#### Theory after phil

### FW

#### Ethics must account for motivation to function – theories would otherwise be infinitely escapable because people disagree on its application or its authority which fails as a guide to action and can’t prescribe obligations. Applicability underlies ethics because it otherwise can’t account for hidden tipping points and isn’t useful in real world dilemmas.

#### Perspectivism is true –

#### 1] Opacity – we can never access another person’s perspective because we can never fully understand who someone else is or what they think. Every truth I create cannot be universalized because I can’t guarantee that they will create the same truth because they do what they want.

#### 2] Resolvability – Centuries of moral debate proves we can’t come to an objectively correct answer so it has to be indexed to individual subjects. High school debaters can’t come to a correct conclusion on their own and moral dilemmas are too complicated to “solve” in 45 minutes, so you should prefer a perspectivist account.

#### 3] The theory of relativity proves that objective reality does not exist but only in the reference to the observer.

**Berghofer 20** [Philipp Berghofer (a graduate student at University of Graz, Institute of Philosophy). “Scientific perspectivism in the phenomenological tradition”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science volume. 16 June 2020. Accessed 4/17/21. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13194-020-00294-w> //Xu]

Concerning general relativity, Merleau-Ponty states: The physics of relativity confirms that absolute and final objectivity is a mere dream by showing how each particular observation is strictly linked to the location of the observer and cannot be abstracted from this particular situation; it also rejects the notion of an absolute observer. We can no longer flatter ourselves with the idea that, in science, the exercise of a pure and unsituated intellect can allow us to gain access to an object free of all human traces, just as God would see it. This does not make the need for scientific research any less pressing; in fact, the only thing under attack is the dogmatism of a science that thinks itself capable of absolute and complete knowledge. We are simply doing justice to each of the variety of elements in human experience and, in particular, to sensory perception. (Merleau-Ponty 2004, 44f.) It is to be noted that Merleau-Ponty’s remark is misleading since in the theory of relativity observation is not linked to the location of the observer but to the frame of reference of the observer.Footnote21 The principle of relativity implies that there is no privileged frame of reference; the laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames of reference. Special relativity is built upon the principle of relativity (first postulate) and the postulate that in a vacuum the speed of light is constant for all observers. Together, these two postulates have several implications that show that some of the facts that we usually consider to be “objective” are in fact observer-dependent. For instance, special relativity implies the relativity of simultaneity: It depends on the observer’s frame of reference whether two events separated in space occur at the same time. There is no objective or absolute sense in which we could tell that two spatially separate events take place simultaneously. When we turn to general relativity, we see that space and time are not absolute, not a fixed background, but that the geometry of spacetime itself is influenced by what is going on within spacetime, namely by the energy-momentum of matter. This means that there is a reciprocal relationship between spacetime and what it contains (including the embodied observer).Footnote22

#### 4] Subjectivity only has meaning when it interacts with other machines – there are no intrinsic values and a failure to recognize that stratifies subjects and reifies violence.

**Malins 04** [Brackets Original. Peta Malins (Program Manager of the Bachelor of Legal and Dispute Studies and a Lecturer in Criminology and Justice Studies @ RMIT University). “Machinic Assemblages: Deleuze, Guattari and an Ethico-Aesthetics of Drug Use”. The University of Melbourne. 2004. Accessed 2/19/21. http://janushead.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Malins.pdf //Xu]

