## 1

#### Interp: Debaters must not defend the hypothetical implementation of an explicit actor or action.

#### Resolved in LD means statement of values

UPitt ND University Of Pittsburgh Communications Services Webteam, copyright 2015-21, "Basic Definitions," Department of Communication , <https://www.comm.pitt.edu/basic-definitions> CHO

Affirmative/Pro. The side that “affirms” the resolution (is “pro” the issue). For example, the affirmative side in a debate using the resolution of policy, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens, would advocate for federal government implementation of a poverty reduction program. Argument. A statement, or claim, followed by a justification, or warrant. Justifications are responses to challenges, often linked by the word “because.” Example: The sun helps people, because the sun activates photosynthesis in plants, which produce oxygen so people can breathe. Constructive Speech. The first speeches in a debate, where the debaters “construct” their cases by presenting initial positions and arguments. Cross-examination. Question and answer sessions between debaters. Debate. A deliberative exercise characterized by formal procedures of argumentation, involving a set resolution to be debated, distinct times for debaters to speak, and a regulated order of speeches given. Evidence. Supporting materials for arguments. Standards for evidence are field-specific. Evidence can range from personal testimony, statistical evidence, research findings, to other published sources. Quotations drawn from journals, books, newspapers, and other audio-visuals sources are rather common. Negative/Con. The side that “negates” the resolution (is “con” the issue). For example, the negative side in a debate using the resolution of fact, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production, would argue that global warming does not threaten agricultural production. Preparation Time. Debates often necessitate time between speeches for students to gather their thoughts and consider their opponent's arguments. This preparation is generally a set period of time and can be used at any time by either side at the conclusion of a speech. Rebuttal Speech. The last speeches in a debate, where debaters summarize arguments and draw conclusions about the debate. Resolution. A specific statement or question up for debate. Resolutions usually appear as statements of policy, fact or value. Statement of policy. Involves an actor (local, national, or global) with power to decide a course of action. For example, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens. Statement of fact. Involves a dispute about empirical phenomenon. For example, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production. Statement of value. Involves conflicting moral dilemmas. For example, Resolved: The death penalty is a justified method of punishment. Topic. A general issue to debate. Topics could be “The Civil War,” “genetic engineering,” or “Great Books.”

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)



#### Unjust means “an unjust decision, judgment, or action is not fair or reasonable, or is not done according to accepted legal or moral standards”

That’s Macmillan Dictionary No Date [“unjust”. Macmillan Dictionary. No Date. Accessed 1/23/2022. <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/unjust> //Xu]

#### Definitions use “is” which is present tense per the Grammar Monster definitions above.

#### Semantics o/w –

#### First, Precision – they can arbitrarily jettison words which decks ground and preparation. Second, the judge doesn’t have the authority to vote if it wasn’t legitimate

#### Violation: They cannot defend hypothetical implementation and use the state – or they are Extra-T

#### Limits - imprecisely includes thousands of affs that expand immunity and deprives us of the enforcement counterplan - makes it impossible to be neg

#### Phil Ed – creates better ethical subjectivity and critical thinking that o/ws on uniqueness to LD.

#### TVA: a] Read a phil aff that affirms that private appropriation is unjust b] ssd is good cuz it prevents dogmatism and generates critical thinking

#### Fairness and education - debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and is the reason why schools fund debate

#### Drop the debater on T – dta is illogical since it would indict the entire aff

#### No RVIs on T: -illogical you shouldn’t win for meeting ur burden of being topical

#### Use competing interps— either there's a bright line which collapses, or there isn't which causes intervention.

## 2

#### Interp – The affirmative may not specify private entities.

#### Upward entailment and adverb of quantification determine whether a bare plural’s existential.

Leslie 16 [Sarah-Jane Leslie (Ph.D., Princeton, 2007) is the Dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. She has previously served as the Vice Dean for Faculty Development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, Director of the Program in Linguistics, and Founding Director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. She is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy. She is the author of numerous articles in philosophy and psychology, published in journals such as Science, PNAS, Philosophical Review, and Noûs.] “Generic Generalizations” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy April 24, 2016. DOA: 12/11/19, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/ SLHS-RR

There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In (1b), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in (1a) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. (1a) does not entail that animals are striped, but (1b) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1a) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (1b) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### They violate – 1] private entities doing unjust appropriation doesn’t mean that it also applies to native tribes 2] “appropriation by private entities” and “generally, appropriation by private entities” mean the same

#### Outweighs

#### C/a the semantics weighing above

#### Violation – they only defend Chinese entities

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Limits – infinite combination of affs from Soko to SpaceX to the Cherokee. Explodes aff ground – you cherry-pick affs with no neg ground and I must prep all affs while they prep one which pigeonholes me to generics.

#### 2] TVA – read this aff as an advantage – we still get discussion on their aff.

## 3

#### CP Text: The People’s Republic of China should

#### increase and encourage private and civil space cooperation with the United States over appropriation of outer space.

#### de-militarize its space industry.

#### dismantle and remove ASAT weapons.

#### The United States Federal Government should repeal the Wolf Amendment.

#### The Counterplan competes – it re-directs China’s commercial space industry to productive cooperation with the United States. The 1AC said that China’s government is reliant on private action meaning the Plan collapses all of the space sector meaning meaningful cooperation with the US becomes impossible.

#### Cooperation de-escalates the Space Race, solves Sino-Russian axis, and spills-over to broader US-China relations

Marshall and Hadfield 21 Will Marshall and Chris Hadfield 4-15-2021 "Why the U.S. and China Should Collaborate in Space" <https://time.com/5954941/u-s-china-should-collaborate-in-space/> (CEO of Planet which operates 200 satellites that image the entire Earth landmass on a daily basis, and he formerly worked at NASA on lunar missions and space debris. Colonel Chris Hadfield was Commander of the International Space Station and flew both the U.S. Space Shuttle and Russian Soyuz vehicles. Prior to that he served as a fighter/test pilot with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force.)//Elmer

