## 1

#### Text: Private appropriation of outer space except for mega constellations is unjust. The internet capabilities resulting from the satellites should be distributed evenly throughout the world in a communist manner.

#### It competes – it doesn’t ban a form of private appropriation – anything else would-be severance which is a voter for shiftiness and moots the nb to zero

#### Internet is open to massive vulnerabilities now

Griffiths 19 James Griffiths 7-26-2019 "The global internet is powered by vast undersea cables. But they’re vulnerable." <https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/asia/internet-undersea-cables-intl-hnk/index.html> (CNN Analyst)//ELmer

Hong Kong (CNN) - On July 29, 1858, two steam-powered battleships met in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. There, they connected two ends of a 4,000 kilometer (2,500 mile) long, 1.5 centimeter (0.6 inch) wide cable, linking for the first time the European and North American continents by telegraph. Just over two weeks later, the UK’s Queen Victoria sent a congratulatory message to then US President James Buchanan, which was followed by a parade through the streets of New York, featuring a replica of a ship which helped lay the cable and fireworks over City Hall. In their inaugural cables, Queen Victoria hailed the “great international work” by the two countries, the culmination of almost two decades of effort, while Buchanan lauded a “triumph more glorious, because far more useful to mankind, than was ever won by conqueror on the field of battle. The message took over 17 hours to deliver, at 2 minutes and 5 seconds per letter by Morse code, and the cable operated for less than a month due to a variety of technical failures, but a global communications revolution had begun. By 1866, new cables were transmitting 6 to 8 words a minute, which would rise to more than 40 words before the end of the century. In 1956, Transatlantic No. 1 (TAT-1), the first underwater telephone cable, was laid, and by 1988, TAT-8 was transmitting 280 megabytes per second – about 15 times the speed of an average US household internet connection – over fiber optics, which use light to transmit data at breakneck speeds. In 2018, the Marea cable began operating between Bilbao, Spain, and the US state of Virginia, with transmission speeds of up to 160 terabits per second – 16 million times faster than the average home internet connection. Today, there are around 380 underwater cables in operation around the world, spanning a length of over 1.2 million kilometers (745,645 miles). Underwater cables are the invisible force driving the modern internet, with many in recent years being funded by internet giants such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Amazon. They carry almost all our communications and yet – in a world of wireless networking and smartphones – we are barely aware that they exist. Yet as the internet has become more mobile and wireless, the amount of data traveling across undersea cables has increased exponentially. “Most people are absolutely amazed” by the degree to which the internet is still cable-based, said Byron Clatterbuck, chief executive of Seacom, a multinational telecommunications firm responsible for laying many of the undersea cables connecting Africa to the rest of the world. “People are so mobile and always looking for Wi-Fi,” he said. “They don’t think about it, they don’t understand the workings of this massive mesh of cables working together. “They only notice when it’s cut.” Network down In 2012, Hurricane Sandy slammed into the US East Coast, causing an estimated $71 billion in damage and knocking out several key exchanges where undersea cables linked North America and Europe. “It was a major disruption,” Frank Rey, director of global network strategy for Microsoft’s Cloud Infrastructure and Operations division, said in a statement. “The entire network between North America and Europe was isolated for a number of hours. For us, the storm brought to light a potential challenge in the consolidation of transatlantic cables that all landed in New York and New Jersey.” For its newest cable, Marea, Microsoft chose to base its US operation further down the coast in Virginia, away from the cluster of cables to minimize disruption should another massive storm hit New York. But most often when a cable goes down nature is not to blame. There are about 200 such failures each year and the vast majority are caused by humans. “Two-thirds of cable failures are caused by accidental human activities, fishing nets and trawling and also ships’ anchors,” said Tim Stronge, vice-president of research at TeleGeography, a telecoms market research firm. “The next largest category is natural disaster, mother nature – sometimes earthquakes but also underwater landslides.” A magnitude-7.0 earthquake off the southwest coast off Taiwan in 2006, along with aftershocks, cut eight submarine cables which caused internet outages and disruption in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Japan, Korea and the Philippines. Stronge said the reason most people are not aware of these failures is because the whole industry is designed with it in mind. Companies that rely heavily on undersea cables spread their data across multiple routes, so that if one goes down, customers are not cut off. How a cable gets laid Laying a cable is a years-long process which costs millions of dollars, said Seacom’s Clatterbuck. The process begins by looking at naval charts to plot the best route. Cables are safest in deep water where they can rest on a relatively flat seabed, and won’t rub against rocks or be at risk of other disturbances. “The deeper the better,” Clatterbuck said. “When you can lay the cable down in deep water you rarely have any problems. It goes down on the bottom of the seabed and just stays there.” Things become more difficult the closer you get to shore. A cable that is only a few centimeters thick on the bottom of the ocean must be armored from its environment as reaches the landing station that links it with the country’s internet backbone. “Imagine a long garden hose, inside of which are very small tubes that house a very, very thin fiber pair,” Clatterbuck said. That hose is wrapped in copper, which conducts the direct current that powers the cable and its repeaters, sometimes up to 10,000 volts. “The fibers are wrapped in urethane and wrapped in copper and wrapped again in urethane,” he said. “If we’re going to have to put that cable on a shoreline that is very shallow and has a lot of rocks, you’re now going to have to armor coat that cable so no one can hack through it.” Cables in less hospitable areas can be far thicker than garden hoses, wrapped in extra plastic, kevlar armor plating, and stainless steel to ensure they can’t be broken. Depending on the coast, cable companies might also have to build concrete trenches far out to sea, to tuck the cable in to protect it from being bashed against rocks. “Before the cable-laying vessels go out they send out another specialized ship that maps the sea floor in the area when they want to go,” said TeleGeography’s Stronge. “They want to avoid areas where there’s a lot of undersea currents, certainly want to avoid volcanic areas, and avoid a lot of elevation change on the sea floor.” Once the route is plotted and checked, and the shore connections are secure, huge cable laying ships begin passing out the equipment. “Imagine spools of spools of garden hose along with a lot of these repeaters the size of an old travel trunk,” Clatterbuck said. “Sometimes it can take a month to load the cable onto a ship.” The 6,600 kilometer (4,000 mile) Marea cable weighs over 4.6 million kilograms (10.2 million pounds), or the equivalent of 34 blue whales, according to Microsoft, which co-funded the project with Facebook. It took more than two years to lay the entire thing. Malicious cuts The blackout came without warning. In February 2008, a whole swath of North Africa and the Persian Gulf suddenly went offline, or saw internet speeds slow to a painful crawl. This disruption was eventually traced to damage to three undersea cables off the Egyptian coast. At least one – linking Dubai and Oman – was severed by an abandoned, 5,400 kilogram (6-ton) anchor, the cable’s owner said. But the cause of the other damage was never explained, with suggestions it could have been the work of saboteurs. That raises the issue of another threat to undersea cables: deliberate human attacks. In a 2017 paper for the right-wing think tank Policy Exchange, British lawmaker Rishi Sunak wrote that “security remains a challenge” for undersea cables. “Funneled through exposed choke points (often with minimal protection) and their isolated deep-sea locations entirely public, the arteries upon which the Internet and our modern world depends have been left highly vulnerable,” he said. “The threat of these vulnerabilities being exploited is growing. A successful attack would deal a crippling blow to Britain’s security and prosperity.” However, with more than 50 cables connected to the UK alone, Clatterbuck was skeptical about how useful a deliberate outage could be in a time of war, pointing to the level of coordination and resources required to cut multiple cables at once. “If you wanted to sabotage the global internet or cut off a particular place you’d have to do it simultaneously on multiple cables,” he said. “You’d be focusing on the hardest aspect of disrupting a network.”

#### SpaceX satellites are key to internet access

James Pethokoukis 11/30 [James Pethokoukis, a columnist and an economic policy analyst, is the Dewitt Wallace Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he writes and edits the AEIdeas blog and hosts a weekly podcast, “Political Economy with James Pethokoukis.” He is also a columnist for The Week and an official contributor to CNBC. “Why a SpaceX bankruptcy would hurt the global poor” Faster, Please! November 30, 2021 <https://fasterplease.substack.com/p/-why-a-spacex-bankruptcy-would-hurt>

I don’t have enough deep knowledge about SpaceX’s business or financials to reliably gauge the actual bankruptcy risk here, and the piece’s reporter is skeptical. I will note, however, that although the company is currently valued at around $100 billion, the bank Morgan Stanley assigns it a valuation “of somewhere between $5bn and $200bn, with uncertainty about its success accounting for the wide range,” according to The Economist. Starship and Starlink are key to that upper bound. (Also: A Morgan Stanley survey of “institutional investors and industry experts” expect SpaceX to become more valuable than Tesla, currently a trillion-dollar company. We’ll see.) So it’s not surprising that Musk emphasizes the importance of the Starlink internet satellite venture here, especially its next incarnation. Now go and Twitter search on the terms “Musk,” “ruining,” and “sky,” and you’ll find plenty of complaints about the Starlink constellation — with currently more than 1,700 satellites in low-Earth orbit. For many of these keyboard critics, Starlink is nothing more than an uberbillionaire's reckless effort to become an even wealthier uberbillionaire. Or maybe it’s just another Muskian vanity project, like building rockets to Mars. Either way, these diehard anti-Muskers see a cluttered sky for visual astronomers, both amateur and professional, as a horrific tradeoff just so the entrepreneur can sell global internet access. Now, the extreme version of this critique is unserious, little more than anti-billionaire emoting. The profit potential of Starlink is unclear, though it seems to be Musk’s goal that the telecom business will one day help fund his Mars ambitions. But the venture isn’t there yet. Last summer, Musk estimated that Starlink would likely need between $20 billion and $30 billion in investment. "If we succeed in not going bankrupt, then that'll be great, and we can move on from there," Musk said. For now, Starlink aims to add another 1,000 satellites a year, even more when Starship is operational. That is, assuming Starship become operational. But the astronomy issue is a real one, as SpaceX has acknowledged. And after astronomer complaints about the brightness of the first group of 60 satellites launched in 2019, SpaceX developed a work-around to minimize the glare from solar reflection on subsequent launches. Of course, some scientists don’t want to rely on the goodwill of SpaceX and other satellite companies. They see an international regulatory agreement, perhaps a new protocol under the Outer Space Treaty, as a necessity. But as such an add-on is unlikely to happen anytime soon, notes The Economist, “not least because other issues raised by the mega constellations, such as risks from debris, will doubtless seem more pressing.” Here’s one of the many pictures floating around the Internet showing the impact of Starlink satellites — “the 333-second exposure shows at least 19 satellites passing overhead” — on astronomical observations, via the IFLScience website: Of course, framing the trade-off as the above picture vs. “better global internet” doesn’t quite capture the benefits of the latter. And they are considerable. There remains a stark digital divide in global internet access. As the World Economic Forum notes: “Globally, only just over half of households (55 percent) have an internet connection, according to UNESCO. In the developed world, 87 percent are connected compared with 47 percent in developing nations, and just 19 percent in the least developed countries.” It seems pretty clear that broadband internet access brings considerable economic gains, particularly to poorer countries. (Musk has specifically said this is a goal of Starlink.) Here are a few examples from the August 2021 analysis “The Economic Impact of Internet Connectivity in Developing Countries” by Jonas Hjort (Columbia University) and Lin Tian (INSEAD): Quite a few studies convincingly estimate the effect on consumption of specific internet-enabled technologies (rather than internet connectivity itself) through model-based approaches, and a few do so more directly. Jack & Suri (2014) show that access to mobile money decreased consumption poverty by two percentage points in Kenya. In contrast, Couture et al. (2021) finds that expansion of e-commerce in China has little effect on income to rural producers and workers. Different areas of Sub-Saharan Africa got access to basic internet at different times starting in the early 2000s. Exploiting variation arising from the gradual arrival of submarine cable connections and using nighttime satellite image luminosity as a proxy for economic activity, Goldbeck & Lindlacher (2021) estimate that basic internet availability leads to about a two percentage point increase in economic growth. As we briefly discussed in Sub-section 3.1.1, Bahia et al. (2020) show evidence that the gradual roll-out of mobile broadband in Nigeria between 2010 and 2016 increased labor force participation and employment. The paper also shows that household consumption simultaneously increased and poverty decreased. Households that had at least one year of mobile broadband coverage experienced an increase in total consumption of about 6 percent. Masaki et al. (2020) document a similarly striking result. Combining household expenditure surveys with data on the location of fiber-optic transmission nodes and coverage maps of 3G mobile technology, they show that 3G coverage is associated with a 14 percent increase in total consumption and a 10 percent decline in extreme poverty in Senegal. Finally, Bahia et al. (2021) use a similar empirical approach to study the effect of mobile broadband roll-out in Tanzania and find a comparable increase in household consumption and decline poverty in this setting. The eventual endgame here is that there are going to be many tens of thousands more satellites in orbit, enabling total global internet coverage. And they will be joined by all manner of human-occupied installations for tourist, commercial, and scientific endeavors. (You may have missed the late October announcement that Blue Origin, the space company owned by Jeff Bezos, is teaming up with other firms to build a space station in Earth orbit.) Stargazing from Earth will never be the way it used to be. Then again, people still complain about shadows from skyscrapers even as humanity continues to build them. But recall one of the running themes of this newsletter: Technology solves one problem, creates another, then solves that one — rinse and repeat — even as the overall direction is forward. More astronomy in the future will be space based. And if all those space objects and structures make even low-Earth orbit astronomy difficult, more of it will need to be performed further out, as with the James Webb Space Telescope. Or maybe via telescopes on the Moon, such as the proposed Lunar Crater Radio Telescope, which would deploy robots to transform a half-mile wide crater into an observatory by attaching a wire mesh along the crater walls. And once there are lots of satellites around a fully colonized Moon, off to Mars — which might be accessible thanks to Starlink funding Musk’s deep-space ambitions. Meanwhile, there will be a lot less global poverty here on Earth than otherwise.

