## 1

#### Reading hidden game-over spikes vs me is a voting issue DTD for deterrence

#### THOMPSON:

Marshall Thompson – Former Debater and Current Coach. http://vbriefly.com/2015/04/21/marshall-thoughts/

First, I think that evaluating who is the better debater via who dropped spikes excludes lots of specific individuals, especially those with learning disabilities. I have both moderate dyslexia and extreme dysgraphia.  Despite debating for four years with a lot of success I was never able to deal with spikes. I could not ‘mind-sweep’ because my flow was not clear enough to find the arguments I needed, and I was simply too slow a reader to be able to reread through the relevant parts of a case during prep-time. **ab**I was very lucky, my junior year (which was the first year I really competed on the national circuit) spikes were remarkably uncommon. Looking back it was in many ways the low-point for spike. They started to be used some my senior year but not anything like the extent they are used today. I am entirely confident, however, in saying that if spikes had had anywhere near the sameprevalence when I started doing ‘circuit’ debate as they do now, I—with the specific ways that dyslexia/dysgraphia has affected me—would never have bothered to try to debate national circuit LD (I don’t intend to imply this is the same for anyone who has dyslexia or dysgraphia, the particular ways that learning disabilities manifest is often difficult to track). Now, the mere fact that I would have been prevented from succeeding in the activity and possibly from being able to enjoyably compete is not an argument. I never would have been able to succeed at calligraphy, but I would hardly claim we should therefore not make the calligraphy club about handwriting. Instead, what I am suggesting is that the values that debate cares about and should be assessing are not questions of handwriting or notation. We expect notation instrumentally to avoid intervention, but it is not one of the ends of debate in itself. Thus, if there is a viable principle upon which we can decrease this strategic dimension of spikes but maintain non-intervention I think we should do so. I was ‘good’ at philosophy, ‘good’ at argument generation, ‘good’ at research, ‘good’ at casing, ‘great’ at framework comparison etc. It seems to me that as long as I can flow well enough to easily follow a non-tricky aff it was proper that my learning disabilities not be an obstacle to my success. (One other thing to note, while I was a ‘framework debater’ who could never have been good at spikes because of my learning disability I have never met a ‘tricky debater’ who could not have succeeded in debate without tricks simply in virtue of their intelligence and technical proficiency; that is perhaps another reason to favor my account.) Second, spikes add in a greater dimension of randomnessto the round. If they are seen then they are ‘caught’ then they don’t really help you win, if they are not they do. Against most debaters one can ‘reliably’ beat them or will ‘reliably’ lose to them. With cases with lots of spike however, one might generally beat them and then once just miss a spike and it is all over. If the round were to have happened at a different time then the spike might have been caught. This ‘luck’ dimension strikes me as at least giving reason to think it does not track with what we want when assessing who did the better debating.

#### Hold the line – disabled participation is a voter that outweighs – accessibility controls the internal link to participation in debate that makes in-round impacts relevant. Also turns the aff because proves the aff isn’t universalizable to disabled people

## 2

The logistical project necessitates a para-ontological relationship with blackness – creations of unity drive the myth of transcendental control over space-time that renders politics and civil society damning.

Moten 13 [Brackets original. Fred Moten (Professor of Performance Studies at New York University). “Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh): Just Friends”. The South Atlantic Quarterly 112:4, Fall 2013. Accessed 1/2/22. <http://raumstation.cc/content/archiv/poetiken_der_existenz/Moten-blackness-and-nothingness-mysticism-in-the-flesh.pdf> //Recut Xu]

