# OFF

### 1NC – OFF

#### CP:

A picture containing text, person

Description automatically generated

#### It competes –

#### Textually – we exclude all of the text.

#### Functionally – writing tyrannically locks the oral presentation of the 1AC into the left brain dominated sphere of literacy.

Godesky 06 Jason, [Writing, Language & Thought](http://anthropik.com/2006/06/writing-language-thought/), The Anthropik Network, <http://anthropik.com/2006/06/writing-language-thought/>, June 13th 06

If we can see the influence of language in general on our capacity for thought, then the question Ong addresses becomes vital—**how does orality, or literacy, shape our cognition and perception? To what extent is our experience of the world “as it is,” and to what extent is it mediated and formed by our literacy**? **Though words are** grounded in **oral speech**, **writing tyrannically locks them into a visual field forever**. A literate person, asked to think of the word “nevertheless,” will normally (and I strongly suspect always) have some image, at least vague, of the spelled-out word and be quite unable ever to think of the word “nevertheless” for, let us say, 60 seconds, without adverting to any lettering but only to the sound. This is to say, **a literate person cannot fully recover a sense of what the word is** to purely oral people. (Ong, 1982, p. 12)

#### Reliance upon the phonetic alphabet destabilizes the balance of human mental evolution, creating a destructive trend toward masculine values that subliminally reprograms the user.

Shlain ‘98 Dr. Leonard Shlain is a neurosurgeon at California-Pacific Medical Center and contributor to *The Encyclopedia of Creativity*, *The Alphabet Versus The Goddess: The Conflict Between Word and Image*, 1998, pg. 66-8, 1998

Aside from the obvious benefits that derived from their ease of use, **alpha­bets produced a** subtle **change in cognition that redirected human thinking**. **For sophisticated neurolinguistic** reasons the early practitioners could not have known, **alphabets reinforced only half of the dual strategy that humans** had **evolved to survive**. As we have seen, this strategy had three components: left brain/right brain, cone/rod, and right hand/left hand. Each tripartite half of this duality perceived and reacted to the world in a different way; a unified response emerged only when both complementary halves were used.

**All forms of writing increase the left brain's dominance over the right**. As civilization progressed from image-based communication, such as pictographs and hieroglyphs, to non-iconic forms, such as cuneiform, written communication became more left-brain oriented. An alphabet, being the most abstract form of writing, enhances left-brain values the most. **Each letter stands only for a singular sound; meaning emerges only when letters are strung together in a row. Unlike icons, which often evolved from images of things, an alphabetic word bears no resemblance to the object or action it symbolizes**. Nowhere in t he word dog can we discern a dog. There remain some trace correlations, as with the word water, which begins with the letter w. The ancient Egyptians created a hieroglyph for water that resembles our letter w and to indicate water on a map, or in a cartoon, we still use a series of wavy lines. This iconic symbol for water became the alphabetic letter w and is a component of many words associated with the liquid state of mat­ter (e.g., wet, wave, wash, wade, wallow, winnow, womb, and woman). However, we no longer connect the letter w with water directly. When we see w in print as part of a word, the brain issues complex directions that instruct the lips to purse so that we can pronounce the phonetic sound of w. **Alphabets** have long divorced themselves from the images of concrete things. They **have washed out of the written language iconic patterns that were apparent in earlier forms of writing**. All that remains are letters that stand starkly like rows of pier posts at ebb tide.

**The versatility of letters becomes evident when they are placed in regu­lar, linear, consensually agreed upon arrangements**. Aligning three letters to spell d-o-g results in the English reader instantly seeing a dog in the mind's eye. Yet the mental image of a dog was once attached only to a real dog, or to the invisible spoken word, dog. The induction of any member of society (usually a young child) into alphabet arcana numbs her to the fact that she supplants all-at-once gestalt perception with a new, unnatural, highly abstract one-at-a-time cognition. **In this fashion, alphabets subliminally ele­vated, within each alphabet user, the influence of the left hemisphere at the expense of the right**. Rods were not as important as cones for reading this new form of writing. **As more and more people** could **read** and write, **the dominant pen-wielding right hand played an increasingly critical role in communication, masculinizing culture**. It made no difference if the writing hand belonged to a female or male: both sexes were inexorably brought to heel by the left brain within each individual.

#### The counterplan solves – imagining & privileging our pictogram plan cuts through left brain dominance & enables a fully integrated psyche.

Shlain ’98 – Dr. Leonard, neurosurgeon at California-Pacific Medical Center and contributor to *The Encyclopedia of Creativity*, *The Alphabet Versus The Goddess: The Conflict Between Word and Image*, 1998, pg. 4-5, 1998

To observe an enthralled four-year-old mastering the letters of the alphabet is to witness the beginning of a lifelong method central to the acquisition of knowledge. Literacy, once firmly rooted, will eclipse and supplant speech as the principal source of culture changing information. Adults, for so long enmeshed in the alphabet's visual skein, cannot easily disentangle themselves to assess its effect on culture. One could safely assume that fish have not yet discovered water.

**Imagine that you came of age in a non-literate culture and were unaware of the impact the written word could have** on your life. Suppose that as an adult you then found yourself in a literate society confronted by others who seemed to possess magical powers. **Your reaction probably would not differ much from that of Prince Modupe, a young West African who**, in his autobiography, related his encounter with the written word:

The one crowded space in Father Perry's house was his bookshelves. I gradually **came to understand that the marks on the pages were trapped words**. Anyone could learn to decipher the symbols and turn the trapped words loose again into speech. The ink of the print trapped the thoughts; **they could no more get away than a doomboo could get out of a pit**. When the full realization of what this meant flooded over me, I experienced the same thrill and amazement as when I had my first glimpse of the bright lights of Konakry. I shivered with the intensity of my desire to learn to do this wondrous thing myself.6

**The prince could not know that in his attempt to free the doomboo, the pit itself would trap him** in an unforeseen way: written words and images are entirely different "creatures." Each calls forth a complementary but oppos­ing perceptual strategy.

**Images are primarily mental reproductions of the sensual world of vision**. Nature and human artifacts both provide the raw material from the outside that the brain replicates in the inner sanctum of consciousness. **Because of their close connection to the world of appearances**, images approximate reality: **they are concrete**. **The brain simultaneously perceives all parts of the whole integrating the parts synthetically into a gestalt**. The majority of images are perceived in an all-at-once manner.

**Reading words is** a **different** process. **When the eye scans distinctive individual letters arranged in a certain linear sequence, a word with meaning emerges**. **The meaning** of a sentence, such as the one you are now reading, **progresses word by word**. **Comprehension depends on** the sentence's syntax, **the** particular **horizontal sequence in which its grammatical elements appear**. The use of analysis to break each sentence down into its component words, or each word down into its component letters, is a prime example of reductionism. **This process occurs at a speed so rapid that it is below awareness**. An alphabet by definition consists of fewer than thirty meaningless symbols that do not represent the images of anything in particular; a feature that makes them abstract. Although some groupings of words can be grasped in an all-at-once manner, in the main, the comprehension of writ­ten words emerges in a one-at-a-time fashion.

#### The Western emphasis on rationality and hypermasculinity makes war inevitable

**Sjoberg 11**

(Laura, University of Florida, Gender, the State and War Redux: Feminist International Relations across the ‘Levels of Analysis’, International Relations 25.1)

A third way that feminists have seen gender in the ‘state’ is in Waltzian neorealists’ tendencies to portray states as ‘abstract unitary actors whose actions are explained … according to some higher rationality presented as independent of human agency.’76 However, feminists have observed that ‘characterizations of state behavior in terms of self-help, autonomy, and power seeking privilege characteristics associated … with masculinity.’77 This means that ‘models of IR [and **the causes of war]** have been built on assumptions of a rigid boundary between inside and outside, anarchy and order, foreign and domestic.’78 These models portray the ‘outside’ as a dangerous space. Even as these models have been deconstructed in some IR work, characteristics associated with femi­ninity have not been recognized in more complex views of the state, and analysis of the influence of gender remains marginal.79 Instead, feminist work has revealed rationality as a partial, stereotypically masculine view of state decision-making that ignores (the feminine characteristic of) emotion and shown that states’ interests are far from unitary. Characterizing states as rational, unitary actors reifies understandings of state identity and interest that represent only narrow portions of states’ populations. Particularly, femi­nists suggest that ‘the boundaries between inside and outside, order and anarchy evoke gendered constructions of self and other that privilege hegemonic constructions of mas­culinity.’80 Feminists have criticized the implications of these arguments for understand­ing individual subjectivity. Particularly: Feminists’ concern for the political margins inspires the insight that states are not monolithic entities, but diverse amalgamations of people and experiences … the state is not an agent but a compilation of agents. Some agents within a state are represented in the state’s political decisions while others are not.81 While some theorists disregard the insecure people inside of secure states either by presuming order ‘inside’ the state or by arguing for a utilitarian approach to security and resource provision, feminists argue that this **instrumentalizes individuals**, particu­larly at the margins of global politics.82 If, for example, as feminists have argued, states and state structures (sometimes) benefit from wars, but women are dispropor­tionately negatively affected, than the interests of women in a state can be different from the interests of the state ‘as a whole’ should such a thing exist.83 Arguing that state interests are not only diverse but sometimes internally contradictory, feminists contend that failure to understand the state as gendered allows those in power to adju­dicate these conflicts in their interests to maintain the appearance of state unity. This feminist argument has two potential implications: that the state is more complicated, less unified, and less representative than it is often portrayed in neorealist theory, and that states’ decisions and interactions can be understood with reference to the gen­dered identities implicit in the framing of state behavior as rational and unified.84 It is important to understand that this critique is different from the criticism that Waltzian neorealism does not explain specific wars (which Waltz rejects because he explicitly states that his approach is systemic, rather than being a theory of foreign policy). The feminist argument that gender hierarchy impacts state behavior is an argument not about individual state choices, but about the nature of states doing the choosing; there­fore, it is a theory of the state’s role in the system, rather than a (here, irrelevant) the­ory of foreign policy. Feminists have argued that state militarism is more evidence that the state and its war decisions (generally and specifically) are both gendered and gender-constitutive. Militarism is ‘the processes by which characteristically military practices are extended into the civilian arena’ by extension of war-related, war-preparatory, and war-based meanings and activities into political life.85 Feminists have argued that state militarism is not gender-neutral, natural, or automatic.86 Instead, gender-differentiated roles are both demanded and reified by militarization, as: Men are under constant pressure to prove their manhood by being tough, adversarial, and aggressive … in one highly legitimated and organized institution within most societies, men not only can, but – to be successful – must prove their masculinity … women must be properly subservient to meet the needs of militaries.87 Because militarism requires men to be willing to kill and die on behalf of their state (and the innocent women inside it) while women simultaneously serve as the feminized other in need of protection and the reproducers of masculine soldiers, many IR feminists see it as impossible to understand state militarism without conceptualizing it as gendered, and see it as impossible to understand war and/or wars without understanding state milita­rism.88 The gendered nature of militarism has implications for the gendered nature of the state, since militaries and their signifiers are among the few features that are pervasive across states.89 As such, failing to understand the state as gendered means losing explana­tory power in terms of state identities and behaviors. Understanding gendered militarism is even more important, feminists argue, because of its links to state nationalism, which: is a set of discourses about who ‘we’ are and who belongs in the political community.… Nationalism therefore depends upon ‘national chauvinism’ such that members of other nations as well as racial, sexual, or ideological others inside the nation are constructed in terms of femininity or subordinate masculinity. These others are weak and inferior, or they are hypermasculine.… [N]ationalist discourses that constitute the identity of the nation are predicated upon discourses of gender that reproduce traditional gender roles.90 Particularly, feminists see that ‘gender difference between women and men serves to symbolically define the limits of national difference [my emphasis].’91 In other words, gender differentiation among states is a cause of war. Gendered nationalism shapes state identity and differentiates among states in the international arena through wom­en’s bodies, as they are constructed as biological and cultural reproducers of the nation.92 In these nationalist discourses, it is crucial that women serve as women (par­ticularly as mothers) to insure national security and pride. The observation of gendered nationalism, then, might have two implications for second-image theorizing of war. First, it provides evidence that the state identity is tied to state gender identity, and therefore identity-based state war decisions are tied to **state gender identities**. Second, if feminist scholars are right that states use gender metaphors (or, as Spike Peterson recently called it, ‘feminization as devalorization’)93 in their nationalist contests, gen­der accounts for how states’ identities influence their interaction and even their propen­sity to make wars. Evidence about the significance of gender for second-image theorizing, then, looks substantially different when one looks beyond Elshtain’s narrow formulation to consider feminist work on gender in nationalism, militarism, citizenship and individual subjectiv­ity, leadership, and the philosophy of the state in theory and practice. **Twenty years of feminist IR work** makes a strong case for both the accuracy and usefulness of calling the state ‘gendered,’ both for better analysis of global politics and for theorizing the causes of war. If feminists are **(even partly) right** that gender is a key part in how states form political communities, choose leaders, determine their political interests, see and pre­pare for war, and compare themselves to other states, then it is theorizing the second image without reference to gender that appears to be problematic in accounting for when and how war is made.

### 1NC – OFF

#### **FWK - the 1AC is an object of research - They can weigh their impacts but we should be able to garner dissads and alt competition by testing their justifications because those are the reasons they staked out to vote aff.**

#### The supposed objectivity imbued in the freedom of press deters a cultural revolution that galvanizes support for a peoples dictatorship by entertaining the opinions of capitalist pigs. If we win the K the fwk goes away because both are impact justified. Winning maoist autocracy good means you can evaluate the round as maintain communist legitimacy as a counter-standard

Houn 59 Franklin w. Houn“Chinese Communist Control of the Press” The Public Opinion Quarterly , Winter, 1958-1959, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter, 1958-1959), pp. 435-448 Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public Opinion Research <http://www.jstor.com/stable/2746592> CHO -- ask me for pdf

THE PRESS in Communist China is essentially a political instrument with which the regime conducts socialist and Communist education among the masses. During the last few years the regime has developed the press into an elaborate, diversified, and highly specialized apparatus with each of its parts designed to reach a specific audience and to serve a definite function. Schools have included newspaper reading in their curricula, while governmental agencies, mass organizations, military units, commercial firms, industrial plants, and cooperative farms have organized "newspaper reading groups," which not only make it obligatory for literate persons to read newspapers regularly but also enable illiterate persons to get information and propaganda messages from newspapers by having literate persons read newspapers to them. With a regular readership comprising a majority of the vast population, the press is indeed the most important instrument used by the regime in the conduct of socialist and Communist education. The performance of the press, therefore, may well determine the pace and even the success or failure of the Communists' adventure in remolding the Chinese people's ideology. To ensure maximum effectiveness and absolute political reliability, the regime has found it necessary to put this giant press apparatus under rigid control and close supervision. Unlike the practice in some other totalitarian countries, press control in Communist China does not take the form of any conventional censorship. The absence of conventional censorship may be at- tributed to at least two causes. In the first place, a special censorial agency to screen the content of the press is necessary only in a country which has a press independent of the government. In such a case the government may find it impossible to curb a hostile or irresponsible press unless it has a censorship system. Since the press in Communist China is not an independent institution but an integral part of the government or of the Communist party, which is more or less synonymous with is one of internal supervision rather than external control. In the second place, a conventional censorship system would not be an adequate mechanism for controlling a press like the one in Communist China, which is expected to make certain positive contributions to the attainment of the regime's socio-political goals. Censorship is normally an instrument of prevention. While a government may use such an instrument to prevent the press from printing material that it finds detrimental or hostile to its interests, it cannot rely upon the same instrument to have the newspapers feature material most beneficial to the state. To ensure that the press will actively serve a regime's interests, there must be a type of control that is much broader in scope and more positive in nature than a conventional censorship system. How does the Chinese Communist regime actually control the press? Controls exercised by the Chinese Communist regime over the press fall into four major categories: organizational, personnel, editorial, and operational. ORGANIZATIONAL CONNTROL Through organizational control the regime determines the structural of the press. It is the regime that decides when, where, and how many papers should be founded. It is also the regime that decides who may found or own what kinds of newspaper. By making such decisions the regime is not only capable of suppressing "objectionable" or "superfluous" newspapers but also free to develop a press with a physical structure commensurate with the tasks that it is to perform. In point of fact, decisions of this nature made by the regime since 1949 have resulted in the confiscation of the former Kuomintang newspapers, the virtual elimination of privately owned news- papers, and, as said before, the development of a nationwide press apparatus for the regime itself. The theoretical justification for these decisions is that the press is a political weapon and that under a "people's dictatorship" such a weapon must be used by the people themselves or their representatives to the exclusion of their political enemies. Kuomintang newspapers. Since the Kuomintang was regarded as the arch enemy of the people, it was only natural for the Communists to ban all its newspapers on the mainland once they seized power there. Actually, most of the official newspapers of the Kuomintang, including the forty-four daily papers (one of them had editions in ten major cities) published by the cen- tral and provincial headquarters of the party, suspended publication on the eve of Communist occupation of their respective cities or towns, as they were fully aware of what their destiny would be after the Communists' arrival.' Thus the newly arrived Communist functionaries found little more to do than to confiscate the properties of the Kuomintang papers. This, of course, was done very quickly and thoroughly. As part of the campaign for the sup- pression of counter-revolutionaries, the Communist regime also liquidated or sent to forced-labor camps a good many former Kuomintang newsmen who failed to flee the mainland. Privately owned newspapers. The Communists' policy toward privately owned newspapers, however, has been far more subtle in form and circuitous in development. This is inevitable in view of the intricacy of the Chinese Communists' theory of the nature of the Chinese state at the "people's dictatorship" stage. According to this theory, all elements of society other than the bureaucratic capitalists, feudal landlords, and lackeys of foreign imperialism, most of whom, in the Communists' opinion, have strong representation in the Kuomintang, are legitimate components of the People's Republic of China and therefore entitled to enjoy all political rights including the right to have their own newspapers.2 Consequently, outright banning of all privately owned newspapers-a practice adopted by the Russian Communists after the October Revolution- has not been considered by the regime in Peking an advisable or expedient policy. On the other hand, the Communists do not see fit to give completely free rein to any privately owned newspaper. It is part of their theory that, during the stage of "people's dictatorship," the party or the government must effect an ideological transformation of the population as a whole and, in order to do this, it must assume the role of teacher, guide, and leader of the people. As people's teacher, guide, and leader, the party or government has both the right and responsibility to direct the flow of ideas and information through all sections of the mass communication media. This, of course, implies governmental regulation of privately owned newspapers. The first step taken by the Communist regime in this connection was to announce that while privately owned newspapers with "reactionary dispositions" would be outlawed at once, "progressive" ones and those without definite political inclinations might apply for new licenses for continuation of publication. Thus quite a number of privately owned newspapers were able to carry on business side by side with newspapers owned by the Communists, though they were subject to strict control and supervision by the regime. But late in 1951 the regime began to put into effect a policy aimed at reducing the number of privately owned newspapers and changing the nature of those to be retained. Many privately owned newspapers were closed, others were amalgamated, and still others were "reformed" and "reorganized."

**The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of a mass party building based on the scientific formulation of Maoist principles, in this: The People’s Press ought to prioritize Maoist advocacy over objectivity.**

Williams 18 [Carine, 7/30/18, “Why Black People Need Maoism in 2018”, *The Hampton Institute*, <http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/why-black-people-need-maoism.html#.XWwv7ZNKh0s> // KZaidi]

When they hear Maoism, many people think of China, Peru, and the Philippines. They picture peasants "surrounding the cities from the countryside." This is, of course, understandable, but a mistake. Maoism is not simply "everything that Mao did," or "everything that happened in China between 1949 and now." I have spent a great deal of my time writing working to dispel these sorts of myths, some peddled in an unprincipled fashion by anti-Maoists. Maoism is a living, breathing science. By science we mean something with universal principles that can be taken and applied by all who have a material interest in making revolution. In the United States, this is Black people, or the New Afrikan nation. It was not by accident that the original Black Panther Party (BPP) developed close relations with the revolutionary leadership of the People's Republic of China. Huey didn't go to China to play; he went to study and learn things that could be applied back home. Of course, he eventually degenerated in political line and practice, taking a right opportunist course along with Bobby Seale (always a centrist) and Elaine Brown (who guided the party, in his absence, into a mainstream political force that led into the arms of the Democratic Party). This opportunism in the highest expression of revolutionary sentiment, practice, and force in this country to date needs to be studied and ruthlessly criticized, yet we should be careful. We must place things in their historical context and ensure that we are able to divide one into two, meaning see the beneficial as well as the negative aspects of a thing but also realize that one aspect must be primary. The BPP was destroyed by a combination of factors: lack of a really scientific method of analysis and cohesive program of political education, failure to promote and apply the Marxist-Leninist principle of Democratic Centralism (debate inside the party, formation of a political line through this debate, and the upholding of this decision by all party members and organs), and a culture of liberalism that ended with comrades fighting comrades, thus opening the door for external factors (the FBI and other LE agencies) to play havoc and get cadre railroaded into prison and killed. We must study and learn all of these lessons, because when we develop another organization with the prestige, mass base, and power that the Panthers had, and we will, they will come for us all again. So, why do we need Maoism? Because we are against the most brutal, bloody, and vicious empire known to humankind. This country is looting and enslaving our class siblings all over the world. To overturn this order of things, to smash it and rebuild it in the interests of the revolutionary proletariat of the entire world, we must apply the synthesis of 200 years of systematic, organized class struggle, which is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism: the continuity of the revolutionary project that was Marxism-Leninism, with a rupture from the dogmatism and revisionism. Maoists do not uphold "Actually Existing Socialism" because a scientific analysis rooted in the principles laid down by the revolutionary movements and projects that gave us Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao would demonstrate that stealing food from Filipino fisherfolk, like the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been doing, is 100% non-Marxist. This is in disagreement with many Marxist-Leninist organizations today, which uphold these things and other imperialist depredations carried out under the faded red banner of China. The Maoist argument is that Marxist-Leninist terrain has been spent, and the 21st century must learn from Maoism. "You haven't seized state power yet!" others cry. Indeed, and there has never been a truly Maoist party that has initiated armed struggle in the imperialist metro poles. This doesn't mean that Maoist principles cannot be applied to these countries, this means that we must be ever more creative in our application and ever more disciplined in our party-building efforts. Party building in the USA requires the careful and thorough cultivation of a mass base. Tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of people must depend on and follow this party and participate in mass organizations before it can even begin to call itself a vanguard. This is what many who came out of the New Communist Movement of the mid-late 1970s failed to realize. The days of endless squabbling sects that fight over "mass bases" of a handful of other activists must be put to an end, and we must have a truly mass perspective. There is optimism in the spread of For the People (FTP) organizations and the development of the Organizing Committee for a Maoist Communist Party (MCP-OC) which has a more mass orientation and places primacy on the development of a class analysis and political line in the USA that is based in painstaking investigation and rooted in the aspirations and struggles of the most oppressed, along with a record of seeking to develop international solidarity and prison work. This, I believe, is the best hope for New Afrikan Maoists in the United States and I wholeheartedly encourage Black comrades to develop FTP-type organizations in their own communities under OC guidance. Even if this isn't done, at the very least studies in Maoism, studies in Maoist revolutions, and studies in Maoist theory are beneficial. After and during these studies, think about how it can be applied on your block and in your community. Learn about and be like Fred Hampton. Time is up for spinning our wheels; we must get together, unite on a principled and unshakeable basis, and mount a formidable resistance against decades and centuries-old oppression based in capitalism and white supremacy. I also encourage support and donation to the Hampton Institute as an invaluable resource in promoting revolutionary ideology and practice in the finest Marxist tradition.

#### Resource competition and wealth extraction under Racial Capitalism produces fascism, endless war and environmental destruction which requires the cultivation of a mass base.

Robinson 14(William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis*. Structural crises* reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of *social reproduction.* The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of *hegemony* and *domination.* National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanityI mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and **to** destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term *21st century fascism*.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism,extrememasculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

#### We fiat global Communist central planning and Maoist governance - using fiat to imagine future communist governance is a prior to developing the political grammar to get there

**Tonstad 16** (Professor Tonstad is a constructive theologian working at the intersection of systematic theology with feminist and queer theory. Her first book, God and Difference: The Trinity, Sexuality, and the Transformation of Finitude, was published by Routledge in 2016 and was named both as a best new book in ethics and a best new book in theology in Christian Century in the spring of 2017. “Debt Time is Straight Time” political theology, Vol. 17 No. 5, September 2016, 434–448, Edited for ableist language – “visible” changed to “recognizable” )

If debt time, as I have argued, is straight time, can other temporal modes of production and affiliation be imagined? If debt time depends on promises made in the past to subjugate the present and future, might other promising pasts (made available through the non-limitative, intergenerational relations that “homosexual production” sometimes promotes) redirect us toward other futures — futures located in queer time? Dreaming and day-dreaming allow for Kathi Weeks’s “utopian demand” that can teach us what a “different world” in which our dreams would come to life would look like.45 To reeducate our temporal desires, we need to “affirm what we are and will it, because it is also the constitutive basis from which we can struggle to become otherwise.”46 This affirmation is no mere acceptance of the past as it is enforced on us by the moral couplings effort-reward or debt-obligation. Rather, it is “an active intervention into our ways of inhabiting the past.” The utopic demand affirms a future in which the demand would no longer be utopic, while also estranging us from the ethos that there is no alternative.47Guy Hocquenghem writes, “Homosexual production takes place according to a mode of non-limitative horizontal relations, heterosexual reproduction according to one of hierarchical succession … another possible social relation … is not vertical but horizontal.”48 Horizontal temporal relations can join with new spatial orders to constitute a we. Franco Berardi notes that one of the reasons workers’ struggles have tended to disappear historically (as exceptions rather than lasting coalitions) is that “for struggles to form a cycle there must be a spatial proximity of laboring bodies and an existential temporal continuity. Without this proximity and this continuity, we lack the conditions for cellularized bodies to become a community.”49 Spatial proximity is not enough by itself — antiblackness in the United States is but one example proving the point — but it is essential to the formation of coalitions and new forms of solidarity. Without side-by-side relationships, spatial and symbolic, and without creating and becoming a we, we can neither understand “our” time aright to diagnose it, nor shift the future into a direction other than the one marked out by the insistence that there is no alternative. With such relationships, the door is open for possibilities for redirecting the trajectory of debt time that do not require “distance from dominant culture,” but instead can take their own “imbrication with contemporary socioeconomic forces”50 as a point of departure. The first step is to name the powers and in so naming call them up and make them visible [recognizeable]— materialization of the demons that ride and haunt us, seeking to destroy us. The next step is to reorder our temporal and spatial relations to each other to create a we that does not yet exist.The promise of queer prophetic performance Sleeping and waking cross each other: for we must wake from our dreams of dust and ashes in order to read the signs of the times, and we must sleep so that we can learn to dream new dreams. Between the space of sleep and waking, we encounter the memory of other times, a memory that may become grounds for a future that is no future. Naming the signs of the times (knowing the time in order to escape its grasp, refusing the future in order to redirect it) is a prophetic practice. Althaus-Reid says, “[I]f God is to be found in human relationships of economic and loving orders, it is obvious that the right not to be straight in a capitalist society and church has the goal of liberating God.”51 And who can set God free? We need a prophetic52 bodily reordering in which the untimely one will arrive and tell us, or better show us, the series of negations, intentional relations, and world-making activities that are our best hope for living love in a time of capital. These hopes weigh less than the Spirit of Gravity does on our shoulders (that always-already that the history of Christian capitalism imposes on us); with them we may hope for an easier yoke that would allow us to replenish our relations to ourselves and others. Prophets dream for us and against us; they sound the alarm and they fall into trances in which revelations are given to them. Prophets use speech, performance, visions, dreams, and bodies to shift the relations between structures of authority and embedded hierarchicalizations. Those manipulations, those reorderings of apparently fixed elements of the world, reproduce but can also reconfigure visions of orders of power.53 Most importantly, prophets contend with other prophets in inexplicable bodied acts,54 and prophets contend with the prophets of other gods.55 Prophetic contestation breaks open the “monopoly of actuality” that insists “there is no alternative.” “Blow the trumpet … sound the alarm!” “Your sons and daughters will prophesy, your old men will dream dreams, your young men will see visions. Even on my servants, both men and women, I will pour out my spirit in those days.”56 The passage from Joel points to the transgenerational and transgendered aspects of prophecy, and to the importance of dreams. Late capitalism denies us dreams, and late capitalism monetizes even our dreams. But prophets dream the dreams that the rest of us are denied. Prophecies “have been a means by which the “poor” have externalized their desires, given legitimacy to their plans, and have been spurred to action.” For this reason, prophecy had to be “replaced with the calculation of probabilities” — a calculation that depends on the postulate that “the future will be like the past.”57 We are seeking a future that is not like the past. Prophecy opens the possibility of the impossible beyond calculation and prediction. Prophecy can connect the partially open future with the overdetermined present to suggest strategies for redirection and recreation. Kirk Fuoss argues that performance always involves contestation; if he is right, the same would apply to prophetic performances.58 Prophetic performances may contribute to the development of what Valerie Rohy understands as queer non-causality: a temporality “whose beginnings are found in the future.”59 Rohy describes the way becoming gay may involve a circular causality that escapes linear historical determination. In the case of Oscar Wilde, for instance, “Wilde’s homosexuality both causes the gay male identity of the future and is caused by it.”60 Such alternative causalities may break the effort-reward, promise-fault couplings of determinate historical time — of debt time. If we become what is not yet possible, our becoming escapes the past’s determination without negating it. Queer performances that embody impossible futures may have the capacity to vivify and illuminate extant alternative imaginaries while challenging the “monopoly of actuality” exercised by debt time, especially if these queer prophetic performances distinguish themselves from capital not by their freedom from it61 but by practicing in relation to it. Performance can reeducate our imaginations (our dreams) in ways that do not pretend — as attenuated or homonormative gay culture sometimes does — that no other economic order is possible. We need to relearn the connections between sexuality and the economic order that lesbian feminists and black feminists recognized from the very beginning.62 We must enter desire’s school for reeducation so we may learn to name the present for the sake of a redirected future. In order to change our futures (to make them no future for the time of financialized capitalism and hetero-same reproduction), we need — as I have argued — spatial and symbolic side-by-side relations, we need to learn the nature of our time (and times), and we need to create the worlds that we need to learn to want through institution-building and the generation of publics.

#### Command economy key 2 Red innovation

Nieto & Mateo 20 [Maxi Nieto is a PhD is sociology from the University of Elche and writer for Ciber Comunismo and Juan Pablo Mateo is a visiting scholar in the department of Economics at The New School, New York and economics professor at the University of Valladolid (Spain). January 2020, “Dynamic Efficiency in a Planned Economy: Innovation and Entrepreneurship Without Markets”, Science & Society, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338327276\_Dynamic\_Efficiency\_in\_a\_Planned\_Economy\_Innovation\_and\_Entrepreneurship\_Without\_Markets //](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338327276_Dynamic_Efficiency_in_a_Planned_Economy_Innovation_and_Entrepreneurship_Without_Markets%20//)gbs jacobs & majeed]

4.1. Innovation and social property. Innovation occurs as a result of a long and complex accumulation process of knowledge and creativity, where very rarely is a single individual solely responsible. This is an essentially social process in which a plurality of actors and institutions contribute in very different spheres and circumstances. The Austrian School presents an idealized image of innovation in capitalist economies, attributing it exclusively to the figure of the enterprising entrepreneur — whether in a disruptive sense (Schumpeter), or in a strictly coordinating sense (Kirzner). In fact, the entrepreneurial function develops within specific institutional frameworks and organized structures, both at the micro and macro levels. In this sense, a socialist economy has significant advantages for developing technological and business innovation, as opposed to a capitalist economy: i) socialism allows for greater and more efficient allocation of resources to R&D&I activities, thanks to centralized control of the surplus and the absence of sumptuous consumption and a rentier population; ii) there are no obstacles (property rights) to the free dissemination of new products and techniques; iii) the equal distribution of resources (which guarantees that no basic needs go unmet) allows for discovery and fuller development of talent, which likewise occurs when work is undertaken through tasks that are more balanced for the majority and less routine; iv) in allocating investment, more information is available and the criteria are more varied than mere expectation of profit; v) social ownership is more inclusive and participatory than capitalist enterprise in terms of generating and mobilizing knowledge (tacit or not) and encouraging innovation; vi) socialism does not impose short-term innovation cycles looking to generate products that can be commercialized in, say, four to six months, as is typical in capitalist economies. Under these favorable general conditions, the development of innovation in a socialist economy would unfold in three fundamental areas: i) Strategic planning: this traces the main lines of scientific, technological, and innovation research. Here would enter programs for the development of new technologies and infrastructures, as well as visionary projects that explore eventualities and future scenarios. This sort of research is carried out in universities, scientific academies, technological institutes, and other specialized centers in coordination with the business world. The process would consist in testing different alternative productive projects or techniques in order to verify results, in connection with the companies and sectors being served. ii) Companies: research, design, and innovation departments. iii) Business entrepreneurship: individuals and teams put forward proposals in hopes of securing financing. For any of these three areas, material incentives would exist that reward the degree to which the freely programmed objectives are achieved, in addition to purely social or moral incentives such as social recognition or professional and personal fulfilment. In the next section, we focus on how socialist entrepreneurship — something that the Austrian School considers impossible — would ostensibly work. 4.2. Ecosystems for innovation and entrepreneurship. In today’s most dynamic capitalist economies, entrepreneurship and business innovation are developed mainly in the so-called innovation ecosystems, which are institutional environments dedicated to promoting symbiotic interaction among the different actors involved in the process of creating and transforming companies and industries. This sort of institutional framework represents the antithesis of the liberal mythology where the individual capitalist–entrepreneur operates in a purely commercial environment, since these ecosystems are based on public institutions and resources as well as procedures that are not strictly mercantile.9 An efficient and dynamic socialist economy needs institutional environments capable of fostering and channeling the initiative of individuals with special talents to translate innovative ideas into business projects. It must be clear that an ecosystem of socialist innovation does not substitute for, but instead complements, the innovations developed by particular state institutions and programs (such as the transition to a new source of energy, new materials, etc.) as well 9 In the case of Spain, think tanks and capitalist consultants openly admit that “there is not enough private capital to invest in new companies, either through individual investment or through venture capital funds” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2015, 32). as innovations taking place in the industrial design departments of businesses. The actors involved in such an ecosystem are essentially the same as those participating in the equivalent ecosystems of the current capitalist economies. Principal differences would lie in the form of interaction among them (in the absence of mercantile links), their decision-making capacity (since no private property rights adhere), and the types of rules in force (including the incentive system). Among the main actors would be the following

## ON

### 1NC – UV

#### Reject 1AR Theory arguments – 1) double bind – either you can put minor ink next to answer of my responses and extend your arguments to auto-win or the judge has to intervene to see if the 2ar answers to the 2n are good enough. Intervention o/w since it takes the round out of debater’s hands 2) they have 2 speeches on theory while I have 1 which means they can structurally preempt my answers and respond to them and I can’t do either 3) infinite abuse in the context of aff abuse doesn’t make sense since you can read 1ac theory and uplayer with other 1ar offs like Ks 4) they have 1 more minute on the theory debate due to a 7-6 skew which o/w since theory is mainly about substance 5) they can blow up dropped arguments , we cant frame them out but they can which means only dropped arguments for them are game over.

#### Resolvability OW infinite abuse

#### 1] Jurisdiction- If the judge can’t resolve an argument they don’t have the jurisdiction to vote on it because there is a risk of an incorrect decision

#### 2] Magnitude- resolvability means judge intervention which is worse than a shell with reasonability on it

#### 3] Probability- Judge intervention is 100% likely because no matter what 2NR responses don’t get answered to but you can resolve the theory debate with DTA

#### 4] Irreversibility- Judge intervention is the worst violation of fairness because it takes the debate out of the hands of the debaters which is irreversible since the decision would be incorrect

#### All theory paradigm issues and voters the aff thinks are good must be in the 1ac since they have 1 more speech than me on theory so they should take a stance sooner so I don’t have to answer all of them in one speech while they can go for them in multiple – 2n issues are reciprocally answered by the 2ar.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

#### LBL

#### A] DTA still deters future abuse because we won’t go for arguments we can’t win on

#### B}

### 1NC – OV

#### Capitalism r/c poverty because it relies on scarcity and financial inequality

#### Link wall

#### 1] They say sensationalism to generate partisanship for “socialist” and “endorsement of violence” but that advocacy is good in the context of communism

#### 2] The 1AC is stuck in the problem of diagnosis of symptoms like “poverty in the US is a death sentence” or “violence and oppressive impacts” but fail to overthrow the system through material analysis and revolutionary organizing.

#### 3] 1AC Watts says to protect private Intellectual Property which deters innovation, cooperation, incentivizes greed and sustains resource competition.

### 1NC – LBL

#### 1AC Coblin – its about facebook hatespeech NOT free press so aff can’t solve AND requires cultivation of mass base.

#### 1AC Ryan is a neg card – says that objective reporting about poverty empowers right-wingers to use that info to their advantage.

### Populism turn

#### Objectivity cedes the press to the far right

Meyer 2020. Will Meyer/February 6, 2020. The Abuses of Objectivity. <https://newrepublic.com/article/156486/abuses-objectivity> [Will Meyer is a writer and musician. He is editor of The Shoestring, a worker-owned news publication in Western Massachusetts.]

In January 2017, Kellyanne Conway, at that time President Trump’s press secretary, coined the term “alternative facts” on Meet the Press. The term was part of a broader move by President Trump and others on the right to discredit journalists, taunting them as “enemies of people” and purveyors of “fake news.” In this environment, the mainstream press doubled down on its commitments to truth-telling and objectivity. The Washington Post introduced the new slogan, “Democracy Dies in the Darkness.” The New York Times aired a pompous ad during the Oscars titled “The Truth is Hard.” The nonprofit ProPublica used the motto “Defend the Facts” in its fundraising. Newsrooms were defending the twentieth-century ideal of impartial journalism, leaning hard on its norms and brand. What a commitment to objectivity meant, however, was often the appearance of fairness. Neutrality meant showing two sides to every story, even in cases where one side’s arguments were much weaker than the other’s. Over the summer, The New York Times looked into conditions at a Staten Island Amazon warehouse and told the story in a way that was more than generous to management. More recently, the paper was criticized by this magazine for taking its both-sides-style reporting on impeachment so far as to take right-wing conspiracy theories at face value. “Objectivity” also meant veering away from describing figures on the right in unflattering terms—avoiding the words “lies” or “racism”—because those descriptions could be seen as evidence of left-wing bias. Above all, it meant that reporters themselves could not be seen to have any political opinions, because then they would be vulnerable to accusations of impropriety, regardless of the accuracy of what they actually wrote. Just days after the new president was sworn in, NPR’s senior vice president of News, Michael Oreskes, defended his organization’s choice not to call the president elect’s fabrications “lies.” On that same day, January 25, 2017, the popular public radio show Marketplace fired an award-winning transgender journalist, Lewis Raven Wallace, after he wrote a blog post questioning journalistic objectivity. In a follow-up post describing the firing, Wallace notes that the ethics code he was accused of having violated didn’t contain the words “objectivity” or “neutrality.” The show hadn’t received blowback for this transgression (or any of Wallace’s work), nor had he advocated for any particular political position. He merely offered skepticism about the frame, suggesting that as a trans journalist, he could not be impartial about attacks on his humanity. During his firing, Marketplace Vice President Deborah Clark told Wallace about leaving the anti-apartheid struggle—choosing journalism over activism—as a student: The subtext was that Wallace had to get in line. He didn’t, and paid the price with his job. Wallace follows in a long line of journalists who questioned the sacrosanct wisdom of objectivity. His new book, The View From Somewhere: Undoing the Myth of Journalistic Objectivity, aims to place his own story in the context of a long history of deviants and agitators who resisted the basic premise that media should be neutral. The ideal of neutrality, he shows, has been used both by the center to marginalize radical voices and by the right as a bludgeon to quiet and discredit its critics. Meanwhile, right-wing media organizations do not hold themselves to the same standard—Fox News’s infamous slogan “Fair and Balanced” came at the expense of liberals who took it at face value. One Weekly Standard writer has described the right’s strategy as: “Criticize other people for not being objective. Be as subjective as you want. It’s a great little racket.” As long as the left tries to be fair to the right, but the right does not try to be fair to the left, objectivity will always push discourse to the right. The ideal of objectivity is relatively recent. Before the 1830s, newspapers and pamphlets were mostly produced either by political parties (appealing to men who could vote) or business interests, which created trade journals; and, before advertising took hold, early American newspapers were in some cases subsidized by the government. It was, by most accounts, the advent of the penny press—newspapers with mass appeal—that pioneered the advertising business model and led more directly to the papers we know today. Tracing these changes, journalism scholar David Mindich has identified a shift in the mid-nineteenth century from partisan political writing to the more detached, observational writing that foreshadows modern journalistic conventions. This included formats that separated fact-based writing from editorial essays, and the birth of the professional reporter, who went out to gather the news not as a political participant but as a neutral observer. Between the late 1880s and World War I, the newspaper business was “unsure of its place” and went through many changes to establish the norms newspapers employ now. In was in these years that the first professional journalism schools opened and ethical standards for the profession started to be established. Mindich argues that objectivity, at least as an ideal, began to form in the 1890s, directly alongside the professionalization of the trade, shifting from a “low-class occupation” to a specialized one. By 1924, a book called The Ethics of Journalism by Nelson Antrim Crawford spelled out these standards: a wall between advertising and editorial, a moratorium on bribes, fact-checking and thorough sourcing, and a greater reliance on “experts.” The historical moment in which this occurred was in the wake of World War I, when the nation got a taste of mass propaganda created by the U.S. government to support the war effort. In his book Public Opinion, The New Republic’s founding co-editor Walter Lippman lamented the role of naked distortions in shaping public perceptions. Within two years of Lippman’s book’s publication in 1922, rigorous standards began to take form. Some were skeptical—“Show me a man who thinks he’s objective, and I’ll show you a man who’s deceiving himself,” Henry Luce, the founder of Time, said in 1923—but a consensus was hardening. Although Wallace says that objectivity “emerged for many of the right reasons,” he argues that it was just as quickly “weaponized,” as it was ideologically used to police journalism’s bounds. With the rise of objectivity and professional ethics, Wallace writes that the “gates went up,” leaving many outside. The first journalist to be fired for a breach of objectivity (not unlike Wallace) was Morris Watson, a reporter from the Associated Press in 1935. What made him “biased,” according to his bosses, was his effort to organize a union with the Newspaper Guild. He sued, and the newly formed National Labor Relations Board took his case and brought it to the Supreme Court, which ruled in his favor. The AP had not found any actual bias in his reporting, the court found, but was banking on “potential bias” to thwart his organizing. Watson was a victim of what Wallace dubs “journalism’s purity ritual,” which can be described as using objectivity as a pretext to fire someone for their politics. One particularly egregious example Wallace came across was a 1996 headline in The New York Times: “Gay Reporter Wants to Be Activist.” As the paper of record reported: To labor leaders … Sandy Nelson is an unlikely hero—a lesbian, socialist journalist. But to the top editors at The [Tacoma] News Tribune, where Ms. Nelson works, she is a walking conflict of interest whose off-duty activities threaten the credibility of journalism. During the 1980s, Nelson was involved in a local struggle to pass a human rights ordinance that would prohibit job discrimination against gay workers. Although political expression was allowed by her union, Nelson was relegated to the copy desk by her editor, a post from which she filed a lawsuit. Unlike in Watson’s case, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled against her, deciding that journalists were exempt from a state law protecting employees from retaliation for political expression. When Wallace interviewed Nelson for the book, she told him, “They didn’t go after people who were involved with their churches, or people who were in the Boy Scouts. They can be political, can’t they?” She believed her bosses intended to make an example out of her, adding, “During the McCarthy era they went after people in the same way.” The tendency to exclude gay journalists, on the grounds of “objectivity,” from conversations about issues that affected the gay community led to serious problems in media coverage. In 1982, as the AIDS death toll continued to rise to around 400, The New York Times ran only five stories; none were on the front page. For comparison, the paper ran four front page and 50 total articles on the Tylenol scare that year, which killed seven people. Yet executives there refused to allow those close to the crisis to influence the paper’s reporting. Instead, as one critic charged in 1981, “Lesbians and gay men at the Times were allowed little—if any—positive influence over the paper’s coverage of gay people.” As Wallace shows, the Times was criticized repeatedly for its homophobic stories, often qualifying crimes with the word “homosexual” (as in “homosexual murder”), prompting journalists and activists to pressure the paper to stop using the term. The Times never reported on violence against queer people but would go out of its way to say if the perpetrator of a crime was gay. The ideal of objectivity has led to an increase in “both-sidesism”—often elaborate attempts to avoid showing favor to any person in a story. One of the most telling examples of this was The New York Times’s coverage of the killing of Michael Brown by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014. In its coverage, the Times went out of its way to portray “balance.” In a story about Brown’s memorial, the paper remarked that he was “no angel” and went out on a limb to mention that he allegedly stole an iPod when he was in ninth grade, a fact that had nothing to do with his death. The memorial piece concerned itself with trafficking heavy-handed moral obfuscations. At one point, it quoted a violent lyric (“My favorite part is when the bodies hit the ground”) in a rap song Brown had “collaborated on,” as if that could somehow be morally comparable to the police violence that saw his body fall in the same manner. Instead of objectivity or impartiality, The View From Somewhere advocates for a different distinction: between earnestly searching for the truth and peddling distortions and falsehoods. For Wallace, it’s OK for journalists to admit where they are coming from, while still “hanging on to some basic tenets of traditional journalism ethics: verification and fact-checking, editorial independence from political parties and corporations, clarity and transparency about financial and political conflicts of interests, and deep, thorough sourcing.” In Wallace’s paradigm, “curiosity” is the “antidote to misinformation and disinformation.” Wallace calls for more collaborative journalism, like Chicago’s City Bureau or Indigenous Media Rising, where members of communities work with journalists to change what kinds of stories are covered and how. Still, in-depth, curious journalism is difficult and expensive to produce, and many newsrooms are strapped for resources, if they even exist at all. Today, some 1,400 communities have lost papers in the past 15 years (it is within these vacuums that Trump excelled), more papers are owned by indifferent hedge funds, and even civic-minded philanthropy seems to overlook local news. The economic precariousness of the news business remains outside of Wallace’s purview. Democracy has been dying in the darkness for quite some time. What The View From Somewhere makes dazzlingly clear is that saving journalism will mean saving it from a false notion of objectivity.