#### a sovereign subject of mastery and individualization that creates international necro-zones of racialized sacrifice – the subject of IR theory depends on an asymmetrical segregated order of nation states.

Agathangelou 11 [Anna M. Agathangelou (political scientist from York University in Toronto. She is the co-director of Global Change Institute, Cyprus and was a visiting fellow in the Program of Science, Technology and Society at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard). “Bodies to the Slaughter: Global Racial Reconstructions, Fanon's Combat Breath, and Wrestling for Life”. Somatechnics, March 2011, vo. 1, No. 1 : pp. 209-248. Accessed 1/22/22. <https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/full/10.3366/soma.2011.0014> //recut Xu]

Fanon scales colonisation to the level of the slave and colonised body. He illustrates the incommensurability of the intimate encounter of black flesh with the body of the coloniser and focuses on the structuring processes required to make it possible. He begins his critique with the normative imperial order of slavery and colonisation and those humanist interventions claiming to protect the sovereign subject. He tells us that the constitution of this sovereign subject depends on an asymmetrical segregated-order: This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species ... When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to a given race, a given species ... The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich. (Fanon 1967d: 39–40, emphasis in original) Fanon points out that this order’s constitution depends on direct violence that turns a species into slaves, black, and colonised. This violence makes it possible for zones to become ‘civil’ spaces of ‘generalized trust’ and security for the sovereigns; the species occupying them possess ‘generalized trust’ and are racially white. This relation ends up being taken for granted: belonging to a given race of property relations is the precondition for any ‘civil’ encounter. Indeed, as Wilderson argues, ‘Fanon makes clear how some are zoned, a priori, beyond the borders of generalized trust’ (Wilderson 2010: 33). The establishment of gratuitous violence zones, positions and constitutes simultaneously the species and the colonised. Further, ‘the condition of possibility upon which subjectivity’ (Fanon 1967d: 39–40) is based must be recognised and theorised. The creation of colonised zones, the interstate state system, racialised whiteness, and property relations require theorising if we are to disrupt those relations which unify and entify a normative ‘ethical order’. Fanon, of course, is clear: without the vertical existence of breath, that is, giving one’s breath as nourishment for blackness, slavery, and colonisation, there is no such order. This order, even when it claims inclusion, segregates subjects of recognition from ‘species’. Subjects are positioned into the interstate structure of worlds with sovereign protection, able to take by force and accumulate anything, from things to life itself. Fanon seems to have anticipated Foucault who argues: ‘Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power ... The individual ... is not the vis-a`-vis of power; it is I believe, one of its prime effects’ (Foucault 1980: 98). However, Fanon does not begin with this prime effect of power, as he wants us to learn to read social relations, racism, and economies of violence as if experiencing our own gratuitous violence, in an attempt to think the impossible place of the slave, the black body, and the colonised – in other words, the living being whose existence is already assumed as structurally impossible and, hence, as breath which can never be synonymous with life. The basis of the (inter) state structure, Fanon recognises, is already the juristic sovereign person whose essence, or what Goodrich calls the sovereign that the state has a right to kill, is already secured from the threat of mutilation. On the one hand, Foucault (1990: 138) asks this about state power: ‘How could power exercise its highest prerogative by putting people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order?’ On the other hand, Fanon makes explicit the matrix of violence which requires and makes sure that species are zoned as black and colonised: ‘Individualism is the first to disappear ... the colonialist bourgeoisie had hammered into the native’s mind the idea of a society of individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity, and whose only wealth is individual’ (Fanon 1967d: 47): Their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together – that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler – was carried on by a dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons. The settler and the native are old acquaintances. In fact, the settler is right when he speaks of knowing ‘them’ well. For it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence. The settler owes the fact of his very existence, that is to say, his property, to the colonial system. (Fanon 1967d: 36) But why such insistence? What tension does Fanon want to foreground? Fanon actually has a different ‘locus of enunciation’ and insists on a long trajectory of the effects of the imperial, colonial, and slave order and vertical relations of what he calls ‘combat breath’ (Fanon 1967c: 65). By drawing out Fanon’s idea of ‘combat breath’ and articulating it as struggles that disrupt the practices of violence and the final destruction of countries and people, we see that enforcing the right to life of the radical individual (the propertied man of a structure of white supremacy which depends on slavery and colonisation) will authorise thanatopolitics and necroeconomics, not by suspending a right to life but rather by enforcing a right to that ‘liberal’ life. But this minimalist right to life could preclude crucial relations in the everyday continuum-spaces of the human and the non- human, including ecologies and it does by deploying practices of disfigurement and destruction. Fanon exposes the imperial European re-assemblage of power and demonstrates that state power shifts are connected to the emergence of an ‘international’ order and apparatuses that make possible a particular sovereign-master-colonising subject. In his view, colonial power says: ‘Since you want independence, take it and starve ... A regime of austerity is imposed on these starving men; a disproportionate amount of work is required for their atrophied muscles’ (Fanon 1967d: 96). Fanon notes the prevalence of suffocation and starvation in world politics, the devouring of the flesh and the subsequent redistribution of its existential vital energy that is turned into wealth. Amelioration requires more than changing working conditions and setting up less exploitative structures (such as socialism and communism). Rather, it requires ‘regime[s] which [are] completely oriented toward the people as a whole’ which prioritise the principle ‘that man is the most precious of all possessions’.8 Such a locus will preclude ‘that caricature of society where all economic and political power is held in the hands of the few who regard the nation as whole with scorn and contempt’ (Fanon 1967d: 98).

