## 1

#### Western Communication is on the brink of implosion – oversaturated by endless signs and images. Reality is dead, information is dissuasive, and truth no longer exists – any critical content of the Aff is over-coded by the hyperreal form of communication.

Artrip and Debrix 18, Ryan E., and François Debrix. "The viral mediation of terror: ISIS, image, implosion." Critical Studies in Media Communication 35.1 (2018): 74-88. (Philosophy and Political Science at Guilford College and Elon University)//Elmer

Mediation and the virality of the image A crucial feature of the contemporary media system (and its accompanying global circulation of images) is oversaturation. This oversaturation of media is characterized by so-called viral patterns of production, dissemination, and consumption of content, often achieved through globally networked digital platforms. Enabled by a seemingly exponential growth of networks and by ever-widened thresholds of social connectivity, digital technologies have ushered in an unprecedented intensity of information production. Today’s global mediascape is perhaps best defined by its immeasurable volume of communicative activity, constituted by an interminable accumulation/circulation of representational images (thus, it may be more apt to call it a global media circuitry). In order to theorize the relevance of the accumulative/circulatory effects of representation taking place throughout contemporary media processes, we turn to Jean Baudrillard’s theory of simulation. According to Baudrillard’s theory of simulation, images have a tendency to “exceed” their original or intended function to represent, reflect, or describe some facet of reality. Images eventually overtake, overwhelm, and erase the possibility of originality or referential certainty. For Baudrillard (1983b), this takes place over the course of four “successive phases of the image” (p. 11). The first stage corresponds to the representational function of the image in its most ideal form. It describes a moment in the development of western thought—less likely an actual historical moment than one retroactively imposed on or assumed by western thought itself—whereby any reality can be perfectly reflected by an image. A second stage emerges as a response or opposition to the notion of representational faithfulness. It introduces the possibility of representational malfunction (often deployed intentionally), and it relates to what Baudrillard (1993) refers to in Symbolic Exchange and Death as “the counterfeit,” something that, Baudrillard claims, is “the dominant schema in the ‘classical period’” (p. 50). With the counterfeit, the image does not accurately represent anymore but rather “masks or perverts a basic reality” (Baudrillard, 1983b, p. 11). Representation gives way to distortion. Or, to put it somewhat differently, representation as distortion can now mislead, hide, cheat, dissimulate, or facilitate the production (and valuation) of lies and untruths (or counter-realities). In a third stage, Baudrillard (1983b) theorizes that the image now “masks the absence of a basic reality” (p. 11). The third stage marks a radical break from the first and second stages, and from representation in general. Representation becomes more or less a ruse or a lure; it can no longer be trusted (it cannot even be trusted to spread lies or falsehoods). In the third stage, the image’s “true” function is neither to reflect nor to distort, but rather to mask the impossibility of representation. Baudrillard (1996) conceptualizes that a crater has been left in the wake of a reality whose referentiality/representability has been “murdered” by the image itself, by the lure of representation, and by the desire to over-signify by way of the image. This third stage is marked by an over or hyperactive global (re)production of images and meanings in a panic mode eager to restore reality/referentiality at all costs. The demands that the real always be meaningful are everywhere in excess. “There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity. […] there is a panic-stricken production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production,” writes Baudrillard (1983b, pp. 12– 13). A panic-driven sense of reality’s radical absence generates a crisis about the capacity of verifiable truth and representable meaning. Still, according to this (il)logic, it is not enough to say that the absence of the real creates a void of meaning and truth inside which the entirety of western thought and its belief-systems disappear. Frantically, this void also stimulates and simulates reproductive effects driven by disappointment (that the real is no more) but also by desire (that the quest for the real produce more and more reality). Thus, this stage of “representation” or of reality-production also inevitably turns toward proliferation and saturation of all the signs that can stand for the real itself. The less reality is present, the more its signs, as substitutes for the real, proliferate. As Baudrillard (2005) puts it: “We live in terror both of the excess of meaning and of total meaninglessness” (p. 134). Demands on reality to be exponentially re-enacted, displayed, and proliferated (the new modalities of representation in this third phase) further deepen the absence of the real. Demands for evermore meaning (everything must make sense, be meaningful) exacerbate a general loss of certainty. Meaning, too, is about the exponential production and display of signs, signs that stand for what is meaningful. As Baudrillard (1988) writes, “Everywhere one seeks to produce meaning, to make the world signify, to render it visible. We are not, however, in danger of lacking meaning; quite to the contrary, we are gorged with meaning and it is killing us” (p. 63). Lastly, Baudrillard (1983b) arrives at a fourth stage of the image/simulation. Here, the image, indebted to the effects of absence-proliferation resulting from the third stage, “bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum” (p. 11). This stage of the image relates to a phase of the “real” in which the effects of representation (or what formerly could be called representation) can now be conceptualized as a series of independent operations. Images now circulate and reproduce in more or less complete abstraction from the demands of referentiality. In effect, the “real” has been hollowed out by its own representations (as we saw in the third stage). Nothing is left of the real but its simulacra, its sign-images that circulate and are exchanged indiscriminately throughout a global mediascape. At this stage, when we point to a “real” object in the world, we actually point to a hyper-mediation of the object and of its sign-function, often to manifold images, void of originality by virtue of having been hyper-circulated. The mediation of reality has led to the disappearance of the real and representation, and we find instead a hallucinatory complex of “hyperreality” whereby things appear and in fact are “more real than the real” (Baudrillard, 1983a, p. 99). Baudrillard’s diagnosis about representation, reality, and their fateful (hyper)- mediation is reflected through many of the operations of contemporary media, particularly those that involve the proliferation and saturation of inputs and outputs in the global circuitry. The immeasurable volume of