#### Internet access checks multiple existential threats

Eagleman ’10 [Dr. David; 11/9/2010; PhD in Neuroscience @ Baylor University, Adjunct Professor of Neoroscience @ Stanford University, Former Guggenheim Fellow, Director of the Center for Science and Law, BA @ Rice University; “Six Ways The Internet Will Save Civilization”; https://www.wired.co.uk/article/apocalypse-no]

Many great civilisations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics. Usually this results from: natural disasters, resource depletion, economic meltdown, disease, poor information flow and corruption. But we’re luckier than our predecessors because we command a technology that no one else possessed: a rapid communication network that finds its highest expression in the internet. I propose that there are six ways in which the net has vastly reduced the threat of societal collapse.

Epidemics can be deflected by telepresence

One of our more dire prospects for collapse is an infectious-disease epidemic. Viral and bacterial epidemics precipitated the fall of the Golden Age of Athens, the Roman Empire and most of the empires of the Native Americans. The internet can be our key to survival because the ability to work telepresently can inhibit microbial transmission by reducing human-to-human contact. In the face of an otherwise devastating epidemic, businesses can keep supply chains running with the maximum number of employees working from home. This can reduce host density below the tipping point required for an epidemic. If we are well prepared when an epidemic arrives, we can fluidly shift into a self-quarantined society in which microbes fail due to host scarcity. Whatever the social ills of isolation, they are worse for the microbes than for us.

The internet will predict natural disasters

We are witnessing the downfall of slow central control in the media: news stories are increasingly becoming user-generated nets of up-to-the-minute information. During the recent California wildfires, locals went to the TV stations to learn whether their neighbourhoods were in danger. But the news stations appeared most concerned with the fate of celebrity mansions, so Californians changed their tack: they uploaded geotagged mobile-phone pictures, updated Facebook statuses and tweeted. The balance tipped: the internet carried news about the fire more quickly and accurately than any news station could. In this grass-roots, decentralised scheme, there were embedded reporters on every block, and the news shockwave kept ahead of the fire. This head start could provide the extra hours that save us. If the Pompeiians had had the internet in 79AD, they could have easily marched 10km to safety, well ahead of the pyroclastic flow from Mount Vesuvius. If the Indian Ocean had the Pacific’s networked tsunami-warning system, South-East Asia would look quite different today.

Discoveries are retained and shared

Historically, critical information has required constant rediscovery. Collections of learning -- from the library at Alexandria to the entire Minoan civilisation -- have fallen to the bonfires of invaders or the wrecking ball of natural disaster. Knowledge is hard won but easily lost. And information that survives often does not spread. Consider smallpox inoculation: this was under way in India, China and Africa centuries before it made its way to Europe. By the time the idea reached North America, native civilisations who needed it had already collapsed. The net solved the problem. New discoveries catch on immediately; information spreads widely. In this way, societies can optimally ratchet up, using the latest bricks of knowledge in their fortification against risk.

Tyranny is mitigated

Censorship of ideas was a familiar spectre in the last century, with state-approved news outlets ruling the press, airwaves and copying machines in the USSR, Romania, Cuba, China, Iraq and elsewhere. In many cases, such as Lysenko’s agricultural despotism in the USSR, it directly contributed to the collapse of the nation. Historically, a more successful strategy has been to confront free speech with free speech -- and the internet allows this in a natural way. It democratises the flow of information by offering access to the newspapers of the world, the photographers of every nation, the bloggers of every political stripe. Some posts are full of doctoring and dishonesty whereas others strive for independence and impartiality -- but all are available to us to sift through. Given the attempts by some governments to build firewalls, it’s clear that this benefit of the net requires constant vigilance.

Human capital is vastly increased

Crowdsourcing brings people together to solve problems. Yet far fewer than one per cent of the world’s population is involved. We need expand human capital. Most of the world not have access to the education afforded a small minority. For every Albert Einstein, Yo-Yo Ma or Barack Obama who has educational opportunities, uncountable others do not. This squandering of talent translates into reduced economic output and a smaller pool of problem solvers. The net opens the gates education to anyone with a computer. A motivated teen anywhere on the planet can walk through the world’s knowledge -- from the webs of Wikipedia to the curriculum of MIT’s OpenCourseWare. The new human capital will serve us well when we confront existential threats we’ve never imagined before.

Energy expenditure is reduced

Societal collapse can often be understood in terms of an energy budget: when energy spend outweighs energy return, collapse ensues. This has taken the form of deforestation or soil erosion; currently, the worry involves fossil-fuel depletion. The internet addresses the energy problem with a natural ease. Consider the massive energy savings inherent in the shift from paper to electrons -- as seen in the transition from the post to email. Ecommerce reduces the need to drive long distances to purchase products. Delivery trucks are more eco-friendly than individuals driving around, not least because of tight packaging and optimisation algorithms for driving routes. Of course, there are energy costs to the banks of computers that underpin the internet -- but these costs are less than the wood, coal and oil that would be expended for the same quantity of information flow.

The tangle of events that triggers societal collapse can be complex, and there are several threats the net does not address. But vast, networked communication can be an antidote to several of the most deadly diseases threatening civilisation. The next time your coworker laments internet addiction, the banality of tweeting or the decline of face-to-face conversation, you may want to suggest that the net may just be the technology that saves us.

#### Starlink solves internet monopolies

**Krow 21** Krow, A. (2021, February 27). *Will Starlink disrupt spectrum’s internet provider monopoly?* Medium. <https://medium.com/technology-hits/will-starlink-disrupt-spectrums-internet-provider-monopoly-c3b33d20be11> (Teacher. Writer. Future Author. Aspiring Linguist. Progressive Voter. Twitter @ajkrow\_writer.) //Aadit

Throughout college and well into my teaching career, I’ve spent several hundred dollars sitting in coffee shops, drinking a latte or a Frappuccino while I completed work using their Wi-Fi until closing. Once I arrived home, I opened YouTube on my phone and played a video at the lowest resolution, 144p. I waited for several minutes as the video buffered. This became a daily occurrence when living in a rural area. Millions still don’t have access to fast internet at home As of [2019](https://www.digitaltrends.com/web/31-percent-us-households-no-broadband-internet/), a third of households nationwide do not have a reliable internet connection. The only way those families can access the internet is to leave their homes and go to a public library, school, or Starbucks. A week before schools transitioned to virtual learning in 2020, I remember some of my students stared at their phones under their desks. When I caught them and asked them to turn it in, they refused. For many students, the only internet access they had available was at school. [As of September 2020](https://usafacts.org/articles/internet-access-students-at-home/), 3.7 million children still did not have access to an internet connection at home. In August of 2020, teachers were expected to provide live (synchronous) classes to students via Zoom. I panicked. I still did not have access to the internet in my rural home. I immediately went on apartments.com and searched for a decent apartment that would have access to the internet. Once school started, many students could not log in to Google Classroom or Zoom and attend class. Of the seventy or so students I see every other day, less than half log in to Zoom. All the other students have never logged in, nor have they turned in a single assignment since school began. As a result, teachers, schools, and [districts nationwide failed them](https://apnews.com/article/distance-learning-coronavirus-pandemic-oregon-7fde612c3dbfd2e21fab9673ca49ad89). Corporations control who gets access to the internet In the United States, only two companies control a majority of the internet service available in the country. Those are Spectrum (also known as Comcast) and Charter (also known as Xfinity). Both companies decided they wouldn’t compete against each other. Instead, they would each claim one area and be the only internet service provider available. By doing so, they could raise prices and provide data caps. Customers have no choice other than to agree to the terms and conditions. In the U.S., [83.3 million people](https://ilsr.org/report-most-americans-have-no-real-choice-in-internet-providers/) are controlled by an internet monopoly: either Charter or Spectrum. Since both corporations have no other competition, they have no incentive to innovate or expand their services to other areas, namely rural areas. Spectrum and Charter see no benefit in laying out hundreds or thousands of feet of underground cable and spend tens of thousands of dollars to provide internet to a rural home, as the customer would only pay $50-$100 a month. Meanwhile, their “competitors” provide poor services and fail to offer any sort of competition to Charter or Spectrum. ViaSat, for example, offers limited data plans — its most expensive plan offers 150GB for $200 per month. In a family of four or five people, where children are connected to Zoom meetings, that data plan will reach its limit very quickly. This data plan also can’t compare to Spectrum, which offers unlimited internet for a quarter of the price of ViaSat. However, ViaSat and HughesNet are the only internet service providers available to rural areas. Since ViaSat and HughesNet face no competition from Spectrum and Charter, they have no incentive to provide fast speeds for their consumers. The average speed of ViaSat clocks in at [11.7Mbps](https://testmy.net/hoststats/viasat), or 1.4 Megabytes per second. At that speed, a YouTube video has to be played at the lowest resolution and would still buffer. Google Fiber failed to disrupt the market Roughly ten years ago, Google announced it would become an internet service provider. Google planned to disrupt Spectrum and Charter’s current control of the market by offering internet using fiber-cable. This new technology would allow for faster speeds. [As of 2020](https://support.google.com/fiber/answer/6250056?hl=en), it is about five times faster than Spectrum internet. Today, a majority of the U.S. population still does not have access to Google Fiber. According to Google, Fiber is [only available in twelve cities](https://fiber.google.com/) in the country. Rural customers still don’t have a solution, nor do city people have access to more than one or two options. Starlink will do what Google couldn’t A few years ago, Elon Musk announced Starlink, a division of SpaceX. Musk intends on providing internet access to everyone around the world wirelessly through the use of satellites. So far, SpaceX has launched over a thousand satellites into low-Earth orbit, though the FCC has approved SpaceX to launch over 12,000 satellites for Starlink usage. As more satellites are launched into space, internet coverage will expand around the world. Whether you live in an urban, suburban, or rural area, you will have access to high-speed internet. Many YouTubers who have preordered the Starlink service have already received their installation package and are testing it out in remote areas. As of [a few days ago](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/22/elon-musk-spacex-will-double-starlink-internet-speed-later-this-year.html), Elon Musk made a few promises. People would have access to 300Mbps speed internet, and coverage will be available worldwide by the end of 2021. This timeline beats Google Fiber, as Google is only providing coverage to a dozen cities in the U.S. For people who lack internet access or want something other than Spectrum or Charter, Starlink will be the answer.

## 2

#### The 1AC is an ideological fantasy constructed by relentless planning at the expense of scapegoated identities, all for recognition from the Other in an attempt to fill the lack.

