## 1

#### Interp: The affirmative must define democracy in a delimited text in the 1AC.

#### Democracy is flexible and has too many interps – normal means shows no consensus and makes the round irresolvable since the judge doesn’t know how to compare between types of offense and o/w since it’s a side constraint on decision making.

**Wikipedia**, xx-xx-xxxx, "Democracy Index," No Publication, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index> SJCP//JG

[Full democracies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_democracy) are nations where civil liberties and fundamental political freedoms are not only respected but also reinforced by a political culture conducive to the thriving of democratic principles. These nations have a valid system of governmental checks and balances, an independent judiciary whose decisions are enforced, governments that function adequately, and diverse and independent media. These nations have only limited problems in democratic functioning.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6) [Flawed democracies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illiberal_democracy) are nations where elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honoured but may have issues (e.g. media freedom infringement and minor suppression of political opposition and critics). These nations have significant faults in other democratic aspects, including underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6) [Hybrid regimes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_regime) are nations with regular [electoral frauds](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_fraud), preventing them from being fair and free democracies. These nations commonly have governments that apply pressure on political opposition, non-independent judiciaries, widespread corruption, harassment and pressure placed on the media, anaemic rule of law, and more pronounced faults than flawed democracies in the realms of underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6)

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night – triggers presumption since the aff wasn’t subject to well researched scrutiny. We lose access to American politics DA’s, Xi lashout DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### 2] Real World – Policy makers will always how they are implementing a law. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, private entities can circumvent since there is no delineated way to enforce the aff and means their solvency can’t actualize.

#### DSpec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from policies that require enforcement to function.

#### Fairness is a voter – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it

#### Educaton is a voter it’s the reason schools fund debate

#### Drop the debater—the abuse has already occurred and my time allocation which leads to severance in the 1ar which ow/s on magnitude b) to deter future abuse, big punishment incentivizes people to stop bad practices

#### Competing interps – a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blip storm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

## 2

#### 1] Interpretation – Objective Journalism is constituted of three things: factual information, impartial and unbiased viewpoints, and emotional detachment

Calcutt and Hammond 11 Andrew Calcutt and Philip Hammond, 11 [Andrew Calcutt, (Andrew Calcutt is Principal Lecturer in Journalism at the University of East London, where he leads Master courses in journalism and magazines. He is vice-chair of the London East Research Institute and editor of Proof: Reading Journalism and Society (www.proof-reading.org). Previous publications include White Noise: An A–Z of Contradictions in Cyberculture (1999) and Arrested Development: Pop Culture and the Erosion of Adulthood (1998)). Philip Hammond (Philip Hammond is Reader in Media and Communications at London South Bank University. He is the author of Media, War and Postmodernity (2007) and Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts (2007) and is co-editor, with Edward Herman, of Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (2000)).]. "Journalism Studies: A Critical Introduction." Routledge & CRC Press, 3-8-2011, Accessed 3-4-2022. https://www.routledge.com/Journalism-Studies-A-Critical-Introduction/Calcutt-Hammond/p/book/9780415554312 // duongie

Objectivity in journalism is a complex idea, used to refer to at least three distinct, though interrelated, concepts. First, it primarily entails a commitment to truthfulness: reporting factually accurate information. Second, objectivity is often thought to imply neutrality in the sense of fairness and balance: seeking to be impartial and unbiased in the process of reporting and, where there are conflicting interpretations of an event, presenting different viewpoints even-handedly. Third, objectivity is also often understood to imply neutrality in the sense of emotional detachment: a dispassionate approach that separates fact from comment and allows news audiences to make up their minds about events rather than being offered a journalist’s own response. These are interrelated in that – at least in theory – journalists are dispassionate and neutral so as not to let their own emotional responses and political allegiances get in the way of reporting truthfully.

#### 2] Violation – the Aff only interprets Objectivity as factual reporting which isn’t sufficient to constitute Objectivity – [that’s the 1AC Definition and CX proves].

