# Strake Semis 1NC

CONTENT WARNING – DEATH GOOD

### 1NC – Hijack

#### We’re hijacking synthetic a posteriori moral naturalism

#### The 1AC syllogism is not very clear but we’ll define what their words means a bit more clearly for them

Their Author Lutz, Matthew and Lenman, James, "Moral Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/naturalism-moral/>. // Cho

It might be tempting to say that moral naturalism should, properly understood, consist in the conjunction of Epistemic, Metaphysical, and Analytic Naturalism. But that suggestion would be unacceptable, as there is a strong tension between Epistemic Naturalism and Analytic Naturalism. If Analytic Naturalism is true, then it should be possible (at least in principle) to go through a process of conceptual analysis that would reveal the synonymy between moral claims and claims in the natural sciences. But if this is possible, then substantive moral principles are knowable a priori—which, in turn, entails that substantive moral principles are not known in the same way as scientific principles. Analytic Naturalism therefore seems to entail that Epistemic Naturalism is false, and vice versa. Naturalists who accept Analytic Naturalism are called, appropriately enough, analytic naturalists. Naturalists who reject Analytic Naturalism are synthetic naturalists, since they hold that claims regarding relations between the moral and the natural are synthetic rather than analytic. This is not to say that analytic naturalists allow no room for empirical investigation into morality—far from it. If, for instance, an analytic naturalist were to hold that the term ‘good’ is synonymous with ‘pleasurable’, they would hold that the claim “Pleasure is good” is analytic, and knowable a priori. But the claim “It is good to help others” would be the kind of claim that is amenable to empirical investigation, in virtue of the fact that “It is good to help others” would be synonymous with “It is pleasant to help others”, and whether pleasure results from helping others is the kind of claim that can be empirically investigated. So analytic naturalists should be understood as saying that some moral claims—in particular, moral claims that state general relations between natural properties and moral properties (like “Pleasure is good”)—are knowable a priori. Synthetic naturalists claim that all moral claims are synthetic claims, knowable by empirical methods. In sum, while any moral naturalist will agree with the statement that moral facts are natural facts, different philosophers will mean different things by that statement.

#### This means that their framework is entirely contingent on the empirical investigation of moral claims and the verifiability of those investigations. I agree that empirical investigation is the only way to synthesize moral claims that are supervened by naturalism. However, these investigations are unverifiable.

#### First – Cartesian Skepticism. Brain in a vat means that even if they are right about how morality works, we can’t know if the circumstances observed in our brain equate to natural properties

Chapman summarizes descarte 14 [Andrew Chapman (lecturer in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder). “External World Skepticism”. 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. 6 FEBRUARY 2014. Accessed 12/11/21. <https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/> //Xu]

You’re being deceived by a very powerful evil demon right now. This demon has the ability to manipulate your sensory impressions such that it will seem to you that things are some way when they are not that way at all. Accordingly, things are actually nothing like P. For example, suppose it seems to you as though you are in a room with a table and chair in it and that you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (1) is true, then you actually are in a room with a table and chair in it and you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, then you are not in a room with a table and chair in it and you are not reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, things are very different from how they seem to you to be.1

\*Footnote 1\*

1 If the evil demon scenario is too far-fetched for you, imagine that you are dreaming or that you are hallucinating or even that you are in a laboratory and your visual cortex is being stimulated by electrodes.

\*Paragraph Following the First\*

Philosophers call (2) a skeptical scenario. In skeptical scenarios, you are radically misled, deceived, or bamboozled by your evidence in such a way that how things seem to you is different from how things actually are. Perhaps the most famous propounder of skeptical scenarios in the history of philosophy is René Descartes (1596-1650) in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). In the Meditations, Descartes considers that he might be dreaming or that he might be being deceived by the evil demon from our scenario (2) above. Hollywood has made much of skeptical scenarios in movies like Total Recall, The Matrix, and Inception. So back to our original question: Which of (1) or (2) is best supported or best justified by its seeming to you that P? If you’re being honest with yourself, you’ll conclude that how things seem equally well supports (1) and (2). From your internal, first-personal perspective, either of (1) or (2) could be true given how things seem to you. And if that weren’t bad enough, here comes the kicker: If both (1) and (2) are equally well supported by your evidence, how can you ever possibly know anything about the world outside your own skin? This is the problem of external world skepticism, perhaps the central problem of modern epistemology.

#### Second – Bonini paradox means modeling the brain is physically and empirically impossible

**Wikipedia** [Brackets Original. “Bonini's paradox”. Wikipedia. No Date. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonini%27s_paradox> //Houston Memorial DX]

In modern discourse, the paradox was articulated by John M. Dutton and William H. Starbuck[2] "As a model of a complex system becomes more complete, it becomes less understandable. Alternatively, as a model grows more realistic, it also becomes just as difficult to understand as the real-world processes it represents".[3] This paradox may be used by researchers to explain why complete models of the human brain and thinking processes have not been created and will undoubtedly remain difficult for years to come. This same paradox was observed earlier from a quote by philosopher-poet Paul Valéry, "Ce qui est simple est toujours faux. Ce qui ne l’est pas est inutilisable".[4] ("A simple statement is bound to be untrue. One that is not simple cannot be utilized."[5]) Also, the same topic has been discussed by Richard Levins in his classic essay "The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology", in stating that complex models have 'too many parameters to measure, leading to analytically insoluble equations that would exceed the capacity of our computers, but the results would have no meaning for us even if they could be solved.[6] (See Orzack and Sober, 1993; Odenbaugh, 2006)


#### Third – Scientific hypothesis can never disprove false positives which means conclusions impossible

**Nickles**, Thomas. (Philosopher @ University of Nevada, Reno) "Falsifiability." New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. **2005**. , <https://elearning.shisu.edu.cn/pluginfile.php/35320/mod_resource/content/1/Falsifiability%20%28Introduction%29.pdf> ///AHS PB

