly classified as objective (e.g., the above statement about robbery), many others were dominantly classified as nonobjective (e.g., the stem cell research statement). This suggests that subjects in Goodwin and Darley's study may have actually favored what Wright, Grandjean, and McWhite (2013) called “metaethical pluralism,” i.e., they sometimes sided with objectivism and other times with nonobjectivism. More recent studies have by and large confirmed this hypothesis of folk metaethical pluralism. Wright et al. (2013) and Wright, McWhite, and Grandjean (2014), for example, replicated Goodwin and Darley's results, using the exact same measures, but letting subjects classify the presented statements as moral and nonmoral themselves. Objectivity ratings for statements that were dominantly self‐classified as moral varied between as little as 5% and as much as 85%. Research based on different measures yielded high proportions of intrapersonal variation as well (e.g., Beebe, 2014; Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Fisher, Knobe, Strickland, & Keil, 2017; Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, 2017; Wright, 2018; Zijlstra, forthcoming‐a).2

#### 4] Governmental action necessitates public deliberation of affected citizens.

**Christman 15** [Bracketed for Clarity. John Christman (Professor of Philosophy, Political Science, and Women's Studies at Penn State University). “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Mon Jul 28, 2003; substantive revision Fri Jan 9, 2015. Accessed 6/12/20. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/> //Xu]

In closing, we should add a word about the implications of political liberalism for the traditional division between liberal justice and democratic theory. I say “division” here, but different views of justice and democracy will convey very different conceptions of the relation between the two (see Christiano 1996, Lakoff 1996). But traditionally, liberal conceptions of justice have viewed democratic mechanisms of collective choice as essential but highly circumscribed by the constitutional provisions that principles of justice support. Individual rights and freedoms, equality before the law, and various privileges and protections associated with citizen autonomy are protected by principles of justice and hence not subject to democratic review, on this approach (Gutmann 1993). However, liberal conceptions of justice have themselves evolved (in some strains at least) to include reference to collective discussion and debate (public reason) among the constitutive conditions of legitimacy. It could be claimed, then, that basic assumptions about citizens' capacities for reflective deliberation and choice — autonomy — must be part of the background conditions against which an overlapping consensus or other sort of political agreement concerning principles of justice is to operate. Some thinkers have made the connection between individual or “private” autonomy and collective or “public” legitimacy — prominent, most notably Habermas (Habermas 1994). On this view, legitimacy and justice cannot be established in advance through philosophical construction and argument, as was thought to be the case in natural law traditions in which classical social contract theory flourished and which is inherited (in different form) in contemporary perfectionist liberal views. Rather, justice amounts to that set of principles that are established in practice and rendered legitimate by the actual support of affected citizens (and their representatives) in a process of collective discourse and deliberation (see e.g., Fraser 1997, 11–40 and Young 2000). Systems of rights and protections (private, individual autonomy) will necessarily be protected in order to institutionalize frameworks of public deliberation (and, more specifically, legislation and constitutional interpretation) that render principles of social justice acceptable to all affected (in consultation with others) (Habermas 1994, 111). This view of justice, if at all acceptable, provides an indirect defense of the protection of autonomy and, in particular, conceptualizing autonomy in a way that assumes reflective self- evaluation. For only if citizen participants in the public discourse that underlies justice are assumed to have (and provided the basic resources for having) capacities for competent self- reflection, can the public defense and discussion of competing conceptions of justice take place (cf. Gaus 1996, Parts II and III, Gaus 2011). Insofar as autonomy is necessary for a functioning democracy (considered very broadly), and the latter is a constitutive element of just political institutions, then autonomy must be seen as reflective self-appraisal (and, I would add, non-alienation from central aspects of one's person) (see Cohen 2002, Richardson 2003). This approach to justice and autonomy, spelled out here in rough and general form, has certainly faced criticism. In particular, those theorists concerned with the multi-dimensional nature of social and cultural “difference” have stressed how the conception of the autonomous person assumed in such principles (as well as criteria for rational discourse and public deliberation) is a contestable ideal not internalized by all participants in contemporary political life (see, e.g., Brown 1995, Benhabib 1992). Others motivated by post-modern considerations concerning the nature of the self, rationality, language, and identity, are also suspicious of the manner in which the basic concepts operative in liberal theories of justice (“autonomy” for example) are understood as fixed, transparent, and without their own political presuppositions (see, e.g., Butler 1990; for general discussion see White 1990). These charges are stated here much too generally to give an adequate response in this context. But the challenge remains for any theory of justice which rests on a presumption of the normative centrality of autonomy. To be plausible in a variously pluralistic social setting, such a view must avoid the twin evils of forcibly imposing a (reasonably) contested value on resistant citizens, on the one hand, and simply abandoning all normative conceptions of social order in favor of open ended struggle for power on the other. The view that individuals ought to be treated as, and given the resources to become, autonomous in one of the minimal senses outlined here will, I submit, be a central element in any political view that steers between the Scylla of oppressive forms of perfectionism and the Charybdis of interest-group power politics.

