### OV

#### [We base our story off of Kojo Laing’s novel *Major Gentl and the Achimota Wars*]

**The Year 2020 Brings a LIFE of death for the Modern Day African Subject. The world has submitted to General Torro’s desires – the mastermind beyond the radar whose words have the power to unite western nations, a proxy for the United States who relies upon outer space to enforce a position of power. Western NATIONS have put their all on creating a simulation that ensures safety at the expense of others enforcing Torro as the overlord which guides the common consensus of reality creating what we know as the Achimota War.**

### Advantage

#### The advantage is Juju space:

#### The First scenario is the Achimota War:

#### Welcome to 2020 – the western world has retreated to living in computer simulations – in turn deciding Africa to be an expendable area to push out the Achimota into space erasing their history

[John Wright 96, contributor on semantic scholars, “Culture Wars in Cyberspace: A Note on Kojo Laing's Major Gentl and the Achimota Wars”, Semantic Scholar, <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Culture-Wars-in-Cyberspace%3A-A-Note-on-Kojo-Laing's-Wright/ae8c718997f505a66d0d8fbc5dda01a22665fd51>] //WY

In the fiction of the Ghanaian novelist Kojo Laing, the plot is seldom the main attraction and may even distract from and impede the writer's most serious themes. In his first two books, Search Sweet Country (1986) and Woman of the Aeroplanes (1988), both written in the vein of surrealist fantasy, the humorous narrative action is a lightweight vehicle or figurative device through which can be read any number of polemical statements about neocolonialism, Third World development, and Euro-African political and cultural relations. Laing's third novel, which continues to mine the comic-fantastical vein of his first two works and is perhaps his most bizarre book to date, follows much the same pattern, and I propose in this short article to take brief account of its seriocomic combination of elements and the ensuing implications. Major Gentl and the Achimota Wars (1992) is set in the year 2020 A.D., and on first impression seems to be the staple fare of sci-fi futuristic fantasy. Europe has retreated into a cyberworld of computerized emblems and virtual reality, in which physical existence and experiential learning have become unnecessary and have been abandoned, along with "language and humanity,"1 to the poorer countries. The cybernetic superpowers, who communicate with each other through exclusive secret codes, have decided that the Third World does not qualify for what is now conceived as reality, and have declared Africa to be irrelevant to the modern world and humanly expendable, being useful only as storage space, nuclear sanctuary, toxic dumping ground, and experimental laboratory for germ warfare and genetic engineering (thus even the wildly futuristic has an uncomfortably contemporary ring). Direct wars, like all direct experience, are now obsolete and have been replaced by computer-coded conflicts with invisible foes and satellite-videoed holocausts with instant replays. About a third of the way through the novel, however, we hear also, in the same hyperrealist context, of more traditional propagandist image-wars, much closer to home, in which Africa is reduced to a newsreel of famine and primitive degradation by powers who no longer bother to seek knowledge of the continent other than that which they themselves have created. At this point the polemical note begins to sound more urgently. Laing's satiric point is, of course, that for Europe, Africa has always existed in a state of virtual reality, as idea and screen image, or, as one character puts it, "the thingness of Africa is the headness of somewhere else" (65). In one of these wars, called the "First War of Existence," the city, country, and continent surrounding the Accra suburb of Achimota have gone mysteriously missing, apparently dematerialized by Western Internet Warriors who, as part of their push to get out of the galaxy, have siphoned off the Achimotans' cerebral energy into cyberspace, and thence into outer space, through brainwave transmissions. This has caused the latter to forget their own place-names, cultural traditions, and history, and has simultaneously erased from their consciousnesses all knowledge of the Western world to avert any danger of their aspiring to its wealth, power, and privilege. This pirating of African brainwaves is partly a fantastical rendition of the Third World brain drain, and the system of co-optation of African intellectuals to Western power centers by educational aid programs, dealt with in earlier Ghanaian novels such as Ayi Kwei Armah's Why Are We So Blest? (1972), in which Europe and America replenish their mental and spiritual voids by draining the superior intelligence and vitality of their victims. But Laing is also making a more topical 1990s statement about the selective nature of communication in the Information Age. The technocratic powers who build the information highways also make the decisions about where they run. For countries not let onto the network, little or no data are available and consequently they cease, informationally, to exist. One of the Achimotan government ministers looks back to the 1990s when Africa, struggling to survive, was required to prove that it still existed and was at least given the opportunity to do so. In 2020 the blank computer screen imperially asserts, by default, its nonexistence.

#### General Major Gentl provides a ray of hope for defeating the evil General Torro of the United States who enforces colonial control – only banning Torro’s appropriation by private entities can halt his army which depends on abusing space to exert control - everyone in this round has a categorical imperative to surrender all their tools as a mechanism for making General Major Gentl’s victory as easy as possible.

Francis Ngaboh-Smart 11-1-97, “Science and the Re-representation of African Identity in Major Gentl and the Achimota Wars”, Connotations: A Jounral for Critical Debate, https://www.connotations.de/article/francis-ngaboh-smart-science-and-the-re-representation-of-african-identity-in-major-gentl-and-the-achimota-wars//WY

