## 1

#### Interp – the aff may not specify what form of reporting ought to have objectivity prioritized.

#### Violation – they spec vaccines.

#### 1] Ought is universal – they violate because they specify the obligation from all reporting to only vaccines.

Peetz, V. (1981). Imperative inference--an addendum. Analysis, 41(1), 54–55. doi:10.1093/analys/41.1.54//vp

I AM sorry that Professor Hare (ANALYSIS, 39.4, October 1979, p. 161, footnote 1) thinks that I misrepresented him when I said ('Imperative inference\*, ANALYSIS, 39.2, March 1979) that he had suggested that there are imperative inferences whose premisses are all indicatives. The precise reference in The Language of Morals, which as Hare rightly says I should have given, is page 33, line 25, where Hare says \*. . . there is one kind of imperative conclusion which can be entailed by a set of purely indicative premisses.' Now, of course, Hare is here talking about hypothetical imperatives which he regards as somewhat different from the ordinary imperatives which he had discussed in the previous chapter, but, from my point of view, what I say about imperative inference will also include these hypothetical imperatives. I did mention that Hare had given rules for imperative inference, but I did not say what these rules were and I am sorry if I thereby gave an unbalanced view of what Hare had said. What I should have said, but did not, is that Hare's rules for imperative inference, namely (1) No indicative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which cannot be validly drawn from the indicatives among them alone. (2) No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not contain at least one imperative, will apply in a modified form to inferences containing descriptions of imperatives. The modified form will be something like (1') No indicative conclusion which does not contain a description of an imperative can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which cannot be validly drawn from the indicatives among them, which do not contain descriptions of imperatives, alone. (2') No conclusion describing an imperative can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not contain at least one description of an imperative. **The modified form of these rules will apply also to ought** if it is regarded as descriptive of a prescription and that they do apply is at least part of what is meant by saying that an ought cannot be derived from an is. I would like to suggest that such an ought is sufficient for Hare's needs.As Hare says, the use of a specific ought implies or presupposes a 54 at University of Bath Library & Learning Centre on July 12, 2015 http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from IMPERATIVE INFERENCE AN ADDENDUM 5 5 **universal ought**, so that when one says 'You ought to do X', this presupposes an argument such as Everyone ought always to do X in circumstances C You are now placed in circumstances C Therefore, you ought to do X now (where ought is being used in a descriptive sense). Now according to Grice's conversational maxim (H. P. Grice, 'Logic and Conversation' in Syntax and Semantics Vol. 9, ed. P. Cole, Academic Press, N.Y., 1978) that one ought not to say more or less than one needs to, it would seem that, if the use of ought presupposes an argument such as the one above, then 'You ought to do X' conversationally implies that the speaker subscribes to the prescription, although not actually uttering a prescription himself. If he wants to show that he does not subscribe to the prescription, then he has to deny it specifically: 'You ought to do X, but do not do X'. So, while Hare's rules (in their modified form) are necessary for inferences involving descriptions of imperatives (including oughts). Hare does not need inferences involving explicit imperatives for his moral theory.

#### 2] to means “—used as a function word to indicate agreement or conformity”

That’s Merriam Webster ND [Merriam Webster. “to”. No Date. Accessed 3/12/2022. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/to //Xu]

#### They violate since they specify the type of prioritization.

#### Outweighs

#### 1] Controls internal link – people base prep off the rez – no stasis point for arguments.

#### 2] Jurisdiction – judge is contracted to vote inside the rez and they don’t have the authority to vote on the aff

#### 1] Limits – infinite combination of affs from War, Investigative, to Climate. Explodes aff ground – you cherry-pick affs with no neg ground and I must prep all affs while they prep one which pigeonholes me to generics.

#### 2] TVA – read this aff as an advantage – we still get discussion.

## 2

#### Debaters must disclose round reports on the NDCA wiki for every round they have debated this season or must disclose past rebuttal strategies.

#### Violation: I have screenshots

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### Standards:

#### 1~ Level Playing Field – In the squo big schools know everyone's 2NRs and 2ARs by collecting flows and scouting, while small school debaters are left guessing. That's key knowledge because it tells you what layers debaters actually go for like theory, K or util, which is key to plan the best possible strategy against them. Round reports solve because everyone can equally access the wiki.

#### 2~ Strategy Education – Round reports help young debaters understand what the best debaters go for in the 2NR and 2AR in the context of the round. This is key to education – it teaches us how to make decisions given the big picture.