As an assemblage, a [drug using body] has only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs. We will never ask what a [drug using body] means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, and with what bodies without organs it makes its own converge. A [drug using body] exists only through the outside and on the outside. A [drug using body] itself is a little machine (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 4)1 The work of Deleuze and Guattari is perhaps best conceived of as a ‘tool box’2 –as a collection of machinic concepts that can be plugged into other machines or concepts and made to work. This is how I approach their writing, and why–despite initial misgivings–I have transformed the above excerpt (surreptitiously replacing the concept ‘book’ with ‘drug using body’) to suit the purposes of this paper. In making this transformation, I soon discovered that it became a perfect little language-machine: not only articulating where I want to take the concept of drug use, but also [through its parentheses] expressing the open applicability of Deleuze and Guattari’s work. Insert body of choice: a sexual body; a bicycle, a language; a body of art; a film–the excerpt works for them all. In this openly mutating state the passage introduces some of the key concepts in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical project: becomings, rhizomatic connections, and multiplicities. It also, more explicitly, outlines their project to take thought (and ethics) away from internal meanings, causes, and essences, and toward surface effects, intensities and flows. However it is the particular concept of the body activated by the excerpt–the concept of the body as machinic assemblage–that I find most useful to the task of rethinking drug use. It is a concept that unravels the modern fantasy of the body as a stable, unified, bounded entity, and gives a language to the multitude of connections that bodies form with other bodies (human and otherwise). A body’s function or potential or ‘meaning’ becomes entirely dependent on which other bodies or machines it forms an assemblage with. Colebrook’s (2002) example of the bicycle is useful here: a bicycle is a machine that doesn’t begin to work or have a particular meaning until it connects up with another machine. When it connects up with a cyclist, it becomes a vehicle; when is placed in a gallery, it becomes an artwork. A cigarette is similarly multiple: when smoked it becomes a drug; when held seductively at the end of ones fingertips it becomes an object of beauty; when shown in a film it becomes a plot device (Klein, 1993). And a drug using body is no different: when it connects up to bicycle, it becomes a cyclist; to a cigarette, a smoker; to LSD, a tripper. The drug using body is multiple. While numerous writers have begun to make movements toward rethinking drug use via Deleuze and Guattari3 , very few have explored this intersection in detail4 . In this paper I will map out some of the specific implications of rethinking the drug using body in this way. I will begin by exploring what happens to the subject (the ‘drug user’, the ‘addict’) when the body becomes a multiplicity. Like Deleuze and Guattari: I will not ask what a drug using body ‘means’ or signifies; but rather, what affects its assemblages produce and what flows of desire they cut off (its components and affects). I will then explore Deleuze and Guattari’s own particularly bleak conception of drug-use, arguing that the pessimism it engenders can be strategically sidestepped using Deleuze and Guattari’s other philosophical tools. I will explore how we might productively approach drug use via a Deleuzian ethics, and will argue for a specific ethical rethinking of drug use according to the concepts of the machinic assemblage and rhizomatic multiplicities. A strategy with implications not only for social policy, but also for how we understand ourselves. And who we might become. Subjectivity and the drug using body Bodies that fall prey to transcendence are reduced to what seems to persist across their alterations. Their very corporeality is stripped from them, in favor of a supposed substrate–soul, subjectivity, personality, identity–which in fact is no foundation at all, but an end effect, the infolding of a forcibly regularized outside. (Massumi, 1992: 112) For Deleuze and Guattari a body (human, animal, social, chemical) has no interior truth or meaning; it exists only through its external connections and affects. They write: We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body. (ATP5 : 257) So where does this leave the subject? And identity? If we are to talk only of the drug using body and its multiplicities–where does the ‘drug user’ or ‘addict’ disappear to? For Deleuze and Guattari the subject is nothing more (and nothing less) than a particular way in which bodies have become organised and stratified in the post-Enlightenment social world. In order to comprehend the ‘human’ body, the social world (or socius) reduces the complexity and chaos of an ever-changing multiplicity of bodily flux to discrete categories of meaning and constancy. Bodies become ordered and delimited according to hierarchical binary presuppositions: human/animal, man/woman, healthy/unhealthy, lawful/criminal, hetero/gay, clean/junkie. Binaries that bodies never fully correspond to: No real body ever entirely coincides with either category. A body only approaches its assigned category as a limit: it becomes more or less “feminine” or more or less “masculine” depending on the degree to which it conforms to the connections and trajectories laid out for it by society… “Man” and “Woman” as such have no reality other than that of logical abstraction. (Massumi, 1992: 86) Yet when bodies fall outside these binaries, or try to claim a different identity, they are rarely granted anything outside a third term (‘bi-sexual’, ‘reformedsmoker’) that remains reliant upon, and limited to, those binary relations. Multiplicities reduced to binaries and trinities. Manifold potential reduced to a discrete set of bodily possibilities. You will be a boy or a girl; a smoker or a non-smoker; a civilized human being (with all bodily parts fulfilling civilized ‘human’ functions)’ or an animal. Your choice. You will subscribe to modern selfhood (and all its bodily and linguistic demands) or you’ll be rejected: You will be organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body–otherwise you’re just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted–otherwise you’re just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement–otherwise you’re just a tramp. (ATP: 159)

**This commits us to practical deliberation as the method of moral inquiry   
Serra 09**Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member. https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/905

This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that ethics is valuable as a science in a broad sense. But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, through the examination of past actions and the self-correction of the self in view of future action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life can be lived. In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his system, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct (or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re- search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, moral inquiry is performed in a deliberative way, weighing up argumentations, beliefs and principles, and comparing them either with their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as well as possible experiences that can be forceful or impinge upon the deliberative subject in such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint- ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and thought experiments... Such responsiveness is part of what it is to make a moral decision and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)3. Likewise, this same deliberative activity implies an effort to acquire habits, beliefs and principles that contribute to a truly free deliberation which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas- ticity and receptiveness to experience4. Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi- ment carried out within imagination that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef- forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con- crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even more, according to Peirce, the activity takes the form of experimentation in the inner world; and the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. The real and living logical conclusion is that habit (CP 5.491, 1907). Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided (CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in- fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative subject.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with pragmatic deliberation.

#### [New] Impact Calc – deliberation is procedural, which means that agents ought to act in a deliberative fashion by employing the pragmatic procedure of deliberation, not the substance or conditions where deliberation can arise. To clarify, consequences are a sequencing question.

