# NC

## 1 Disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose their contact information

#### Violation: They didn’t

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

#### Prefer

#### 1] Inclusion – Novices would have a way to contact you about your positions and learn from them and debaters would tell you before round about triggering positions that you’ve read before. Independent voter because inclusion is a gateway issue for debate to occur in the first place

#### 2] Prep Skew- Pre-round disclosure can’t happen if you don’t have a preferable means of contact because I would never know the aff.

#### Fairness – its constitutive to debate as competitive activity that requires objective evaluation

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact to debate

#### Competing Interpretations – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) reasonability invites judge intervention

#### Drop the Debater – a) it’s the only way to may up for time spent on theory b) it’s the only way to deter future abuse

#### No RVI’s- a) clash – people go all in on theory which decks substance engagement b) chilling effect – people will be too scared to read theory because RVI’s encourage baiting theory

## 2: Democracy spec

**Interp: The affirmative must define democracy in a delimited text in the 1AC.**

**Democracy is flexible and has too many interps – normal means shows no consensus and makes the round irresolvable since the judge doesn’t know how to compare between types of offense and o/w since it’s a side constraint on decision making.**

**Wikipedia**, xx-xx-xxxx, "Democracy Index," No Publication, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index> SJCP//JG

[**Full democracies**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_democracy) **are nations where civil liberties and fundamental political freedoms are not only respected but also reinforced by a political culture conducive to the thriving of democratic principles**. These nations have a valid system of governmental checks and balances, an independent judiciary whose decisions are enforced, governments that function adequately, and diverse and independent media. These nations have only limited problems in democratic functioning.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6) [**Flawed democracies**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illiberal_democracy) **are nations where elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honoured but may have issues (e.g. media freedom infringement and minor suppression of political opposition and critics)**. These nations have significant faults in other democratic aspects, including underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6) [**Hybrid regimes**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_regime) **are nations with regular** [**electoral frauds**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_fraud)**, preventing them from being fair and free democracies.** These nations commonly have governments that apply pressure on political opposition, non-independent judiciaries, widespread corruption, harassment and pressure placed on the media, anaemic rule of law, and more pronounced faults than flawed democracies in the realms of underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6)

**Violation – you don’t.**

**Prefer –**

**1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night – triggers presumption since the aff wasn’t subject to well researched scrutiny. We lose access to American politics DA’s, Xi lashout DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.**

**2] Ground – not defining hurts my strategy since they can shift out as I ask DA questions, so I err on the side of caution and read generics which get destroyed by AC frontlines.**

**3] Real World – Policy makers will always how they are implementing a law. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, private entities can circumvent since there is no delineated way to enforce the aff and means their solvency can’t actualize.**

**DSpec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from policies that require enforcement to function.**

## 3 Peace Journalism PIC

### 1NC Shell v1

#### CP Text – In a Democracy, a Free Press ought to prioritize Objectivity over Advocacy, except for instances of Peace Journalism.

#### The CP competes – Peace Journalism is a form of advocacy journalism since it is a form of agenda-setting and framing.

Hakorimana 20, Gratien. Exploring peace journalism practices for conflict prevention in Rwanda: The case study of Pax Press initiative. Diss. University of Rwanda, 2020. (Master's degree, bachelor's and diploma, peace studies and conflict transformation, political science and mass media studies at the University of Rwanda)//Elmer

(viii) Framing theory: it examines how journalists choose what to report on and how they report what they chose. Now, both theories, agenda-setting and framing, are critical in peace journalism because “any meaningful debate about journalism must include some efforts to set out the basis on which some forms of representation should be preferred to others”. Agenda setting and framing theories are often combined together, because they share the focus on the influence of media to the audience. This is why they are recognized as important in the Peace journalism, and other advocacy forms of journalism according to some studies (Ogenga, 2019: 68).