While much has been made of the tense March 18 exchange between American and Chinese diplomats in Anchorage, Alaska, one area became an unlikely candidate for cooperation: outer space. During a press conference after the meeting, Jake Sullivan, the U.S. National Security Advisor, pointed out that the Perseverance rover that recently landed on Mars “wasn’t just an American project. It had technology from multiple countries from Europe and other parts of the world.” China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, seized the opportunity to say that, “China would welcome it if there is a will to carry out similar cooperation from the United States with us.” Planned or not, Yang’s comment gave voice to one very smart way two geopolitical rivals sharing the same planet could work together despite their growing tensions. Space exploration has long been used to foster deep cooperation, even between adversaries. During the height of the Cold War, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. jointly undertook the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission, which both served as a means of political rapprochement and opened the possibility of cooperation in other areas. Those links endured. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was invited to partner in the construction of the International Space Station (ISS). It was a multi-layered act that went beyond simple generosity; the more work former Soviet scientists had to do designing and building the ISS, the less likely they’d be to sell their expertise to other countries. Today, Sino-American space cooperation is similarly desirable. It could improve ties as it did for the U.S. and Russia, de-escalate an emerging Sino-Russian axis in space, and serve as a bargaining chip to help sustain other areas of cooperation. While China and the U.S. seem to clash on virtually every issue, space, by its nature, is different. Orbit isn’t a high-ground that one can seize. Instead, space works like a commons, where for any one state or company to be able to operate safely, all have to act responsibly. We need peaceful cooperation to enjoy its benefits. One reason not to cooperate in space with a geopolitical rival is technology transfer. There are legitimate concerns that collaboration could lead to technology sharing that unfairly advances China. Indeed, in 2011, the U.S. Congress included a passage, known as the Wolf Amendment, in an appropriations bill, forbidding NASA from cooperating in any way with China for fear of technological theft or espionage. The reasoning was straightforward: The U.S. enjoys significant leadership in some space technologies, including satellites, and much of that technology is proprietary, shared with no other countries. In the area of human spaceflight, however, things are different. The U.S. has extensively shared the entire ISS program for decades with the fourteen partner nations, including Russia. If there ever were secrets there, they are secrets no more. In fact, Russia and the U.S. as partners saved the day between 2011, after the space shuttles were grounded, and 2021, when the U.S. regained the ability to transport astronauts to space. During that decade, Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft served as the only way to get crews to and from the station. At the same time, uncrewed American resupply ships similarly helped keep the ISS viable when the Russian Soyuz fleet was grounded following mishaps. China has developed and proven a very successful human spaceflight program; adding their launch and spacecraft capability to the partnership would strengthen the overall mission. In order for China and the U.S. to work together in space, some things would have to change. First, the Wolf Amendment would have to be repealed—nothing meaningful can happen until that goes. Cooperation might then begin in lower profile areas such as sharing remote sensing data and reducing orbital debris. The United States and Europe have led the way with Landsat and Copernicus satellite programs providing free images of Earth that can be used to understand changes to our environment. The Chinese have yet to create a similar data share program for their Earth imaging systems—but they should. The United States and China could also discuss joint efforts to reduce the belt of space junk that circles the planet and threatens everyone’s satellites. Most importantly, cooperation could extend to joint human spaceflight missions; the US could invite China to conduct a crewed visit to the ISS, or to join in the human exploration of the Moon, targeted to happen in this decade and which both nations are now working on separately; the goal would be a joint Moon base rather than a space race. For decades, space travel has provided an opportunity for humans to see our world differently. Apollo 11 astronaut Michael Collins said, “The thing that really surprised me was that the Earth projected an air of fragility.” Chinese astronauts, since Yang Liwei’s first flight 18 years ago, have surely had a similar experience gazing down at our planet. Cooperating in space can give the United States and China the opportunity to change their thinking together. Bold American leadership can be a leveraged move in reducing tensions, as it was in keeping the Cold War cold—a win for all nations and our shared, blue-green planet.

#### US-China Relations key to prevent escalation – current US course turns status quo cold war hot.

Nye 21 Joseph Nye 3-3-2021 "The factors that could lead to war between the US and China" <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-factors-that-could-lead-to-war-between-the-us-and-china/> (professor at Harvard University and author)//Elmer

When China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, recently called for a reset of bilateral relations with the United States, a White House spokesperson replied that the US saw the relationship as one of strong competition that required a position of strength. It’s clear that President Joe Biden’s administration is not simply reversing Donald Trump’s policies. Some analysts, citing Thucydides’ attribution of the Peloponnesian War to Sparta’s fear of a rising Athens, believe the US–China relationship is entering a period of conflict pitting an established hegemon against an increasingly powerful challenger. I am not that pessimistic. In my view, economic and ecological interdependence reduces the probability of a real cold war, much less a hot one, because both countries have an incentive to cooperate in a number of areas. At the same time, miscalculation is always possible and some see the danger of ‘sleepwalking’ into catastrophe, as happened with World War I. History is replete with cases of misperception about changing power balances. For example, when US President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, he wanted to balance what he saw as a growing Soviet threat to a declining America. But what Nixon interpreted as decline was really the return to normal of America’s artificially high share of global output after World War II. Nixon proclaimed multipolarity, but what followed was the end of the Soviet Union and America’s unipolar moment two decades later. Today, some Chinese analysts underestimate America’s resilience and predict Chinese dominance but this, too, could turn out to be a dangerous miscalculation. It is equally dangerous for Americans to over- or underestimate Chinese power, and the US contains groups with economic and political incentives to do both. Measured in dollars, China’s economy is about two-thirds the size of that of the US, but many economists expect China to surpass the US sometime in the 2030s, depending on what one assumes about Chinese and American growth rates. Will American leaders acknowledge this change in a way that permits a constructive relationship, or will they succumb to fear? Will Chinese leaders take more risks, or will Chinese and Americans learn to cooperate in producing global public goods under a changing distribution of power? Recall that Thucydides attributed the war that ripped apart the ancient Greek world to two causes: the rise of a new power and the fear that this created in the established power. The second cause is as important as the first. The US and China must avoid exaggerated fears that could create a new cold or hot war. Even if China surpasses the US to become the world’s largest economy, national income is not the only measure of geopolitical power. China ranks well behind the US in soft power and US military expenditure is nearly four times that of China. While Chinese military capabilities have been increasing in recent years, analysts who look carefully at the military balance conclude that China will not, say, be able to exclude the US from the Western Pacific. On the other hand, the US was once the world’s largest trading economy and its largest bilateral lender. Today, nearly 100 countries count China as their largest trading partner, compared to 57 for the US. China plans to lend more than US$1 trillion for infrastructure projects with its Belt and Road Initiative over the next decade, while the US has cut back aid. China will gain economic power from the sheer size of its market as well as its overseas investments and development assistance. China’s overall power relative to the US is likely to increase. Nonetheless, balances of power are hard to judge. The US will retain some long-term power advantages that contrast with areas of Chinese vulnerability. One is geography. The US is surrounded by oceans and neighbours that are likely to remain friendly. China has borders with 14 countries, and territorial disputes with India, Japan and Vietnam set limits on its hard and soft power. Energy is another area where America has an advantage. A decade ago, the US was dependent on imported energy, but the shale revolution transformed North America from energy importer to exporter. At the same time, China became more dependent on energy imports from the Middle East, which it must transport along sea routes that highlight its problematic relations with India and other countries. The US also has demographic advantages. It is the only major developed country that is projected to hold its global ranking (third) in terms of population. While the rate of US population growth has slowed in recent years, it will not turn negative, as in Russia, Europe, and Japan. China, meanwhile, rightly fears ‘growing old before it grows rich.’ China’s labour force peaked in 2015 and India will soon overtake it as the world’s most populous country. America also remains at the forefront in key technologies (bio, nano and information) that are central to 21st-century economic growth. China is investing heavily in research and development, and competes well in some fields. But 15 of the world’s top 20 research universities are in the US; none is in China. Those who proclaim Pax Sinica and American decline fail to take account of the full range of power resources. American hubris is always a danger but so is exaggerated fear, which can lead to overreaction. Equally dangerous is rising Chinese nationalism, which, combined with a belief in American decline, leads China to take greater risks. Both sides must beware of miscalculation. After all, more often than not, the greatest risk we face is our own capacity for error.