#### The commercialization of leisure space is a colonial project of vindicative appropriation of the white commons. The proliferation of racialized hierarchies culminate in the irrational threat that create zones of exclusion and violence.

Kahrl 12 [Andrew W, 4/16/2012, Assistant Professor of History at Marquette University, “‘Warning: Black People at Leisure’”, *Harvard University Press*, <https://harvardpress.typepad.com/hup_publicity/2012/04/warning-black-people-at-leisure-andrew-kahrl.html> //Partner Majed]

It was perhaps fitting that, on the day after Derbyshire’s piece was published, the state of Michigan announced plans to charge entry fees to Belle Isle in order to fund improvements and eventually make the park an attractive place for “corporate outings” and other private events. Once considered one of the nation's finest urban parks, Belle Isle suffered serious budget cuts and deterioration after being mostly abandoned by whites. For, in the summer of 1943, Belle Isle provided the spark that lit one of the nation’s worst race riots. On a hot summer afternoon, an estimated crowd of one-hundred thousand whites and blacks jostled for space to picnic and swim on the island. Fights erupted and soon spilled over onto the mainland. When the dust settled two days later, twenty-five African American and nine white Detroiters were dead. It was neither the first nor the last time that an attempt to draw (or erase) a color line in the sand would descend into deadly violence. While we tend to think of segregated beaches and public parks as among the most irrational excesses of the Jim Crow era (how absurd, after all, is the notion that one can demarcate a color line across a body of water), racialized leisure space served an important function in the maintenance of white supremacy. In Jim Crow America, working- and middle-class whites came to see public beaches and parks as their own private domain—a publicly funded “country club” for the common (white) folk—and understood desegregation as the theft of “their” beaches and parks at the hands of privileged white public officials. That these public officials were themselves often members of private swim clubs and owners of summer vacation homes, thus experiencing fewer direct effects of desegregation, served only to fuel white backlash against civil rights, and cynicism toward government in general. But while some whites defended what they saw as their “rights” to segregated leisure by greeting African Americans at the park and on the shore with chains and baseball bats, those who could afford it instead retreated to new, commercial theme parks, safely located in remote outposts of suburbia, accessible only by automobile. Or, they implemented a host of racially laden but ostensibly color-blind measures of exclusion designed to make public beaches “public” in name only. During the years when African Americans stepped up demands for the right to enjoy public beaches, many wealthy shoreline municipalities, especially along the northeastern seaboard, adopted entry fees (with different rates for residents and non-residents), removed public locker rooms, or—in some cases—placed outright bans on non-resident access. Meanwhile, towns with comparatively large numbers of poor and minorities steadily abandoned public beaches altogether and sold portions of their beachfront holdings to private developers. Other towns targeted by civil rights protests proposed designating certain days on the summer calendar when poor blacks from the inner city, under the auspices of the Fresh Air fund and other charitable organizations, could visit the beach—and, presumably, allowing locals to do as Derbyshire would later advise: make other plans. We see this form of strategic avoidance on display at public beaches and parks across the country today, where on certain holidays and pre-scheduled annual events, large crowds of African Americans and other minorities gather to enjoy a moment in the sun while whites retreat to their backyards and private clubs. Indeed, the irony of the outrage among white liberals over Derbyshire’s “talk” is that so many of them already teach those same lessons simply by virtue of their choices of where (and when) to take their children for pleasure and amusement each summer. The adage “fear proves itself” offers an apt description of the re-segregation via privatization of leisure space over the past several decades. In the years following desegregation, African Americans ventured to beaches and amusement parks expecting—and prepared for—a confrontation. Not surprisingly, they came in groups, or what white observers would label “gangs,” because of the sense of security it afforded. Expectations of discriminatory treatment by vendors and businesses, and harassment by police officers, were often confirmed upon arrival. Black beachgoers’ exuberance soon turned into anger, which found expression in loud demonstrations, property damage, or simply meeting whites’ hostile stares in kind. Media coverage of events such as the 1989 Labor Day weekend “riot” at Virginia Beach, where underlying tensions over police brutality and exploitative practices by local businesses were ignored in favor of sensationalistic depictions of black violence and “criminality,” only fueled white America’s retreat from places populated by large crowds of blacks at leisure. The answer, for most white Americans, was to retreat even further behind the walls of an increasingly fortressed America. The rise of private beaches and decline of public ones paralleled (and often accompanied) the boom in gated residential communities in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, as with “Twin Lakes,” where Trayvon Martin was gunned down, exclusive access to recreational and environmental amenities such as man-make lakes and private beaches are prominently featured in advertisements for newly developed gated communities. Such features signal to prospective residents that, behind these walls, they can expect to enjoy freedom from any awkward or threatening encounters with the “race problem” during their moments of leisure. Just as the physical layout of gated communities (no thru-ways, a jigsaw pattern of cul-de-sacs) are meant to signal to residents that an unfamiliar person is, by definition, a suspicious person (since there’s no plausible reason they might be passing through on the way to somewhere else), the culture of leisure activities behind these gates reinforces the notion that an integrated leisure space is a dangerous one. Not surprisingly, white America’s abandonment of public beaches and parks such as Belle Isle has only reinforced those prejudices, as the steady decline in public funding for maintenance and improvement of public beaches and parks has, indeed, made these places unappealing and often dangerous to visit, confirming in many observers’ minds the linkages between racial integration and deterioration. In this age when proposals to fund even the most basic of public services are contentious, it is no surprise that few even talk about revitalizing public space in America through public works projects, and instead conclude that the only way to arrest this vicious cycle is to hand these facilities over to private, for-profit entities dedicated to keeping undesirables out and dollars flowing in. Similar dynamics can be observed in Twin Lakes and other neighborhoods protected by private security guards and citizen watch groups, where the evisceration of funds for police departments to do neighborhood policing has contributed to a loss of faith in public institutions, fueling homeowners’ sense of insecurity and embrace of vigilantism. That we don’t often hear about racial incidents at beaches and amusement parks today is less a sign of how far we have come and more an indication of how effectively we have limited even the chances of an encounter between large groups of whites and blacks in leisure settings. The sad fact is that most white Americans don’t consciously share Derbyshire’s racist views, not because they have confronted and worked to overcome their prejudices through deliberate actions, but rather because their daily lives are often absent of situations where those fears might become manifest. Rather than giving white children “the talk” about the need to avoid large concentrations of black people, they allow the built environment do the work for them.

