## 2

#### Interp: Debaters must not defend the hypothetical implementation of an explicit actor or action

#### Resolved in LD means statement of values

UPitt ND University Of Pittsburgh Communications Services Webteam, copyright 2015-21, "Basic Definitions," Department of Communication , <https://www.comm.pitt.edu/basic-definitions> CHO

Affirmative/Pro. The side that “affirms” the resolution (is “pro” the issue). For example, the affirmative side in a debate using the resolution of policy, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens, would advocate for federal government implementation of a poverty reduction program. Argument. A statement, or claim, followed by a justification, or warrant. Justifications are responses to challenges, often linked by the word “because.” Example: The sun helps people, because the sun activates photosynthesis in plants, which produce oxygen so people can breathe. Constructive Speech. The first speeches in a debate, where the debaters “construct” their cases by presenting initial positions and arguments. Cross-examination. Question and answer sessions between debaters. Debate. A deliberative exercise characterized by formal procedures of argumentation, involving a set resolution to be debated, distinct times for debaters to speak, and a regulated order of speeches given. Evidence. Supporting materials for arguments. Standards for evidence are field-specific. Evidence can range from personal testimony, statistical evidence, research findings, to other published sources. Quotations drawn from journals, books, newspapers, and other audio-visuals sources are rather common. Negative/Con. The side that “negates” the resolution (is “con” the issue). For example, the negative side in a debate using the resolution of fact, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production, would argue that global warming does not threaten agricultural production. Preparation Time. Debates often necessitate time between speeches for students to gather their thoughts and consider their opponent's arguments. This preparation is generally a set period of time and can be used at any time by either side at the conclusion of a speech. Rebuttal Speech. The last speeches in a debate, where debaters summarize arguments and draw conclusions about the debate. Resolution. A specific statement or question up for debate. Resolutions usually appear as statements of policy, fact or value. Statement of policy. Involves an actor (local, national, or global) with power to decide a course of action. For example, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens. Statement of fact. Involves a dispute about empirical phenomenon. For example, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production. Statement of value. Involves conflicting moral dilemmas. For example, Resolved: The death penalty is a justified method of punishment. Topic. A general issue to debate. Topics could be “The Civil War,” “genetic engineering,” or “Great Books.”

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)

A picture containing text, sign

Description automatically generated



#### Violation: They defend “China” as the actor and implement a regulation which isn’t resolutional OR they are extra T

#### Voter for limits and ground - justifies infinite unpredictable aff advantage ground which overstretches research burdens while spiking core generics

#### Fairness - manipulating the balance of prep structurally favor’s the aff - people come to debate for different reasons but pursuit of the ballot is the only unifying characteristic

#### Clash - unpredictability destroys research accessibility and nuanced refinement - empathy and value clarification are key to fight dogma and create better advocates - turns case because precluding testing means the aff should be considered presumptively false

#### Phil Ed – creates better ethical subjectivity and critical thinking that o/ws on uniqueness to LD. Switch to policy and read the heg aff on the water topic – solves all your offense

#### TVA: Read a phil aff that affirms that private appropriation is unjust

#### AND switching side’s is good

**Victory Briefs 12** [“Neg-Neg” in LD?,” Feb 25, 2012, <https://www.vbriefly.com/2012/02/25/201202neg-neg-in-ld/>]

POSTED ON FEBRUARY 25, 2012 BY VICTORY BRIEFS

Additionally, I’m not convinced the advantages of a Neg-Neg model outweigh what I believe is a compelling interest in switch-sides debate. Any coach who’s worked with new debaters should note than one of the first and most transformative learning experiences for a student is adopting diametrically opposed positions on a topic. Allowing debaters to share in contestable premises could encourage conformity in an activity that is already short on innovation. Paradoxically, this radical departure from orthodox practice enables debaters to rely on conventional wisdom at the expense of difficult research and critical thinking. Glass suggests that debaters ought not have to defend positions that are inconsistent with their own beliefs, but this seems to be one of the most useful virtues that debate provides a student. Much has already been written on these virtues, and there’s little question that a Neg-Neg trend would come at their expense. That’s not to say a debate about competing premises or policies isn’t itself valuable. But, that debate can and should happen even in a traditional Aff-Neg framework.

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and is the reason why schools fund debate

#### Drop the debater on T – I can't respond to a new aff in the 2NR since I don't have a 3NR to defend my offense.

#### T link turns 1AR theory – proves the aff forced me to be abusive.

#### No RVIs on T: (A) The 1AR would just sit on T with frontlines so I'll always lose to the unchecked 2AR collapse. (B) The aff has the burden of being topical so I have an unconditional right to read T.

#### Use competing interps—either there's a bright line which collapses, or there isn't which causes intervention.

## 3

#### The litmus test for ethics is certainty and non-arbitrariness – blurry guidelines for ethics allows agents to inconsistently understand morality or arbitrarily opt out which renders ethics useless since it can’t serve as a guide to action.

#### Thus, the meta-ethic is practical reason.

#### 1] Empirical Uncertainty – only intrinsic and a priori truths like 1+1=2 are certain for agents – relying on the empirics is incoherent because different agents have different interpretations of history, have access contrasting forms of information, or rely on inconsistent methods for calculation but practical reason is universal and applies to all agents

#### 2] Infinite Regress – certainty must answer “why” because it would otherwise allow agents to infinitely question why it’s true – other frameworks allow agents to question every part of it, but questioning reason concedes its authority which proves its inescapable.

#### 3] Action Theory – any action can be broken down into an infinite number of sub-actions. Without an account of what an action is, it’s impossible to ask questions about which actions are good. Practical reason solves – the intent to follow through on a maxim unites subactions into a full actions.

#### 4] Is-Ought Gap – descriptive claims cannot prescribe action – “arsenic is poison” doesn’t mean “one ought not drink arsenic” because it doesn’t ought to be that way. Only a nonnatural a priori premise can form ought statements.

#### Practical reason is universalizable – its incoherent to claim that 1+1=2 for me, but not for everyone else.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with universalizable maxims – actions are ethical insofar as willing it doesn’t infringe on the ability to will it.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Performativity – when you enter debate, you presume that you will be free to set and pursue ends in the round because of a system of reciprocally enforced constraints.

#### Negate –

#### 1]Space appropriation and exploration originates from private companies such as Space X and Blue Origin. Preventing such is a restriction on the ability of companies to set and pursue their ends and these companies gain contracts with the government for projects which turns promise breaking offense.

#### 2] unfair treatment -

## 4

#### CP Text: The People’s Republic of China should

#### increase and encourage private and civil space cooperation with the United States over appropriation of outer space.