#### 1] Pluralistic Materialism – other theories rely on minimalistic criteria; our framework understands knowledge as changing and uses experience to base social change and revise ideas. Glaude 7Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the African-American chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (5-7)

In a Shade of Blue is my contribution to the tradition I have just sketched. My aim is to think through some of the more pressing conceptual problems confronting African American political life, and I do so as a Deweyan prag-matist. I should say a bit about what I mean by this self-description. John Dewey thought of philosophy as a form of cultural and social criticism. He held the view that philosophy, properly understood as a mode of wis-dom, ought to aid us in our efforts to overcome problematic situations and worrisome circumstances. The principal charge of the philosopher, then, is to deal with the problems of human beings, not simply with the problems of philosophers. For Dewey, over the course of his long career, this involved bridging the divide between science, broadly understood, and morals—a divide he traced to a conception of experience that has led philosophers over the centuries to tilt after windmills. Dewey declared, “The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.”9Dewey bases this conclusion on several features of his philosophy: (1) anti foundationalism, (2) experimentalism, (3) contextualism, and (4) soli-darity.10 Antifoundationalism, of course, is the rejection of foundations of knowledge that are beyond question. Dewey, by contrast, understands knowledge to be the fruit of our undertakings as we seek “the enrichment of our immediate experience through the control over action it exercises.”11He insists that we turn our attention from supposed givens to actual consequences, pursuing a future fundamentally grounded in values shaped by experience and realized in our actions. This view makes clear the experimental function of knowledge. Dewey emphasized that knowledge entails efforts to control and select future experience and that we are always con-fronted with the possibility of error when we act. We experiment or tinker, with the understanding that all facts are fallible and, as such, occasionally afford us the opportunity for revision.12Contextualism refers to an understanding of beliefs, choices, and actions as historically conditioned. Dewey held the view that inquiry, or the pursuit of knowledge, is value-laden, in the sense that we come to problems with interests and habits that orient us one way or another, and that such pursuits are also situational, in the sense that “knowledge is pursued and produced somewhere, some when, and by someone.”13Finally, solidarity captures the associational and cooperative dimensions of Dewey’s thinking. Dewey conceives of his pragmatism as “an instrument of social improvement” aimed principally at expanding democratic life and broadening the ground of individual self-development.14Democracy, for him, constitutes more than a body of formal procedures; it is a form of life that requires constant attention if we are to secure the ideals that purportedly animate it. Individuality is understood as developing one’s unique capacities within the context of one’s social relations and one’s community. The formation of the democratic character so important to our form of associated living involves, then, a caring disposition toward the plight of our fellows and a watchful concern for the well-being of our democratic life.

#### 2] Best studies prove pluralistic tendencies are inevitable

Polzler 19[Thomas Pölzler and Jennifer Cole Wright- “Empirical research on folk moral objectivism” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6686698/> NCBI. Published July 5th 2019]

Examining these studies' results more closely, however, makes it less clear whether this interpretation is appropriate (Pölzler, 2018b). Take again Goodwin and Darley's study. In this study, almost 30% of subjects' responses to the disagreement measure and almost 50% of their responses to the truth‐aptness measure fell on the option that the researchers took to be indicative of subjectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, pp. 1347, 1351). Moreover, while some moral statements were dominantly classified as objective (e.g., the above statement about robbery), many others were dominantly classified as nonobjective (e.g., the stem cell research statement). This suggests that subjects in Goodwin and Darley's study may have actually favored what Wright, Grandjean, and McWhite (2013) called “metaethical pluralism,” i.e., they sometimes sided with objectivism and other times with nonobjectivism. More recent studies have by and large confirmed this hypothesis of folk metaethical pluralism. Wright et al. (2013) and Wright, McWhite, and Grandjean (2014), for example, replicated Goodwin and Darley's results, using the exact same measures, but letting subjects classify the presented statements as moral and nonmoral themselves. Objectivity ratings for statements that were dominantly self‐classified as moral varied between as little as 5% and as much as 85%. Research based on different measures yielded high proportions of intrapersonal variation as well (e.g., Beebe, 2014; Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Fisher, Knobe, Strickland, & Keil, 2017; Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, 2017; Wright, 2018; Zijlstra, forthcoming‐a).2

#### 3] Performativity- when you enter debate, you presume that you can discuss the topic because of deliberation. This means denial of my framework is impossible and all objections should be ignored on face because responding to my framework requires my framework to do so.

#### 4] TJF – it doesn’t matter how true a philosophy is if it can’t be engaged or is impossible to learn from – even if a theory was correct, we shouldn’t use its philosophy in debate specifically.

#### 1] Inclusion – Prag definitionally is a procedural for allowing almost any argumentation in the debate space with the Other which controls the internal link to inclusion and is an impact multiplier

#### 2] Resource Disparities – intent based frameworks ensure big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity and require a higher level of analytic thinking that small schools have.