Gunder 05 Michael Gunder, 2005, “The Production of Desirous Space: Mere Fantasies of the Utopian City?” Planning Theory 2005 4: 173, DOI: 10.1177/1473095205054604, all brackets were in the original text, SJBE

Jouissance is one of the four structuring elements of social discourse,4 or social interactions, links and relationships, where synchronic language meets diachronic speech to evoke an effect on the Other (Lacan, 2004: 3). Zupancic (2004) associates Lacan’s (2004) theory of the Four Discourses (see Gunder, 2003a, 2004; Hillier and Gunder, 2005) with the Marxian theory of commodification and surplus-value via Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). Lacan (2004: 111) contends that surplusvalue and surplus-enjoyment are historically equivalent, especially in the situation of the Master’s injunction of ‘No!’ in the emerging early phase of Calvinistic repressive capitalism. In contrast to the historical authority and rationality of the Master’s repressive command, late capitalism is structured under a rationality of the university or bureaucracy. Now knowledge and technology, not the Master’s injunction, become ‘agency expressing a logic of governmentality and expertise (including that of planning) that does not prohibit enjoyment, but rather channels jouissance in ways that produces a “bio-politics” (after Foucault) of an alienated subject that has no option, but to enjoy and be satisfied’ (Hillier and Gunder, 2005; McGowan, 2004; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b; Zupancic, 2004). In this regard, ‘a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths [or fantasies] that structure these practices’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1993: 202). This is taken further by the barely challenged international hegemonic discourse of global capitalization and the fantasies it induces in externally structuring the nation state’s very enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 63; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 61). Even the ruling British Labour government, with its ‘Third Way’, in contrast to its tradition of socialism, has placed ‘economic globalisation’ as ‘the most significant factor in shaping Labour Party thinking since the early 1990s’ (Allmendinger, 2003: 326). As McGowan (2004) observes: we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism. The alternatives, which once seemed to be just around the corner, have become unimaginable today. The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority. Only by coming to understand this obedience to the dictates of global capitalism as obedience can we hope to break out of it. Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon simply because we have not properly recognized our own investment in sustaining it. We see it as unsurpassable because we don’t want to lose it – and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. (McGowan, 2004: 193) Illusion resides under this global fantasy of capital where ‘the basic feature of’ this dominant cultural imperative ‘no longer operates on the level of ideals and identifications, but directly on the level of regulating jouissance’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 113). Even in Lefebvre’s day, this was a capitalism where surplus-value was synonymous with surplus-enjoyment supporting the injunction: ‘you must enjoy!’. In this light, the role of planning is to facilitate enjoyment by sustainably providing the correct space – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – where enjoyment can be effectively materialized and maximized under the imperative of global capitalism. Consequently: urbanism is nothing more than an ideology that claims to be either ‘art’ or ‘technology’ or ‘science’, depending on the context. This ideology pretends to be straightforward, yet it obfuscates, harbours things unsaid: which it covers, which it contains, as a form of will tending towards efficiency. Urbanism is doubly fetishistic. First, it implies the fetishism of satisfaction. What about vested interests? They must be satisfied, and therefore their needs must be understood and catered to, unchanged . . . Second, it implies the fetishism of space. Space is creation. Whoever creates space creates whatever it is that fills space. The place engenders the thing and the good place engenders good things. (Lefebvre, 2003: 159) This is exacerbated further in the current milieu of consumerist post-democracy personified by the master signifier: global capitalism. ‘Post-democracy is founded on an attempt to exclude the political awareness of lack and negativity from the political domain, leading to a political order which retains the token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralizes the centrality of political antagonism’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 59). In response to the dominant ‘logic’ of global competitiveness, the technocrats and experts including planners, shape, contextualize and implement public policy in the interest of the dominant hegemonic bloc. This is constructed under the logics and knowledges of university discourses (see Gunder, 2004), with an objective to remove existing or potential urban blight,‘dis-ease’ and dysfunction detracting from local enjoyment and global competitiveness (Gunder, 2005; McGuirk, 2004). Of course, the hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debate as to what constitutes desired enjoyment and what is lacking in urban competitiveness. In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of planning remedy. This is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness, is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Planners, programmers, and users want solutions. For what? To make people happy. To order them to be happy. It is a strange way of interpreting happiness. The science of the urban phenomenon cannot respond to these demands without the risk of validating external restrictions imposed by ideology and power. (Lefebvre, 2003: 141) Yet this lack and its resolution are more often technical in nature, rather than political. As a consequence, the technocrats in partnership with their ‘dominant stakeholders’ can ensure the impression of happiness for the many, while, not to mention, achieving the stakeholders’ specific interests. Material happiness for all but that evil other Lacanian theory suggests that a subject’s jouissance is given freest rein when an act of desire contains a dimension of transgression. It is the ‘little sin’ that gives the most pleasure; it is the prohibition as such which elevates a common everyday object into an object of desire (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 177). The bio-politics of contemporary planning are predicated on enjoyment – you will enjoy! – not the prior duality of repression/freedom of the Weberian capitalist master’s injunction: ‘No you cannot do that!’. The achievements of traditional utopian goals were ones of freedom to act against the repression of the negative injunction. Contemporary injunctions are to enjoy – or at least to sustain our happiness – regardless of what we actually desire. Happiness is not a class of truth, but one of an ontological class of being where: ‘happiness’ relies on the subject’s inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desires. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we ‘officially’ desire. Happiness is thus hypocritical: it is the happiness dreaming about things we do not really want. (Zˇ izˇek, 2002a: 59–60) Planning continues to succeed because it underpins the primal desire of most subjects in society for a conflict-free, safe and assured happy future, even if it can only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario of material happiness, rather than as an impossible reality that actually sates all desires (Gunder, 2003a, 2003b). This is a fantasy predicated on an obedience to a shallow consumptive quantitative imperative to be materially happy, which often occurs at the expense of our actual qualitative psychic desires. In our contemporary global society the ‘moral law’ is no longer the imperative that acts as a limitation, stopping us from enjoying too much. Instead, the cultural imperative, the now dominant moral Law itself, in its injunction for us to enjoy becomes ‘the ultimate “transgression”’ should one wish to pursue a life of moderation (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 174). Further, ‘the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social world can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder . . . a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated, but instead must be eliminated’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 108). This is the stranger, the Other that is not us that can act as the ‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised as the one who is blamed for our lack, the Evil force that stole our precious jouissance’ and stopped the fantasy from achieving its utopian vision (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 58). Even our ‘“complex” contemporary societies rely on the basic divide between included and excluded’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 86). Zˇ izˇek (2004b: 86) continues: in any society ‘there is a multitude within the system and a multitude of those excluded, and simply to encompass them both within the scope of the same notion amounts to the same obscenity as equating starvation with dieting.’ It is continually this Other that permits the delusion of harmony in our identity defining groups and for this to transpire we require an Other, external to the group for the group to define itself. We require a disparity, or gap, to allocate a degree of difference to an Other to conceptualize the group identification as who we are not and on this Other we can attribute all the signs of disharmony that jeopardize our shared fantasy (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 5). Difference is essential to complete our fantasy of harmony, but only by providing the sacrificial Other on which we can blame the disappointment of the fantasy to deliver (Zˇ izˇek, 2004a: 158–9). In this light, planning,‘as part of the apparatus of the modern state, makes its own imprint, has its own powers for good and evil’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). This is especially so as planning identifies, or at least names and legitimizes, what constitutes an urban pathology that detracts from what is desirous of the globally competitive city. Planning then sets out to remedy this lack or deficiency. Civil society, i.e. the public stage, and media of information dissemination are central to this process. Of course, our media are not ideologically neutral. As a consequence, media access for putting forth particular tropes of desire constitutes a central component of social, as well as economic, capital. This is well documented by Flyvbjerg (1998a) where the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce controlled the editorial content of the local newspaper. This argument is central to that of Chomsky’s (2003) multinational corporate steering of mass media content in the, so-called, ‘free’ press. This is where the mass media are free to publish almost anything, provided, of course, they do not alienate their corporate clients who provide their majority of income and profits via their advertising payments. Gunder (2003b) documented how planning actors and their affiliated partners gained public agreement via the rhetorical use of culturally shared ‘master signifiers’ and their related metonymies and metaphors. Here each signifier was linked to associations in the public’s unconscious that induced a conscious expression of desire for a particular set of values or specific consequential actions. Effective deployment of rhetorical tropes can seduce subjects ‘to relinquish previous desires (including identifications and embrace new ones) – or alternatively, to invest all the more completely in old ones’ (Bracher, 1993: 51–2). For example, does anyone wish to live in a city that is losing enjoyment to other locations because it lacks the fitness to compete? In Lacan, the construction of reality is continuous with the field of desire. Desire and reality are intimately connected . . . The nature of their link can only be revealed in fantasy . . . when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62–3) This is where, from a Lacanian outlook, by accepting rationalization as the means to fulfil a desire for completeness – via the utilization of falsifying words – ‘man does not adapt himself to reality; he adapts reality to himself’ (Roudinesco, 1997: 114). Ideological fantasies as to what constitutes an enjoyable and satisfying city are deployed to hide the dysfunctions and unpredictabilities that are ubiquitous throughout all social spheres, particularly for those lacking in sufficient capital to offset adversity. Social reality ‘is sustained by the “as if”, the fantasy of what things are like’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Rationalization, or realrationalität as Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls it, exists between the everyday activities of social life and the held universal ideals or values of what ought to be, even if it is not so, in social reality. The belief that planning is not political, but technical ‘allows the myths of objectivity, value neutrality, and technical reason to persist, and thereby fosters a certain delusion about planning practice’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). Sandercock (2004: 134) continues: planning ‘helps to redefine political debate, producing new sources of power and legitimacy, changing the force field in which we operate’. Lefebvre suggests that planning is based on a strategy of mixing scientificity and rationality with ideology. ‘Here, as elsewhere, scientificity is an ideology, an excrescence grafted onto real, but fragmentary, knowledge’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 166). In particular, Lefebvre argues that quantitative expertise including the technology of urban planning is largely a myth. This is because planning administrators: and bad administrators at that, rarely use much actual technology. However, they have the ability to persuade the people as a whole that because these are technological decisions they should be accepted. In other words, a large part of Lefebvre’s criticism [of planners] is not that technocrats are technocrats, but that they are precisely the opposite. Technology should be put to the service of everyday life, of social life rather than being precisely the condition of its suppression and control. Urbanism, for example, is an ideology that operates under the cover of this myth of technology. (Elden, 2004: 145) Social reality can only exist in the symbolic and imaginary registries as it is composed, that is constructed, as a ‘result of a certain historically specific set of discursive practices and power mechanisms’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 66). Flyvbjerg (1998a) illustrates this well in his exposé of the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce’s intervention in that city’s planning process. Here this grouping of dominant business people is given hegemonic voice to determine what constitutes acceptable transportation modes and spatial development in Aalborg’s town centre. In this example the planner’s technical facts, by themselves, produced the weaker argument. This was perhaps because the dissemination of these facts and their implications for planning action were ineffectively articulated to the public, if at all, via the local information media controlled by the Chamber of Commerce. In contrast, in Sydney, McGuirk (2004) documented how planners actively participated in and facilitated the dominant network of actors successfully pushing for a series of local, regional and national policies supporting Sydney’s global competitiveness. It appeared to be of little consequence that these policies induced adverse effects on the rest of the country, not to mention many of Sydney’s residents. Not dissimilarly, the Auckland case cited in the introduction illustrates how the planners actively consulted the dominant commercial stakeholders in developing their growth strategy, yet failed to have direct consultation with the Region’s actual residents (ARGF, 1999; Gunder, 2003a). Planners and their governance forum of dominant stakeholders appeared to inherently know what is in the best interests of their region’s residents. Planning as agonistic ethics Notwithstanding the ‘full rendering of the antagonisms which traverse our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic whole, kept together by forces of solidarity and co-operation’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 6). Planning is one such instrument that shapes and justifies the governing ideals of utopian desire and in this ‘sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is dominant’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 110). The subtle and not so subtle application of power defines truth, reason and rationality and this particularly comprises the deployment of power in our planning and related practices (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). Moreover, a Lacanian line of reasoning about knowledge and truth indicates that the constituting components of these induced fantasies of truth and rationality are mediated on the wants and needs of actors with the capacity to inflict their desires and wants on the Other and, as if, these desires belong to those who have been imposed on. This is via assertions of unquestionable ‘truth’, which are often supported and empowered by selected ‘distorted’ knowledge, practices and language put forward by their ideological supporters, employed professional experts and controlled media. Further, in this light traditional Kantian and related enlightenment ‘ethics is nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology that tries to pass off its own commandments as authentic, spontaneous, and “honorable” inclinations of the subject’ (Zupancic, 1998: 41). In contrast to traditional ethics, Lacan’s (1992) theorizing may provide an alternative way to develop new values beyond those already constituted by society as traditional morals of good or evil shaping acceptable behaviours. Traditional ethics is predicated on a reality principle as to what is possible without transgression in social reality. As Zupancic (2003: 77) observes, this ‘reality principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself as empirical factor or (biological, economic . . .) necessity.’ This ‘beyond good or evil’ does not have to lead to postmodern nihilism, rather Lacan lays a groundwork for an ethics of the Real, where through acknowledgement of this Real that we cannot know or articulate we can establish new ‘truths’ in relationship to the ‘good’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b; Zupancic, 2000, 2003). This is through a mechanism of ethical sublimation where we create ‘a certain space, scene, or “stage” that enables us to value something that is situated beyond the reality principle, as well as beyond the principle of common good’ (Zupancic, 2003: 78). It is the space, or stage, created when the planner, or other actor, makes the ethical decision to recommend an action or permission that is contrary to existing regulations, precedence, professional expectations, or cultural imperatives. This is perhaps because somehow for the planner, perhaps simply driven by strong feelings, the ‘correct’ and expected action is perceived as not being the right thing to do. From the Lacanian perspective of the ethics of the Real, to make the sensed wrong into a rightness is the ethically correct task, even if this requires the agent to act against what he/she thinks society expects of that actor. This act of transcending the reality principle, and being true to the actor’s desires,5 makes possible a new good, a new potential, it changes the rules as to what is possible (Gunder and Hillier, 2004: 230). ‘The ethical, then, is the constellation of events in which the subject frees herself from the symbolic law (“freedom”), commits herself to an act (“agency”), and thereby makes it possible for the law to be rethought’ (Kay, 2003: 109). The ethical ‘act is an “excessive”, trans-strategic intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 81). Viewed from this perspective, Kant’s categorical imperative must be rethought itself as purely transgressive: the ethical act proper is a transgression of the legal norm – a transgression which, in contrast to a simple criminal violation, does not simply violate the legal norm, but redefines what is a legal norm. The moral law does not follow the Good – it generates a new shape of what counts as ‘Good’. (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 170) This is a transgression that introduces new spaces for what can be considered ‘good’ and hence a wider space for jouissance, beyond that of mere technically produced materialist satisfaction. Of course, a key question becomes: how can a credible planner, or other actor, transcend the accepted norms and expectations of a society to create a new space for a new concept of ‘good’? Further, how can one effectively and reasonably mobilize such an ethics of the Real in everyday life when it is so contrary to the consensual instrumental rationality of the modern project and its ready-made solutions, that are, arguably planning’s purpose and foundations? Planning theorists (e.g. Gunder and Hillier, 2004; Pløger, 2004) and researchers in other disciplines (e.g. Mouffe, 1999, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2003a; Thrift, 2004a, 2004b) are currently attempting to address these complex issues that essentially require new insight and perhaps even profound change in our very relationships towards social reality, itself. Further, they are attempting to do so in a manner that does not simply impose a new intransigent set of ideals to replace our late-modern cultural imperatives, but rather to encourage diverse opportunities for multiple opening in which imminence may continually occur (after Deleuze). Coherent and implementable means to achieve this desired state are yet to emerge as new knowledges and practices, if they can ever do so. Yet, this author suggests that mere awareness and articulation of the impossible implications that the Lacanian Real has on traditional rationality are perhaps one of many points of commencement. Of course, this discourse also may fall into the trap leading to transcendental idealism, i.e. a process of identifying a lack, or void, in our knowledge and practices and then presenting a hegemonic solution that must be implemented, regardless of effect and affect! This author suggests that to change social reality, to begin to question and where necessary traverse our norms and laws, while avoiding the imperative of idealism, calls for a return to agonism that reawakens the political awareness of lack and negativity in place of the technical injunction: you will enjoy! This permits a space for an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism that does not exclude the Others’ voice attempting to articulate their desires and wants in response to the ‘irreducibility of the Real’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b: 331). Rather this re-politicization of the planning problematic from that of the technical, quantified, solution is one that values Lacan’s Real and Lefebvre’s lived space by making the ‘key “jump from quantity to quality”, from antagonisms subordinated to differences to the predominant role of antagonism’ as pure agonism (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 92). In Lefebvre’s city ‘unconscious desires and passions lay dormant, dormant beneath the surface of the real, within the surreal . . . waiting for . . . the day they can be realized in actual conscious life’ (Merrifield, 2000: 178). In this regard, rather than continuing to fill the lack generating the urban problematic and produce a largely phallic enjoyment, Stavrakakis (2003b: 332) reminds us that in Lacan’s later teachings he spoke of another form ‘of jouissance – female or feminine jouissance – which values this lack per se as something that entails a different kind of enjoyment.’ Perhaps this feminine jouissance may be more appropriate to politicize the needs and wants of lived space. Yet, to do so would require a politics that acknowledges the impossibility of the Lacanian Real. In contrast to the notion that what is meant by an utopia is an imagined ‘ideal society; what characterizes utopia is literally the construction of a u-topic space, a social space outside the existing parameters, the parameters of what appears to be “possible” in the existing social universe’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 123). This proposed utopia is one that may permit, at least aspects of Lefebvre’s ‘lived space’ of the qualitative to be both visible and articulated in conscious life. Rather than contestant cities and regions competing globally under one cultural imperative to attract and retain finite capital and resources via one ‘logic’ and vision, this article calls for a planning ethos that encourages diverse groups within cities and regions to actively contest their perspectives and desires without threat of exclusion. To achieve such a state requires planning ‘to find ways of working with agonism without automatically recurring to procedures, voting, representativity, forced consensus or compromises’ that inherently exclude (Pløger, 2004: 87). This requires a planning ethos predicated on a central awareness of the irreducible Real. This is an understanding that any forced resolution always excludes a remainder, what cannot be articulated or perceived. Further, this remainder will continue to have unconscious effect in terms of what drives our materialized actions. This suggests an overt democratic planning process, representative of a society that is explicitly and overtly hegemonic for all participants, not tacitly hegemonic in its privileging of specific groups with access to power and technocratic justification that is constituted under a logic implicitly desiring social order (Critchley, cited in Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 95). This is in contrast to the existing social reality, where political processes, such as planning, appear to strive for public participation culminating in an harmonious public consensus, when of course this is but an ideological foil that excludes in the name of a ‘general interest’ defined by a privileged few and legitimized by technocratic ‘reason’. In contrast, a strong society ‘places conflict and power at its centre’ by guaranteeing the very ‘existence of conflict’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998b: 229). Our current dominating fantasy of harmony is sustained by the illusion of continued consumer abundance produced and brought by the cornucopia of global capitalism, at least for the first world. This enjoyment of global capitalism ‘constitutes a (partial) reality with hegemonic appeal, a horizon sustained by the hegemony of an administration of desire with seemingly unlimited resources’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 61). Of course, resources and global carrying capacities are axiomatically finite. So perhaps must be our desires, for they can never be sated. Traversing our fundamental fantasy for harmony: a start, not a conclusion! Lacan and his followers, such as Stavrakakis, Zˇ izˇek or Zupancic, produce valid arguments for a psychoanalytically derived philosophy of reality and ideology ‘capable of theorizing the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices of domination’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Revealing and transversing the ideological constructs that shape and structure our social reality is inadequate in itself as a mere academic critical exercise of knowledge production. This author argues that we must radically challenge our underlying beliefs for ourselves, and, in particular, not externalize them to ‘larger cultural practices and technologies’ so that hegemonic networks, or partnerships, of dominant actors, including intellectuals and bureaucratic professionals, can do our believing and desiring for us through planning and related diverse agencies of social guidance (Dean, 2001: 628). To do so we must traverse our fundamental fantasies that seek harmony and security. This article’s application of Lacan, augmented with some of Lefebvre’s urban insights, gives us a combination of Freudian and Marxist thought that is considerably at odds to that conjured up by the Frankfurt School’s vision of society as ‘a liberated collective culture’ with little space for the individual histories of unique subjects (Jameson, 2003: 8). The latter is the School, or project, drawing on Marx and Freud, which eventually created the Habermasian product of communicative rationality. This is a rationality that sought as its seldom if ever achieved ideal, to produce undistorted (ideologically free) speech acts ‘based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensiveness, truth, truthfulness, and rightness’ constituting a basis for consensually agreement as to how we should act (Habermas, 1979: 3). Yet, as Hillier (2003) illustrates, this is an ideal of undistorted speech that is an impossibility because of the Lacanian Real and the incompleteness it always induces in language, not to mention the impossibility of absolute truth. Yet, this author would agree with Habermas’ call for the supremacy of discourse over mere technical reason. Habermas’ last two validity claims of truthfulness to our desires and the need to act in regard of what our unconscious feeling says is rightness, even if this sense is perhaps not readily justifiable with symbolic knowledge and reasoned argument, should be given due regard through our discourses. In contrast to Habermas’ validity claims of truth and comprehensiveness, Lacan’s theorizing suggests a much more fundamental contextualization of urban ideology based on the fantasies we construct to paper over the lack induced by the Real. This is a perspective that situates our very social reality, including space and social interaction, as principally constituted and composed of ideological fantasy constructs, misrecognitions and misunderstandings (see Hillier, 2003). As Jameson (2003: 37–8) observes, we owe to Lacan ‘the first new and as yet insufficiently developed concept of the nature of ideology since Marx’. Drawing on Althusser, Jameson (2003: 37–8) continues that ideology is ‘the “representation” of the Imaginary relationships of individuals to their Real conditions of existence’, so that ‘the individual subject invents a “lived” relationship with collective systems.’ This is a symbolic, materialized, relationship of practices and rituals (Krips, 2003: 149). Here, it is the desire of this Other that we fundamentally seek and wish to please as we constantly strive to return to our idealized primordial desire for infant maternal security and contentment (Hillier and Gunder, 2005). So we construct and share illusions and fantasies – ideologies – that we are somehow achieving this impossible task. It is the aggregate of these Others, and the illusions we generate about them and ourselves, that constitutes the social reality that is our lived space.