#### 5] Performativity- when you enter debate, you presume that you can discuss the topic because of deliberation. This means denial of my framework is impossible and all objections should be ignored on face because responding to my framework requires my framework to do so.

#### 6] Normative Necessity- If you’re unsure what the good is, allow for deliberation because it allows people to pursue their conception of the good and discuss it. This means that epistemic modesty collapses because it means we need to include various viewpoints, which is prag

#### 7] **Rule Following Paradox-** There is nothing inherent to a rule that tells us how we ought to follow it, which proves no internal motivation or direction to follow a particular rule, regardless of how correct the rule is. Since only our interpretation can tell us how to follow the rule, there can be no incorrect application. Only deliberation accounts for the diversity of interpretations of our norms.

### Affirm

#### 1] Strikes are intrinsically tied to public forums that provide opportunities for deliberation. Simms 18

Melanie Simms, 3-23-2018, "Why workers go on strike," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/why-workers-go-on-strike-93815

Both of these demonstrate how a strike around a fairly technical employment issue can develop a momentum of its own and become a catalyst for a much wider expression of dissatisfaction about the changing bargains being made. As with the concerns raised by junior doctors about [the management of the NHS](https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/01/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-junior-doctors-strike), the higher education pension dispute has rapidly become a space in which to question the [broader direction of the sector](https://theconversation.com/university-lecturer-explains-why-academics-are-striking-over-pension-cuts-93039). In this context, emotions can run high. Many relationships are strengthened, but some inevitably become strained. By definition, strikes are not business as usual. What then becomes important, is how the parties can explicitly negotiate compromises that smooth the way back to work – even if that means negotiating a new normal.

#### 2] The right to strike is justified on the basis of the right to self-determination and justification – strikes are a form of communicative action and to deny it as a right would generate a contradiction, Borman ’16:

Borman, David A. "Contractualism and the Right to Strike." *Res publica* 23.1 (2017): 81-98. Yoaks