### Offense

#### Spec in doc

#### Democracy

Webster. Democracy. Merriam Webster. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democracy

Definition of democracy

1a: government by the people

especially : rule of the majority

b: a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections

2: a political unit that has a democratic government

#### Free press

Dictionary.com. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/free-press

a body of book publishers, news media, etc., not controlled or restricted by government censorship in political or ideological matters.

#### Ought

Dictionary.com. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought

(used to express duty or moral obligation):

#### Prioritize

Lexico. Oxford Lexico. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/prioritize

designate or treat (something) as more important than other things.

#### Objective

Lexico. Oxford Lexico. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/objective

(of a person or their judgment) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.

#### Over

Lexico. Oxford Lexico. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/over

2.3Expressing preference.

#### Advocacy

Lexico. Oxford Lexico. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/advocacy

Public support for or recommendation of a particular cause or policy.

#### Objectivity in the press is consistent with the pragmatic theory of truth via rigorous inquiry and pluralist decision-making.

Ward 17 [Stephen J. A. Ward (Distinguished Lecturer in Ethics at the University of British Columbia, Courtesy Professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon, and founding director of the Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin). “ENGAGEMENT AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY”. Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. March 27, 2017. Accessed 2/26/2022. <https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/2017/03/27/engagement-and-pragmatic-objectivity/> //Xu]

In the first article in this series, I argued for a radical rethink of ethics to respond properly to the challenge of journalism in a time of Trump. We need to practice democratically engaged journalism, which views journalists as social advocates. But they are advocates of a special kind: objective advocates for plural democracy. Here, I’ll examine the method of objective engagement, what I call pragmatic objectivity. Journalists of this ilk are neither partisans nor neutral reporters of “just the facts.” Objective engagement sounds strange to some ears; it runs against a strong strain of dualistic thinking in journalism ethics: I can be a disinterested journalist or an interest-driven advocate but not both. Facts versus opinion, facts versus values, neutrality versus engagement. These dualisms are the trouble-making heritage of a journalism ethic from a different media era a century ago. Pragmatic objectivity rejects the dualisms, but not objectivity. It redefines it. But how can journalists be engaged and objective? OBJECTIVITY AS TESTING What does it mean to be objective, and why be objective? Since philosophy in antiquity, objectivity has been an ideal of inquiry. Objectivity in this tradition is ontological, i.e., it is knowledge of the world as it exists independent of mind. Objective beliefs map the world. Subjective beliefs fail to map. To be concerned about objectivity is to ask: Which beliefs, reports, and theories are reliable representations of the world? Humans make mistakes. The sources of error are known: our desires, ideologies, prejudices, faulty logic, and interests. How decide which beliefs map the world? There is only one way. We examine how we formed a belief. We evaluate its reasons and its methods. Objectivity becomes epistemological. Objective belief is supported by evidence. Subjective belief lacks support. Objectivity comes down to testing beliefs by the methods and criteria of good inquiry. For example, we test beliefs to see if they follow valid statistical methods. The most familiar modes of testing are the methods of science. But criteria for objective inquiry populate philosophy, logic, critical thinking, social science, law, and journalism. Objectivity is an ideal. Even if never fully realized, it is a target at which to aim. Being objective is not easy. It requires mental discipline and a willingness to critique one’s views. So “Why be objective?” becomes, “Why value well-evidenced belief?” For two reasons. We need objective beliefs to guide actions. And, we need objective methods for adjudication: Teachers need to mark exams objectively; judges need to adjudicate disputes by law and fact. Too much time has been wasted of late on the flabby, unfocused question as to whether objectivity exists, or whether it is valuable. Of course objectivity exists, if we mean there are people capable of reasonably objective judgments. That happens every day. And, it is clear that objective judgment has value in many domains of life. So what is the debate over objectivity in journalism about, anyway? The real issue is what type of objective testing is appropriate for journalism? OLD AND NEW OBJECTIVITY Historically, journalism objectivity has been reductionist. Testing for objectivity is reduced to testing for facts and neutrality. The conception, adopted in the early 1900s for professional newsrooms, is that a report is objective if and only if it neutrally reports only observable facts. The sphere of objective belief is reduced to beliefs derived from the senses. Traditional objectivity is dualistic: it draws a firm line between observation and interpretation of fact, neutral reporting and advocacy. It is exclusive: Reporter’s opinions and interpretations are to be excluded from good reporting. This is the old objectivity. It makes objective engagement ‘sound strange.’ This way of thinking continues to haunt debates, even if people doubt objectivity. Reporters still balk at the suggestion they interpret events. They worry about losing neutrality when covering Trump. Too many commentators reject objectivity because they think of it as strict neutrality, as if there was not some other conception. Pragmatic objectivity is a new objectivity. It is plural and holistic. It evaluates beliefs with a variety of standards. It is inclusive, open to the evaluation of many kinds of writing. It denies dualisms, viewing journalism as both factual and interpretive, an engaged chronicling. For pragmatic objectivity, the sphere of objective belief is larger than the sphere of fact. What we know depends not only on observation but on our perspectives—webs of belief and values. Knowledge is an interpretation, in which fact and theory are entangled. Even what we consider a fact is determined by our webs of belief. Hence, expert analysis of political events and scientific theories of unobservable forces in nature can be objective, even if not reducible to observable fact. They are objective to the extent that they are reliable indicators of the world and guides to action. Journalism stories are web-dependent interpretations. They are not pure observations of fact. Even apparent facts-only reporting, e.g., reporting a news conference, require the journalist to select salient statements, decide on quotations, and make sense of the conference for a public. Salience, choosing content, and creating meaning are interpretive functions. If this view is true, then we need a notion of objectivity that disciplines and tests our interpretive tendencies, rather than tries to eliminate them. We need appropriate standards of evaluation. Pragmatic objectivity provides a list for journalism. They are: Standards of attitude: Journalists should adopt the objective stance, step back from their beliefs, display a passion for truth and give reasons that others could accept. Standards of empirical validity: What is the empirical evidence for the story? Are the facts carefully collected, verified, complete and placed in context? Are counter-facts treated seriously? Standards of clarity, logic, and coherence: Does the story cohere with existing knowledge in the field? Is the interpretation logically consistent? Are the concepts clear? Are fallacious arguments or manipulative techniques used? Standards of diverse and trusted sources: Are important sources taken into account and fairly assessed? Standards of self-consciousness: In constructing a story, are we conscious of the conceptual frame we use to understand the topic? Are there other frames? Standard of open, public scrutiny: Have we subjected our views to the views of others? Are we prepared to alter our views? The standards apply to many forms of journalism from ‘straight’ reporting to editorial commentary and advocacy journalism. It is a flexible, platform-neutral method.