#### 3] Standards:

#### a] Topic Ed – Topic Lit Controversy isn’t Objectivity Good/Bad BUT about distinctions of Impartial Reporting and Point of View – the Topic is about tensions between Advocacy and Objectivity which ISN’T Factual Research Good/Bad – that outweighs since we only debate the Topic for one tournament.

## 3

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – anything else moots 7 minutes of the nc – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

#### They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Scalar methods like comparison increases intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – T/F binary is descriptive and technical.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional. I denied the truth of the resolution by disagreeing with the aff which means I’ve met my burden.

#### Negate -

#### 1] In[[3]](#footnote-3) used as a function word to indicate means, medium, or instrumentality but the rez doesn’t specify so vote neg on presumption

#### 2] a[[4]](#footnote-4) “used when expressing rates or ratios; in, to, or for each; per” but there are no numbers in the rez

#### 3] democracy[[5]](#footnote-5) The practice or principles of social equality but its logically impossible to be inside principles.

#### 4] free[[6]](#footnote-6) conveying only the broad sense; not literal, so literal objectivity is impossible, vote neg on presumption

#### 5] press[[7]](#footnote-7) Move or cause to move into a position of contact with something by exerting continuous physical force, but theres no movement in the rez

#### .

## 4

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted – there’s always an institutional DA to going through Congress c) ought[[8]](#footnote-8) means “moral obligation” so the lack of that obligation means the aff hasn’t fulfilled their burden d) resolved[[9]](#footnote-9) indicates “firmly determined” which means they proactively did something, to negate that means that they aren’t resolved e) permissibility can’t affirm since then anything would be ok which would justify racism – we should be safe and do nothing. f) to negate[[10]](#footnote-10) means to deny the truth of which means if the aff is false you vote neg

#### Objectivity presumes the existence of real, perceptible truth.

Ryan 01 [Michael Ryan (Michael Ryan is a professor of communication at the University of Houston. He received a B.A. degree in government and an M.A. in journalism, both at the University of Texas at Austin, and a Ph.D. in journalism at Southern Illinois University). “Journalistic Ethics, Objectivity, Existential Journalism, Standpoint Epistemology, and Public Journalism”. Journal of Mass Media Ethics. Exploring Questions of Media Morality. Volume 16, 2001 - Issue 1. Accessed 3/1/2022. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327728jmme1601_2> //Xu]

Objective journalists are accountable to their audiences, to the highest ethical and professional standards of objective journalism, and, finally, to their employers. They never assume that their employers, and not themselves, bear the ultimate responsibility for their behavior. This definition assumes, of course, the existence of a “real” world about which human beings can be right or wrong. Objective journalists believe a real world exists and that one can produce a reasonably accurate description of that world. They do not guarantee their descriptions are accurate in every respect, only that they have followed a process that allows them to produce a description that is more accurate than any other process allows, and that allows society to move closer to an understanding of the real world.

#### Thus the meta-standard is *consistency with philosophical skepticism.*

#### Journalistic ethics assume that objectivity is both possible and accessible. Disproving either of those assumptions means that aff has no offense.

#### Now Negate

#### 1] Objectivity impossible – human emotion.

Didier summarizes Salazar 20 [Emily Didier (Marquette University, BA International Relations (International Communication concentration); Public Relations minor). Ruben Salazar (civil rights activist and a reporter for the Los Angeles Times). “The Importance of Advocacy Journalism”. Medium. Feb 22, 2020. Accessed 3/2/2022. <https://medium.com/@emilyd7630/the-importance-of-advocacy-journalism-a1e682d14251> //Xu]

Ruben Salazar claims that objectivity in the press is unrealistic because as human beings we are emotional. We can attempt to be only rational; however, by our nature, our behavior is influenced by our emotions, and journalism is no exception. I agree with Salazar that humans are emotional and cannot be completely objective. Moreover, even if we recognize our emotions, biases, perspectives, etc. and attempt to leave them out of the story, it is nearly impossible to do so entirely. Our life experiences influence the way we think about things and thus the way a journalist would write about things, so complete objectivity is impossible in my opinion.