Framed by and set within the scientific developments of this century, Major Gentl is thus primarily about technological advancement. In fact it is the vision of an electronically transformed world that provides the novel with much of its impetus for meditating on existence. Which is to say that although the date 2020 is a reference to the future, Laing also underscores a "this−worldly" (Suvin 155) perspective. He, for instance, makes credible references to the present, which imparts an air of immediacy on the agonizing incidents. Also, most of the technologies of transformation are already perfected, and a first war of existence has already been fought. The new electronic gadgets are thus only signs of a second configuration of existence whose "possibilities" have already manifested themselves. Laing, however, plots the reconfiguration of existence in the form of a war, which he labels the "Second war of Existence," and the war provides the book with its main narrative thread. At a deceptively literal level, though, the war becomes a conflict between Africa on the one side and the West and apartheid South Africa on the other. The West is represented by Torro, the terrible Roman, and Africa by Major Gentl. Preceded by a series of alliances and counter−alliances, the war starts late in the novel. While Achimota waits for the real battle, Torro and Gentl's children start their own war, a war that is never won by either [→page 62] side. And when Gentl and Torro eventually go to war, Torro loses because of his reliance on technology: "Victory comes with the destruction of Torro's hub of computers" (176). It is not a decisive victory, however; the ellipses at the end of the book seem to look forward to other strategies and other wars. Structurally, in other words, Laing turns to the open−endedness of science fantasy rather than be restricted by the closure characteristic of many realist narratives. As important as the war may be for Laing's understanding of relations between the West and Africa, however, it may appear that he is primarily concerned with drawing on a science fantasy megatext to reconceive identity. This concern is evident in the numerous inter−galactic references or adventures in which Major Gentl abounds, and which seem to open up a space for a new subjectivity in African fiction. Torro, for example, wants "to burst out of the present galaxy," and he also anticipates inventions that would "negate distance, mass, and even space" (5). Also, most characters in Achimota have rooms in space: "The major had arranged with the golden crawl to rent two rooms on the moon" (1). In addition, the ambitious, power−hungry, wealthy, corrupt, philandering millionaire, Pogo Alonka Forr, wants to have a room in the sun: "Bamboozle the sun with attention and you could even end up having a hotel in it" (12). Further, The Grandmother Bomb, a dedicated scientist, has a "solar calculator," an "orbiting satellite," and "lampposts …suspended in the eternal darkness [with] lanes …for celestial bicycles" (44). Finally, the Golden Cockroach is usually suspended in the sky when eavesdropping on Western countries. In addition to the extension of space through these inter−galactic activities is the use of one of the "icons" of science fiction narrative: the city. This is not the first time Laing has used the city in his work, of course. Reference to and use of the city first appears in his poetry, where it takes the form of what M. E. Kropp Dakubu calls "the spiritual town" (24). But it is in Search Sweet Country, predominantly set in Accra and its surrounding villages, that the city enters Laing's novelistic discourse. And by Woman of the Aeroplanes, Laing uses the twinning of two cities, Tukwan (Ghana) and Levensvale (Scotland), to show his bias for cultural intermingling. In one respect, then, the use of the city in Major Gentl [→page 63] may well be the culmination of Laing's long−standing fascination with the urban landscape. Laing's relentless concern with the city may however be due to another important reason, namely, to present a severely attenuated vision of the nationalist belief in an "authentic" African identity, which is what the explosion of the geography of Achimota City is probably intended to convey. "Over the last two decades," Laing writes, "Achimota City's fast new geography had devoured Accra almost completely while at the same time most of the rest of the country had inexplicably vanished, land and all" (3). Of course, this may be a reference to "urbanization," as Brain Robert has argued. But Laing's "urbanism" expressly depicts not a city "tied to the idea of place" as is evident in modernist depictions of the city, but rather what Sharpe and Wallock would call a postmodern, "decentered urban field," or an image of "the urban as no longer synonymous with locale" (11, 14). As such, Achimota, the " truncated city bursting to survive and to find the rest of its country," exemplifies the irruption of a new space, the "urban field," in African literature (3). To reinforce the shift from the modernist city to the postmodern "urban field," Laing situates the actions in the novel within zones or heterotopias, sites that allow "a large number of fragmentary possible worlds [to] coexist in an impossible space" (Brian McHale 45). Structurally, then, in place of chapters, the novel is divided into seventeen zones. Indeed, the juxtaposition of the beautiful and the ugly, the believable and the unbelievable in the following description would show Laing's desire to create "an alien space within [the] familiar space" of Achimota City, an important method of constructing a zone in postmodern fiction: It may appear that the space described above, which is identical with the spaces straddled by Gentl's "house of bamboo" with its "kinetic walls [→page 64] [and] strange patterns" (137) and Pogo's house of glass, cannot probably be "located anywhere but in the written text itself." However, as Laing's criticism of the West will later reveal, his use of the zone is in consonance with its use by other postcolonial writers such as Márquez, Cortázar, Fuentes, among others, in whose writings the non−Western world (Africa) is conceived as "Europe's other, its alien double" (McHale 49−53). Also, because of its affinity with science fiction narrative, Major Gentl's explosion of space is probably intended to foreground its creation of a cyberspace which, in contemporary science fiction, is "a vast, geometric, limitless field bisected by vector lines converging somewhere in infinity" (Scott Bukatman 119). The descriptions of Achimota, in their distortion of dimension, for instance, transform the city into such a "limitless field," since the "cyberspace arises at precisely the moment when the topos of the traditional city has been superseded" (122). Among other things, however, the cyberspace is also the effect of the lack of dimension created by gadgets of the information age: computers, televisions, videos, and other visual mediums. In Major Gentl, the characters are addicted to technological contraptions such as the computer. Torro wears "computer−controlled roller skates," and the instruments with which he neutralizes his enemies are computers strategically "hidden at various points in the city" (123, 6). Mr. Cee, a cockroach that functions as the symbol or "emblem" of Achimota City, also has "supercables" that give him feedback to see things in a triple view; Gentl's binoculars, like most computer terminals, are "self−translating" (166). Finally, when one of the elders is accused of impotence, he uses a visual medium to disprove his accusers: "He had to walk on to the television screens with an erection to prove his potentiality" (70). The chaotic landscape of Achimota city and the emphasis on the visual are thus important as elements of spatial rupture. Naturally, any writing that emphasizes a heterotopian space, as Major Gentl does, is likely to disavow nativist notions of identity, since in a heterotopia, Foucault reminds us, "`things' are …`arranged' in" such a way "that it is impossible to find …a common locus beneath them" (xviii). Indeed, Achimota or the Ghana it is supposed to symbolize, because of its own "internal heterogeneity" as well as its implication [→page 65] in European culture, can no longer create an undisturbed site for subjective articulation. Specifically, in his use of the zone as both a structural device and a controlling metaphor, Laing seeks to rethink the supposedly collective subject of nationalist rhetoric. The rethinking of the collective subject will thus be in line with Grandmother Bomb's observation that "we are entering a new era" (134), as well as the novel's reference to the "new man" (123), the repatriated slave perhaps, whom even Gentl admits is neither Ghanaian nor Azanian (105). And Laing, through his mode of characterization, depicts this "new man" in various ways. First, he plugs the characters into electronic hardware, presenting us with bloodless anomalies. Second, but more spectacular, he allows the characters to transgress the boundaries between self and world, conflating the distinctions between humanity and machine, or nature and culture, and destroying, in the process, all the categories conventionally perceived as necessary for structuring identity. The example that immediately comes to mind is the character called Mr. Cee who, we learn, "would shed its symbolic nature and become a real city cockroach crawling about looking for truth" (1). But, although Mr. Cee's love of home, community, culture, and life as opposed to Torro's love of death and weapons of destruction is a dramatic contrast between the two that also corresponds to the differences between the values of Achimota or Africa and Rome or the West, Mr. Cee still remains insubstantial and ephemeral. This is probably because his demand, "`Shape me, shape me!' …`I am talking about love between you and this emblem that I am …'" (51) is a request that is analogous to nationalist quests for a strong sense of identity.

#### Second, is whitewashing -- the oil gang will do anything to erase blackness from the equation of humanity using cybergenetic transformation technologies.