To summarize: the conflict between labour and capital and government which is made manifest in a strike is not located at the first-order level where a specific schedule of putative rights is to be justified or constrained; instead, it takes place at the more fundamental level where the right to have rights (in this domain), or the salience of normative justification, is itself contested. In the strike, a demand for justification is confronted with (often, is inspired by) a refusal to justify: implicit or explicit (second-order) moral claims collide with (unjustified) norm-excluding assertions of interest. If this characterization is correct, then non-instrumental contractualism might appear to have advanced no farther than Nielsen, when he awkwardly concludes that the conditions are not yet right for morality. Although agreements here concern what is right, contractualists do not exclude consideration of existing interest positions: to the contrary, they argue in one form or another that a norm is to be judged legitimate if it can be reasonably accepted from the point of view of all affected, taking into account the effects the general observance of the norm could be anticipated to have on their interests (Habermas 1990, p. 65). But if this is so, then the present prospects for justifying a right to strike might be thought bleak indeed. As Nielsen observed, the recognition of such a right is very much in contradiction to the existing interests of employers, so that a consensus on this point ‘would only be possible if the capitalists generally—and not just in isolated instances [ala` Engels and Owen, above]—would in the interests of fairness and humaneness de-class themselves voluntarily. But,’ Nielsen sagely concludes, ‘it is an idle dream to expect this to happen’ (Nielsen 1989, p. 127). Prima facie, given the difficulty just described, hypothetical-agreement-contractualism might seem to have an important advantage over its rival: namely, its willingness to declare that some interests—such as the interest in maintaining positions of asymmetrical power—are not legitimate (Scanlon 1997, p. 278). But for the actual-agreement contractualist, there are two problems with this response. First, it is not clear that there is a defensible point of view from which we are able to distinguish unilaterally and conclusively between legitimate and illegitimate interests on someone else’s behalf—hence Forst’s prohibition of such claims or, better, ‘diagnoses’. Second, even if I am able to carry through the argument that the interests standing in the way of justifying a right to strike—which do so by blocking the communicative orientation or a presupposed right to self-determination in the first place—are such that they may be ‘reasonably rejected’, it is not clear to the actual-agreement contractualist (a position influenced by pragmatism) what the good would be of such a unilateral defence. Typically, the motivational significance of deontological justification is to deprive the would-be violator of rights of all legitimate reasons for their actions (for instance, by proving that there can be no good reason for cheating). But in the case at hand, depriving opponents of their ability to justify their refusal to recognize rights is pointless, since that refusal takes the form of a refusal of justification itself. Put differently: we cannot leap to the question of whether employers would be unreasonable to reject the right to strike, since we must first deal with the question of what types of reasons or considerations are relevant and it is here that the disagreement is stalled. Because the conflict occurs at the fundamental level where the types of reasons that are salient is itself in dispute, the actual-agreement approach seems to fare hardly better: the project of justification as it is described by Forst and Benhabib cannot get off the ground. Workers, by making some purportedly legitimate firstorder demand, simultaneously assert their right to have rights in the domain of labour; the law and employers refuse to take up that claim in a communicative attitude and insist instead on a compromise-orientation framed by considerations of relative power. Because existing relations of power are so asymmetrical, employers are able today—and at the level of the development of law, have historically been able—to force the orientation toward compromise upon their interlocutors. Of course, the first-order move on the part of employers implies a second-order commitment that the economy operate as a ‘norm-free’ or ‘justification-free’ sphere of the play of interests, money, and power, a commitment which itself calls for justification. But the impasse is simply repeated at the second-order level: as I’ve already argued, there is no genuine effort (nor was there historically) to normatively justify this view in terms acceptable to workers, an effort which would require taking up communicatively, even if critically, the moral-normative claims of workers and so accepting (by presupposition) their right to have rights. Instead, as the dissenting Justices in Saskatchewan continued to argue, the economy is to be regarded as a ‘delicate’, technical system in which competing interest are in a complex balance; the state must have the ‘flexibility’ to intervene as the system requires and because of this the Court, even when faced with a Charter challenge, must ‘demonstrate deference in the field of labour relations’ apparently irrespective of the force of reason (Saskatchewan 2015, paras. 107 and 114). Thus, rather than being a question of applied ethics, the issues raised by the strike tend toward the meta-ethical: can the demand to justify itself be justified in a way that is compelling from the perspective of those who refuse to argue? If we could answer this in the affirmative, the right to strike would immediately come under the general defence of justification; the remaining questions to be settled within discourse would concern only the legitimacy of particular strikes and particular demands (none of which would challenge the right to strike itself). There is little hope, I think, of arriving at such a result via informal logic: morality is a practical, historical device and the limits of practices of reason-giving are determined by social struggle. Probably all of the contractualists I have mentioned here would accept this judgment in some form; but it certainly has a greater affinity with, and so perhaps offers some reason to prefer, the approach of the actual-agreement contractualists insofar as the latter see the scope of morality as the product of ‘political struggles, social movements, and learning processes’ (Benhabib 2007, p. 16). For hypothetical-agreement contractualists like Scanlon, morally motivated social struggle must have two distinct stages: first, contractualist reasoners have independent insight into what cannot be reasonably rejected; second, they engage in social struggle, armed with this prior, independent, and already completed justification for their conduct. For the actual-agreement contractualist, at least full justification only emerges at the end of the struggle, with the successful effort to convince others and so reach agreement (see Borman 2015a). When it is a question of opening up some domain of human life to moral questioning, the actual agreement account seems a better fit for the messy outcomes of historical struggle, of which the labour movement is an especially good example. Historically, workers saw labour, its terms and conditions, as a moral question. The presently ambiguous status of the right to strike reflects the unresolved legacy or, to put it more harshly, the historical failure or defeat of the labour rights movement in this regard. Indeed, the ‘special interest’ character of many trade unions today, which confine themselves to advancing the narrowly defined employment interests of their members (for which they are ridiculed by their anti-union critics) is the result of the systematic repression of a much broader labour movement which actively sought connections with broader concerns of social justice. It is noteworthy, in this respect, that by the 1950s in the U.S., secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes were illegal (Lambert 2005, pp. 62–63). Where does this leave the right to strike? If morality is regarded as a practical project of coordinating action and action-effects via legitimized norms, then it is enough to show how workers who demand such a right are reasonable to do so while employers who refuse to engage with the claim are not. Operating on the premises of actual-agreement-contractualism, it is in fact easy to accomplish this: I would propose that, because the scope of morality is defined by the pursuit of rationally legitimated norms, every sincerely raised and undefeated demand for justification— every assertion of the right to justification—is presumptively or pro tanto legitimate. This does not mean that every particular strike is actually legitimate any more than any proposed substantive right is automatically justified. The right to have rights is justified presumptively as an implication of the mere raising of any given rights-claim, and so similarly, the right to self-determination in labour is justified presumptively by the mere raising of any labour-rights-claim. Any attempt to take-up, even in order to reject the right to have rights would presuppose its recognition, and the same may be said for the right to self-determination. Let me repeat this deceptively simple, though somewhat unsatisfying, outcome: the particular strike implicitly asserts a right to self-determination, as a presupposition of whatever particular claims are made. That right cannot be reasonably rejected since any attempt to reject it on the basis of reasons is self-defeating, guilty—as Habermas might say—of a petitio tollendum fallacy. If indeed the right to strike is derivable from the right to self-determination, then there is a presumptively justified right to strike. And this is established without appeal to antecedent normative reasons for believing that those affected should agree to such a right. This does not do away with the practical obstacles that endure in the absence of full justification or recognition of the right to have rights in labour. We can add for good measure that if the rejection of justification within labour is bolstered only by appeals to the interests of employers taken personally, then the rejection is not based on good, generalizable reasons. If the rejection is, as is more commonly the case in legislative restrictions of the right to strike, ‘justified’ by first-order appeals to economic efficiency, then the reply is guilty of a fallacy of irrelevance. Of course, employers and governments could attempt a second-order justification of the firstorder insistence upon compromise-orientation in place of consensus-orientation (that is, a principled, communicatively oriented defence of the claim that economies ought to be regarded as ‘norm-free’ subsystems evaluated according to their efficiency alone); but doing so would require genuine communicative engagement with the justificatory demands of workers who reject the thesis on the basis of putatively good reasons and would be tantamount to an acceptance of the right to self-determination (here, as agreeing to be governed by principles of compromiseformation). Simply pushing through a compromise-orientation at the second-order level, too, entails that the entire sequence of interactions is reduced to a question of mere power.