#### de-militarize its space industry.

#### dismantle and remove ASAT weapons.

#### The United States Federal Government should repeal the Wolf Amendment.

#### The Counterplan competes – it re-directs China’s commercial space industry to productive cooperation with the United States. The 1AC said that China’s government is reliant on private action meaning the Plan collapses all of the space sector meaning meaningful cooperation with the US becomes impossible.

#### Cooperation de-escalates the Space Race, solves Sino-Russian axis, and spills-over to broader US-China relations

Marshall and Hadfield 21 Will Marshall and Chris Hadfield 4-15-2021 "Why the U.S. and China Should Collaborate in Space" <https://time.com/5954941/u-s-china-should-collaborate-in-space/> (CEO of Planet which operates 200 satellites that image the entire Earth landmass on a daily basis, and he formerly worked at NASA on lunar missions and space debris. Colonel Chris Hadfield was Commander of the International Space Station and flew both the U.S. Space Shuttle and Russian Soyuz vehicles. Prior to that he served as a fighter/test pilot with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force.)//Elmer

While much has been made of the tense March 18 exchange between American and Chinese diplomats in Anchorage, Alaska, one area became an unlikely candidate for cooperation: outer space. During a press conference after the meeting, Jake Sullivan, the U.S. National Security Advisor, pointed out that the Perseverance rover that recently landed on Mars “wasn’t just an American project. It had technology from multiple countries from Europe and other parts of the world.” China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, seized the opportunity to say that, “China would welcome it if there is a will to carry out similar cooperation from the United States with us.” Planned or not, Yang’s comment gave voice to one very smart way two geopolitical rivals sharing the same planet could work together despite their growing tensions. Space exploration has long been used to foster deep cooperation, even between adversaries. During the height of the Cold War, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. jointly undertook the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission, which both served as a means of political rapprochement and opened the possibility of cooperation in other areas. Those links endured. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was invited to partner in the construction of the International Space Station (ISS). It was a multi-layered act that went beyond simple generosity; the more work former Soviet scientists had to do designing and building the ISS, the less likely they’d be to sell their expertise to other countries. Today, Sino-American space cooperation is similarly desirable. It could improve ties as it did for the U.S. and Russia, de-escalate an emerging Sino-Russian axis in space, and serve as a bargaining chip to help sustain other areas of cooperation. While China and the U.S. seem to clash on virtually every issue, space, by its nature, is different. Orbit isn’t a high-ground that one can seize. Instead, space works like a commons, where for any one state or company to be able to operate safely, all have to act responsibly. We need peaceful cooperation to enjoy its benefits. One reason not to cooperate in space with a geopolitical rival is technology transfer. There are legitimate concerns that collaboration could lead to technology sharing that unfairly advances China. Indeed, in 2011, the U.S. Congress included a passage, known as the Wolf Amendment, in an appropriations bill, forbidding NASA from cooperating in any way with China for fear of technological theft or espionage. The reasoning was straightforward: The U.S. enjoys significant leadership in some space technologies, including satellites, and much of that technology is proprietary, shared with no other countries. In the area of human spaceflight, however, things are different. The U.S. has extensively shared the entire ISS program for decades with the fourteen partner nations, including Russia. If there ever were secrets there, they are secrets no more. In fact, Russia and the U.S. as partners saved the day between 2011, after the space shuttles were grounded, and 2021, when the U.S. regained the ability to transport astronauts to space. During that decade, Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft served as the only way to get crews to and from the station. At the same time, uncrewed American resupply ships similarly helped keep the ISS viable when the Russian Soyuz fleet was grounded following mishaps. China has developed and proven a very successful human spaceflight program; adding their launch and spacecraft capability to the partnership would strengthen the overall mission. In order for China and the U.S. to work together in space, some things would have to change. First, the Wolf Amendment would have to be repealed—nothing meaningful can happen until that goes. Cooperation might then begin in lower profile areas such as sharing remote sensing data and reducing orbital debris. The United States and Europe have led the way with Landsat and Copernicus satellite programs providing free images of Earth that can be used to understand changes to our environment. The Chinese have yet to create a similar data share program for their Earth imaging systems—but they should. The United States and China could also discuss joint efforts to reduce the belt of space junk that circles the planet and threatens everyone’s satellites. Most importantly, cooperation could extend to joint human spaceflight missions; the US could invite China to conduct a crewed visit to the ISS, or to join in the human exploration of the Moon, targeted to happen in this decade and which both nations are now working on separately; the goal would be a joint Moon base rather than a space race. For decades, space travel has provided an opportunity for humans to see our world differently. Apollo 11 astronaut Michael Collins said, “The thing that really surprised me was that the Earth projected an air of fragility.” Chinese astronauts, since Yang Liwei’s first flight 18 years ago, have surely had a similar experience gazing down at our planet. Cooperating in space can give the United States and China the opportunity to change their thinking together. Bold American leadership can be a leveraged move in reducing tensions, as it was in keeping the Cold War cold—a win for all nations and our shared, blue-green planet.

#### US-China Relations key to prevent escalation – current US course turns status quo cold war hot.

Nye 21 Joseph Nye 3-3-2021 "The factors that could lead to war between the US and China" <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-factors-that-could-lead-to-war-between-the-us-and-china/> (professor at Harvard University and author)//Elmer