**Falsifiable contrasts with verifiable. A claim is empirically verifiable if possible observation statements logically imply the truth of the claim. If actual observation statements do imply the claim, then it is verified. "This raven is black" verifies "There are black ravens."** During the 1930s the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle proposed verifiability both as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience and a criterion of meaning. Their idea was that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is verifiable in principle, and its meaning is given by its method of verification. For the logical empiricists, only empirically verifiable claims make genuine assertions about the world and are, in this broad sense, scientific. All other claims (metaphysical, religious, ethical, etc.) are cognitively meaningless. In his Logik der Forschung (1934; Logic of Scientific Discovery), Popper replied by rejecting the logical empiricists' concern with language and meaning and by noting that **verifiability as a criterion** of demarcation **excludes** scientific **law** claims and thus the core of science **itself. For** since **a law claim** is universal in scope (in simplest form, "All A's everywhere and everywhen are B's"), it **cannot possibly be verified: there are always actual or potential instances beyond those so far observed. Yet a** universal claim **can be falsified by a single negative instance. The first observed black swan refuted the claim "All swans are white."** (Law claims of statistical probabilistic forms are more problematic.) Based on this logical asymmetry of verification and falsification, Popper proposed falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience, although not as a criterion of meaning. According to Popper, nonscience includes pseudoscience (e.g., Freudian psychology and Marxism) and metaphysics, the one fraudulent, the other sometimes providing a valuable heuristic for science. Many deep scientific problems have their roots in metaphysics, but to be scientific, a claim must take an empirical risk. Moreover, **falsifiability**, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, **is a permanent status** for Popper. **No amount of successful testing can establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever remains conjectural. That all** scientific **theories remain falsifiable entails** fallibilism, the view that **our best epistemic efforts remain open to future revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge**

#### Fourth – Paradox of scientific induction means that scientific truth is impossible

Black’s quotes Hume [Brackets Original. David Hume (Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, historian, economist, librarian and essayist). “The Paradox of Induction”. Black’s Academy. No Date. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://www.blacksacademy.net/pages/px-015-pxqekj-paradox-induction.php> //Xu]

The paradox of induction is the problem that in all scientific reasoning we form conclusions, called laws, that are of a general nature; however, the evidence we have for those laws is based upon particular experiences. For example, we form the conclusion that all rays of light will be bend as the pass from air into glass, but we have only ever observed a finite number of instances of this law. On further reflection we see that there is no necessary connection between something happening on one occasion and the same thing happening in like circumstances on another occasion. We are not directly acquainted with the “power” behind events that ensures the uniformity of nature throughout space and time. Another illustration of this might concern the uniformity of space. Imagine that a space mission is about to be sent to the nearest star, Alpha Centuri. People might be queuing up to volunteer to be the first people to witness life on a distant planet. On the other hand, there might be anxious reluctant passengers, desperate not to be dragged on the fool-hardy mission. Why? Because there is no guarantee that the laws of nature operate in the same way in outer space as they do in our solar system. It is entirely conceivable that once the space ship passes beyond the perimeter of our solar system, that entirely different laws of physics will apply, and the space ship could be destroyed by chaotic forces that cannot be anticipated. We have no way at present of being sure that universe is uniform. We have only sampled physical nature in our own limited portion of the universe. We might regard the fear of the passengers as outlandish, but it is not an irrational fear. Just because things have happened at one point of space and at a given time in a certain way is no guarantee that they always will happen that way. This, then, is the paradox. Every day we reason from particular instances to generalities, and such inference is essential to our way of life; but there is no guarantee that such an inference is valid, and, indeed, very often such inferences prove to be fallacious — as in the case of the chicken that reasoned that its master would always feed it just because its master always has! A schematic representation of the inductive inference is as follows.  The general law encompasses a potentially infinite number of instances that no amount of observation could possibly affirm. The problem is usually expressed as a problem of inference from past to future, but strictly this is only an instance of the problem; unobserved past events are also subject to the paradox of induction — we can never be sure that any general law has applied uniformly even in the past. No general law can ever be certain. Yet inductive reasoning is (in the very broadest sense) the basis of science, which constructs laws governing all events. [We have to put this qualifying remark in because science in practice hardly ever employs direct inductive arguments. It proceeds by forming hypotheses and testing these. Nonetheless, the evidence for any scientific theory is based on particular experimental observation, so in the broadest sense science employs induction from particular to general laws. The question of how science actually operates is considered under the heading of the methodology of science. Philosophers of science generally agree that the actual practice of science does not follow an inductive pattern. Yet, the paradox of induction remains. Even so, this point is complicated by the fact that eminent philosophers, such as Karl Popper, have maintained that they have solved the paradox of induction by demonstrating that science does not employ induction. This is considered elsewhere..] One of the purposes of science is to make predictions — in other words to predict that past generalities will also apply in the future

#### Thus, the counter-standard is *consistency with solipsistic egoistic act hedonism utilitarianism.*

#### Prefer

#### 1] 1% risk of solipsism being true under util means that we are ethically obligated to egoism. If you are the only person that exists then the pleasure you experience is the sum total of pleasure of universe which means it definitely outweighs

Milan **Griffes, 20** [Milan Griffes, (Milan Griffes posts about ethics, contemplative practice, social phenomena, and interesting tidbits from things I'm reading.)]. "Average utilitarianism implies solipsistic egoism" (Tarsney 2020)." 4-29-2020, Accessed 12-19-2021. https://for um.effectivealtruism.org/posts/22TXQ5Ai6ix6k6XbT/link-average-utilitarianism-implies-solipsistic-egoism // Cho