#### The misrecognition of desire is the root cause of accumulation and capitalism- they try to destroy the symptoms of desire but we control the root cause- desire will always manifest itself.

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Capitalist ideology aims at producing subjects who experience their existence as dissatisfied and simultaneously invest themselves completely in the ideal of happiness or complete satisfaction.15 This idea manifests itself not just in the everyday workings of capitalism but in its most serious theorists — from Adam Smith and David Ricardo to Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. According to Adam Smith, society can attain the satisfaction of true prosperity as long as it unleashes humanity’s natural propensity for accumulation. He writes: “The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions.”16 The desire to accumulate enables capitalist subjects to overcome barriers and obtain happiness. For Smith and others, there is no question of an insurmountable barrier and no possibility of enjoying the barrier itself. Capitalism survives on the basis of the same misrecognition that plagues Freud’s neurotic: the mistaking of desire for drive, the inability to see satisfaction in the act of not getting the object. Without engendering this collective misrecognition, capitalism could not sustain itself as capitalism. Capitalist subjects structurally fail to see their own inherent self-satisfaction, and it is this failure that keeps them going as capitalist subjects. Freud’s thought reveals this, and it reveals that there is a beyond of the capitalist subject — a beyond that is the death drive. The emancipatory politics of psychoanalysis is thus inherently anticapitalist insofar as the functioning of capitalism depends on the idea of obtaining the object. Capitalism feeds off of desire’s perpetual dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction leads to efforts to accumulate more capital, attempts to increase productivity, 61 The Economics of the Drive and the introduction of new commodities into the market — in short, every aspect of capitalist economics. Marketers in capitalist society are bent upon producing desire in subjects and blinding them to the drive. In the Grundrisse Marx describes the way capitalism perpetuates desire through the production of needs: “Production not only supplies a material for the need, but it also supplies a need for the material. . . . The need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. The object of art — like every other product — creates a public which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty. Production thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object.”17 Capitalism functions by sustaining — and even increasing — a sense of dissatisfaction commensurate with desire. This explains capitalism’s infatuation with the new. Capitalism constantly seeks out and embraces what is new, because the new keeps desire going by helping to create a sense of lack. The new holds the promise of a future enjoyment that will surpass whatever the subject has experienced before. Th is promise is the engine behind capitalism’s creation of ever more needs. The more represents a constant lure, the next more — at least from afar — always seems to be it, the object that would provide the elusive enjoyment. A portrayal of the inherent dissatisfaction that capitalism requires even among the wealthy occurs near the end of Roman Polanski’s Chinatown (1974). In the fi lm’s penultimate scene, Jake Gitt es ( Jack Nicholson) reproaches Noah Cross ( John Huston) for continuing a patt ern of ruthless accumulation despite having already obtained a vast fortune. The ir conversation makes clear the insatiable nature of the imperative to accumulate. Jake asks, “How much are you worth?” Cross, sensing the possibility of buying Jake off , says, “I have no idea. How much do you want?” But Jake doesn’t want money; he wants to know what keeps Cross going. Jake continues, “No, I just want to know what you’re worth. Over ten million?” Cross responds, “Oh my, yes.” The n Jake asks, “Why are you doing it? How much bett er can you eat? What can you buy that you can’t already aff ord?” Cross gives an answer emblematic of the capitalist subject: “The future, Mr. Getz [sic], the future.” Cross’s appeal to the “future” indicates that he believes in the promise of capitalism — that the future holds the lost enjoyment that always eludes us today. Despite his millions, his emphasis on the future demonstrates that Cross cannot recognize his own inherent satisfaction.18 62 Subjectivity Capitalism leaves individual subjects with a constant sense of their own dissatisfaction, but it also holds out the lure of future enjoyment, which prompts both the capitalist to create a new commodity and the consumer to buy it. Just as the capitalist hopes that every newly created commodity will be it, so does the consumer. However, no new commodity can ever provide the lost enjoyment for either the capitalist or the consumer, no matt er how successful the commodity is, because the enjoyment has only an imaginary status. Once the commodity is realized for each (put on the market, in the case of the capitalist, or purchased, in the case of the consumer), it necessarily loses its enjoyment value. In this sense, capitalism depends upon the dynamic of the child at Christmas time. On Christmas Eve all the presents under the tree offer the promise of a future enjoyment, but by aft ernoon on Christmas Day the child ends up bored and desiring once again, not having found the elusive enjoyment in any of the opened packages. Th is boredom isn’t just the sign of the child’s narcissism or that it has been spoiled by overindulgent parents; it is, rather, a structural necessity within the desiring world of capitalism. The cycle of the promise of future enjoyment and then the inevitable dissatisfaction that follows can only perpetuate itself as long as capitalist subjects continue to hope, that is, to believe in the promise that the new commodity holds out. More than anything else, hope keeps capitalism going. Giving up hope — and yet continuing on, enjoying continuing on — moves us from desire to the drive. Th is type of transformation also entails the end of the capitalist subject: capitalist subjects without hope are no longer capitalist subjects. What holds us back from this possibility is our inability to discover a way of finding satisfaction satisfying. Th is failure, perhaps even more than its human costs, is what most disturbs Marx about capitalism. The points in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts at which Marx seems to slip into humanism as he recounts the eff ects of capitalism are the points at which he tries to articulate, though he wouldn’t put it this way, the capitalist system’s resistance to the death drive: capitalism doesn’t allow us to find satisfaction in our satisfaction. Its logic is one that Marx calls “self-renunciation.” As he puts it in perhaps the most famous passage from the Manuscripts, “The less you eat, drink and buy books; the less you go to the theater, the dance hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, 63 The Economics of the Drive etc., the more you save — the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor dust will devour — your capital. The less you are, the less you express your own life, the greater is your alienated life, the more you have, the greater is the store of your estranged being.”19 What Marx describes here as “alienated life” is not a life made unnatural by capitalism but a life where satisfaction is not satisfying, a life stuck within the capitalist logic of desire.