MacDonald 16, Ian P. MacDonald received his Ph.D. in African literature and postcolonial theory from Columbia University in 2014., “Let Us All Mutate Together: Cracking the Code in Laing’s Big Bishop Roko and the Altar Gangsters”, The Cambridge Journal of Postcolonial Literary Inquiry, p313-328, doi:10.1017/pli.2016.15//WY

Both Derek Wright and Francis Ngaboh-Smart have interpreted Laing’s Major Gentl and the Achimota Wars (1992) as an allegory for the emergence of the Internet. In that novel, a future Africa has been digitally erased from the Web archive, and the story follows a civil war aimed at reintegrating the continent into the global scene. Beginning from this reading, I approach Laing’s next work, Big Bishop Roko and the Altar Gangsters (2006), as a formal sequel to Major Gentl, investigating the changing landscape of global digital access and its potential as a site of resistance over the decade that separates their publication. If, in Major Gentl, West Africans have been exiled from the Web, the eponymous protagonist in Roko uses networked access to interrupt neoliberal economic and social engineering underway in the global North. Through experiments in “genetic mutation”— a metaphor for cyborgian transformation from biological to networked existence— Roko hacks the evolutionary process and forces Africa’s voice into the digital sphere in an attempt to remedy that technology’s unequal distribution. In both novels, Laing indigenizes science fiction using a technique I refer to as jujutech—a hybrid of science fiction and African folk traditions. The resulting style identifies the ways the genre itself mutates and evolves as it escapes the gravity of its Euro-American roots. Laing’s decision to publish Roko electronically further points to form following function, highlighting new avenues for the dissemination of experimental African works in underrepresented genres. The hallucinogenic environments, animism, anthropomorphism, and fabulism in Kojo Laing’s fourth novel, Big Bishop Roko and the Altar Gangsters (2006), make any detailed summary difficult. Like a palimpsest, the narrative seems constantly to overwrite itself.1 In its broadest strokes, the novel follows the Anglican bishop of “Gold Coast city,” Bishop Roko Yam, who has hired a local griot known only as the Wordman to chronicle his attempts to fight wars on two fronts. The first of these, the Renaissance War, pits Roko against a motley crew of local evangelical sects led by the gold smuggler, stock market trader, and ersatz priest, Zigzag Zala. In the second, the Canterbury War, Roko attempts to stop the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Pope from enacting “change beyond change” in the post-industrialized world—the novel’s code for cyber-genetic transformations that would auto-evolve those affected into a different species, one no longer capable of communication with now-merely human Africans. Although Laing appears to differentiate between local and foreign forces here, the two wars are eventually shown to be mirror images, with actors in one war consistently affecting the progress of the other. In the world of Big Bishop Roko, local and global spaces nearly always overlap. Laing indicates as much in a prefatory note to Major Gentl and the Achimota Wars (1992),2 where he heralds his desire to “internationalise” English by incorporating words “from Akan and Ga and sometimes Hausa,” as well as those he has simply made up, in line with “the [universal] idea . . . to create one gigantic language.” In Big Bishop Roko, Laing reprints a variation on this front matter, suggesting that he has chosen not to italicize Ghanaisms in the novel as leaving them “unmarked” lends “an exotic freshness to the utterance.” These pocket-sized manifestos point in the direction of a universal creole, one that serves as a template for other amalgams in the novels—not an erasure of one or the other of seemingly incompatible couplets, but a synthesis. As Moussa Issifou argues in the context of Woman of the Aeroplanes (1988), Laing “substitute[s] the debate of exclusivity with the debate of inclusivity, for he believes, there are no self-sufficient languages, but complementary languages.” Laing’s desire to obscure the dividing line between languages (even invented ones) highlights parallel slippage in the fields of space and time in his novels as well as, in Big Bishop Roko, the dissolution of the boundary between science and magic. I approach Big Big Bishop Roko as a formal sequel to Major Gentl, a continuation of the latter’s investigation into the changing landscape of global digital access and the Internet’s potential as (anti)liberatory space. In both works, “postcolonial societies” have been “caught in the fold of a modern technological maze,” 4 and Big Bishop Roko continues, in increasingly surreal ways, Major Gentl’s meditation upon the dangers of uneven technological dissemination and the necessary codependence between ethics and scientific advancement. But if, in Major Gentl, West Africans have been exiled from the Web and thus abandoned by history, the eponymous protagonist in Roko exploits networked access to interrupt the neoliberal economic and social engineering emanating from the global North. Through experiments in “genetic mutation”—the novel’s metaphor for a cyborgian transformation from biological to networked existence, the conflation of the digital and the genetic—Roko stages an intervention into the evolutionary process and forces Africa’s voice into the realm of cyberspace in an attempt to remedy that technology’s unequal distribution. Big Bishop Roko rejects both revolutionary militarism and nostalgic traditionalism, elements that have often set the tone for early examples of anticolonial African literature. Bishop Roko Yam, the hero and ethical core of the novel, laments, “[T]here was nothing sadder than seeing [Gold Coasters] trying in vain to uphold their unbroken consciousness in groups. . . . The greatest lump of tragedy in the city was the communalistic show of mob togetherness (unity as opposed to creativity!)” (98).5 As to “the pastoral epistemics” of the local traditionalists, he feels they are “wrong” (187) and wonders, “What was the value of rituals that took you backwards towards an old humanity . . . rather than forwards, towards the new humanity of a new cosmology?” (323). Neither, though, does Laing uncritically accede to progress for mere progress’s sake. Instead, Roko’s aim over the course of the novel involves arbitrating an ethical stance from which to assess and access global transformations: ones that—in the wake of cloning, virtual reality, and genetic engineering at the turn of the twenty-first century— rattle the most jaded of imaginations even outside the estranging conceits of science fiction (SF); and Big Bishop Roko is SF, if conducted in a novel way. As with Major Gentl, which opens in the year 2020, Big Bishop Roko presents a world filled with “analogical tufts of lightyear phrasing” that Laing’s protagonists seek to “iron[ize]” (6). In Big Bishop Roko, Laing meditates on the dystopian and utopian possibilities of cyberspace and its effects on locations far removed from its production centers. By evacuating the unconscious realms of his characters into the “material” world of the novel, Laing creates what he calls an “internet of dreams” (1) wherein Western technology fuses with religion and African-coded fabulism to form what I refer to throughout this article as jujutech: a style of SF in which the fabulism of writers such as Amos Tutuola, Syl Cheney-Coker, and Ben Okri absorbs hyper-technological paradigms with the result that, as Brenda Cooper explains, “technology is magical and . . . magical inventions are scientific.” 6 Juju has, over the years, taken on stereotypical or negative connotations, so its adoption in this context is not without its problems but Laing enthusiastically embraces the term, evoking the Tutuolan caprice but without the kind of commitment to established folklore that helped the latter construct his abstract journeys through the ghostly woods. Rather, throughout Big Bishop Roko, Laing juxtaposes Christian religious doctrine, the jargon of genetics and evolution, and elements West African mythical performance to orchestrate an admixture of otherwise disjointed systems of signification.

### Plan

#### Thus the plan - The appropriation of outer space by private entities that assist General Torro. Here’s to securing a win for General Major Gentl.