Within this framework blackness and antiblackness remain in brutally antisocial structural support of one another like the stanchions of an absent bridge of lost desire over which flows the commerce and under which flows the current, the logistics and energy of exclusion and incorporation, that characterizes the political world. Though it might seem paradoxical, the bridge between blackness and antiblackness is “the unbridgeable gap between Black being and Human life” (Wilderson 2010: 57). What remains is the necessity of an attempt to index black existence by way of what Chandler (2007: 41) would call paraontological, rather than politico-ontological, means. The relative nothingness of black life, which shows up for political ontology as a relation of nonrelation or counterrelation precisely in the impossibility of political intersubjectivity, can be said both to obscure and to indicate the social animation of the bridge’s underside, where the im/possibilities of political intersubjectivity are exhausted. Political ontology backs away from the experimental declivity that Fanon and Du Bois were at least able to blaze, each in his own way forging a sociological path that would move against the limiting force, held in the ontological traces, of positivism, on the one hand, and phenomenology, on the other, as each would serve as the foundation of a theory of relations posing the nothingness of blackness in its (negative) relation to the substance of subjectivity-as-nonblackness (enacted in antiblackness). On the one hand, blackness and ontology are unavailable for one another; on the other hand, blackness must free itself from ontological expectation, must refuse subjection to ontology’s sanction against the very idea of black subjectivity. This imperative is not something up ahead, to which blackness aspires; it is the labor, which must not be mistaken for Sisyphean, that blackness serially commits. The paraontological distinction between blackness and blacks allows us no longer to be enthralled by the notion that blackness is a property that belongs to blacks (thereby placing certain formulations regarding non/relationality and non/communicability on a different footing and under a certain pressure) but also because ultimately it allows us to detach blackness from the question of (the meaning of) being. The infinitesimal difference between pessimism and optimism lies not in the belief or disbelief in descriptions of power relations or emancipatory projects; the difference is given in the space between an assertion of the relative nothingness of blackness and black people in the face, literally, of substantive (antiblack) subjectivity and an inhabitation of appositionality, its internal social relations, which remain unstructured by the protocols of subjectivity insofar as mu—which has been variously translated from the Japanese translation of the Chinese wu as no, not, nought, nonbeing, emptiness, nothingness, nothing, no thing but which also bears the semantic trace of dance, therefore of measure given in walking/falling, that sustenance of asymmetry, difference’s appositional mobility—also signifies an absolute nothingness whose antirelative and antithetical philosophical content is approached by way of Nishida Kitaro¯’s enactment of the affinities between structures and affects of mysticism that undergird and trouble metaphysics in the “East” and the “West.” Indeed, the content that is approached is approach, itself, and for the absolute beginner, who is at once pilgrim and penitent, mu signals that which is most emphatically and lyrically marked in Édouard Glissant’s phrase “consent not to be a single being” and indicated in Wilderson’s and Mackey’s gestures toward “fantasy in the hold,” the radical unsettlement that is where and what we are. Unsettlement is the displacement of sovereignty by initiation, so that what’s at stake—here, in displacement—is a certain black incapacity to desire sovereignty and ontological relationality whether they are recast in the terms and forms of a Lévinasian ethics or an Arendtian politics, a Fanonian resistance or a Pattersonian test of honor. Unenabled by or in this incapacity, Nishida’s philosophy folds sovereignty in the delay that has always given it significance, putting it on hold, but not in the hold, where to be on hold is to have been committed to a kind of staging, a gathering of and for the self in which negation is supposed to foster true emergence in “a self-determination of that concrete place of the contradictory identity of objectivity and subjectivity” (Nishida 1987: 96). What I term, here, a delay is understood by Nishida as “the moment [that] can be said to be eternal . . . [wherein] consciously active individuals, encounter the absolute as its inverse polarity, its mirror opposite, at each and every step of our lives” (96). It is in echoing a traditional Buddhist teaching, which asserts the nonself even against what are considered foolish declarations of the nonexistence of self, that Nishida restages a standard ontotheological skit in which sovereignty—whether in the form of the consciously active indi- vidual or in that individual’s abstract and equivalent dispersion in the nation, “the mirror image of the Pure Land in this world” (123)—takes and holds the space-time, the paradoxically transcendental ground, of the everyday unreality of “the real world,” where the sovereign’s endless show carries a brutally material imposition. What remains to be seen is what (the thinking and the study of) blackness can bring to bear on the relation between the un/real world and its other(s). What if blackness is the refusal to defer to, given in the withdrawal from the eternal delay of, sovereignty? What if Nishida’s preparatory vestibule for a general and infinite self-determination is pierced, rather than structurally supported, by (the very intimation of) the no-place to which it is opposed in his own work? When Nishida argues that “the human, consciously active volitional world makes its appearance from the standpoint of the paradoxical logic of the Prajnaparamita Sutra literature,” which offers us the phrase “Having No Place wherein it abides, this Mind arises,” he means to assert the legitimacy of an idea or image of the whole that takes “the form of the contradictory identity of the consciously active self and the world, of the volitional individual and the absolute” (95–96). What if (the thinking and the study of) blackness is an inhabitation of the hold that disrupts the whole in which the absolute, or absolute nothingness, is structured by its relation to its relative other? What if the nothing that is in question here moves through to the other side of negation, in “the real presence” of blackness, in and as another idea of nothingness altogether that is given in and as and to things? Both against the grain and by way of Fanon’s negation of the condition of relative nothingness, which is instantiated in what he takes to be the white man’s manufacture of the black, black study is attunement of and toward blackness as the place where something akin to the absolute nothingness that Nishida elaborates and a radical immanence of things that is not disavowed so much as it is unimagined in that same elaboration converge. This is to say that what remains unimagined by Nishida—not simply radical thingliness but its convergence with nothingness—is, nevertheless, made open to us by and in his thinking. Nishida helps prepare us to consider, even in the nationalist divigation of his own engagement with the heart of a teaching that has no center, that blackness is the place that has no place. “Having no place where it abides, this Mind [of the Little Negro Steelworker] arises.”1 Things are in, but they do not have, a world, a place, but it is precisely both the specificity of having neither world nor place and the generality of not having that we explore at the nexus of openness and confinement, internment and flight. Having no place wherein they abide, in the radically dispossessive no-place of the hold, in “Mutron,” Cherry and Blackwell touch intimacy from the walls. In that break, the architectonic intent of the hold as sovereign expression and recuperation breaks down. Feel the complete lysis of this morbid body/universe. Touch is not where subjectivity and objectivity come together in some kind of self-determining dialectical reality; beyond that, in the hold, in the basho (the place of nothingness, that underground, undercommon recess), is the social life of black things, which passeth (the) understanding. In the hold, blackness and imagination, in and as consent not to be a single being, are (more and less than) one. We are prepared for this generative incapacity by Wilderson’s work, where what distinguishes the sovereign, the settler, and even the savage from the slave is precisely that they share “a capacity for time and space coherence. At every scale—the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe—they can both practice cartography, and although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, their respective ‘mapness’ is never in question. This capacity for cartographic coherence is the thing itself, that which secures subjectivity for both the Settler and the ‘Savage’ and articulates them to one another in a network of connections, transfers and displacements” (Wilderson 2010: 181). Absent the “cartographic coherence [that] is the thing itself,” we must become interested in things, in a certain relationship between thingliness and nothingness and blackness that plays itself out—outside and against the grain of the very idea of self-determination—in the unmapped and unmappable immanence of undercommon sociality. This is fantasy in the hold, and Wilderson’s access to it is in the knowledge that he can have nothing and in the specific incapacity of a certain desire that this knowledge indexes. It remains for us to structure an accurate sense of what nothing is and what it constitutes in the exhaustion of home, intersubjectivity, and what Sexton calls “ontological reach” (Sexton 2011a). The truth of the formulation that the black cannot be among or in relation to his or her own is given in terminological failure. What’s at stake is how to improvise the declension from what is perceived as a failure to be together to the unmappable zone of paraontological consent. The promise of another world, or of the end of this one, is given in the general critique of world. In the meantime, what remains to be inhabited is nothing itself in its fullness, which is, in the absence of intersubjective relationality, high fantastical or, more precisely, given in the fugal, contrapuntal intrication that we can now call, by way of Mackey and Wilderson, fantasy in the hold, where the interplay of blackness and nothingness is given in an ongoing drama of force and entry. In a tradition of Buddhist teaching that goes back to the opening of The Gateless Gate, a thirteenth-century gathering of ko¯ans (case studies that take the form of stories, dialogues and/or questions meant to induce in the initiate dual intensities of doubt and concentration), that drama emerges as a deconstructive and deconstructed question, as exemplified in conventional presentations and interpretation of “Jo¯shu¯’s Dog.” The ko¯an reads: “A monk asked [Zen master] Jo¯shu¯ in all earnestness, ‘Does a dog have Buddha nature or not?’ Jo¯shu¯ said, ‘Mu!’” (Yamada 2004: 11). Even when we take into account Steven Heine’s warnings (Heine 2012) regarding the legitimacy of traditional attributions and interpretations of the Mu Ko¯an—which require us to consider both that it was not Jo¯shu¯ who responded to the question or that Jo¯shu¯’s response was the opposite of mu and that, therefore, the negative way that response is understood to open ought now to be closed—we are left with an ontotheological possibility that blackness may well exhaust. There is an appositional response, which this phantom query cannot properly be said to have called, that persists in and as an echoepistemology of passage, a sociotheology of the aneschaton, the instrumental interruption of telos by the universal (drum) machine, Blackwell’s prompt out to the study of the last things, the study carried out by the things that are last, by the least of these, whose movement constitutes a critique of the general and necessary relation between politics and death, a critique of the critique of judgment, a deconstruction of the opposition of heaven and hell. Cherry brings the noise of the end of the world in the invention of the earth. Though eschatology is understood to be a department, as it were, of theology, it has been both displaced by an administrative desire for the teleological and appropriated by a retributive desire for a kind of finality of and in sentencing, each in its commitment to sovereignty and the already existing structures that depend upon the very idea. But it’s not that I want to enclose things in the dialectical movement between beginning and end. Invention and passage denote an already existing alternative for which we are not constrained to wait. We are already down here on and under the ground, the water, as worked, unwrought nothingness working fleshly releasement in a privation of feasting, a fragility of healing. Mu is a practice of mysticism in the flesh; “Mutron,” the ritual Blackwell and Cherry perform, is their concentration meditation. It indexes the specific and material history of the drowned and burned, the shipped and held, as the condition for the release not just of the prevailing worldview but of the very idea of worldview, of transcendental standpoint and Pure Land. Cherry and Blackwell are initiates, who in turn initiate us, in what it is to abide in the social materiality of no place, of Having No Place, as a place for study. This shows up as a radical displacement of binary logic, moving through negation, because the way of the hold is no via negativa. Rather, the hold is distressed circuitry, an impedance or impediment of current, a placement of the self’s or the settler’s or the sovereign’s dyadic currency in kenotic abandon. “Mutron” is a way out of no way given in and as the exhaustion of what it is to abide, where the first and the last are neither first nor last. To remain in the hold is to remain in that set of practices of living together where antikinetic theorizing is both bracketed and mobilized by performative contemplation, as in the monastic sociality of Minton’s, where the hermetic absence of and from home is given in and as a playhouse, a funnyhouse, a madhouse. The club, our subcenobitic thing, our block chapel, is a hard row of constant improvisational contact, a dispossessive intimacy of rubbing, whose mystic rehearsal is against the rules or, more precisely, is apposed to rule, and is, therefore, a concrete social logic often (mis)understood as nothing but foolishness, which is, on the other hand, exactly and absolutely what it is. Foucault’s meditations point precisely in this direction: The ship of fools was heavily loaded with meaning, and clearly carried a great social force. . . . The madman on his crazy boat sets sail for the other world, and it is from the other world that he comes when he disembarks. This enforced navigation is both rigorous division and absolute Passage, serving to underline in real and imaginary terms the liminal situation of the mad in medieval society. It was a highly symbolic role, made clear by the mental geography involved, where the madman was confined at the gates of the cities. His exclusion was his confinement, and if he had no prison other than the threshold itself he was still detained at this place of passage. . . . A prisoner in the midst of the ultimate freedom, . . . he is the Passenger par excellence, the prisoner of the passage. It is not known where he will land, and when he lands, he knows not whence he came. His truth and his home are the barren wasteland between two lands that can never be his own. . . . The link between water and madness is deeply rooted in the dream of the Western man. (Foucault 2006: 10–11) Deleuze has seized on this dimension of Foucault’s thought to probe how for him “the inside [functions] as an operation of the outside.” Indeed, “in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside, as if the ship were a folding of the sea. . . . Thought has no other being than this madman himself. As Blanchot says of Foucault: ‘He encloses the outside, that is, constitutes it in an interiority of expectation or exception’” (Deleuze 1988: 81). Deleuze continues: Forces always come from the outside, from an outside that is farther away than any form of exteriority. So there are not only particular features taken up by the relations between forces, but particular features of resistance that are apt to modify and overturn these relations and to change the unstable diagram. . . . [This is] “where one can live and in fact where Life exists par excellence.” . . . [This is] life within the folds. This is the central chamber, which one need no longer fear is empty since one fills it with oneself. Here one becomes a master of one’s speed and, relatively speaking, a master of one’s molecules and particular features, in this zone of subjectivation: the boat as interior of the exterior. (Deleuze 1988: 100–101) Passage, which is to say this passage, which is to say the passage between these passages of Foucault and Deleuze, the passage between these and those of Wilderson and Mackey, is given in the hold that Cherry and Blackwell deconstructively reconstruct just so you’ll know that the music and its performance was never about transcendence unless transcendence is understood as immanence’s fugitive impurity. How would you recognize the antiphonal accompaniment to gratuitous violence—the sound that can be heard as if in response to that violence, the sound that must be heard as that to which such violence responds? Wilderson asks the question again so that it can be unasked; so that we can hear Cherry and Blackwell unask it in and as intimacy in dislocation. Unasking takes the form of a caesura, an arrhythmia of the iron system, that Blackwell presses into the interruptive, already interrupted New Orleans continuum of his roll whose distended rearticulation stretches out so you can go down in it enough to think about what it means somewhere you’re only supposed to be going through, to be contained in the atopic atemporality that propels you, as the immanence of the transcendental hallway of our endless preparation, our experimental trial, given as our ongoing study of how to speak, the terrible beauty of our imprisonment in the passage, our life in the folds. Blackwell asks a question that Cherry anticipates, but by which Cherry is driven and to which Cherry responds in the bent, appositional reflection that unasks it. This drama is revived in Wilderson’s questioning; the question is a seizure that moves us to unask it. That unasking is mu not because the question’s terms and assumptions are incorrect; not because the implied opposition of nothing and something—where nothingness is too simply understood to veil (as if it were some epidermal livery) (some higher) being and is therefore relative as opposed to absolute—doesn’t signify; but because nothing (this paraontological interplay of blackness and nothingness, this aesthetic sociality) remains to be explored; because we don’t know what we mean by it even when we recite or record its multiphonic swerve; because blackness is not a category for ontology or for phenomenological analysis. Wilderson’s question—“Would nothing ever be with nothing again”—precisely in its irreducible necessity, cannot be answered but can only be unasked in the lyricism of that ill logic that black monks incessantly, thelonially, perform, as difference without opposition, in “a black hole,” as Jay Wright says (Wright 2013: 56), “germ and terminal, expansive/in its nothingness.” What would it be for this drama to be understood in its own terms, from its own standpoint, on its own ground? This is not simply a question of perspective awaiting its unasking, since what we speak of is this radical being beside itself of blackness, its appositionality. The standpoint, the home territory, chez lui—Charles Lam Markmann’s insightful mistranslation of Fanon illuminates something that Richard Philcox obscures by way of correction, Among one’s own, signifies a relationality that displaces the already displaced impossibility of home and the modes of relationality that home is supposed to afford (Fanon 1967). Can this sharing of a life in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused and consent, this undercommon appositionality, be a place from which to know, a place out of which emerges neither self-consciousness nor knowledge of the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question? But not simply to be among one’s own; rather, also, to live among one’s own in dispossession, to live among the ones who cannot own, the ones who have nothing and who, in having nothing, have everything. To live, in other words, within the general commonness and openness of a life in Deleuze’s sense (hence the necessity of a philosophy of life; hence the necessity but also the rigor of a disbelief in social death, where social death is precisely understood as the imposition of the subject’s necessity rather than the refusal of the subject’s possibility, which, in any case, the imposition founds and enforces. At stake is the curve, the suppleness and subtlety, not only of contemplation on social life but of contemplative social life; at stake is the force of an extraphenomenological poetics of social life. And so we arrive, again and again, at a profound impulse in Fanon that—as Chandler indicates in his reading, which is the initial reading, of Du Bois—constitutes Du Bois’s horizon and which appears in the various forms of that question whose necessity is so fundamental that it must be unasked—the question of the meaning of (black) being, the question of the meaning of (black) things. We study in the sound of an unasked question. Our study is the sound of an unasked question. We study the sound of an unasked question. In the absence of the ame- nity (some pleasantness or pleasantry of welcome or material comfort), what is borne in the emptiness or nothingness of the amenity (of which love or soul is born, in exhaustion, as a society of friends), what are the other elements of mu? Chant and ko¯an and moan and Sprechgesang, and babble and gobbledygook, le petit nègre, the little nigger, pidgin, baby talk, bird talk, Bird’s talk, bard talk, bar talk, our locomotive bar walk and black chant, our pallet cries and shipped whispers, our black notes and black cant, the tenor’s irruptive habitation of the vehicle, the monastic preparation of a more than three-dimensional transcript, an imaginal manuscript we touch upon the walls and one another, so we can enter into the hold we’re in, where there is no way we were or are.