When China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, recently called for a reset of bilateral relations with the United States, a White House spokesperson replied that the US saw the relationship as one of strong competition that required a position of strength. It’s clear that President Joe Biden’s administration is not simply reversing Donald Trump’s policies. Some analysts, citing Thucydides’ attribution of the Peloponnesian War to Sparta’s fear of a rising Athens, believe the US–China relationship is entering a period of conflict pitting an established hegemon against an increasingly powerful challenger. I am not that pessimistic. In my view, economic and ecological interdependence reduces the probability of a real cold war, much less a hot one, because both countries have an incentive to cooperate in a number of areas. At the same time, miscalculation is always possible and some see the danger of ‘sleepwalking’ into catastrophe, as happened with World War I. History is replete with cases of misperception about changing power balances. For example, when US President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, he wanted to balance what he saw as a growing Soviet threat to a declining America. But what Nixon interpreted as decline was really the return to normal of America’s artificially high share of global output after World War II. Nixon proclaimed multipolarity, but what followed was the end of the Soviet Union and America’s unipolar moment two decades later. Today, some Chinese analysts underestimate America’s resilience and predict Chinese dominance but this, too, could turn out to be a dangerous miscalculation. It is equally dangerous for Americans to over- or underestimate Chinese power, and the US contains groups with economic and political incentives to do both. Measured in dollars, China’s economy is about two-thirds the size of that of the US, but many economists expect China to surpass the US sometime in the 2030s, depending on what one assumes about Chinese and American growth rates. Will American leaders acknowledge this change in a way that permits a constructive relationship, or will they succumb to fear? Will Chinese leaders take more risks, or will Chinese and Americans learn to cooperate in producing global public goods under a changing distribution of power? Recall that Thucydides attributed the war that ripped apart the ancient Greek world to two causes: the rise of a new power and the fear that this created in the established power. The second cause is as important as the first. The US and China must avoid exaggerated fears that could create a new cold or hot war. Even if China surpasses the US to become the world’s largest economy, national income is not the only measure of geopolitical power. China ranks well behind the US in soft power and US military expenditure is nearly four times that of China. While Chinese military capabilities have been increasing in recent years, analysts who look carefully at the military balance conclude that China will not, say, be able to exclude the US from the Western Pacific. On the other hand, the US was once the world’s largest trading economy and its largest bilateral lender. Today, nearly 100 countries count China as their largest trading partner, compared to 57 for the US. China plans to lend more than US$1 trillion for infrastructure projects with its Belt and Road Initiative over the next decade, while the US has cut back aid. China will gain economic power from the sheer size of its market as well as its overseas investments and development assistance. China’s overall power relative to the US is likely to increase. Nonetheless, balances of power are hard to judge. The US will retain some long-term power advantages that contrast with areas of Chinese vulnerability. One is geography. The US is surrounded by oceans and neighbours that are likely to remain friendly. China has borders with 14 countries, and territorial disputes with India, Japan and Vietnam set limits on its hard and soft power. Energy is another area where America has an advantage. A decade ago, the US was dependent on imported energy, but the shale revolution transformed North America from energy importer to exporter. At the same time, China became more dependent on energy imports from the Middle East, which it must transport along sea routes that highlight its problematic relations with India and other countries. The US also has demographic advantages. It is the only major developed country that is projected to hold its global ranking (third) in terms of population. While the rate of US population growth has slowed in recent years, it will not turn negative, as in Russia, Europe, and Japan. China, meanwhile, rightly fears ‘growing old before it grows rich.’ China’s labour force peaked in 2015 and India will soon overtake it as the world’s most populous country. America also remains at the forefront in key technologies (bio, nano and information) that are central to 21st-century economic growth. China is investing heavily in research and development, and competes well in some fields. But 15 of the world’s top 20 research universities are in the US; none is in China. Those who proclaim Pax Sinica and American decline fail to take account of the full range of power resources. American hubris is always a danger but so is exaggerated fear, which can lead to overreaction. Equally dangerous is rising Chinese nationalism, which, combined with a belief in American decline, leads China to take greater risks. Both sides must beware of miscalculation. After all, more often than not, the greatest risk we face is our own capacity for error.

#### US-China War goes Nuclear.

Brands and Beckley 21 Hal Brands and Michael Beckley 12-16-2021 "Washington Is Preparing for the Wrong War With China" https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-12-16/washington-preparing-wrong-war-china (Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute)//Elmer

