## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not justify 1ar theory is dtd, no rvi, competing interps, and aff fairness first

#### Violation: its all in the underview

#### Standard: Infinite Abuse - their norm justifies the affirmative auto winning every round since they can read a risk free 1AR shell with DTD and Competing interps which I cannot answer since the theory shell since they make paradigm issues like evaluate the theory debate after the 1ar in the 1ar. Even if I try to uplayer the shell and read meta theory to get an out in the 2NR I can’t since your shell is the highest layer and nor can I go for paradigm issues like reasonability to gut check the shell since you denied that as well. Norming is an independent voter since justifying the value of debate necessarily justifies the norms of the activity being good in order for debate to be valuable.

## 2

#### Interp: The affirmative must specify jurisdiction in a delimited text in the 1AC.

#### Jurisdiction is flexible and has too many interps – normal means shows no consensus and makes the round irresolvable since the judge doesn’t know how to compare between types of offense and o/w since it’s a side constraint on decision making – independently turns judicial application.

Maggie **Koerth-Baker, 15** [Maggie Koerth-Baker, (Maggie Koerth, formerly known as Maggie Koerth-Baker, is an American science journalist. She is a senior science editor at FiveThirtyEight and was previously a science editor at Boing Boing and a monthly columnist for The New York Times Magazine.)]. "Who Makes the Rules for Outer Space?." No Publication, 10-30-2005, Accessed 12-13-2021. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/space-law/ // duongie