#### A pragmatically objective press is a necessary component of a pluralist and deliberative democracy.

Ward 17 [Stephen J. A. Ward (Distinguished Lecturer in Ethics at the University of British Columbia, Courtesy Professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon, and founding director of the Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin). “ENGAGEMENT AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY”. Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. March 27, 2017. Accessed 2/26/2022. <https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/2017/03/27/engagement-and-pragmatic-objectivity/> //Xu]

OBJECTIVITY WITHIN ENGAGEMENT How is pragmatic objectivity compatible with journalism as engaged? Objectivity and engagement are compatible because there is a difference between methods and goals. Goals are the aims of engagement in life and society. We are partial about our goals, favoring them over others. But our methods of achieving goals can be objective or subjective. The value of objectivity is that it helps us to be engaged, to achieve certain goals or perform certain functions. Scientists follow objective methods to create new technology to solve a problem. Judges follow the objective methods of law to pursue their goal of justice. Democratically engaged journalists have a dual commitment: they are committed to impartial methods as a means to their partial commitment to plural democracy. They commit themselves to rational and objective methods for deciding what to publish and how to persuade. Their desire for objective belief is part of a desire for reason-based democratic processes. In contrast, there are engaged citizens, such as extreme partisans, who use partial methods for partial goals. They do whatever it takes to advance their cause. Their manipulative strategies exploit the sources of subjective belief such as fears, biases, and stereotypes. Objective engagement does not require an all-encompassing neutrality which precludes expressing a view or coming to a conclusion. Both scientists and judges are impartial in method but they rightly come to conclusions and take sides in conflicts. Objectively engaged journalists are impartial or disinterested because they do not let their partialities or interests undermine objective judgment and inquiry. They do not prejudge the story before fairly weighing all relevant evidence. But after such inquiry, journalists are free to draw an informed conclusion. Such is the method of investigative journalism. Objectivity is not a value-free zone. TRUMP AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY How might pragmatic objectivity shape our response to journalism in a time of Trump? It would open up the space in which we think about journalism, refusing to reduce the options to a forced choice between neutral stenography and biased partisanship. Calling for a return to traditional objective journalism is like proposing that we go backward in time. Not only do many journalists not practice traditional facts-only reporting but the public sphere that once justified such an ethic has greatly disappeared. The situation is too serious for outdated solutions. Evidence, fact, and truth are ideas increasingly defined by politics, power, and manipulative persuasion. What is a fact is too often what someone claims is a fact, for self-interested reasons. Partisans and leaders, including Trump and his advisers, tweet unsubstantiated claims for political reasons: to galvanize their base of support, to maintain their ideology; and to distract the media. One strategy is to insert fake news into the infosphere knowing it will be there forever, influencing someone, diluting the influence of other interpretations. This insouciance toward objective reasons and disciplined thinking is disturbing. We face the end of the ideal of informed and reasonable democratic publics. In this corrupted media sphere, journalists should not be passive or neutral. Such a climate needs an active journalism with a method that resists subjective claims. Pragmatic objectivity encourages journalists to do the things that need to done: There is no better antidote to fake news than real news, objectively tested. Fake news and alternate facts are just other terms for biased, subjective belief. There is no better antidote to a passive, manipulatable press than a press objectively engaged as watchdogs for plural democracy, who fact-test political claims and investigate conflicts of interest among Trump’s family and advisers. There is no better antidote to illiberal and intolerant media than an objectively engaged journalism that performs the political explanatory journalism noted in the first article. Finally, news media that follow pragmatic objectivity, aimed at protecting plural democracy, can justifiably take legal and other action against a presidential decision, law, or policy that violates a constitutional principle, such as free expression, or the rights of minorities.