## 3

#### Interp: The affirmative must define democracy in a delimited text in the 1AC.

#### Democracy is flexible and has too many interps – normal means shows no consensus

**Wikipedia**, xx-xx-xxxx, "Democracy Index," No Publication, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index> SJCP//JG

[Full democracies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_democracy) are nations where civil liberties and fundamental political freedoms are not only respected but also reinforced by a political culture conducive to the thriving of democratic principles. These nations have a valid system of governmental checks and balances, an independent judiciary whose decisions are enforced, governments that function adequately, and diverse and independent media. These nations have only limited problems in democratic functioning.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6) [Flawed democracies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illiberal_democracy) are nations where elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honoured but may have issues (e.g. media freedom infringement and minor suppression of political opposition and critics). These nations have significant faults in other democratic aspects, including underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6) [Hybrid regimes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_regime) are nations with regular [electoral frauds](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_fraud), preventing them from being fair and free democracies. These nations commonly have governments that apply pressure on political opposition, non-independent judiciaries, widespread corruption, harassment and pressure placed on the media, anaemic rule of law, and more pronounced faults than flawed democracies in the realms of underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6)

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night – triggers presumption since the aff wasn’t subject to well researched scrutiny. We lose access to American politics DA’s, Xi lashout DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### 2] Ground – not defining hurts my strategy since they can shift out as I ask DA questions, so I err on the side of caution and read generics which get destroyed by AC frontlines.

#### 3] Real World – Policy makers will always how they are implementing a law. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, private entities can circumvent since there is no delineated way to enforce the aff and means their solvency can’t actualize.

#### DSpec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from policies that require enforcement to function.

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation and substantive engagement

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact and why schools fund debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### Neg theory is drop the debater – a) Prep skew – infinite prep means they frontline every shell enough to be efficient at DA and skew substance enough b) 1AR Flex –you moot 6 min of my offense and restart on unpredictable layers while kicking the args.

#### No rvi

#### [a] Baiting—they’ll bait the theory debate and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse since they’ll get away with unacceptable practices

#### [b] 1AR all-outs—they’ll collapse entirely to theory which crowds out substance and kills education.

#### [c] Chilling effect—people will be scared to read theory since they can lose off of it, so no one will check abuse.

#### [d] Norm-setting—I shouldn’t be forced to keep advocating for a bad norm if I realize it’s bad in the middle of the round.

#### [e] Illogical—doesn’t make sense to win just for being fair.

#### 1NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea since the shell was read earlier. Norming outweighs A] Constutivism- It’s the constitutive purpose of theory debating B] Sequencing- it’s a pre-requisite to actualizing any other voter like fairness or education

## 4

#### Western Communication is on the brink of implosion – oversaturated by endless signs and images. Reality is dead, information is dissuasive, and truth no longer exists – any critical content of the Aff is over-coded by the hyperreal form of communication.

Artrip and Debrix 18, Ryan E., and François Debrix. "The viral mediation of terror: ISIS, image, implosion." Critical Studies in Media Communication 35.1 (2018): 74-88. (Philosophy and Political Science at Guilford College and Elon University)//Elmer