But while the rules of empire are pretty neatly spelled out in the treaty—no nukes, no planting a flag and claiming anything in space as your country’s territory—the rules of commerce aren’t quite as clear-cut. Now, almost 50 years later, with a private space race underway in the United States, lawyers and politicians are starting to really hash out what it means for a government to be responsible for a corporation and what the fair use of space should look like. With President Barack Obama’s signing of the U.S. Commercial Space Law and Competitiveness Act, it’s a discussion that’s likely to grow more heated. Basics of Space Law A fundamental tenet of space law—the concept of governments being responsible for the work of non-governmental actors—has few, if any, precedents. There are places on Earth that are governed by laws similar to those that govern space—the sea, for instance. But no country is inherently responsible for whatever its citizens do when they’re out in international waters, says Joanne Gabrynowicz, professor of space law at the University of Mississippi and editor-in-chief of the Journal of Space Law . If that were the case, every pirate would technically be a privateer—their buckles swashed with official state approval. But you don’t need anything as exotic as the specter of space privateering to see why government responsibility can be a problem. As it currently stands, two private companies operating in space couldn’t even sue each other without the prior approval of their governments, says Michael Listner, an attorney and the principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions, a legal think tank. Currently, this is an issue that primarily affects the U.S. There are lots of countries with commercial, but not necessarily private, operations in space—Russia, China, Canada, Japan. Commercial entities launch rockets and manage satellites all the time. But in most of those cases, “commercial” basically means “revenue generating,” not “private enterprise,” Gabrynowicz says. Some of the corporations operating in space are government-owned, while others are technically private but operate with levels of government control and government money that would be unfamiliar to Americans, says Fabio Tronchetti, associate professor of law at China’s Harbin Institute of Technology. Government Minders The U.S. has the largest and most important private sector operating in space, from launching people and supplies for NASA to more speculative companies dedicated to space tourism and asteroid mining. Many of those companies would prefer there be less government involvement in their business. For instance, Bigelow Aerospace is a company that designs and builds inflatable pods that humans can live in in orbit—one of their pods will be attached to the International Space Station next year—or on a surface like the moon. For many years, Bigelow had to treat its products, legally, as though it were dealing in arms, wrangling with export controls meant to prevent guns, bombs, and valuable military secrets from being sold to the wrong people, stolen, or accidentally exposed. Even the most innocuous, non-weaponizable parts of their system fell under these controls. At one point, the company was forced to have two government officials watching two guards who were protecting a coffee-table-shaped kickstand for their pod. When the company had technical interchange meetings with partners in Moscow, it had to pay to bring along government minders. “If you dropped an alien in the room and said ‘point to the free country,’ they would have pointed to the Russians because we had two government monitors monitoring our every word,” says Mike Gold, Bigelow’s director of operations and business growth. “We spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on that. I would joke that KGB would spy on you, but at least they had the courtesy to do it for free.” That problem was solved by changes to U.S. export control rules in 2013, but cutting back on regulations still remains a popular mantra in the industry. Among several features of the U.S. Commercial Space Law and Competitiveness Act is the extension of a moratorium on regulation for human spaceflight safety requirements. The bill also leaves open a regulatory hole, wherein the Federal Aviation Administration licenses and monitors launches and re-entries, but there is no federal authority in charge of activities that happen in orbit. Gabrynowicz thinks this is problematic because the U.S. government also has a risk-sharing regime with these companies where it indemnifies them beyond their insurance coverage. The bill extends that, as well. So, she says, the government is responsible for the companies by authority of international law, the government will pay for any particularly large financial damages incurred by the companies, and the government is reducing or not establishing regulations on those companies. To Gabrynowicz, that looks like a moral hazard. Privatizing the Space Race The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 did a good job of keeping the space race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union from devolving into something out of a James Bond movie. But it didn’t do a very good job of planning for future races to claim resources found in space. Article II of the treaty is just 30 words long. It says, “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Today, space lawyers are spending an awful lot of time debating what, exactly, that means. Lawyers are split pretty evenly on whether you can mine an asteroid and profit from it. The debate has been spurred by the handful of companies that have announced an interest in mining asteroids or the moon for minerals and other resources. None of these plans are likely to become reality in the next 20 years. In fact, it’s still debatable whether mining an asteroid is technically feasible or would make financial sense at all. But the companies interested in this business plan—including Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries—want some kind of assurance that, if they do succeed, they will get to profit off what they dig up. That’s a reasonable request…but it’s assurance that the Outer Space Treaty can’t unequivocally offer. “There’s a spurious argument that, well, the State can’t appropriate, but I can!” Johnson says. “But that’s easily refuted. Property exists as a relationship between citizen and sovereign. You only get property rights based on the State.” We buy and sell property with the help of legal contracts. Those contracts are only real in so much as a state exists to enforce them. At best, say Johnson, Listner, Gabrynowicz, and Tronchetti, you can say that the Outer Space Treaty neither affirms nor denies the right of a private company to mine an asteroid, keep what it mines, and sell those resources for profit. Lawyers, Listner says, are split pretty evenly on whether that means you can do it or you can’t. Which is where the U.S. Commercial Space Law Competitiveness Act comes in, again. One of the most important things the bill does is say, explicitly, that U.S. companies can own and sell resources they mine. But the new law could become a problem, space lawyers say. Essentially, it’s the U.S. trying to unilaterally settle an open question. “It’s really an ideological and intellectual battle,” Listner says. Even more troubling, from the perspective of Gabrynowicz and Tronchetti is the fact that the Space Resource and Utilization Act doesn’t set up any system for licensing those mining activities. Given that the Outer Space Treaty obliges countries to maintain control over companies operating in space, that could be seen as the U.S. refusing to follow international law, Gabrynowicz says. Uncharted Territory Space lawyers can point out many other potential problems with the U.S. Commercial Space Law and Competitiveness Act, but the repercussions depend on what other countries decide to do. Historically, ever since the Outer Space Treaty was signed, countries have worked out their differences off the books, in bilateral negotiations. That happened in 1978, when a Soviet Kosmos satellite, powered by an onboard nuclear reactor, crashed in western Canada. That country initially billed the Soviet Union more than $6 million to cover the costs of cleanup and containment. Ultimately, the two countries came to an agreement where the Soviets paid half that amount and never formally had to acknowledge liability. “More recently, you had a piece of Chinese debris that crashed into a Russian satellite,” Tronchetti says. “Essentially, they just let that go.” So what happens if the United States decides companies can own minerals mined on an asteroid and another country, China say, decides they can’t? “That’s the problem, isn’t it?” Tronchetti says. “Nobody knows. But we should think about international consequences.” Gabrynowicz, for instance, worries that making unilateral decisions about space law could affect efforts to negotiate the rules that manage disputed places here on Earth, like the Arctic, where Russia, the U.S., and other countries are currently jockeying for access to oil and other resources. The geopolitical climate isn’t amenable to a new space treaty. In theory, a new treaty would solve all of these problems. But nobody thinks it would work. The Outer Space Treaty succeeded, Johnson says, because there were really only two parties at the table back then—the U.S. and the Soviet Union. “They just said, ‘Let’s come up with compromise text and then take it to the rest of the world and tell them we’ve agreed. We’re the most important people doing anything in space and everyone else will just go along,’ ” he says. Needless to say, that’s not how things work today. Even just a few years after the passage of the Outer Space Treaty, in 1979, an expanded document known as the Moon Treaty failed to draw any interest from the U.S. or the Soviets. That treaty would have clarified some of the issues the Outer Space Treaty left vague, including banning commercial sale and use of extraterrestrial resources. Only 16 countries are part of the treaty—none of them a major spacefaring nation. The geopolitical climate isn’t amenable to a new space treaty, Johnson says. There are too many stakeholders now and their goals don’t align enough. “The era of treaty making has really been over since the 1980s,” Johnson says. Now, the future of space is in the hands of the diplomats and lawyers who will hash out bespoke compromises in backrooms and boardrooms all over the world.