#### Peace Journalism severs Neutrality principles of Objectivity.

Shaw 11 Dr Ibrahim Seaga Shaw (2011) Debates in Peace Journalism, Journal of Peace Education, 8:3, 363-365, DOI: 10.1080/17400201.2011.621380 (Chairman and Information Commissioner, Right to Access Information Commission in Sierra Leone)//Elmer

Chapter 1 sets the context by discussing the more traditional criticisms of peace journalism, based on the view that it undermines some of the important standards of professional journalism – especially ‘objectivity’, which emphasises neutrality and the simple separation of facts from opinion. One of the critics, journalist David Loyn (2007), says peace journalism turns reporters into ‘players’ rather than ‘observers’ and hence renders them ‘over-critical’, which is against the tenets of objective journalism. On the other hand, Thomas Hanitzsch (2007) says it is not possible to associate objective reality with its representation because the latter is inevitably biased; hence he sees peace journalism as not critical enough. Lynch, for his part, criticises ‘objectivity’ that favors ‘event’ (drama) over ‘process’ (structure), ‘official’ over ‘unofficial’ sources, and above all ‘dualism as a template for conflict’, a win–lose kind of situation where the winner takes all. He develops this notion in chapter 2, where he explores pedagogical arguments to help students appreciate the differentiated impact of peace journalism and war journalism as patterns of media response to conflict. Chapter 3 calls for a rethinking of journalism training in countries in conflict to reflect peace journalism as a critical pedagogy, which he describes as a solution-oriented dialogue. Paolo Freire (1970/2000) calls it libertarian education, which promotes reconciliation between the teacher and the student. The author develops this critical pedagogical approach of peace journalism in chapters 4 and 5 with case studies from Indonesia, and in chapters 6 and 7 with case studies from the Philippines. Moreover, these four chapters, as well as chapter 8 (a case study from Australia), use content analysis to demonstrate the extent to which peace journalism’s evaluative criteria are used in the news media discourse. In chapters 9 and 10 the author roundly blames war journalism for the prolonged Palestinian–Israeli crisis as well as terrorism in general, while the final chapter focuses on the reflections of journalists on the reporting and mis-reporting of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.

#### Peace Journalism as advocacy specifically sets up conflict resolution – particularly the Middle East.

Abouaoun 20 Elie Abouanoun 3-13-2020 "Rethinking Media’s Role in Conflict and Peace in the Middle East" <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/03/rethinking-medias-role-conflict-and-peace-middle-east> (Director, Middle East and North Africa Programs at US Institute of Peace)//Elmer