Mediation and the virality of the image A crucial feature of the contemporary media system (and its accompanying global circulation of images) is oversaturation. This oversaturation of media is characterized by so-called viral patterns of production, dissemination, and consumption of content, often achieved through globally networked digital platforms. Enabled by a seemingly exponential growth of networks and by ever-widened thresholds of social connectivity, digital technologies have ushered in an unprecedented intensity of information production. Today’s global mediascape is perhaps best defined by its immeasurable volume of communicative activity, constituted by an interminable accumulation/circulation of representational images (thus, it may be more apt to call it a global media circuitry). In order to theorize the relevance of the accumulative/circulatory effects of representation taking place throughout contemporary media processes, we turn to Jean Baudrillard’s theory of simulation. According to Baudrillard’s theory of simulation, images have a tendency to “exceed” their original or intended function to represent, reflect, or describe some facet of reality. Images eventually overtake, overwhelm, and erase the possibility of originality or referential certainty. For Baudrillard (1983b), this takes place over the course of four “successive phases of the image” (p. 11). The first stage corresponds to the representational function of the image in its most ideal form. It describes a moment in the development of western thought—less likely an actual historical moment than one retroactively imposed on or assumed by western thought itself—whereby any reality can be perfectly reflected by an image. A second stage emerges as a response or opposition to the notion of representational faithfulness. It introduces the possibility of representational malfunction (often deployed intentionally), and it relates to what Baudrillard (1993) refers to in Symbolic Exchange and Death as “the counterfeit,” something that, Baudrillard claims, is “the dominant schema in the ‘classical period’” (p. 50). With the counterfeit, the image does not accurately represent anymore but rather “masks or perverts a basic reality” (Baudrillard, 1983b, p. 11). Representation gives way to distortion. Or, to put it somewhat differently, representation as distortion can now mislead, hide, cheat, dissimulate, or facilitate the production (and valuation) of lies and untruths (or counter-realities). In a third stage, Baudrillard (1983b) theorizes that the image now “masks the absence of a basic reality” (p. 11). The third stage marks a radical break from the first and second stages, and from representation in general. Representation becomes more or less a ruse or a lure; it can no longer be trusted (it cannot even be trusted to spread lies or falsehoods). In the third stage, the image’s “true” function is neither to reflect nor to distort, but rather to mask the impossibility of representation. Baudrillard (1996) conceptualizes that a crater has been left in the wake of a reality whose referentiality/representability has been “murdered” by the image itself, by the lure of representation, and by the desire to over-signify by way of the image. This third stage is marked by an over or hyperactive global (re)production of images and meanings in a panic mode eager to restore reality/referentiality at all costs. The demands that the real always be meaningful are everywhere in excess. “There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity. […] there is a panic-stricken production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production,” writes Baudrillard (1983b, pp. 12– 13). A panic-driven sense of reality’s radical absence generates a crisis about the capacity of verifiable truth and representable meaning. Still, according to this (il)logic, it is not enough to say that the absence of the real creates a void of meaning and truth inside which the entirety of western thought and its belief-systems disappear. Frantically, this void also stimulates and simulates reproductive effects driven by disappointment (that the real is no more) but also by desire (that the quest for the real produce more and more reality). Thus, this stage of “representation” or of reality-production also inevitably turns toward proliferation and saturation of all the signs that can stand for the real itself. The less reality is present, the more its signs, as substitutes for the real, proliferate. As Baudrillard (2005) puts it: “We live in terror both of the excess of meaning and of total meaninglessness” (p. 134). Demands on reality to be exponentially re-enacted, displayed, and proliferated (the new modalities of representation in this third phase) further deepen the absence of the real. Demands for evermore meaning (everything must make sense, be meaningful) exacerbate a general loss of certainty. Meaning, too, is about the exponential production and display of signs, signs that stand for what is meaningful. As Baudrillard (1988) writes, “Everywhere one seeks to produce meaning, to make the world signify, to render it visible. We are not, however, in danger of lacking meaning; quite to the contrary, we are gorged with meaning and it is killing us” (p. 63). Lastly, Baudrillard (1983b) arrives at a fourth stage of the image/simulation. Here, the image, indebted to the effects of absence-proliferation resulting from the third stage, “bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum” (p. 11). This stage of the image relates to a phase of the “real” in which the effects of representation (or what formerly could be called representation) can now be conceptualized as a series of independent operations. Images now circulate and reproduce in more or less complete abstraction from the demands of referentiality. In effect, the “real” has been hollowed out by its own representations (as we saw in the third stage). Nothing is left of the real but its simulacra, its sign-images that circulate and are exchanged indiscriminately throughout a global mediascape. At this stage, when we point to a “real” object in the world, we actually point to a hyper-mediation of the object and of its sign-function, often to manifold images, void of originality by virtue of having been hyper-circulated. The mediation of reality has led to the disappearance of the real and representation, and we find instead a hallucinatory complex of “hyperreality” whereby things appear and in fact are “more real than the real” (Baudrillard, 1983a, p. 99). Baudrillard’s diagnosis about representation, reality, and their fateful (hyper)- mediation is reflected through many of the operations of contemporary media, particularly those that involve the proliferation and saturation of inputs and outputs in the global circuitry. The immeasurable volume of hyper-produced digital contents seems to have overwhelmed the global circuits of communication, representation, and meaning/signification. The globalized world is faced with an irreducible complexity of interdependent transmissions, exchanges, and always expanding and morphing communication channels occurring between a multitude of networked actors/actants, interests, and media across the shifting realms of speculative finance, statecraft, international intelligence, the management of political processes, journalism, news-reporting/making, publishing, academia, or “scientific” expertise, and everyday consumer practices, on and on, ad nauseam. There occurs a widespread hyper-generation, hyper-distribution, and hyper-signification of causality and connectivity that, in turn, become virtually indistinguishable categories, excreted by digitally mediated social exchange, and often emerging as a series of signs or symptoms of the boundless growth of an implosive global system. As the system grows, all meanings, certainties, and truth-claims implode. Within this implosive global system, mediation of the true and the real may remain operative, but only according to a logic of functional contradiction. Indeed, the promise of certainty is continually (re)produced concomitantly with its disappointment or deferral. This is perhaps the fateful or fatal strategic extension of the culture industry’s logic of domination and libidinal exploitation that had once been outlined by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002). As Horkheimer and Adorno put it, [t]he culture industry endlessly cheats its consumers out of what it endlessly promises. The promissory note of pleasure issued by plot and packaging is indefinitely prolonged: the promise, which actually comprises the entire show, disdainfully intimates that there is nothing more to come, that the diner must be satisfied with reading the menu. (p. 111) Today, however, the operationalization of promise-disappointment functions beyond the strategic scope of consumer marketing and the culture industry. The mediatized subject is constantly hit by a barrage of direct and indirect promissory notes about various forms and versions of certainty, security, and truth emanating from multiple news media pundits, commentators, ideologues, technocrats, politicians, community activists, and fellow “digizens.” Increasingly, the reality of power (social, political, economic, etc.) is being scrambled by a hyper-real overproduction of conflicting “truths” and “untruths,” “reals” and “unreals,” “facts” and “alternative facts,” or “news” and “fake news” that exacerbate the implosion of ideologically incoherent and semantically fragmented images purporting to represent some sort of social/ political/economic reality (Artrip & Debrix, 2014). Put differently, in seeking to diagnose and represent the true and the real, media today often produce a series of “undecidable symptoms, and an assortment of vague and contradictory diagnoses” (Baudrillard, 1995, p. 48). Even mainstream news commentaries today echo a vaguely postmodern concern that we have somehow entered a dangerous “post-truth” era of mediated social and political reality (Davies, 2016; Flood, 2016). One widespread sentiment in response to this “posttruth crisis” is to fetishize “fact-checking” technologies and related epistemic media/ truth policing practices. This sentiment commonly implores that countermeasures be taken in response to “fake news” proliferation. Yet, the machineries that produce and disseminate the true and the untrue are one and the same. Both involve the same conditions of reproduction, the same thirst for reality, and the same system of operationalized promise/disappointment. The imperative to “fact-check” suggests that media need to fight against a threat to their own legitimacy and against the endangerment of truth. But journalists and pundits who tout “fact-checking” as some panacean form of political/social resistance appear to do so in complete ignorance or denial of the hyper-real effects of today’s global media. They fail to see that, in the words of Baudrillard (2005), “[t]he excess of information engenders undecidability of facts and confusion of minds. […] The excess of transparency engenders terror” (p. 193). The ethos/pathos of “factchecking” assumes that the immediacy of truth is still possible, or that media can or must remain neutral conduits for the transmission of reality. Thus, the fetishization of “fact-checking” does not care to address (or cannot make itself address) the more difficult situation, but one that is arguably at the root of the so-called post-truth condition: truth is always already mediated. Truth is always already vulnerable to the challenges of “alternative” forms of reality assessment and representation. The viral form of today’s media simultaneously demands and prohibits a hegemonic instantiation of truth. Perhaps this simultaneous and contradictory demand for and prohibition of epistemological hegemony has always been a central feature of liberal democracies and their quests for truth. The devout faith in the “marketplace of ideas” in (neo)liberal democratic designs—rooted in the virtues of transparency, freedom, and competition—promises that (like the infamous invisible hand of the market, perhaps) it will eventually always be able to sort out fact from fiction. But the radical equivalency and universal fungibility of all ideas make it such that each attempt to instantiate a hegemonic truth tends only to energize an opposition**al** or contradictory attempt. In the domain of news and political media, the user-subject’s search for truth resembles a shell game, the plight of which is perhaps nowhere more evident than with Counselor to President Trump Kellyanne Conway’s insistence on “alternative facts” in opposition to the seemingly more measured, documented, quantitative, and conventional facts reported about public attendance at Trump’s presidential inauguration (Bradner, 2017). The new U.S. executive’s blatant disregard for referential reality, made evident by the continual torrent of images, signs, and contradictory truth-claims disseminated from the state apparatus (or via the president’s Twitter account), reflects a stage of simulation in which the lie operates as a self-sustaining simulacrum. The lie is no longer a “counterfeit” (as it was in Baudrillard’s second phase of the image), but rather a free-floating signifier. The lie no longer antagonizes truth or the real. Rather, the lie makes sense only in relation to other lies that do not even care anymore to appear truthful. The lie mirrors the hyper-real condition and operations of media because it functions according to a framework of “truth” that assumes no weight about reality, assigns no inherent value to the real, and makes no referential claims. There is no certainty left when it comes to truths and lies. What is left is an unending play of symptoms emanating from the oversaturation (an oversaturation of images, signs, statements, and “realities,” once again) of an undifferentiated global system. Everything becomes uncertain (Baudrillard might say that it is indifferent), reduced to the universally fungible mode of information/news. As Baudrillard (1995) intimated, “everything which is turned into information becomes the object of endless speculation” (p. 41).