#### 3] Destroying the right to strike takes away workers’ basic right to argumentation – the right to strike preserves contestability, Lindblom ’19:

Lindblom, Lars. "Consent, contestability, and unions." *Business ethics quarterly* 29.2 (2019): 189-211.

To provide a justification of unions is to give justificatory reasons for the rights to form unions and non-discrimination of union members and the duty of good faith bargaining. Moreover, the theory we are looking for must be able to handle the problem concerning acts of employer authority that created difficulties for the consent-based theories, such as libertarianism. Let us, then, turn to how unions can implement contestability and thereby solve the problem of consent. Starting with the basis of contestation, the demand for transparency solves, as was noted above, the problem of information. With transparency in place, employees will be informed about the policies and decisions that affect them. This aspect of contestability demands that parties make clear the reasons that are moving them when making decisions. This, in turn, underwrites some preconditions for good faith bargaining and provides a link between contestability and unions. Now, it is quite obvious that there is a connection between unions and voice. Part of the purpose of a union is to enable its members to express their views or demands and to make their voices heard. The fact that a group of people, rather than an individual, expresses itself when a union speaks out makes it more probable that what is being expressed is also heard. If we want to get serious about voice, we should have mechanisms that implement it efficiently. Therefore, a right to form unions would seem to follow from the implementation of contestability. This indicates, furthermore, that the right to strike should be protected as a part of the implementation of the mechanism of contestability, since such a right safeguards the possibility to make one’s voice heard.12 Moreover, discrimination of union members would undermine this mechanism for voice. If employees fear that they will be retaliated against if they speak out, they will clearly be hesitant to voice their concerns. Nondiscrimination of union members is, therefore, a demand of the ideal of contestation. These two points imply that the standard of cooperation should include a norm against the discrimination union members and respect for the right to form unions.

### Method

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse

#### – drop the debater – 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off

#### – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time

#### – competing interps – reasonability narrows the theory debate to one issue of brightline, making it easy for the Neg to collapse to the issue in the long 2NR

#### – 1AR theory is the highest layer – the NC has 7 minutes to be abusive and 6 minutes to leverage the abuse against 1A theory in the 2N, making checking abuse lexically impossible

#### 2] Give me new weighing in the 2AR for 1AR shells – I don’t know what arguments will be read in the 2NR so 1AR weighing is impossible as I don’t know what to weigh against.

#### 3] Affirm if I win offense to a counterinterp

#### A] Timeskew – 6 Minute 2NR with collapse to whatever I undercover means that you can win theory and substance, but I need to go for both in half the time and split it between the 2 layers.

#### B] Reciprocity – you get T and theory so I should get theory and an RVI to make the burden reciprocal.

#### 4] Nothing in the 1AC has triggered it, but Presumption and permissibility affirm –

#### a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false ie if I told you my name is Daniel you would believe me

#### b) If agents have to justify why every action is morally good we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water

#### c) empirics

**Shah 19,**[Shah, Sachin. “A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC.” NSD Update, National Symposium of Debate, 16 Feb. 2019, <http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/> ]//LHPSS accessed 9/4/19

As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds **from** 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (**2017 – 2019** YTD), **the neg**ative **won 52.99% of ballots** (**p-value < 0.0001)** and 54.63% of upset rounds (p-value < 0.0001). **This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics.**

### Adv

#### Plan – A just government of the People’s Republic of China ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### Lack of Chinese Right to Strike devastates Collective Bargaining – undermines any legal leverage for Strikes.