#### US-China War goes Nuclear.

Brands and Beckley 21 Hal Brands and Michael Beckley 12-16-2021 "Washington Is Preparing for the Wrong War With China" https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-12-16/washington-preparing-wrong-war-china (Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute)//Elmer

The United States is getting serious about the threat of war with China. The U.S. Department of Defense has labeled China its primary adversary, civilian leaders have directed the military to develop credible plans to defend Taiwan, and President Joe Biden has strongly implied that the United States would not allow that island democracy to be conquered. Yet Washington may be preparing for the wrong kind of war. Defense planners appear to believe that they can win a short conflict in the Taiwan Strait merely by blunting a Chinese invasion. Chinese leaders, for their part, seem to envision rapid, paralyzing strikes that break Taiwanese resistance and present the United States with a fait accompli. Both sides would prefer a splendid little war in the western Pacific, but that is not the sort of war they would get. A war over Taiwan is likely to be long rather than short, regional rather than local, and much easier to start than to end. It would expand and escalate, as both countries look for paths to victory in a conflict neither side can afford to lose. It would also present severe dilemmas for peacemaking and high risks of going nuclear. If Washington doesn’t start preparing to wage, and then end, a protracted conflict now, it could face catastrophe once the shooting starts. IMPENDING SLUGFEST A U.S.-Chinese war over Taiwan would begin with a bang. China’s military doctrine emphasizes coordinated operations to “paralyze the enemy in one stroke.” In the most worrying scenario, Beijing would launch a surprise missile attack, hammering not only Taiwan’s defenses but also the naval and air forces that the United States has concentrated at a few large bases in the western Pacific. Simultaneous Chinese cyberattacks and antisatellite operations would sow chaos and hinder any effective U.S. or Taiwanese response. And the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would race through the window of opportunity, staging amphibious and airborne assaults that would overwhelm Taiwanese resistance. By the time the United States was ready to fight, the war would effectively be over. The Pentagon’s planning increasingly revolves around preventing this scenario, by hardening and dispersing the U.S. military presence in Asia, encouraging Taiwan to field asymmetric capabilities that can inflict a severe toll on Chinese attackers, and developing the ability to blunt the PLA’s offensive capabilities and sink an invasion fleet. This planning is predicated on the critical assumption that the early weeks, if not days, of fighting would determine whether a free Taiwan survives. Yet whatever happens at the outset, a conflict almost certainly wouldn’t end quickly. Most great-power wars since the Industrial Revolution have lasted longer than expected, because modern states have the resources to fight on even when they suffer heavy losses. Moreover, in hegemonic wars—clashes for dominance between the world’s strongest states—the stakes are high, and the price of defeat may seem prohibitive. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, wars between leading powers—the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the world wars—were protracted slugfests. A U.S.-Chinese war would likely follow this pattern. If the United States managed to beat back a Chinese assault against Taiwan, Beijing wouldn’t simply give up. Starting a war over Taiwan would be an existential gamble: admitting defeat would jeopardize the regime’s legitimacy and President Xi Jinping’s hold on power. It would also leave China more vulnerable to its enemies and destroy its dreams of regional primacy. Continuing a hard fight against the United States would be a nasty prospect, but quitting while China was behind would seem even worse. Washington would also be inclined to fight on if the war were not going well. Like Beijing, it would view a war over Taiwan as a fight for regional dominance. The fact that such a war would probably begin with a Pearl Harbor–style missile attack on U.S. bases would make it even harder for an outraged American populace and its leaders to accept defeat. Even if the United States failed to prevent Chinese forces from seizing Taiwan, it couldn’t easily bow out of the war. Quitting without first severely damaging Chinese air and naval power in Asia would badly weaken Washington’s reputation, as well as its ability to defend remaining allies in the region. Both sides would have the capacity to keep fighting, moreover. The United States could summon ships, planes, and submarines from other theaters and use its command of the Pacific beyond the first island chain—which runs from Japan in the north through Taiwan and the Philippines to the south—to conduct sustained attacks on Chinese forces. For its part, China could dispatch its surviving air, naval, and missile forces for a second and third assault on Taiwan and press its maritime militia of coast guard and fishing vessels into service. Both the United States and China would emerge from these initial clashes bloodied but not exhausted, increasing the likelihood of a long, ugly war. BIGGER, LONGER, MESSIER When great-power wars drag on, they get bigger, messier, and more intractable. Any conflict between the United States and China is likely to force both countries to mobilize their economies for war. After the initial salvos, both sides would hurry to replace munitions, ships, submarines, and aircraft lost in the early days of fighting. This race would strain both countries’ industrial bases, require the reorientation of their economies, and invite nationalist appeals—or government compulsion—to mobilize the populace to support a long fight. Long wars also escalate as the combatants look for new sources of leverage. Belligerents open new fronts and rope additional allies into the fight. They expand their range of targets and worry less about civilian casualties. Sometimes they explicitly target civilians, whether by bombing cities or torpedoing civilian ships. And they use naval blockades, sanctions, and embargoes to starve the enemy into submission. As China and the United States unloaded on each other with nearly every tool at their disposal, a local war could turn into a whole-of-society brawl that spans multiple regions. Bigger wars demand more grandiose aims. The greater the sacrifices required to win, the better the ultimate peace deal must be to justify those sacrifices. What began as a U.S. campaign to defend Taiwan could easily turn into an effort to render China incapable of new aggression by completely destroying its offensive military power. Conversely, as the United States inflicted more damage on China, Beijing’s war aims could grow from conquering Taiwan to pushing Washington out of the western Pacific altogether. All of this would make forging peace more difficult. The expansion of war aims narrows the diplomatic space for a settlement and produces severe bloodshed that fuels intense hatred and mistrust. Even if U.S. and Chinese leaders grew weary of fighting, they might still struggle to find a mutually acceptable peace. GOING NUCLEAR A war between China and the United States would differ from previous hegemonic wars in one fundamental respect: both sides have nuclear weapons. This would create disincentives to all-out escalation, but it could also, paradoxically, compound the dangers inherent in a long war. For starters, both sides might feel free to shoot off their conventional arsenals under the assumption that their nuclear arsenals would shield them from crippling retaliation. Scholars call this the “stability-instability paradox,” whereby blind faith in nuclear deterrence risks unleashing a massive conventional war. Chinese military writings often suggest that the PLA could wipe out U.S. bases and aircraft carriers in East Asia while China’s nuclear arsenal deterred U.S. attacks on the Chinese mainland. On the flip side, some American strategists have called for pounding Chinese mainland bases at the outset of a conflict in the belief that U.S. nuclear superiority would deter China from responding in kind. Far from preventing a major war, nuclear weapons could catalyze one. Once that war is underway, it could plausibly go nuclear in three distinct ways. Whichever side is losing might use tactical nuclear weapons—low-yield warheads that could destroy specific military targets without obliterating the other side’s homeland—to turn the tide. That was how the Pentagon planned to halt a Soviet invasion of central Europe during the Cold War, and it is what North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia have suggested they would do if they were losing a war today. If China crippled U.S. conventional forces in East Asia, the United States would have to decide whether to save Taiwan by using tactical nuclear weapons against Chinese ports, airfields, or invasion fleets. This is no fantasy: the U.S. military is already developing nuclear-tipped, submarine-launched cruise missiles that could be used for such purposes. China might also use nuclear weapons to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. The PLA has embarked on an unprecedented expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and PLA officers have written that China could use nuclear weapons if a conventional war threatened the survival of its government or nuclear arsenal—which would almost surely be the case if Beijing was losing a war over Taiwan. Perhaps these unofficial claims are bluffs. Yet it is not difficult to imagine that if China faced the prospect of humiliating defeat, it might fire off a nuclear weapon (perhaps at or near the huge U.S. military base on Guam) to regain a tactical advantage or shock Washington into a cease-fire. As the conflict drags on, either side could also use the ultimate weapon to end a grinding war of attrition. During the Korean War, American leaders repeatedly contemplated dropping nuclear bombs on China to force it to accept a cease-fire. Today, both countries would have the option of using limited nuclear strikes to compel a stubborn opponent to concede. The incentives to do so could be strong, given that whichever side pulls the nuclear trigger first might gain a major advantage. A final route to nuclear war is inadvertent escalation. Each side, knowing that escalation is a risk, may try to limit the other’s nuclear options. The United States could, for instance, try to sink China’s ballistic missile submarines before they hide in the deep waters beyond the first island chain. Yet such an attack could put China in a “use it or lose it” situation with regard to its nuclear forces, especially if the United States also struck China’s land-based missiles and communication systems, which intermingle conventional and nuclear forces. In this scenario, China’s leaders might use their nuclear weapons rather than risk losing that option altogether.