Moreover, solipsistic swamping is just the limiting case of a more general phenomenon, viz., that when combined with standard expectational decision rules, average utilitarianism, variable value views, and rank-discounted utilitarianism all seem to over-weight small-population scenarios. For instance, consider an average utilitarian who assigns 1% credence to the hypothesis that the Universe will only ever contain 1020 welfare subjects, and 99% credence to the more optimistic hypothesis that advanced future civilizations will eventually support 1050 welfare subjects or more (Bostrom, 2013). The same absolute welfare improvement matters 1030 times more in the former scenario and therefore, discounting for her credence, matters 1028 times more in expectation. Thus, even though she is quite confident in the “optimistic” hypothesis, she should premise her choices almost entirely on the “pessimistic” hypothesis.11 More generally, she will end giving almost no practical weight to states that imply a very large population, even when those states are very probable. Apart from optimism about the future of humanity, such states might correspond to (i) hypotheses that attribute sentience to more beings, e.g., to insects, other invertebrates, or relatively simple artificial intelligences or (ii) cosmological hypotheses that imply that the Universe is very large and hence contains many nonEarth-originating welfare subjects (as well as exobiological hypotheses that imply a higher probability of welfare subjects emerging in a given star system). If we find this general phenomenon of “small-population swamping” counterintuitive, then ignoring small probabilities won’t help, since we cannot assume that small-population scenarios will always deserve de minimis probabilities. Maybe the conclusion to draw is that some population axiologies cannot be combined with standard decision theory, but must be equipped with their own, bespoke theories of decision-making under risk that avoid the tyranny of small population scenarios. It not immediately obvious what these decision theories should look like, and in departing from standard decision theory, they are likely to incur significant theoretical costs.12 But in any case, if we conclude that certain views. in population ethics cannot safely appeal to the best developed and most widely accepted theory of decision-making under risk, this on its own would be a notable conclusion. Absent some clever decision-theoretic escape, we are left with a conditional: If average utilitarianism, a variable value view, or rank-discounted utilitarianism is correct, then the best thing we can do, ex ante, to make the world a better place is to act selfishly (to greater or lesser extents, depending on the axiology). This leaves us, of course, with two further options: Reject all these axiologies, or embrace (de facto, impartially motivated) ethical egoism.

Table

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#### **2]** Darwinian dilemma – Evolution means we are all ethical egoists

Thayer 2000 Bradley A., Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense & Strategic Study, Missouri State University, International Security, 01622889, Fall2000, Vol. 25, Issue 2 “"Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics"

Evolutionary theory offers two sufficient explanations for the trait of egoism. The first is a classic Darwinian argument: In a hostile environment where resources are scarce and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others.[41] In times of danger or great stress, an organism usually places its life its survival--before that of other members of its group, be it pack, herd, or tribe. For these reasons, egoistic behavior contributes to fitness. Evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins's selfish gene theory provides the second sufficient explanation for egoism. A conceptual shift is required here because Dawkins's level of analysis is the gene, not the organism. As Dawkins explains, at one time there were no organisms, just chemicals in a primordial "soup."[42] At first, different types of molecules started forming by accident, including some that could reproduce by using the constituents of the soup--carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen. Because these constituents were in limited supply, molecules competed for them as they replicated. From this competition, the most efficient copy makers emerged. The process, however, was never perfect. Sometimes mistakes were made during replication, and occasionally these accidents resulted in more efficient replication or made some other contribution to fitness. One such mistake might have been the formation of a thin membrane that held the contents of the molecule together--a primitive cell. A second might have involved the division of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "survival machines." He explains, "The first survival machines probably consisted of nothing more than a protective coat. But making a living got steadily harder as new rivals arose with better and more effective survival machines. Survival machines got bigger and more elaborate, and the process was cumulative and progressive."[43] From a genetic perspective, there is no intentionality in this process, but it continued nonetheless because of evolution. Dawkins makes clear, however, that the interests of the gene and the organism need not coincide at different stages in an organism's life, particularly after reproduction.[44] In general, however, the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behavior spreads.

#### That negates

#### 1] Egoism means that theft and appropriation for self-interests are morally obligatory

Nobis summarizes egoism ND (The author doesn’t agree with egoism but explains what egoism would conclude in) [Nathan Nobis; Teaching Philosophy. 1000-Word Philosophy. Animals and Ethics 101; No Date; "Ethical Egoism"; 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology; https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/; 12-18-2021] //Miller

3.3. Egoism and Wronging Others for Your Own Gain Another objection takes us to the heart of the matter. Imagine this: Your credit card bill is due tonight, but you won’t be able to pay the full amount until next month, so you will be charged interest and a late fee. You just saw someone, however, accidentally leave their wallet on a park bench with a lot of cash hanging out of it. You saw where they went, but you could take the cash to pay the bill and nobody would ever know. Also, you know of an elderly person who always carries a lot of cash on their evening walk. You know you could rob them, pay your bill, certainly never get caught and then buy dinner at a fancy restaurant. If ethical egoism is true, not only can you permissibly take the wallet and rob someone, you must: not doing so would be wrong, since these crimes are in your self-interest. (If you’d feel guilty doing this, egoists respond that you shouldn’t since you’ve done nothing wrong on their view.) Many believe that, since actions like these are clearly wrong, this shows that egoism is false and the argument at 2.3 fails: egoism does not best explain our moral obligations even if we sometimes must do what’s best for ourselves. An egoist might respond that we are just assuming their theory is false: they don’t agree that we shouldn’t steal the wallet and refrain from assault.[5] But we aren’t “assuming” anything: we just have better reason to believe that assault for personal gain is wrong than that egoism is true. Recall that racists and sexists do not agree that their forms of discrimination are wrong either, but this doesn’t justify racism or sexism. People sometimes hold false moral views; this might be true of egoists.

Empirics flow Neg

Autry and Kwast 19 Greg Autry and Steve Kwast 8-22-2019 "America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China" (Greg Autry, a clinical professor of space leadership, policy, and business at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, and Steve Kwast)//Elmer