The United States is getting serious about the threat of war with China. The U.S. Department of Defense has labeled China its primary adversary, civilian leaders have directed the military to develop credible plans to defend Taiwan, and President Joe Biden has strongly implied that the United States would not allow that island democracy to be conquered. Yet Washington may be preparing for the wrong kind of war. Defense planners appear to believe that they can win a short conflict in the Taiwan Strait merely by blunting a Chinese invasion. Chinese leaders, for their part, seem to envision rapid, paralyzing strikes that break Taiwanese resistance and present the United States with a fait accompli. Both sides would prefer a splendid little war in the western Pacific, but that is not the sort of war they would get. A war over Taiwan is likely to be long rather than short, regional rather than local, and much easier to start than to end. It would expand and escalate, as both countries look for paths to victory in a conflict neither side can afford to lose. It would also present severe dilemmas for peacemaking and high risks of going nuclear. If Washington doesn’t start preparing to wage, and then end, a protracted conflict now, it could face catastrophe once the shooting starts. IMPENDING SLUGFEST A U.S.-Chinese war over Taiwan would begin with a bang. China’s military doctrine emphasizes coordinated operations to “paralyze the enemy in one stroke.” In the most worrying scenario, Beijing would launch a surprise missile attack, hammering not only Taiwan’s defenses but also the naval and air forces that the United States has concentrated at a few large bases in the western Pacific. Simultaneous Chinese cyberattacks and antisatellite operations would sow chaos and hinder any effective U.S. or Taiwanese response. And the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would race through the window of opportunity, staging amphibious and airborne assaults that would overwhelm Taiwanese resistance. By the time the United States was ready to fight, the war would effectively be over. The Pentagon’s planning increasingly revolves around preventing this scenario, by hardening and dispersing the U.S. military presence in Asia, encouraging Taiwan to field asymmetric capabilities that can inflict a severe toll on Chinese attackers, and developing the ability to blunt the PLA’s offensive capabilities and sink an invasion fleet. This planning is predicated on the critical assumption that the early weeks, if not days, of fighting would determine whether a free Taiwan survives. Yet whatever happens at the outset, a conflict almost certainly wouldn’t end quickly. Most great-power wars since the Industrial Revolution have lasted longer than expected, because modern states have the resources to fight on even when they suffer heavy losses. Moreover, in hegemonic wars—clashes for dominance between the world’s strongest states—the stakes are high, and the price of defeat may seem prohibitive. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, wars between leading powers—the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the world wars—were protracted slugfests. A U.S.-Chinese war would likely follow this pattern. If the United States managed to beat back a Chinese assault against Taiwan, Beijing wouldn’t simply give up. Starting a war over Taiwan would be an existential gamble: admitting defeat would jeopardize the regime’s legitimacy and President Xi Jinping’s hold on power. It would also leave China more vulnerable to its enemies and destroy its dreams of regional primacy. Continuing a hard fight against the United States would be a nasty prospect, but quitting while China was behind would seem even worse. Washington would also be inclined to fight on if the war were not going well. Like Beijing, it would view a war over Taiwan as a fight for regional dominance. The fact that such a war would probably begin with a Pearl Harbor–style missile attack on U.S. bases would make it even harder for an outraged American populace and its leaders to accept defeat. Even if the United States failed to prevent Chinese forces from seizing Taiwan, it couldn’t easily bow out of the war. Quitting without first severely damaging Chinese air and naval power in Asia would badly weaken Washington’s reputation, as well as its ability to defend remaining allies in the region. Both sides would have the capacity to keep fighting, moreover. The United States could summon ships, planes, and submarines from other theaters and use its command of the Pacific beyond the first island chain—which runs from Japan in the north through Taiwan and the Philippines to the south—to conduct sustained attacks on Chinese forces. For its part, China could dispatch its surviving air, naval, and missile forces for a second and third assault on Taiwan and press its maritime militia of coast guard and fishing vessels into service. Both the United States and China would emerge from these initial clashes bloodied but not exhausted, increasing the likelihood of a long, ugly war. BIGGER, LONGER, MESSIER When great-power wars drag on, they get bigger, messier, and more intractable. Any conflict between the United States and China is likely to force both countries to mobilize their economies for war. After the initial salvos, both sides would hurry to replace munitions, ships, submarines, and aircraft lost in the early days of fighting. This race would strain both countries’ industrial bases, require the reorientation of their economies, and invite nationalist appeals—or government compulsion—to mobilize the populace to support a long fight. Long wars also escalate as the combatants look for new sources of leverage. Belligerents open new fronts and rope additional allies into the fight. They expand their range of targets and worry less about civilian casualties. Sometimes they explicitly target civilians, whether by bombing cities or torpedoing civilian ships. And they use naval blockades, sanctions, and embargoes to starve the enemy into submission. As China and the United States unloaded on each other with nearly every tool at their disposal, a local war could turn into a whole-of-society brawl that spans multiple regions. Bigger wars demand more grandiose aims. The greater the sacrifices required to win, the better the ultimate peace deal must be to justify those sacrifices. What began as a U.S. campaign to defend Taiwan could easily turn into an effort to render China incapable of new aggression by completely destroying its offensive military power. Conversely, as the United States inflicted more damage on China, Beijing’s war aims could grow from conquering Taiwan to pushing Washington out of the western Pacific altogether. All of this would make forging peace more difficult. The expansion of war aims narrows the diplomatic space for a settlement and produces severe bloodshed that fuels intense hatred and mistrust. Even if U.S. and Chinese leaders grew weary of fighting, they might still struggle to find a mutually acceptable peace. GOING NUCLEAR A war between China and the United States would differ from previous hegemonic wars in one fundamental respect: both sides have nuclear weapons. This would create disincentives to all-out escalation, but it could also, paradoxically, compound the dangers inherent in a long war. For starters, both sides might feel free to shoot off their conventional arsenals under the assumption that their nuclear arsenals would shield them from crippling retaliation. Scholars call this the “stability-instability paradox,” whereby blind faith in nuclear deterrence risks unleashing a massive conventional war. Chinese military writings often suggest that the PLA could wipe out U.S. bases and aircraft carriers in East Asia while China’s nuclear arsenal deterred U.S. attacks on the Chinese mainland. On the flip side, some American strategists have called for pounding Chinese mainland bases at the outset of a conflict in the belief that U.S. nuclear superiority would deter China from responding in kind. Far from preventing a major war, nuclear weapons could catalyze one. Once that war is underway, it could plausibly go nuclear in three distinct ways. Whichever side is losing might use tactical nuclear weapons—low-yield warheads that could destroy specific military targets without obliterating the other side’s homeland—to turn the tide. That was how the Pentagon planned to halt a Soviet invasion of central Europe during the Cold War, and it is what North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia have suggested they would do if they were losing a war today. If China crippled U.S. conventional forces in East Asia, the United States would have to decide whether to save Taiwan by using tactical nuclear weapons against Chinese ports, airfields, or invasion fleets. This is no fantasy: the U.S. military is already developing nuclear-tipped, submarine-launched cruise missiles that could be used for such purposes. China might also use nuclear weapons to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. The PLA has embarked on an unprecedented expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and PLA officers have written that China could use nuclear weapons if a conventional war threatened the survival of its government or nuclear arsenal—which would almost surely be the case if Beijing was losing a war over Taiwan. Perhaps these unofficial claims are bluffs. Yet it is not difficult to imagine that if China faced the prospect of humiliating defeat, it might fire off a nuclear weapon (perhaps at or near the huge U.S. military base on Guam) to regain a tactical advantage or shock Washington into a cease-fire. As the conflict drags on, either side could also use the ultimate weapon to end a grinding war of attrition. During the Korean War, American leaders repeatedly contemplated dropping nuclear bombs on China to force it to accept a cease-fire. Today, both countries would have the option of using limited nuclear strikes to compel a stubborn opponent to concede. The incentives to do so could be strong, given that whichever side pulls the nuclear trigger first might gain a major advantage. A final route to nuclear war is inadvertent escalation. Each side, knowing that escalation is a risk, may try to limit the other’s nuclear options. The United States could, for instance, try to sink China’s ballistic missile submarines before they hide in the deep waters beyond the first island chain. Yet such an attack could put China in a “use it or lose it” situation with regard to its nuclear forces, especially if the United States also struck China’s land-based missiles and communication systems, which intermingle conventional and nuclear forces. In this scenario, China’s leaders might use their nuclear weapons rather than risk losing that option altogether.

# Case

### Russo-China Advantage

#### China-Russia coop solves nuclear war

Artyom Lukin 20 {Artyom Lukin is Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University. He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. 6-13-2020. “The Russia–China entente and its future.” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7}//JM