#### The privatization of space requires the exclusion of blackness by codifying racial hierarchies that appropriate leisure in favor of whiteness

Austin 98 [Regina, 1998, William A. Schnader Professor of Law, Emeritus @ University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, “‘Not Just for the Fun of It!’ Governmental Restraints on Black Leisure, Social Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space”, *Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law*, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/814/> //Partner Majed]

Through the process of privatization, public leisure spaces take on, reflect, and are characterized by the social standing and the racial identities of the persons who occupy them.94 Thus, there are white-identified leisure spaces and nonwhite-identified leisure spaces. A white-identified space is one in which whites predominantly play and seek to maintain that predominance through formal and informal mechanisms of exclusion. A white-identified space may also be characterized by the nature of the leisure activity conducted there. Camping, playing tennis, and listening to classical music are white-identified leisure activities, and national parks, tennis courts, and symphony or concert halls are consequently whiteidentified spaces. Playing basketball and enjoying rap music, on the other hand, are associated with blacks and may be thought of as black activities; urban outdoor public basketball courts and rap concerts are typically considered black-identified.9 5 Racialized space may also be assessed temporally ; there are restaurants and movie theaters (like the one in Dedham, Massachusetts) that are white by day and black by night, or vice versa, and beaches that are white from the late Fall to the early Spring and multiracial during the rest of the year.96 It is not just the patrons of so-called "third spaces" (not home and not work) who engage in this process of privatizing and racializing; it is the proprietors as well. Historically, according to social historian David Nasaw, the respectability, and thereby the profitability, of places of commercialized mass entertainment and amusement, be they movie palaces or world's fair pavilions, have long been based on the inclusion of white women among their patrons and the exclusion of all blacks, regardless of gender or class.97 From the mid- 1 800s to the civil rights era (if not beyond), prohibitions against or on blacks' participation enhanced the status of mass forms of leisure by countering the moral and material concerns of the bourgeoisie, which favored leisure consistent with domesticity and educational enrichment and feared association with persons who were vulgar and rowdy. 98 The exclusion or restricted inclusion of blacks, who were assigned the role of indecent, disreputable "other," made possible the creation of audiences that were heterogeneous and democratic as to gender and class, insofar as whites were concemed.99 It allowed for the uniting of white Americans-native-born and immigrant, middle-class and poor-in a common experience of luxury in leisure venues under an umbrella of white privilege that generated conduct characterized by decency and goodwill. In some cases, the message of black inferiority and white superiority was even reinforced by the fare being served to the segregated audiences (for example, exhibitions of blacks in African village settings or performances by whites in blackface).100

#### Thus, the advocacy: Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Appropriation is process of privatizing public domains which includes through social norms