#### 2] Nothing is verifiable under a standard of falsifiability.

**Nickles**, Thomas. (Philosopher @ University of Nevada, Reno) "Falsifiability." New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. **2005**. , <https://elearning.shisu.edu.cn/pluginfile.php/35320/mod_resource/content/1/Falsifiability%20%28Introduction%29.pdf> ///AHS PB

**Falsifiable contrasts with verifiable. A claim is empirically verifiable if possible observation statements logically imply the truth of the claim. If actual observation statements do imply the claim, then it is verified. "This raven is black" verifies "There are black ravens."** During the 1930s the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle proposed verifiability both as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience and a criterion of meaning. Their idea was that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is verifiable in principle, and its meaning is given by its method of verification. For the logical empiricists, only empirically verifiable claims make genuine assertions about the world and are, in this broad sense, scientific. All other claims (metaphysical, religious, ethical, etc.) are cognitively meaningless. In his Logik der Forschung (1934; Logic of Scientific Discovery), Popper replied by rejecting the logical empiricists' concern with language and meaning and by noting that **verifiability as a criterion** of demarcation **excludes** scientific **law** claims and thus the core of science **itself. For** since **a law claim** is universal in scope (in simplest form, "All A's everywhere and everywhen are B's"), it **cannot possibly be verified: there are always actual or potential instances beyond those so far observed. Yet a** universal claim **can be falsified by a single negative instance. The first observed black swan refuted the claim "All swans are white."** (Law claims of statistical probabilistic forms are more problematic.) Based on this logical asymmetry of verification and falsification, Popper proposed falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience, although not as a criterion of meaning. According to Popper, nonscience includes pseudoscience (e.g., Freudian psychology and Marxism) and metaphysics, the one fraudulent, the other sometimes providing a valuable heuristic for science. Many deep scientific problems have their roots in metaphysics, but to be scientific, a claim must take an empirical risk. Moreover, **falsifiability**, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, **is a permanent status** for Popper. **No amount of successful testing can establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever remains conjectural. That all** scientific theories remain falsifiable entails fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future revision**. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge.**

#### 3] Cartesian Skepticism. Brain in a vat means that even if they are right about how morality works, we can’t know if the circumstances observed in our brain equate to natural properties

Chapman summarizes descarte 14 [Andrew Chapman (lecturer in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder). “External World Skepticism”. 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. 6 FEBRUARY 2014. Accessed 12/11/21. <https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/> //Xu]

You’re being deceived by a very powerful evil demon right now. This demon has the ability to manipulate your sensory impressions such that it will seem to you that things are some way when they are not that way at all. Accordingly, things are actually nothing like P. For example, suppose it seems to you as though you are in a room with a table and chair in it and that you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (1) is true, then you actually are in a room with a table and chair in it and you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, then you are not in a room with a table and chair in it and you are not reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, things are very different from how they seem to you to be.1

\*Footnote 1\*

1 If the evil demon scenario is too far-fetched for you, imagine that you are dreaming or that you are hallucinating or even that you are in a laboratory and your visual cortex is being stimulated by electrodes.

\*Paragraph Following the First\*

Philosophers call (2) a skeptical scenario. In skeptical scenarios, you are radically misled, deceived, or bamboozled by your evidence in such a way that how things seem to you is different from how things actually are. Perhaps the most famous propounder of skeptical scenarios in the history of philosophy is René Descartes (1596-1650) in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). In the Meditations, Descartes considers that he might be dreaming or that he might be being deceived by the evil demon from our scenario (2) above. Hollywood has made much of skeptical scenarios in movies like Total Recall, The Matrix, and Inception. So back to our original question: Which of (1) or (2) is best supported or best justified by its seeming to you that P? If you’re being honest with yourself, you’ll conclude that how things seem equally well supports (1) and (2). From your internal, first-personal perspective, either of (1) or (2) could be true given how things seem to you. And if that weren’t bad enough, here comes the kicker: If both (1) and (2) are equally well supported by your evidence, how can you ever possibly know anything about the world outside your own skin? This is the problem of external world skepticism, perhaps the central problem of modern epistemology.