#### Their political fantasy is doomed to failure —They reestablish the master narrative by posing their utopic vision as the ultimate societal goal and paper over the lack that structurally determines the structure they critique

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The field of social construction and **political reality is the field in which the symbolisation of this real is attempted.** Chaitin is correct when asserting that symbolisation has the creative power to produce cultural identities, but at a price, the cost of covering over the fundamental nothingness that forms its foundation. It is **culture**, not nature, that **abhors** a vacuum, above all that of **its own contingency** (Chaitin, 1996:4- 5), of **its ultimate inability to master and symbolise the impossible real: there is a structural lack in the symbolic, which means that certain points of the real can’t be symbolised in a definite manner.** The unmitigated real provokes anxiety, and this in turn gives rise to never-ending, defensive, imaginary constructs (Verhaeghe, 1994:60). Following from this, **all human productions** [Society itself, culture, religion, science] **can be understood in the light of that structural failure of the symbolic in relationship to the real** (ibid.: 61). It is the moment of this failure, the moment of our encounter with the real, that is revealed as the moment of the political par excellence in our reading of Lacan. It is the constitutivity of this moment in Lacanian psychoanalysis that proves our fantasmatic conception of the socio-political institution of society as a harmonious totality to be no more than a mirage. It is this traumatic moment of the political qua encounter with the real that initiates again and again a process of symbolisation, and initiates the ever-present hegemonic play between different symbolisations of this real. **This play leads to the emergence of politics, to the political institution of a new social fantasy** (or of many antagonistic fantasies engaged in a struggle for hegemony**) in the place of the dislocated one, and so on and so forth.** In this light, Lacan’s insistence on the centrality of the real, especially in the latter part of his teaching, acquires major political importance. Lacan himself, in his seminar on The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis uses noise and accident as metaphors or examples of our encounter with the real. It might be possible to add the political to this chain of equivalences. Lacan’s schema of **socio-political life is** that of a play, **an unending circular play between possibility and impossibility, between construction and destruction**, representation and failure, articulation and dislocation, reality and the real, politics and the political. It is this constitutive play which can help illuminate a series of political questions and lead to a novel approach to political analysis. As an illustration let us examine a concrete problem of political analysis. How are we, for example, to account for the emergence and the hegemonic force of apartheid discourse in South Africa? Is this emergence due to a positively defined cause (class struggle, etc.)? What becomes apparent now, in light of the structural causality of the political, is that the reasons for the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s are not to be found in some sort of objective conditions (Norval, 1996:51). **Apartheid can be traced back to the dislocations that conditioned the emergence of this Afrikaner nationalist discourse** (associated, among others, with the increasing capitalisation of agriculture, the rate of urbanisation and events such as the Great War). The articulation of a **new political discourse can only make sense against the background of the dislocation of the preceding socio-political order or ideological space. It is the lack created by dislocation that causes the desire for a new discursive articulation. It is this lack created by a dislocation of the social which forms the kernel of the political** as an encounter with the Lacanian real. Every dislocatory event leads to the antagonistic articulation of different discourses that attempt to symbolise its traumatic nature, to suture the lack it creates. In that sense the political stands at the root of politics, dislocation at the root of the articulation of a new sociopolitical order, an encounter with the real moment of the political at the root of our symbolisation of political reality. Underlying Lacan’s importance for political theory and political analysis is his insistence on the split, lacking nature of the symbolic, of the socio-political world per se. Our **societies are never harmonious ensembles. This is** only **the fantasy through which they attempt to constitute and reconstitute themselves. Experience shows that this fantasy can never be fully realised. No social fantasy can fill the lack around which society is always structured. This lack is re-emerging with every resurfacing of the political**, with every encounter with the real. We can speak about the political exactly because there is subversion and dislocation of the social. The level of social construction, of human creativity, of the emergence and development of socio-political institutions, is the level in which the possibility of mastering the real makes itself visible but only to be revealed as a chimera unable to foreclose a moment of impossibility that always returns to its place. Given this context, **the moment of the political should be understood as emerging at the intersection of our symbolic reality with this real, the real being the ontological horizon of every play between political articulation and dislocation, order and disorder, politics and the political.** 2

#### Negate to engage in the death drive- the aff’s attempt to fill the loss will perpetually fail. Instead, enjoy the lost object and to reproduce the loss.

**McGowan** [Todd McGowan (Professor in the Department of English at the University of Vermont). “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis.” [Symploke Studies in Contemporary Theory](https://www.jstor.org/bookseries/j.ctt1d98863). Pg 13-14. 2013. Accessed 1/30/20. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1ddr7nv//> Xu]

The death drive is neither (contra Marcuse) aggressiveness nor an impulse to return to an inorganic state (as Freud’s metaphor in Beyond the Pleasure Principle might imply) but an impetus to return to an originary traumatic and constitutive loss. The death drive emerges with subjectivity itself as the subject enters into the social order and becomes a social and speaking being by sacrificing a part of itself. This sacrifice is an act of creation that produces an object that exists only insofar as it is lost. This loss of what the subject doesn’t have institutes the death drive, which produces enjoyment through the repetition of the initial loss. Subjects engage in acts of self-sacrifice and self-sabotage because the loss enacted reproduces the subject’s lost object and enables the subject to enjoy this object. Once it is obtained, the object ceases to be the object. As a result, the subject must continually repeat the sacrificial acts that produce the object, despite the damage that such acts do to the subject’s self-interest. From the perspective of the death drive, we turn to violence not in order to gain power but in order to produce loss, which is our only source of enjoyment. Without the lost object, life becomes bereft of any satisfaction. The repetition of sacrifice, however, creates a life worth living, a life in which one can enjoy oneself through the lost object. The repetition involved with the death drive is not simply repetition of any particular experience. The repetition compulsion leads the subject to repeat specifically the experiences that have traumatized it and disturbed its stable functioning. The better things are going for the subject, the more likely that the death drive will derail the subject’s activity.

## 3

#### Commercial mining solves extinction from scarcity, climate, terror, war, and disease.

Pelton 17—(Director Emeritus of the Space and Advanced Communications Research Institute at George Washington University, PHD in IR from Georgetown).. Pelton, Joseph N. 2017. The New Gold Rush: The Riches of Space Beckon! Springer. Accessed 8/30/19.