hyper-produced digital contents seems to have overwhelmed the global circuits of communication, representation, and meaning/signification. The globalized world is faced with an irreducible complexity of interdependent transmissions, exchanges, and always expanding and morphing communication channels occurring between a multitude of networked actors/actants, interests, and media across the shifting realms of speculative finance, statecraft, international intelligence, the management of political processes, journalism, news-reporting/making, publishing, academia, or “scientific” expertise, and everyday consumer practices, on and on, ad nauseam. There occurs a widespread hyper-generation, hyper-distribution, and hyper-signification of causality and connectivity that, in turn, become virtually indistinguishable categories, excreted by digitally mediated social exchange, and often emerging as a series of signs or symptoms of the boundless growth of an implosive global system. As the system grows, all meanings, certainties, and truth-claims implode. Within this implosive global system, mediation of the true and the real may remain operative, but only according to a logic of functional contradiction. Indeed, the promise of certainty is continually (re)produced concomitantly with its disappointment or deferral. This is perhaps the fateful or fatal strategic extension of the culture industry’s logic of domination and libidinal exploitation that had once been outlined by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002). As Horkheimer and Adorno put it, [t]he culture industry endlessly cheats its consumers out of what it endlessly promises. The promissory note of pleasure issued by plot and packaging is indefinitely prolonged: the promise, which actually comprises the entire show, disdainfully intimates that there is nothing more to come, that the diner must be satisfied with reading the menu. (p. 111) Today, however, the operationalization of promise-disappointment functions beyond the strategic scope of consumer marketing and the culture industry. The mediatized subject is constantly hit by a barrage of direct and indirect promissory notes about various forms and versions of certainty, security, and truth emanating from multiple news media pundits, commentators, ideologues, technocrats, politicians, community activists, and fellow “digizens.” Increasingly, the reality of power (social, political, economic, etc.) is being scrambled by a hyper-real overproduction of conflicting “truths” and “untruths,” “reals” and “unreals,” “facts” and “alternative facts,” or “news” and “fake news” that exacerbate the implosion of ideologically incoherent and semantically fragmented images purporting to represent some sort of social/ political/economic reality (Artrip & Debrix, 2014). Put differently, in seeking to diagnose and represent the true and the real, media today often produce a series of “undecidable symptoms, and an assortment of vague and contradictory diagnoses” (Baudrillard, 1995, p. 48). Even mainstream news commentaries today echo a vaguely postmodern concern that we have somehow entered a dangerous “post-truth” era of mediated social and political reality (Davies, 2016; Flood, 2016). One widespread sentiment in response to this “posttruth crisis” is to fetishize “fact-checking” technologies and related epistemic media/ truth policing practices. This sentiment commonly implores that countermeasures be taken in response to “fake news” proliferation. Yet, the machineries that produce and disseminate the true and the untrue are one and the same. Both involve the same conditions of reproduction, the same thirst for reality, and the same system of operationalized promise/disappointment. The imperative to “fact-check” suggests that media need to fight against a threat to their own legitimacy and against the endangerment of truth. But journalists and pundits who tout “fact-checking” as some panacean form of political/social resistance appear to do so in complete ignorance or denial of the hyper-real effects of today’s global media. They fail to see that, in the words of Baudrillard (2005), “[t]he excess of information engenders undecidability of facts and confusion of minds. […] The excess of transparency engenders terror” (p. 193). The ethos/pathos of “factchecking” assumes that the immediacy of truth is still possible, or that media can or must remain neutral conduits for the transmission of reality. Thus, the fetishization of “fact-checking” does not care to address (or cannot make itself address) the more difficult situation, but one that is arguably at the root of the so-called post-truth condition: truth is always already mediated. Truth is always already vulnerable to the challenges of “alternative” forms of reality assessment and representation. The viral form of today’s media simultaneously demands and prohibits a hegemonic instantiation of truth. Perhaps this simultaneous and contradictory demand for and prohibition of epistemological hegemony has always been a central feature of liberal democracies and their quests for truth. The devout faith in the “marketplace of ideas” in (neo)liberal democratic designs—rooted in the virtues of transparency, freedom, and competition—promises that (like the infamous invisible hand of the market, perhaps) it will eventually always be able to sort out fact from fiction. But the radical equivalency and universal fungibility of all ideas make it such that each attempt to instantiate a hegemonic truth tends only to energize an opposition**al** or contradictory attempt. In the domain of news and political media, the user-subject’s search for truth resembles a shell game, the plight of which is perhaps nowhere more evident than with Counselor to President Trump Kellyanne Conway’s insistence on “alternative facts” in opposition to the seemingly more measured, documented, quantitative, and conventional facts reported about public attendance at Trump’s presidential inauguration (Bradner, 2017). The new U.S. executive’s blatant disregard for referential reality, made evident by the continual torrent of images, signs, and contradictory truth-claims disseminated from the state apparatus (or via the president’s Twitter account), reflects a stage of simulation in which the lie operates as a self-sustaining simulacrum. The lie is no longer a “counterfeit” (as it was in Baudrillard’s second phase of the image), but rather a free-floating signifier. The lie no longer antagonizes truth or the real. Rather, the lie makes sense only in relation to other lies that do not even care anymore to appear truthful. The lie mirrors the hyper-real condition and operations of media because it functions according to a framework of “truth” that assumes no weight about reality, assigns no inherent value to the real, and makes no referential claims. There is no certainty left when it comes to truths and lies. What is left is an unending play of symptoms emanating from the oversaturation (an oversaturation of images, signs, statements, and “realities,” once again) of an undifferentiated global system. Everything becomes uncertain (Baudrillard might say that it is indifferent), reduced to the universally fungible mode of information/news. As Baudrillard (1995) intimated, “everything which is turned into information becomes the object of endless speculation” (p. 41).