Austin 98 [Regina, 1998, William A. Schnader Professor of Law, Emeritus @ University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, “‘Not Just for the Fun of It!’ Governmental Restraints on Black Leisure, Social Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space”, *Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law*, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/814/> //Partner Majed]

The private nature of leisure interactions has a spatial or geographical dimension that fosters the segregation of leisure venues along status lines. Without the aid of law, public domains can be privatized or appropriated as private preserves by a group of people who (1) use them for private purposes, (2) indulge in styles of informal behavior (including dress and speech) that reflect familiarity with the surroundings and the inhabitants, and (3) adopt a proprietary attitude about the places in dealing with outsiders.91 Thus, a first-class passenger in an airliner might feel justified in asserting his priority to the first-class lavatory ahead of a passenger traveling coach.92 Similarly, silencing other patrons in a movie theater makes the experience less public and communal for them, but it is in accord with the expectation that patrons should enjoy the film "in the privacy of their fantasies. "

#### Private entity means (d) Private entity. (1) This term means **any entity other than a State, local government, [Native] Indian tribe, or foreign public entity**.

That’s Cornell Law ND [Bracketed from Indian to Native. Cornell Legal Information Institute, “2 CFR § 175.25 - Definitions.”, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/2/175.25> //Partner Majed]

#### Entity is Full Definition of entity 1a: BEING, EXISTENCE especially : independent, separate, or self-contained existence b: **the existence of a thing as contrasted with its attributes**

Merriam-Webster ND [Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “entity” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity> //Partner Majed]

#### Deep space is deep space /ˈdēp ˈspās/ Learn to pronounce noun **another term for outer space.**

That’s Google ND [Google, “deep space”, <https://www.google.com/search?q=deep+space+definition> //Partner Majed]

#### Deep space is the production of space and subjectivity, in which the metaphorical and material are inseparable

McKittrick 06. McKittrick, Katherine. Demonic Grounds: Black Women And The Cartographies Of Struggle. First edition ed. University of Minnesota Press, 2006. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/book/31692.

Deep space is the production of space intensified and writ large, ideological and political shifts that impact upon and organize the everyday in multiple contexts and scales—within and across homes, factories, streets, local and world banks, social services, military invasions, developing and overdeveloped nations, resistance tactics, gentrification projects. In this sense, deep space identi- fies the immediacy, materiality, and power of Smith’s larger concerns, speci- fically, uneven geographic development as it is perpetuated by, and lived according to, unjust social systems. Deep space and its production, he writes, are “crushingly real.”34 Second, and related, deep space is imbued with sociospatial theories produced outside the discipline of geography. The writings of Frederick Jameson and Michel Foucault, for example, are underwritten by geo- graphic concerns: the epoch of space, cognitive mappings, and so forth. And Smith goes on to suggest that these geographic concerns—which are of great interest to some within the discipline of geography—connect the materiality of deep space with a struggle over theorizing its crushing real- ness. That is, the late-twentieth century “speeding up” of time-space, the simultaneity of an expanding and shrinking world, the lives which were lost and the lives which profited, created new analytical and political spaces. Deep space, in its crushing realness, has also led to ‘‘subject positions,” “conceptual space,” “theoretical space,” “contested spaces,” “spaces of negotiation,” [and] “spaces of signification.”35 This reassertion of space in social theory—Smith gives the excellent example of how “mapping seems to cover virtually every kind of plausible translation from one text to another”—has in part rendered the material contours of deep space metaphoric. Yet Smith’s critique of social theory is not simply a condem- nation. Rather, he suggests that we seek out the connections between material and metaphoric space: . . . it makes sense to conceive of deep spaces as combining the inherently social processes and produced structures of space together with the most superficial refractions from space in any given fixed form. Metaphorical and material are this inseparable in deep space yet remain distinct. To the extent that metaphor dominates our conceptions of space it is the latter refraction of fixed form that informs us; metaphorical appropriations of space are “real” enough but they conceal the life of deep space . . .36 What kind of theoretical work can deep space do for black geographies? Before I turn to how material space, metaphoric space, and social theory might be reimagined through black studies and human geography, I want to suggest that investigations of deep space might also examine the political, ideological, and economic ruptures pertinent to historical and contempo- rary subaltern lives. Specifically, if we trust that the important economic and political occurrences in the 1980s intensified and corresponded with important shifts, on the ground and in social theory, we can also look to key geographic moments played out across the black diaspora as bringing into focus the material workings of deep space. I am thinking specifically about the importance of 1492 and new world expansion but also about the civil and human rights movements of the 1960s.37 The former, which ush- ered in exploration, conquest, and transatlantic slavery, and the latter, which sought to desegregate, decolonize, and liberate, exposed the limits of trans- parent space and reoriented the meaning of human social theories. And these moments were markedly geographic: new maps were developed; big- ger, better, slave ships were produced; European subjects expanded into, exploited, and made cartographically intelligible, “newer” worlds; lands and resources were lost and claimed; aboriginal communities were destroyed and colonized; escapes were plotted and charted; slave labor built roads, plantations, houses; material places were boycotted; marches were orga- nized; nationalisms were heightened; women and men were incarcerated; women and men demanded new forms of citizenship; colonial political systems were challenged. I am suggesting, then, that it is important to consider the ways in which deep space is also recognizable in these dias- poric ruptures. Here, the contestations over space, place, and race are heightened, worked out across the soil and within and across nations and communities.