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night – triggers presumption since the aff wasn’t subject to well researched scrutiny. We lose access to Tech Race DA’s, Asteroid DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### 2] Ground – not defining hurts my strategy since they can shift out as I ask DA questions, so I err on the side of caution and read generics which get destroyed by AC frontlines.

#### 3] Real World – Policy makers will always how they are implementing a law. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, private entities can circumvent since there is no delineated way to enforce the aff and means their solvency can’t actualize.

#### ESspec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from policies that require enforcement to function.

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and is the reason why schools fund debate

#### Drop the debater—the abuse has already occurred and my time allocation which leads to severance in the 1ar which ow/s on magnitude b) to deter future abuse, big punishment incentivizes people to stop bad practices

#### Competing interps – a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blip storm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory d) Double Bind – either 1) my Theory shell is unwarranted in which case you shouldn’t have any problem answering it or 2) you’re actually abusive in which case the whole shell stands and outweighs.

## 3

#### We’re hijacking a priori morality first- that means intuitions

#### 1) Intuitions are defined a priori- some truths are intuitively clear.

**Parfit** [David Parfit(Senior Research Fellow @ Oxford). The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Second Edition. February 21, 2000. Accessed 1/8/20. <https://books.google.com/books?id=FcUi2AxNW3gC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false//> Recut Houston Memorial DX]