Are We Humans Doomed to Extinction? What will we do when Earth’s resources are used up by humanity? The world is now hugely over populated, with billions and billions crammed into our overcrowded cities. By 2050, we may be 9 billion strong, and by 2100 well over 11 billion people on Planet Earth. Some at the United Nations say we might even be an amazing 12 billion crawling around this small globe. And over 80 % of us will be living in congested cities. These cities will be ever more vulnerable to terrorist attack, natural disaster, and other plights that come with overcrowding and a dearth of jobs that will be fueled by rapid automation and the rise of artifi cial intelligence across the global economy. We are already rapidly running out of water and minerals. Climate change is threatening our very existence. Political leaders and even the Pope have cautioned us against inaction. Perhaps the naysayers are right. All humanity is at tremendous risk. Is there no hope for the future? This book is about hope. We think that there is literally heavenly hope for humanity. But we are not talking here about divine intervention. We are envisioning a new space economy that recognizes that there is more water in the skies that all our oceans. Th ere is a new wealth of natural resources and clean energy in the reaches of outer space—more than most of us could ever dream possible. There are those that say why waste money on outer space when we have severe problems here at home? Going into space is not a waste of money. It is our future. It is our hope for new jobs and resources. The great challenge of our times is to reverse public thinking to see space not as a resource drain but as the doorway to opportunity. The new space frontier can literally open up a “gold rush in the skies.” In brief, we think there is new hope for humanity. We see a new a pathway to the future via new ventures in space. For too long, space programs have been seen as a money pit. In the process, we have overlooked the great abundance available to us in the skies above. It is important to recognize there is already the beginning of a new gold rush in space—a pathway to astral abundance. “New Space” is a term increasingly used to describe radical new commercial space initiatives—many of which have come from Silicon Valley and often with backing from the group of entrepreneurs known popularly as the “space billionaires.” New space is revolutionizing the space industry with lower cost space transportation and space systems that represent significant cost savings and new technological breakthroughs. “New Commercial Space” and the “New Space Economy” represent more than a new way of looking at outer space. These new pathways to the stars could prove vital to human survival. If one does not believe in spending money to probe the mysteries of the universe then perhaps we can try what might be called “calibrated greed” on for size. One only needs to go to a cubesat workshop, or to Silicon Valley or one of many conferences like the “Disrupt Space” event in Bremen, Germany, held in April 2016 to recognize that entrepreneurial New Space initiatives are changing everything [ 1 ]. In fact, the very nature and dimensions of what outer space activities are today have changed forever. It is no longer your grandfather’s concept of outer space that was once dominated by the big national space agencies. The entrepreneurs are taking over. The hopeful statements in this book and the hard economic and technical data that backs them up are more than a minority opinion. It is a topic of growing interest at the World Economic Forum, where business and political heavyweights meet in Davos, Switzerland, to discuss how to stimulate new patterns of global economic growth. It is even the growing view of a group that call themselves “space ethicists.” Here is how Christopher J. Newman, at the University of Sunderland in the United Kingdom has put it: Space ethicists have offered the view that space exploration is not only desirable; it is a duty that we, as a species, must undertake in order to secure the survival of humanity over the longer term. Expanding both the resource base and, eventually, the habitats available for humanity means that any expenditure on space exploration, far from being viewed as frivolous, can legitimately be rationalized as an ethical investment choice. (Newman) On the other hand there are space ethicists and space exobiologists who argue that humans have created ecological ruin on the planet—and now space debris is starting to pollute space. Th ese countervailing thoughts by the “no growth” camp of space ethicists say we have no right to colonize other planets or to mine the Moon and asteroids—or at least no right to do so until we can prove we can sustain life here on Earth for the longer term. However, for most who are planning for the new space economy the opinion of space philosophers doesn’t really fl oat their boat. Legislators, bankers, and aspiring space entrepreneurs are far more interested in the views of the super-rich capitalists called the space billionaires. A number of these billionaires and space executives have already put some very serious money into enterprises intent on creating a new pathway to the stars. No less than five billionaires with established space ventures—Elon Musk, Paul Allen, Jeff Bezos, Sir Richard Branson, and Robert Bigelow—have invested millions if not billions of dollars into commercializing space. They are developing new technologies and establishing space enterprises that can bring the wealth of outer space down to Earth. This is not a pipe dream, but will increasingly be the economic reality of the 2020s. These wealthy space entrepreneurs see major new economic opportunities. To them space represents the last great frontier for enterprising pioneers. Th us they see an ever-expanding space frontier that offers opportunities in low-cost space transportation, satellite solar power satellites to produce clean energy 24h a day, space mining, space manufacturing and production, and eventually space habitats and colonies as a trajectory to a better human future. Some even more visionary thinkers envision the possibility of terraforming Mars, or creating new structures in space to protect our planet from cosmic hazards and even raising Earth’s orbit to escape the rising heat levels of the Sun in millennia to come. Some, of course, will say this is sci-fi hogwash. It can’t be done. We say that this is what people would have said in 1900 about airplanes, rocket ships, cell phones and nuclear devices. The skeptics laughed at Columbus and his plan to sail across the oceans to discover new worlds. When Thomas Jefferson bought the Louisiana Purchase from France or Seward bought Alaska, there were plenty of naysayers that said such investment in the unknown was an extravagant waste of money. A healthy skepticism is useful and can play a role in economic and business success. Before one dismisses the idea of an impending major new space economy and a new gold rush, it might useful to see what has already transpired in space development in just the past five decades. The world’s first geosynchronous communications satellite had a throughput capability of about 500 kb / s. In contrast, today’s state of the art Viasat 2 —a half century later— has an impressive throughput of some 140 Gb/s. Th is means that the relative throughput is nearly 300,000 greater, while its lifetime is some ten times longer (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 ). Each new generation of communications satellite has had more power, better antenna systems, improved pointing and stabilization, and an extended lifetime. And the capabilities represented by remote sensing satellites , meteorological satellites , and navigation and timing satellites have also expanded their capabilities and performance in an impressive manner. When satellite applications first started, the market was measured in millions of dollars. Today commercial satellite services exceed a quarter of a billion dollars. Vital services such as the Internet, aircraft traffi c control and management, international banking, search and rescue and much, much more depend on application satellites. Th ose that would doubt the importance of satellites to the global economy might wish to view on You Tube the video “If Th ere Were a Day Without Satellites?” [ 2 ]. Let’s check in on what some of those very rich and smart guys think about the new space economy and its potential. (We are sorry to say that so far there are no female space billionaires, but surely this, too, will come someday soon.) Of course this twenty-fi rst century breakthrough that we call the New Space economy will not come just from new space commerce. It will also come from the amazing new technologies here on Earth. Vital new terrestrial technologies will accompany this cosmic journey into tomorrow. Information technology, robotics, artificial intelligence and commercial space travel systems have now set us on a course to allow us humans to harvest the amazing riches in the skies—new natural resources, new energy, and even totally new ways of looking at the purpose of human existence. If we pursue this course steadfastly, it can be the beginning of a New Space renaissance. But if we don’t seek to realize our ultimate destiny in space, Homo sapiens can end up in the dustbin of history—just like literally millions of already failed species. In each and every one of the five mass extinction events that have occurred over the last 1.5 billion years on Earth, some 50–80 % of all species have gone the way of the T. Rex, the woolly mammoth, and the Dodo bird along with extinct ferns, grasses and cacti. On the other hand, the best days of the human race could be just beginning. If we are smart about how we go about discovering and using these riches in the skies and applying the best of our new technologies, it could be the start of a new beginning for humanity. Konstantin Tsiokovsky, the Russian astronautics pioneer, who fi rst conceived of practical designs for spaceships, famously said: “A planet is the cradle of mankind, but one cannot live in a cradle forever.” Well before Tsiokovsky another genius, Leonardo da Vinci, said, quite poetically: “Once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return.” The founder of the X-Prize and of Planetary Resources, Inc., Dr. Peter Diamandis, has much more brashly said much the same thing in quite diff erent words when he said: “The meek shall inherit the Earth. The rest of us will go to Mars.” The New Space Billionaires Peter Diamandis is not alone in his thinking. From the list of “visionaries” quoted earlier, Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX; Sir Richard Branson, the founder of Virgin Galactic; and Paul Allen, the co-founder of Microsoft and the man who financed SpaceShipOne, the world’s first successful spaceplane have all said the future will include a vibrant new space economy. Th ey, and others, have said that we can, we should and we soon shall go into space and realize the bounty that it can offer to us. Th e New Space enterprise is today indeed being led by those so-called space billionaires , who have an exciting vision of the future. They and others in the commercial space economy believe that the exploitation of outer space may open up a new golden age of astral abundance. They see outer space as a new frontier that can be a great source of new materials, energy and various forms of new wealth that might even save us from excesses of the past. Th is gold rush in the skies represents a new beginning. We are not talking about expensive new space ventures funded by NASA or other space agencies in Europe, Japan, China or India. No, these eff orts which we and others call New Space are today being forged by imaginative and resourceful commercial entrepreneurs. Th ese twenty-fi rst century visionaries have the fortitude and zeal to look to the abundance above. New breakthroughs in technology and New Space enterprises may be able to create an “astral life raft” for humanity. Just as Columbus and the Vikings had the imaginative drive that led them to discover the riches of a new world, we now have a cadre of space billionaires that are now leading us into this New Space era of tomorrow. These bold leaders, such as Paul Allen and Sir Richard Branson, plus other space entrepreneurs including Jeff Bezos of Amazon and Blue Origin, and Robert Bigelow, Chairman of Budget Suites and Bigelow Aerospace, not only dream of their future in the space industry but also have billions of dollars in assets. These are the bright stars of an entirely new industry that are leading us into the age of New Space commerce. These space billionaires, each in their own way, are proponents of a new age of astral abundance. Each of them is launching new commercial space industries. They are literally transforming our vision of tomorrow. These new types of entrepreneurial aerospace companies—the New Space enterprises—give new hope and new promise of transforming our world as we know it today. The New Space Frontier What happens in space in the next few decades, plus corresponding new information technologies and advanced robotics, will change our world forever. These changes will redefi ne wealth, change our views of work and employment and upend almost everything we think we know about economics, wealth, jobs, and politics. Th ese changes are about truly disruptive technologies of the most fundamental kinds. If you thought the Internet, smart phones, and spandex were disruptive technologies, just hang on. You have not seen anything yet. In short, if you want to understand a transition more fundamental than the changes brought to the twentieth century world by computers, communications and the Internet, then read this book. There are truly riches in the skies. Near-Earth asteroids largely composed of platinum and rare earth metals have an incredible value. Helium-3 isotopes accessible in outer space could provide clean and abundant energy. There is far more water in outer space than is in our oceans. In the pages that follow we will explain the potential for a cosmic shift in our global economy, our ecology, and our commercial and legal systems. These can take place by the end of this century. And if these changes do not take place we will be in trouble. Our conventional petro-chemical energy systems will fail us economically and eventually blanket us with a hydrocarbon haze of smog that will threaten our health and our very survival. Our rare precious metals that we need for modern electronic appliances will skyrocket in price, and the struggle between “haves” and “have nots” will grow increasingly ugly. A lack of affordable and readily available water, natural resources, food, health care and medical supplies, plus systematic threats to urban security and systemic warfare are the alternatives to astral abundance. The choices between astral abundance and a downward spiral in global standards of living are stark. Within the next few decades these problems will be increasingly real. By then the world may almost be begging for new, out of- the-box thinking. International peace and security will be an indispensable prerequisite for exploitation of astral abundance, as will good government for all. No one nation can be rich and secure when everyone else is poor and insecure. In short, global space security and strategic space defense, mediated by global space agreements, are part of this new pathway to the future.

#### Resource scarcity coming now and causes extinction—asteroid mining is the only way to solve

Crombrugghe 18 – Guerric, Business Development Manager Brussels, Brussels Capital Region, “Asteroid mining as a necessary answer to mineral scarcity”, LinkedIn, 1/11/2018, <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/asteroid-mining-necessary-answer-mineral-scarcity-de-crombrugghe>

We need minerals, and we always will. Yet, our reserves are finite and a 100% end-of-life recycling rate is impossible to achieve. Eventually, new entrants will therefore be required to sustain our system. While the business case for asteroid mining can obviously not be closed with current technologies, it will someday become a necessity. We may as well start preparing ourselves. Scarcity of resources, the challenge of the 21st century According to the World Bank, in 2016 humanity's growth rate was of 1.18% in terms of population, and 2.50% in terms of GDP. Both of these, in turn, drive our staggering resource consumption: there are more of us, and each of us needs more. On the other, the Earth is a closed system, and resources are only available in a finite amount. We all know by now that there is only this much oil & gas, but the same can actually be said for water, arable land, minerals, etc. These two simple observations have sparkled the debate around the scarcity of resources. Even with the best intentions, mathematics teaches us that it is impossible to indefinitely extract resources from a given finite supply [1]. The problem arising in the short-term is the exhaustion of the existing supply. That limit is actually coming in fast. In a paper published in 2007, Stephen Kessler demonstrates that the global mineral reserves are only sufficient for the next 50 years. The figure on the right shows the ratio of known global reserve to global annual consumption, given a rough indication of adequacy in years. It dates from an earlier paper, published in 1994. Since then, the development of environmental-friendly technologies (e.g. batteries, electric engines, etc.) has drastically increased the consumption rate of high-tech metals such as cobalt, platinum, rare earths, or titanium. On the other hand, exploration programs have allowed to discover new deposits, notably of gold and diamond. We will certainly be able to continue to increase - or at least sustain - our reserves, but only temporarily. Recycling and other temporary fixes An obvious solution is recycling, i.e. rejuvenating our stocks. A popular concept to illustrate this idea is that of urban mining: retrieving the ores present in smartphones and other electronic devices. It may prove to be not only more environmental-friendly, be also safer and more cost-effective. Nevertheless, every solution based on recycling is, again, nothing more than a temporary fix, buying us a finite amount of time. The United Nations Environment Programme studied in a report the current recycling rate of 60 metals. More than half of them have an end-of-life recycling rate below 1%, and less than one-third are above 50%. Nickel, for example, is relatively easy to retrieve, with and end-of-life recycling rate of up to 63% under the best conditions. At that rate, less than 1% of the initial stock is available after only 10 cycle. Even with a staggering 99% efficiency, the same 1% limit is achieved in less than 460 cycles. Not bad, of course, but still not enough. Should our hunger for resources continue, and even with the most optimised recycling techniques, a second problem will arise in the longer term: the amount of resources needed at a given time will simply exceed the total available stock. Unless we manage to find growth vectors that do not require raw materials, that tipping point is an impassable limit. Its proximity obviously depends on our consumption rate. Asteroid mining? No matter which way we look at it, we will thus be short on resources, either through sheer exhaustion (i.e. transformation in an unrecoverable form) or because the demand will exceed the total reserves. We can - and should - talk about recycling, dematerialisation, and other more ethically questionable solutions such as bio-engineering. Nonetheless, no matter how good they are, these are only temporary fixes. If we don't radically change our lifestyle, we will sooner or later have to address the elephant in the room: the Earth is a closed system, we need new entrants. How can space help? Short answer: all these minerals can be found in space. Some are difficult to obtain, others are even more difficult, none are straightforward. The most accessible destination is near-Earth asteroids, a reservoir of over 17,000 known - and counting - giant rocks that regularly cross the orbit of our planet. They are commonly classified in three main families. The most interesting one, for our case, is that of the S-type asteroids. These are metallic bodies, containing first and foremost nickel, iron and cobalt, but also gold, ores from the platinum group. But the list doesn't stop there, many other minerals can be found in smaller amounts: iridium, silver, osmium, palladium, rhenium, rhodium, ruthenium, manganese, molybdenum, aluminium, titanium, etc. How do we get there? Let's take an example: Ryugu, formerly known as 1999 JU3. It's a C-type asteroid measured to be approximately one kilometre in size [2]. In addition to nickel, iron and cobalt, it also contains a fair share of water, nitrogen, hydrogen, and ammonia. Its total value is estimated to be approximately 80 billion USD. Fantastic! But how do we get there and, most importantly, how much does it cost? Well, we may have the start of an answer to these questions. Reaching Ryugu is a technological challenge, but it is feasible. In December 2014, the Japanese space agency has launched a spacecraft, Hayabusa2, heading to the asteroid. Its mission includes the collection of a small sample which will be sent back to the Earth, with a landing planned for December 2020. The target for the sample size is at least 100 µg. The total cost of the mission was projected to be around 200 million USD. That's 2 trillion USD per gram. Let's be optimistic and assume that the sample retrieved is pure gold. At today's rate, it is worth 42.5 USD per gram. That's a difference of over 10 orders of magnitude. Some may argue that Hayabusa2 has many other objectives that retrieving a sample. The mission does indeed include multiple landers, thorough scientific investigations, etc. There is actually another asteroid sample return mission underway, which we could you as a second point of comparison: OSIRIS-Rex, from NASA. It's heading for Bennu, also a C-type asteroid, which it will reach in August 2018. Total cost of the mission: 980 million USD. Target sample size: at least 60 g. We achieve thus roughly speaking 16 million USD per gram. Better, but still 6 orders of magnitude off compared to pure gold. It's pretty much as good as it gets with existing state-of-the-art technologies. Not much of a business case. Should we forget about it? Referring back to our earlier conclusion on resource scarcity, we had two options. Either we drastically reduce our resource consumption, to such a degree that reserves can last for longer than humanity itself, or we extend our closed system, the Earth, to nearby asteroids. In the current state of affairs, I am honestly not sure which course of action is the easiest. As they get increasingly rare, the cost of minerals will go up. On the other hand, as explained in a previous article, we can expect the cost of space activities to go steadily down. Step by step, these 6 orders of magnitude will slowly get munched away from both ends, until eventually asteroid mining becomes a viable operation. In other words: it will only become financially interesting once minerals become a thousand times more expensive and space activities a thousand times cheaper. As a point of reference, the introduction of reusable rockets by SpaceX, widely considered as one of the few truly disruptive changes in the aerospace sector in the last few decades, has "only" brought a cost reduction of 30%. While it's clearly amazing, we still need at least 220 innovations of the same calibre [3] before we can make it work (again: assuming the price of minerals simultaneously goes up by a factor of a thousand). It's therefore quite likely that space mining will not take place within our lifetime [4]. How can we accelerate the process? Firstly, we can only celebrate and support the numerous private initiatives which contribute to make that reality happen, either indirectly (e.g. launchers, space systems, etc.) or directly (e.g. in-space manufacturing, lunar exploration, etc.). Shout out to all the folks who manage to keep the flame of space exploration burning while generating profit for their investors. Secondly, space agencies and other institutional actors should continue to act as promoters of pioneering mission such as Hayabusa2, OSIRIS-REx, or DART. We can only regret that the Asteroid Redirect Mission from NASA and the Asteroid Impact Mission from ESA were not funded. From my perspective, these should actually be amongst the top priorities of our space exploration agenda. Not only are they instrumental to our understanding of the solar system, but they are also essential if we want to avoid the same fate as the dinosaurs. It's a question of survival. As a bonus, they also pave the way towards cost-efficient asteroid mining. In the meantime, we might want to consume existing resources a bit more efficiently.