#### 4] Goodman’s new riddle of induction – generalization’s predictive power is not sufficient to prove that induction is rational

Jeff **Speaks,** 3-30-20**06**, "Goodman’s new riddle of induction," No Publication, <https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/mcgill/201/goodman-new-riddle.html> Houston Memorial SC

We have already discussed Hume’s problem of induction. Goodman thinks that no answer to this problem is really possible, but also that none is really necessary. He argues for this by first asking how we can justify deductive, rather than inductive, inferences: “How do we justify a deduction? Plainly, by showing that it conforms to the general rules of deductive inference. ...when a deductive argument has been shown to conform to the rules of logical inference, we usually consider it justified without going on to ask what justifies the rules.” (63) When we do try to justify the rules of deduction, Goodman thinks, we can do no better than to cite our deductive practices: “Principles of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deductive practice. ...This looks flagrantly circular ...But this circle is a virtuous one. The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with each other.” He thinks that we can say the same thing about the justification of induction: “All this applies equally well to induction. ...Predictions are justified if they conform to valid canons of induction; and the canons are valid iff they accurately codify accepted inductive practice. A result of such analysis is that we can stop plaguing ourselves with certain spurious questions about induction.” (64) A reason to be dissatisfied with an explanation of justification in terms of accepted practice. Suppose that we accept Goodman’s treatment of the classical problem of induction. This still leaves us with a question: what are the valid canons of induction? As Goodman says, “As principles of deductive inference, we have the familiar and highly developed laws of logic; but there are available no such precisely stated and well-recognized principles of inductive inference.” (65) The task of giving canons of inductive inference is the task of explaining when a certain set of premises can provide a good inductive argument for a given conclusion. 2 The new riddle Goodman discusses a number of attempts to formulate canons off inductive inference in �3. We will not pay much attention to the details of these, but instead will just focus on inductive arguments of the form: 1. Emerald1 is green. 2. Emerald2 is green. . . 1000. Emerald1000 is green. C. All emeralds are green. It seems clear that inductive arguments of this form are often good arguments. And what makes them good seems, intuitively, to be that the conclusions of arguments of this form are generalizations, and the premises are instances of that generalization. It seems like this is a good first step in putting together a logic of induction: a generalization is confirmed by its instances. Goodman’s new riddle of induction shows that this is a false step: not all generalizations are confirmed by their instances. He shows this by inventing the predicate ‘grue.’ It is defined as follows: An object is grue if and only if the object is either (1) green, and has been observed before now, or (2), blue, and has not been observed before now. This is a perfectly fine definition, in the sense that it gives us clear conditions on when the word ‘grue’ applies to an object. But it poses a problem when we use it in inductive arguments. Consider, for example, the following argument: 1. Emerald1 is grue. 2. Emerald2 is grue. . . 1000. Emerald1000 is grue. C. All emeralds are grue. This argument seems, by the standard suggested above, to be a perfectly good inductive argument. But it cannot be, since it does not give us good reason to believe that all emeralds which have not been observed till now are blue. Another way to see the problem is that the example of ‘grue’ seems to show that exactly the same evidence -- observation of 1000 green emeralds -- provides good evidence for believing both that the next emerald to be observed will be green, and that it will be blue. But this is absurd. Why the assumption of the uniformity of nature seems only to make the problem worse. But if, as seems clear, there is something wrong with the inductive argument involving ‘grue’, we have only two options: (i) say that there is also something wrong with the inductive argument involving ‘green’, in which case we are rejecting the rationality of induction, or (ii) find some relevant difference between the two arguments.