#### US-China Relations solves laundry list of existential threats.

Paulson 15, H. M. "Dealing with China: An insider unmasks the new economic superpower. Hachette Book Group." Inc.: All Books (2015). (Former US Treasury Secretary)//Elmer

One crisp day in early March 2014, I found myself sitting in a sleek conference room high above Boston Harbor taking questions from a group of financial executives. These men and women worked for a range of institutions that managed well over $3 trillion of financial assets, including the personal savings and pension funds of millions of Americans. They were keen to learn as much as they could about the Chinese economy. Was it about to hit the wall? Was I worried about a real estate bubble? How fragile was the country's financial system? Was the government serious about dealing with China's environmental problems? One fellow had a more personal question for me. "Hank," he said. "You're a real patriot. Why are you helping China?" The question pulled me up short. Three years before, when I first 'c began planning to write this book, I don't think I would have been asked anything like that at a meeting of sophisticated financiers. They would J have accepted that helping China to reform its economy, open its markets, protect its environment, and improve the quality of life of its people-all things I have been working on-would bring economic and strategic benefits to the U.S. as well. But that viewpoint has been changing as China has emerged as our biggest, most formidable economic competitor since the end of World War II and has started flexing its newfound military muscle in unsettling ways. As a result, many Americans, from all walks of life, have begun to view China with growing apprehension and resentment. Some would now prefer confrontation to cooperation. I understand these sentiments. Partly they are a function of China's choices and actions, and partly they are born of frustration with the recent economic troubles of the United States. I've spent a fair number of pages explaining how China must carry out meaningful economic reforms if it expects to continue its amazing success story. These arguments make sense for China and its people. But why should an American care? Why should we root for China to succeed? Shouldn't we instead be hoping that this ungainly giant stumbles, if only to slow down its daunting economic and military growth? In coming years China's weight and influence in the world, already substantial, is likely to begin to rival our own. Why take the chance now of helping the Chinese deal with so many of their problems and challenges? Why aid a competitor? The answer is simple: we should do so because it is more than ever in America's own self-interest that we do. To begin with, just about every major global challenge we face-from economic and environmental issues to food and energy security to nuclear proliferation and terrorism-will be easier to solve if the world's two most important economic powers can act in complementary ways. But these challenges will be almost impossible to address if the U.S. and China work at cross-purposes. If we want to benefit from an expanding global economy, we need the most dynamic growth engines, like China's, to thrive. If we want to prevent the worst climate change outcomes and to preserve our fragile global ecosystems, we need China to solve its massive environmental problems at home and adopt better practices abroad. If we want to keep diseases from our shores, we need Chinaand other countries to use the very best methods to prevent and halt epidemics. If we want to stem the spread of dangerous weapons to those who might harm our citizens, we need nations, including China, to work together to end illicit trafficking. If we want all these things to happen, we must be proactive, frank, and at times forceful with the Chinese while seeking ways to cooperate, to develop complementary policies, and to work to more fully integrate them into a rules-based global order. If we attempt to exclude, ignore, or weaken China, we limit our ability to influence choices made by its leaders and risk turning the worst-case scenarios of China skeptics into a self-fulfilling reality.

## 4

#### We’re hijacking utilitarianism - Consequentialism means determinism is true

#### 1] Induction if x action leads to y result then x action must be influenced by prior action which means a causal chain of events structure my action rather than my will

#### 2] Focus on end states necessitates determinism because scientific models assume x will happen if y – anything else means you can’t predict the end point of any actions

#### I defend the squo and that negates – actions are predetermined which means we aren’t culpable for actions we don’t take

## 5

#### Their demand for durable fiat is a form of white delusion that represents an active misapprehension of reality -- there is an epistemic imperative to dismantle this anti-black social practice.

**McRae ’19** [Emily; May 13; Associate Professor of Buddhism at the University of New Mexico; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 1,” p. 44-45]

I offer this story not only as an example of everyday white delusion, but also to set the tone of this chapter: From both the Buddhist and critical race theoretical perspectives that I draw on here, ignorance (delusion) is not someone else’s problem. There is a moral, and epistemic imperative to confront our own ignorance, to dismantle the false beliefs and misunderstandings that inform our everyday sense of reality. In this chapter, I use the Buddhist concept of avidyā (ignorance, confusion, delusion) to analyze the causes, mechanisms, and possible correctives for white delusion. In Buddhist contexts, avidyā refers not only to a lack of knowledge but also (and primarily) to an active misapprehension of reality, a warped projection onto reality that reinforces our own dysfunction and vice. Ignorance is rarely innocent; it is not an isolated phenomenon of just-not-happening-to-know-something. It is maintained and reinforced through personal and social habits, including practices of personal and collective false projection, strategic ignoring, and convenient “forgetting.” This view of avidyā has striking similarities to philosophical analyses of white ignorance, such as Charles Mills’s, which understand white ignorance not in terms of a passive lack of knowledge but as an active refusal by whites to confront basic facts about our social world.