America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China The private sector can give the United States a much-needed rocket boost. The current U.S. space defense strategy is inadequate and on a path to failure. President Donald Trump’s vision for a Space Force is big enough. As he said on June 18, “It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.” But the Air Force is not matching this vision. Instead, the leadership is currently focused on incremental improvements to existing equipment and organizational structures. Dominating the vast and dynamic environment of space will require revolutionary capabilities and resources far deeper than traditional Department of Defense thinking can fund, manage, or even conceive of. Success depends on a much more active partnership with the commercial space industry— and its disruptive capabilities. U.S. military space planners are preparing to repeat a conflict they imagined back in the 1980s, which never actually occurred, against a vanished Soviet empire. Meanwhile, China is executing a winning strategy in the world of today. It is burning hard toward domination of the future space markets that will define the next century. They are planning infrastructure in space that will control 21st-century telecommunications, energy, transportation, and manufacturing. In doing so, they will acquire trillion-dollar revenues as well as the deep capabilities that come from continuous operational experience in space. This will deliver space dominance and global hegemony to China’s authoritarian rulers. Despite the fact that many in the policy and intelligence communities understand exactly what China is doing and have been trying to alert leadership, Air Force leadership has convinced the White House to fund only a slightly better satellite command with the same leadership, while sticking a new label onto their outmoded thinking. A U.S. Space Force or Corps with a satellite command will never fulfill Trump’s call to dominate space. Air Force leadership is demonstrating the same hubris that Gen. George Custer used in convincing Congress, over President Ulysses S. Grant’s better experience intuition, that he could overtake the Black Hills with repeating rifles and artillery. That strategy of technological overconfidence inflamed conflict rather than subduing it, and the 7th Cavalry were wiped out at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The West was actually won by the settlers, ranchers, miners, and railroad barons who were able to convert the wealth of the territory itself into the means of holding it. They laid the groundwork that made the 20th century the American Century and delivered freedom to millions of people in Europe and Asia. Of course, they also trampled the indigenous people of the American West in their wake—but empty space comes with no such bloody cost. The very emptiness and wealth of this new, if not quite final, frontier, however, means that competition for resources and strategic locations in cislunar space (between the Earth and moon) will be intense over the next two decades. The outcome of this competition will determine the fate of humanity in the next century. China’s impending dominance will neutralize U.S. geopolitical power by allowing Beijing to control global information flows from the high ground of space. Imagine a school in Bolivia or a farmer in Kenya choosing between paying for a U.S. satellite internet or image provider or receiving those services for free as a “gift of the Chinese people.” It will be of little concern to global consumers that the news they receive is slanted or that searches for “free speech” link to articles about corruption in Western democracies. Nor will they care if concentration camps in Tibet and the Uighur areas of western China are obscured, or if U.S. military action is presented as tyranny and Chinese expansion is described as peacekeeping or liberation. China’s aggressive investment in space solar power will allow it to provide cheap, clean power to the world, displacing U.S. energy firms while placing a second yoke around the developing world. Significantly, such orbital power stations have dual use potential and, if properly designed, could serve as powerful offensive weapons platforms. China’s first step in this process is to conquer the growing small space launch market. Beijing is providing nominally commercial firms with government-manufactured, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles they can use to dump launch services on the market below cost. These start-ups are already undercutting U.S. pricing by 80 percent. Based on its previous success in using dumping to take out U.S. developed industries such as solar power modules and drones, China will quickly move upstream to attack the leading U.S. launch providers and secure a global commercial monopoly. Owning the launch market will give them an unsurmountable advantage against U.S. competitors in satellite internet, imaging, and power. The United States can still build a strategy to win. At this moment, it holds the competitive advantage in every critical space technology and has the finest set of commercial space firms in the world. It has pockets of innovative military thinkers within groups like the Defense Innovation Unit, under Mike Griffin, the Pentagon’s top research and development official. If the United States simply protects the intellectual property its creative minds unleash and defend its truly free markets from strategic mercantilist attack, it will not lose this new space race. The United States has done this before. It beat Germany to the nuclear bomb, it beat the Soviet Union to the nuclear triad, and it won the first space race. None of those victories was achieved by embracing the existing bureaucracy. Each of them depended on the president of the day following the only proven path to victory in a technological domain: establish a small team with a positively disruptive mindset and empower that team to investigate a wide range of new concepts, work with emerging technologies, and test innovative strategies. Today that means giving a dedicated Space Force the freedom to easily partner with commercial firms and leverage the private capital in building sustainable infrastructure that actually reduces the likelihood of conflict while securing a better economic future for the nation and the world.

#### 2] We cognitively prefer the squo over pleasurable experiences

**Henderson 16,** Rob. 2016. “How Powerful Is Status Quo Bias?” Psychology Today. Retrieved April 19, 2019 (<https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/after-service/201609/how-powerful-is-status-quo-bias).//SS>

Status quo bias is a cognitive bias that explains our preference for familiarity. Many of us tend to resist change and prefer the current state of affairs. How powerful is this cognitive bias? Consider this thought experiment from the renowned philosopher, Robert Nozick: "Suppose there was an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Super-duper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel like you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Of course, while in the tank you won't know that you're there; you'll think that it's all actually happening. Would you plug into this machine for life?" For most of us, our intuition is to say no. We might say something like, “There is more to life than pleasure," and cite the importance of our relationships with loved ones and connection to reality. And perhaps that’s true. But consider this variant on the above proposal: "It is Saturday morning and you are planning to stay in bed for at least another hour when all of the sudden you hear the doorbell. Grudgingly, you step out of bed to go open the door. At the other side there is a tall man, with a black jacket and sunglasses, who introduces himself as Mr. Smith. He claims to have vital information that concerns you directly. Mildly troubled but still curious, you let him in. ‘‘I am afraid I have to some disturbing news to communicate to you’’ says Mr. Smith. ‘‘There has been a terrible mistake. Your brain has been plugged by error into an experience machine created by neurophysiologists. All the experiences you have had so far are n**othing but the product of a computer program** designed to provide you with pleasurable experiences. All the unpleasantness you may have felt during your life is just an experiential preface conducive toward a greater pleasure (e.g. like when you had to wait in that long line to get tickets for that concert, remember?). Unfortunately, we just realized that we made a mistake. You were not supposed to be connected; someone else was. We apologize. That’s why we’d like to give you a choice: **you can either remain** connected to this machine **(and we’ll remove the memories of this conversation taking place) or you can disconnect**. However, you may want to know that your life outside is not at all like the life you have experienced so far. What would you choose?" This question comes from an experiment by **Felipe De Brigard**, a researcher at Duke University, who challenged the intuitions many of us hold when we read the original happiness machine thought experiment. One might think that individuals, when faced with the choice between reality and simulation, would consider contact with reality to be critical and therefore a clear majority of people would opt to exit the machine. However, when De Brigard posed this question to participants and measured the responses, **he found** the opposite result. Among the respondents, **59 percent stated that they would prefer to remain connected to the machine**, while only 41 percent stated that they would prefer to disconnect. The result of this study has interesting implications for the way we think about our capacity for change and our preference for the familiar. **When individuals are faced with the choice to change their environment or remain in their current state of affairs**, even when the decision is between simulated familiarity and unknown reality, **most will choose the familiar**. It is likely that this is a form of risk aversion that is characteristic of status quo bias—that individuals averse to the risk of losing their current reality will choose to remain, even at the expense of living in real, rather than a virtual, reality. Research from Kahneman and Tversky suggests that losses are twice as psychologically harmful as gains are beneficial. In other words, individuals feel twice as much psychological pain from losing $100 as pleasure from gaining $100. One interpretation is that in order for an individual to change course from their current state of affairs is that the alternative must be perceived as twice as beneficial. This highlights the challenges we may face when considering a change to our usual way of doing things. When military members are considering their choices as their contract comes to an end, many consider re-enlisting simply because they are unaware of the many opportunities that exist for them. Even when we understand our current path is no longer beneficial or no longer makes us happy, we must still overcome the natural urge to stay on the path unless the alternative is sufficiently attractive. In order for us to readily pursue an alternate path, we must believe that the alternative is clearly superior to the current state of affairs. **The status quo effect is pervasive in both inconsequential and major decisions. Oftentimes we are held back by what we believe to be the safe option, simply because it is the default**. Bearing in mind our natural propensity for the status quo will enable us to recognize the allure of inertia and more effectively overcome it.