#### The Kantian telos of the self-determined agent is a project of degrading logistics.

Harney et al 18 [Bracketed for g-lang. Stephen Matthias HARNEY (Professor of Strategic Management at Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University), Mattia FRAPORTTI (Singapore Management University), and Niccolo CUPINI (researcher at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Southern Switzerland). “Logistics Genealogies: A dialogue with Stefano Harney”. Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. March 2018. Accessed 1/5/22. <https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7227&context=lkcsb_research> //Xu]

We could begin the next chapter of logistics with Kant. He says famously that we should treat [others] men as ends and not means. It’s true. It’s in all the business ethics textbooks! This would appear at fi­rst sight to run counter to the history of logistics, where people seem to be treated as means to an end. At fi­rst people and things seem to be mobilized as means to the end of profi­t through war and conquest, and then with the Atlantic slave trade and settler colonialism mobilization of people and things is for the end of pro­fit through racial capitalism. Logistics delivers humans, animals, energy, earthly materials to an end, to a point, the point of production. But this includes, crucially, the point of production of the settler, the pro duction of the entrepreneur, the banker, the slave trader, and the investor. These ­figures I mention are produced as ends. So it is not that Kant does not mean what he says, or that logistics is in con‑flict with what he wants. It is just that what he understands is this: that [agent] man is an end when [they are] he is this kind of ­figure, a ­figure who posits himself as self-made, self-suffi­cient, and self-determined. Kant may want this for everyone. But his very formulation, seeking this self-possessed man as an end, this man who has come out of the tutelage of someone else this kind of “man” requires the rise of logistics. Because the only way to create this kind of man as an end — or any kind since this man is Man — is to mobilize and deliver resources that allow for this false and indeed delusional claim of independence to appear plausible, at least to this man and men like him, such as Kant. These means are utilized for but one end: the production of profi­t and cispatriarchy that support and make possible this illusion of self-authored man who can declare himself an end. This end of man is, in other words, a degradation of means. Indeed, if I were asked to give a short definition of logistics, I would call it the general degradation of means. This is how Fred and I understand modern logistics. Other histories, other ways of living, might suggest to us that not being capable of being an end in oneself, indeed, of every fully being oneself, is in fact a way to disabuse this “oneself” delusion and place the incomplete self in the hands of others for use, for service, for love. Here means are enlarged, enriched, and entangled for each other. You may hear echoes of Agamben on use here, but let’s be cautious about that. We would have to do something for our comrade he will not do for himself, any more than Hegel would. We would have to bring him out of the ancient world of master and slave, because we are not talking here about countering logistics with a mutuality of means that allows all of us to reach a more balanced individuation, as in Agamben’s forgotten preclassical world. And more importantly, all that we have developed historically in the fugitivity of use — history and future in the present of logisticality and hapticality — all of this Agamben has chosen not to inherit by his willful disregard of the black radical tradition. We need only recall Fanon here on the difference of the colonial relationship of master and slave to see that the break or escape must be with recognition (of an end) itself, with both subject and object, and indeed, we should perhaps read Fanon as saying revolt and revolution are laboratories of a means without ends. In other words, when Fred and I speak about hapticality we are talking about a materialism beneath materialism, under materialism, an undercommon materialism, what our friend Denise Ferreira da Silva calls difference without separability. Our ability to be in the feel of each other is historical and magical, painful and beautiful. It emerges in its strongest form — from a thousand rivers — in the nautical event, the­ first horrible logistics dedicated to the ends of man/Man. An event that is the dispersion of event, its shoreless strand. It’s a way we inherit — or we can inherit — an experimental undermaterialism of sound, feel, taste, touch, including at a spooky distance. This is an undercommon materialism that, having been denied an end, already rejects that end for this spooky means. This includes what Cedric Robinson calls the capacity “to retrieve things that presumably no longer existed.” And if it has a theory — like Marx’s early theoretical senses — it is a theory that somehow, always, escapes. This hapticality is the fugitive call-and-response in the face of logistics, that degradation of means to produce [one] man as an end. The call-and-response and the ring shout are sonars of logisticality. It’s our endless revolution, and again as Robinson says, revolution is magic because it should be impossible.