#### The 1AC’s belief in the power of objectivity in changing ideologies is a farce – the era of hyperreality has rendered communication useless and dogmatism becomes the new conduit of information.

Morris 20 [James Morris (). “Simulacra in the Age of Social Media: Baudrillard as the Prophet of Fake News”. Journal of Communication Inquiry. First Published December 3, 2020. Accessed 3/12/2022. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0196859920977154> //Xu + Cho]

Political controversies accentuate this separation of a simulated world view from its connection to a more fact-based conception of reality. Baudrillard discusses Watergate as not so much a re-establishment of profound reality, but part of the simulacrum of reality. This is because truth suffocates under the plethora of possible explanations for global events, such as the shooting down of a Malaysian airliner, the poisoning of Russian political refugees, or the destruction of two tall buildings in New York City. All of these events are surrounded by competing conspiracy theories. Baudrillard (1994) asks, “Is any given bombing in Italy the work of leftist extremists, or extreme-right provocation, or a centrist mise-en-scene to discredit all extreme terrorists and to shore up its own failing power, or again, is it a police-inspired scenario and a form of blackmail to public security? All of this is simultaneously true, and the search for proof, indeed the objectivity of the facts does not put an end to this vertigo of interpretation” (p. 16). This scenario echoes Deleuze’s concept of the fold, where the same reality is seen in different ways depending on alternative perspectives, none of which fully represents an underlying reality that can never be known in its entirety (Deleuze, 1992). Most people are convinced that their perspective is the “true” one, and it is nearly impossible to convince someone with an opposing perspective to change their beliefs, since these now revolve around a system of meaning that reinforces itself and is not directly connected to reality. There is no common ground of information during online discussions from which to build a shared perspective, since arguments stem from beliefs and faith, not facts. The controversy over climate change denial is a case in point. Even when 97 per cent of scientists believe that climate change is a real phenomenon,3 many still refute its human causation. In most cases, they don’t want to listen, because believing in climate change would force them to fundamentally alter their way of life, and those companies that rely on this way of life for their income encourage this situation, such as those in the fossil fuel business. Similarly, “anti-vaxers” continue to cling to long-discredited research linking the MMR vaccine to cases of autism. Baudrillard (1994) argues that this is how we deal with the effect of rampant simulation, where we can no longer tell whether anything we hear about in media is true: “‘Take your desires for reality!’ can be understood as the ultimate slogan of power since in a non-referential world, even the confusion of the reality principle and the principle of desire is less dangerous than contagious hyperreality” (p. 22). The emergence of “deep fake” technology has further accentuated this situation. This is artificial-intelligence-powered software that can make famous people (or, indeed, anyone) appear to say anything you want on video, ready to share online via social media. Even video evidence can no longer be trusted, no matter how real it looks.