To introduce this argument, I shall sum up some of my claims. (A) There are some irreducibly normative reason-involving truths, some of which are moral truths. (B) Since these truths are not about natural properties, our knowledge of these truths cannot be based on perception, or on evidence provided by empirical facts. (C) Positive substantive normative truths cannot be analytic, in the sense that their truth follows from their meaning. Therefore (D) Our normative beliefs cannot be justified unless we are able to recognize in some other way that these beliefs are true. We do, I believe, have this ability. We have reasons to have certain normative beliefs, and we can respond to these reasons. Normative beliefs can also be self-evident, and intrinsically credible. One such belief is (E) Torturing children merely for fun is wrong. There are similar non-normative beliefs, such as (F) No statement can be both wholly true and wholly false. Since our normative beliefs are neither caused by what we believe, nor based on empirical evidence, we need another word to refer to our way of forming these beliefs. On the view that I have called Intuitionism: We have intuitive abilities to respond to reasons and to recognize some normative truths. Though it is intuitively clear that certain acts are wrong, most of our moral beliefs cannot depend only on such separate intuitions. We must also assess the strength of various conflicting reasons, and the plausibility of various principles and arguments, trying to reach what Rawls calls reflective equilibrium. This kind of intuitively-based reflective thinking is not only, as Scanlon writes, the best way of making up one’s mind about moral matters . . . it is the only defensible method. We have similar abilities to recognize truths about what is rational, and about what we have reasons to believe, and want, and do. Many recent writers reject such claims. Schiffer, for example, doubts that moral intuitions are worth discussing, and Field and Boghossian call the idea of rational intuition ‘obscurantist’ and ‘a mystery’. But these criticisms are aimed at the view that intuition is a special quasi-perceptual faculty. That is not the view that I am defending here. When I use the word ‘intuitive’, I mean what Boghossian means when he describes one of his claims as ‘intuitively plausible’ and ‘intuitively quite clear’. Intuitionism can also be challenged with claims about disagreement. When Boghossian denies that beliefs can be intrinsically credible, or self-evident, he points out that (G) different people might find conflicting beliefs self-evident. If we claim that we have some ability, however, it is no objection that we might have lacked this ability. Different people might have conflicting visual experiences, which were like dreams and hallucinations, and were not a source of knowledge. But that is not in fact true. Different people’s visual experiences seldom conflict, and believing what we seem to see is a fairly reliable way of reaching the truth. It may be similarly true that, after careful reflection, different people would seldom find conflicting beliefs self-evident. Believing what seems self- evident, after such reflection, may be another fairly reliable way of reaching the truth. When Schiffer argues that there are no moral truths, he claims that (H) even in ideal conditions, when everyone knows the relevant facts and is reasoning equally well, we and others could rationally disagree about any moral question. For example, Schiffer claims that, though we could rationally believe that (E) torturing children merely for fun is wrong, it would be equally rational to reject this belief. This claim assumes that we cannot have decisive reasons to have our moral beliefs. If we had such reasons to believe (E), it would not be equally rational either to have or to reject this belief. What Schiffer calls his error theory might be true, since we might never have decisive reasons to have any moral belief. But Schiffer cannot support this theory by claiming that we and others could rationally disagree about any moral question, since this claim assumes that we have no such reasons. Nor could we reject Schiffer’s theory merely by claiming that we and others could not rationally disagree. When we are trying to decide whether we have decisive reasons to have certain beliefs, we cannot usefully appeal to claims about whether, when considering these beliefs, we and others could rationally disagree.

#### 2) Reason exists in 2 forms, intuitive and reflective. If I say what is 1+1, the answer of 2 is intuitive ie you don’t need to think about it. If I say what is 5/11, this is reflective, because you need to go through a system of conscious steps to reflect upon it. However, every step made in a deductive syllogism should be intuitively true, so intuitions control the internal link to reflective reasoning.

#### Negate –

#### We have an intuitive preference for the squo.

**Henderson 16,** Rob. 2016. “How Powerful Is Status Quo Bias?” Psychology Today. Retrieved April 19, 2019 (<https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/after-service/201609/how-powerful-is-status-quo-bias).//SS>