### Method

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse

#### – drop the debater – 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off

#### – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time

#### – competing interps – reasonability narrows the theory debate to one issue of brightline, making it easy for the Neg to collapse to the issue in the long 2NR

#### 2] Affirm if I win offense to a counterinterp

#### A] Timeskew – 6 Minute 2NR with collapse to whatever I undercover means that you can win theory and substance, but I need to go for both in half the time and split it between the 2 layers.

#### B] Reciprocity – you get T and theory so I should get theory and an RVI to make the burden reciprocal.

#### 3]Nothing in the 1AC has triggered it, but Presumption and permissibility affirm –

#### a) We always default to assuming something true until proven false ie if I told you my name is Rahul you would believe me

#### b) If agents have to justify why every action is morally good we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water

#### c) empirics

**Shah 19,**[Shah, Sachin. “A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC.” NSD Update, National Symposium of Debate, 16 Feb. 2019, <http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/> ]//LHPSS accessed 9/4/19

As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds **from** 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (**2017 – 2019** YTD), **the neg**ative **won 52.99% of ballots** (**p-value < 0.0001)** and 54.63% of upset rounds (p-value < 0.0001). **This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics.**

### Advantage

#### We Affirm the Whole Resolution – Resolved: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### Objective Journalism lies in Objectivity of its methodology.

Jones 9 Alex Jones 9-15-2009 "An Argument Why Journalists Should Not Abandon Objectivity" <https://niemanreports.org/articles/an-argument-why-journalists-should-not-abandon-objectivity/> (Alex S. Jones, a 1982 Nieman Fellow, is director of the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University.)//Elmer

In their book “The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect,” Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, describe what they call “the lost meaning of objectivity.”… As [they] point out, “In the original concept, in other words, the method is objective, not the journalist.” It was because journalists inevitably arrived with bias that they needed objectivity as a discipline to test that bias against the evidence so as to produce journalism that would be closer to truth. They argue that the quickening of objectivity as the American journalistic standard was born of a desire to have a more scientific way of approaching news. The nation’s faith in science was surging, and the scientific method seemed suited to journalism. Scientists begin their research with assumptions. They have expectations of what will happen, but they don’t know what will happen. They have, in other words, their own opinions and beliefs—their point of view or even bias—about what is likely the truth, and they do their research to test those assumptions. Their objective, scientific inquiry is not one that is without bias, but one in which bias has to stand up to evidence and results. This is the sensible and realistic approach to objectivity that might be termed genuine objectivity. It begins with the assumption that journalists have bias, and that their bias has to be tested and challenged by gathering facts and information that will either support it or knock it down. Often, there is information that does both, and that ambiguity needs to be reported with the same dispassion with which a scientist would report variations in findings that were inconclusive. If the evidence is inconclusive, then that is—by scientific standards—the truth. But journalistic objectivity is an effort to discern a practical truth, not an abstract, perfect truth. Reporters seeking genuine objectivity search out the best truth possible from the evidence that the reporter, in good faith, can find. To discredit objectivity because it is impossible to arrive at perfect truth is akin to dismissing trial by jury because it isn’t perfect in its judgments.

#### Advantage 1 is Democracy

#### Best studies prove declining distrust in news objectivity diminishes Democratic accountability.

Sands 20 John Sands 8-4-2020 "Americans are losing faith in an objective media. A new Gallup/Knight study explores why." <https://knightfoundation.org/articles/americans-are-losing-faith-in-an-objective-media-a-new-gallup-knight-study-explores-why/> (Researcher at the Knights Foundation)//Elmer