Friedman 17 Eli Friedman 4-20-2017 "Collective Bargaining in China is Dead: The Situation is Excellent" <https://www.chinoiresie.info/collective-bargaining-in-china-is-dead-the-situation-is-excellent/> (Assistant Professor of International and Comparative Labour at Cornell University)//Elmer

For many years reform-oriented labour activists and scholars working in China have seen **collective bargaining** as the **cure for** the **country’s severe labour problems**. The logic underlying this was often unstated, but straightforward: collective bargaining was crucial for twentieth century labour movements in capitalist countries in giving workers a voice and creating a more equitable social distribution of wealth. With growing levels of labour unrest in China over the past twenty years, collective bargaining seemed like a logical next step. Hopeful reformers—both within the official unions as well as labour NGO activists and academics—envisioned rationalised, legalised bargaining between labour and capital as a central pillar in the construction of a more just workplace and society. The **challenges to institutionalising** a robust **collective bargaining** system **in** the People’s Republic of **China** (PRC) **have** always **been profound**. **Fundamental** to labour relations theory **is** that collective bargaining rights must be accompanied by the **right to strike** and freedom of association—**capital** **has no reason to take workers seriously without labour possessing some coercive power**. But independent unions have long been an anathema to the Communist Party. From the Lai Ruoyu debacle of the 1950s to the crushing of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation in 1989, the Party has made it clear time and again that independent worker organisations are forbidden. Although workers have never enjoyed the right to strike in practice, the right was formally included in the Chinese constitutions of 1975 and 1978. It **was Deng Xiaoping who removed it from the constitution just as private capital began pouring into China in the early 1980**s. Working Within the System Nonetheless, with no signs of articulated worker movements since 1989, many well-intentioned people thought it was worth trying to advance worker rights within the system. Especially from the mid 2000s on, academics (myself included) launched research projects, NGOs held training sessions, and foreign unions engaged with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). Many assumed that the state would eventually decide that worker insurgency was exacting too high a cost, and that serious labour reforms were therefore necessary. And indeed, beginning in the late 2000s the ACFTU made collective negotiations (xieshang)—rather than the more antagonistic sounding ‘bargaining’ (tanpan)—a high priority, investing time and resources into expanding the coverage of collective contracts. At its best, **collective bargaining in China** **has been woefully inadequate**. The state and the ACFTU have been very cautious about controlling workers’ aspirations, and have insisted on the fundamental harmony of interests between labour and capital. Experiments with bargaining have been almost **exclusively restricted to single enterprises**, thereby preventing workers from constituting cross-workplace ties. The overwhelming majority of collective contracts are **formulaic**: **actual bargaining rarely occurs**, and **enforcement is** largely **non-existent**. The few shining examples where employers have made real compromises during collective bargaining have followed autonomously organised wildcat strikes. The best-known case is the 2010 strike from a Honda transmission plant in Guangdong province, which resulted in major wage gains as well as an (ultimately unsuccessful) effort to reform the enterprise union. It is not coincidental that substantive worker-led bargaining is much more likely in Japanese or American firms, where the state must be cautious not to inflame patriotic sentiments. State-sanctioned economic nationalism is a shaky foundation for a robust collective bargaining system. The Death of Collective Bargaining under Xi Even these timid efforts have been smothered in recent years, as the central government has turned in a markedly anti-worker direction under Xi Jinping. There was a brief moment in 2010 when discussion about the right to strike emerged from hushed whispers into the public discourse. But this opening was ephemeral, and union reformers in Guangdong who had pushed gentle reforms in the mid-late 2000s were replaced with typical Party apparatchiks. The country’s pre-eminent centre for labour studies at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou was shuttered. The academic study of employment has now been left almost entirely to business schools, as the government has stymied further expansion of labour relations programs. Labour NGOs in Guangzhou were subjected to a brutal crackdown in December 2015, with the government specifically targeting those groups that had been helping workers to engage in collective negotiations to resolve strikes. And the ACFTU has seemingly given up on advancing collective negotiations altogether. The Chairman of the ACFTU Li Jianguo does not even mention the term in his speeches anymore. Under the ‘work developments’ section of the ACFTU’s website, a lonely single report on collective contracts for the entirety of 2016 is a stark indication that the union has almost totally forsaken this agenda. Collective bargaining is not dead in the sense that it will disappear from China’s labour-capital relations. It is almost certain that official unions will continue to pursue bargaining in its current vacuous, bureaucratic, and worker-exclusionary form. Collective contracts will continue to be signed, tabulated, and then hidden from view from workers. Somewhat less pessimistically, workers will continue to force management to bargain with the collective via wildcat strikes. This latter form will still be an important means by which workers can attempt to ensure their most basic rights, and these efforts are absolutely worth supporting. But collective bargaining is dead as a political aim. It is not going to be the cornerstone of twentieth century-style class compromise in China, it is not generative of worker power, and it certainly does not herald broader social transformation. To the extent that legal bargaining does develop, it will be as a mechanism for the state to deprive workers of autonomous power. What then might Chinese workers and allied intellectuals and activists aim for? At the risk of stating the obvious, **the working class needs more power**. The question is, how to foster proletarian power in the face of a highly competent authoritarian state that views organised workers as an existential threat? In the absence of independent organisations, the only option is an intensification of already widespread worker insurgency. The more wildcat strikes, mass direct action, and worker riots, the more the state and capital will be forced to take worker grievances seriously. Of course such forms of collective action come at great risk for workers, and many have already paid a high price. In any particular case, the risks may certainly outweigh the benefits. But in the aggregate, expansive unrest is just what the working class needs. With the institutions firmly oriented towards advancing the inter-related goals of state domination and exploitation by capital, disruption on a large scale is the only chance workers have of forcing change. Ungovernability will be the necessary prelude to any institutional reform worthy of the name.