I argue that Buddhist analyses of avidyā may help us understand the mechanisms of white ignorance and the practices for deconstructing it. On the Buddhist view, the mechanisms for maintaining avidyā include obsession with self and clinging to fixed narratives about the self (in the case of white delusion, “I’m not racist” or “I’ve earned and deserve everything I have”) and the refusal to take seriously cause and effect (such as a failure to historicize racism, the failure to understand broad, systemic effects of racism, and the inability to apply abstract knowledge of racism to specific cases). In my own case of white delusion, I was guilty of both kinds of mistakes: I was clinging to a narrative that obscured reality—that it was only women who bore the burden of managing physical appearance in our society—and I failed to apply my knowledge of how racism works in the abstract to the specifics of my partner’s life.  
Buddhist conceptions of ignorance or delusion may also help to locate possible correctives for white ignorance. Because avidyā is not simply a lack of knowledge, it cannot be completely remedied by exposure to facts and analyses of those facts. To be receptive to such knowledge in the first place, to remember and apply it, we must overcome our own dysfunctional emotional patterns that sustain our confusion. So, on a Buddhist ethical view, white people cannot combat white ignorance simply with knowledge about racism (which is already widely available) but rather white people need to do the personal and emotional work of deconstructing our own whiteness, as it arises in our own lives, to uproot our white ignorance. This is uncomfortable and ugly (but necessary) work that will require white people to correct for major moral blind spots by developing the moral skill of equanimity (or “tarrying,” as George Yancy has argued).3

#### Just like debate, international relations is complicit in an anti-black rationalism that pathologizes the lived realities of black folx as an insufficient critical prospective -- only the alt’s intentional incorporation of race into policy debates enshrines the empathy AND connectedness necessary to challenge the mundane white supremacy preserved through their practice of denial.

**Gordon and Harper-Shipman ’20** [Lewis and T.D.; 2020; Professor of Philosophy at UCONN-Storr; Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at Davidson College; *The Routledge Handbook to Rethinking Ethics in International Relations*, “Race and Ethics in International Relations,” p. 75-77]

Through a systematic positing of rationalism and parsimonious models, conventional IR elides the possibility of including the lived realities of black, brown, and red peoples in the Global South as valid forms of evidence and critical perspectives. To the extent that these voices can be quantified in an undifferentiated manner, they do not figure legitimately into the existing disciplinary paradigm. Without intentionally incorporating race into the framework, scholars are unable to explain phenomena such as the Global North’s continued imperial domination through globalization or the racialized political economy of contemporary forms of slavery such as sex-traffcking and forced domestic servitude in the United States (Crawford 2002; Georgis and Lugosi 2014; J.A. Gordon 2019). Alternative methodologies that may allow for a more ethical incorporation of race into IR include the world-travelling goal of achieving ‘a space of mutual understanding using the tool of empathy, which is the ability to enter the spirit of a different experience and find it in an echo of some part of oneself’ (Sylvester 2017, 182; see also Anzaldúa 1987; Sylvester 1995).There isalso poise, an epistemological framework for offering a critique of and reconstructing IR in a fashion that is void of colonial, capitalist-patriarchy (see Agathangelou and Ling 2004). Grovogui (2001) proposes reverse ethnography as a methodology available to the formerly colonized for assessing the colonizers’ ontological dispositions for what they are and not what the colonizers say they are. Exposing the limitations in this line of thinking in IR knowledge production demonstrates the provincial nature of the predominantly white approach to International Relations, which contradicts the current positivist paradigm. that calls for universal theorizing. Finally, though not exclusively, ethics demands connectedness and its concomitant obligation to others. This involves being in-relation-with-others instead of being separate. Models of IR premised on purity would require the elimination of relations with others (read as forms of contamination), whereas those premised on being-in-relations leads to a form of structural, ongoing mixture and transformation, which Jane Anna Gordon (2014) describes as ‘creolizing theory’. As the white supremacist origins of IR oppose such a model, overcoming that history requires acknowledging a different model of coexistence on our planet.

Conclusion

Race conjoined with ethics in IR thus raises normative, disciplinary, and methodological challenges to the field. The first raises the obligation of overcoming the normative project of global white supremacy through acknowledging that history and addressing how its continuation is often preserved through ongoing practices of denial. It also demands addressing how dominant global policies and the arguments that support them also facilitate disempowerment, dehumanization, and violence in the Global South and its manifestations in the Global North. This leads to disciplinary and methodological concerns that break down a neat divide between epistemological and normative practices. As the constructivist approaches tend to lead also to normative constructivism, the challenge of race and ethics in IR becomes also the imaginative act of theorizing different kinds of power relations and modes of coexistence with fidelity to extant global challenges on the organization of human and other planetary forms of life.

#### Unethical delusions are an existential threat.

**Loy ’18** [David; April 21st; Former professor of Ethics, Religion, and Society at Xavier University; Mountain Cloud, “Are Humans Special? Part 3 by David Loy,” <https://www.mountaincloud.org/are-humans-special-part-3-by-david-loy-2/>]

If we are special because of our potential, we must choose. We are free to derive the meaning of our lives from delusions about who we are — from dysfunctional stories about what the world is and how we fit into it—or we can derive that meaning from insight into our nonduality with the rest of the world. In either case, there are consequences.

The problem with basing one’s life on delusions is that the consequences are unlikely to be good. As well as producing poetry and cathedrals, our creativity has recently found expression in world wars, genocides, and weapons of mass destruction, to mention a few disagreeable examples. We are in the early stages of an ecological crisis that threatens the natural and cultural legacy of future generations, including a mass extinction event that may lead to the disappearance of half the earth’s plant and animal species within a century, according to E. O. Wilson—an extinction event that may include ourselves.

What needs to be done so that our extraordinary co-creative powers will promote collective well-being (collective in this case referring to all the ecosystems of the biosphere)?

From a Buddhist perspective our unethical tendencies ultimately derive from a misapprehension: the delusion of a self that is separate from others, a big mistake for a species whose well-being is not separate from the well-being of other species. Insofar as we are ignorant of our true nature, individual and collective self-preoccupation naturally motivates us to be selfish. Without the compassion that arises when we feel empathy — not only with other humans, but with the whole of the biosphere — it is likely that civilization as we know it will not survive many more generations.

In either case, we seem fated to be special. If we continue to devastate the rest of the biosphere, we are arguably the worst species on earth: a cancer of the biosphere. If, however, humanity can wake up to become its collective bodhisattva —undertaking the long-term task of repairing the rupture between us and Mother Earth — perhaps we as a species will fulfill the unique potential of precious human life.

#### The alternative is to submit to Black Buddhist meditation -- in the face of a case about banning Laws, we only offer silence.

**Vesely-Flad ’19** [Rima; May 13; Ph.D. Director of Peace and Justice Studies at Warren Wilson College; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 5,” p. 85-86]

Lovingkindness practices toward the self, alongside personal interpretations of the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Noble Path, guide many Black Buddhist practitioners who have suffered generational trauma and racist degradation in our contemporary moment. Valerie Mason-John, also known as Vimalasara, an African-Canadian teacher in the Nichiren tradition, speaks of the importance of the Four Noble Truths for people of African descent in particular. The First Noble Truth is that suffering is a universal experience. Mason-John states, “We of African descent know what suffering is. It’s in our DNA.”20 The Second Noble Truth states that suffering is a result of ignorant craving. For many Black Buddhists, the interpretations of the causes of suffering are greatly expanded into teachings of white myopia, the desire to exist in delusion, and the collective ego of the dominant white culture. The Third Noble Truth is that there is a path to end suffering. The very promise of liberation is enticing for people of African descent. The Fourth Noble Truth describes the path of liberation, known as the Noble Eightfold Path. In this path, “Right Concentration,” which leads to settling the mind, is a particularly compelling practice.