China and Russia are the two largest—and neighboring—powers of continental Eurasia. Can two tigers share the same mountain, especially when one great power is rapidly gaining strength and the other is in relative decline? And there seems to be a pattern in the history of international relations that two ambitious major powers that share a land border are less likely to make an alliance, while they are more likely to engage in territorial disputes with one another as well as rivalry over primacy in their common neighborhood. There are at least three major parts of Eurasia—East Asia, the post-Soviet space (mainly Central Asia), and the Arctic—where China’s and Russia’s geopolitical interests intersect, creating potential for competition and conflict. But, on the other hand, if managed wisely, overlapping interests and stakes can also generate opportunities for collaboration. The following sections examine how Russia and China are managing to keep their differences in key Eurasian zones under control while displaying a significant degree of mutual cooperation. East Asia This is China’s ‘home region’, but also one where Russia, by virtue of possessing the Far Eastern territories, is a resident power. Moscow, which has traditionally been concerned with keeping sovereignty over its vulnerable Far East, does not at present see China as a major security risk on Russia’s eastern borders. All border delimitation issues between Moscow and Beijing were resolved in the 1990s and 2000s, while the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty explicitly states that the two countries have no territorial claims to each other. Furthermore, Moscow is well aware that Chinese military preparations are directed primarily toward Taiwan, the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, not against the Russian Far East. There is the cliché, persistent among the Western media and commentariat, of a Chinese demographic invasion of the Russian Far East. For example, a Wall Street Journal article claimed recently that ‘about 300,000 Chinese, some unregistered, could now be settled in Russia’s Far East’ (Simmons 2019). In reality, the actual number of the Chinese who live more or less permanently in the Russian Far East is far lower, and there are very few cases of illegal Chinese migration. There is no imminent risk of the Russian Far East falling under Chinese control demographically or otherwise. Not sensing any major Chinese menace to the Russian Far East, Russia has refused to engage in rivalry with China in East Asia. On the most important issues of contemporary East Asian geopolitics Moscow has tended to support Beijing or displayed friendly neutrality. On the Korean Peninsula, Moscow has largely played second fiddle to Beijing. On the South China Sea disputes, although Russia’s official stance is strict neutrality, some Russian moves may be seen as favoring Beijing. For example, following the July 2016 Hague tribunal ruling that rejected China’s claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea, Putin expressed solidarity with China, calling the international court’s decision ‘counterproductive’ (Reuters 2016). Russia shares with China the objective of reducing American influence in East Asia and undermining the US-centric alliances in the region. Russian weapon sales are helping China alter the military balance in the Western Pacific to the detriment of the USA and its allies. Russia’s decision to assist China with getting its own missile attack early warning system may have also been partly motivated by the desire to strengthen China vis-à-vis the USA in their rivalry for primacy in East Asia. The Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov hinted as much by saying that this strategic system will ‘cardinally increase stability and security in East Asia’ (TASS 2019c). Russian deference to China on East Asian issues, albeit somewhat hurting Moscow’s great-power pride, makes geopolitical sense. The Kremlin treats Pacific affairs as an area of lower concern than Europe, the Middle East, or Central Asia. Mongolia, which constitutes Siberia’s underbelly, is the only East Asian nation that can count on Russian security protection in case it finds itself in danger of external aggression, at any rate a purely theoretical possibility so far. It would be incorrect to say that Russia has completely withdrawn from East Asian geopolitics. In some cases, Russia does act against Chinese wishes in the Asia–Pacific. One recent example is Russia’s quiet determination to keep drilling in the areas of the South China Sea on the Vietnamese continental shelf over which China lays sovereignty claims. The Russian state-owned energy company Rosneft operates on Vietnam’s shelf, despite Beijing’s displeasure and periodic harassment by Chinese ships (Zhou 2019). Apart from the desire to make profits from the South China Sea’s hydrocarbons, Russia may be seeking to support its old-time friend Vietnam—to whom it also sells weapons—as well as demonstrate that it is still an independent actor in East Asia. Through such behavior on China’s Southeast Asian periphery, the Kremlin could also be sending the signal to Beijing that, if China gets too closely involved in Russia’s backyard, such as Central Asia or the Caucasus, Russia can do similar things in China’s. Albeit a friction point between Beijing and Moscow, the activities by Russian energy firms in the South China Sea are unlikely to destabilize the Sino-Russian entente, since Moscow and Beijing need each other on much bigger issues. The post-Soviet space Russia has vital stakes in the geopolitical space formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and is willing to go to great lengths to defend those interests. It was, after all, a perceived brazen attempt by Brussels and Washington to draw Ukraine into the EU’s and NATO’s orbit that induced Moscow to take drastic action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, causing a rupture with the West. When it comes to Moscow–Beijing politics over the post-Soviet space, the most problematic question is certainly about Central Asia, a region composed of five former Soviet republics which shares borders with both Russia and China. Since the nineteenth century, Russia has traditionally considered Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, in the 2000s China began its economic expansion in the region. It is now by far the biggest trade partner for Central Asian states (Bhutia 2019) as well as its largest source of investments. China also set up a small military presence inside Tajikistan, apparently to secure a sensitive area which borders China’s Xinjiang region and Afghanistan (Lo 2019).

#### Space weapon deployment doesn’t cause an arms race or increase chance of war

Lopez 12 [LAURA DELGADO LO´ PEZ, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Arlington, Virginia. Astropolitics. "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391]

The previous discussion demonstrates that although a globalized space arms race could follow U.S. deployment of space weapons, it is also plausible and more likely that it may not happen at all. As Mueller states: ‘‘In the end, most of the inevitability arguments are weak.’’62 The assumptions discussed here break the argument into a series of debatable maxims that other scholars have also considered. Hays, for instance, counters the inevitability argument by pointing out that previous ASAT tests did not have this purported destabilizing effect, to which we can add that even after the Chinese ASAT test, neither Russia nor the United States, who would be both capable and more politically likely to launch space weapons, moved forward in that direction.63 Although some may draw attention to the recent wake-up calls in order to underline a sense of urgency, one should also recall that when it seemed truly inevitable before, it did not happen either. In his detailed account of military space developments from 1945 to 1984, Paul Stares described how superpowers’ assessment of the value of space weapons shifted, with a ‘‘hiatus in testing’’ reflecting the attractiveness of satellites as military targets.64 In this changed landscape, Stares also assumed the inevitability argument, claiming that ‘‘the chances of space remaining a ‘sanctuary’ [absence of weapons] into the 21st century appear today to be remote.’’65 Perhaps the conditions are more conducive now, but the important point to be reiterated is that the outcome is not inevitable, and that any such prediction must be undertaken with caution. One of the most prominent theorists to propose an alternate picture and pair it with an aggressive pro-space weapons stance is Everett Dolman. In his Astropolitik theory, Dolman summarizes the steps that the United States must take to assume control of space, particularly through withdrawal from the current space regime.66 This move, he argues, would benefit not only the United States, but also the rest of the world, since having a democracy controlling space is a catalyst for peace.67 Elsewhere, he writes: ‘‘Only a liberal world hegemon would be able to practice the restraint necessary to maintain its preponderant balance of hegemonic power without resorting to an attempt at empire.’’68 Accordingly, he believes that this strategy would be ‘‘perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing U.S. hegemony,’’69 but that other countries, correctly assessing U.S. leadership in space, would not seek to deploy their own systems. Having the ability to prevent the stationing of foreign weapons systems in space, he writes, ‘‘makes the possibility of large-scale space war and a military space race less likely, not more.’’70 In fact, he says, ‘‘to suggest that the inevitable result is a space arms competition is the worst kind of mirror-imaging.’’71 Dolman argues that the weaponization of space by the United States would ‘‘decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting spending away from conventional weapons systems,’’ which would reduce U.S. capabilities in territorial occupation and would thus be perceived as less threatening to other countries.72

#### No space war, and no impact if it does happen

Handberg 17 Roger Handberg 17, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, 2017, “Is space war imminent? Exploring the possibility,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 36, No. 5, p. 413-425