Status quo bias is a cognitive bias that explains our preference for familiarity. Many of us tend to resist change and prefer the current state of affairs. How powerful is this cognitive bias? Consider this thought experiment from the renowned philosopher, Robert Nozick: "Suppose there was an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Super-duper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel like you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Of course, while in the tank you won't know that you're there; you'll think that it's all actually happening. Would you plug into this machine for life?" For most of us, our intuition is to say no. We might say something like, “There is more to life than pleasure," and cite the importance of our relationships with loved ones and connection to reality. And perhaps that’s true. But consider this variant on the above proposal: "It is Saturday morning and you are planning to stay in bed for at least another hour when all of the sudden you hear the doorbell. Grudgingly, you step out of bed to go open the door. At the other side there is a tall man, with a black jacket and sunglasses, who introduces himself as Mr. Smith. He claims to have vital information that concerns you directly. Mildly troubled but still curious, you let him in. ‘‘I am afraid I have to some disturbing news to communicate to you’’ says Mr. Smith. ‘‘There has been a terrible mistake. Your brain has been plugged by error into an experience machine created by neurophysiologists. All the experiences you have had so far are n**othing but the product of a computer program** designed to provide you with pleasurable experiences. All the unpleasantness you may have felt during your life is just an experiential preface conducive toward a greater pleasure (e.g. like when you had to wait in that long line to get tickets for that concert, remember?). Unfortunately, we just realized that we made a mistake. You were not supposed to be connected; someone else was. We apologize. That’s why we’d like to give you a choice: **you can either remain connected to this machine (and we’ll remove the memories of this conversation taking place) or you can disconnect**. However, you may want to know that your life outside is not at all like the life you have experienced so far. What would you choose?" This question comes from an experiment by **Felipe De Brigard**, a researcher at Duke University, who challenged the intuitions many of us hold when we read the original happiness machine thought experiment. One might think that individuals, when faced with the choice between reality and simulation, would consider contact with reality to be critical and therefore a clear majority of people would opt to exit the machine. However, when De Brigard posed this question to participants and measured the responses, **he found** the opposite result. Among the respondents, **59 percent stated that they would prefer to remain connected to the machine**, while only 41 percent stated that they would prefer to disconnect. The result of this study has interesting implications for the way we think about our capacity for change and our preference for the familiar. **When individuals are faced with the choice to change their environment or remain in their current state of affairs**, even when the decision is between simulated familiarity and unknown reality, **most will choose the familiar**. It is likely that this is a form of risk aversion that is characteristic of status quo bias—that individuals averse to the risk of losing their current reality will choose to remain, even at the expense of living in real, rather than a virtual, reality. Research from Kahneman and Tversky suggests that losses are twice as psychologically harmful as gains are beneficial. In other words, individuals feel twice as much psychological pain from losing $100 as pleasure from gaining $100. One interpretation is that in order for an individual to change course from their current state of affairs is that the alternative must be perceived as twice as beneficial. This highlights the challenges we may face when considering a change to our usual way of doing things. When military members are considering their choices as their contract comes to an end, many consider re-enlisting simply because they are unaware of the many opportunities that exist for them. Even when we understand our current path is no longer beneficial or no longer makes us happy, we must still overcome the natural urge to stay on the path unless the alternative is sufficiently attractive. In order for us to readily pursue an alternate path, we must believe that the alternative is clearly superior to the current state of affairs. **The status quo effect is pervasive in both inconsequential and major decisions. Oftentimes we are held back by what we believe to be the safe option, simply because it is the default**. Bearing in mind our natural propensity for the status quo will enable us to recognize the allure of inertia and more effectively overcome it.

## 4

#### Permissibility and presumption negate

#### 1] Obligations- the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation

#### 2] Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 3] Negating is harder – that’s the heg

#### 4] Affirmation theory- Affirming requires unconditionally maintaining an obligation

Affirm [is to]: maintain as true.

That’s Dictionary.com- “affirm” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm

#### 5] Also presuming things are true means you believe lies but presuming things are false doesn’t mean you ignore truth bc truth will have a justification so you don’t need to presume anything. So only presumption flipping negative filters out lies which is a prior question to truth testing.

#### The standard is consistency with the logical consequence of the resolution. Prefer this –

#### 1. Text – Oxford Dictionary defines ought as “used to indicate something that is probable.”

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought> //Massa

#### Ought is “used to express logical consequence” as defined by Merriam-Webster

(<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>) //Massa

#### 1nc definition choice anything else moots the 1nc since out strategy was premised on the lack of a 1ac def

#### Now negate

#### 1] Their inherency proves that the aff won’t happen or you vote negative on presumption since the aff is non-inherent.