Manuel writes in The Way of Tenderness:

Only in the deep silence of meditation did I begin to disbelieve that I was born only to suffer. Eventually after many years of sitting meditation, I recognized the root of my self-hatred, both external and internal, as a personal and collective denial or denigration of the body I inhabited.

Her reflections are echoed by Owens’s reflections on silence: “silence became the medium in which I was reborn into a sense of happiness and contentment. But overall, it ushered me into a period of thriving and flourishing in my life.”22 In meditation, practitioners cultivate their ability to confront the suffering wrought by their mental constructs rather than avoid pain. They seek to heal the damage wrought by racism and to rearticulate profound teachings that are rooted in concentration practices. In-depth interviews with Black Buddhist teachers and practitioners illuminate a progression in the process of acknowledging one’s racial identity and embracing teachings of non-self. The progression begins with claiming and rearticulating Blackness as part of the social self, and in so doing, embracing African ancestry. For many, the next step is entering into an experience of silence that facilitates a recognition of the truth of non-self. Finally, Black Buddhist teachers and long-term practitioners integrate embodiment with the psychologically liberating practice of silence. The ten Black Buddhist teachers and long-term practitioners interviewed for this chapter emphasized four primary themes in their articulation of embodiment and Anatta: (1) Being visible in social spaces; (2) Claiming African ancestral lineages; (3) Embracing the two truths of relative and absolute existence; and (4) Liberating the self and the community.

## Case

### FW

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### Russo-China Advantage

#### Sino-Russian Alliance collapses inevitably due to Lack of Will.

Rome 21 [Nathaniel Rome (the associate editor for technology and security at the Georgetown Security Studies Review). "A Chinese-Russian Moon Base? Not So Fast." Foreign Policy. October 17, 2021. Accessed 1/22/2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/17/moon-base-china-russia-lunar-space-nasa/> //Xu]

In June, China and Russia unveiled a road map for a plan for a joint moon base dubbed the International Lunar Research Station, the latest example of burgeoning Sino-Russian cooperation and a direct challenge to the United States’ own plan for a moon base. “More than six decades ago, brave men began their exploration of the moon.” the Chinese-Russian announcement video said. “This time we come with greater courage, stronger determination, and more ambitious goals.” The plan is stunning in its ambition—a multidecade, multilateral effort consisting of 14 missions and culminating in a potential manned base—making it the largest cooperative project between China and Russia in space. This effort follows a trend of increased Sino-Russian cooperation in economic, military, and diplomatic spheres. To Americans, it is a challenge: The two primary U.S. adversaries are collaborating on a high-tech endeavor in an attempt to outmatch NASA’s lunar base plans—part of the Artemis program—and wrest leadership in space exploration away from the United States. The Sino-Russian lunar base and the Artemis program both aim to recruit a global coalition of states to construct a lunar research base on the moon’s south pole. Beyond science and exploration, these efforts are about national prestige, spurring new technologies and industry, experimenting with resource extraction, and setting the groundwork for other missions to the moon and to Mars. There has been minimal response from governments around the world, and no country has yet taken up China and Russia on their invitation to participate in the lunar research station. Governments considering a response—such as European countries that are reportedly “discussing the proposal”—are presumably occupied with the same question: Will this plan succeed, or is it hot air from propagandists in Beijing and Moscow? A detailed look at the plan reveals that it faces numerous significant hurdles judging from the checkered history of Sino-Russian space cooperation, the daunting technical barriers the plan faces, and the delicate political balance that must continue for the project to succeed. The proposed lunar base would be the most significant Sino-Russian cooperative venture in space—by a considerable margin. Previous cooperation between the two powers has yielded mixed success. In 1957, the Soviet Union and China signed the New Defense Technical Accord, whereby Moscow provided Beijing with nuclear and missile-related capabilities. Chinese scientists, directed by Mao Zedong, began researching satellites and expected Russian assistance. In 1958, the CIA speculated that substantial Russian assistance could allow China to launch a satellite by 1959 or 1960. However, when Chinese scientists visited Moscow a few months later, they were given the cold shoulder: They were not allowed to view satellite designs or launch sites and were advised to give up on satellites. By 1960, Soviet advisors left China due to the deepening political fissure between the two leading communist states, ending hopes for space cooperation. Over the succeeding decades, the Soviet Union’s focus was squarely on competition with the United States while China advanced its own indigenous space program. The next period of cooperation was in the mid-1990s, when Russia sold space technology—including designs for the Soyuz capsule—which accelerated China’s development of a manned space program. In 2007, China and Russia signed an agreement for “joint Chinese-Russian exploration of Mars,” culminating in a 2011 launch of a Mars orbiter and landing craft. However, the Russian rocket malfunctioned, causing Russian and Chinese spacecraft to come crashing back down to Earth, an embarrassing conclusion to both countries’ first attempt to reach the red planet. Building and maintaining a lunar base would require massive financial investment, the development of new technologies, and substantial advances in rocket technology by both China and Russia. There is no public budget for the project, but it would surely require tens of billions of dollars. For comparison, NASA estimates that the Artemis program will cost $86 billion by 2025. Russia’s space program is severely cash-strapped and has seen it’s budget fall 18 percent since 2014, with deeper cuts planned over the next three years. Funding difficulties have undermined Russian space priorities such as their flagship post-Soviet rocket, the Angara, which is already 16 years behind schedule. China’s space program is better resourced—second only to the United States’ among national initiatives—and would probably finance most of the joint project, as Russian commentators have gleefully noted. But Beijing may prefer to finance other ongoing initiatives such as the Tiangong space station and its own high-profile Mars and lunar missions; similarly, Russia may allocate its limited resources toward a planned multibillion-dollar space station. The lunar station plan would require both countries to develop new advanced modules. Extrapolating from the proposed diagram and Chinese academic writing on the subject, the project would require the development of space nuclear power, tunneling rovers, swarms of small autonomous robots, long-range communications systems, moon-based telescopes, resource extraction capabilities, and—if it is to support humans—a whole host of habitation technologies. These are ambitious capabilities for two countries that have only ever landed rovers on the moon. This plan would also require China and Russia to successfully field new heavy-lift rockets in the early 2030s. China plans to use the Long March 9, which has been under development since 2011. China aims to have the system ready by 2030, leaving little margin for delays. A bigger issue is Russia’s heavy-lift rocket. The project’s road map depicts a Russian Angara-class rocket that appears to be around 300 feet tall. No such rocket exists. In fact, the rocket seems to be a recycled and rescaled diagram of a long-discarded Angara rocket configuration. This suggests that either a new heavy-lift rocket will be constructed within the struggling Angara program or the diagram is a misleading placeholder for another developmental rocket. Neither scenario inspires confidence. In any joint project, the most important determinant of success is the political will of both parties, which could be undermined in three main ways. The first is the domestic political situation in each country: Will other priorities take precedent over a joint lunar base and prompt either party to miss timelines or suspend participation, particularly since both countries will probably experience leadership changes over the decadeslong project? The second consideration is the power dynamic between Beijing and Moscow, and how it evolves over the project’s duration of more than 20 years. It is no secret that Beijing is the senior party in project, has a better resourced space program, and is advancing at a faster rate. China had been discussing this lunar base since 2016 before inviting Russia to participate. Will China tolerate Russian partnership if Moscow’s tasks are persistently delayed? In an ominous start, Russia’s first contribution, the Luna-25 mission, has encountered “problems” and has been delayed seven months. On the flip side, will Russia—with its proud history of space exploration—tolerate playing second fiddle to the Chinese upstarts? The third variable is whether both Russia and China will continue to view the United States as their primary geopolitical competitor in the coming decades. Mutual opposition to perceived U.S. space dominance has been the primary driver of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. Forecasting power dynamics between great powers over a 20-year timeframe is an incredibly difficult—perhaps futile—effort, but one cannot simply assume stasis. China and Russia are quick to promote their ambitious joint lunar project to the world, saying it will “benefit all mankind.” But the plan faces substantial, though not insurmountable, challenges, judging from the lackluster history of Sino-Russian space cooperation, financial and technical barriers, and the delicate political balance that the project requires. Other governments eyeing the Sino-Russian moon base as a competitive alternative to the Artemis program would do well to look again at the proposal’s viability and practical value.