In 2014, the world watched in disbelief, as global news networks covered the stream of gruesome and horrific beheading videos released by the so-called Islamic State. For the first time, by bringing the terror of the Islamic State directly to the devices in the palm of our hands, it felt personal and close by, rather than across the world in a mysterious land. Without question, the role of the media in peace and conflict is becoming ever more important. While terror groups like IS have been proven effective in their use of media for their sinister agendas, has the rest of the world caught up? As media technologies advance, so too must our strategies to responsibly and effectively harness their power. Sadly, in some cases in the Middle East and North Africa, media have been employed, by both regimes and terrorists, as a tool to cause harm, incite violence and fuel dangerous narratives. With conflict and seemingly unending turmoil ravaging the region today, the role of media is as important as ever in documenting and exposing citizens around the world to the realities on the ground. However, strict requirements and seemingly impossible lists of legalities and compliances imposed by authoritarian regimes result in the suppression of ideas and stories that run counter to the official narrative. This is especially true in states where the government has cracked down on publications that are critical of their policies, which they describe as “fake news.” Too often journalists are targeted for illuminating injustice at the hands of harsh regimes in the region; regimes that are finding it more and more difficult to keep the world in the dark in the modern technological era. It is not surprising then that the region suffers from a lack of access to credible and reliable information; the result of amateurs taking up journalism as part of “democratization” combined with the unfortunate reality that serious journalists are co-opted by regimes to spread disinformation that aligns with official narratives. It is also challenging to decipher fact from fiction, as competing political agendas and international interests try to direct narratives and sway public opinion in their favor. The mix of digital technology, unscrupulous politics and commercial exploitation of the new communications landscape highlights the need for a revised framework of ethics, essential for rebuilding public trust in journalism and media; a framework that reasserts that the core values of accuracy, independence and responsible reporting that have evolved over the past 150 years remain as relevant as ever. The Media’s Power to Build Peace In a recently co-hosted conference in Tunis, Tunisia, the United States Institute of Peace and Al-Hurra Television partnered to address this complex issue and discuss recommendations for how the power of the media can be better employed to promote peacebuilding initiatives and resolve conflict in the region. By enhancing cooperation and coordination among local, independent media outlets in the region to create networks for knowledge sharing, their influence and strength would be consolidated and magnified. Additionally, by educating media practitioners in the region about the critical role they can play in building peace, promoting solidarity and understanding among communities in conflict with one another, they can challenge narratives of hatred and the use of violence as legitimate means to an end. Empowering media practitioners to embrace this role is essential, and there is a great opportunity for the international community to play a role here. With ever advancing media technologies, there are countless creative ways to elevate moderate voices and promote positive chronicles of peace and conflict resolution to change harmful narratives. Looking at the long-term, the region would benefit from developing and delivering media education to communities, beginning from an early age with a focus on using such skills for peacebuilding initiatives and innovatively combatting hate speech. With ever advancing media technologies, there are countless creative ways to elevate moderate voices and promote positive chronicles of peace and conflict resolution to change harmful narratives. Finally, and most essentially, governments of the region must provide the space for peace journalism to flourish to mitigate conflict and reduce tension, embracing the positive role that peace journalism can play in bridging divides. Getting violent and paranoid regimes to provide greater space for independent voices is a major challenge, as the trend line has tended to go in the opposite direction since the so-called “Arab Spring,” toward greater control and even intelligence service dominance over the media. Certainly, media alone cannot reverse decades of deep-seated conflict and turmoil in the region, but it can in fact catalyze modest strides toward understanding, empathy and humanizing the “other.” Restless masses throughout the Middle East are deeply unhappy with the status quo, as demonstrations from Algeria to Iran have made abundantly clear. Despite massive repression and regime media manipulation, many of the old lies don’t seem to work anymore. The region is indeed hungry for truthful representations of its own history with conflict and for accurate depictions of the consequences and human toll of the violence that has devastated the region. Without it, future generations are likely to repeat it.

#### Objectivity hides “War Journalism” that creates Serial Policy Failure and Militarism.

Lynch 8, Jake. Debates in peace journalism. Sydney University Press, 2008. (Jake Lynch is Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, Australia and Senior Research Fellow of the School of Communication, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.)//Elmer