#### That solves worker liberation, labor reforms, and re-establishes credible Collective Bargaining in China – establishing legal protection for Labor Unions reduces overall labor-related discontent.

Dongfang 11 Han Dongfang 4-6-2011 "Liberate China's Workers" <https://archive.md/7RvDG#selection-307.0-316.0> (director of China Labour Bulletin, a nongovernmental organization that defends the rights of workers in China.)//Elmer

HONG KONG — **There is no legal right to strike in China**, but there are strikes every day. Factory workers, hotel employees, teachers and taxi drivers regularly withdraw their labor and demand a better deal from their employer. Strikes are often successful, and these days strike leaders hardly ever get put in prison. It may seem ironic that workers in a nominally Communist country don’t have the right to strike, and that workers are apparently willing to defy the Communist Party by going out on strike. But China effectively abandoned Communism and embraced capitalism many years ago. And in a capitalist economy, strikes are a fact of life. Chinese scholars, government **officials** and even some businessmen have long recognized this fact and have **called for the** **restoration of the right to strike**, **which was removed from the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1982**. **Deng Xiaoping feared that the economic reforms he was introducing would lead to labor unrest.** Although Deng and his successors were able to quiet labor unrest and strike action for a while, the trend over the last five years or so has been clear. As the business leader Zeng Qinghong noted recently, the number of strikes is increasing every year. Mr. Zeng, who is head of the Guangzhou Automobile Co., reported that in just two months last summer, there were more than 20 strikes in the automotive industry in the Pearl River Delta alone, and that new strikes were occurring all the time. Mr. Zeng suggested in a submission to this year’s National People’s Congress, China’s annual legislature, that the right to strike should be restored because it was a basic right of workers in a market economy and a natural adjunct to the right to work. I agree with Mr. Zeng on this point and would like to take his argument one step further. The **right to strike** **is** clearly important, but the most vital and fundamental right of workers is **the right to collective bargaining**. After all, **why do workers go out on strike**? Very simply, they go on strike **for higher pay and better working conditions**. **The strike is not an end in itself but is part of a bargaining process.** And **if the collective bargaining process were more effective**, in many cases, **workers would not need to go out on strike at all**. If you talk to factory workers, most will tell you they would rather not go on strike if they can avoid it. Indeed, most only go on strike because they have no alternative. **China’s workers want and need an alternative**. They want **a system** in **which they can raise their demands** for higher pay and discuss those demands **in** peaceful, **equal and constructive negotiations** with management. **If workers can achieve their goals through peaceful collective bargaining, in the long run there will be fewer strikes**, workers will be better paid and labor relations will be vastly improved. We also have to be aware that if the right to strike is reinstated in the Constitution in isolation — without the right to collective bargaining — there would be a danger that the right of workers to go on strike might actually be eroded. Just look at the right to stage a public demonstration. Chinese citizens do have the constitutional right to demonstrate but in reality they have to apply to the police for permission, and of course very few of those applications are granted. Likewise, if workers have to apply to the authorities before they can go on strike, the right to strike will become meaningless. Moreover, the number of strikes would not be reduced because workers would continue to go out on strike regardless and labor relations will deteriorate even further. On the other hand, if the **right to strike** is framed in a way that **can** **liberate workers** and **encourage** **and empower them to engage in collective bargaining**, **safe** **in the knowledge that they have a powerful weapon that can be deployed if necessary, labor relations will be enhanced** and the number of strikes might actually decrease. There is a saying in China that “you should not only focus on your head when you have headache because the real reason for the headache could be your foot.” As Mr. Zeng noted, the rapidly increasing number of strikes in China has become a major headache, not only for business but for the government as well. If the government wants to reduce the number of strikes in China, it needs to take a holistic approach and address the root cause of the problem — the absence of an effective collective bargaining system in which democratically elected workers’ representatives can negotiate better pay and conditions with their employer. If such a system can be implemented in China it would obviously benefit workers but it would also **benefit employers** like Mr. Zeng who are **concerned** **about** **high worker turnover and the loss of production through strike action.** Crucially, it is also in the interest of the Chinese government to introduce collective bargaining. The authorities may be nervous about handing power to the workers but they should bear in mind that by doing so they would aid the development of more harmonious labor relations, which could lead to the Communist Party’s goal of creating a more prosperous, stable and harmonious society.