#### Space weapon deployment doesn’t cause an arms race or increase chance of war

Lopez 12 [LAURA DELGADO LO´ PEZ, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Arlington, Virginia. Astropolitics. "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391]

The previous discussion demonstrates that although a globalized space arms race could follow U.S. deployment of space weapons, it is also plausible and more likely that it may not happen at all. As Mueller states: ‘‘In the end, most of the inevitability arguments are weak.’’62 The assumptions discussed here break the argument into a series of debatable maxims that other scholars have also considered. Hays, for instance, counters the inevitability argument by pointing out that previous ASAT tests did not have this purported destabilizing effect, to which we can add that even after the Chinese ASAT test, neither Russia nor the United States, who would be both capable and more politically likely to launch space weapons, moved forward in that direction.63 Although some may draw attention to the recent wake-up calls in order to underline a sense of urgency, one should also recall that when it seemed truly inevitable before, it did not happen either. In his detailed account of military space developments from 1945 to 1984, Paul Stares described how superpowers’ assessment of the value of space weapons shifted, with a ‘‘hiatus in testing’’ reflecting the attractiveness of satellites as military targets.64 In this changed landscape, Stares also assumed the inevitability argument, claiming that ‘‘the chances of space remaining a ‘sanctuary’ [absence of weapons] into the 21st century appear today to be remote.’’65 Perhaps the conditions are more conducive now, but the important point to be reiterated is that the outcome is not inevitable, and that any such prediction must be undertaken with caution. One of the most prominent theorists to propose an alternate picture and pair it with an aggressive pro-space weapons stance is Everett Dolman. In his Astropolitik theory, Dolman summarizes the steps that the United States must take to assume control of space, particularly through withdrawal from the current space regime.66 This move, he argues, would benefit not only the United States, but also the rest of the world, since having a democracy controlling space is a catalyst for peace.67 Elsewhere, he writes: ‘‘Only a liberal world hegemon would be able to practice the restraint necessary to maintain its preponderant balance of hegemonic power without resorting to an attempt at empire.’’68 Accordingly, he believes that this strategy would be ‘‘perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing U.S. hegemony,’’69 but that other countries, correctly assessing U.S. leadership in space, would not seek to deploy their own systems. Having the ability to prevent the stationing of foreign weapons systems in space, he writes, ‘‘makes the possibility of large-scale space war and a military space race less likely, not more.’’70 In fact, he says, ‘‘to suggest that the inevitable result is a space arms competition is the worst kind of mirror-imaging.’’71 Dolman argues that the weaponization of space by the United States would ‘‘decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting spending away from conventional weapons systems,’’ which would reduce U.S. capabilities in territorial occupation and would thus be perceived as less threatening to other countries.72

#### MAD checks space escalation – nuclear response and debris

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

### ASATs Advantage

#### Vote Neg on Zero I/L – ASAT’s aren’t private actor space appropriation – this means the Plan can’t solve anything.

#### a] Outer Space means above the atmosphere.

Howell 17 Elizabeth Howell 6-7-2017 "What is Space?" <https://www.space.com/24870-what-is-space.html> (Ph.D., is a contributing writer for Space.com since 2012. As a proud Trekkie and Canadian, she tackles topics like spaceflight, diversity, science fiction, astronomy and gaming to help others explore the universe. Elizabeth's on-site reporting includes two human spaceflight launches from Kazakhstan, and embedded reporting from a simulated Mars mission in Utah. She holds a Ph.D. and M.Sc. in Space Studies from the University of North Dakota, and a Bachelor of Journalism from Canada's Carleton University.)//Elmer

From the perspective of an Earthling, outer space is a zone that occurs about 100 kilometers (60 miles) above the planet, where there is no appreciable air to breathe or to scatter light. In that area, blue gives way to black because oxygen molecules are not in enough abundance to make the sky blue.

#### China’s ASAT’s are located on the ground.

Erwin 20 Sandra Erwin 9-1-2020 "Pentagon report: China amassing arsenal of anti-satellite weapons" <https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-china-amassing-arsenal-of-anti-satellite-weapons/> (Sandra Erwin writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector. She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense.)//Elmer

WASHINGTON — China is progressing with the development of missiles and electronic weapons that could target satellites in low and high orbits, the Pentagon says in a new report released Sept. 1. China already has operational ground-based missiles that can hit satellites in low-Earth orbit and “probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit,” says the Defense Department’s annual report to Congress on China’s military capabilities. DoD has been required by law to submit this report since 2000. The Pentagon says Chinese military strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems and to deny them to adversaries as central to modern warfare. China for years has continued to “strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space,” the report says. China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new anti-satellite weapons programs since it confirmed it used an ASAT missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007, but the nation has been steadily advancing in this area, the report says. So-called counterspace capabilities developed by China include kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, orbiting space robots and space surveillance to monitor objects across the globe and in space.

#### b] Private entity are non-governmental.

Dunk 11 Von Der Dunk, Frans G. "1. The Origins Of Authorisation: Article VI Of The Outer Space Treaty And International Space Law." National Space Legislation in Europe. Brill Nijhoff, 2011. 3-28. (University of Nebraska)//Elmer

4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enterprise in this context. Contrary to the version o fthe concept applicable under general international law, where 'direct state responsibility' only pertained to acts somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under 'indirect', 'due care' / 'due diligence' responsibility18, Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the state's own ("whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies" ...) or those of private actors (... "or by non-governmental entities"). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its compliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key principles being left undefined.