The enduring power of propaganda There is little doubt that the world would be greatly benefited by the spread of peace journalism. Even to posit its existence contributes to our emancipation from the grip of those deadly forms of propaganda so influential in liberal democratic societies. This propaganda remains hegemonic partly because its facade so convincingly claims for itself neutrality and objectivity, which misleadingly implies that the journalist is detached on a principled, professional basis from special interests and ideological agendas. The non-critical pedagogy of war journalism should be viewed as a perfected form of mind control that entraps almost every practicing journalist Most of these war journalists honestly believe that their 'objectivity' makes them truth-tellers, and as such, the indispensable guardians of democracy. Lynch disabuses us of such a perception by showing us persuasively that the beliefs that make war journalism appear respectable are more correctly understood as the results of thorough brainwashing that enlists the fraternity of mainstream journalists into a virtual cult. Despite the many efforts at demystification, war journalism retains its paradigmatic status. This means that those who attempt to explain its harmful social effects are immediately excluded from mainstream channels of communication no matter how strong their credentials. Noam Chomsky, Johan Galtung, Jake Lynch, and many brave others, have done their creative best to open our eyes, and give us healthier ways to conceive of political turmoil, but sadly the long journey to a future where a culture of nonviolence and human security exists has barely begun. It remains a difficult journey that is blocked at every turn by the forces of wealth and privilege in the early 210 century. These forces avoid debate, carrying on their nihilistic struggle to retain pre-eminence by sustaining a near monopoly of sources of information that facilitates the marginalization of competing views. The employers of war journalists have long ago forfeited the benefits of moral and political imagination that might lead to such constructive adjustments in the canon of objectivity due to their addictive reliance on the fixes of violence and war. Despite this marginality there are reasons for peace journalists to work harder than ever. There is gathering evidence that the war system is producing a variety of failures for even the most powerful actors. First, the technology of mass destruction is spreading around the world, and if not eliminated, is almost certain to find its way into the field of battle in the decades ahead. Secondly, the politics of resistance are demonstrating over and over on various blood soaked battlefields again that military superiority does not produce political victory. The United States should have learned this lesson from its defeat in Vietnam, and it did seem intimidated for a while, but it has regressed, presently trying to (mis)represent a disastrous failure in Iraq as victory. Thirdly, the waste of resources devoted to militarism arc watering the roots of mass resentment in many countries, as well as making impossible a series of essential, yet expensive, adjustments to the challenges of climate change. Fourthly, the remarkable transformation of security politics in Europe since the end of World War II provides a laboratory for a framework of relations among sovereign states where war options have been effectively excluded and conflicts are addressed as if nonviolence is the only alternative. If in Europe, long the crucible of war, why not elsewhere, eventually everywhere? Yet so long as war journalism shapes the way we grasp policy options, it is unlikely that any of these realities will be properly appreciated. More likely in the short run is the reinforcement of militarist modes of behaviour; as the utility of military power continues to diminish, war journalists are enlisted to disguise failures by exhibiting enthusiasm for new tactics and the promise of better and more weapons, and to summon the public to display their unified support of official war aims as an expression of patriotic virtue.

#### Middle East Stability goes Nuclear.

Silverstein 21 “Iran-Israel tensions: The threat of nuclear disaster looms large,” Richard Silverstein [writes the Tikun Olam blog, devoted to exposing the excesses of the Israeli national security state], 23 April 2021 <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/iran-israel-tensions-threat-nuclear-war-looms-large> SM