#### 5] The pursuit of knowledge results in the dogmatic fallibilism and denies the subject’s inherent bias.

Bardon 20 [Adrian Bardon(professor of philosophy at Wake Forest). “[Humans are hardwired to dismiss facts that don’t fit their worldview](https://www.fastcompany.com/90458795/humans-are-hardwired-to-dismiss-facts-that-dont-fit-their-worldview).” Fast Company. 2/1/20. Accessed 2/9/20. [https://www.fastcompany.com/90458795/humans-are-hardwired-to-dismiss-facts-that-dont-fit-their-worldview//](https://www.fastcompany.com/90458795/humans-are-hardwired-to-dismiss-facts-that-dont-fit-their-worldview/) Houston Memorial SC]

“Motivated reasoning” is what social scientists call the process of deciding what evidence to accept based on the conclusion one prefers. As I explain in my book, The Truth About Denial, this very human tendency applies to all kinds of facts about the physical world, economic history, and current events. DENIAL DOESN’T STEM FROM IGNORANCE The interdisciplinary study of this phenomenon has exploded over just the last six or seven years. One thing has become clear: The failure of various groups to acknowledge the truth about, say, climate change, is not explained by a lack of information about the scientific consensus on the subject. Instead, what strongly predicts denial of expertise on many controversial topics is simply one’s political persuasion. A 2015 metastudy showed that ideological polarization over the reality of climate change actually increases with respondents’ knowledge of politics, science, and/or energy policy. The chances that a conservative is a climate-change denier is significantly higher if he or she is college-educated. Conservatives scoring highest on tests for cognitive sophistication or quantitative reasoning skills are most susceptible to motivated reasoning about climate science. This is not just a problem for conservatives. As researcher Dan Kahan has demonstrated, liberals are less likely to accept expert consensus on the possibility of safe storage of nuclear waste, or on the effects of concealed-carry gun laws. DENIAL IS NATURAL Our ancestors evolved in small groups, where cooperation and persuasion had at least as much to do with reproductive success as holding accurate factual beliefs about the world. Assimilation into one’s tribe required assimilation into the group’s ideological belief system. An instinctive bias in favor of one’s in-group” and its worldview is deeply ingrained

## 5

#### NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea 3] It was introduced first so it comes lexically prior.

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew – ows on quantifiaiblity

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

## Case

#### Idexicals - On Indexicals

#### 1] Trigger permissibility- It would justify every action being permissible since people can act under their own index

#### 2] Indexicals negate- we have proven an index under which the aff is false so vote neg since you can’t weigh between indexes

#### 3] Morally repugnant- it would justify individuals operating under the index that Nazism is true and that being a legit perspective

#### I’m Straight-turning Util – heaven exists and is the most desirable outcome under every relevant metric. It hijacks all their 1% risk calculus because heaven would offer infinite utility, hedonic value, and zero suffering.

McCall ND

Betsy McCall, [I went back to school in January, and among the goals of this project is probably a "second" major in philosophy. It was a secondary consideration to my astronomy major, but because courses can't really start until Autumn, I could get a serious head start on this one at the beginning. It's almost finished now. I have a couple areas of interest in Philosophy: history of/philosophy of science, and logic/skepticism.] no specific date but sometimes "Utilitarianism & the Afterlife," No Publication, <http://www.betsymccall.net/edu/philo/utilitarianism_afterlife1.pdf> CHO