### 2

#### Interp – if the aff defends a nonresolutional plan that is extratopical, they do not get 1AR theory.

#### Violation – preemptive

#### 1] implementation is extra-t – “is” isn’t hypothetical and only the “present tense third-person singular of BE”.

That’s Merriam Webster [“is”. Merriam Webster. No Date. Accessed 12/17https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is //Xu]

#### 2] they spec PTD – the rez doesn’t have an actor or explicit plan and their aff also allows certain forms of appopriation

#### that’s a voting issue for limits and ground since they can tack on infinite different permutations of planks and add ons to the plan to solve for neg ground and das which hurts in depth clash and kills negative engagement

#### Prefer –

#### 1] self inflicted – the only reason that we might’ve been abusive was because we couldn’t engage the aff

#### 2] They get infinite prep time to choose every part of the aff changing the actor, action and moral evaluation which proves that every part of the aff should be defensible to substance.

#### 3] Clash – specificity is good only if engagement on the specifics happens

#### 1AR theory is drop the arg

#### 7 - 6 time skew

#### No 3nr, so 2ar gets to weigh however they want

#### Judge psychology – judges are more likely to by 2a arguments as they are the last speech

#### D. there’s no such thing as infinite abuse as nc only has 7 minutes

#### Evaluate Theory Debate after 2N not 2A

#### Reciprocity

#### A] The aff has both the 1AC and 1AR to make theory arguments while the neg also has Allowing the 2ar to respond or go for theory kills fairness by creating a 3:2 skew

#### B] 2AR on theory makes new arguments which forces intervention by creating new arguments on the flow so you shouldn’t flow it since it kills clash since I don’t have a 3nr.

#### Neg gets an RVI on 1AR theory if the neg didn’t read a shell:

#### [a] Reciprocity

#### [B] Friv Theory

#### [C] Norming

### 3

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted – there’s always an institutional DA to going through Congress b) ought[[1]](#footnote-1) means “moral obligation” so the lack of that obligation means the aff hasn’t fulfilled their burden c) resolved[[2]](#footnote-2) indicates “firmly determined” which means they proactively did something, to negate that means that they aren’t resolved d) permissibility can’t affirm since then anything would be ok which would justify racism – we should be safe and do nothing.

#### **Interp: if the aff reads a plan-text then they must concede that permissibility negates**

#### Infinite abuse – the aff could just defend an aff with zero offense and then just win on permissibility affirms.

#### Constitivsim – comparative worlds means presumption negates since the aff is not a good idea

#### Permissibility negates because if neither the squo nor aff are ethically viable

## Case

### 1NC – OV

#### Hedonism means that only pleasure is irrelevant – reject impacts that are based on pain.

#### 1] They have no justification for why pain is morally relevant. Blum is about dopamine chemicals in neocortices but they have no empirically analysis for why pain is part of the human biology

#### 2] Phenomenal conceptions are also morally relevant since analytically derived intrinsic truths aren’t empirically researched and collapse into their skep. That’s the distinction above from the 1nc ABOUT ANALYTICS VS SYNTHETIC NATURALISM

#### 3] Proves their framework negates since there is zero risk of something being immoral. Even if they win that actions that cause pleasure are just, they don’t have any synthetically derived truths about why pain or anything else is unjust.

### 1NC – AT: Blum Study

#### fMRI is unverifiable and prone to errors, outweighs since its worst at perceiving emotion

Looi 16 [Mun Keat Looi; Features Editor and journalist with 15 years experience in science writing, digital content, longform features, narrative storytelling; 7/30/16; "Thousands of neuroscience studies are flawed. So why aren’t neuroscientists freaking out?"; Quartz; https://qz.com/725746/a-deep-flaw-has-been-discovered-in-thousands-of-neuroscience-studies-so-why-arent-neuroscientists-freaking-out/; 12-18-2021] //Miller