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)



#### Unjust means unjust adjective US /ʌnˈdʒʌst/ **not morally right; not fair**: New laws will protect employees against unjust dismissals. (Definition of unjust from the Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary © Cambridge University Press)

That’s Cambridge Dictionary ND [“Meaning of unjust in English” Cambridge Dictionary, [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust]](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust%5d)

#### Debate was created as a game but it is more than a competition. The attempt to hold on to the white purification of fair games pathologize non-conforming bodies as rule breakers. Thus the ROB is to invade the community.

Graziano 14 (Valeria Antonella, ADRI Research Fellow, Middlesex University London, Common pleasures: The politics of collective practice from sociability to militant conviviality, Diss., Autumn 2014, pp. 179-189. Gendered language modified in [brackets], “dispositives” is a plural of Foucauldian “dispositif”, which means “the various institutional, physical, and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures which enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social body”)

The fact that games can distill discrete outcomes and goals out of activities that are not bound by necessity is what transforms them into valuable dispositives from the point of view of power. Obviously, with this I do not mean to suggest that games are bad or dangerous per se. The point of a critique of gamification as the dominant format of sociability within contemporary capitalism is to denounce the way in which it predicates that experience is measurable and comparable, an outlook that economizes the realm of so called free activities transforming them in a new kind of labour, and not to stigmatize games as dangerous social activities. Games however do impact society in a negative sense when they become the dominant format through which power promotes sociability. In this case the rules that qualify games as responsive systems morph into laws presiding the exclusion or inclusion of subjects from having access to fundamental resources for their life. In a game questioning of the rules is not contemplated, because in order to play a game the rules must be considered binding by all participants. As Huizinga, rules are so sacred in games that communities of players are usually more lenient towards those who cheat them than towards those who disregard them: The player who trespasses against the rules or ignores them is a "spoil-sport." The spoil-sport is not the same as the false player, the cheat; for the latter pretends to be playing the game and, on the face of it, still acknowledges the magic circle...the spoil-sport shatters the play-world itself. By withdrawing from the game he [they] reveals the relativity and fragility of the play-world in which he [they] had temporarily shut himself [themselves] with others. 391 Yet, if sociability becomes a game, it requires that we accept the rules that govern the ethics of society leaving no margin for conflict or disagreement about what those might be. Gamification in this sense has major political and ethical implications, as it demands a belief in the inevitability of the social as it is, marginalizing all those who don’t want to acknowledge the power of its magic circles rather than those who do not play by the official rules. In gamification, the cheats who ‘plays the system’ with a cynical attitude are actually often welcomed in the experience economy, as their activities identify malfunctions and weaknesses in the formats of organization and fuel the development of the experience industries towards the production of ever better and more sophisticated solutions. In contrast with the idea of sociability as game, we can take play to be expressive of the capacity of sociability to ‘make sense’ of the world. Play in fact does not demand an a priori faithfulness to rules, but it is the drive that pushes us to discover and make up new rules and constraints to actualise our freedom. While games presupposes a shared meaning, meaning is what play makes out of reality (as Huizinga suggested “all play means something”392), and as a model for sociability it further indicates a process through which people become meaningful to each other. As such, to play describe the process that leads to the formulation of the rules of a given game, but it also move beyond games as such to describes the sense that is attributed to the relation between one game to another, or between games and other modes of action such as reproductive and productive labour.

#### Linguistic standardization is procedurally unfair – the internal protocols of debate that professioinalize discussion and destroy community building. Only linguistic pluralism can access competitive equity for black participants

**DeShields 18** (Inte’a A; Ph.D; Language, Literacy & Culture, University of Maryland, Baltimore County (Baltimore, MD); “Spitfire: Framing ‘White Rage’ in Response to Black Rhetoric”; GR)