The assumption made is that space war will be successfully waged in both the heavens and on the Earth itself. This assumption, however, is grounded on several hypotheticals occurring. First, that total devastating strategic surprise can be achieved—the side attacked becomes so damaged and devastated that further resistance is impossible to sustain regardless of national will, since nuclear weapons overhang the entire enterprise. The analogy usually invoked for American audiences is a “Pearl Harbor” type attack. This scenario is premised on equivalent American incompetence and lack of readiness as exhibited in December 1941. One must note that Pearl Harbor ended as a strategic failure for Japan—it led to defeat because the attack mobilized U.S. power without hesitation, given the intense political divisions over whether to enter the worldwide conflicts already raging. The attack was a military failure because Navy carriers were not destroyed along with battleship row along with critical fuel facilities. Similar analogies invoke September 11, 2001 as the prototype for such attacks more recently, but the same caveats apply. Total surprise assumes that all relevant opponent systems and civilian assets are disabled and left vulnerable to follow on attacks. In fact, collapse of U.S. defenses leaves U.S. cities as hostages to the rulers of the heavens, or vice versa if the U.S. moves first. Space war is extremely destabilizing, as will be discussed, since survivability of one's strategic assets becomes problematic. Second, surprise requires that sufficient offensive space assets be placed in orbit without triggering a response by other states—the scale of such technology deployment is in itself possibly self-defeating given high costs and a likely lack of launch capacity. In addition, much launch capacity is now international rather than national, so maintaining secrecy becomes even more difficult. Space as an operational environment suffers from excessive transparency, meaning any launches can be monitored and tracked by others with strong evidence as to what is being deployed. One must remember that the original satellite launches in the 1950s were accurately tracked by a British grade-school class as a science project. In addition, at least since the early 1960s, remote sensing has increased exponentially the global capability to detect buildup of military assets of differing types, whether in space or on the ground. Commercial remote-sensing capabilities further enhance the capacity to detect militarily relevant actions. For example, commercial imagery is accessed by private parties to monitor the North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs, in effect expanding the capacity of the world to look in on various states' interior regions, scanning for relevant information, including weapons buildup and launch capabilities. Even construction of physical facilities for production of space assets or for other weaponry can be monitored, making surprise more difficult but not impossible, as demonstrated in earlier monitoring of North Korea and, in 1998, the nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India. That means if the ASAT weapons come from ground locations, there is a high probability that they can be detected but no guarantee exists that detection will in fact occur. The uncertainty will impact calculations of attack success. Third, the most obvious initial attack of space-based assets will most likely come from cyber attacks, given that such actions do not necessarily require the scale of resources necessary for other modalities such as kinetic weapons, or even lasers or other energy-type weapons. One will have to position the weapons plus the infrastructure to permit rapid recycling of the weapons for the next attack. Firing off interceptors will likely be a one-off, meaning extremely precise targeting will be required if the attack is to be successful. Note that none of these systems require that individuals be placed in Earth orbit, despite the imagery describing such operations in fictional universes. Deployment requires a large lift capacity for initial deployment plus replenishment of destroyed or inoperative space assets, since a space conflict assumes that assets will be lost either kinetically or be compromised by cyber or energy beams. In any case, the combatants must be able to recover their capabilities lost during the conflict; failure to do would mean defeat or at least stalemate, negating the reason for the attack. That raises a major question when one considers the problem or expectation that space war can be successfully conducted or defended. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) remains a critical weak point for all potential space-war participants. Loss of space assets occurs routinely during operations, but actual combat losses can be exponential depending on the weaponry used, and replacing those losses becomes the race to the next level after the initial exchange or combat. Unfortunately, ORS remains a major weakness of the United States and likely other states; deploying replacement satellites remains a multiyear process, while launch capabilities are scheduled long in advance. The rise of multiple private-launch competitors may partially alleviate some of the delay but that remains problematic given that the military payloads may be competing with commercial vendors also trying to replace losses. The tradeoff is that. in principle, private-launch vendors may be able to do so more cheaply, but their capacity may be saturated by demand from the civil and commercial sectors, leaving few “uncommitted” launch options for military purposes. Normally this is not an issue, but the available launch options may be third party rather than national-flag carriers, which raises severe security concerns. Fourth, several other assumptions become essential to make the strategy work, including that such an attack does not render Earth orbit so debris-saturated that further military space operations become impossible to sustain. Also, damage to civilian space assets remains, such that their continuation is possible if undamaged replacements can be quickly reintroduced to restart economically critical operations. Globalization has been fostered through satellite technologies. Their disruption can be devastating for all parties, regardless of who is the winner or the loser. What may occur is the graveyard of the modern economic system. No potential space participants would be immune to the damage, regardless of whether or not they were participants in the actual conflict. Fifth, there must be no difficulty in separating potential targets from the enemy, allied states, and nonbelligerent states. This creates a situation in which the spread of space technologies globally complicates actions, expanding the range of participants beyond the combatants, much like earlier wars at sea, where there were the combatants' ships, along with those of nonbelligerents, including neutrals whom the combatants struggled to draw into the conflict on their side, or at least to render their services unavailable to the other side. The earliest discussion of space conflict was premised on Cold War analogies, meaning two major combatants, either U.S.–Russia, or U.S–-China, or even a three-way war. Presently, analyses focus on a bilateral conflict with the U.S. opposed to China and Russia. Whether that would occur is obviously unknown, despite political rhetoric about a Eurasia coalition of likeminded states. What it does is multiply the number of potential targets and complicates reactions to neutrals' actions to protect their interests or assets. The distinction between combatants and neutrals or third parties will be possibly blurred beyond separation. The byproduct of a kinetic space conflict is massive amounts of space debris, destroying or damaging most space assets regardless of their state sponsor or nationality. Initial attacks may be focused and precise, but the result is still the same. The debris generated by armed conflict will endure beyond the immediate clash. The obvious alternative is a strictly electronic attack on space assets' operating systems, leaving the satellites in orbit, although without the ability to move them or control possible erratic changes in orbit due to collisions with other space debris. Other forms space war will take Reality is more complicated—kinetic action produces debris, the ultimate deterrent to actual space war. Therefore, space war could likely track several distinct phases. The first is cyber attacks, which disable or destroy the working systems of the spacecraft or the ground-support network—in effect, a series of stealth attacks. Civilian satellites are extremely soft targets—defense requires a capacity to detect and analyze any attack on the spacecraft, not available presently for most commercial spacecraft due to cost considerations. Otherwise, one could use nuclear weapons to create electromagnetic pulses (EMP) which can fry unprotected electronics both in space and on the ground, depending on where the weapons are detonated. Interestingly, space war scenarios have some territorial war aspects in that any attacks on space assets will devastate both military and civilian targets without distinction between the war participants and civilians. Similar to unrestricted submarine warfare, all targets in the relevant area will become casualties or otherwise impacted in their operations. Second, attacks that are conducted against the ground down links and/or communications systems, leaving the spacecraft without guidance or instructions, and also no information is returned to the commanders even if the satellites survive the initial onslaught. These can involve kinetic attacks against specific locations or insertion of special operations forces to render the facility inoperative. For example, antennas can be disabled or destroyed, disrupting operations until new facilities are brought online. Other alternatives could include kinetic weapons launched from space, “rods from God.”20 Air strike packages could include electronic warfare elements capable of scrambling or disrupting operations of such facilities even prior to physical strikes against the targets. Spacecraft not destroyed or disabled in the initial two stages of the attack can be directly attacked by “dazzling” their receivers, with laser impulses destroying the receivers for which there are few replacements without replacing the spacecraft physically. Third, rapid replacement of inoperative satellites, regardless of the reasons, does not occur, which translates into a race for the third, possibly end, phase of the war, replenishment. Inability to replace losses may mean that none of the combatants are able to dominate in the end, meaning conventional conflict may be the outcome, although issues of global reach may confine conflicts to relatively small areas. In previous conventional conflicts, large-scale forces were moved, albeit slowly, across the globe to the conflict, i.e., Desert Shield morphing into Desert Storm after a nearly six-month buildup.