\*\*\*fMRI = Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging

Modern neuroscience would be impossible without functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI. The technique is barely 25 years old, but thousands of studies that use it are published each year. When you see headlines such as “Vegetative state patients can respond to questions” or “This is your brain on writing,” you can be sure that fMRI was involved. Last week a new map of the brain based on fMRI scans was greeted as a “scientific breakthrough.” However, earlier this month, Anders Eklund, of Sweden’s Linköping University, published the latest in a series of papers showing a deep flaw in how researchers have been using fMRI. This flaw, Eklund and his colleagues believe, could ruin the results of as many as 16,500 neuroscience studies over the last 20 years. The findings have prompted debate and discussion among scientists. But, surprisingly, none of them is freaking out about the fact that two decades worth of understanding could be overturned. In fact, it turns out, the flaws in fMRI are a good example of how scientists are tackling one of the biggest problems the discipline is currently facing: that of making experiments reproducible. The dead fish that thought fMRI is a specialized form of MRI, an imaging technique that enables you to look inside the body without having to cut it open. The “functional” bit of fMRI is that it measures changes in blood flow, while ordinary MRI just maps the shapes of tissue. The more active a part of the brain is, the more blood flows to it. By watching which bits are active when someone performs certain tasks or experiences certain stimuli, neuroscientists make deductions about how the brain works. If you put a dead creature in an fMRI scanner, therefore, you should see nothing: Dead things don’t have any blood flow. But in 2009, some researchers put a dead salmon into an fMRI scanner, just to see what would happen. To their surprise parts of the brain lit up, as if the dead fish were ”thinking.” The reason is that MRI measurements aren’t straightforward to interpret. The signals are “noisy,” in the same way a distant radio station sounds noisy or fuzzy when you try to tune in. In fMRI, which looks for very subtle changes in the signals, the noise can nearly obscure the effect you’re looking for. So fMRI scanners rely heavily on software and statistical tests to eliminate background noise—the standard level of activity you’d see when nothing is happening. The trouble is, what is “standard” activity can vary from one object to another, or even from person to person. So these software packages and statistical tests have to make a lot of assumptions, and sometimes use shortcuts, in separating real activity from background noise. Because of this scientists expect a 5% rate of false positives—of the scanner showing something as brain activity when it is not. The dead salmon paper grabbed headlines and even won an IgNobel prize (a jokey annual award for “improbable research”), but it was really just one case of a false positive—”a funny illustration of what can go wrong if you don’t check your assumptions,” says Sam Schwarzkopf, an experimental psychologist at University College London. What Eklund’s studies have shown, however, is that the real rate of false positives can often be far higher than 5%. Seeing through the fog In their latest paper, Eklund and his colleagues studied data from 499 people in a resting state—scanned when they were doing nothing—and analyzed the readings using three commonly used software packages and settings. For one loose yet commonly used setting, the false positive rate was as much as 90%. Some brain regions were more prone to false positives than others; the posterior cingulate cortex, which is linked to emotion and memory, turned up more of them than any other region, no matter the program used. Eklund’s team estimate that anywhere between 3,500 and 16,500 papers using flawed fMRI methods have been published. You’d be forgiven for thinking neuroscience is facing a crisis. Yet when I contacted various scientists, there was no hint of panic. In fact, it seemed like this was quite normal. In part this is because the flaws in fMRI are not new. Studies that have found excessive false positives go back several years, and some of the problems have been known ever since fMRI was first developed 25 years ago. Each software package has a slightly different way of correcting for errors. Moreover, software can always be updated to improve it. Eklund says that in the time since he and his colleagues first released their findings last December on ArXiv (a site where scientists publish versions of papers awaiting peer review), one of the three packages they tested has been amended (pdf) via a software update, while the team behind another published a comment (pdf) agreeing with some of Eklund’s points but stating that the “flawed” methods are still useful to scientists. However, the Eklund study does point at a much bigger problem facing science: how it deals with the fact that a certain proportion of studies are always flawed. Rinse, repeat Science depends on the idea of reproducibility: that other scientists should be able to do the same experiment as you and get the same results. In principle, a finding doesn’t become part of the canon of scientific knowledge until it’s been reproduced several times. If it can’t be, it is weeded out. That’s the theory. But in fact science as a whole is facing a reproducibility crisis. Scientists don’t have much funding or professional incentive to repeat previous studies, and when they do, many studies have proven impossible to replicate. That means a lot of published findings may be wrong but remain unchallenged. This is true of fMRI studies in particular. Though the cost of fMRI has fallen, a scan can still cost at least $600 an hour to run, and funding for repeating previous studies can be hard to come by. This problem might be alleviated by letting neuroscientists see raw data from other studies, so they can check the results without the cost of doing their own scans. The trouble is that researchers—in neuroscience as in many other disciplines—also tend to keep their data to themselves. They publish just the brain images but not the underlying measurements that made them, and don’t disclose the version of software they used. (This isn’t deliberate secrecy, it’s just the way things have always been done.) Nor are there standard protocols for how long researchers should keep their original datasets. In the early days of fMRI storage was expensive, so it’s unlikely data were kept. That means past studies can’t be reanalyzed even if someone could get the funding to do it. The good news is that neuroscience is also leading the way in fixing the problem of reproducibility. After the dead salmon paper came out, scientists corrected for the flaws it showed up—in their IgNobel speech the researchers said that the number of people using the incorrect methods had gone from 40% down to 10%. “In many ways fMRI scientists lead the field in the application of new statistical methods and best practices,” says Micah Allen, a neuroscientist at University College London, adding that websites like Neurovault, which allow easy sharing of data, are growing in rapid popularity. And Schwarzkopf says that over so many years, any really key findings from fMRI studies have likely been re-tested, some using newer and more accurate methods. False findings would have crumbled and been swept away, as they are supposed to. This is why neuroscientists are not in despair. Eklund’s discovery doesn’t mean fMRI is useless, just that it needs to be used better. And that is what they are now striving to do.

#### Brain scan evidence is seriously flawed but corruption and journalistic incentives result in dishonest and overconfident reports.

Bell 12 [(Vaughn, contributor to The Observer; cites Edward Vul and Hal Pashler, University of California researchers; Anders Eklund from Linköping University in Sweden; Tal Yarkoni, a neuroscientist at the University of Colorado Psychologist; and psychologist Russ Poldrack, from the University of Texas) “The trouble with brain scans” The Observer, 26 May 2012] AT CHO Recut

But now neuroscientists have had to come to terms with the fact that many of the methods on which brain scan studies are based have been flawed. To understand where these flaws come from it's important to know something about how data from the most common technique, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging or fMRI, is analysed. The scanner creates a 3D map of the brain split up into tens of thousands of tiny blocks called voxels (like pixels but for volume) and each has a value that describes blood flow – used as a proxy for brain activity as more active areas need more oxygen. What you want to know is which bits of the brain are more active in certain tasks. Of course, [but] the brain is changing all the time so scientists use statistics to check that changes in blood flow are due to the experimental tasks and not because of unrelated brain changes. The statistical problem is huge, however, as each scan has about 50,000 data points and thousands of scans are made in a single study. When we're talking about millions of comparisons[.], a big problem is false positives. Imagine you are playing two roulette wheels. Clearly, the result of one doesn't affect the outcome of the other but sometimes they'll both come up with the same number just due to chance. Now imagine you have a roulette wheel for every point or voxel in the brain. A comparison of any two scans could look like some areas show linked activity when really there is no relationship. Ideally, the analysis should separate roulette wheels from genuine activity, but you may be surprised that hundreds if not thousands of studies have been conducted without such corrections. To illustrate the problem, Craig Bennett and his colleagues at the University of California did a spoof experiment on a dead salmon. The standard techniques showed "brain activity" in the deceased fish. Further illustrating the issue, Edward Vul and Hal Pashler from the University of California showed that some researchers were producing conclusions by first picking out the best results and then seeing if there was a relationship between them. To return to our roulette analogy, it would be like discarding any results that weren't in the range of numbers 1-5 and then using only these selected results to see if any of the same numbers came up, something that is suddenly much more likely. A recent study by Anders Eklund and colleagues from Linköping University in Sweden found that they could find spurious "brain activity" related to non-existent tasks with standard settings on the most popular fMRI analysis software. Recent advances have tried to control these problems but researchers have become much more cautious. "Our default attitude to any new and interesting fMRI finding should be scepticism," says Tal Yarkoni, a neuroscientist at the University of Colorado. "What's particularly problematic," he says, "is the amount of flexibility researchers have when performing their analyses… you have no idea how many things the researchers tried before they got something to work." Psychologist Russ Poldrack, from the University of Texas, who has been at the forefront of correcting these issues, also highlights cultural issues. This flexible approach "also includes methods that are known by experts to be invalid, but unfortunately these still get into top journals, which only helps perpetuate them". Yarkoni explains that "researchers have a big incentive to come up with exciting new findings", meaning scientists are motivated to "torture" the data and journals are attracted by the media-friendly results

#### Takes out Blum – the main reference for the study is based on fMRI research Blum did prior to the paper releasing and the brain scans Blum uses for the article they cite is based on the same flawed analysis

Blum et al. 14 [Kenneth Blum; Department of Psychiatry& McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida, College of Medicine, Gainesville, Florida, USA; Yijun Liu; Department of Psychiatry& McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida, College of Medicine, Gainesville, Florida, USA; Wei Wang; Department of Radiology, Tangdu Hospital, Fourth Military Medical University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China; Yarong Wang; Department of Radiology, Tangdu Hospital, Fourth Military Medical University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China; Yi Zhang; School of Life Science and Technology, Xidian University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710071, China; Marlene Oscar-Berman; Department of Psychiatry, Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, MA, USA; Andrew Smolen; Institute for Behavioral genetics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO. USA; Marcelo Febo; Department of Psychiatry& McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida, College of Medicine, Gainesville, Florida, USA; David Han; Department of Management Science and Statistics, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio Texas, USA; Thomas Simpatico; Department of Psychiatry, Human Integrated Services Unit, University of Vermont Center for Clinical & Translational Science, College of Medicine, Burlington Vermont, USA; Frans J Cronjé; University of Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa; Zsolt Demetrovics; Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest, Hungary; Mark S. Gold; Department of Psychiatry& McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida, College of Medicine, Gainesville, Florida, USA; 12/16/14; "rsfMRI effects of KB220Z™ on Neural Pathways in Reward Circuitry of Abstinent Genotyped Heroin Addicts"; PubMed Central (PMC); https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4979602/; 12-18-2021] //Miller

METHODS IRB and Subjects The experimental protocol was approved by Institutional Review Board of the Fourth Military University, China. Ten abstinent male heroin-dependent patients (HDP, right handed, age 33 ± 7.57 years, range 20–44 years) were enrolled from a local inpatient treatment research facility. All subjects signed an informed consent. All HDP volunteers met DSM-IV criteria for heroin dependence. They regularly used cigarettes and denied any psychotropic agent in the 3 months before fMRI scan. All HDP had a confirmed diagnosis of heroin dependency with mean abstinence from heroin of 16.0 ±7.91 months (range 3–24 months), a negative test for morphine in urine analysis (reagent box produced by China Carrie City International Engineering Co.), and a negative HIV blood test. None of the HDP had a history of neurological illness or injury other than drug addiction. None of the subjects were taking psychoactive prescription drugs within 1 week of the fMRI. None of the subjects were previously exposed to a high magnetic field (Table 1).

#### **AND the part of their study that proves pleasure circuitry is from animals and your author says its not comparable to humans – I’ll read blue**

Blum et al. 18 Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/>, R.S.

Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42].

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45].

Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations.

Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50]

In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders.

In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS.

Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

### 1NC – AT: Moral Realism

#### Even if they are right about the byproduct hypothesis, synthetic naturalism means it’s impossible to know whether we’ve been able to discover moral truths

#### 1] Lions derive hedonic value out of violently killing and eating their prey alive which is also how they survived which means either morality is the same as doing what is evolutionary advantageous or we aren’t able to ascertain natural moral properties.

#### 2] The human brain undergoes evolution at changes in structure which proves that the brain is malleable.

Blum Recut Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/>, R.S. CHO Recut

Sousa et al. [[50](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R50)] also found differences in much older areas, including an ancient structure called the cerebellum. Accordingly, an ancient part of the human brain seems to have very recent change. It will take years to understand more fully what all the changes mean, but this finding could eventually help divulge what makes the human brain unique, and even what goes wrong in a range of brain disease states. The role of dopamine in brain function has been well established throughout many decades of research and merited the Nobel Prize in 2000. Continued work by one of us (KB) and the late Ernest P. Noble, showed the role of dopamine genetics in severe alcoholism. Also work by Mark Gold and Charles Dackis with regard to the “dopamine depletion hypothesis” and cocaine, as well the work of Elman et al. on both RDS and anti-reward, suggest the real need for balancing brain dopamine to induce homeostasis [[53](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R53)–[56](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R56)]. The new findings by Sousa et al., [[50](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R50)] also call for the importance of dopamine homeostasis through genetic addiction risk (GARS) testing and Pro-dopamine regulation (KB220PAM), as pointed out by Gold and associates many years ago [[57](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R57)–[59](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/#R59)]. While we applaud the elegant work of Berridge and associates in disentangling pleasure from incentive salience and learning signals in brain reward circuitry in animal models, new consideration especially as it relates to humans is required.