#### The Kantian abstraction away from aesthetic blackness pathologizes racialized subjects and cannot ground ethics.

Lloyd 20 [Brackets original. David Lloyd (distinguished professor of English at the University of California, Riverside). The social life of black things: Fred Moten’s consent not to be a single being”. Radical Philosophy. Spring 2020. Accessed 1/5/22. <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/rp207_lloyd.pdf> //Xu]

To put things this way is to acknowledge, as Moten everywhere does, that the aesthetic tradition furnishes not only, and not so much, a theory of art as a theory of freedom and of the subject, which, taken together, constitute the conditions of possibility for any modern concept of the political. The aesthetic is an expressly regulative faculty for Kant, both in the technical sense that its concepts necessarily have no constitutive or determinative force and in the sense that Moten elaborates, its will to regulate the ‘lawless freedom of the imagination’. But it is also regulative in the sense of establishing the terms in and through which freedom and the autonomy of the subject are thought as properties of the universal human. If, in one regard, aesthetic freedom is compensatory for restraint felt elsewhere in the system, a reserve of ‘free play’ to the side of the constraints of labour and the unfreedom of political life, its larger concept exemplifies and prepares human freedom in and through identification with the Subject whose abstraction from particular material properties and interests grounds its universal claims. Such a formal conception of freedom as the autonomy of the subject and as categorical for human being requires in the first place the subject’s indifference to its own materiality and to any enjoyment of its object. Likewise, the judgment of taste is obliged to let go, ‘so far as possible … of the element of matter, i.e., sensation, in our general state of representation’, and reflect solely upon the ‘formal peculiarities’ of that representation.5 The formal freedom of the subject is, for Kant, at once the condition and the product of that ‘public or common sense’ without which no realm of liberal political subjecthood could be imagined. But the autonomous subject is necessarily set over and against another human that Kant elsewhere designates the pathological subject. This is the human subjected to necessity, whether in the form of external forces or of internal needs and desires, the human as material being, capable perhaps of approaching freedom but only at the price of being subjected to formation. This formal freedom is both closely regulated and regulative of a disposition of human beings and their relative value along a scale that ranges from the representative universal and free subject to humans subjected to matter and necessity. A whole history of cultural pedagogy or Bildung instituted in and by liberal states through the apparatus of education stems from this exemplary model of freedom and continues to play out to this day.6 Accordingly, as Moten points out, ‘The regulative discourse on the aesthetic that animates Kant’s critical philosophy is inseparable from the question of race as a mode of conceptualising and regulating human diversity, grounding and justifying inequality and exploitation … ’ [SL 2]. As a counter-aesthetic of life-in-common, rather than a universal common sense that finds its ultimate representation in the state ‘as a kind of degraded representation of commonness’ [SL 8], the black radical tradition, in Moten’s reinscription of it, deconstructs this Kantian regulative discourse at every turn. This is in part because blackness can be read as the ‘anteKantian’ as much as the antiKantian instantiation of that ‘lawless freedom of the imagination’ whose wings and whose flight aesthetic judgment is tasked with clipping. Blackness historically becomes the object of an aesthetic regulation in ‘a set of brutally discursive maneuvers’ that critically exceed any of the longstanding phenomena that concern historians and sociologists, that is, the deployment of racial difference in the disciplining of coerced labour or the segmentation of the labour force and its political counterpart, a militant working class. ‘This is so even as what is continually revealed, if not confessed, is that what is now, in the wake of those maneuvers, called blackness makes those very maneuvers possible and – for and as eternally thwarted and dispersed sovereignty – necessary’ [SL 3]. What is revealed across the extended terrain of consent not to be a single being is that the aesthetics that is and is of the black radical tradition is consubstantial with the practices of an alternative sociality or life form that ‘animaterialises’ both a constant underpresence,‘the dynamic hum of blackness’s facticity’ [SL 10], and the white racial fantasies and projections that constitute the series of figures for sensuality and indiscipline. Those figures ‘have always been inseparable from a “natural” history of inequality’, calling forth and legitimating ‘a predispositional servitude, a captivity in which the embodiment of the need for constraint … precisely insofar as she [the black (woman)] is supposed to be incapable of self-regulation, is given over to the ultimate form of governance, namely that phantasmatic and im/possible condition of being wholly for another’ [SL 13].

#### Racialized violence is constantly delegitimized within the White Imaginary. The 1AC is a rhetorical artefact because our epistemological orientation towards the world is the founding principle and has psychological impacts on debaters – the ROB is to deconstruct White Linguistics.

**Doyle-Wood 18** [Brackets Original. Chisani Doyle-Wood (Master’s in Social Justice Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education). “‘Get Out’ White Supremacist Projects: Racialization and AntiBlackness.” A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Sociology and Equity Studies In Education Ontario Institute for Studies in Education University of Toronto. 2018. Accessed 5/11/21. <https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/89484/3/Doyle-Wood_Chisani_201806_MA_thesis.pdf> //Xu

* Epistemology before materiality
* psychological violence
* trivialization/epistemological bias