#### The Impact is implosive violence as we seek to exterminate otherness by imposing meaning onto the globe.

Artrip and Debrix 14, Ryan E., and François Debrix. "The digital fog of war: Baudrillard and the violence of representation." (2014). (Philosophy and Political Science at Guilford College and Elon University)//Elmer

The story that needs to be told is thus not about the undoubtedly deplorable “truth” or fact of explosive and warlike violence, but about a violence of another sort. In the radical digital transparency of the global scene, we (members of the demos) often have full or direct exposure to explosivity, as we saw above with the image of terror. But what still needs to be thought and problematized is implosivity or what may be called implosive violence. Implosive violence is a violence for which we do not, and perhaps will never, have much of a language (Rancière, 2007: 123). Although, not having a language for it or, rather, as we saw above, seeking to find a language to talk about it and, perhaps, to make sense of it is still sought after. This is, perhaps, what digital pictures of war/terror violence seek to capture or want to force through. Implosive violence, often digitally rendered these days, is in close contact with media technologies and representational devices and techniques because it seeks representation and meaning. This is why implosive violence insists on **calling in wars** (against terror, for example) and on mobilizing war machines (against terrorist others, against **vague enemy figures**), but wars and war machines that no longer have—to the extent that they ever had—a clearly identifiable object and subject, or a **clear mission/**purpose. As such, this implosive violence and its wars (the new Western/global way of war, perhaps) must remain uncertain, unclear, foggy, inwardly driven, representational, and indeed virulent. They must remain uncertain and confused even as they are digitally operative and desperately capture events/images to give the impression that meaning**s/significations** can **and will** be found. Yet, as we saw above, it is not meanings exactly that must be found, but information and the endless guarantee of its immediate circulation. As information occupies the empty place of meaning, certainty, or truth, images must be instantaneously turned into appearances that search for meanings that will never be discovered because, instead, a proliferation of information-worthy facts and beliefs will take over (perhaps this is what US fake pundit and comedian Stephen Colbert famously referred to as “truthiness”). Or, as Baudrillard puts it, “free from its former enemies, humanity now has to create enemies from within, which in fact produces a wide variety of inhuman metastases” (Baudrillard, 2003). Thus, this implosive violence is destined to be a global violence since it "is the product of a system that tracks down any form of negativity and singularity, including of course death as the ultimate form of singularity. […] It is a violence that, in a sense, puts an end to violence itself and strives to establish a world where anything related to the natural must disappear  […] Better than a global violence, we should call it a global virulence. This form of violence is indeed viral. It moves by contagion, produces by chain reaction, and little by little it destroys our immune systems and our capacities to resist" (2003; our italics).

#### The 1AC’s reliance on Media as a conduit of images and facts is an abolishment of reality that replaces human interaction with spectacle, image, and simulation reinforcing the hegemony of the Sign Economy.

Pawlett 7, William. Jean Baudrillard: against banality. Routledge, 2007. (Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies at the University of Wolverhampton)//Elmer

To exemplify his position regarding information, Baudrillard focuses on news reports where there is ‘a discontinuum of signs and messages in which all orders are equivalent (1998a: 121). News reports on ‘war, famine and death are interspersed with adverts for washing powder and razors’ and, we might add, with the self-advertising of journalists, news organisations and TV companies. But this is not merely a chaotic, confused abundance of signs: ‘it is the imposition upon us, by the systematic succession of messages, of the equivalence of history and the minor news item, of the event and the spectacle, of information and advertising at the level of the sign’ (1998a: 122). Not only events, but also the world itself, are ‘segmented’, cut up into ‘discontinuous, successive, non-contradictory messages’. We do not consume a spectacle or an image as such, but the principle of the succession of all possible spectacles or images: ‘there is no danger of anything emerging that is not one sign among others’ (1998a: 122). Baudrillard engages with the theories of McLuhan and his infamous slogan ‘The medium is the message’, arguing that the really signiﬁcant level at which media inﬂuence people is not that of the content of its messages. It is in ‘the constraining pattern – linked to the very technical essence of those media – of the disarticulation of the real into successive and equivalent signs’ (1998a: 122). Marxist attempts to theorise the effects of the media on audiences and consumers fail because such critiques focus on the ideological nature of content and the ownership of networks but pay little attention to the medium itself and to its possible affects on perception and social relations (1981: 166–72). In exploring the medium Baudrillard postulates a ‘law of technological inertia’, suggesting that the closer the medium gets to ‘the real’, through techniques such as documentary style ﬁlm-making and live coverage, the greater the ‘real absence from the world’. In other words, ‘the world’ as space of perspective – of seeing and knowing – is increasingly replaced by a sequence of images in which ‘the primary function of each message is to refer to another message’ (1998a: 122). In this way the medium, not the message, imposes a certain way of seeing the world on the audience. Rather than a space for reﬂection and critical distance we have information sliced and diced as a commodity-sign. This is no Luddite hatred of technology. Both McLuhan and Baudrillard note that the medium of the printed book, dating back to the ﬁfteenth century, imposes a particular mechanics of perception, a form of constraint favouring solitary reﬂection and linearity. But the distinctive nature of the electronic mass media is, for Baudrillard, that they ‘function to neutralise the lived, unique, eventual character of the world and substitute for it a multiple universe of media which are homogeneous’ (1998a: 123). The electronic media are ideological in the sense that they declare through their form, and often also in content, ‘the omnipotence of a system of reading over a world become a system of signs’. The ‘confused’ and ‘conﬂicted’ world is transformed into an abstract, ordered one, a world of consumable signs where ‘the signiﬁer becomes its own signiﬁed . . . we see the abolition of the signiﬁed and the tautology of the signiﬁer . . . the substitution of the code for the referential dimension deﬁnes mass media consumption’ (1998a: 124–5). For Baudrillard the media are, in fact, ‘anti-mediatory’ (1981: 169). They prevent response, the reciprocal exchange of meaning, allowing only simulatory responses, responses drawn from a predeﬁned range or code. Indeed, for Baudrillard ‘the code is the only agency that speaks’ (1981: 179). Today, ‘interactive’ TV is far more developed but the ‘interactivity’ on offer remains that of the medium or the code. We are confronted with a myriad of choices, channels, spectator angles and phone-in options, but all are generated from the medium: we merely complete the circuit. Human interaction is replaced by simulatory interactivity.