Americans have high aspirations for the news media to be a trusted, independent watchdog that holds the powerful to account. But in a new Gallup/Knight study, we’ve found the gap is growing between what Americans expect from the news and what they think they are getting. Perceptions of bias are increasing too, which further erodes the media’s ability to deliver on its promise to our democracy. The landmark poll of 20,000 people found that Americans’ hope for an objective media is all but lost. Instead, they see an increasing partisan slant in the news, and a media eager to push an agenda. As a result, the media’s ability to hold leaders accountable is diminished in the public’s eye. The study also explores the connections between political affiliation and attitudes toward the media, as well the public’s view on diversity in newsrooms and the connection between local news consumption, civic engagement and community attachment. A hallmark of Knight Foundation’s Trust, Media and Democracy initiative, “American Views 2020: Trust, Media and Democracy” is a biennial report based on a poll that took place over last winter. It is one of the most comprehensive surveys of public opinion on the media, and holds important implications for the future of journalism and our democracy. You can read more below, or join a discussion of the findings in partnership with the Paley Center at 2 p.m. Thursday, Aug. 6. Here are 10 findings that stood out to us: 1) Americans see increasing bias in the news media: One of the primary reasons Americans don’t think the media works for them is because of the bias they perceive in coverage. Many feel the media’s traditional roles, such as holding leaders accountable, is compromised by bias, with nearly 7 in 10 Americans (68%) who say they see too much bias in the reporting of news that is supposed to be objective as “a major problem,” up from 65% in the 2017 Knight/Gallup study. They see it in their own news sources (57%), and more than 6 in 10 are concerned about bias in the news other people are getting, the survey finds. Some 7 in 10 Americans worry that owners of media companies are influencing coverage. 2) Americans think the media is pushing an agenda. Eight in 10 Americans say that when they suspect an inaccuracy in a story, they worry it was intentional —because the reporter was misrepresenting the facts (52%) or making them up (28%). Only 18% say they think the inaccuracies were innocent mistakes. And when it comes to news sources they distrust, nearly three-quarters of Americans (or 74%) say those outlets are trying to persuade people to adopt a certain opinion.

#### Accountability is critical to a functioning democracy – specifically by an Objective Press.

Hamilton and Krosnick 20 [James Hamilton](https://profiles.stanford.edu/james-hamilton) and [Jon Krosnick](https://profiles.stanford.edu/jon-krosnick) 2-27-2020 "Stanford researchers discuss journalism and democracy in lead up to Super Tuesday" <https://news.stanford.edu/2020/02/27/journalism-and-democracy/> (Hamilton also directs the Stanford Journalism Program, is a co-founder of the Stanford Computational Journalism Lab and a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. Krosnick also directs the Political Psychology Research Group and is a professor, by courtesy, of psychology.)//Elmer

How important is an objective media for a functioning democracy? Hamilton: Objectivity was a commercial product that only evolved in the late 1800s with the high costs of printing presses. Newspapers shifted from partisan to nonpartisan in order to attract larger audiences from both parties and to sell these readers’ attention to advertisers. Fast forward to today’s world of hundreds of cable channels and millions of websites. Each person is better able to find an outlet that reflects their worldview, which can also reinforce their political views and affect their electoral choices. Criticisms of the media can also have political dividends. Historically, attacks by politicians on the credibility of the media have been part of a conscious strategy to weaken the accountability function of reporters. For example, attacks on the media as biased during President Richard Nixon’s administration, especially by Vice President Spiro Agnew, were frequent and virulent. Krosnick: In recent years, we have seen a collapse of the notion that politically relevant facts can be discerned by news professionals, leaving voters uncertain about whether the messages communicated by those professionals can be trusted. President Trump has played a major role in raising doubts about the veracity of information conveyed by major news organizations. Social media has allowed individuals and small organizations to disseminate messages (perhaps accurate, perhaps false) directly to voters, unmediated by major news organizations. And Russia has been accused of disseminating false information via social media, as well. All this means is that voters are forced to identify news sources they trust. And because different news sources are disseminating different messages about the same matters, voters will now end up with more disparate views of reality than was the case decades ago.

#### Democracy solves Nuclear War.

Diamond 19, Larry. Ill winds: Saving democracy from Russian rage, Chinese ambition, and American complacency. Penguin Books, 2019. (professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University, PhD in Sociology)//Elmer