The goal of Utilitarianism is to lay out a moral philosophy to provide us a way of living, and a way of making difficult moral choices correctly(Mill, 2001) in circumstances which are uncommon enough that experience has not, or cannot, prepare us for the solution. But in doing so, Utilitarianism must confront the same moral challenges confronted by all moral philosophies, including the consequences of belief in the afterlife(Hasker, 2005). The afterlife has provided a complex moral challenge for many moral philosophical frameworks throughout the ages, from Buddhism to Christianity. Buddhism posits that life is suffering, and that the ultimate goal of living is really to escape living altogether by achieving nirvana, or at least, a better life in the next reincarnation(Becker, 1993). Christianity similarly puts this life into a comparison with another better alternative, in this case, the possibility of an infinitely better afterlife in heaven with god and the angels(Pohle, 1920). In both cases, the philosophical frameworks have been forced to incorporate specific prohibitions against suicide in order to avoid the apparently logical conclusion that death is preferable to life, and we would do well to get ourselves there as quickly as possible. Mill, in arguing for Utilitarianism, does not specifically address this question, perhaps because Mill himself gave the afterlife little personal credence(Wilson, 2009). However, writing to a largely Christian Western audience, like Christianity, and a deep-seated historical affinity for belief in reincarnation(Haraldsson, 2005), Mill and his followers must be prepared to address this potential concern. There is nothing inherent in Utilitarianism that requires that the calculations of utility should apply only to this life, since according to common beliefs of the afterlife, our behaviour here on Earth certainly has consequences for our disposition in the hereafter. And if one rejects the possibility of an afterlife, no conflict arises: there is only this life to consider, and surely it must be a good thing to extend that life as long as possible, as long as it is predominantly still contributing positively to the overall positive side of the balance sheet, so to speak. But, when an afterlife is introduced, if the afterlife is permitted to be weighed against the present life, apparently strange contradictions become possible, depending on the characteristics assigned to the hereafter. For instance, if we consider the Christian conception of the afterlife (or something vaguely similar), where there is a heaven offering eternal rewards for good behaviour, and eternal damnation for bad behaviour (particularly on the Catholic view), does it not appear to serve utility if once the person achieves a certain level of moral perfection that they should die in order to secure that reward? Christianity has addressed this concern by prohibiting suicide(Pohle, 1920) (and making it a damning offense punishable by an eternity in hell) for someone attempting to speed their eternal reward. However, if we consider the overall utility of a people, would not designating a handful of “scapegoats” to kill the mostly likely heavenbound before they mess it up be an overall plus to utility if the utility of eternal rewards in the afterlife are to be taken seriously? And indeed, does not the problem become more acute if one accepts the efficacy of the Catholic confessional? Should it not be the appropriate thing to do be for priests to kill their confessants as soon as their penance has been completed while their sins are forgiven and their souls are still clean? Worse yet, does it not suggest that the most innocent, the children, would be best served by being executed at an early age? Nor does reincarnation protect against this concern entirely. According to the Buddhist philosophy, since “life is suffering”(Becker, 1993), should not the Utilitarian argue that escaping this life of suffering in the expectation of a better reincarnation not demand that the improvement in one’s lot not justify suicide, or murder? Particularly if the risk on continued living is to damage the chances of receiving that improved reincarnation or enduring additional suffering. Of course, one would require some kind of guidelines for when such a utility-motivated killing was appropriate, but these guidelines would depend very much on one’s views of the afterlife. If Utilitarianism is meant to be a scientific and testable approach to a moral system, the introduction of a non-testable utility calculation clearly introduces a paradox. To address the apparent paradox of murdering the best people in society under the rubric of improving the overall utility calculation, Utilitarianism will need to make some explicit claims. One possible way of dealing with this concern is to specifically require that considerations of the afterlife not be taken into effect for purposes of utility. That this might be the case is not obvious, and so some kind of argument will be needed. And since we are all going to die eventually some day, it must not be too general a claim about the negative utility of simply dying. Another possible way to address this problem is to explicitly claim that for those that function as the scapegoats, the utility sinks as it were, that their loss of utility is larger than any possible utility gains by those whom they send to their eternal reward. This would probably require some fuzzy math: by claiming that the utility gains of heaven were finite and punishments for this particular act were infinite and unforgiveable (the tactic employed by Catholics to prevent suicide(Pohle, 1920)). A third potential solution is to argue that the afterlife is inherently inferior to this life, for instance, in the manner of Tartarus to the Ancient Greeks (explicitly not the Elysian Fields). While it may or may not be explicitly unpleasant, it is a situation not as pleasant as remaining alive, and so would be a negative net effect on utility to go there too soon. A fourth possible solution might be to explicitly make a claim as a part of Utilitarian philosophy that there is no afterlife. This is perhaps the least radical of the scenarios outlined so far. In the absence of a religious moral structure, Utilitarianism is a favourite of the non-religious. While this might serve to narrow the appeal of Utilitarianism, it will provide a justification for not considering the afterlife in utility calculations that is not entirely ad hoc, and it would comport well with Mill’s own beliefs(Wilson, 2009). However, the argument Mill, I suspect, would mostly likely favour, is to simply argue that utility calculations can only be applied to this life for reasons of testability. He wanted this theory to be a scientific approach to morality that would provide a framework for making general and testable claims, as science does(Mill, 2001). It is often argued that science cannot test the claims of religion because religion is, by definition, inherently untestable: likewise is the afterlife. For this reason, Utilitarianism can only apply to this life, and utility calculations cannot extend beyond the grave without invoking theological explanations beyond the scope of this theory. While some may find this the most satisfying and non-confrontational, it nonetheless leaves unsolved the issue of the contradiction within the Utilitarian theory generated by the introduction of a positive afterlife, and therefore, leaves it open to possible criticism. The introduction of a positive view of the afterlife presents specific problems for the Utilitarian theory, whenever the utility calculation leads to the conclusion that the afterlife is preferable to the present life. These considerations will need to be addressed in some fashion by the Utilitarian theory or by individual Utilitarians so that paradoxical claims such as murder increasing utility can be avoided.