#### The Will to Objectivity turns the world into a Global Target – Academic Rationality and the Will to Know culminates in Extermination.

* Answers Science/Objective Truth Args

Chow 06. Rey Chow, professor of comparative literature at Brown, The Age of the World Target, 2006, pg. 40 //Elmer

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the "scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target.52 In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are **part and parcel of a strategic logic**. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes 53—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts **to "know" the other cultures**? Can "knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting **or getting the other** that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign "self"/"eye"—the "I"—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, **its destruction by the bomber**. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. "Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences.54 This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object"-and by "the problem of the vanishing object."

#### The Alternative is Radical Thought, catching debate in a trap of its own making. Instead of subsuming to the demand for truth, we are masters of illusion – bet on our critique of form, an enigma that reveals the contradiction of it all.

Pawlett 7, William. Jean Baudrillard: against banality. Routledge, 2007. (Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies at the University of Wolverhampton)//Elmer

Radical thought, as Baudrillard styles it, is not scientific, but nor is it critical. Both scientific and critical thought purport to operate on ‘reality’, but for Baudrillard, following Nietzsche, belief in ‘reality’ is an ‘otherworldly spiritual consolation . . . one of the elementary forms of the religious life . . . the last refuge of the moral zealots’ (1996c: 94). Baudrillard insists that ‘No one believes fundamentally in the real, nor in the self-evidence of their real lives’ (ibid.). Scientific and critical thought posit a ‘comforting’ and ‘necessary’ relationship between thought and reality. Baudrillard’s radical thought, in contrast, claims a fundamental ‘incompatibility between thought and the real’ (1996c: 96). As they are not naturally connected, thought is singular. Radical thought occurs ‘at the violent intersection of meaning and non-meaning, of truth and non-truth’, it ‘wagers on the illusion of the world’ (1996c: 97–8). Any attempt by thought to remain faithful to the world or to the ‘real’ is doomed because ‘It arises from a total misunderstanding about language, which is illusion in its very movement, since it is the bearer of that continuity of the void, that continuity of the Nothing . . . at the very heart of what it says, since it is, in its very materiality, the deconstruction of what it signifies’ (1996c: 98). Baudrillard’s position here is in accord with that expressed, some twenty years earlier, in Symbolic Exchange; language should not be confused with its meaning alone, it is also material – the material illusion. That is, language is a medium, a form, a singularity: no language can be faithfully translated into another and no language faithfully translates ideas or thoughts. The physical form of language – sounds, silences, marks, spaces – ‘deconstructs’ the content of signified meanings. As with the anagrammatic dispersal, noble ideas and figures – gods and heroes alike – are ‘sacrificed’, becoming no more than a series of sound effects, sensuous forms of breath and song: ‘Words move quicker than meaning, but if they go too quickly, we have madness’ (1996c: 99). Scientific and critical thought tends to treat language as a neutral medium of representation, or at least attempts to find a language that is adequate to representation, a tool that can ‘extract’ truths. The task of extraction is an exacting one, requiring much discipline and toil. Baudrillard plays with a reversal of this image of thought, suggesting that ‘reality asks nothing other than to submit itself to hypotheses. And it confirms them all. That, indeed, is its ruse and its vengeance’ (1996c: 99). By contrast, radical thought must advance behind a mask and constitute itself as a decoy, without regard for its own truth. It must pride itself on not being an instrument of analysis, not being a critical tool. For it is the world which must analyse itself. It is the world itself which must reveal itself not as truth, but as illusion. (Baudrillard, 1996c: 99) Writing should not aim to ‘capture’ the object, but should make the object more enigmatic by seducing it, by allowing it to ‘disappear for itself’ through a ‘poetic resolution’ (1996c: 100). In other words, as the object is abstracted, limited, coded, preceded by simulated models of itself, forced under the glaring lights of scientific rationality, it is allowed, by radical thought, to disappear from its coded position. Thought is allowed to be meaningless, poetic, ‘useless’: ‘Cipher, do not decipher’ (1996c: 104). In any case the object takes its revenge both on those who believe in its reality – scientists, technicians, critical realists – and on those, like Baudrillard, who do not, by ‘wreak[ing] vengeance on those who deny it by paradoxically proving them right’ (ibid.). Baudrillard refers to his own hypothesis of simulation, which he put forward in the late 1970s, as ‘the most cynical, most provocative hypothesis’. Yet reality, or the social world, he argues, refused to prove him wrong. Indeed, social reality seems to become more simulatory, more unreal, by the day. One example, if any more are needed, might be TV news channels, such as BBC News 24. The programmes begin with, and repeat at nauseatingly frequent intervals, the most portentous and strident clashing sounds accompanied by pulses of light (or ‘information’) beaming across the globe, strafing it and enclosing it within a matrix. These are interspersed with stock images of ‘people’: shanty towns in China, the business classes in the USA, cultured people in Europe, flashpoints in the Middle East, smiling children in Africa, the ‘global world’ reduced to a series of signs for your consumption. And then the reassuring images of ‘our’ professional news team: the energetic young career girl in designer specs, the mature and tenacious foreign correspondent in linen suit; all attentive, all on message, nodding sagely as they receive the latest updates, working for us, to deliver to us . . . the truth! And the BBC is, of course, a beacon of restraint in comparison to the fully commercial channels. Yet descriptive and critical thought are so redundant, so banal, because ‘The simulated disorder of things has moved faster than we have’. Hence radical thought must be ‘exceptional, anticipatory and at the margin’ (1996c: 101). Baudrillard denies that radical thought is depressive; it is meaning and critique that are ‘unhappy’ and disillusioned. Banal thought may aim to be optimistic but it is also ‘maddeningly tedious and demoralizingly platitudinous’. For Baudrillard ‘the definition of a radical thinking [is]: a happy form and an intelligence without hope’ (1996c: 103). Radical thought plays with the beautiful materiality of language and generates ideas, rather than platitudes, and ‘as for ideas, everyone has them. More than they need’ (ibid.). Fatal theory or radical thought are unexchangeable; they have no equivalence in use-value or exchange-value, but play with ‘a reciprocal alteration between matter and thought’ (2001c: 24). What might this mean for sociology? We analysed a deterministic society deterministically. Today we have to analyse a non-deterministic society non-deterministically – a fractal random, exponential society, the society of the critical mass and extreme phenomena, a society entirely dominated by relations of uncertainty. (Baudrillard, 2001c: 18)