#### The Right to Strike re-balances China’s Economy.

Roberts 10 Dexter Roberts 8-5-2010 "Is the Right to Strike Coming to China" <https://archive.md/hjNI7> (Editor at Bloomberg)//Elmer

The name gives no hint of the revolutionary changes afoot for mainland workers. Yet the **proposed Regulations** on the Democratic Management of Enterprises, now being debated by the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress, **could give Chinese labor the ultimate**—and until now taboo—**bargaining tool**: **an officially sanctioned right to strike**. "This has been a no-go area in China for decades," says Robin Munro, deputy director at the Hong Kong-based China Labour Bulletin. All **Chinese workers** belong to one **union**, but it **wields little power**. "This is the first time ever Chinese authorities have said it is O.K. to strike." The draft law could take effect by this fall in Guangdong, the industrialized coastal province where Honda (HMC) workers in June illegally and successfully struck for higher wages. The proposed law is seen by many activists and researchers as a trial balloon before a possible national rollout. The rules: If one-fifth or more of a company's staff demands collective bargaining, then management must discuss workers' grievances. Before talks begin, the union must elect local worker representatives. Until now, union reps came from management ranks. The next section of the proposed law ventures into even more radical territory. For six decades, picketing and disrupting production have been illegal and subject to harsh punishment. Under the Guangdong proposal, as long as workers first try negotiating and refrain from violence, they're allowed to strike. Though the draft could still get watered down, the fact that officials are even considering legalizing strikes signals a sea change. The party's moves are an attempt to recognize—and regulate—what is already happening. "Every month there are hundreds of strikes," says Chang Kai, a labor relations professor at Renmin University of China who advised the Honda workers. "What the government is concerned about is whether it can control these strikes or not." **Formalizing workers' rights** **could** also advance **China's goal of rebalancing the economy**. "There is a **new emphasis on how to reduce the wage gap** **and get consumers to spend more**," says Chang-Hee Lee, an industrial relations expert at the International Labour Organization's Beijing office. "This is **not** very **easy** to accomplish **unless** **workers have more bargaining power**." The bottom line: A proposed law being debated in Guangdong could greatly strengthen the bargaining power of Chinese workers.

#### Chinese Economic Decline leads to all-out War – specifically over Taiwan.

Joske 18 Stephen Joske 10-23-2018 “China’s Coming Financial Crisis And The National Security Connection” <https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/chinas-coming-financial-crisis-and-the-national-security-connection/> (senior adviser to the Australian Treasurer during the 1997–98 Asian crisis)//re-cut by Elmer

The biggest **national security issues**, however, **arise from** the unpredictable **political impact of a recession in China**. We learned this, or should have, during the 1997 to 1998 Asian crisis. China may have had a disguised recession or near recession in 1998, but it was in a much smaller economy. Apart from that one episode there is no collective memory of recession and how to deal with it. As such, **China** is now **psychologically unprepared** to deal with the challenges of a recession. China’s coming recession will be accompanied by a large uncontrolled devaluation of the RMB as foreign exchange reserves evaporate, so it will be impossible to conceal this time. All asset prices, including housing prices, will be hit. **Combine** the **shock** of an unexpected economic setback **with tensions** in a one party state where a single individual has been calling the shots, and **political instability could set in.** While Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has not eliminated corruption, it has created many enemies who are biding their time. Minxin Pei has documented the activities of China’s powerful corruption networks. These networks, not a debilitated civil society, represent the alternative government of China. Competition between them could easily be destabilizing in a winner-take-all political environment. While our understanding of elite politics in China is poor, a recession would likely discredit the existing leadership and **set off intense competition between corrupt factions** for control of China. Bo Xilai, a former Chongqing party chief and Politburo member, was purged in 2012 but his son appears to still be interested in politics. While the outcome is impossible to predict, we can **see** the conditions in place for destabilizing events ranging from **military adventurism** to **civil war**. Alternatively, the regime could reassert its stability through increased repression, which would make China harder to deal with and would spill over into the Chinese diaspora. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has never had a real economic base. It is all about power projection (such as the Gwadar port) and would quickly be dropped by Beijing as a post-crisis China becomes focused on domestic political and economic stability. **Any Chinese military adventurism is likely to be focused on Taiwan.** China’s military is currently poorly equipped for an invasion of Taiwan, which has difficult geography and a substantial military, making an invasion of Taiwan unlikely to succeed. However, it is possible the Chinese **leadership would miscalculate** the risks, leaving it in a limited war with no clear resolution that would quickly **draw in Japan and the U**nited **S**tates. China has spent most of its history disunited, reflecting its geography. It has a number of widely dispersed economic centers. It was in outright civil war as recently as the 1960s. If competition between political factions remains unresolved, a civil war could develop, leaving China as a battleground where Russia, Japan, and the United States seek to influence the outcome. This scenario would stall or even end China’s rise as a global military and political power.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