## ON

### Hedge

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew – ows on quantifiaiblity

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

### 1NC – Defense

#### OST Fails

**Evanoff 17** [Kyle Evanoff, Kyle is a research associate in international economics and U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations 10/10/17, "The Outer Space Treaty’s Midlife Funk," Council on Foreign Relations [https://www.cfr.org/blog/outer-space-treatys-midlife-funk accessed 12/11/2021](https://www.cfr.org/blog/outer-space-treatys-midlife-funk%20accessed%2012/11/2021)] Adam

Half a century later, however, the Outer Space Treaty has entered something of a funk. Despite the universal aspirations of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which molded the document into its completed form, many of the principles enshrined within the text are less suited to the present than they were to their native Cold War milieu. While the anachronism has not reached crisis levels, current and foreseeable developments do present challenges for the treaty, heightening the potential for disputes. At the crux of the matter is the ongoing democratization of space. During the 1950s and ‘60s, when the fundamental principles of international space law took shape, only large national governments could afford the enormous outlays required for creating and maintaining a successful space program. In more recent decades, technological advances and new business models have broadened the range of spacefaring actors. Thanks to innovations such as reusable rockets, micro- and nanosatellites, and inflatable space station modules, costs are decreasing and private companies are crowding into the sector. This flurry of activity, known as New Space, promises nothing less than a complete transformation of the way that humans interact with space. Asteroid mining, for example, could eliminate the need to launch many essential materials from Earth, lowering logistical hurdles and enabling largescale in-space fabrication. Companies like Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries, by extracting and selling useful resources in situ, could help to jumpstart a sustainable space economy. They might also profit from selling valuable commodities back on terra firma. As a recent (bullish) Goldman Sachs report noted, a single football-field-sized asteroid could contain $25 to $50 billion worth of platinum—enough to upend the terrestrial market. With astronomical sums at stake and the commercial sector kicking into high gear, legal questions are becoming a major concern. Many of these questions focus on Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits national appropriation of space and the celestial bodies. Since another provision (Article VI) requires nongovernmental entities to operate under a national flag, some experts have suggested that asteroid mining, which would require a period of exclusive use, may violate the agreement. Others, however, contend that companies can claim ownership of extracted resources without claiming ownership of the asteroids themselves. They cite the lunar samples returned to Earth during the Apollo program as a precedent. Hoping to promote American space commerce, Congress formalized this more charitable legal interpretation in Title IV of the 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. Luxembourg, which announced a €200 million asteroid mining fund last year, followed suit with its own law in August. Controversies like the one surrounding asteroid mining are par for the course when it comes to the Outer Space Treaty. The agreement’s insistence that space be used “for peaceful purposes” has long been the subject of intense debate. During the treaty-making process, Soviet jurists argued that peaceful meant “non-military” and that spy satellites were illegal; Americans, who enjoyed an early lead in orbital reconnaissance, interpreted peaceful to mean “non-aggressive” and came to the opposite conclusion. Decades later, the precise meaning of the phrase remains a matter of contention. While the Outer Space Treaty has survived past disputes intact, some experts and policymakers believe that an update is in order. Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX), for instance, worries that legal ambiguity could undermine the nascent commercial space sector—a justifiable concern. Russia and Brazil, among other countries, hold asteroid mining operations to constitute de facto national appropriation. And while there are plenty of asteroids to go around for now (NASA has catalogued nearly 8,000 near earth objects larger than 140 meters in diameter), more supply-side saturation could lead to conflicts over choice space rocks. The absence of clear property rights makes this prospect all the more likely. Plans to establish outposts on the moon and Mars present a bigger challenge still. Last week, prior to the first meeting of the revived National Space Council, Vice President Mike Pence described the need for “a renewed American presence on the moon, a vital strategic goal” in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. His piece came on the heels of SpaceX Founder and Chief Executive Officer Elon Musk’s announcement at the 2017 International Astronautical Congress of a revised plan to colonize the red planet, with the first human missions slated for 2024. Musk hopes for the colony to house one million inhabitants within the next fifty years. While mining might require only temporary use of the celestial bodies, full-fledged colonies would necessarily be more permanent affairs. With some national governments arguing that mining operations would constitute territorial claims, lunar and Martian bases are almost certain to enter the legal crosshairs. And, even under the favorable U.S. interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty, states and private companies would need to avoid making territorial claims. If viable colony locations are relatively few and far between, fierce competition could make asserting control a practical necessity. Even so, policymakers should avoid hasty attempts to overhaul the Outer Space Treaty. The uncertainties associated with altering the fundamental principles of international space law are greater than any existing ambiguities. Commercial spacefaring already entails high levels of risk; adding new regulatory hazards to the mix would jeopardize investment and could slow progress in the sector. While the current property rights regime may be untenable over longer timelines, it remains workable for now.

#### Bastani’s Luxury Communism is an idealistic fantasy that fails horribly – direct indict

**Whitlock 19** Whitlock, R. (2019, July 2). *Fully automated luxury communism isn’t our future*. Medium. <https://onezero.medium.com/fully-automated-luxury-communism-isnt-our-future-1e4c9fb9c602> (Robert Whitlock is a UK freelance journalist interested in climate change, renewable energy and transport, and various political and current affairs issues. Lives in South West UK.) // Aadit

“This is not a book about the future but about a present that goes unacknowledged,” Bastani begins. “The outline of a world immeasurably better than our own, more equal, prosperous, and creative, is there to see if only we dare to look. But insight alone is not enough. We must have the courage — for that is what is required — to argue, persuade, and build. There is a world to win.” Immense wealth will be generated, he explains, by the “extreme supply” of valuable resources generated by new space industries such as asteroid mining. Advancements in robotics and automation on Earth will, in turn, mean that humans are largely liberated from manual work. And the new-found wealth from this space exploration and the liberation of our time will enable us all to live in luxury and abundance. All this, I’ll remind you, in a book categorized as non-fiction. “It turns out that Marx’s early suspicion that the countries set to lead the revolution would be those at the cutting edge of capitalist modernity was right. Only now we know that means technology as much as politics.” During this transition, capitalism will collapse because both automation and the “extreme supply” of resources will make all goods and services permanently cheaper. Once that happens, Bastani argues, this new system of Fully Automated Luxury Communism (FALC) will be overseen by an elected, populist, left-wing government. Talking to *OneZero*, Bastani explained that Marx saw automation as central to his communist vision. Rather than being the threat it’s often characterized as, mechanization actually liberates workers. “It turns out that Marx’s early suspicion that the countries set to lead the revolution would be those at the cutting edge of capitalist modernity was right. Only now we know that means technology as much as politics,” says Bastani. He adds that the goal is Marx’ well-known maxim: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.” The FALC manifesto has captured the imagination of some in the left, especially in Britain. But how realistic is this vision? Assumption one: Most jobs will be automated, and soon Bastani describes the creeping automation of manufacturing, retail, transport, and health care. For businesses, the incentives are higher productivity, lower costs, and, in the case of self-driving cars, safety. Avoiding the complexities of managing human beings is also attractive to some; the CEO of Chinese electronics firm Foxconn [complained](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14353567) that managing 1 million employees “gave him a headache,” and three years later replaced 60,000 workers with robots at a factory in Kunshan, China. “[Automation] is the leading edge of a transformation which will mean not only the loss of countless jobs, but entire professions,” Bastani writes. While [some academics](http://theautomatedeconomy.com/erik-brynjolfsson/) have asserted that creativity and idea generation will be uniquely valuable in a world of automation, Bastani is not so sure: “This may well prove the case in some areas, but surely not for a world of nearly 10 billion people” — as level UN demographers [project](https://www.treehugger.com/environmental-policy/un-revises-population-projections-downward-yet-again.html) the world may reach by the end of the century. Bastani is tapping popular concern about automation taking over jobs, particularly manual labor. Yet research shows that automation is both a long way off and not necessarily displacing jobs. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that skilled manufacturing jobs currently represent 8.5% of the U.S. workforce, or 12.75 million jobs, yet [89%](https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/industry/manufacturing/manufacturing-skills-gap-study.html?mod=djemRTE_h) of manufacturers report that they can’t find skilled applicants to fill vacant positions. This could mean 2.4 million vacant jobs by 2028, costing the manufacturing industry $454 billion. Increasingly, manufacturing work involves managing new and advanced technologies, indicating that technology is creating new jobs rather than simply replacing them. Research by [McKinsey Digital](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/where-machines-could-replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet) found that automation will eliminate very few occupations entirely over the next decade. In about 60% of jobs, about a third of the tasks involved can be automated, which means that less than 5% of jobs could be fully automated. In addition, the [costs](https://www.sptechnology.co.uk/cost-of-industrial-automation/) of automating businesses are significant, and [prohibitive for small businesses](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_White_Paper_Technology_Innovation_Future_of_Production_2017.pdf), at least for now. A 2017 [report](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_White_Paper_Technology_Innovation_Future_of_Production_2017.pdf) by the World Economic Forum found very limited awareness of automated production technologies among small businesses, who will rely on government support and incentives to adapt. Google, meanwhile, [spent](https://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transportation/self-driving/google-has-spent-over-11-billion-on-selfdriving-tech) at least $1.1 billion on its self-driving car project between 2009 and 2015, and the project still faces many [logistical](https://www.technologyreview.com/s/530276/hidden-obstacles-for-googles-self-driving-cars/) and [regulatory](https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1331598) hurdles before it can move beyond the test phase. Assumption two: The new space industries will be economically viable Pricing within the capitalist structure is based on finite supply, Bastani says, so the opening up of space mining industries will dramatically expand our supply of valuable materials, pushing prices down. “The limits of the earth won’t matter anymore — because we’ll mine the sky instead,” Bastani says. This idea — of the extreme supply of resources collapsing the value system of capitalism and liberating the workers — is central to FALC. And yet, even with achievements in robotics, automation, and commercial space exploration as foundations for its realization, we are still light-years away from reliable, affordable space mining. There are three main challenges in space mining: cost, identification of suitable asteroids for potential mining, and the problems of extraction. Though the potential returns on investment are unknown, there is active research in this area from a range of mostly privately funded elite interests. Planetary Resources, a privately funded asteroid mining company, says it will take [a decade](https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303459004577364110378178038) to identify which asteroids are suitable for commercial mining. Logistical challenges include setting up equipment on a moving asteroid with a low gravitational field, how to mine the resources themselves, and getting into space in the first place. And the struggling company itself was [acquired](https://spacenews.com/asteroid-mining-company-planetary-resources-acquired-by-blockchain-firm/) last year by a blockchain firm. As well as complexity, the costs will be vast. Prior to its [bankruptcy](https://spacenews.com/mars-one-company-goes-bankrupt/) in February, private space exploration project Mars One estimated that the cost of [sending four people to Mars](https://www.mars-one.com/faq/finance-and-feasibility/what-is-mars-ones-mission-budget) would be $6 billion, with every subsequent mission costing $4 billion. NASA itself hasn’t published estimates of a Mars trip, though two veteran space scientists have [estimated](https://spacenews.com/op-ed-mars-for-only-1-5-trillion/) that a technically complex traveling space station would cost at least $130 billion, translating into $230 billion for just one manned space flight. Put simply, the cost of obtaining any minerals from asteroids will far outweigh their potential value on Earth. Profitable asteroid mining is likely to remain a technological and economic fantasy for decades, if not centuries to come. It makes FALC’s case for space resources and extreme supply speculative, at best. Assumption three: We don’t want to work Let’s assume, however, that humans do eventually manage to unlock an unprecedented wealth of resources from asteroids, and that everyone on Earth would feel the economic benefit. With machines to replicate human work, we will be freed all manual and intellectual effort. Leaving aside, too, that many people enjoy the sociability and purpose of work, what will we all do with our newfound time and freedom? If we look at the most successful technology companies today, it seems hard to imagine how a future that demands immense investment and expertise could be anything other than privately owned. Perhaps rather oddly, Bastani describes something that sounds like the “gentlefolk of leisure” of a 19th century English novel: “Under FALC we will see more of the world than ever before, eat varieties of food we have never heard of, and lead lives equivalent — if we so wish — to those of today’s billionaires. Luxury will pervade everything as a society based on waged work becomes as much a relic of history as the feudal peasant and medieval knight.” And yet, if we look at the most successful technology companies today — the vast, online empires that are some of the wealthiest companies ever created — it seems hard to imagine how a future that demands immense investment and expertise could be anything other than privately owned. The companies that build the automation — and asteroid mining — of the future are likely to be private empires, too. At what point do these companies give away all their wealth to the workers of the world? Unless Bastani is proposing a revolution to take it back by force? But that’s not what he’s calling for here. FALC, he says, must be embedded within a “luxury populism” and engage with mainstream electoral politics. So populist far-left parties would propose this future, and we could vote for it. They’d propose that worker-owned businesses and cooperatives would be favored over multinationals. A “One Planet Tax” would shift wealth from richer to poorer countries. A system of [universal basic services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_basic_services) would offer government-funded housing, food, and health care to everyone who needed it. “You can only live your best life under FALC and nothing else, so fight for it and refuse the yoke of an economic system which belongs in the past,” says Bastani. Bastani has been bold enough to label his book a manifesto. He’s not hiding the fact that he is laying the theoretical groundwork for a distant revolution. He offers an imaginative, alternative outcome to the inevitable disruption that technology is having on our society. These are important issues to consider. However, FALC is clearly and simply fully-fledged communism, remarketed for the 21st century. History shows us that communism fails because of natural human hierarchies and desires, and there’s no reason to think that complex technological systems and the space-mining companies of the future should make that any different. The FALC vision may rest on the foundations of realism, but it is so impossibly utopian and idealistic as to be whimsical. The science is far too expensive and too theoretical to ever make this a reality, certainly within our lifetimes, however enticing it might be to think of a future without work. We need to look for solutions to our global problems with the technologies we have today, and Fully Automated Luxury Communism cannot offer us anything but an illusory utopia.