## Warming DA

### 1NC Shell v1

#### Desire for “Objectivity” results in a false balance in the name of media neutrality that results in climate denialism.

Mohammed 14. Omar Mohammed. October 26, 2014. Objectivity, False Equivalencies and Climate Change. <https://cronkitehhh.jmc.asu.edu/blog/2014/10/objectivity-false-equivalencies-climate-change/?fbclid=IwAR3a6UrzMhqM_Tiu8WiuWF7ReRaeL9MLKyq2wP10PAH1gLeMJvynRIGS6Ac> [Frequent Writer and Editor at Humphrey Fellows at Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication – ASU]

But not quite all of them, though. Some say that their colleagues are exaggerating the problem and have branded them “alarmist.” I am referring to here is climate change, global warming and the central question of what causes them. So as a journalist, confronted with with appears to be two competing arguments, what do you do? At the core of what it means to be a reporter is to “be fair and balanced in presenting the contours of a debate.” Yes, an overwhelming majority of climate scientists believe that global warming is a real phenomenon and that it is caused by humans. In fact, a 2009 survey showed that 90% and 82% respectively believe in those conclusions. Does that therefore mean journalists should accept that a consensus has emerged and take as fact that global warming is indeed real? Aren’t we supposed to be objective in the way we cover stories and make sure that the minority view is also heard? No, actually. A journalist’s commitment should be to the truth and not adhering to false equivalencies in the name of objectivity. Of course, the truth can be an elusive idea. However, attempting to establish the truth when covering a story should be the governing principle of any journalist. When it comes to climate change, media critics have chastised the mainstream press’ ambivalence on forcefully reporting the truth of the issue. Robert S. Eshelman, writing in 2013 for Columbia Journalism Review (CJR), argues that journalists seem hypnotized by the complexity of the issue and as a result hide behind the cloak of reporting both sides of the story. He says: “[I]t’s as if journalists are stuck in time, presenting the science as something still under debate. A notion to be evaluated, tossed around. As scientific certainty grows today’s reporters, editors, and producers should cease with the false conceit about a debate.” Instead of balance, reporters should strive for accuracy, is Eshelman’s point. After all no journalist would give the argument that smoking cigarettes is not as unhealthy as it is claimed equal weight against scientists who have shown the opposite. So, why do journalists aspire to practice this concept of balance when it comes to climate change? Especially after an overwhelming majority of climate scientists have shown that climate change is real and caused by humans? Images taken in 1992 and 2005 show the loss of snow occurring on Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania, the highest free standing mountain in the world. Scientists say this is due to human behavior. Image via Environment and Media Part of the reason that journalists struggle with climate change may have something to do with the painful transition that the industry has endured over the last decade. With legacy revenue models decimated by the arrival of the internet, news organisations have been forced to reorient their priorities. Here is Eshelman again: “When the media industry was flush with revenue, newsrooms were well stocked with experienced, issue-specific reporters and editors. But since the early 2000s, shrinking staffs, the elimination of environmental desks, and narrower news holes has made reporting on climate change even more difficult.” Established outlets such as The New York Times, The Guardian and Reuters have seen their coverage of climate change deteriorate considerably. Alexis Sobel Fitts, also writing in CJR, points to a study that shows that in 2011, “The New York Times cut its global warming article count by 15 percent, and the Guardian slashed coverage by 21 percent that same year…Reuters, too, dropped its climate coverage by 27 percent.” While there may be some evidence that coverage has rebounded in 2013, social scientists suggest the shift is merely cosmetic. From Ms. Fitts: Max Boykoff, who since 2000 has tracked climate coverage in the top five newspapers in the United States—The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, USA Today, the Los Angeles Times, and The Washington Post—found a drop in coverage in 2013. And Robert Brulle, a social scientist at Drexel University who monitors climate coverage on television news, said his preliminary data (measuring through the end of November 2013) found 30 stories, just a single story more than in 2012, which Brulle said was “statistically just a write off. So what effect has this “ambivalent reporting” of climate change and global warming had on public opinion? Well, not particularly positive. To wit: “According to a recent Gallup poll, only 24 percent of Americans surveyed saw climate change as an issue worth “a great deal” of concern. The issue was rated second-to-last in terms of importance, just before “race relations” on the survey. (Fifty-one percent responded that climate change was worthy of little to no worry.) And according to the most recent US National Climate Assessment, conducted in April, 64 percent of Americans surveyed believe global warming is happening, a rate that’s remained relatively steady since 2008.” [Image Ommitted] A Pew Research survey of 39 nations conducted in 2013 found that only 40% of Americans see climate change as a major threat to the U.S., compared to a median of 54% in the global survey. A Pew Research survey of 39 nations conducted in 2013 found that only 40% of Americans see climate change as a major threat to the U.S., compared to a median of 54% in the global survey. This begs the question: Have we then, as journalists, fulfilled our public service role when it comes to this issue? Are we communicating the urgency of what’s at stake? One reporter, who was asked about the issue, had this to say: “My job is to tell readers what is happening in science, to provide facts, data, and context..I do not see my job as trying to influence readers’ views, just inform.” Only time will tell if this will be enough.