#### Next, their epistemological framework of a posteriori knowledge gives maximum leeway to our account of the afterlife.

#### 1] Pascals Wager – the existence of heaven is impossible to disprove but even a risk that we could get there would be worth staking everything on because it would be infinitely better than future attainable on Earth. Answering this negates because it creates a reverse pascals wager where we can never be sure that our decisions our ethical because of uncertainty that we could make a mistaken about consequences that are magnitudes larger.

#### 3] Reflective Equilibrium – conceptions of the afterlife have persisted for thousands of years through multiple religions and is even more persistently persuasive than utilitarianism.[[11]](#footnote-11) That turns aggregates and averages since the belief in the afterlife is a consensus for agreement.

#### Aspec misses the boat the res isn’t about what the demcocracy should do but the free press in a democracy means it doesn’t matter

#### Blum is my best friend in this debate – we are conceding the entirety of the evidence and the specificities of the card should constrain how you evaluate this debate. The way in which we measure moral value is through the stimulation of “neocortices.” Blum is a study about the affects of drugs on the brain and that means that you should think about every piece of util offense ultimately as drugs that are rewarding to the brain.

#### Group moen, extinction and death ows -

#### Pleasure its good but its absence isn’t bad—you have no offense under util.

Benatar 97 bracketed for language Benatar, David (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa). “Why It is Better Never to Come Into Existence.” American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 34, Number 3, July 1997.

Having rejected alternative evaluations, I return to my original diagram. To determine the relative advantages and disadvantages of coming into existence and never coming to be, we need to compare 1) with 3), and 2) with 4). In the first comparison we see that non-existence is preferable to existence. The advantage is a real one. In the second comparison, however, **the** pleasures **of the existent**, although good,are not a[n] realadvantage over nonexistence, because the absence of pleasures is not bad. **For the good to be a real advantage over non-existence,** [the absence of pleasure] it would have to be the case that its absence were bad**.** To illustrate this, **consider an analogy** which, because it involves the comparison of two existent people is unlike the comparison between existence and non-existence in this way, but which nonetheless may be instructive**.** S is prone to regular bouts ofillness**.** Fortunately for him, **he** is also so constituted that he recovers quickly**. H lacks the capacity for quick recovery, but he never gets sick. It is bad for S that he gets sick and it is good** for him **that he recovers quickly.** It is good that H never gets sick**, but it is not bad that he [doesn’t]** lacks the capacity to **heal speedily. The capacity for quick recovery, although a good for** S, is not a[n] real advantage over H. This is because the absence of that capacity is not bad for H (and H is not worse off than he would have been had he had the recuperative powers of S). S is not better off than H in any way, even though S is better off than he himself would have been had he lacked the capacity for rapid recovery

#### Extinction proper -

#### Extinction doesn’t destroy future generations – humans didn’t originally exist and evolved instead out of microorganisms which proves live can always exist by generating spontaneously.