The most obvious response to the ill winds blowing from the world’s autocracies is to help the winds of freedom blowing in the other direction. The democracies of the West cannot save themselves if they do not stand with democrats around the world. This is truer now than ever, for several reasons. We live in a globalized world, one in which models, trends, and ideas cascade across borders. Any wind of change may gather quickly and blow with gale force. People everywhere form ideas about how to govern—or simply about which forms of government and sources of power may be irresistible—based on what they see happening elsewhere. We are now immersed in a fierce global contest of ideas, information, and norms. In the digital age, that contest is moving at lightning speed, shaping how people think about their political systems and the way the world runs. As doubts about and threats to democracy are mounting in the West, this is not a contest that the democracies can afford to lose. Globalization, with its flows of trade and information, raises the stakes for us in another way. Authoritarian and badly governed regimes increasingly pose a direct threat to popular sovereignty and the rule of law in our own democracies. Covert flows of money and influence are subverting and corrupting our democratic processes and institutions. They will not stop just because Americans and others pretend that we have no stake in the future of freedom in the world. If we want to defend the core principles of self-government, transparency, and accountability in our own democracies, we have no choice but to promote them globally. It is not enough to say that dictatorship is bad and that democracy, however flawed, is still better. Popular enthusiasm for a lesser evil cannot be sustained indefinitely. People need the inspiration of a positive vision. Democracy must demonstrate that it is a just and fair political system that advances humane values and the common good. To make our republics more perfect, established democracies must not only adopt reforms to more fully include and empower their own citizens. They must also support people, groups, and institutions struggling to achieve democratic values elsewhere. The best way to counter Russian rage and Chinese ambition is to show that Moscow and Beijing are on the wrong side of history; that people everywhere yearn to be free; and that they can make freedom work to achieve a more just, sustainable, and prosperous society. In our networked age, both idealism and the harder imperatives of global power and security argue for more democracy, not less. For one thing, if we do not worry about the quality of governance in lower-income countries, we will face more and more troubled and failing states. Famine and genocide are the curse of authoritarian states, not democratic ones. Outright state collapse is the ultimate, bitter fruit of tyranny. When countries like Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan descend into civil war; when poor states in Africa cannot generate jobs and improve their citizens’ lives due to rule by corrupt and callous strongmen; when Central American societies are held hostage by brutal gangs and kleptocratic rulers, people flee—and wash up on the shores of the democracies. Europe and the United States cannot withstand the rising pressures of immigration unless they work to support better, more stable and accountable government in troubled countries. The world has simply grown too small, too flat, and too fast to wall off rotten states and pretend they are on some other planet. Hard security interests are at stake. As even the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy makes clear, the main threats to U.S. national security all stem from authoritarianism, whether in the form of tyrannies from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea or in the guise of antidemocratic terrorist movements such as ISIS.1 By supporting the development of democracy around the world, we can deny these authoritarian adversaries the geopolitical running room they seek. Just as Russia, China, and Iran are trying to undermine democracies to bend other countries to their will, so too can we contain these autocrats’ ambitions by helping other countries build effective, resilient democracies that can withstand the dictators’ malevolence. Of course, democratically elected governments with open societies will not support the American line on every issue. But no free society wants to mortgage its future to another country. The American national interest would best be secured by a pluralistic world of free countries—one in which autocrats can no longer use corruption and coercion to gobble up resources, alliances, and territory. If you look back over our history to see who has posed a threat to the United States and our allies, it has always been authoritarian regimes and empires. As political scientists have long noted, no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other—ever. It is not the democracies of the world that are supporting international terrorism, proliferating weapons of mass destruction, or threatening the territory of their neighbors.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species)

#### Advantage 2 is Pandemics:

#### Objective Media Coverage is key to combat Vaccine Disinformation BUT Advocacy creates polarization that hardens misinformation.

Sullivan 21 Margaret Sullivan 3-7-2021 "The media plays a crucial role in battling vaccine misinformation. But here’s what not to do." <https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/vaccine-misinformation-media/2021/03/05/fd01a0ba-7dbd-11eb-a976-c028a4215c78_story.html> (Education: Georgetown University; Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism)//Elmer

There are all sorts of ways to counter reluctance to get the coronavirus vaccine. There’s leading by example. There’s guilt. And there’s pure charm. Dolly Parton went the latter route last week as she got her first shot, wearing a sparkly blue cold-shoulder dress for her Instagram PSA and crooning “Vaccine” to the tune of her signature “Jolene.” Anthony S. Fauci made an argument both moral and scientific, reflective of his Jesuit education. “Think about your societal obligation,” he told members of the military, about a third of whom reportedly don’t want the vaccine. He added: “Like it or not, you’re propagating this outbreak.” And Boston Marathon director Dave McGillivray chose to inspire, explaining to the Wall Street Journal how he took the logistics expertise he would have deployed for this year’s canceled race and reapplied it to organizing vaccinations in Massachusetts instead. Despite all this high-level persuasion, a big chunk of Americans — about 3 in 10 — remain hesitant, according to a new Pew Research survey. And like Parton, Fauci and McGillivray, the news media has a role to play — not in outright advocacy, but in relentlessly providing accurate, nuanced information and answering questions straightforwardly.

#### Pandemics risk extinction - simulations, empirics, and surging connectivity prove.

Kim 21, Kiseong, et al. "Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading." Applied Sciences 11.7 (2021): 2997. (Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; R&D Center)//Re-cut by Elmer

Several epidemics, such as the Black Death and the Spanish flu, have threatened human life throughout history; however, it is unclear if humans will remain safe from the sudden and fast spread of epidemic diseases. Moreover, the transmission characteristics of epidemics remain undiscovered. In this study, we present the results of an epidemic simulation experiment revealing the relationship between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk. To analyze the time-dependent risk and impact of epidemics, we considered two parameters for infectious diseases: the recovery time from infection and the transmission rate of the disease. Based on the epidemic simulation, we identified two important aspects of human safety with regard to the threat of a pandemic. First, humans should be safe if the fatality rate is below 100%. Second, even when the fatality rate is 100%, humans would be safe if the average degree of human social networks is below a threshold value. Nevertheless, certain diseases can potentially infect all nodes in the human social networks, and these diseases cause a pandemic when the average degree is larger than the threshold value. These results indicated that certain infectious diseases lead to human extinction