#### Advocacy Journalism for Climate Change is key to momentum.

Meincke 21.Bill Meincke. October 29, 2021. Is Presenting a Solution for Climate Change Advocacy Journalism?. <https://theclick.news/is-presenting-a-solution-for-climate-change-advocacy-journalism/?fbclid=IwAR0ae9RGQtqfOwQ1DGMxY5p2rRqxJwHHdppTJ0Q9biYxJZYPXIFzeCkPbKc> [Bill is a Los Angeles based reporter for The Click and SBNation’s Southsidesox.com. He is the co-host to the podcast The Big Blurt and a producer on The Story of Our Trauma – A podcast focused on the stories of those that have suffered from PTSD. He has written for LAXSportsNation.com covering the Los Angeles Kings and the iO Comedy Network focusing on current events with a comedic touch. Bill earned a B.A. in Arts and Media Management in his hometown, Chicago, at Columbia College and is currently pursuing his masters in American Journalism at New York University.]

(LOS ANGELES) — Advocacy in journalism is apparent everywhere. Newspapers’ editorial boards endorse political candidates, support vaccine mandates, and praise police reform. Some readers may find this style of editorializing and reporting repulsive and question its integrity — but advocacy journalism, in many cases, is necessary. When it comes to the public’s safety, advocacy journalism is the most important type of journalism there is. Take this story from Mother Jones, later republished on Grist, where I first encountered it. The article — titled “Can we move our forests in time to save them?” — focuses on the author’s journey through forests in the Pacific Northwest. From the headline alone, the piece shouts its advocacy. It insinuates that climate change is a threat to our forests and that we may be responsible for their survival. Climate change is a real problem, but there are some people in the world that still fully deny its existence — two different points of view. The subtitle from the author, Laura Markham, is clear about her preference for the survival of our trees: “Trees have always migrated to survive. But now they need our help to avoid climate catastrophe.” This is a clear call to action. It immediately rejects the call for journalists to be objective and neutral. The story begins with Markham’s personal thoughts on climate change, “Our rapidly changing climate vexes me, keeps me up at night — perhaps you’ve felt this, too.” It forms an immediate connection to the reader. Now that the reader has latched onto the problem, she drops a fact that most of them will find terrifying. “​​In California, where I live, climate change helped kill nearly 62 million trees in 2016 alone, and last year, 4.2 million acres of our state burned,” Markham writes, citing the US Forest Service and the California State Government. She continues her adventure through the Oregon trees, meeting with a Forest Service scientist, addressing the rise in temperatures, the problems they cause, and painting a scary picture of the not so distant future. This is strikingly similar to the way Edward R. Murrow advocated for United States intervention during the blitz on Britain during World War II, simply by describing his observations. Markham cleanly lays out the effect climate change has had on the Pacific Northwest. She leads the audience to the conclusion that the only solution is human intervention. Murrow and Markham both painted a grim picture. A picture they both saw with their own eyes. Markham took it one step further and presented the reader with fact-based solutions to the question asked in the title, Can we move our forests in time to save them? The most important thing an advocacy journalist can do is make it clear that the conclusions drawn in the article are based in fact. Laura Markham did just that and more. As Dave Berman and the Independent Media Center wrote in “Advocacy Journalism, The Least You Can Do, and The No Confidence Movement,” “If we are ever to create meaningful change, advocacy journalism will be the single most crucial element to enable the necessary organizing. It is therefore very important that we learn how to be successful advocacy journalists.”

#### Empirically works for Climate Solutions – Journalism is key.

Watts 20 Jonathan Watts 10-9-2020 "Climate crisis: does journalism actually make a difference?" <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/oct/09/turning-up-the-spotlight-how-our-climate-coverage-has-made-a-difference> (Guardians Global Environment Editor)//Elmer