### ASATs Advantage

#### Vote Neg on Zero I/L – ASAT’s aren’t private actor space appropriation – this means the Plan can’t solve anything.

#### a] Outer Space means above the atmosphere.

Howell 17 Elizabeth Howell 6-7-2017 "What is Space?" <https://www.space.com/24870-what-is-space.html> (Ph.D., is a contributing writer for Space.com since 2012. As a proud Trekkie and Canadian, she tackles topics like spaceflight, diversity, science fiction, astronomy and gaming to help others explore the universe. Elizabeth's on-site reporting includes two human spaceflight launches from Kazakhstan, and embedded reporting from a simulated Mars mission in Utah. She holds a Ph.D. and M.Sc. in Space Studies from the University of North Dakota, and a Bachelor of Journalism from Canada's Carleton University.)//Elmer

From the perspective of an Earthling, outer space is a zone that occurs about 100 kilometers (60 miles) above the planet, where there is no appreciable air to breathe or to scatter light. In that area, blue gives way to black because oxygen molecules are not in enough abundance to make the sky blue.

#### China’s ASAT’s are located on the ground.

Erwin 20 Sandra Erwin 9-1-2020 "Pentagon report: China amassing arsenal of anti-satellite weapons" <https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-china-amassing-arsenal-of-anti-satellite-weapons/> (Sandra Erwin writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector. She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense.)//Elmer

WASHINGTON — China is progressing with the development of missiles and electronic weapons that could target satellites in low and high orbits, the Pentagon says in a new report released Sept. 1. China already has operational ground-based missiles that can hit satellites in low-Earth orbit and “probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit,” says the Defense Department’s annual report to Congress on China’s military capabilities. DoD has been required by law to submit this report since 2000. The Pentagon says Chinese military strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems and to deny them to adversaries as central to modern warfare. China for years has continued to “strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space,” the report says. China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new anti-satellite weapons programs since it confirmed it used an ASAT missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007, but the nation has been steadily advancing in this area, the report says. So-called counterspace capabilities developed by China include kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, orbiting space robots and space surveillance to monitor objects across the globe and in space.

#### b] Private entity are non-governmental.

Dunk 11 Von Der Dunk, Frans G. "1. The Origins Of Authorisation: Article VI Of The Outer Space Treaty And International Space Law." National Space Legislation in Europe. Brill Nijhoff, 2011. 3-28. (University of Nebraska)//Elmer

4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enterprise in this context. Contrary to the version o fthe concept applicable under general international law, where 'direct state responsibility' only pertained to acts somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under 'indirect', 'due care' / 'due diligence' responsibility18, Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the state's own ("whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies" ...) or those of private actors (... "or by non-governmental entities"). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its compliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key principles being left undefined.

#### China’s ASATs are operated by the Strategic Support Force – proven by 1AC Chow and Kelley.

#### The SSF is a governmental entity – they’re not a private actor.

Pollpeter et Al 17 Pollpeter, Kevin L., Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham. The creation of the PLA strategic support force and its implications for Chinese Military Space Operations. RAND Corporation Santa Monica United States, 2017. (Analyst at Rand)//Elmer

This report explores the missions and organization of China's military space enterprise, focusing on the organizational structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF). Created on December 31, 2015, as part of a major reorganization of China's military, the SSF is charged with developing and employing most of the PLA's space capabilities. Its creation signifies a shift in the PLA's prioritization of space and an increased role for PLA space capabilities. Chinese military strategists see military space capabilities and operations as a key component of strategic deterrence, critical to enabling the PLA to fight informatized local wars and counter U.S. military intervention in the region and essential for supporting operations aimed at protecting China's emerging interests in more-distant parts of the world. The main function of the SSF's space component appears to be the launch and operation of satellites to provide the PLA with command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It appears that information warfare, including space warfare, long identified by PLA analysts as a critical element of future military operations, has entered a new phase of development in which an emphasis on space and information warfare, long-range precision strikes, and the requirements associated with conducting operations at greater distances from China has necessitated the establishment of a new and different type of organization.

#### This means the Aff doesn’t effect ASATs – they will say Commercial Sectors produce them, that’s irrelevant since the PLA operates them as an act of appropriation which isn’t effected by the plan.

#### Russia thumps ASATs – specifically challenges US dominance – takes out 1AC Weichart which says “China and Russia”

Miller & Fontaine 17 [Jim Miller is President of Adaptive Strategies, LLC, which provides consulting to private sector clients on strategy development and implementation, international engagement, and technology issues. He serves on the Board of Directors for the Atlantic Council, and on the Board of Advisors for Endgame, Inc. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Defense Science Board. Richard Fontaine is the Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served as President of CNAS from 2012 to 2019 and as a Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow from 2009-2012. Prior to CNAS, he was foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain for more than five years. He has also worked at the State Department, the National Security Council and on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 9/19. "A New Era in U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability." https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/a-new-era-in-u-s-russian-strategic-stability]

Space has long been a domain used by militaries. In recent years, however, the United States has considerably deepened its reliance on space for the full range of military activities. Russia has taken note and has begun developing more substantial counter-space capabilities of varying types.59 As U.S. defense leaders have made clear, the United States will need to continue to leverage space for its warfighting and intelligence purposes, just as it becomes a far more contested domain in light of Russian (and others’) counter-space capabilities.

Particularly important in this context is the fact that space may be a classically unstable domain in that it appears highly offense-dominant under current technological and deployment conditions. Given U.S. reliance on space, Russia may have strong incentives to strike early in a conflict – or even during a deep crisis – in order to disable or weaken U.S. space contributions to effective power projection, before the United States can take steps to defend against such capabilities. This is particularly important because the United States relies on its space architecture for crucial nuclear command, control, and communications; missile early warning; and other strategic-related functions. Such functions are not necessarily clearly disaggregated from conventional warfighting functions in the U.S. space architecture. There is therefore a high potential for rapid escalation to the strategic level should war carry into space, as it appears likely it would in the event of U.S.-Russian conflict.