### Add ons

#### China’s Economy is on the brink of collapse – only solving poverty can reverse it.

Lopez 10-24 Linette Lopez 10-24-2021 "If China's economy keeps stumbling, it won't just take down Beijing - the whoel world will collapse with it" <https://archive.md/M4qjY#selection-2241.0-2250.1> (Linette is the senior finance correspondent at Business Insider, writing a combination of opinions and analysis. She joined BI in the summer of 2011 after graduating from Columbia University's School of Journalism.)//Elmer

**China's economy** — the 2nd-largest in the world — **is teetering on the brink of disaster**. Since this spring, Beijing has **canceled** initial **public offerings**, **fined tech companies** billions for antitrust violations, forcibly **shut down** China's entire for-profit **education industry**, and **sent CEOs running** for the exits to avoid the government's ire. Even more dire, the Chinese megadeveloper Evergrande recently started missing payments on its more than $300 billion in debt, shaking global markets. The convulsions have woken the world up to a startling new possibility — that Beijing may be willing to allow some of its private corporate behemoths to collapse in a bid to reshape the economic model that made China a superpower. The **upheaval**, spanning multiple industries and vast swaths of the country, **is** the result of one giant issue: **China's inability to** **borrow or buy** its **way out of its current economic crisis**. **For decades**, the country **relied on cheap labor** and eye-popping amounts of debt, handed out by government-owned banks, to fuel economic growth — pouring money into massive apartment developments, factories, bridges, and other projects at lightning speed. **Now** the **country** **needs people to actually use**, **and pay for**, **everything that's been built**. But the **bulk of China's population lacks** the **income needed to shift the economy** from one driven by state investments to one sustained by consumer spending.

#### Taiwan goes Nuclear.

Talmadge 18 [Caitlin, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-China War Could Spiral Out of Control,” accessible online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option>, published Nov/Dec 2018]//re-cut by Elmer

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a **military confrontation**—resulting, for example, **from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan**—**no longer seems** as **implausible** as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. **China**, by contrast, not only has **nuclear weapons**; it has also **intermingled** them **with its conventional** military **forces**, **making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other**. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. **Conventional forces** can threaten nuclear forces in ways that **generate pressures to escalate**—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. **If U.S. operations endangered** or damaged China’s **nuclear forces,** Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, **Beijing might** reluctantly **conclude** that limited **nuclear escalation**—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—**was** a **viable** option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The **most worrisome flash point** for a U.S.-Chinese war **is Taiwan**. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored **U.S. strategy** to ensure a conventional victory **would** likely **endanger** much of China’s **nuclear arsenal** in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in **wartime developments** that could **shift** **China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions.** If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline. If such escalation appears far-fetched, China’s history suggests otherwise. In 1969, similar dynamics brought China to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In early March of that year, Chinese troops ambushed Soviet guards amid rising tensions over a disputed border area. Less than two weeks later, the two countries were fighting an undeclared border war with heavy artillery and aircraft. The conflict quickly escalated beyond what Chinese leaders had expected, and before the end of March, Moscow was making thinly veiled nuclear threats to pressure China to back down. Chinese leaders initially dismissed these warnings, only to radically upgrade their threat assessment once they learned that the Soviets had privately discussed nuclear attack plans with other countries. Moscow never intended to follow through on its nuclear threat, archives would later reveal, but Chinese leaders believed otherwise. On three separate occasions, they were convinced that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent. Once, when Moscow sent representatives to talks in Beijing, China suspected that the plane transporting the delegation was in fact carrying nuclear weapons. Increasingly fearful, China test-fired a thermonuclear weapon in the Lop Nur desert and put its rudimentary nuclear forces on alert—a dangerous step in itself, as it increased the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch. Only after numerous preparations for Soviet nuclear attacks that never came did Beijing finally agree to negotiations. China is a different country today than it was in the time of Mao Zedong, but the 1969 conflict offers important lessons. China started a war in which it believed nuclear weapons would be irrelevant, even though the Soviet arsenal was several orders of magnitude larger than China’s, just as the U.S. arsenal dwarfs China’s today. Once the conventional war did not go as planned, the Chinese reversed their assessment of the possibility of a nuclear attack to a degree bordering on paranoia. Most worrying, China signaled that it was actually considering using its nuclear weapons, even though it had to expect devastating retaliation. Ambiguous wartime information and worst-case thinking led it to take nuclear risks it would have considered unthinkable only months earlier. This pattern could unfold again today.