#### The Impact is implosive violence as we seek to exterminate otherness by imposing meaning onto the globe.

Artrip and Debrix 14, Ryan E., and François Debrix. "The digital fog of war: Baudrillard and the violence of representation." (2014). (Philosophy and Political Science at Guilford College and Elon University)//Elmer

The story that needs to be told is thus not about the undoubtedly deplorable “truth” or fact of explosive and warlike violence, but about a violence of another sort. In the radical digital transparency of the global scene, we (members of the demos) often have full or direct exposure to explosivity, as we saw above with the image of terror. But what still needs to be thought and problematized is implosivity or what may be called implosive violence. Implosive violence is a violence for which we do not, and perhaps will never, have much of a language (Rancière, 2007: 123). Although, not having a language for it or, rather, as we saw above, seeking to find a language to talk about it and, perhaps, to make sense of it is still sought after. This is, perhaps, what digital pictures of war/terror violence seek to capture or want to force through. Implosive violence, often digitally rendered these days, is in close contact with media technologies and representational devices and techniques because it seeks representation and meaning. This is why implosive violence insists on **calling in wars** (against terror, for example) and on mobilizing war machines (against terrorist others, against **vague enemy figures**), but wars and war machines that no longer have—to the extent that they ever had—a clearly identifiable object and subject, or a **clear mission/**purpose. As such, this implosive violence and its wars (the new Western/global way of war, perhaps) must remain uncertain, unclear, foggy, inwardly driven, representational, and indeed virulent. They must remain uncertain and confused even as they are digitally operative and desperately capture events/images to give the impression that meaning**s/significations** can **and will** be found. Yet, as we saw above, it is not meanings exactly that must be found, but information and the endless guarantee of its immediate circulation. As information occupies the empty place of meaning, certainty, or truth, images must be instantaneously turned into appearances that search for meanings that will never be discovered because, instead, a proliferation of information-worthy facts and beliefs will take over (perhaps this is what US fake pundit and comedian Stephen Colbert famously referred to as “truthiness”). Or, as Baudrillard puts it, “free from its former enemies, humanity now has to create enemies from within, which in fact produces a wide variety of inhuman metastases” (Baudrillard, 2003). Thus, this implosive violence is destined to be a global violence since it "is the product of a system that tracks down any form of negativity and singularity, including of course death as the ultimate form of singularity. […] It is a violence that, in a sense, puts an end to violence itself and strives to establish a world where anything related to the natural must disappear  […] Better than a global violence, we should call it a global virulence. This form of violence is indeed viral. It moves by contagion, produces by chain reaction, and little by little it destroys our immune systems and our capacities to resist" (2003; our italics).

#### The Alternative is Radical Thought, catching debate in a trap of its own making. Instead of subsuming to the demand for truth, we are masters of illusion – bet on our critique of form, an enigma that reveals the contradiction of it all.

Pawlett 7, William. Jean Baudrillard: against banality. Routledge, 2007. (Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies at the University of Wolverhampton)//Elmer

Radical thought, as Baudrillard styles it, is not scientific, but nor is it critical. Both scientific and critical thought purport to operate on ‘reality’, but for Baudrillard, following Nietzsche, belief in ‘reality’ is an ‘otherworldly spiritual consolation . . . one of the elementary forms of the religious life . . . the last refuge of the moral zealots’ (1996c: 94). Baudrillard insists that ‘No one believes fundamentally in the real, nor in the self-evidence of their real lives’ (ibid.). Scientific and critical thought posit a ‘comforting’ and ‘necessary’ relationship between thought and reality. Baudrillard’s radical thought, in contrast, claims a fundamental ‘incompatibility between thought and the real’ (1996c: 96). As they are not naturally connected, thought is singular. Radical thought occurs ‘at the violent intersection of meaning and non-meaning, of truth and non-truth’, it ‘wagers on the illusion of the world’ (1996c: 97–8). Any attempt by thought to remain faithful to the world or to the ‘real’ is doomed because ‘It arises from a total misunderstanding about language, which is illusion in its very movement,

## 5

#### CP Text – In a Democracy, a Free Press ought to prioritize Objectivity over Advocacy, except for instances of Solution Journalism in vaccine reporting.