#### No liberal order or SOI impact - states won’t risk war, err towards isolation, AND mediate ties economically.

Mueller 21 [John; February 17; Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies; The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, “The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran,” Ch. 6]

Complacency, Appeasement, Self-destruction, and the New Cold War It could be argued that the policies proposed here to deal with the international problems, whether real or imagined, presented by China, Russia, and Iran constitute exercises not only in complacency, but also in appeasement. That argument would be correct. As discussed in the Prologue to this book, appeasement can work to avoid military conflict as can be seen in the case of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As also discussed there, appeasement has been given a bad name by the experience with Hitler in 1938. Hitlers are very rare, but there are some resonances today in Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. Both are shrewd, determined, authoritarian, and seem to be quite intelligent, and both are fully in charge, are surrounded by sychophants, and appear to have essentially unlimited tenure in office. Moreover, both, like Hitler in the 1930s, are appreciated domestically for maintaining a stable political and economic environment. However, unlike Hitler, both run trading states and need a stable and essentially congenial international environment to flourish.128 Most importantly, except for China’s claim to Taiwan, neither seems to harbor Hitler-like dreams of extensive expansion by military means. Both are leading their countries in an illiberal direction which will hamper economic growth while maintaining a kleptocratic system. But this may be acceptable to populations enjoying historically high living standards and fearful of less stable alternatives. Both do seem to want to overcome what they view as past humiliations – ones going back to the opium war of 1839 in the case of China and to the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union in 1989–91 in the case of Russia. Primarily, both seem to want to be treated with respect and deference. Unlike Hitler’s Germany, however, both seem to be entirely appeasable. That scarcely seems to present or represent a threat. The United States, after all, continually declares itself to be the indispensable nation. If the United States is allowed to wallow in such self-important, childish, essentially meaningless, and decidedly fatuous proclamations, why should other nations be denied the opportunity to emit similar inconsequential rattlings? If that constitutes appeasement, so be it. If the two countries want to be able to say they now preside over a “sphere of influence,” it scarcely seems worth risking world war to somehow keep them from doing so – and if the United States were substantially disarmed, it would not have the capacity to even try. If China and Russia get off on self-absorbed pretensions about being big players, that should be of little concern – and their success rate is unlikely to be any better than that of the United States. Charap and Colton observe that “The Kremlin’s idee fixe that Russia needs to be the leader of a pack of post-Soviet states in order to be taken seriously as a global power broker is more of a feel-good mantra than a fact-based strategy, and it irks even the closest of allies.” And they further suggest that The towel should also be thrown in on the geo-ideational shadow-boxing over the Russian assertion of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia and the Western opposition to it. Would either side be able to specify what precisely they mean by a regional sphere of influence? How would it differ from, say, US relations with the western-hemisphere states or from Germany’s with its EU neighbors?129 Applying the Gingrich gospel, then, it certainly seems that, although China, Russia, and Iran may present some “challenges” to US policy, there is little or nothing to suggest a need to maintain a large US military force-in-being to keep these countries in line. Indeed, all three monsters seem to be in some stage of self-destruction or descent into stagnation – not, perhaps, unlike the Communist “threat” during the Cold War. Complacency thus seems to be a viable policy. However, it may be useful to look specifically at a couple of worst-case scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China (after it builds up its navy more) and an invasion of the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia by Russia. It is wildly unlikely that China or Russia would carry out such economically self-destructive acts: the economic lessons from Putin’s comparatively minor Ukraine gambit are clear, and these are unlikely to be lost on the Chinese. Moreover, the analyses of Michael Beckley certainly suggest that Taiwan has the conventional military capacity to concentrate the mind of, if not necessarily fully to deter, any Chinese attackers. It has “spent decades preparing for this exact contingency,” has an advanced early warning system, can call into action massed forces to defend “fortified positions on home soil with precision-guided munitions,” and has supply dumps, booby traps, an wide array of mobile missile launchers, artillery, and minelayers. In addition, there are only 14 locations that can support amphibious landing and these are, not surprisingly, well-fortified by the defenders.130 The United States may not necessarily be able to deter or stop military attacks on Taiwan or on the Baltics under its current force levels.131 And if it cannot credibly do so with military forces currently in being, it would not be able to do so, obviously, if its forces were much reduced. However, the most likely response in either eventuality would be for the United States to wage a campaign of economic and military (including naval) harassment and to support local – or partisan – resistance as it did in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion there in 1979. 132 Such a response does not require the United States to have, and perpetually to maintain, huge forces in place and at the ready to deal with such improbable eventualities. The current wariness about, and hostility toward, Russia and China is sometimes said to constitute “a new Cold War.”133 There are, of course, considerable differences. In particular, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union – indeed the whole international Communist movement – was under the sway of a Marxist theory that explicitly and determinedly advocated the destruction of capitalism and probably of democracy, and by violence to the degree required. Neither Russia nor China today sports such cosmic goals or is enamored of such destructive methods. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the United States was strongly inclined during the Cold War massively to inflate the threat that it imagined the Communist adversary to present. The current “new Cold War” is thus in an important respect quite a bit like the old one: it is an expensive, substantially militarized, and often hysterical campaign to deal with threats that do not exist or are likely to selfdestruct.134 It may also be useful to evaluate terms that are often bandied about in considerations within foreign policy circles about the rise of China, the assertiveness of Russia, and the antics of Iran. High among these is “hegemony.” Sorting through various definitions, Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow array several that seem to capture the essence of the concept: domination, controlling leadership, or the ability to shape international rules according to the hegemon’s own interests. Hegemony, then, is an extreme word suggesting supremacy, mastery, preponderant influence, and full control. Hegemons force others to bend to their will whether they like it or not. Reich and Lebow also include a mellower designation applied by John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan in which a hegemon is defined as an entity that has the ability to establish a set of norms that others willingly embrace.135 But this really seems to constitute an extreme watering-down of the word and suggests opinion leadership or entrepreneurship and success at persuasion, not hegemony. Moreover, insofar as they carry meaning, the militarized application of American primacy and hegemony to order the world has often been a fiasco.136 Indeed, it is impressive that the hegemon, endowed by definition by what Reich and Lebow aptly call a grossly disproportionate military capacity, has had such a miserable record of military achievement since 1945 – an issue discussed frequently in this book.137 Reich and Lebow argue that it is incumbent on IR scholars to cut themselves loose from the concept of hegemony.138 It seems even more important for the foreign policy establishment to do so. There is also absurdity in getting up tight over something as vacuous as the venerable “sphere of influence”