A performance that is highly stylized and reflective of all the components a debater strives to present in competition— a well-organized, compelling set of arguments and evidence that work within the set of rules that govern what is most desirable in a competitive debater. Paroske (2011) suggests that for debaters, language acquisition of the debate style and language is essential to be taken seriously by the debate community, of fellow debaters, coaches, and judges. He posits that language acquisition ensures that only those willing to adopt the new language system become experienced debaters (p. 191). He goes on to explain, that part of the nature of competitive debate is the restriction of what can or cannot be said within the linguistic rules of framing an argument. This process then, in the framework of EoP, may limits the extent to which observation of a participants’ identity as it relates to whom they are outside of the confines of the technical, jargon laden, physically restrictive, debate performance. The possible limitation of at least observing the poetics of performance, in observation and analysis of debate may be that “agency in a debater’s use of unmarked patterns is used to establish identification and mark identity as a skilled debater “while strategy for political and moral devices may call for the use of marked patterns.” A debater may be reluctant to utilize marked 80 patterns for fear of judgment that may result in a loss and the subsequent mark of being identified as deviant to the linguistic norms of debate. Paroske, cites Bourdieu (1984 and 1986) and Dimock (2009) to explain the phenomenological function of language and social capital as it relates to the language of debate. To be successful in debate by most standards entails “forcing all thoughts into the official language” (Paroske, 2011, p. 192) [thereby] restricting what can be said. To progress further in the ranks, language fluency is an almost nonnegotiable skill. The acquisition of and adroit use of debate language and stylistics means a debater uses the language of debate which, in its form as representative of pedagogical ideology, social capital, and politically loaded arguments, a debater strategically chooses which part of her or his pedagogically political linguistic identity will achieve a win. However, the choice of language will most always be presented in the form of standardized, unmarked English. This strategic act of using unmarked language, limiting a representation of a linguistic identity additional to that of a debater, is likely to be limited in this framework which may also limit the variability of the observable poetics of the performance given that debaters, aside from individual characteristics of voice, strategically utilize a set a rules of jargon that are most likely to garner a win. There was a time 81 when debate was seen as a game in which the best performance of high academic discourse wins. The idea of high academic discourse reiterates a political inclination toward a standard of whiteness that goes unmarked in the language of debate and thereby making any varied use of language not strategic to an argument or evidence potentially marked as deviant and low academic discourse. For Bauman, performance is meant to highlight an “artful use of language in the conduct of social life-in kinship, politics, economics, and religion-...” rendering performance “socially constitutive and efficacious, not secondary and derivative.” The stylistic expectations of ICFD [debate] may prove to be a limiting factor in the number of African American participants that use marked varieties of English in competition given that research by Rogers (1996) “reveals a majority of male debaters express the view that minorities are “deficient in the skills necessary for success within the open ranks due to some cultural ‘flaw’ linked to emotion, cognitive process and/or verbal ability” (Hill, 1998, p. 18). Those who choose to participate and progress through the ranks have in some way mastered the language stylistics and expectations of debate. Many African Americans will even change their communication styles in order to disprove [stereotype] expectations and be successful in forensics competition (Hill, 1998). In this view, the language of debate may prove limiting in its originality of speeches, which, in the case of policy debate, are often, part of a debate teams’ case arguments constructed for them and used throughout a year of competition and language conformity is celebrated and rewarded. For African American debaters the pressure to acquire and efficaciously employ the language of debate is high. Bauman acknowledges the politics present in the utilization of this frame and the issues in the act of such control and the social issues of power that may arise from its application. As an answer to the possible problems that may arise Bauman offers factors of consideration in moving along in the research process are; access, legitimacy, competence, and values. The interrelations of dimensions of analysis provide the following theory developed by Bucholtz and Hall as a boarding point for a more pragmatic performer-centered approach to data collection and analysis of the sociocultural interaction of language and identities of African American ICFD participants. Bucholtz and Hall (2003) view performance from the frame of Hymes and Bauman as well as, performativity from the frame of Austin and Butler (see above) as intelligible concepts in the development of their approach to the study of language and identity and language interaction. Performance in both senses involves stylization, the highlighting and exaggeration of 83 ideological associations (Bucholtz and Hall, 2003). They go on to explain, that [p]performance is therefore a way to bring identities to the fore, often in subversive or resistant ways (Bauman & Briggs, 1990, p. 381) 22 and look to Hymes (1975) Bauman (1978), Bauman and Briggs (1990), and Briggs (1998), who viewed performance as more than a “mere reiteration of an underlying textual structure that was traditionally taken to be primary” (p. 587) but demonstrated that performance is instead emergent in the course of its unfolding in specific encounters as a spring board for developing a framework that sees identity as an emergent phenomenon of social interaction and culture. African Americans, Intercollegiate Competitive Debate, and Language Students across the life span of education experience a system that celebrates standardized English while home varieties have historically faced a stream of efforts to “iron out,” “white-wash,” correct, fix, make proper, and de-culturalize the speech patterns of various linguistic cultural backgrounds. Black English and its speakers have experienced the pressures and stigmatization throughout the course of American history. Black English(es) have been the root of contentious debates in public forums; from the abolitionist movement (Dick, 1973), throughout the Civil Rights and the 22 Pagliai and Farr (2000) 84 Black of Arts Movements, to the Ann Harbor School District Decision of 1979 and Oakland, California Ebonics resolution of 1997, to recent literature centered on race and language politics (Alim & Smitherman, 2012). No aspect of the Black American experience can be explored without consideration of language, culture and identity, and the subsequent intersections. Researchers have begun trying to discover what it is about the activity that turns women and minorities away? (Stepps & Gardner, 2001). The leading perspective stems from the belief of cultural/social bias represented in the demographics of participants, coaches, judges, and forensics and debate program directors. Research on the perspective of women, primarily white women, in pursuing and competing in debate is available at length; however, ethnic minorities, namely African Americans have not been an area of in depth consideration. Loge (1991) and Hill (1998) pursued penetrating the topic of African Americans in collegiate forensics and debate. Other studies have highlighted the numbers of African Americans in debate in lump with women who out number ethnic minorities considerably. These same studies focus on gender related issues in debate and effectively establish evidence of gender bias in language and rewarded delivery style. Loges (1990) recognized the disparity and began to record and quantify the 85 reasons why African American students participate in debate. In a survey of 64 schools “only 22 reported having black debaters on the team…a total of only 40 black debaters, of whom 22 were novice, 10 junior varsity and only 8 varsity.” Even more telling, “only nine schools reported that their black debaters won speaker awards and only two schools reported that their black debaters frequently reached the elimination rounds of large tournaments” (p. 80). Under-represented debaters must participate in a debate structure and culture formed by the dominant group of white coaches and debaters (Stepps & Gardner, 2001; Stepp, 1997; Loge, 1990). They must also participate and meet the linguistic stylistic satisfaction of judges that reflect the latter population. It is here, in the realm of coaching, competing, and being judged, both in and outside of the activity, that there lies a point of contention that raised the sands of discord in reaction to Black rhetoric by white media. Competitors in ICFD enter the activity fully aware of the language component but minority students quickly find themselves to be few in numbers. This activity allows for a competitive edge that rests in large part, on the effective use of standardized American English or the status quo of American speech. The status quo, however, represents a recycling of ideologies that reflect high value on the skillful use of standardized American English that is steeped in race and class bias. In consideration of the bias that rests as the foundation of standardized American English it is necessary to investigate the inextricably linked role of language identity and subsequent language attitudes as it relates to these students’ experiences in competing with a language that may not be culturally their own.