Though, before moving forward in my writing, for the purpose of providing a greater understanding of my analysis on the construction of an anti-‘Blackness,’ I briefly want to bring to focus a few words for you to keep in mind throughout your reading: Intelligence, morality and subjectivity. When thinking to White imagined/constructed blackness, these words come to mind, as they suggest a correlation to consciousness, agency, person-hood, and the ability to make decisions; to think. These traits, however, only associated and constructed in such a way to reify their relationship to White bodies. The implication here, in racializing binary mode of thought, is that black bodies lack these characteristics. In fact, in relation to historical practices of colonization and enslavement this ‘lack’ of disposition was used as rationalization for black enslavement and its continuation. As Mama (1995) argues even “during period[s] of colonial rule, missionaries, evangelists, among colonists, heavily enacted methods of forced conversion, forced containment, in order to” (p. 27) ‘civilize’ people who look like me, you, us, i.e. black folks. It was and is these frameworks of knowledge and discourse on ‘blackness,’ positioned as “truth claim/[fact] (Mama, 1995, p. 21) that worked/work to uphold White Supremacy, to perpetuate racialization, and to reinforce derogatory conclusions of blackness and black bodies as a collective. Now, I am going to bring one more word into my discussion here: Anger. I do this because I wish to, in the rest of my work tie in the language use around anger, what is seen to be appropriate anger, what it means to carry an accepted/condoned anger, in order to bring about an understanding of how these words have been constructed via racially coded/White linguistic processes. This too is relevant to understanding a White imagined blackness and the processes of racialization. So, drawing on anger here, in the following chapters, I will speak to who is allowed to be angry. For example, positioning myself in this question as a black woman, I can recall countless numbers of experiences in my lifetime of my body-encounter with racism. In my earlier years, my most common reaction to racism was to fight. To this day, there are moments when I still get very angry during these encounters, and rightfully so. However, I’ve come to understand, that the deep root of my anger, was/is as Lorde (1984) states, not only in “response to racist attitudes [but, as well] to the actions and presumptions that arise out of those attitudes” (p.125). When I/me/Black women get angry, in this body, I am seen by the greater White majority, as an irrational being, or someone who has no business getting so angry, because [and I have been told this before]: “it’s not worth it”: “slavery is over”: “racism is not as bad as it was”: “we live in Canada.” These counterarguments to my experience were/are a means of trivializing my anger, our anger. The implication being, that our problems, our histories, our voices, our realities are not relevant, nor do they matter. Moreover, it is through this process where we are forced to internalize, forced to silence ourselves, forced to sit with this position over an entire lifetime. We are, as Mama (1995) states, to “accept the order created and imposed,” so as to avoid any harsh consequences/penalties for our resistance (p. 20). Under these linguistic, discursive conditions, the language constructed around the usage of anger, the meaning of anger, is a space that I/we are not allowed to occupy, but which nevertheless, continue to be used [negatively] in association with our character, to denigrate us. Moreover, if I am to express my anger, if I am to get angry, to yell, my Black body is often then reminded of my place. I am pushed back into subordination, served a bowl of education on civilization, and reminded of my “moral degeneracy” (Mama, 1995, p. 21). A term that only exists so as to be able to distinguish my blackness as “Other,” as non-White, as not them. Though this form of racialized social control, is as James Baldwin states [in Peck, 2016], “our culture.” Let us think of it this way, “if a White man [Polish, Irish, etc.] picks up a gun and says give me liberty or give me death, he is applauded. But when the black man does this, he is criminalized for everything he has done and is made an example of, in order to make sure there is no one else out there like him” (I am Not Your Negro). This process of racialization, this racist construction of blackness becomes so insidious, that any form of violence unleashed onto us as black peoples, is routinely blanketed with colonial discourses of equality, democracy, liberalism – POST. Though, claims to liberalism, democracy, equality and even anti-essentialism, bring about obvious contradictions within the regime of Whiteness. Where violence and subordination enacted upon my/our black bodies become legitimized and coddled by post-modern frameworks that talk about diffused power, denying the materiality of my/our body, as my/our resistance to oppression is marked as violent/deviant. This idea of anger/resistance associated with blackness is constructed as animalistic, fearful, one to be policed, playing hand in the racialization, the inferiorization of our bodies, as black. Again, remember, it was during the period of enslavement where “anti-abolitionists used [this as] fact to argue [why] black people were constitutionally unfit for freedom” (Mama, 1995, p.23). So when speaking to this idea of a dominant constructed blackness, or rather, a White constructed blackness as an important factor in understanding this history, we can begin to move on to critique and interrogate White Supremacy as colonial, with it’s coercive agenda of installing a particular ontological order of what it means to be, as a means to subdue, as a means to “treat the disease[d] negro” (Mama, 1995, p.23). I ask myself, is this marking of my anger, with my difference used to maintain my subordinate blackness, inferiorized and surveilled? If so, how can this discourse, this imposition, be subverted, so as to de-centre and displace Whiteness?

### 1NC – FWK block

#### The role of the ballot precludes your standard

#### 1. The standard speaks to offense leveraged under a normative framework and thus a normative conception of reality. No one consistently abides by normative ethics because we all have subjectivity. The Role of the ballot on the other hand, speak to the judge’s obligation as an individual in the round and thus preclude examination of normativity.

#### 2. Para-ontology is an epistemic prerequisite to engagement in any other framing – we need to deconstruct the reality of our world first in order to understand it. Para-ontology precedes ethics as it frames the way we view other subjects

#### 3. Outweighs on magnitude – we’ve won an epistemology claim that proves that black bodies are excluded from all decisions calculus which means any other rob leads to erasure we can’t come back from

## 3

#### Presumption and permiss negates

#### 1] Obligations- the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation

#### 2] Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 3] Negating is harder – that’s the heg

#### 4] Affirmation theory- Affirming requires unconditionally maintaining an obligation

Affirm [is to]: maintain as true.

That’s Dictionary.com- “affirm” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm

#### We’re hijacking their syllogism – Humans are not agents they are patients

#### This isn’t schmagency – we aren’t choosing not to be agents but rather that we were never agents in the first place.

#### A rock didn’t choose not to be an agent, it just constitutively isn’t. We never chose to be alive or exist which takes out performativity

#### Prefer

#### 1] Neuroscience – humans constitutively are selfish and imbued with contradictions in moral decision making.

#### FeldmanHall 12 FeldmanHall, Oriel et al. “Differential neural circuitry and self-interest in real vs hypothetical moral decisions.” Social cognitive and affective neuroscience vol. 7,7 (2012): 743-51. doi:10.1093/scan/nss069 CHO