“Will this story make a difference?” It’s a question journalists ask themselves all the time. The answer is rarely clearcut, and there is no shortage of stories that barely make a ripple. But there have been a number of occasions in recent years on the Guardian’s environment desk when the answer has been a resounding yes. The media is part of a social nervous system, alerting the public to remote danger in the same way neurotransmitters tell the brain the tips of the fingers are being burned. We serve as amplifiers that enable weak or remote voices to reach a wide audience and centres of decision making. And, of course, we also have a role as watchdogs, holding political authority to account. These roles – of transmission, amplification and investigation – are all vital elements in any effective response to the world’s environmental breakdown. The Earth is an extraordinary piece of evolutionary engineering that has self-regulated itself for millions of years. That homeostasis is now being destabilised by human activities. Scientists tell us it is not too late to fix this, but we need to start the repair work urgently. Journalists can facilitate that. That is because we can connect the local and the global, which is an essential part of any solution. The climate crisis, collapse of natural life support systems, rise of zoonotic diseases and the pollution of air, water and soil are often first apparent in distant regions and poor communities, though the cause and ultimate consequences can be found in wealthier and more densely populated cities. As we have learned with Covid-19, unless problems are identified and dealt with early and at a local level, the health and economic costs can be horrendous as they later spread and expand across the world. The Guardian makes those connections because it has an internationalist and social perspective and is not owned by a tycoon or corporate interests. This independence sets it apart from most other media organisations, which have a narrower domestic and economic focus, or see their role as entertainers to distract readers, or echo-chambers that reinforce prejudices. Instead of putting distance between the UK and the rest of the world, we are more likely to explore what links us together, which is essential if we are going to address global environmental problems. Finding out how people are affected and fighting back at a local level was a goal of the Green Blood series on the threats posed to environmental activists and journalists who cover the mining sector. This has made a difference. Soon after the findings were published by the Guardian and its 35 partner media organisations, Guatemala’s constitutional court upheld a request from indigenous campaigners to suspend operations at one of the largest nickel mines in Central America due to the facility’s environmental impact. Similarly, reports of human rights abuses and environmental negligence at the North Mara goldmine in Tanzania prompted multinational corporations such as Apple, Nokia and Canon to review their supply chains. The refiner, MMTC-PAMP, and the mine’s owner, Barrick, have subsequently organised an inquiry into risk management practices at North Mara. The Guardian continues to scrutinise the operator’s promise to pay more heed to the concerns of the local community and environment. Similarly, the Defenders series on the killings of environmental and land activists continues to have ramifications. In the past two years, two of those profiled have won landmark lawsuits. In South Africa, courts ruled against a proposed titanium mine that would have torn up land belonging to the Xolobeni community on the Wild Coast. In Kenya, judges awarded $12m in damages to the residents of the Owino Uhuru shantytown for deaths and health impacts from a nearby lead smelter for recycling batteries. In both cases, local activists risked their lives to campaign against powerful economic interests because they were concerned about pollution and other forms of environmental degradation. Media coverage did not decide their cases. But without the international spotlight, their courage and determination would not have received the kind of prominence that can sway opinion. A recent case in point concerned Chinese mining company plans to explore coal deposits in Zimbabwe’s Hwange national park. Local conservationists were keen to get the message out internationally because domestic reports suggested the government was ready to put economic interests above the sanctity of one of the world’s most important homes for elephants, rhinos, cheetahs, giraffes and other wildlife. It worked. Days after stories were published in the Guardian and other media, the authorities announced they would block the plan. Similarly, in Brazil, the world’s biggest meat packing company, JBS, announced in September it would axe suppliers linked to Amazon deforestation. This policy was a turnaround from its previous stance and followed a series of articles by the Guardian in collaboration with Repórter Brasil and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism about the company’s lax oversight of its supply chain. Of course, many other factors are involved in such decisions. Measuring the influence of a story is far harder than counting page views and social media shares. But it is clearly important or corporations and governments would not spend billions on public relations campaigns to avoid negative publicity. In that vein, the Guardian has taken several major steps to try to shape public opinion in favour of greater action on the climate crisis. The biggest environment reporting project of recent years was the Polluters, an old-school piece of investigative journalism that aimed to name and shame the fossil fuel companies, financial companies, public relations firms, thinktanks and politicians that have contributed the most to the climate crisis. This was a cross-disciplinary collaboration of more than 20 journalists across environment, business, investigations, data journalism, video, podcast, graphics and foreign news desks in five countries, with support from universities and NGOs. After eight months of preparation, the newspaper and website led with hard-hitting exposes every day for a week. This intense focus demonstrated the importance the Guardian places on a topic of growing public concern. It generated debate across the political spectrum and within the boardrooms of some of the world’s biggest companies, and it contributed – along with the upsurge in climate activism – to a growing number of announcements by the likes of BP, Shell and several banks and insurance companies to accelerate the shift away from carbon-intensive industries. We also know we can and should do more. As Greta Thunberg and others have pointed out, the climate and nature crises are so pressing they should be the subjects of the top headline on every news website and TV channel. There are still countless untold and under-reported stories. Scientists tell us the world needs to accelerate an energy, transport and food system transformation on a scale unprecedented in history. That is both alarming and exciting. Business as usual is not enough. Nor is journalism as usual.

#### Warming causes Extinction

Kareiva 18, Peter, and Valerie Carranza. "Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back." Futures 102 (2018): 39-50. (Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA)//Re-cut by Elmer

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (**climate change**, global **freshwater** cycle, **and** ocean **acidification**) do **pose existential risks**. This is **because of** intrinsic **positive feedback loops**, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all **directly connected to** the provision of **food and water**, and **shortages** of food and water can **create conflict** and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. **Ample clean water** is not a luxury—it **is essential for human survival**. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes **Humans** are remarkably ingenious, and **have adapted** to crises **throughout** their **history**. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). **However**, the many **stories** **of** human ingenuity **successfully** **addressing** **existential risks** such as global famine or extreme air pollution **represent** environmental c**hallenges that are** largely **linear**, have immediate consequences, **and operate without positive feedbacks**. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, **the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops**. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that **very warming can cause more CO2 release** which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that **forest fires will become more frequent** and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This **catastrophic fire** embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that **could catch humanity off-guard and produce a** true **apocalyptic event.** Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that **runaway climate change,** and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks **portends** even greater **existential risks**. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

# Case

#### Reject their dangerous philosophy:

#### Homosexuality DA: Gay people cannot operate under the assumptions of the 1n - you have made the round unsafe for them by deploying homophobia. SOBLE (2):

What was it like to listen to the distinguished Kant lecture on sexual perversion, to sit in Kant's classroom in 1780, hearing his emotional, weakly-argued condemnation of masturbation and homosexuality, and copying it into a notebook?96 Did his students titter? Was tittering tolerated in the German classroom? Did they at least roll their eyes? Were they disgusted, along with Kant, at homosexuality, or were they disgusted by his disgust? (Are my students disgusted, along with me, by homophobia, or are they disgusted by my being disgusted?) And those in his classes who masturbated or were homosexual, how did they respond? Consider the pain of hearing oneself accused in the strongest terms of being lower than a beast, and being accused by no less an authority than Professor Kant. His diatribe against homosexuality is little more than intellectual gay-bashing. Thus I imagine the profound fear felt by his targets who attended his lectures. I wonder if I would have had the courage to confront Kant in class, if I would have had the manly balls of my rational autonomy to do what the lesbian sadomasochist Pat Califia does: If I am going to be called all those bad names anyway, I might as well be the first one to spread the good news. When you come out, you make yourself vulnerable to disapproval, criticism, and discrimination. But you also get to define your own terms. You get to go first and be the one to say who you are and what that means. And after you've already admitted in public that you're a hopelessly twisted slut, what are your detractors going to do?97 I don't know if I would have been able to confess my own 'pervy' sexuality in Kant's auditorium. Maybe it is only from the comfortable, far away position of the early 21st-century that I feel safe calling Kant's account of sexual perversion a clunker concocted by a kisöreg.

#### Ableism DA: Kantianism requires rationality that constructs a perfect subject – this form of rationality isn’t accessible to all people, reifying ableism

Ryan**:** Ryan [Philosophy student] “Cognitive Disability, Misfortunate, and Justice.” *Introduction to Ethics, Binghamton University.* 2011. RP

**In Kant's deontological ethics, one has a duty to treat humanity not as a means, but as an ends. However, Kant's criterion for being part of humanity and moral agency is not biological. In order to be considered fully human, and a moral agent, one must be autonomous and rational**. If one lacks rationality and autonomy they cannot escape the chain of causality to act freely from moral principles, and hence are not moral agent's. **Kant's moral program fails to account for those who are cognitively impaired because they lack autonomy and rationality.** Since Kant's requirement for moral agency is so cut-and-dry and leaves no room for ambiguity, there is no clear moral distinction made between the cognitively impaired and other non- human animals. **In the case of Kant, there could be no universal moral law from the categorical imperative that would apply to the cognitively impaired and not non-human animals as well**. McMahan reaches the same conclusion as Kant, namely that, there is no meaningful moral distinction to be made between the cognitively impaired and other non-human animals. McMahan takes it to be the case that certain psychological attributes and capacities constitute a minimum for us to value a person as a moral agent. **The cognitively impaired fall below the threshold for moral agency because they do not have certain psychological attributes and capacities that McMahan takes to be constitutive of moral agency**. Therefore, as morality dictates we be impartial, we cannot give favor to the cognitively impaired over animals with similar psychological endowments. According to McMahan we have no non-arbitrary basis to do so. While McMahan agrees that many accept that we have reasons to give priority to those most proximal to us (which would give the family of someone cognitively impaired reason to favor them over a similarly endowed non-human animal) it does not give a reason for society as a whole to give this preference. **Kant and McMahan are similar, in that their standards for moral agency exclude the cognitively impaired (rationality/autonomy and psychological capacities respectively). In Kant's morality, those who are rational and autonomous are to be treated as ends in themselves. In the case of the cognitively impaired, there is no such requirement.** Similarly, in McMahan's moral theory, those who are human and unfortunate are entitled to compensation by society under the dictates of justice. **However, according to McMahan the cognitively impaired are not human in the relevant sense (possessing certain psychological capacities and features) so they are not entitled to compensation. In excluding the cognitively impaired from moral agency, both Kant and McMahan reach a conclusion that many of us find unsettling, in which we might give the cognitively impaired a moral preference over a similarly endowed non-human animal, is because of a responsibility to respect the family members of the cognitively endowed, not because they have any value as moral agents in themselves.**

## C1

#### Democratization doesn’t lead to peace.

Stephen M. **Walt, 2017** (professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government), June 2, 2017. Retrieved Apr. 14, 2019 from https://bigthink.com/design-for-good/why-promoting-human-rights-may-not-be-the-way-to-a-better-world

I think liberal **democracy** is the best form of government to live under, but it’s **not a** particularly **good way to promote peace**. First of all, **democracies start as many wars** as non-democracies do. Think of the United States, for example, where we have not been bashful about using military force and sometimes **initiating conflicts**, even when we weren’t attacked. So, spreading democracy doesn’t necessarily guarantee peace. Finally, once democracies get into a big war, like World War I and World War II, they kill just as many people, including just as many civilians as non-democracies do. If the way you are spreading democracy is through military force, you have something of a contradiction there. There are better ways to promote peace than trying to aggressively create democracies.

#### Democracy causes great power nuclear war – backsliding solves

Muller, director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, 15

(Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49)

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

#### Democratic peace arguments are wrong—new statistical analysis proves

Sambuddha Ghatak, Department of Political Science, Univeristy of Tennessee, Aaron Gold, Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee and Brandon C. Prins, Howard Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy, Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee, “External Threat and the Limits of Democratic Pacifism,” CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE SCIENCE v. 34 n. 2, 2017, p. 151-154. \*edited for language

It has become a stylized fact that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies not as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a result of settled borders. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely ignored rivalry as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an external threat, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to audience costs, resolve and electoral pressures, fail to resolve problems nonviolently. This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is less [prominent] ~~visible~~. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more consistent evidence that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, democratic pacifism does not survive. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or externalized norms are not always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. Audience costs, resolve, and electoral pressures, produced from external threats, are powerful forces that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to trust one another, which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility. It does appear, then, that there is a limit to the Democratic Peace.