#### Our representation and rhetoric transcends our linguistic subjectivity and fosters communities of difference. The medium of communicable ideas comes prior to a mutual understanding of content.

Vivian 04 [Bradford, *Being Made Strange: Rhetoric Beyond Representation*, pp.76-7//ak47]

The practices by which rhetoric has been defined—overwhelmingly as persuasion or argumentation—reflect its original basis in these metaphysical assumptions about speech, communication, and meaning. The goal of persuading or arguing is inexplicable without some notion of persuasive or argumentative intent. Perfect conformity with one’s intentions is seldom, if ever, achieved in rhetorical practice; yet it remains the ideal possibility upon which notions of persuasion or argumentation are predicated. The more one’s listeners agree with the logic of one’s appeals, the more they have been persuaded. Because of the equivalence between intention and persuasion or argumentation, rhetorical criticism invariably evaluates either the immediate or delayed outcome of a rhetorical act in relation to the critic’s estimation of its intended effects. In 1925, Herbert Wichelns’s (1993) assertion that rhetorical criticism must measure the effects of a discourse rather than its literary qualities, regarded as a crucial innovation by contemporary rhetorical scholars, oriented the modern study of rhetoric according to the success or failure of persuasive intent. By this logic, delayed rhetorical effects are essentially compensatory, typically falling outside the purview of the rhetor’s persuasive, and seemingly transparent, intentions. Whether one defines it as persuasion or argumentation, rhetoric functions essentially as an extension of subjective intentions, which, in turn, depend upon the notion of a concept or meaning independent of language. The extent of these remarks can be reduced to the observation that the active voice dominates conceptions of rhetoric even in the present day. The categories of persuasion or argumentation suggest the activity of a subject upon his or her listeners, of objects that receive the intended action of a subject. The exclusive value of speech in the rhetorical tradition presupposes that such processes are organized by the supposedly inherent reason, virtue, and identity of a speaking subject whose speech represents forms of presence exterior to the order of language. In order to counter traditional conceptions of rhetoric, some have proposed an inverse logic in which rhetorical phenomena reflect ideological structures that determine the reason, virtue, or identity of the speaking subject (or of any meaning at all, for that matter). Early in this chapter, however, I used Nietzsche’s essay on moral definitions of truth and lying to demonstrate that simply reversing the traditional values accorded to truth and language nonetheless preserves a conception of rhetoric predicated on the active voice. Following such a reversal, rhetoric assumes the role of a transparent medium that produces identities and differences, truths and lies, as manifestations of a transcendent ideological order. In such a formulation, all semantic or symbolic differences inevitably are incorporated into a transhistorical unity of absolute meaning. As either instrument or ideology, rhetoric is defined by the representation of ideal and original presence. Representational accounts of rhetoric thus depend on the accepted priority of the active voice in our heritage. In order to develop an account of rhetoric beyond representation, I propose to dissociate rhetoric from its conventional affinity with speech and intention. To be clear, I do not argue that one should disregard the significance of speech and intention in rhetorical processes. But I do insist that they must be given a different sense and value in order to formulate a conception of rhetoric no longer governed by a transcendental subject, namely, human being as such. Neither do I offer an opposing ideal to that of oral address. Instead of dispensing with this ideal, I argue for the benefits of assigning it an alternate sense and value. Doing so obligates one to devise a conception of rhetoric in the middle voice—a conception of rhetoric defined neither by the supposed truth of character nor that of custom (neither by an essential nor social self ) but by the self-enactment of discourse in which such apparently antithetical categories acquire sense and value as constitutive features of subjectivity. An attunement to such enactment, instead of representing an essential identity, lends priority to discursive difference, to the nonrepresentational elements of representation traditionally obscured by appeals to the transparency of speech, reason, or intention. Throughout Part 2, I develop conceptual and methodological principles with which we may finally begin to listen to rhetoric in this voice.