### Method

#### Narration in discursive spaces is not benign – but a matter of preserving methods of survival through liberation from historicism – the “common sense” of scenario planning the real world is parasitic on “chaotic” African story telling resisting colonialism – these everyday discursive rejections of sci-fi legitimate colonial systems of research – only the aff’s circulation of stories through repeated speech acts confronts these racist systems

Susanne Knaller 99, [Susanne Knaller is a professor at the Universität Graz Institut für Romanistik, “Scattered Voices. Some Remarks on a Narrative Theory of Postcolonial Storytelling”. The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory, doi:10.1080/00168899909597392]//WY

What Djebar presents here is the quality of the minor culture as a culture of survival, containing in its complexity, as Bhabha puts it, an act of transnationalism as well as one of translation and forestalling by the unifying discourse of people, nation, and tradition. “The transmission of cultures of survival does not occur in the ordered muse imaginary of national cultures with their claims to the continuity of an authentic ‘past’ and a living ‘present.”’~‘ In such a position, the marginalized areas and group escape every discourse and territory intended for them, those granting them general rights from a position of generosity in spite of their alterity, as well as those placing them in folklore and the idyllic. From this point of view, Walter Benjamin’s much cited concept of narration proves questionable.’5 lntluenced by Lukics, Benjamin defines the novel as the “Geburtenkammer des Individuums in seiner Einsamkeit” and as the announcement of the “tiefen Ratlosigkeit des Lebenden,” whereas the story, a handcrafted form of communication producing experience that moves by word of mouth, thereby represents a praxis: “Sie senkt die Sache in das Leben des Berichtenden ein, um sie wieder aus ihm hervorzuholen. So haftet an der Erzahlung die Spur des Erzahlenden wie die Spur der Topferhand an der Tonschale.”’h The story is thus neither information, like a journalistic article, nor is it subject to verification, to explication, as is history. Moreover, giving itself over to the way of the world, it stands outside all historical categories. Telling stories indeed escapes historicism with its concept of universal history governed by a c~ntinuum,~’ but the world of experience liberated from it invoked by Benjamin is still that of an idyll supported by nostalgia, an idyll in which history means the experience of being, in time and memory, the formation of collectively shared traditions. In short, telling stories reflects the messianic trace: Not without irony, at this point the almost diametrically opposed attempt at the integration of nonwestern cultures into history can be cited. The fact that narratives categorizable according to western models circulate not only demonstrates a capability of narration, but equips a culture with the competence to form history. Conceived as a universal cognitive instrument to create meaning, narration above all makes authority and legitimization possible, which leads us back to White: “It is only by virtue of what it teaches about moral wisdom, or rather about the irreducible moralism of a life lived under the cognitions of culture rather than nature, that narrative can claim cognitive authority at all.”’” Only by assuming a priori legitimized categories, the concept of common sense history,“’ which becomes possible through agreements made of the convictions of “persons of goodwill,” can the validity of such statements be determined.4’ Precisely the concepts of culture and history fall under these categories: The condition of their possibility, on the other hand, is to be found in the demarcation mentioned elsewhere-the difference between chaotic natural occurrences and ordered historical or cultural events. Narratives are only found where there is a social center, (a narrative-forming “consciousness of a social center”) and simultaneously a “historical consciousness,” where there is a master narrative. As the translatability of narratives mentioned above-the “foreign” texts examined according to our models are to be admitted or excluded from the category of narration-implies the ability to form a history, narration becomes a mediating concept between the First World and the Third World.J’ Lyotard demonstrates this in exemplary fashion: The names and the places are erased. At the end of the master history, there will only be humanity.44 As is well-known, in La condition postmoderne Lyotard demonstrates how narration was incorporated into the western striving for universality in modernity and its philosophies. In contrast to scientific discourse or knowledge, no argumentation or presentation of evidence is necessary in narration. The narratives themselves determine-and at the same time are part of-what can be said and done? through their pragmatism of mediation, they legitimate themselves. In contrast, scientific knowledge grants mere reproduction, the interactive act, no legitimacy. Even if, as with Benjamin, the collective is emphasized as the social bond, as the determining factor for narratives, whereby an opposition to the universalist ideas of the western philosophies can be formulated, Lyotard’s argumentation does not lead to a metaphysics of the messianic: The idea of the (small, local) narrative requires rather an open systematics that allows the event as catastrophe and revision to break into the space of narrative without a messianic security. This “imitation” or “disturbance” of the narrative becomes here a catastrophe insofar as the stories do not circulate as common sense. A speech act is performed that proliferates in a space for collisions, where even the speaker is represented in his or her conflicting nature and constitutes an enunciative argumentative character.

#### Form determines the content of narrations as it discursively impacts how we tell the stories of post-colonial countries – not recognizing how the form of storytelling relates to authority brews ambivalence towards how racist structures are constructed in speech – only sci fi’s interrogation shows how history shapes social relations in academic arenas

Susanne Knaller 99, [Susanne Knaller is a professor at the Universität Graz Institut für Romanistik, “Scattered Voices. Some Remarks on a Narrative Theory of Postcolonial Storytelling”. The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory, doi:10.1080/00168899909597392]//WY

If we were to follow Hayden White’s thoughts on historiographic narration, I Yvonne Rainer’s question as to whether or not the subtext of all narration is one of power must be answered positively. “The demand for closure,” as White writes in The Content of the Form, “is a demand for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of real events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama”;’ and further: “narrativizing discourse serves the purpose of moralizing judgement.”’ Such are “the various plots of the various histories that tell us of a merely regional happening . . . images of that authority that summons us to participation in a moral universe that but for its story form, would have no appeal at all.”‘ Whites propagate a moral coherence and unity of narration that may meet with rejection. For Laura Mulvey, for example, the narrative represents above all the incorporation of authority, “the distrust of narrative closure,” and she declares this distrust to be a foundational principle of the feminist avant-garde.s Nevertheless, for a more detailed examination of narration, it seems worth noting that the opposing view can be defended as well. So Richard Rorty and Michel de Certeau propagate narration as a form that rejects authority. In a word, it seems that neither the theory nor practice of narration offers conclusive, unambiguous answers to Yvonne Rainer’s questions. The positioning of narrative in relation to its critical or affirmative content must remain open for now.6 I. In his book The Content of the Form, Hayden White affirms the universality of narration: “far from being one code among many that a culture may utilize for endowing experience with meaning, narrative is a meta-code, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted.”’ He argues this pointedly, saying that in contrast to poems or philosophical treatises, narratives may be translated into other cultures and understood without loss. Narrative is granted a status that de-differentiates cultural space and is thereby granted an a priori “given” content of form (of narration) even prior to each instantiation Still, the problem poses itself for White that narratives are not simply found, inasmuch as historical events do not present themselves as narrated history. Therefore the narrative of the historian can only be an allegorical construction, “which we can only imagine, never experience.”’ White’s analysis takes its argumentative force from the assumption of a conflict between the awareness of a fragmentary, open world and the longing to give it meaningful closure through an act of form-giving. lo This produces an ambivalence between two claims to authority: the will to truth and the will to meaning. Both bring about an instrumentalization by following an economy of adaptation. This is also the foundation of the ambivalence: How can the act that makes the “real” be useful for a cultural structure by giving it meaning be more than an economy of necessity? How can the universality of the instrument of such a task (which is narration) be translated into the content (which is history/culture), whose origin is always found in the same indifference of the open, the fragmentary, the raw? How, in the end, can the linguistic material that serves narration achieve anything but a construct-like differentiation? White solves this conflict by transcending the material: If in The Content of the Form he still understands narration in Mink’s sense as a “transcoding” and labels it allegorical, then he later revises that point of view. Indeed, narratives remain explications of represented real events “by representing them as possessing the coherence of generic plot types-epic, comic, tragic, farcical, and so on,”’ I but the question as to the coherence of reality is answered differently. The endowment of meaning is shifted from finding to discovering: Historical events are no longer interpreted as generally subject to narrative form. Rather, it is important to discover preferences even in the undifferentiated material itself, to extract with determination a difference a priori from it, and thereby to legitimate the will to truth. Historians, then, do not overlay the historical events with a willful narrative form, but rather discover the true, experienced “history.”” How, though, can we decide what the true history is, or whether the version narrated by the historian is adequate to the events and real stories? In the end, the same facts can doubtless be narrated in various ways. By using terminology from Hjemslevs, White tries to show that the difference between ideological (nonobjective) and historical (true) narrative lies neither in the substance and form of the expression (plot and discourse) nor in the form of the content, but rather on the level of the substance of the content. Only on this level is this true: “the representation of real events, emplotted as a story of a specific kind . . . can be identified as a special case of a general notion of the nature of historical reality.”” Here the cognitive authority of the “narrative mode of speaking about the world’ is implemented. A narrative becomes ideological only when the plot type demanded by the examined historical events is not adequately represented. To represent this position with greater precision, White discusses Marx’s critique of Hugo and Proudhon, who portray Louis Bonaparte’s actions between 1848 and 1851 as “heroic,” when “farcical” would be more appropriate. On the level of substance of content, Marx evokes the class struggle as a historical reality, by which argument he justifies his farcical plotting of Louis Bonaparte’s attempt to repeat the events of 1789.14 In The Content of the Form, White does not yet see any logical or factual foundation for Marx’s irony, but only a logic of rhetoric-tropology. In the later article, “Storytelling: Historical and Ideological,” he tries to save scientific narrative from that logic and thereby to place literary narrative at a distance. From this point of view, history can be made valid, in contrast to fictional, artistic discourse as the representation of a factual, true ordering of historical events. Like historiography, analytical philosophy also debates the proximity and points of contact between artistic and nonartistic narration. McIntyre, for example, posits that each action can only be understood when placed in “the context of a set of narrative histories,” and further, that human culture can only be understood as an arsenal of narratives.Is At the same time, he sees inherent dangers in narrative for the analytic-logical philosophical discourse, dangers grounded in the unavoidable mediatization (form), and he places this alongside the danger of uncontrolled multiplication (proliferation). These dangers can only be banished by a rational culture in which the narratives are correlated without contradiction and held together by a will to coherence. Rendered coherent by this rational metanarrative, which at the same time promises a future free from contradictions, literary and philosophical narratives do not interfere with one another. Moreover, narratives provide a ground for maintaining and forming concepts of moral meaning. McIntyre traces this ability of narrative to constitute meaning back to the authority of the substance of content. The truth of narratives formed and made possible in this way is thus interrupted when events (histoire) and characters (as part of these) cede their authority to represent meaning to form. This has fatally occurred in modem literature; as McIntyre puts it, “the cultural place of narrative has been diminished.”’h We can here mention Picon’s description of modem art, in which the work is not expression but creation (giving form): “elle donne 1 voir ce qui n’a pas CtC vu avant elle, elle forme au lieu de reflecter.”” We read elsewhere: “L‘histoire de la poCsie modeme est tout entikre celle de la substitution d’un langage de criation 1 un langage d’expression . . . le langage doit maintenant produire le monde qu’il ne peut plus exprimer.”lx With Jacques Derrida, who quotes Picon’s remarks in connection with his critique of Rousset in “Force et Signification,”Iy we can discern the replacement of mimesis with a conception of creation even in narrative theories from the structuralist ranks, desiring to conceive of meaning as only “immanent in the work” by rejecting mimesism, psychologism, and positivism: In his article, Derrida makes clear the extent to which the perspective of the panoramic view (allowing the “relief” and the structure to come out better) forms a totality behind the thought of creation-the authority giving meaning to form. This happens by the form determining the content and becoming what is essential in the work. Here “form” is creation and means “uncovering,” through a writing that sets something preceding it in signs. “C’est quand I’tcrit est dCfunt comme signe-signal qu’il nait comme langage.”21 This erasure of the referent by the form sets off a process that reifies the form and that finally suggests a demediation on the level of substantive formation, propagated on the substantive level of content by White and McIntyre, for instance. This can be clearly demonstrated in narratology: Tamed by grammars of narrative, the discourse becomes the determining cause of narration. Why, though, is narrative subjugated, on the one hand to the order of the signifier, and on the other to that of the signified? What danger of narrative is to be kept in check? Both the idea of truth content and the idea of creative content-that is, the idea of creation, unity, and meaning-correlate with that fundamental principle of western philosophy described by Foucault as the disciplining moment: the foundational subject, the primal experience, and the universal mediation-writing, reading, exchanging. The event itself is disciplined, having its place in the relationship of dispersing, overlapping, and piling up of material elements,22 where the moment (as sign of continuity) shatters and the subject (as authority), having decomposed into a plentitude of possible positions and functions, is situated. The resulting growth and repetition (McIntyre’s proliferation) does not mean a reading or “commenting on” (Foucault), or “inauguration” (Derrida), a sort of masked (made script) repetition of that which has already been said. Rather, it means the opening of a space for conflict, above all when one thinks of the relationship of form to meaning-or, specific to narration, of discourses to histories one of irritation, whereby proliferation can be made graspable as narration’s form-determined, inherent invitation to continually new semiotic processes-alteration through repetition. This opens up the possibility of altered perspectives and positions.’7

#### Our deployment of science fiction can’t be coopted – rather it’s a process of scenario planning disrupting racist constructs of Africa in discursive arenas – claims of sci-fi being “utopian” or “anti-cognitive” reinforce racist anthropological descriptions of African intellectual inferiority

Ian MacDonald 14, Columbia University Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Candidate, “Alter-Africas: Science Fiction and the Post-Colonial Black African Novel”//WY

\*\*The author refers to science fiction as “sf”

Taking Miéville one step further, these condemnations surrounding fantasy from Suvin, Jameson, and Freedman are more than simply “theoretically foreclosed,”251 they are in their own way neo-colonialist. Such phrases as “anti-cognitive,” “overt ideology,” “protoFascist,” “mystification,” “sociopathological” and “contamination,” eerily echo parallel descriptions in anthropological discourse I touched upon early in this project’s introduction. Sf, in this view, is “cognitively” valid, but in that sense of cognition already conveniently validated by western epistemology. While I have no doubt that this was not their intention, when Suvin and Jameson turn their critical eye to fantasy, they simultaneously describe Africa’s own indispensable tradition of fantasy in the works of Fangunwa, Tutuola, Head, Cheney-Coker, Tansi, Farah, Laing, Ngũgĩ, and Okri, whose staging of the mythic, and often bluntly magical, intrusion into the lived world must now, it seems, be distinguished as reflecting “anti-rationalist” and “anti-modern,” “anti-cognitive” and even “proto-Fascist” tendencies. This is a stunning anathema aimed at an entire literary genealogy. Instead, I ally myself with Miéville, who counters that the boundary building at play in these theorists is itself patently ideological and, more so, indefensible upon close scrutiny. Rather, following Wells, Miéville looks at sf as a genre that “domesticates an impossibility,” as the result of “a strategy, or a game, played by writer and, often, reader, based not on reality-claims but plausibility-claims that hold purely within the text.”252 This is not to say that all fantasy and fabulism is, ipso facto, sf. Some line of demarcation remains valuable in order to delineate spaces for academic discourse. Rather, it suggests that a work need not be one or the other. This is what, for example, keeps Ray Bradbury within the larger discussion of what counts as sf despite the radical impossibility of his premises and despite the fact the he himself, in the context of Dandelion Wine referred to himself as writing “magic realism.” It is because when Bradbury writes about colonies on Mars, or houses so computerized that they can continue functioning long after the humans they serve have been vaporized by a nuclear blast, he is engaging in an investigation into the ways technology affects and will continue to inflect upon human life. In the context of Major Gentl and Big Bishop Roko, for example, Ngobah-Smart argues that “we must resist to see Laing’s verbal idiosyncrasies as just another version of magical realism.”253 Even by the publication of Woman of the Aeroplanes, Laing had begun to incorporate the vocabulary of technology into his stories in integral ways (far more so than, say, examples like Gabriel Garcia Marquez's invocation of magnetism in the opening pages of A Hundred Years of Solitude). When, however, Major Gentl and the Achimota Wars opens in the year 2020 AD, continuing attempts to legislate Laing's approach to mere mythic reproduction threaten to become a form of scholarly silencing.254 Nevertheless, I would not include in an expanded revision of this dissertation works like Okri’s The Famished Road or Head’s A Question of Power. While both of these novels engage in a great deal of play at the dividing line of myth and reality, they do not, in the way the texts analyzed in this dissertation do, engage in a dialectic concerning technology and its increasing role in unforeseen futures. The texts analyzed in this study are, in addition to anything else they may be, meditations on science, technology, and the ways these are absorbed and indigenized into African experience. They may utilize some “juju” now and again, but they remain, nevertheless, primarily concerned with technology and its science fictional possibilities. Nevertheless, such questions remain important, and I am all-too-acutely aware, as a white, male, American scholar, of the dangers of promoting a “gee-whiz” cooption of African literature into the discursive space of sf. It is not my conviction that forcing sf onto these texts in some way makes them more valid analytical objects within established western discursive spaces; rather, it is my contention that these texts, read against parallel exhibits that remain dominated by western episteme of futurity and empire, offer a possibility to decenter, and thus make more valuable, academic studies of sf in the academe. It is not my argument, in other words, that applying an sf label to the texts in this dissertation “saves” these works; rather, I argue that these African sf works might save academic discussions of sf from its own technophilic relationship to Empire.

#### Objective reality is inconclusive – the future is based off of different perceptions of the world, so our reading is best.

MIT Technology Review ’19 (Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page; Covers latest ideas from blog post about arXiv; 03/12/2019; “Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page”; <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/>; *MIT Technology Review*; accessed: 11/19/2020; MohulA)

Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities. Since then, physicists have used the “Wigner’s Friend” thought experiment to explore the nature of measurement and to argue over whether objective facts can exist. That’s important because scientists carry out experiments to establish objective facts. But if they experience different realities, the argument goes, how can they agree on what these facts might be? That’s provided some entertaining fodder for after-dinner conversation, but Wigner’s thought experiment has never been more than that—just a thought experiment. Last year, however, physicists noticed that recent advances in quantum technologies have made it possible to reproduce the Wigner’s Friend test in a real experiment. In other words, it ought to be possible to create different realities and compare them in the lab to find out whether they can be reconciled. And today, Massimiliano Proietti at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and a few colleagues say they have performed this experiment for the first time: they have created different realities and compared them. Their conclusion is that Wigner was correct—these realities can be made irreconcilable so that it is impossible to agree on objective facts about an experiment. Wigner’s original thought experiment is straightforward in principle. It begins with a single polarized photon that, when measured, can have either a horizontal polarization or a vertical polarization. But before the measurement, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, the photon exists in both polarization states at the same time—a so-called superposition. Wigner imagined a friend in a different lab measuring the state of this photon and storing the result, while Wigner observed from afar. Wigner has no information about his friend’s measurement and so is forced to assume that the photon and the measurement of it are in a superposition of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Wigner can even perform an experiment to determine whether this superposition exists or not. This is a kind of interference experiment showing that the photon and the measurement are indeed in a superposition. From Wigner’s point of view, this is a “fact”—the superposition exists. And this fact suggests that a measurement cannot have taken place. But this is in stark contrast to the point of view of the friend, who has indeed measured the photon’s polarization and recorded it. The friend can even call Wigner and say the measurement has been done (provided the outcome is not revealed). So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co. That’s the theory, but last year Caslav Brukner, at the University of Vienna in Austria, came up with a way to re-create the Wigner’s Friend experiment in the lab by means of techniques involving the entanglement of many particles at the same time. The breakthrough that Proietti and co have made is to carry this out. “In a state-of-the-art 6-photon experiment, we realize this extended Wigner’s friend scenario,” they say. They use these six entangled photons to create two alternate realities—one representing Wigner and one representing Wigner’s friend. Wigner’s friend measures the polarization of a photon and stores the result. Wigner then performs an interference measurement to determine if the measurement and the photon are in a superposition. The experiment produces an unambiguous result. It turns out that both realities can coexist even though they produce irreconcilable outcomes, just as Wigner predicted. That raises some fascinating questions that are forcing physicists to reconsider the nature of reality. The idea that observers can ultimately reconcile their measurements of some kind of fundamental reality is based on several assumptions. The first is that universal facts actually exist and that observers can agree on them. But there are other assumptions too. One is that observers have the freedom to make whatever observations they want. And another is that the choices one observer makes do not influence the choices other observers make—an assumption that physicists call locality. If there is an objective reality that everyone can agree on, then these assumptions all hold. But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong. Of course, there is another way out for those hanging on to the conventional view of reality. This is that there is some other loophole that the experimenters have overlooked. Indeed, physicists have tried to close loopholes in similar experiments for years, although they concede that it may never be possible to close them all. Nevertheless, the work has important implications for the work of scientists. “The scientific method relies on facts, established through repeated measurements and agreed upon universally, independently of who observed them,” say Proietti and co. And yet in the same paper, they undermine this idea, perhaps fatally. The next step is to go further: to construct experiments creating increasingly bizarre alternate realities that cannot be reconciled. Where this will take us is anybody’s guess. But Wigner, and his friend, would surely not be surprised.

#### The Multiple Worlds Interpretation is cosmological consensus and best explains the wave function.

Gribbin 20 [John Gribbin (described by the Spectator as “one of the finest and most prolific writers of popular science around,” is the author of, among other books, “In Search of Schrödinger’s Cat,” “The Universe: A Biography,” and “Six Impossible Things,” from which this article is excerpted. He is a Visiting Fellow in Astronomy at the University of Sussex, UK). “The Many-Worlds Theory, Explained”. The MIT Press. May 20, 2020. Accessed 12/11/21. <https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/the-many-worlds-theory/> //Xu]

Most quantum computer scientists prefer not to think about these implications. But there is one group of scientists who are used to thinking of even more than six impossible things before breakfast — the cosmologists. Some of them have espoused the Many Worlds Interpretation as the best way to explain the existence of the Universe itself. Their jumping-off point is the fact, noted by Schrödinger, that there is nothing in the equations referring to a collapse of the wave function. And they do mean the wave function; just one, which describes the entire world as a superposition of states — a Multiverse made up of a superposition of universes. The first version of Everett’s PhD thesis (later modified and shortened on the advice of Wheeler) was actually titled “The Theory of the Universal Wave Function.” And by “universal” he meant literally that, saying: Since the universal validity of the state function description is asserted, one can regard the state functions themselves as the fundamental entities, and one can even consider the state function of the whole universe. In this sense this theory can be called the theory of the “universal wave function,” since all of physics is presumed to follow from this function alone. … where for the present purpose “state function” is another name for “wave function.” “All of physics” means everything, including us — the “observers” in physics jargon. Cosmologists are excited by this, not because they are included in the wave function, but because this idea of a single, uncollapsed wave function is the only way in which the entire Universe can be described in quantum mechanical terms while still being compatible with the general theory of relativity. In the short version of his thesis published in 1957, Everett concluded that his formulation of quantum mechanics “may therefore prove a fruitful framework for the quantization of general relativity.” Although that dream has not yet been fulfilled, it has encouraged a great deal of work by cosmologists since the mid-1980s, when they latched on to the idea. But it does bring with it a lot of baggage. The universal wave function describes the position of every particle in the Universe at a particular moment in time. But it also describes every possible location of those particles at that instant. And it also describes every possible location of every particle at any other instant of time, although the number of possibilities is restricted by the quantum graininess of space and time. Out of this myriad of possible universes, there will be many versions in which stable stars and planets, and people to live on those planets, cannot exist. But there will be at least some universes resembling our own, more or less accurately, in the way often portrayed in science fiction stories. Or, indeed, in other fiction. Deutsch has pointed out that according to the MWI, any world described in a work of fiction, provided it obeys the laws of physics, really does exist somewhere in the Multiverse. There really is, for example, a “Wuthering Heights” world (but not a “Harry Potter” world). That isn’t the end of it. The single wave function describes all possible universes at all possible times. But it doesn’t say anything about changing from one state to another. Time does not flow. Sticking close to home, Everett’s parameter, called a state vector, includes a description of a world in which we exist, and all the records of that world’s history, from our memories, to fossils, to light reaching us from distant galaxies, exist. There will also be another universe exactly the same except that the “time step” has been advanced by, say, one second (or one hour, or one year). But there is no suggestion that any universe moves along from one time step to another. There will be a “me” in this second universe, described by the universal wave function, who has all the memories I have at the first instant, plus those corresponding to a further second (or hour, or year, or whatever). But it is impossible to say that these versions of “me” are the same person. Different time states can be ordered in terms of the events they describe, defining the difference between past and future, but they do not change from one state to another. All the states just exist. Time, in the way we are used to thinking of it, does not “flow” in Everett’s MWI.

### UV

Base impact calculus on intrinsic value — treat humans as an end not a mere means — that’s best to avoid regress and to avoid anti-black grammars— any other solution is worse —

1 - Tautology — util is circular because it deems morality based on pleasure and pleasure based on morality — (1) we need some other framework to determine what good is, so our method of describing violence is a way to describe ethical theories even if util is true — that means anti-black violence take priority because their model devolves into artificial and sadistic desires to define universal value —

2 - Intrinsicness — only recognizing unconditional worth of human being solve because we need something unconditionally valuable to define ethics — util’s goal to maximize pleasure is only conditionally valuable given subject’s treatment of subjects as an end — that means categorical imperative’s subject treatment is an apriori to a consequence i.e. there’s no slavery without anti blackness, but a consequence of slavery might be the economy which is a contingent factor of the external world, not intrinsic value

3 - Atrocities — util justifies authority because people don’t have intrinsic value, just conduits for their actions — justifies slavery and spirit murder because of pleasure for slave master and order of magnitude — the actions of voting for a framework that justifies slavery is psychologically violent to participants in the community – if we prove util justifies slavery, we don’t have to beat extinction outweighs because our non-consequentialist framework gives zero weight to the DA as a side constraint to the ethical dilemma of util

4 - Infinite Universes —

Bostrom 2008 Nick is a Professor at University of Oxford, PhD from London School of Economics. [“The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics”. <http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf> 2008]//Mberhe

ABSTRACT Aggregative consequentialism and several other popular moral theories are threatened with paralysis: when coupled with some plausible assumptions, they seem to imply that it is always ethically indifferent what you do. Modern cosmology teaches that the world might well contain an infinite number of happy and sad people and other candidate value-bearing locations. Aggregative ethics implies that such a world contains an infinite amount of positive value and an infinite amount of negative value. You can affect only a finite amount of good or bad. In standard cardinal arithmetic, an infinite quantity is unchanged by the addition or subtraction of any finite quantity. So it appears you cannot change the value of the world. Modifications of aggregationism aimed at resolving the paralysis are only partially effective and cause severe side effects, including problems of “fanaticism”, “distortion”, and erosion of the intuitions that originally motivated the theory. Is the infinitarian challenge fatal? 1. The challenge 1.1. The threat of infinitarian paralysis When we gaze at the starry sky at night and try to think of humanity from a “cosmic point of view”, we feel small. Human history, with all its earnest strivings, triumphs, and tragedies can remind us of a colony of ants, laboring frantically to rearrange the needles of their little ephemeral stack. We brush such late-night rumination aside in our daily life and analytic 2 philosophy. But, might such seemingly idle reflections hint at something of philosophical significance? In particular, might they contain an important implication for our moral theorizing? If the cosmos is finite, then our own comparative smallness does not necessarily undermine the idea that our conduct matters even from an impersonal perspective. We might constitute a minute portion of the whole, but that does not detract from our absolute importance. Suppose there are a hundred thousand other planets with civilizations that had their own holocausts. This does not alter the fact that the holocaust that humans caused contributed an enormous quantity of suffering to the world, a quantity measured in millions of destroyed lives. Maybe this is a tiny fraction of the total suffering in the world, but in absolute terms it is unfathomably large. Aggregative ethics can thus be reconciled with the finite case if we note that, when sizing up the moral significance of our acts, the relevant consideration is not how big a part they constitute of the whole of the doings and goings-on in the universe, but rather what difference they make in absolute terms. The infinite case is fundamentally different. Suppose the world contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically infinite world contains an infinite quantity of positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: none whatsoever. Aggregative consequentialist theories are threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that if the world is canonically infinite then it is always ethically indifferent what we do. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause another holocaust or prevent one from occurring. If any non-contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is. Is the world canonically infinite or not? Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite.1 Moreover, if the totality of physical existence is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite 3 number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets then there is, with probability one, an infinite number of people.2 Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person-states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations—there are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc. It therefore appears likely that the actual world is canonically infinite. We do not know for sure that we live in a canonically infinite world. Contemporary cosmology is in considerable flux, so its conclusions should be regarded as tentative. But it is definitely not reasonable, in light of the evidence we currently possess, to assume that we do not live in a canonically infinite world. And that is sufficient for the predicament to arise. Any ethical theory that fails to cope with this likely empirical contingency must be rejected. We should not accept an ethical theory which, conditional on our current best scientific guesses about the size and nature of the cosmos, implies that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause or prevent another holocaust.3 1.2. Which theories are threatened? Infinitarian paralysis threatens a wide range of popular ethical theories. Consider, to begin with, hedonistic utilitarianism, which in its classical formulation states that you ought to do that which maximizes the total amount of pleasure and minimizes the total amount of pain in the world. If pleasure and pain are already infinite, then all possible actions you could take would be morally on a par according to this criterion, for none of them would make any difference to the total amount of pleasure or pain. Endorsing this form of utilitarianism commits one to the view that, conditional on the world being canonically infinite, ending world hunger and causing a famine are ethically equivalent options. It is not the case that you ought to do one rather than the other. The threat is not limited to hedonistic utilitarianism. Utilitarian theories that have a broader conception of the good—happiness, preference-satisfaction, virtue, beautyappreciation, or some objective list of ingredients that make for a good life—face the same problem. So, too, does average utilitarianism, mixed total/average utilitarianism, and prioritarian views that place a premium on the well-being of the worst off. In a canonically infinite world, average utility and most weighted utility measures are just as imperturbable by human agency as is the simple sum of utility. Many non-utilitarian ethical theories are also imperiled. One common view is that in determining what we ought to do we should take into account the difference our acts would make to the total amount of well-being experienced by sentient persons even though we 4 must also factor in the special obligations that we have to particular individuals (and perhaps various deontological side-constraints). If our actions never make any difference to the amount of well-being in the world, the maximizing component of such hybrid theories becomes defunct. Depending on the structure of the theory, the components that remain in operation may—or may not—continue to generate sensible moral guidance. Moorean views, which claim that value resides in “organic unities”, are also vulnerable. If the relevant unities supervene on some medium-sized spacetime regions, such as societies or planets, then there might well be infinitely many such unities. If, instead, the relevant unity is the universe itself, then it is unclear that we could change its total value by modifying the infinitesimal part of it that is within our reach.4 For simplicity, we will focus most of the discussion on purely consequentialist theories (even though, as we have seen, the problems affect a much larger family of ethical systems). However, not all consequentialist theories are threatened. The vulnerability infinitarian paralysis arises from the combination of two elements: consequentialism and aggregationism. By “aggregationism” we refer to the idea that the value of a world is (something like) the sum or aggregate of the values of its parts, where these parts are some kind of local phenomena such as experiences, lives, or societies. By consequentialism we refer to the idea that the rightness or wrongness of an action is (somehow) determined on the basis of considerations about whether its consequences increase or decrease value. We shall later explore how various more precise explications of “aggregationism” and “consequentialism” fare in relation to the threat of infinitarian paralysis and associated challenges. The challenge addressed in this paper is related to—but also crucially different from—Pascal’s wager, the St. Petersburg paradox, the Pasadena problem, the Heaven and Hell problem, and kindred prudential “infinite” decision problems. 5 Related, because in each case there is, purportedly, the prospect of infinite values to be reckoned with. Different, because one important escape route that is available in the prudential cases is blocked in the ethical case. This is the route of denying that infinite values are really at stake. One way of responding to Pascal’s wager, for instance, is by taking it to show that we do not in fact have an infinitely strong preference for spending an eternity in Heaven. The attractiveness of this response would be enhanced by the finding that the alternative is to accept highly counterintuitive consequences. In a revealed-preference paradigm, this is anyway a perfectly natural view. If we accept a theory of rationality that grounds what we have reason to do in our preferences (whether raw or idealized) then we have a simple and plausible answer to Pascal: Yes, if one had an infinitely strong preference for eternal life in Heaven, then it would be rational to forego any finite pleasure on Earth for any ever-so- 5 slight increase in the odds of salvation (at least if one assumes that there would be no chance of obtaining an infinite good if one did not accept the wager, and no chance that accepting it might backfire and result in an infinite bad). However, if one does not have an infinitely strong preference for Heaven, then Pascal’s argument does not show that one is irrational to decline the wager. The fact that most people would on reflection reject the wager would simply show that most people do not place an infinite value on Heaven. The analogous response is not available to the ethical aggregationist, who is committed to the view that the total value of a world is the aggregate of the value of its parts, for this entails placing an infinite value on certain kinds of world. If a world has an infinite number of locations, and there is some finite value v such that an infinite number of the locations have an ethical value greater than v, then that world has an infinite ethical value. This is a core commitment of aggregationism; giving it up means giving up aggregationism. So the possibility of an infinite world presents a graver problem for aggregative ethics than it does for prudential rationality

5 - Butterfly Effect — every consequence produces more consequences like dropping pen causes earthquake in 30 years but we aren’t held responsible — proves util is not ethically coherent since there’s no cutoff for evaluating consequences, so non-consequentialism is best

6. No Nuke war —

#### a.] there are no nuke weapons in the world of the aff — they were dismantled when great powers started to live in computer simulations

#### b.] Western nations live in computer simulations where they don’t have conflict with one another and have been united under General Torro — there is no incentive to expand influence since torso is dead

#### 7. Even if they win that nuke’s exist — nuclear war is good — it ends the Achimota War — western powers have already tested their nukes in Achimota so an escalating nuclear war wouldn’t target Africa but instead would destroy western civilization preventing further exploitation of Africa

#### 8. Focus upon hypothetical threats causes displacement that trades community formation IN debate for potential action that drains living energy out of black spirits.