#### China’s ASATs are operated by the Strategic Support Force – proven by 1AC Chow and Kelley.

#### The SSF is a governmental entity – they’re not a private actor.

Pollpeter et Al 17 Pollpeter, Kevin L., Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham. The creation of the PLA strategic support force and its implications for Chinese Military Space Operations. RAND Corporation Santa Monica United States, 2017. (Analyst at Rand)//Elmer

This report explores the missions and organization of China's military space enterprise, focusing on the organizational structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF). Created on December 31, 2015, as part of a major reorganization of China's military, the SSF is charged with developing and employing most of the PLA's space capabilities. Its creation signifies a shift in the PLA's prioritization of space and an increased role for PLA space capabilities. Chinese military strategists see military space capabilities and operations as a key component of strategic deterrence, critical to enabling the PLA to fight informatized local wars and counter U.S. military intervention in the region and essential for supporting operations aimed at protecting China's emerging interests in more-distant parts of the world. The main function of the SSF's space component appears to be the launch and operation of satellites to provide the PLA with command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It appears that information warfare, including space warfare, long identified by PLA analysts as a critical element of future military operations, has entered a new phase of development in which an emphasis on space and information warfare, long-range precision strikes, and the requirements associated with conducting operations at greater distances from China has necessitated the establishment of a new and different type of organization.

#### This means the Aff doesn’t effect ASATs – they will say Commercial Sectors produce them, that’s irrelevant since the PLA operates them as an act of appropriation which isn’t effected by the plan.

#### Russia thumps ASATs – specifically challenges US dominance – takes out 1AC Weichart which says “China and Russia”

Miller & Fontaine 17 [Jim Miller is President of Adaptive Strategies, LLC, which provides consulting to private sector clients on strategy development and implementation, international engagement, and technology issues. He serves on the Board of Directors for the Atlantic Council, and on the Board of Advisors for Endgame, Inc. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Defense Science Board. Richard Fontaine is the Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served as President of CNAS from 2012 to 2019 and as a Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow from 2009-2012. Prior to CNAS, he was foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain for more than five years. He has also worked at the State Department, the National Security Council and on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 9/19. "A New Era in U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability." https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/a-new-era-in-u-s-russian-strategic-stability]

Space has long been a domain used by militaries. In recent years, however, the United States has considerably deepened its reliance on space for the full range of military activities. Russia has taken note and has begun developing more substantial counter-space capabilities of varying types.59 As U.S. defense leaders have made clear, the United States will need to continue to leverage space for its warfighting and intelligence purposes, just as it becomes a far more contested domain in light of Russian (and others’) counter-space capabilities.

Particularly important in this context is the fact that space may be a classically unstable domain in that it appears highly offense-dominant under current technological and deployment conditions. Given U.S. reliance on space, Russia may have strong incentives to strike early in a conflict – or even during a deep crisis – in order to disable or weaken U.S. space contributions to effective power projection, before the United States can take steps to defend against such capabilities. This is particularly important because the United States relies on its space architecture for crucial nuclear command, control, and communications; missile early warning; and other strategic-related functions. Such functions are not necessarily clearly disaggregated from conventional warfighting functions in the U.S. space architecture. There is therefore a high potential for rapid escalation to the strategic level should war carry into space, as it appears likely it would in the event of U.S.-Russian conflict.

#### No liberal order or SOI impact - states won’t risk war, err towards isolation, AND mediate ties economically.

Mueller 21 [John; February 17; Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies; The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, “The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran,” Ch. 6]

Complacency, Appeasement, Self-destruction, and the New Cold War It could be argued that the policies proposed here to deal with the international problems, whether real or imagined, presented by China, Russia, and Iran constitute exercises not only in complacency, but also in appeasement. That argument would be correct. As discussed in the Prologue to this book, appeasement can work to avoid military conflict as can be seen in the case of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As also discussed there, appeasement has been given a bad name by the experience with Hitler in 1938. Hitlers are very rare, but there are some resonances today in Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. Both are shrewd, determined, authoritarian, and seem to be quite intelligent, and both are fully in charge, are surrounded by sychophants, and appear to have essentially unlimited tenure in office. Moreover, both, like Hitler in the 1930s, are appreciated domestically for maintaining a stable political and economic environment. However, unlike Hitler, both run trading states and need a stable and essentially congenial international environment to flourish.128 Most importantly, except for China’s claim to Taiwan, neither seems to harbor Hitler-like dreams of extensive expansion by military means. Both are leading their countries in an illiberal direction which will hamper economic growth while maintaining a kleptocratic system. But this may be acceptable to populations enjoying historically high living standards and fearful of less stable alternatives. Both do seem to want to overcome what they view as past humiliations – ones going back to the opium war of 1839 in the case of China and to the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union in 1989–91 in the case of Russia. Primarily, both seem to want to be treated with respect and deference. Unlike Hitler’s Germany, however, both seem to be entirely appeasable. That scarcely seems to present or represent a threat. The United States, after all, continually declares itself to be the indispensable nation. If the United States is allowed to wallow in such self-important, childish, essentially meaningless, and decidedly fatuous proclamations, why should other nations be denied the opportunity to emit similar inconsequential rattlings? If that constitutes appeasement, so be it. If the two countries want to be able to say they now preside over a “sphere of influence,” it scarcely seems worth risking world war to somehow keep them from doing so – and if the United States were substantially disarmed, it would not have the capacity to even try. If China and Russia get off on self-absorbed pretensions about being big players, that should be of little concern – and their success rate is unlikely to be any better than that of the United States. Charap and Colton observe that “The Kremlin’s idee fixe that Russia needs to be the leader of a pack of post-Soviet states in order to be taken seriously as a global power broker is more of a feel-good mantra than a fact-based strategy, and it irks even the closest of allies.” And they further suggest that The towel should also be thrown in on the geo-ideational shadow-boxing over the Russian assertion of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia and the Western opposition to it. Would either side be able to specify what precisely they mean by a regional sphere of influence? How would it differ from, say, US relations with the western-hemisphere states or from Germany’s with its EU neighbors?129 Applying the Gingrich gospel, then, it certainly seems that, although China, Russia, and Iran may present some “challenges” to US policy, there is little or nothing to suggest a need to maintain a large US military force-in-being to keep these countries in line. Indeed, all three monsters seem to be in some stage of self-destruction or descent into stagnation – not, perhaps, unlike the Communist “threat” during the Cold War. Complacency thus seems to be a viable policy. However, it may be useful to look specifically at a couple of worst-case scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China (after it builds up its navy more) and an invasion of the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia by Russia. It is wildly unlikely that China or Russia would carry out such economically self-destructive acts: the economic lessons from Putin’s comparatively minor Ukraine gambit are clear, and these are unlikely to be lost on the Chinese. Moreover, the analyses of Michael Beckley certainly suggest that Taiwan has the conventional military capacity to concentrate the mind of, if not necessarily fully to deter, any Chinese attackers. It has “spent decades preparing for this exact contingency,” has an advanced early warning system, can call into action massed forces to defend “fortified positions on home soil with precision-guided munitions,” and has supply dumps, booby traps, an wide array of mobile missile launchers, artillery, and minelayers. In addition, there are only 14 locations that can support amphibious landing and these are, not surprisingly, well-fortified by the defenders.130 The United States may not necessarily be able to deter or stop military attacks on Taiwan or on the Baltics under its current force levels.131 And if it cannot credibly do so with military forces currently in being, it would not be able to do so, obviously, if its forces were much reduced. However, the most likely response in either eventuality would be for the United States to wage a campaign of economic and military (including naval) harassment

#### Heg is ineffective

Fettweis 17 – Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University (Christopher, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” *Security Studies*, 26:3, 423-451, 5-8-2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394)//Elmer

Conflict and Hegemony by Region Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes.