# Speech 1NC Harvard Rd 2 vs Millburn 2-18 5PM

## 1

#### 1~ Interp – Debaters must have recordings of their speeches and send them if requested

#### 2~ Violation – They didn't

#### 3~ Standards –

#### a~ Cheating – debaters can fake internet drop offs and then steal prep which decks reciprocity. O/Ws since it destroys competitive incentives and educational value since they are structurally ahead

#### b~ Accidents possible, external conditions like power going out, wifi dropping off, or excessive background noise make it impossible to hear in real time, recordings ensure that a speech isn’t given twice, which allows them to remodify and change their strat or incite judge intervention which is the worst violation of procedural fairness

#### c~ Key to check clipping cards and make cheaters lose with literal proof

## 2

#### Interp: The affirmative must define “outer space” in a delimited text in the 1AC.

#### “Outer Space” is flexible and has too many interps – normal means shows no consensus and makes the round irresolvable since the judge doesn’t know how to compare between types of offense and o/w since it’s a side constraint on decision making – independently turns judicial application.

Leepuengtham 17 [Tosaporn Leepuengtham (Research Judge, Intellectual Property and International Trade Division, Supreme Court of Thailand). "International space law and its implications for outer space activities." 01-27-2017, Accessed 12-9-2021. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781785369612/06\_chapter1.xhtml // duongie

Those states which favor the precise demarcation of outer space support the spatial approach, whereas those who oppose to such demarcation prefer the functional approach, as the latter allows more flexibility in terms of the development of space technology.34 This lack of a definition and delimitation of outer space is problematic, since certain particular areas are neither explicitly defined as ‘air space’ or ‘outer space’. For example, it is vague whether an area located between 80 km and 120 km above sea level would be classified as either air space or outer space in the absence of demarcation, since 80 km is the maximum attitude for convention aircraft, and 120 km is the lowest attitude in which space activities could be carried out.35 Satellites which are stationed in a geostationary orbit are a good example of this ambiguity. Owing to this lack of any internationally recognized delimitation, equatorial states claim sovereignty over that part of the geostationary orbit which is located over their respective territories;36 whereas technologically developed countries believe that the geostationary orbit is an integral part of outer space.37 This uncertain status of areas leads to legal jurisdictional problems. According to international law, a state has sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.38 However, national sovereignty does not extend into outer space.39 Thus, it is necessary to determine where a state’s airspace ends to ensure that the appropriate legal regime is applied. One possible scenario which might occur and which is relevant to the subject of this book is the creation or infringement of an intellectual work is in just such an ambiguous location. This would cast doubt on the ‘legal’ location of creation or infringement, and the question of which applicable legal regime arises. Should we apply the law of the underlying state or is there no law to apply? For example, would satellite signals transmitted from a satellite stationed in a geostationary orbit located over equatorial countries be considered as works created or, if intercepted, be infringed, in outer space or in the sovereign air space of those respective countries? These hypothetical examples highlight why a boundary is necessary if unpredictability arising from different legal application is to be avoided. While it might be argued that this issue is being overemphasized at this stage, given increasing use of space technology, this problem is worth considering now rather than later.

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night – triggers presumption since the aff wasn’t subject to well researched scrutiny. We lose access to Tech Race DA’s, Asteroid DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### 2] Real World – Policy makers will always define the entity that they are recognizing. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, private entities can circumvent since there is no delineated way to enforce the aff and means their solvency can’t actualize.

#### OSspec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from policies that require enforcement to function.

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation and substantive engagement

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact and why schools fund debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### DTD – its key to deter future abuse and the abuse has already occurred

#### Neg theory is drop the debater – a) Prep skew – infinite prep means they frontline every shell enough to be efficient at DA and skew substance enough b) 1AR Flex –you moot 6 min of my offense and restart on unpredictable layers while kicking the args.

#### No rvi

#### [a] Baiting—they’ll bait the theory debate and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse since they’ll get away with unacceptable practices

#### [b] 1AR all-outs—they’ll collapse entirely to theory which crowds out substance and kills education.

#### [c] Chilling effect—people will be scared to read theory since they can lose off of it, so no one will check abuse.

#### [d] Norm-setting—I shouldn’t be forced to keep advocating for a bad norm if I realize it’s bad in the middle of the round.

#### [e] Flex—RVIs make theory uncondo so I always have to go for that route to the ballot, but both debaters should get multiple relevant layers and collapse options.

#### [f] Illogical—doesn’t make sense to win just for being fair.

#### 1NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea since the shell was read earlier.

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

## 3

#### The world relies on the fundamental opposition to disability to exist – disabled bodies are modeled as the inverse reflection to the normate which drives the internal ableism and desire to eliminate disabled bodies.

**Hughes 12** [Bill Hughes (professor of Sociology at Glasgow Caledonian University, BA in sociology from the University of Stirling, PhD in political philosophy from the University of Aberdeen). 2012. Accessed 8/9/20. “Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People.” <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137023001_2> //Xu]

The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. The body produced by ableism is equivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as invulnerable and definitive. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’ (Shildrick, 2002: 51). It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’ (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), the epitome of civilisation, closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’ (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). Through ableism, modernity has been able to structure disability as uncivilised, outside or on the margins of humanity. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’ (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat. Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existen- tial basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death ... that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communica- tion and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness).

#### Functional capacity link– 1AC Jaeggi frames ethical value through mental capacity which excludes people with neurodivergent cognititive subjectivities – independent voter regardless of ontology for violent rhetoric. DTD to deter the practice and reject violence.

#### The aff is national development---their investment in “a modern inquiry into the good life” as a form of individual development determines value based through “functional capacity” This not only pathologizes disability that targets it for death, but it is also subsumed by a neo-colonial architecture that must eliminate disability globally to achieve “qualified subjectivism”

Kolářová and Wiedlack 16 [Kateřina Kolářová and M. Katharina Wiedlack, “Crip Notes on the Idea of Development,” Somatechnics, Volume 6 Issue 2, Page 125-141] Memorial SC recut

‘The undying myth of development, that it will remove all poverty forever from all corners of the world, now lies shattered. It is surprising that so many people believed it for so many years with such admirable innocence…’ (Ashis Nandy qtd in Mignolo 2011: 303; emphasis added). We open this introduction with Nandy's words because they form a fitting preface to the questions that we raise in this issue: Why do we get hooked on the promise of development? What affective investments keep us attached to it? And, given the focus of this special issue, how does the optimism of the ideology of development betray the very people who, in theory, are supposed to benefit from it? But Nandy's words also foreground another problematic form of optimism: the hope that the myth of development has been shattered and dismantled. The contributions to this Cripping Development issue call this into question. They make very clear that the idea of development has retained its political and economic salience. It continues to inform imaginings of the future, a ‘good life’, and humanity. The development fantasy continues to colonise the lives of disabled and racialised communities. Cripping Development charts the manifold ways in which development, with its compulsory optimism, utilises and leans against disability, race, gender, caste, social status, hierarchical notions of ‘difference’ and structures of precarity. Furthermore, our contributors map strategies of resistance and ‘crip appropriations’ to development. They offer more complex explanations for the continued survival of ‘the myth of development’ than Nandy's vision of people's ‘admirable innocence’ and political naïveté suggests. Cripping Development refocuses the debate on neo-coloniality and global exploitation by taking disability as a critical vantage point from which to question the effects of development policies and practices. The authors published herein examine the effects of these policies and practices on the lives of disabled people and communities. They present disability as [is] ‘interarticulated’ (Chen 2015) with other categories that hierarchically organise notions of human worth. These interarticulations are key to understanding modern development and coloniality past and present. Disability needs to be recognised as a central power differential, especially in the Global South and post-Soviet and post-socialist East and Central Europe. It also needs to be understood as one of the ideological tools of what Mignolo terms ‘global coloniality’, which is the reproduction of the power imbalance between the Global North and the Global South and between the global West/East. The articles in this issue place the multifaceted and intersectional experiences of disability centre stage. Just as importantly, they demonstrate how overlooking disability in the intersectional equation reinforces persistent epistemic coloniality. By ignoring the significance of disability we undermine the critique of much current post- and de-colonial work. Cripping Development is the outcome and extension of discussions initiated at ‘De-colonising Disability Theory: Cripping Development’, a conference held in Prague in 2013.1 These discussions confronted the historical present by interrogating the legacies of colonialism. Choosing Prague for the conference location, a place where development's (false and cruel) promises are still evidenced, was meant to inspire discussions about differences and affinities between the post-colonial and post-social contexts. The Roundtable included in this issue seeks to recreate the productive tensions that emerged around and between these points of difference and resonance. The conference location just as importantly foregrounded the significance of the forgotten and often invisible legacy of colonialism that is part of the history of the Czech Republic and many East and Central European countries, a legacy that is reinforced by the participation of these countries in neo-colonial developments. In formulating a crip critique of the idea of development, we felt it important to acknowledge that critical work comes from and is fuelled by different forms of intellectual labour and creativity. The presence of the 3a3or Group,2 a queer activist and artistic collective, at the conference manifested the importance of such mutual inspiration and illustrated how it is often activist and artistic work (much of it without any institutional support) that opens and sustains dialogue on difficult topics. The 3a3or Group was founded in Belgrade in 2013 in an attempt to create ‘a queer platform for the Balkans’ and bring together members of different nationalities. (Kosmogina and Kesić 2015: 53) ‘Queer Calendars’ was the title of their ‘art-activist’ exhibition presenting what they term ‘transition art’ (Kosmogina and Kesić 2015: 51), and in it they drew on queer theory and artistic praxis to record and interrogate the effects of neoliberal capitalism in post-socialist countries. Exhibited on the site of the conference, ‘Queer Calendars’ served as much more than just a visual frame for the conference discussions about the violent effects of global capitalism and the forms of devaluation and dispossession it produces. Mapping the post-socialist landscape in Belgrade, 3a3or critiques civilising and modernising projects as seen from the backside of EU-fostered urban development. ‘Queer Calendars’ offered an alienating view of everyday post-socialist reality in a series of images designed as ‘new year greeting cards’. The pictures offer a bitterly ironic look at Belgrade's ‘development’, drawing attention to what resides in the shadow of progress and what is accepted as the necessary side-effects and collateral damage of unquestioned modern development. They ironically resignify the post-socialist ‘dreamland’ and take as their focus the shanties of the homeless and of people displaced by gentrification, and the plastic packaging and trash floating in the Danube and the Sava river. These images speak to neoliberal necropolitics (Kosmogina and Kesić 2015) and the economics of disposability that render certain bodies expendable. In one image we see four gold teeth lying next to an empty spoon on an empty plate, where past traces of the spoon are still visible in the porcelain. This image exposes the bio-social precarity and modes of dispossession that arrived with the new ‘freedoms’ of neoliberal capitalism. The picture is accompanied by a caption, the New-Year best-wishes greeting of sorts that highlights how precarity, poverty and survival are always in close proximity to disability: ‘Not all that shines can be eaten; Better teeth than the kidney?’ Vladimir Opsenica, a member of the 3a3or Group, offers the following comment: figure Figure 1. ‘Not all that shines can be eaten; Better teeth than the kidney?’ Reproduced with permission of the 3a3or Group. … the image … explicitly refers to the hopeless financial situation of the population and shows the effects of enslaving/exploitative neoliberal capitalism in the region. As relief from poverty, families often sell gold from their inheritance … to obtain basic needs, food. … [P]ulling out the gold teeth from a jaw can be a viable option in conditions of extreme poverty. (Opsenica 2016) People selling their teeth for food, or people ‘donating’ (read ‘selling out of dire need’) their organs (usually a kidney) as transplants to disabled and sick people (in the Global North), would in most cases, not be able to afford the life-saving operation in the country where they live (cf. for example, Scheper-Hughes 2001, Lundin, S. and Cleaves 2015): all these acts represent the complicated networks by which disability is produced and sustained. They illustrate the intricate nature of what we could call the ‘global economy of debility’ across the North/South, East/West divides (Kolářová 2015) that enfolds some disabled lives in life while others are folded out of it. (Puar 2012) ‘Queer Calendars’ serves also as a critical reflection of how specific visions of development that formed the groundwork for the post-socialist transformations positioned Central and East Europe firmly within these global economies of debility. The project also speaks to the ways in which the post-socialist crip imaginaries and the search for radical crip imaginaries remains ‘inarticulable’ (Kolářová 2014) within the boundaries of compulsorily construed and stabilised identities. Thus it pushes us to imagine and create political horizons across and beyond the boundaries of nation states and identities. Jump toTowards a Crip Critique of Development Alongside the general hegemonic persistence of the ideology of development, there is a long tradition of criticism of development. Such criticism has shed light on the ways in which development has been fundamentally entangled with the colonial project and has tied modernisation to dominance and progress to subjection and exploitation. Raymond William's ground-breaking Keywords (orig. published 1976) debunked the myth of ‘developed’ countries coming to aid of ‘developing’ ones. He unmasks such ‘help schemes’ as a ruse to legitimise global exploitative market domination: It is clear that, … an often generous idea of ‘aid to the developing countries’ is confused with wholly ungenerous practices of cancellation of the identities of others, by their definition as underdeveloped or less developed, and of imposed processes of development for a world market controlled by others. (Williams 1976: 104; emphases in the original). Walter Mignolo's words—‘However you look at it, “development” is a capitalist mission’ (2011: 305)—aptly summarise how development targets such countries and regions that can serve its colonial aspiration. Celebratory visions of modernity must be spoiled when we consider modernity's links to its ‘dark side’, coloniality (Mignolo 2011). Mignolo's scepticism echoes the thoughts of Franz Fanon, expressed much earlier in A Dying Colonialism (orig. published 1959). Fanon believed that what ‘drives the colonised to appraise all the coloniser's contribution in a pejorative and absolute way’ (1965: 122) stems from an embodied (and in bodies inscribed) memory of ‘development’ that was part and parcel of the centuries of oppression. Of interest to the focus of this issue, Fanon included a chapter called ‘Medicine and Colonialism’ in which he discussed the reasons why ‘the colonised’ maintain a very ambivalent if not outright dismissive view of ‘Western medical science’, resulting in what he termed ‘almost organic confusion’ (1965: 121). From the perspective of present-day critical disability studies, there is much that can be criticised about Fanon's belief that medicine is driven only and purely by ‘concern [for] man's [sic] health’ and the ‘very principle to ease pain’ (165: 121), on which basis he formulated this notion of ‘confusion’ and concluded ‘it is clear that no negative reaction can be justified’. This notwithstanding, Fanon's appraisal remains crucial for understanding the ways medicine is implicated in the ‘colonial situation’: [T]he French medical service in Algeria could not be separated from French colonialism in Algeria’ … saying yes to … certain innovations of the occupier, the colonised perceived that he thus became the prisoner of the entire system, … while [t]he good faith [saying yes to some innovations] is immediately taken advantage of by the occupier and transformed into a justification of the occupation (1965: 122–3). Cripping Development foregrounds the epistemological dominance reflected in the Global North's unwillingness to ‘conceive of the world “in terms of mutual belonging (co-belonging) across difference” but only in relationship of sameness’ (Mbembe qtd. in Gržinić 2014: 135). The idea of development functions as a useful legitimising rationale for this compulsory sameness. Crip criticism of this notion of development focuses on disability as an axis of power that is frequently omitted from critiques of coloniality/modernity but is central to their workings. It seeks to show how the rationale of development is oftentimes upheld by disability and its interarticulations with race, indigeneity, class, gender and sexuality, and caste, and how precarious, disenfranchised, and dispossessed people in particular are the ones who are made to pay the price for the future promises of development. The issue thence raises questions about ‘the geopolitics of disability in crip times’ (McRuer 2010: 163) and the ‘global economy of debility’ (Kolářová 2015), where the ‘black disabled body’ (Erevelles 2011) becomes a commodity in the transatlantic exchange and can be ‘recapacitated’ for profit (Puar 2012). It builds off the collective efforts and deeds of disability studies work that strive to initiate dialogues with post-colonial, indigenous, and de-colonising projects along what remains, in Karen Soldatic and Shaun Grech's recent wording, ‘anxious intersections’ (2015; see also Naidu Parekh, 2007; Barker and Murray 2010; Barker and Senier 2013). In the decades that have passed since the publication of Fanon's essay, the alliance between medicine and colonialism has certainly not grown any weaker; the exploitation of ‘the black body’ that Erevelles posits as one of the starting points of the political project of disability studies continues in the neocolonial capitalism of the biocapital, pharmaceutical quest for (use of) chemically innocent bodies, the use of bodies for medical experiments, and the use of surrogate-mother or organ-donor bodies. On another level, transnational health policies are framed as part of transnational developmental help and transnational health policies. ‘National health’ and health plans are turned into an indicator of ‘national development’ (or rather proof of underdevelopment), a correlation that can very easily reinforce stigmatised and racialised images of illness and disability. Tanya Titschosky and Katie Aubrecht's analysis of the WHO MIND project (the short name for ‘Mental Health Improvements for Nations Development’) attests to and describes just this. Titschosky and Aubrecht demonstrate how the MIND project links ‘positive mental health’ to ‘a range of development outcomes…’ in a way that utilises health management ‘as a new form of imposed order on postcolonial countries’ (2015: 3). It is hard to overlook the more recent reverberations of reinforced stigmatisation and racialisations in panicky reports about the ‘rise of dementia and Alzheimer's in the third world’. The discourse produced around dementia that guides the transnational health policies of (corporate) bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) in fact indicates the extent to which global capitalisation of debility is in fact buttressed by transnational structures. These transnational bodies express anxiety about the rise of ‘dementia’ in ‘low-income’ and ‘lower-middle-income’ countries and the economic burden it will put on them. And yet, ‘[i]t is a cruel paradox of the global economy of debility that the “developmental help” provided by transnational bodies to “low-income” countries will be calculated against assumed “work potential”, ultimately commodifiable as bio-capital in schemes of outsourced surrogate reproductive care to populations from wealthier nations’ (Kolářová 2015: 84–5). The violent histories of colonialism, slavery, and exploitation that continue to overshadow the post/neocolonial present, however, also leave their traces in the post-colonial and de-colonial criticism that considers disability—if it is noticed at all—as a mere effect of, or a figure of thought representing, colonial violence. Thus, Lucy Barker and Stuart Murray open their important issue exploring post-coloniality by echoing the concern of earlier disability studies’ appraisals of post-colonial theory and noting, ‘there is a pressing need … to resist the too-easy censure of narratives that construct disability as loss’ (2010: 230). This critique does not lose its importance, as the intersections of these critical projects remain ‘anxious’. On the other hand, disability theory and disability studies need to reckon with the material hurt of colonial and racialised dominance. The field needs to rethink its epistemic paradigms and recognise colonial legacies and consider how it contributes to processes of racialisation. We need to question the way disability studies sometimes serves these colonial legacies on a global scale. Colonialism, slavery, and the exploitative practices of extracting vitality have left a material and embodied legacy of relationality ‘buried deep in the psyche and embodied collective memory of the colonized and the colonizer’ (Grech 2015: 3). It is this legacy that constitutes the epistemic horizons and the horizons of knowledge production. And disability, as a notion and epistemic category, was and is deeply implicated in, produced by, and actively co-producing these ambivalent material histories. Grech notes, ‘understanding the disability narrative in the global South means (re)positioning it and understanding it as a global historical narrative’ (2015: 3; cf. also Meekosha 2011). Yet, in thinking through this ‘global historical narrative’, as Rachel Gorman points out, we must be wary of the fallacy of the ‘global idea of disability.’ Gorman claims that this fallacy carries forth the epistemic legacy of coloniality. Gorman's open-forum essay, ‘Disablement In and For Itself: Toward a “Global” Idea of Disability’, which draws on her involvement in anti-racist and anti-colonial community organising and activism, proposes a ‘relational/reflexive methodology’ (p. 251 in this issue). A ‘focus on the dialectic of disability—disablement’ (ibid.) provides a tool to halt the reproduction of disability as white identity and to account for the concerns, identities, and lived realities of racialised, Indigenous, and majority world disabled people. The epistemic challenge of thinking disability globally yet not reproducing the colonising act of ‘assuming’ that uses the epistemological frameworks of disability theory as articulated in the Global North and posits its global universality (Meekosha 2011 and 2013) is also taken up by the Virtual Roundtable. Titled ‘What Kind of Development Are We Talking About?’, the roundtable thinks through the normative idea of development and its burden on disabled and racialised lives. The discussants also reflect on the various strategies of re-signification of development that would allow it to make political alliances with other marginalised groups at different global geo-political locations: Zimbabwe (Tsitsi Chataika), India (Nilika Mehrotra), Australia (Karen Soldatic), and the Czech Republic (Kateřina Kolářová). These theorisations of global disability ‘translations’ and politics illustrate the many ways in which neoliberalism and neoliberal restructurings mould the horizon of what McRuer has called ‘crip times’ (2010 and forthcoming). In ‘Curb Cuts: Crip Displacements and El Edificio de Enfrente’, published in this volume, Robert McRuer reads (and crips) Livia Radwanski's photographs documenting the eviction of the ‘Edificio América’ housing complex in Mexico City. Drawing out the global dimensions of neoliberalised austerity, McRuer brings Radwanski's archive of neoliberal city developments (read: gentrification, displacement, and dispossession) into dialogue with the so-called bedroom tax that has devastated the lives of the disabled in the UK. Through such crip juxtapositions, McRuer undercuts the official political narrative promoting ‘The Year of Mexico in the UK and the UK in Mexico’, ‘ostensibly a cultural initiative designed to promote awareness of both countries’ diversity and history’ (p. 198 in this issue). He highlights how the apparent developmental agendas – here explicitly hinged upon globalised version of disability access – serve as a ‘central component of a now-global austerity politics’. The fantasies of access serve to gloss over the dispossession of crip populations, where ‘crip’ often remains unrecognised by the identity understandings of disability championed by the transnational disability agenda. Katharina Wiedlack and Masha Neufeld's essay also speaks to transnational circulations of disability – this time to unexpected forms of (mis)translations, paradoxical misunderstandings, and conflicts across geopolitical spheres. Their analysis of the song Люди Инвалиды (‘Lyudi Invalidy’, literally translated as ‘disabled people’) by the Russian music duo t.A.T.u. highlights how ‘disability’ and queerness can become the crux of such misunderstandings. t.A.T.u.’s references to North/Western queer crip and disability ‘inclusiveness’, according to the authors, function as a commodified spectacle rather than a gesture towards generous futurity. This special issue further sets out to highlight some anxious omissions in the critical discourses and attempts to forge much needed dialogue between disability theory and post- and de-colonial projects. Little attention so far has been paid to cultural spaces that cannot be simply marked as post-colonial and yet have been heavily targeted with development agendas – the geopolitical spaces most commonly termed ‘post-socialist’ or ‘Eastern’. For instance, within the context of Central and East Europe, development is most often and most intensely evoked through significations of ‘change’, ‘reform’ or ‘transformation’. Robert Kulpa and Joanna Mizielińska point out that ‘[i]t is this constant “transformation” through which Central and East Europe supposedly “has been going” (present perfect continuous is much at home here)’ (2012: 17) that marks its relationality to the West as behind or beyond.’ This construction points to the temporal framework implicated in the geographical location of Central and East Europe as a ‘contemporary periphery,’ geographically not ‘European enough’, and ‘“yet not enough advanced” to become “Western” (temporally)’ (2012: 18). Or to paraphrase Mbembe's critique of the colonial logic and ideology of belonging conceived in terms of sameness, Central and East Europe is ‘being reproduced, re-formed, or better, re-civilised according to the West, with the aim of ultimately becoming the same’ (Gržinić 2014: 135). This is a logic that could also be termed ‘cultural rehabilitation’ or even ‘capitalist rehabilitation’ (Kolářová 2014). Considering the centrality of the development paradigm for Central and East Europe over the last three decades, the focus of the issue exploring the conceptual entrenchment of disability in development discourses is not limited to the context of the Global South. We do not, however, presume that these diverse locations and spaces could be collapsed into each other or that the discourses of development affect them in identical ways – this would amount to another gesture of epistemological colonialism and ‘assuming’ (Meekosha 2011, 2013). There are many important differences between the context of the Global South and the Global East that often also depend on where in these vast locations the focus falls – the process of racialisation and disablement are areas where differences particularly stand out. Nevertheless, Central and East Europe is a region that plays a role in the conceptualisation of the Global South, development, and disability. It is the focus on development that can, as we argue, reveal the entanglement of the Central and East European region with the conceptual framework of the Global South. It seems that more than twenty years after the dissolution of the so-called Eastern Bloc, transition and development remain important signifiers for the diverse post-socialist countries. Dorota Kołodziejczyk and Cristina Sandru point out that ‘the liminal and “in-between”’ position, ‘structures of exclusion/inclusion’ (2012: 113) are indeed points of imbrication between Central and East Europe and regions of the Global South. At the same time, Central and East European EU member states (i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) have become development aid donors (Horký and Lightfoot 2012), which shapes their national identity in a way that seems to elevate them above the Global South understanding the latter mainly as ‘development aid receiv[ers]’ (Szostak 2012), but also to elevate them above other parts of Central and East Europe that are not part of the European Union. Jump to Affect – Time – Space Three facets of development are central to our collective crip critique of development: affect, time, and space. The articles in this collection explore how affect, time and space overlap and understand development through affective materialisations of time and space. First, Cripping Development speaks of affective attachments that sustain the fantasy of development and its affective politics of promise. Development policies have taken a long time to arrive at the current visions of ‘inclusive development’ in the 2015 Development Agenda. Moreover, as Jonah I. Garde's article, ‘Inclusive Development as Crip(dys)topic Promise: Querying Development, Dis/ability and Human Rights’, lays out such epistemologies of inclusive development in fact cement ableist, colonial, and racialised dichotomies. In effect, ‘inclusive development’ can effectively prohibit what it has actually been promising: ‘inclusion’ and ‘development’. Vandana Chaudhry's ‘Labouring Self-Help: Dialectics of Disability and Development in South India’ expands this critique through her long-term ethnographic study of disability-oriented self-help group projects initiated by the World Bank in rural areas of South India. Chaudry critiques the shift away from a state-led welfare model to self-help-oriented people's institutions as a form of neoliberal governance that is meant to ensure ‘a perennial supply of willing low-cost labour’ (p. 194 in this issue). The instrumentalisation of (affective) labour falls in particular on disabled women through the promotion of ‘nurturing gender subjects as altruistic beings’ (ibid.). Drawing attention to this, Chaudhry highlights how the normative ideal of ‘active citizenship’ underwrites the policies of self-help and materialises further disadvantages along the lines of gender, race, and caste. The second axis of the crip critique of development focuses on normative visions of time and (futural) temporality. Garde's and Chaudhry's analyses intimate how fundamentally important constructions of futurity are to the promise and politics of development. The very idea of development conveys a specific rationality and morality based in concepts of time. The Oxford English Dictionary defines development, as ‘[a] gradual unfolding, a bringing into fuller view’, ‘[e]volution or bringing out from a latent or elementary condition’, or as ‘[t]he growth and unfolding of what is in the germ.’ Each definition shows how development is understood both by the morality of reaching assumedly better, more advanced forms of existence, and by a temporal plan and direction towards the future. Or as Mel Chen put it in their 2013 conference keynote, fittingly titled ‘Keep Your Eyes on the Clock’, ‘“[d]evelopment” … refer[s] to the notion of progression towards a seemingly desirable end,’ while—they also argued—development as ‘a set of almost homonymous senses refer[s] to human individual growth on the one hand and economic fate on the other’ (2013). In his above-cited essay, Walter Mignolo notes ‘[t]ime … is a category of reckoning, not a category of experiencing’ (2011: 151). To crip development we must inquire into the overlay between affective politics of development and the culturally hegemonic understandings of time/temporality. It is the normative temporality inherent in development that generates the distinction between disability and ability, debility and capacity. ‘Disability too often serves as the agreed-upon limit of our projected futures’ (2013: 27), as Alison Kafer so aptly puts it. The feminist queer crip critique of development, to borrow from Kafer, needs to look for and disrupt the ways in which normative temporality bears on conceptualisations of disability in (post)colonial times and turns disability into the milestone of both individual and collective development (and the capacity for such development) or relegates disability to backwardness. Cripping Development invites further inquiry into what the realisation that time has become ‘a fundamental concept of coloniality at large’ and remains ‘caught and woven into the imaginary of the modern/colonial world-system’ (Mignolo 2011: 152) means for thinking disability and disability assemblages in relation to radical justice. Unsurprisingly, development's normative temporality overlaps with geopolitical spatial hierarchies and the organisation of (global) space. A deconstruction of the spatial logic that organises the world along the hierarchy of assumed modernity and development thus constitutes the third aspect that we see as central for a crip critique of development.

#### This regime turns disability into narrative prosthesis – discourse of liberal inclusion facilitate interventions on the body to augment or eliminate disability so as to restore wholeness – that requires the exclusion of bodies outside of an acceptable degree of difference.

Mitchell and Snyder ‘1

[David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder, Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois-Chicago. 2001. “Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse.”] pat – ask me for the PDF

The controlling concept of this volume, narrative prosthesis, situates the experience and representational life of disability upon the ironic grounding of an unsteady rhetorical stance. In a literal sense a prosthesis seeks to accomplish an illusion. A body deemed lacking, unfunctional, or inappropriately functional needs compensation, and prosthesis helps to effect this end. Yet the prosthesizing of a body or a rhetorical figure carries with it ideological assumptions about what is aberrant. The judgment that a mechanism is faulty is always already profoundly social. The need to restore a disabled body to some semblance of an originary wholeness is the key to a false recognition: that disabilities extract one from a social norm or average of bodies and their corresponding (social) expectations. To prostheticize, in this sense, is to institute a notion of the body within a regime of tolerable deviance. If disability falls too far from an acceptable norm, a prosthetic intervention seeks to accomplish an erasure of difference all together; yet, failing that, as is always the case with prosthesis, the minimal goal is to return one to an acceptable degree of difference.

It is important to state at the outset that this argument does not deny the reality of physical incapacity or cognitive difference. Rather, we set out the coordinates of the social reception and literary representation of those labeled deviant on ideological as well as physical planes. David Wills defines prosthesis as a term that mediates between the realm of the literary and the realm of the body. In relation to the latter, Wills argues that, far from signifying a deficiency, the prostheticized body is the rule, not the exception. All bodies are deficient in that materiality proves variable, vulnerable, and inscribable. The body is first and foremost a linguistic relation which cannot be natural or average. The textual nature of language, be it oral or print, lacks the very physicality that it seeks to control or represent. A normal body, as Lennard Davis has demonstrated, is a theoretical premise from which all bodies must, by definition, fall short. The body is up against an abstraction with which it cannot compete because the norm is an idealized quantitative and qualitative measure that is divorced from (rather than derived from) the observation of bodies, which are inherently variable. This false model of an ideal body also fails to consider the contingencies of bodies functioning within specific social and historical contexts. It is, in other words, a body divorced of time and space—a thoroughly artificial affair.

Consequently, to return to Wills's fluid notion of prosthesis, the deficient body, by virtue of its insufficiency, serves as baseline for the articulation of the normal body: "the prosthetic body will not be an exception but the paradigm for the body itself. If you will, it is by means of prosthesis that I wish to insist on the non-originary status of the body" (137). The relation between a body and the language used to describe it is unstable, an alien alliance: materiality is not language, and language cannot be material, although each strives to conform to the terms of the other. We engage our bodies in efforts to make their stubborn materiality "fit" ideals. Likewise, words give us the illusion of a fix upon the material world that they cannot deliver.

For Wills this relation between body and word can take on at least four separate poses (137-41).

The word that issues from a body is often believed to glean a corporeal aura from its material host.

The word always augments a prosthetic relation to an exterior material that it cannot possess or embody.

A word returns to the body a sense of possession of the external world that it cannot possess.

The body's need to comprehend a materiality external to it is answered via the ruse of language—that is, the word provides the body with the necessary illusion of its successful entrance into the space of the Other.

This inability of the body to possess, via the word, that which is external to it grounds Wills's (and thus our own) more varied and less singular idea of prosthesis.

While an actual prosthesis is always somewhat discomforting, a textual prosthesis alleviates discomfort by removing the unsightly from view. As we discuss in chapter 2, the erasure of disability via a "quick fix" of an impaired physicality or intellect removes an audiences' need for concern or continuing vigilance. Rather than closet the marred body, the chapters that follow reinstitute its discomforting presence. Narrative Prosthesis is first and foremost about the ways in which the ruse of prosthesis fails in its primary objective: to return the incomplete body to the invisible status of a normative essence. The works under scrutiny here tend to leave the wound of disability undressed so to speak. Its presence is enunciated as transgressive in that literary works often leave the disabled body as a troubled and troubling position within culture.

The prosthetic function in most of the works that follow, then, is to undo the quick repair of disability in mainstream representations and beliefs. In part, this book is about the literary accomplishment of a faulty, or at least imperfect, prosthetic function. The effort is to make the prosthesis show, to flaunt its imperfect supplementation as an illusion. The prosthetic relation of body to word is exposed as an artificial contrivance. Disability services an unsettling objective in these literary works by refusing its desired cultural return to the land of the normative. Ironically, the accomplishment of the works under scrutiny here is to expose, rather than conceal, the prosthetic relation.

#### The alternative is Crip Anarchism – refuse to invest hope in their framework that breeds a cruelly optimistic attachment to systems of violence.

An Anonymous Newtown Autistic 14 (Online blogger since January 2007, “[Crip Anarchism and the shard of truth in the Doug Ford Case](http://stimstammersandwinks.blogspot.com/2014/05/crip-anarchism-and-shard-of-truth-in.html)” <http://stimstammersandwinks.blogspot.com/2014/05/crip-anarchism-and-shard-of-truth-in.html)//> Memorial SC recut

Oppression is also abuse---it is judgements about the body and the use of medication to control bodies as well as the use of isolation. Crip Anarchism, if such a thing does exist in more than just my mind and a few journal articles, calls for an end to all institutions---asylums, nursing homes, jails, statehouses, markets, corporations. All major brick and mortar edifices that allow some to profit and keep others docile. Now, I agree with Doug Ford, that a group home, a site of abuse and isolation, does ruin a neighborhood, but not because of its residents, because of its staff. My neighborhood in Chicago is also ruined by the presence of sites of ableist discipline. The place where I take classes enforces behavior based on social standards which presume that an abled society has no obligation to accept unusual social behaviors on the part of its disabled community-members. The Doug Ford reactions prove something about our society. Most of the populace in the Western World has either sided with private interests or the state. Doug Ford is the state in this equation and the supposedly "nonprofit" (in a bout of doublespeak) Griffin Center is the private interest. I have thought and written about nonprofits elsewhere, but what is assured is that nonprofits are not nonprofit---all of their employees profit and their executives profit intensely. We are led to believe that a group of caregivers, who we or the state pays, really care about us. In fact, the desire of these caregivers to lock us up, is proof of how much they care about us, according to the faithful lambs of the mental health industrial complex. But this is not the case---incarceration is synonymous with profit maximization. Every minute a person is in a specially designed building, someone is paying for that minute. 24 Hour Care may be sold under the guise of safety or health, but ultimately it means 24 hour staffing and 24 hour profit collection. Disability Rights Activists, people who trust the state not to abuse disabled people, intend to use legal frameworks to demand the release of disabled people. But this effort is doomed. In an age in which main industries have died in the west due to globalization, healthcare is one of the strongest Western industries because it needs to be produced on a case by case basis. The power that healthcare corporations exert over politicians cannot be underestimated---this is why efforts at community care and deinstitutionalization in the U.S have stalled. Big health care corporations run group homes and those corporations have a set of loyal lobbyists. Anti-Capitalists, meanwhile, speak exclusively to poor people outside of institutions, failing to instill their critical pedagogies within the nursing home and limiting their politic to representing the able-bodied. Disabled people like racialized people, like gendered bodies and those with alternative sexualities and gender identities---are under threat by both the state and by private interests. To the extent that the state becomes an arm of the abled bourgeosie, it is omnipresent and often the principal funding source for major asylums. Thus we find the Autistic teenagers in Canada. They are under threat by the violence in Doug Ford's statements and the implication that other abled people will do violence to them to enforce their obedience in not wandering, they are under threat by the police, who are called by the private nursing home, to enforce their false doctrine of mental health and they are under threat by the nursing home itself which imprisons them. Furthermore, one is led to a precarious mathematics: what is worse? Closing the nursing home and forcing already oppressed individuals to relocate but potentially freeing them? Or leaving it open, increasing its funding and applauding its use of state violence in enforcing ableist discipline? Both options are violent and terrible. The state and private interests offer us few choices. I bravely choose the non-choice: resistance.

#### Their notion of epistemological certainty projects ontological stigmas against what they perceive as disabled. The notion of self knowledge is negated by the disability drive. Thus the role of the ballot is to adopt epistemological disablement, which posits disability as constitutive to the subject.

**Mollow 15**[Anna Mollow(Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar, UC Dissertation-Year Fellow, coeditor of Sex and Disability and the co-editor of DSM-CRIP). “The Disability Drive.” University of California at Berkeley. Spring 2015. Accessed 4/30/20. <https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf> // Houston Memorial DX]

Ambivalent encounters with disability point to a possibility that is at the heart of psychoanalytic theory: our psyches may be set up in ways that make us innately disabled. Freud‟s theory of the death drive suggests that we are driven by a force that threatens our socially recognizable selves, but are at the same time prevented from fully perceiving this drivenness in ourselves. Always, it will be easier to allow that “someone else” may be under the sway of a self-undoing compulsion toward disability than to imagine ourselves as similarly driven. Yet our unwillingness indeed, perhaps, our structural inability to see ourselves as governed by the disability drive presents a major problem. A central argument of this dissertation will be that when individuals and social movements imagine themselves as not subject to the disability drive, their projects almost invariably have the effect of stigmatizing other abjected subjects, who come to be read as emblems of this disavowed and disabling compulsion. This thesis attempts to upset the impulse to overcome the disability drive. Rather than “putting the „ability‟ back in „disability,‟” the sexual model of disability underscores the disability that may inhere in subjectivity itself, regardless of whether a given individual or political movement identifies as “disabled” or “nondisabled.”17 How, then, might we begin to acknowledge our own determination by the drive? Any knowing of the drive that we might hope to achieve must, on account of the structural barriers that render the drive unthinkable, be an effort characterized by failure and incompletion—that is, we might say, by epistemological disablement. The term “epistemological disablement” will appear frequently in this dissertation, as I will argue that coming into close proximity with the disability drive produces states of cognitive and affective uncertainty, confusion, and incapacity that are akin to disability. In the works that I shall analyze, epistemological disablement will often be performed on a textual level, as theorists and narrators seem to lose control of what they want to say about disability. These moments of epistemological disablement are often disavowed by theorists and narrators and are instead projected onto disabled people. When this happens, disabled people‟s impairments are depicted as the result of an insufficiency of self-knowledge that is assumed not to determine nondisabled subjects. I will challenge these characterizations of disabled people not only by arguing for the value of “cripistemologies” (that is, ways of knowing that arise from disabled people‟s lived experiences) but also by using drive theory to undermine belief in the possibility of a transparent and wholly knowable self, whether disabled or nondisabled.18 My two-pronged approach to the issue of epistemological disablement may seem to present a paradox: on the one hand, I am asserting that disabled people‟s lived experiences generate important knowledge about disability; yet at the same time I am seeking to destabilize the very notion of self-knowledge. Let me be clear, then, that in undertaking this double endeavor I do not forward all-or-nothing claims either “for” or “against” the possibilities of selfknowledge. I will not assert that people cannot ever know anything reliable about themselves, but I will also not suggest that truth claims derived from personal knowledge about disability are infallible. Instead, this dissertation highlights the limits of complete self-knowledge for nondisabled and disabled subjects alike, while at the same time interrogating the social dynamics that give rise to imbalances in the distribution of epistemological authority to particular subjects on the basis of their perceived status as disabled or nondisabled.

#### The role of the ballot precludes your standard

#### 1. The standard speaks to offense leveraged under a normative framework and thus a normative conception of reality. No one consistently abides by normative ethics because we all have subjectivity. The Role of the ballot on the other hand, speak to the judge’s obligation as an individual in the round and thus preclude examination of normativity.

#### 2. Pessimism is an epistemic prerequisite to engagement in any other framing – we need to deconstruct the reality of our world first in order to understand it. Ontology precedes ethics as it frames the way we view other subjects

#### 3. Outweighs on magnitude – we’ve won an epistemology claim that proves that disabled people are excluded from all decisions calculus which means any other rob leads to erasure we can’t come back from

Reps come first –

1. It frames the way we approach topics and it shapes the way we interpret them, so it precedes reality – we wouldn’t have invaded Iraq if we didn’t think that Al Qaeda was based there. Discourse constitutes subjectivity as it frames how they approach the world

2. Proximity – it’s the only thing that happens in round, so in-round discourse is the only real takeaway we have from a debate round. Holding debaters accountable for their reps is key to accessibility which comes first because otherwise debaters leave if they feel like the space is violent. That also means they can’t sever out of their speech act.

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted – there’s alwahys an institutional DA to going through Congress c) Unjust[[1]](#footnote-1) is “contrary to conscience or morality or law” so they need to prove the negative obligation, not just the lack of one.

#### d) resolved[[2]](#footnote-2) indicates “firmly determined” which means they proactively did something, to negate that means that they aren’t resolved e) permissibility can’t affirm since then anything would be ok which would justify racism – we should be safe and do nothing. f) to negate[[3]](#footnote-3) means to deny the truth of which means if the aff is false you vote neg

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1. https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/unjust [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://www.google.com/search?q=resolved+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=resolved+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57.2078j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)