#### The CP competes – Solution Journalism prioritizes Advocacy over Objectivity and violating some Objective Principals is critical to effective Solution Journalism.

Dyer 15 John Dyer 6-11-2015 "Is Solutions Journalism the Solution?" <https://niemanreports.org/articles/is-solutions-journalism-the-solution/> (John Dyer is a journalist based in Massachusetts. He serves as the American editor for Associated Reporters Abroad)//Elmer

That line can be hard to distinguish. Media coverage grants legitimacy and authority to solutions, potentially to the exclusion of other fixes that reporters or their sources never encountered—an easy oversight on big, complicated topics like healthcare, clean water and other global issues, says Arizona State University journalism professor Dan Gillmor. Gillmor wonders if journalists might compromise their objectivity when they approach a story with the goal of proving that a specific solution is valid. “The journalist goes into the topic with some sort of outcome in mind,” says Gillmor. “That’s fine if you are looking for examples of agreement.” The MIT Center for Civic Media’s Ethan Zuckerman believes the proponents of solutions journalism are trying too hard to distance themselves from advocacy. He co-founded a citizen journalism website, Global Voices, in part to advocate for freedom of expression. To Zuckerman, purposefully motivating readers to act on the issues raised in stories is perfectly respectable—indeed, necessary. As confidence in the mainstream media ebbs, why shouldn’t top-notch journalists tell audiences how they might become involved in an issue that energizes them. “What Bornstein is actually doing is essentially saying, ‘Let’s find the problem solvers and let’s do traditional journalism stories about them. Let’s look at them with caution and scrutiny. Let’s evaluate their claims,’” says Zuckerman. “Is it enough that we find a solution if it is a solution that our viewers or our readers can’t be a part of? For me, that’s the most challenging feature of this. Can we give our readers something positive and constructive they can do?”

#### Solution journalism is used in vaccine reporting.

Solutions Journalism 14 [“REPORTING ON SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONALLY”. SOLUTIONS JOURNALISM NETWORK AND PULITZER CENTER. 2014. Accessed 3/12/2022. <https://www.park.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Solutions-Journalism-Toolkit.pdf> //Xu]

There is no right answer. They all can work — depends on the story. There’s also no standard structure for the body of a solutions story. On the next few pages, you’ll find four annotated stories by Pulitzer Center grantees – along with interviews with each of the authors. These are good pieces of journalism that incorporate, to varying degrees, elements of the solutions approach. We hope this annotation will give journalists ideas and models for structuring their own stories. All of these stories make their characters come to life by showing them at work. And all of them are set up like howdunnits. They introduce a seemingly intractable problem, but tantalize the reader or viewer with the implication that perhaps in this case, it’s not so intractable. The audience stays with the story to find out how. Amy Maxmen’s Nature article on mass malaria prevention begins with a colorful scene of the response at work. The problem is familiar to her readers — lots of kids die of malaria — so she spends most of her story on the pros and cons of this response. Chris Berdik’s New York Times Science Times story on a mapping project with the goal of saving Cambodia’s Tonle Sap lake starts with a brief scene-setter. It spends the rest of the article weaving together the various problems — overfishing, dams, climate change — with the mappers’ plans to address them. It’s the most complex structure of the four articles. Steve Sapienza’s PBS NewsHour video, on getting clean water into the slums of Dhaka, Bangladesh, starts with a scene-setter. After introducing viewers to Dhaka, he spends a lot of time on the problem before getting to a successful response. Esha Chhabra’s New York Times Fixes column on polio in India starts with a puzzle: India’s immunization rates for most diseases, such as measles and hepatitis B, is a dismal 61 percent. Yet 95 percent of children are vaccinated against polio. She spends the rest of the piece explaining what the polio campaign did that was different — and how those lessons are now being adopted to increase coverage of other vaccines.

#### Partial and advocative reporting solves vaccines.

CHHABRA 14 [ESHA CHHABRA. “An End to Polio in India?”. New York Times. March 5, 2014. Accessed 3/12/2022. https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/an-end-to-polio-in-india/ //Xu]

Communication — Unicef’s job — is the last key pillar of the polio campaign. It goes beyond just fliers, banners and announcements. Previously, when Muslim communities refused the vaccine — on the grounds that the vaccine was designed to make their children sterile — communication became critical. “At the local level, we had to work with the ulema [Muslim clerics], to correct this message,” said Dr. Bahl. By collaborating with local leaders, Unicef found a new venue to preach the message of good health: the mosque. And it was the health workers who took that message further, by carrying letters, written and signed by local Muslim clerics, urging families to have their children inoculated.