#### In this debate you should reject reactionary politics of white fragility that cling to the status quo. The assumption that our rhetorical performance must sacrifice its radical potential to adhere to hegemonic standards cements academic dogmatism and dooms resistance.

Bolton and Minor, 16 (Michael Bolton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Pace University, Elizabeth Minor, Visiting Research Scholar @ Jindal school of international affairs, “The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay: The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons’ Operationalization of Critical IR Theories,” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12343)

Within the IR literature there is a perennial admonition to make theory more ‘relevant’ to policy makers, but this is usually cast in problem‐solving terms: producing knowledge that solves the problems faced by the existing political framework. (Lepgold, 1998; Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005; Walt, 2005). Many of those engaged in critical theorizing resist such demands to be ‘useful,’ suspicious of the operationalization of academic work in oppressive systems, and tend towards a position of ‘resistance’ to the system as a whole. Critical security studies scholar Anna Stavrianakis (2012, p. 233) for example, calls on disarmament activists to demand ‘transgressive change that fundamentally alters the social landscape as well as generates concrete improvements’ rather than calling for ‘incremental changes that leave the parameters of an issue untouched’. Given the centrality of discourse to critical theorizing, resistance is often framed not in terms of taking territory, mobilizing bodies, changing legislation, gaining votes or raising money. Rather it tends to focus on the critical deconstruction of oppressive discourse and disruption of existing norms (e.g. Hargreaves, 2012). As a result, many critical IR scholars see their academic work – undermining dominant discourses through their scholarship and teaching – as their primary form of resistance. (Said, 1996). An emerging generation of political actors were educated by post‐positivist and critical IR scholars and conceive of their work self‐consciously in discursive terms. That is, they frame their intervention in the political arena as a deliberate attempt to reshape the way society speaks about and gives meaning to a particular phenomenon, people, group or activity. Occupy Wall Street activists drew upon critical and discursive theories to strategize their symbolic disruption of the neo‐liberal order (Welty, 2013). LGBTQA activists and ‘third wave’ feminists are trying to change dominant discourses of gender and sexuality (e.g. St. Pierre, 2000). However, critical theory has had less impact on the realm of international military and security policy, which remains heavily influenced by realist thought (Cooper, 2006). As critical theorizing has begun to be used for solving definable political problems (e.g. Davies, 2012; Merlingen, 2013), what Brown (2013) calls ‘critical problem‐solving theory’, it has eroded Cox's (1981) boundary between ‘problem‐solving’ and critical theories. What happens when a theoretical paradigm that explicitly defines itself in critical opposition is instrumentalized and used in problem‐solving ways? This question, which we begin to explore in this article, is underexamined in the literature (see Weizman, 2012, pp. 185–220 for an important exception). According to the epistemic community literature (e.g. Haas 2004), the education of policy makers can shape their later actions (Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005). Most usefully for this article, it shows how at critical junctures policy makers will turn to experts. Policy makers tend to be less interested in meta‐theory or broad academic debates about an issue. Rather, they look for knowledge that can be used instrumentally to solve a particular policy problem (e.g. Hall, 1993). But moving theoretical ideas from academia, through the activist community, to the policy arena, dilutes the original ideas and reinterprets them in instrumental ways. To help understand this, we draw on postcolonial concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘creolization’ of different ‘knowledge systems’ pushed into contact (Shih and Lionet, 2011, p. 30). We find that some ICAN campaigners responsible for its current strategy have ‘translated’ IR discursive theory into the world of disarmament policy making. In doing so, they selected the aspects of critical security studies ‘to transpose and emphasize’ (cf. Tymoczko, 2000 p. 24) as befit their specific political goals. This creative application of critical theory in a new setting, in its translation of theory into political engagement, may necessarily involve rendering it less threatening to elite audiences, in the process of seeking policy changes (cf. Jeffrey, 2013, pp. 107–131).