This study examined the moral dynamic of self-gain vs other-welfare during real and hypothetical conditions. Our behavioral results show that moral decisions with real consequences diverge from hypothetical moral choices, verifying the ‘hypothetical bias’ effect (Kang et al., 2011). Compared with imagining their moral actions, people who make moral decisions under real conditions keep more money and inflict more pain on another subject. Although the research exploring real moral action is limited (Moll et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Greene and Paxton, 2009), our results stand in stark contrast to findings demonstrating that people act more morally than they think they will (Teper et al., 2011). Our results also contradict the accumulated research illustrating a basic aversion to harming others (Greene et al., 2001; Cushman et al., 2012). We contend that this is likely due to the fact that many of the moral scenarios used within the moral literature do not pit the fundamental motivation of not harming others (physically or psychological) against that of maximizing self-gain (Haidt, 2007). Accordingly, our findings reveal that engaging the complex motivations of self-benefit—a force endemic to many moral decisions—can critically influence moral action. Our fMRI results identify a common neural network for real and hypothetical moral cognition, as well as distinct circuitry specific to real and imagined moral choices. Moral decisions—regardless of condition—activated the insula, MCC and dorsal TPJ, areas essential in higher order social processes, such as empathy (Singer et al., 2004). This neural circuitry is well instantiated in the social neuroscience literature and fits with the findings that moral choices are influenced by neural systems whose primary role is to facilitate cooperation (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). The TPJ has been specifically implicated in decoding social cues, such as agency, intentionality and the mental states of others (Young and Saxe, 2008). For example, TPJ activation correlates with the extent to which another’s intentions are taken into account (Young and Saxe, 2009) and transiently disrupting TPJ activity leads to interference with using mental state information to make moral judgments (Young et al., 2010). Although there is a large amount of research indicating that the TPJ codes for our ability to mentalize, there is also evidence that the TPJ activates during attentional switching (Mitchell, 2008). In addition, one study revealed that patients with lesions to the TPJ do not show domain-specific deficits for false belief tasks (Apperly et al., 2007). Although these differential findings suggest that the specific functionality of the TPJ remains unclear, we propose that TPJ engagement during real and imagined moral decisions suggests a similar mentalizing process is at play in both real and hypothetical moral decision-making: when deciding how much harm to apply to another, subjects may conscript a mental state representation of the Receiver, allowing them to weigh up the potential consequences of their decision. This neural finding reinforces the role of the TPJ—and thus the likely role of mental state reasoning and inference—in moral reasoning. However, we also found distinct neural signatures for both real and imagined moral decisions. In line with the literature, hypothetical moral decisions were specifically subserved by activations in the PCC and mPFC—regions also implicated in prospection, by which abridged simulations of reality are generated (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Although the overall pattern of brain activation during these hypothetical moral decisions replicates the moral network identified in previous research (Greene et al., 2001), the fact that the PCC and mPFC are activated both during prospection and during hypothetical moral decision-making implies that this region is recruited for a wide spectrum of imagination-based cognition (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009). Thus, either hypothetical moral decisions and imagination share a similar network or hypothetical moral decisions significantly rely on the imperfect systems of prospection and imagination. Further research exploring whether the PCC and mPFC are specific to hypothetical moral decisions, or recruited more generally for imagining future events, would help clarify their roles within the moral network. In contrast, real moral decisions differentially recruited the amygdala. These results are consistent with the vast literature implicating the amygdala in processing social evaluations (Phelps, 2006), emotionally relevant information (Sander et al., 2003) and salient stimuli (Ewbank et al., 2009). Research on moral cognition further implicates amygdala activation in response to aversive moral phenomena (Berthoz et al., 2006; Kedia et al., 2008; Glenn et al., 2009); however, this finding is not systematically observed in moral paradigms (Raine and Yang, 2006). In line with the literature, it is possible that in the Real PvG task the amygdala is coding the aversive nature of the moral decision; however, distress ratings indicated that both conditions were perceived as equally aversive. Accordingly, an alternative interpretation is that the amygdala is monitoring the salience, relevance and motivational significance (Mitchell et al., 2002) of the real moral choice space. Decisions, which produce real aversive consequences (i.e. lose money or harm another), are far more salient and meaningful than decisions that do not incur behaviorally relevant outcomes. The amygdala is also commonly recruited for decisions which rely on social signals to emotionally learn positive and negative associations (Hooker et al., 2006). It is possible that the amygdala activation found for real moral decisions is signaling reinforcement expectancy information of both the positively (self-benefit) and negatively (harm to another) valenced stimuli (Blair, 2007), which then subsequently guides behavior (Prevost et al., 2011). This theory not only accounts for the differential behavioral findings between the real and hypothetical conditions but also it is consistent with the more general theoretical consensus regarding human moral cognition (Moll et al., 2005), which emphasizes how lower order regions like the amygdala modulate higher order rational processes (Dalgleish, 2004). Our fMRI results further indicate that there are dissociable neural mechanisms underlying selfish and pro-social decisions. In the Real PvG, decisions that maximized financial benefit (selfish decisions) correlated with activity in the OFC, dlPFC and dACC—regions that support the integration of reward and value representations (Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005), specifically monetary gain (Holroyd et al., 2004) and loss (Bush et al., 2002). Furthermore, the dACC was found to negatively correlate with empathic concern scores and positively correlate with self-reported similarity ratings in the Real PvG task. Together, this suggests that the dACC may be monitoring conflicting motive states (Etkin et al., 2011). However, the dACC has been further implicated in a variety of other functions, including emotion regulation (Etkin et al., 2011), and weighing up different competing choices (Mansouri et al., 2009). Thus, it is equally plausible that the dACC is processing the conflicting negative emotions involved with choosing to harm another for self-gain (Amodio and Frith, 2006). In the PvG task, the morally guided choice is to give up the money to prevent harm to another. Unlike selfish decisions, such pro-social decisions showed significantly greater activation in the rACC/mPFC and right temporal pole, demonstrating that the nature of real moral decisions can be predicted by dissociable networks within the PFC. The rACC/mPFC is a structure engaged in generating empathic feelings for in-group members (Mathur et al., 2010) and for coding feelings of altruistic guilt and distress during theory of mind tasks (Fletcher et al., 1995). Clinical data have also shown that lesions to this area stunt moral emotions, such as compassion, shame and guilt, and contribute to overall deficits in emotional processing (Mendez and Shapira, 2009). In fact, research has demonstrated the rACC/mPFC as a region that responds specifically to the aversion of not harming others (Young and Dungan, 2011). Based on this, we propose that the rACC/mPFC activation found for pro-social decisions could be attributed to the empathic response generated by the emotional aversion (distress) of harming another—a key motivational influence and proximate mechanism of altruistic behavior. Theorists have pointed to the importance of studying moral cognition in ecological valid and consequence-driven environments (Casebeer, 2003; Moll et al., 2005). Our results illustrate that specific regions of the moral network subserve moral choices—regardless of whether they are real or imagined. However, we also found a divergence between real moral behavior and hypothetical moral intentions—which was reflected in the recruitment of differential neurobiological systems. Thus, if morality is a domain where situational influences and the impact of imminent, real consequences can sway our decisions, then it is crucial that cognitive neuroscience investigate moral decision-making under real conditions. This seems especially relevant in light of this new neurobiological evidence, supporting what the philosopher Hume presciently noted—‘the most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation’ (Hume, 1977).

#### 2] Contradictions are constitutive – Kant was a racist which proves a double-bind: Either he was an agent which means he didn’t have practical reason because he didn’t follow his own framework or he wasn’t an agent which proves it isn’t constitutive.

#### That negates

#### 1] Egoism – we have no reason to respect other means that theft and appropriation for self-interests are morally obligatory

Nobis summarizes egoism ND (The author doesn’t agree with egoism but explains what egoism would conclude in) [Nathan Nobis; Teaching Philosophy. 1000-Word Philosophy. Animals and Ethics 101; No Date; "Ethical Egoism"; 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology; https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/; 12-18-2021] //Miller

3.3. Egoism and Wronging Others for Your Own Gain Another objection takes us to the heart of the matter. Imagine this: Your credit card bill is due tonight, but you won’t be able to pay the full amount until next month, so you will be charged interest and a late fee. You just saw someone, however, accidentally leave their wallet on a park bench with a lot of cash hanging out of it. You saw where they went, but you could take the cash to pay the bill and nobody would ever know. Also, you know of an elderly person who always carries a lot of cash on their evening walk. You know you could rob them, pay your bill, certainly never get caught and then buy dinner at a fancy restaurant. If ethical egoism is true, not only can you permissibly take the wallet and rob someone, you must: not doing so would be wrong, since these crimes are in your self-interest. (If you’d feel guilty doing this, egoists respond that you shouldn’t since you’ve done nothing wrong on their view.) Many believe that, since actions like these are clearly wrong, this shows that egoism is false and the argument at 2.3 fails: egoism does not best explain our moral obligations even if we sometimes must do what’s best for ourselves. An egoist might respond that we are just assuming their theory is false: they don’t agree that we shouldn’t steal the wallet and refrain from assault.[5] But we aren’t “assuming” anything: we just have better reason to believe that assault for personal gain is wrong than that egoism is true. Recall that racists and sexists do not agree that their forms of discrimination are wrong either, but this doesn’t justify racism or sexism. People sometimes hold false moral views; this might be true of egoists.