## 6

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew – ows on quantifiaiblity

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

## Case

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted – there’s always an institutional DA to going through Congress c) ought[[1]](#footnote-1) means “moral obligation” so the lack of that obligation means the aff hasn’t fulfilled their burden

#### Objectivity presumes the existence of real, perceptible truth.

Ryan 01 [Michael Ryan (Michael Ryan is a professor of communication at the University of Houston. He received a B.A. degree in government and an M.A. in journalism, both at the University of Texas at Austin, and a Ph.D. in journalism at Southern Illinois University). “Journalistic Ethics, Objectivity, Existential Journalism, Standpoint Epistemology, and Public Journalism”. Journal of Mass Media Ethics. Exploring Questions of Media Morality. Volume 16, 2001 - Issue 1. Accessed 3/1/2022. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327728jmme1601_2> //Xu]

Objective journalists are accountable to their audiences, to the highest ethical and professional standards of objective journalism, and, finally, to their employers. They never assume that their employers, and not themselves, bear the ultimate responsibility for their behavior. This definition assumes, of course, the existence of a “real” world about which human beings can be right or wrong. Objective journalists believe a real world exists and that one can produce a reasonably accurate description of that world. They do not guarantee their descriptions are accurate in every respect, only that they have followed a process that allows them to produce a description that is more accurate than any other process allows, and that allows society to move closer to an understanding of the real world.

#### Nothing is verifiable under a standard of falsifiability.

**Nickles**, Thomas. (Philosopher @ University of Nevada, Reno) "Falsifiability." New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. **2005**. , <https://elearning.shisu.edu.cn/pluginfile.php/35320/mod_resource/content/1/Falsifiability%20%28Introduction%29.pdf> ///AHS PB

**Falsifiable contrasts with verifiable. A claim is empirically verifiable if possible observation statements logically imply the truth of the claim. If actual observation statements do imply the claim, then it is verified. "This raven is black" verifies "There are black ravens."** During the 1930s the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle proposed verifiability both as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience and a criterion of meaning. Their idea was that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is verifiable in principle, and its meaning is given by its method of verification. For the logical empiricists, only empirically verifiable claims make genuine assertions about the world and are, in this broad sense, scientific. All other claims (metaphysical, religious, ethical, etc.) are cognitively meaningless. In his Logik der Forschung (1934; Logic of Scientific Discovery), Popper replied by rejecting the logical empiricists' concern with language and meaning and by noting that **verifiability as a criterion** of demarcation **excludes** scientific **law** claims and thus the core of science **itself. For** since **a law claim** is universal in scope (in simplest form, "All A's everywhere and everywhen are B's"), it **cannot possibly be verified: there are always actual or potential instances beyond those so far observed. Yet a** universal claim **can be falsified by a single negative instance. The first observed black swan refuted the claim "All swans are white."** (Law claims of statistical probabilistic forms are more problematic.) Based on this logical asymmetry of verification and falsification, Popper proposed falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience, although not as a criterion of meaning. According to Popper, nonscience includes pseudoscience (e.g., Freudian psychology and Marxism) and metaphysics, the one fraudulent, the other sometimes providing a valuable heuristic for science. Many deep scientific problems have their roots in metaphysics, but to be scientific, a claim must take an empirical risk. Moreover, **falsifiability**, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, **is a permanent status** for Popper. **No amount of successful testing can establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever remains conjectural. That all** scientific theories remain falsifiable entails fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future revision**. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge.**

#### Cartesian Skepticism. Brain in a vat means that even if they are right about how morality works, we can’t know if the circumstances observed in our brain equate to natural properties

Chapman summarizes descarte 14 [Andrew Chapman (lecturer in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder). “External World Skepticism”. 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. 6 FEBRUARY 2014. Accessed 12/11/21. <https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/> //Xu]

You’re being deceived by a very powerful evil demon right now. This demon has the ability to manipulate your sensory impressions such that it will seem to you that things are some way when they are not that way at all. Accordingly, things are actually nothing like P. For example, suppose it seems to you as though you are in a room with a table and chair in it and that you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (1) is true, then you actually are in a room with a table and chair in it and you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, then you are not in a room with a table and chair in it and you are not reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, things are very different from how they seem to you to be.1

\*Footnote 1\*

1 If the evil demon scenario is too far-fetched for you, imagine that you are dreaming or that you are hallucinating or even that you are in a laboratory and your visual cortex is being stimulated by electrodes.

\*Paragraph Following the First\*

Philosophers call (2) a skeptical scenario. In skeptical scenarios, you are radically misled, deceived, or bamboozled by your evidence in such a way that how things seem to you is different from how things actually are. Perhaps the most famous propounder of skeptical scenarios in the history of philosophy is René Descartes (1596-1650) in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). In the Meditations, Descartes considers that he might be dreaming or that he might be being deceived by the evil demon from our scenario (2) above. Hollywood has made much of skeptical scenarios in movies like Total Recall, The Matrix, and Inception. So back to our original question: Which of (1) or (2) is best supported or best justified by its seeming to you that P? If you’re being honest with yourself, you’ll conclude that how things seem equally well supports (1) and (2). From your internal, first-personal perspective, either of (1) or (2) could be true given how things seem to you. And if that weren’t bad enough, here comes the kicker: If both (1) and (2) are equally well supported by your evidence, how can you ever possibly know anything about the world outside your own skin? This is the problem of external world skepticism, perhaps the central problem of modern epistemology.