## 5

#### NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea 3] It was introduced first so it comes lexically prior.

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

#### Reject 1AR theory A] 7-6 Time skew B] NO 3NR so 2ar gets to weigh however they want C] We only have two speechs to norm over it which means debates become irresolvable and the judge is forced to intervene.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew – ows on quantifiaiblity

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

## Case

### UV

#### On dtd – a] no reason why uq able to check back other alyers liker reps k or rotb solve back

#### On ci – a] 2ar check back if shell is true then 6 minte 2nr cant overcome it

#### On combo shell pre empt – a] it’s a qeusition of the norms you produce which we say is bad b] I could have missed these or fogot ot answer In which the hsells tandds true

#### On aff fairness a point – a] 2ar solves all reasons why you cant engage on multiple b] just proves im doing my job not a reason to drop me

#### B point – a] terminal defense, winning the ci all solve b] sets up invincible 2ar where you win a risk of offense

#### C point – a] reject doesn’t show its methodology b] proves some skew but not absolute skew c] doesn’t take into accoiuntother factors like skill etc.

#### On 2n theory a point – a] creates late breaking theory debates where the 1ar sandbags the paradigm issues b] nonuq 2ar always has to reclarify agsint 6 minute 2n

#### On b point – a] if the shell is true things like reasonability don’t make sense and you can still win the shell b] 2ar can go for substance if 2nr deflates checks the abuse since they still lose

#### On rvi a point – a] can read reps k new rotb and uplayer soplves back b] make a fair 1ac means no need for the 1nc to read theroy

#### On b point – a] 1ar controls direction 1ar ful restart only going for rvis, only case etc. b] no reason us controlling the round is bad and has some impact

#### On pp a point – a] flows both ways would freeze negative obligations b] permissible means you can do whatever you want proves doenst freeze action

#### on b and c point – a] empirically disproven we don’t believe things like conspiracy theories true b] we doubt everything absent some reason to believe it disproves it affirms

### Fw

#### On Indexicals

#### 1] Trigger permissibility- It would justify every action being permissible since people can act under their own index

#### 2] Indexicals negate- we have proven an index under which the aff is false so vote neg since you can’t weigh between indexes

#### 3] Debate solves- the unique process of debate allows us to criticize a framework without assuming a perspective i.e. I can respond to apriori knowledge being true without assuming that knowledge is experiential

#### 4] Morally repugnant- it would justify individuals operating under the index that Nazism is true and that being a legit perspective

#### On trivialism group them – a] we read a hijack solves back b] don’t them go for this as trivialism no warrant c] justifies racism and statements like slavery is good d] confounds misunderstanding w verifialbity clear set rules like speeding etc. disprove that even if someone mistnerprets they still vioalte

#### On performativity – a] fallacy of origin b] pre post fiat distinction j bc the fw is read in round doesn’t mean it matierlizes into how this round functions

#### On tjfs – a] no reason why tjfs matter in the first place reject it creates race to the bottom where we find best “theoretical” fw instead of actual phil b] intuions access same il doesn’t need massive amounts of ev either no uq to kant

#### 1] solipsism – its impossible to verify that agential existence or minds outside of my own since I cannot look inside the mind of someone else and see what they are thinking – o/w – a] rationality is nonverifiable since its impossible to tell if people are practical reasoners b] intentions are impossible to verify since intentions can’t exist if they aren’t an agent

#### 2] affect side constraint – even if non verifiable it happens and they cant account for it

#### 3] tauntological – if knowledge is apriori true for everyone, then everyone should already act morally since its known to them, but since they aren’t, it proves knowledge isn’t accessible to everyone which disproves constituvism

#### 5] regress – hindrance of a hindrance is infinitely regressive since a] the transgression that’s being stopped could be stopping another transgression b] its impossible to weigh between hindrances – for example, killing someone to stop them from robbing someone is incalculable under Kantian ethics