#### Off Paterson -

#### 1] Death causes euphoria through a last hurrah– brain studies.

Stromberg 13 [Joseph Stromberg (Internal Medicine resident UNC-Chappell Hill via BUMedicine. Former science writer at Smithsonian). “A Last-Second Surge of Brain Activity Could Explain Near-Death Experiences”. Smithsonian. August 12, 2013. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/a-last-second-surge-of-brain-activity-could-explain-near-death-experiences-28726479/> //Xu]

The Michigan team, led by neurologist Jimo Borjigin, took a very different approach to examining these episodes. They sought to use electroencephalography (EEG, a technique that measures electrical activity among different areas of the brain) to track what exactly goes on in the seconds after the heart stops pumping blood, or the lungs stop taking in oxygen.Of course, they couldn’t do this with human subjects, so they subjected lab rats to what seems to be a pretty gruesome experience in the name of science: They anesthetized nine rats and forcibly induced cardiac arrest, causing the rodents’ hearts to stop pumping blood, while they monitored brain activity with an EEG. They found that, in all nine rats, brain activity continued for roughly 30 seconds after the animals’ blood stopped pumping. The activity persisted in all six regions of the brain they monitored, and gradually declined over the course of the 30 seconds before disappearing. Although the team had predicted they’d find some activity, “we were surprised by the high levels,” George Mashour, a co-author, said in a press statement. “At near-death, many known electrical signatures of consciousness exceeded levels found in the waking state, suggesting that the brain is capable of well-organized electrical activity during the early stage of clinical death.” To see whether this activity was caused by something specific about cardiac arrest in particular—say, the experience of pain—they also suffocated other rats while measuring their brain activity. They found virtually the same patterns of data, indicating that the activity is inevitably generated by the brain in the final moments before it shuts down. In both cases, many characteristics of the brain activity correlated with the activity they’d measured earlier in the rats when they were fully conscious. The clear implication is that these rats may have been going through their own near-death experiences in the lab, just before dying. If these same patterns of brain activity occur in humans just after cardiac arrest—something that will be difficult to determine, given the problems of hooking up people to EEGs while they’re being resuscitated—it could go a long way toward explaining why humans have out-of-body experiences when they near death without the need to invoke souls or the afterlife. Just as the activity in our brains during the REM stages of sleep accounts for the experience of dreaming, this data could account for the sensation of continuing awareness after clinical death. Other researchers have previously speculated about physiological explanations for the other typical descriptions of near-death experiences. It’s been documented that when people faint, for example, the loss of blood flow to the brain can generate a narrowing of the field of vision—perhaps explaining the tunnel often described in their memories. The release of epinephrine and other chemicals in the brain during moments of stress, meanwhile, could account for the sense of euphoria.

#### 2] Ontological is IRRELEVANT UNDER UTIL FRAMING -- this is about christian ethics

#### 3] turn christian ethics -- heaven disproves that death is evil because we die to go to heaven

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. In. Merriam Webster Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. A. Lexico Oxford Dictionary. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/a [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. democracy. Lexico Oxford Dictionary. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/democracy> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. free. Lexico Oxford Dictionary. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/free> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Press. Lexico Oxford Dictionary. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/press> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. https://www.google.com/search?q=resolved+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=resolved+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57.2078j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. <https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/ipsos-global-dvisory-supreme-beings-afterlife-and-evolution#:~:text=Just%20over%20half%20of%20global,%22heaven%20but%20not%20hell%22>. CHO [↑](#footnote-ref-11)