#### OBJECTIVITY IS WHAT MAKES FAKE NEWS POSSIBLE, ANY HINT OF BIAS OR FACTUAL ERROR MAKE THE MEDIA LOSE CREDIBILITY. THIS ALLOWS PEOPLE TO REJECT NEWS REPORTS AS FABRICATIONS

**Winston 20** (Brian. Brian Winston is a journalist who is the first holder of the Lincoln Professorship at the University of Lincoln, United Kingdom. He was a Pro Vice Chancellor for 2005-2006 and the former dean of Media and Humanities), and Matthew Winston. The roots of fake news: Objecting to objective journalism. Routledge, 2020.

Populism 101 holds that disagreeing with the leader is never an honest difference of opinions. To disagree with the leader, criticise the leader, be anything less than fanatically supportive of the leader, is always an attack on not just the leader, but the nation, deliberately intending it harm. Whether a private citizen, a judge, or a journalist, why else would you do it? But enough about all that. The part of this that matters the most in the context of our argument is that tackling this type of Trumpian notion of fakery (which never includes his own fabrications) with endless cross-checked rebuttals is to address the wrong issue. All the advice currently being offered in the marketplace of ideas on how to sort the news from the dross is never going to be foolproof. Only skepticism in the context of one’s own prior knowledge, or ‘collateral experience’ (to use a phrase of Charles Peirce)24 of the world, will ‘protect’ you from the fake, and even that is obviously far from infallible. The rhetoric (at least) of a fake news/news dichotomy, however, must be noticed as it serves to re-enforce a vision of good and bad media which comforts ‘good’ (all too often simply meaning ‘mainstream’) media. This carries a significant cost: the current focus on the dichotomy masks the news media’s deepest problems, which, as we suggest above, are located in the ideology and practice of journalism itself, rather than in the credulity of those who consume it. Trumpian attacks gain traction because journalism promises what it conspicuously fails to deliver: the more loudly it insists on its truth, the greater the threat to its credibility. Fake news flourishes not so much because of pure lying

#### Objectivity creates media bubbles and right wing news.

Kelkar 19 (Shreeharsh. Shreeharsh Kelkar is lecturer in the Interdisciplinary Studies Field Major at UC Berkeley), Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 5 (2019), 86-106, Post-truth and the Search for Objectivity: Political Polarization and the Remaking of Knowledge Production

* Brackets included in original text

In an era where both political parties presided over coalitions that spanned the ideological spectrum, newspapers could practice a detached objectivity through which they could be critical of all political persuasions. **Political polarization however raised serious questions about journalistic objectivity as practiced. As polarization increased, partisans on both sides, especially conservatives, started to accuse mainstream media institutions of exhibiting “journalistic bias.” While journalists and academics studiously followed objective norms and cast themselves as experts, they were always more left-of-center in their own politics. Conservatives, not unreasonably, perceived this as “bias,” and therefore sought to create their own information ecosystem of think tanks and media. Aided partly by regulatory changes, this led to the creation of an alternative right-wing media ecosystem (like cable news channels and conservative talk radio) and new audiences who consumed them. A key feature of this alternative ecosystem was its focus on the biases of mainstream media institutions. The success of the alternative right-wing media ecosystem is reflected in its outsized influence on setting the goals of the Republican Party, a truly unprecedented state of affairs. Political scientists Matt Grossman and David Hopkins argue that “the establishment of an explicitly right-of-center media ecosystem as a conscious alternative to ‘mainstream’ journalism allows conservative media personalities to exert an influence over Republican officeholders and voters that has no true counterpart among Democrats**” (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016a). This has led to an information asymmetry in terms of the news and knowledge that circulates amongst publics of different political persuasions. While the right relies on its alternative information system, the left relies on traditional news media and intellectual sources [e.g. university research] that often implicitly flatter the Democratic worldview but do not portray themselves or their consumers as engaged in an ideological conflict. Similarly, left-of-center think tanks have adapted to conservative upstarts by frequently opposing them in policy debates, but still retain broader ties to scholarly researchers and closer adherence to academic norms. (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016a) The rise of the internet and the growth of internet publishing further complicated matters. The internet took classifieds away from newspapers and magazines, thereby taking away a chunk of their revenue; further, it brought forth a new class of proto-journalists: bloggers, citizen-activists, advocates, who utilized it to reach a broader audience. These new voices did not necessarily subscribe to the established model of journalistic objectivity, where the journalist remains invisible and reports all sides of a conflict. Instead, they created a new genre of writing (embodied today in outlets like Vox and Talking Points Memo) embodying a different style of objectivity: their writing style accords a prominent space to facts but proudly spurns the invisible-reporter view-from-nowhere model of the NYT or CNN. The writer’s loyalties are clear, facts and opinions are mixed, and every side does not get equal (or similar) coverage (Farrell and Drezner 2007).

1. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought [↑](#footnote-ref-1)