#### Colonization doesn’t reduce existential risk – Earth-bound threats outweigh even in long term risk management

* Short- and long-term risk assessment should focus on protecting earth
* Earth gets riskier as tech advances which raises the risk that our impact happens before colonization
* Even if tech gets there, future social and economic context prevents missions
* Risk Dynamics Paradox – existential risks are rooted in human psychology, so they’ll follow us to space – Bostrom agrees!

Szocik 19 [Konrad Szocik, University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Should and could humans go to Mars? Yes, but not now and not in the near future. Futures Volume 105, January 2019, Pages 54-66. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001632871830199X]

I argue, following other authors (Baum, 2009; Baum, Denkenberger, & Haqq-Misra, 2015; Jebari, 2015; Sandberg, Matheny, & Ćirković, 2008; Turchin & Green, 2017) that human space settlement is not able to reduce and/or to exclude the risk of human extinction. For this reason, it should not be perceived in terms of space refuge. In terms of both short-term and long-term perspectives of risk assessment, it would be better to protect humans on Earth.5 I reject the supportive role which could be played by human space settlement after a catastrophe on Earth, i.e., a recovery coordination mission. Due to so-called the paradox of technological progress discussed in the last section, further putative progress in space technology will be counterbalanced by increasing anthropogenic risks including, among others, overpopulation and limited resources (these anthropogenic threats are unavoidable in near future, in contrast to other risks that are only more or less probable but not unavoidable). Permanent lack of strong rationale for human mission to Mars – both now and in the near future – leads to paradoxical situation. Even if in some point in the future the minimum level of advancement in human deep-space technologies will be achieved, social, political, and economic contexts will gradually decrease the chances for real preparation of this mission. Another paradox, let’s call it the risk dynamics paradox, is that the most probable threats in the near future are, as Bostrom and Cirkovic (2008) argue, anthropogenic threats caused by civilizational and technological progress. The paradox lies in the fact that humans are not able to run from these kinds of risks that are rooted in their way of thinking, style of life, and population dynamics, risks implied by Malthus’ law. The human species can try to protect against natural disaster but not against deleterious effects of its own technological progress. In regard to possible future existential risks, I assume that their deleterious power is a little bit exaggerated, and, in any event, human space settlement is not a right way to cope with them. However, in any case, it is hard to speculate if any human space settlement must repeat the same path of human expansion as it was the case on Earth. It is unclear if human technological expansion and exploration must always lead to deleterious and self-destructive effects. In this paper, I do not discuss ethical and moral concerns which are traditionally considered when discussing the human place in space. They include such topics as the human right to explore space (it means both right to intervene in any extraterrestrial object, and human duty and rationale for space expansionism, mostly in the context of the idea of space refuge and possible catastrophic scenarios on Earth), or the value of human life and space objects.

#### Space exploration/dominance is a settler colonialist fantasy of Empire from Above. Each satellite acts as a new outpost in the construction of settlement in what is presumed to be an outer space terra nullius – they bring the civilizing mission to space

Redfield 02 [Peter, Prof. Anthropology @ UNC-Chapel Hill, “Postcolonial Technoscience: Redfield: Half-Life of Empire in Outer Space,” *Social Studies of Science* 32/5-6, pp. 794-8//ak47]

In this paper, I take a related but slightly different tack, emphasizing degrees of distance within locality, and examining intersections of place, power and time implicit in the location and operation of a vast technical network. For if we incorporate colonial history into our considerations of science and technology, do we not always, continually, need to ask what it might mean for something to be somewhere relative to somewhere else? My focus will rest directly on the spatial edge between metaphor and materiality used to distinguish global and local: the planet, united and bounded by its atmospheric limit, revealed and transcended by technoscience. The general argument I will advance here is that outer space reflects a practical shadow of empire.10 I mean by this two things. The first is that space represents a kind of stabilization of ‘elsewhere’, and its removal from the globe. From the very inception of influential modern dreams of space exploration, the masculine adventure of earthly colonialism was a constant referent, and the temporal pairing of rocket launches and the greatest anti-colonial movements only accentuated the parallel.11 Indeed, the realization of outer space – its initial domestication if you will – represents the effective provincialization of terrestrial empire from above. Once a few white men moved beyond the atmosphere they became newly, artificially human by virtue of the nonhuman space around them, cast as universal representatives by virtue of their transcendent, hazardous location. Once extended beyond the planet, modernity acquired the possibility of another geographic frame, intermingled with a new temporal order. Whatever the past may have been, the future was clearly out there, and everything else a local concern. Aliens became extraterrestrials.

The second way in which I want to link outer space and empire is the manner in which each enacts and represents place in terms of connection, dislocation and the possibility of an ever-longer network. Just as an imperial outpost signified not only itself but also the expansion of a metropolitan centre, so too a satellite link is both an immediate presence and a conduit beyond the horizon. In a sense, outer space puts human place into three dimensions. This is simultaneously a highly practical matter, involving a material assemblage of launch vehicles and a swarming of satellites, and a representational one. For looking up from the ground implies a motion away from it. In a setting marked by colonial history such a motion is not neutral, as I hope to illustrate in French Guiana. First, however, I will review some of the more obvious traces of empire in dreams of space travel.

The Inertia of Adventure and Another New World When discussing the conquest of space, it is automatic to refer to Christopher Columbus. [Pecker (1987): 3] The rhetorical link between outer space and colonial history requires little introduction. Anyone with a passing acquaintance of the Space Age is familiar with its frontier metaphors and allusions to European colonial expansion, from the frequent appearance of male explorers past in NASA presentations to the imaginary exploits of increasingly varied Star Trek

#### Space projects are predicated on techniques of settlement – the dream of a perfected humanity free of non-human others is written into engineering and navigational design

Redfield 02 [Peter, Prof. Anthropology @ UNC-Chapel Hill, “Postcolonial Technoscience: Redfield: Half-Life of Empire in Outer Space,” *Social Studies of Science* 32/5-6, pp. 798-800//ak47]

I want to underscore three observations about these two famous moments of space fantasy. The first is simply an affirmation of deep rhetorical connections between exploration above and below the atmosphere. Despite the particularities of the cultural imagination displayed in them, when taken together these two works remind us of the greater narrative inertia inside the drive for adventure. While focus shifts to a wondrous horizon, and new, exacting techniques of exploration such as rockets and astronomical navigation, the field of vision retains earthly assumptions, desires and fears. As interesting as what each set of explorers seeks in the moon is what they bring with them: frock coats and a sense of civilization on the one hand, and campfire sweaters and a lust for profit on the other. The material is there for an effort to ‘provincialize’ these fictions by revealing the specificity of their historical debts. Such a project would remain a scholastic exercise, however, and well within the bounds of the literary end of postcolonial studies, were it not for the uncomfortable fact that these fictions provided space exploration with a recognizable future, and thus helped engender fantastic practices. These dreams found engineers, eager to materialize them.

My second observation is about the form of colonization being imagined: like the occupants of Verne’s projectile for whom the ‘Selenites’ are ultimately superfluous, or Lang’s heroic protagonist who stays behind on the moon, the history of space representation is full of visions of settler colonization. This point is not surprising, given the narrative topology of any act of leaving the earth or extending human life through the galaxy, but it has effects when placed next to the fissures of terrestrial history. Even the planners of the German V-2 dreamed beyond their engines of destruction, imagining an era of peaceful exploration, while American and Soviet cold warriors alternated geopolitical fears of final conflict with calls to embrace a new dawn for humanity.19 Amid explicitly imperial tropes of representation, space offered the prospect of a renewed form of settlement, this time into a zone safely free from human difference. Returning to etymological roots, humans could find new domains to culture, together, as a species.20 By considering the earth as a planetary entity, then, fantasies of space exploration have presented a ‘limit case’ of one measure of scale. Within them – and their potential realization – the atmosphere serves as the threshold of human unity.

My final observation involves a potential dynamic of representation created by the interaction of the first two points. Like Verne’s protagonists, committed to their trajectory and inventing a goal on the fly, the language of space exploration returns to history post hoc, within a planetary frame implying common humanity. Thus it should come as no surprise that the sense of history commonly invoked in space narratives is a species narrative, full of giant leaps. Here we have a variation of Chakrabarty’s dilemma, only posed in scalar, rather than chronological terms. Just as European history naturally defines the categories of modernity by virtue of precedence, outer space naturally defines the globe by virtue of bounding it.

Those people claiming this new realm seem to leave old ones – at least their more unpleasant details – behind. Such a space fantasy involves ‘scale’, both in the sense of a motion of expansion and the sense of establishing a boundary. It is consequently impatient with concerns that remain local (the actual lives of any Selenites), or ultimately earthly (the calculations of Lang’s financiers). Space is a higher calling.

#### The bastani 3 evidence proves our link – trying to imagine a new future while still working within those systems only locks in ur desires

### Method

#### 1] The Role of the Judge is to vote for the Best Debater – any other Role of the Judge is self-serving and slants the Judge to be pre-disposed to any particular understanding of the world which brackets out coalitions that have different theories i.e. Racism v Capitalism which your RoTJ prevents

#### 2] there is no debate key warrant their card is about politics writ large – book clubs, actual socialist organizing or rallies solve your rotb better but ours is intrinsic to debate

#### 3] utopian imagination bad – when their politics fail causes backlash from the people they led along the entire time

#### 4] justifies eugenics saying that we should imagine a new perfect world getting rid of the impurities of the world ie would get rid of people who are against teir cause

#### 5] literally about how it got memed on – proves cant actualize since no one will take your movement seriously and will inevitably fail

### Apocalypse now

#### 1] none of their cap bad stuff links to us we agree cap is bad

#### 2] AT Bastani 5 – haven’t proven how ur method is uq able to solve just critiqued cap w out actualzing what that looks like

#### 3]