Israel had a near-miss of potentially catastrophic proportions on Thursday. As it has done hundreds of times in the past decade, the Israeli air force attacked Iranian bases inside Syria. In response, Syrian forces fired anti-aircraft missiles of a rather primitive Soviet model, one of which overflew its target and landed some 30 kilometres from Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. Israel said recently that it was bolstering its defences around Dimona for just such an eventuality. Although an Iranian general taunted Israel, implying that Iran had some responsibility for the attack, that doesn’t appear to be the case. But the missile landing inside Israel does show that if Iran wanted to attack Dimona, it has the capacity. And despite Israel’s best efforts, an Iranian missile could hit its target. With that, one of the worst nuclear disasters in the region’s history could unfold, including a Chernobyl-type radioactive leak that could endanger not only all of Israel, but also many of its neighbours.A US general has assured a Senate committee that the Syrians weren’t intending to attack Israel. Rather, a misguided missile meant to target an Israeli warplane overshot its target. He blamed it on “incompetence”, as if that was supposed to be somehow reassuring; rather, it only reinforces how easy it is even for a mistake to cause a nuclear disaster.Campaign of terror Certainly, if either Israel or Iran wanted to bomb each other’s nuclear facilities, they could do so successfully. An Israeli attack would probably cause less catastrophic damage, but only because Iran’s nuclear programme is not nearly as developed as Israel’s. An Iranian direct hit on Dimona would cause incalculable damage due to the plutonium reactor at the facility. Nor does this happen in a vacuum: Israel has maintained a decade-long campaign of terror attacks on Iranian military bases and nuclear scientists. Most recently, it bombed the Natanz nuclear facility, destroying the power generation source and damaging older-generation centrifuges. It also attacked an Iranian Revolutionary Guard spy ship off the Yemeni coast this month. Iran has responded in its own limited way, restrained by its need to maintain good relations with nuclear-deal signatories. For Israel, the attacks are a low-risk proposition. It defies US opposition (if there is any) with a wink and a nod, and the attacks look good on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s résumé. To weather his corruption trial and retain public support, he needs external enemies (and internal enemies, but that’s a different story). Iran provides these in spades.Eliminating Israeli leverage The US could exert control over this scenario by eliminating Israeli leverage. If it agreed to lift sanctions in exchange for Iran’s return to low levels of uranium enrichment, as designated in the nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration, Israel’s rejectionist approach would become moot. The problem is that US President Joe Biden is running scared from Republican opposition to any nuclear deal with Iran. Besides, he has designated the Middle East a low priority for his administration. There is some faint hope in the US announcement that it is ready to lift a partial set of sanctions. However, the list on offer is quite limited, and will certainly not satisfy the Iranians. Such half-measures present an example of the limitations of the Biden approach. He should instead make a full-throated commitment to end this dithering once and for all. Israel is mounting a full-court press this coming week as it sends its Mossad and military intelligence chiefs, along with its army chief of staff, to Washington in an attempt to influence nuclear negotiations as they enter what may be a final stage. According to Haaretz, army chief of staff Aviv Kochavi “will also raise other issues, including Iran’s military expansion in Syria and the instability of Lebanon. Israel is concerned about the possibility that Hezbollah will try to … [foment] conflict with Israel.” The hypocrisy of Israel’s refusal to acknowledge its own massive military interventions in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and even Iraq, while decrying Iran’s involvement in Syria, is almost breathtaking. There is next to no chance that any of this will enter into the considerations of negotiators in Vienna. Unlike Israel, they are interested in doing a nuclear deal, not engaging in wishful thinking. Combustible Middle East mix Returning to the Biden administration’s global goals, the Middle East doesn’t care about presidential priorities. It contains a combustible mix of corrupt elites and overbearing dictators who do not shirk from causing mayhem in their domains. And one of them, perhaps a desperate Israeli prime minister or an ageing ayatollah eager to preserve his honour and legacy, could inadvertently (or intentionally) set the entire region aflame. If Biden doesn’t act quickly and decisively, there is a sizeable risk that another missile from one country or the other will hit a target and cause devastation. That would mark a point of no return, like the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, which led to World War One. The difference is that in 1914, armies fought with guns, bayonets and artillery. Today, they will fight with F-35s, ballistic missiles and possibly nuclear weapons.

## FW

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being. Prefer –

#### 1] Naturalism – Only material realities are epistemically accessible

Papineau ‘07

David Papineau, “Naturalism”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007//KOHS-AG

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if **moral facts lie outside** this range, **then** it follow that **moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world**. (Harman, 1986) At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, **knowledge** of the spatiotemporal world **is mediated by physical processes** **involving our** sense organs and **cognitive systems**. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.

#### Pleasure is an intrinsic good—solves regress.

Moen ’16 – (Ole Martin, PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy @ University of Oslo, "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267). Modified for glang

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask what her~~is~~ end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail.

#### Outweighs –

#### A] Other FWs rely on long questionable claims that make them less likely. Only util is epistemically accessible.

#### B] History – Thousands of years of debating haven’t settled ethical questions, so presume util since there’s good in making the world a better place

#### 2] Death outweighs – agents can’t act ethically if they fear bodily harm – turns NCs

#### 3] Extinction comes first under any framing – future value, magnitude, risk parity

Pummer 15 Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015 AT, recut BWSEK

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists tendency only. There is a to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable.

#### 4] Consequentialism true –

A] No intent-foresight distinction – when I foresee something it enters into my intention. ie letting someone die has the same effect as you killing them. Their death is an irrefutable fact.

B] No act-omission distinction – omitting is just choosing not to take any other action

C] Necessary enablers – If I ought to mow the lawn, then I ought to turn on the lawnmower. The consequence of that action is being able to mow to lawn

D] You can only evaluate if you’ve achieved their FW by looking at the consequences of it