Appropriation leads to selfish gains

Autry and Kwast 19 Greg Autry and Steve Kwast 8-22-2019 "America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China" (Greg Autry, a clinical professor of space leadership, policy, and business at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, and Steve Kwast)//Elmer

America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China The private sector can give the United States a much-needed rocket boost. The current U.S. space defense strategy is inadequate and on a path to failure. President Donald Trump’s vision for a Space Force is big enough. As he said on June 18, “It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.” But the Air Force is not matching this vision. Instead, the leadership is currently focused on incremental improvements to existing equipment and organizational structures. Dominating the vast and dynamic environment of space will require revolutionary capabilities and resources far deeper than traditional Department of Defense thinking can fund, manage, or even conceive of. Success depends on a much more active partnership with the commercial space industry— and its disruptive capabilities. U.S. military space planners are preparing to repeat a conflict they imagined back in the 1980s, which never actually occurred, against a vanished Soviet empire. Meanwhile, China is executing a winning strategy in the world of today. It is burning hard toward domination of the future space markets that will define the next century. They are planning infrastructure in space that will control 21st-century telecommunications, energy, transportation, and manufacturing. In doing so, they will acquire trillion-dollar revenues as well as the deep capabilities that come from continuous operational experience in space. This will deliver space dominance and global hegemony to China’s authoritarian rulers. Despite the fact that many in the policy and intelligence communities understand exactly what China is doing and have been trying to alert leadership, Air Force leadership has convinced the White House to fund only a slightly better satellite command with the same leadership, while sticking a new label onto their outmoded thinking. A U.S. Space Force or Corps with a satellite command will never fulfill Trump’s call to dominate space. Air Force leadership is demonstrating the same hubris that Gen. George Custer used in convincing Congress, over President Ulysses S. Grant’s better experience intuition, that he could overtake the Black Hills with repeating rifles and artillery. That strategy of technological overconfidence inflamed conflict rather than subduing it, and the 7th Cavalry were wiped out at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The West was actually won by the settlers, ranchers, miners, and railroad barons who were able to convert the wealth of the territory itself into the means of holding it. They laid the groundwork that made the 20th century the American Century and delivered freedom to millions of people in Europe and Asia. Of course, they also trampled the indigenous people of the American West in their wake—but empty space comes with no such bloody cost. The very emptiness and wealth of this new, if not quite final, frontier, however, means that competition for resources and strategic locations in cislunar space (between the Earth and moon) will be intense over the next two decades. The outcome of this competition will determine the fate of humanity in the next century. China’s impending dominance will neutralize U.S. geopolitical power by allowing Beijing to control global information flows from the high ground of space. Imagine a school in Bolivia or a farmer in Kenya choosing between paying for a U.S. satellite internet or image provider or receiving those services for free as a “gift of the Chinese people.” It will be of little concern to global consumers that the news they receive is slanted or that searches for “free speech” link to articles about corruption in Western democracies. Nor will they care if concentration camps in Tibet and the Uighur areas of western China are obscured, or if U.S. military action is presented as tyranny and Chinese expansion is described as peacekeeping or liberation. China’s aggressive investment in space solar power will allow it to provide cheap, clean power to the world, displacing U.S. energy firms while placing a second yoke around the developing world. Significantly, such orbital power stations have dual use potential and, if properly designed, could serve as powerful offensive weapons platforms. China’s first step in this process is to conquer the growing small space launch market. Beijing is providing nominally commercial firms with government-manufactured, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles they can use to dump launch services on the market below cost. These start-ups are already undercutting U.S. pricing by 80 percent. Based on its previous success in using dumping to take out U.S. developed industries such as solar power modules and drones, China will quickly move upstream to attack the leading U.S. launch providers and secure a global commercial monopoly. Owning the launch market will give them an unsurmountable advantage against U.S. competitors in satellite internet, imaging, and power. The United States can still build a strategy to win. At this moment, it holds the competitive advantage in every critical space technology and has the finest set of commercial space firms in the world. It has pockets of innovative military thinkers within groups like the Defense Innovation Unit, under Mike Griffin, the Pentagon’s top research and development official. If the United States simply protects the intellectual property its creative minds unleash and defend its truly free markets from strategic mercantilist attack, it will not lose this new space race. The United States has done this before. It beat Germany to the nuclear bomb, it beat the Soviet Union to the nuclear triad, and it won the first space race. None of those victories was achieved by embracing the existing bureaucracy. Each of them depended on the president of the day following the only proven path to victory in a technological domain: establish a small team with a positively disruptive mindset and empower that team to investigate a wide range of new concepts, work with emerging technologies, and test innovative strategies. Today that means giving a dedicated Space Force the freedom to easily partner with commercial firms and leverage the private capital in building sustainable infrastructure that actually reduces the likelihood of conflict while securing a better economic future for the nation and the world.

#### 2] Terminal defense to your fw since it proves that its self-defeating and that contradictions are inevitable and proves that actions can’t be a priori unjust.

## 4

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not justify 1ar theory is dtd, no rvi, competing interps

#### Violation: its all in the underview

#### Standard: Infinite Abuse - their norm justifies the affirmative auto winning every round since they can read a risk free 1AR shell with DTD and Competing controls strongest IL to education since I can never engage. Norming is an independent voter since justifying the value of debate necessarily justifies the norms of the activity being good in order for debate to be valuable.

#### Education is a voter it’s the reason why schools fund debate

#### Drop the debater—the abuse has already occurred and my time allocation which leads to severance in the 1ar which ow/s on magnitude b) to deter future abuse, big punishment incentivizes people to stop bad practices

#### Competing interps – a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blip storm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

## 5

#### NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea 3] It was introduced first so it comes lexically prior.

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

#### Reject 1AR theory A] 7-6 Time skew B] NO 3NR so 2ar gets to weigh however they want C] We only have two speechs to norm over it which means debates become irresolvable and the judge is forced to intervene.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew – ows on quantifiaiblity

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense

## Case