#### Implications A] Means that the dynamic brain changing means that there are no natural facts that our brain can discover B] Science fails because an evolving brain means that we can never truly understand the a posteriori brain since studies are retroactive conclusions that are analyzed post-hoc

### 1NC – Paterson

#### This is based on analytic naturalism and is deontological – its irrelevant under the meta-ethic cuz they are saying its an ipso facto naturalism claim that hasn’t been tested by science

#### Neuroscience fails to discover naturalistic truths and can’t explain near death experiences

Klinghoffer 20 [David Klinghoffer; Senior Fellow at Discovery Institute and the editor of Evolution News & Science Today; 6/4/20; "Neuroscientist: Neuroscience “Is a Failure”"; Evolution News; https://evolutionnews.org/2020/06/neuroscientist-neuroscience-is-a-failure/; 12-18-2021] //Miller

Despite cries of “Follow the science!” and “Listen to the science!” it’s healthy to be reminded of the limits to what science can tell us. Often, those limits come into play in their starkest form when the focus is on the issues that matter to us most. The topics in science that are best understood tend to be of more modest significance for our lives. As an example, public health science has flailed in its response to the coronavirus, the subject on everyone’s mind at the moment. Evolutionary science flails (even as it denies doing so) in answering the ultimate question anyone can ask: How did we, as complex biological beings, come to be here? The Mandate of Naturalism The pattern holds when it comes to another profound concern: What lies on the other side of dying? Neuroscience has sought to beat back the reality of reports pointing to an existence beyond death. Near death experiences (NDE) violate the mandate of naturalism: everything must be explained in material terms, which is impossible to do if an immaterial soul can separate from the body. At Mind Matters, however, neurosurgeon and neuroscientist Michael Egnor explains that accounts of NDEs can’t be explained in any strict materialist fashion. Individuals in NDEs may return with perceptions of what was going on around them when they were “dead” or near-dead that their own physical senses could not have captured. Nor are the experiences like states of intoxication, where weird things are also reported. With NDEs, memory is enhanced not blunted. There are other reasons for thinking that these experiences involve a genuine out-of-body journey. As Dr. Egnor notes, NDEs have been reported across cultures and down through history, and are not more common among people whose faith tradition prompts them to expect a life after death. So this can’t be mere confirmation bias. “Digging in the Wrong Spot” Egnor notes the remarkable failure of neuroscience to explain not just NDEs but the entire relationship between the brain and mind: It is as if cosmology had failed to tell us anything meaningful about the universe; or medical science failed to tell us anything about health and disease; or geology failed to tell us anything about rocks. Neuroscience has told us nothing — nothing — about how the brain gives rise to the mind. The Hard Problem, after two centuries of neuroscience and a vast trove of data, remains utterly unsolved. Philosopher Roger Scruton (1944–2020) famously described neuroscience as “a vast collection of answers with no memory of the questions.” It seems reasonable to attribute this abject failure of neuroscience — and neuroscience is a failure (how many other scientific disciplines have utterly failed to explain the salient phenomenon of the system they study?) — to the rigid materialist bias of its practitioners. If you’ve been digging in the same spot for centuries and haven’t found the treasure, maybe you’ve been digging in the wrong spot. The scientific challenge is to explain NDE’s, not to explain them away. Read the rest of Mind Matters. Materialism has the same problem with other profound questions we wonder about. Egnor asks, “How many other scientific disciplines have utterly failed to explain the salient phenomenon of the system they study?” I can think of one. In the context of evolution, you could reformulate his final sentence this way: “The scientific challenge is to explain the infusions of information in life’s history, the marvelous jumps and discontinues in the fossil record, the ultimate biological discontinues in the origin of life and in the origin of our species, not to explain these things away.” Evolutionary science, like neuroscience, will take a great step forward when everyone can agree that its mission is to explain, not explain away.

#### Death is irrelevant – Lazarus reflex proves synthetic pleasure is achievable in corpses.

Borreli quotes Mann 14 [Lizette Borreli (writer, a film critic and a sports enthusiast based in New York City. She received her BA in Media Studies from CUNY Hunter College) quotes Stephanie Mann (brain death expert). The Big 'O': 10 Facts About Orgasms That Will Blow Your Mind”. Medical Daily. Sep 29, 2014. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://www.medicaldaily.com/big-o-10-facts-about-orgasms-will-blow-your-mind-305460> //Xu]

Science can agree there is orgasm after death. Spinal reflexes can be triggered in dead people, a certain kind of dead person, however: a beating-heart cadaver. This is someone who is brain-dead, or legally dead, but they’re being kept alive on a respirator so that their organs will be oxygenated for transplantation. If you trigger the right spot, you will notice a reflex called the Lazarus reflex. “Yes, if the sacral nerve is being oxygenated, you conceivably could,” Stephanie Mann, brain death expert, told Roach, regarding whether you can conceivably trigger an orgasm in a dead person.

#### Extinction doesn’t destroy future generations – humans didn’t originally exist and evolved instead out of microorganisms which proves live can always exist

#### Death causes euphoria – brain studies.

Stromberg 13 [Joseph Stromberg (Internal Medicine resident UNC-Chappell Hill via BUMedicine. Former science writer at Smithsonian). “A Last-Second Surge of Brain Activity Could Explain Near-Death Experiences”. Smithsonian. August 12, 2013. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/a-last-second-surge-of-brain-activity-could-explain-near-death-experiences-28726479/> //Xu]

The Michigan team, led by neurologist Jimo Borjigin, took a very different approach to examining these episodes. They sought to use electroencephalography (EEG, a technique that measures electrical activity among different areas of the brain) to track what exactly goes on in the seconds after the heart stops pumping blood, or the lungs stop taking in oxygen.Of course, they couldn’t do this with human subjects, so they subjected lab rats to what seems to be a pretty gruesome experience in the name of science: They anesthetized nine rats and forcibly induced cardiac arrest, causing the rodents’ hearts to stop pumping blood, while they monitored brain activity with an EEG. They found that, in all nine rats, brain activity continued for roughly 30 seconds after the animals’ blood stopped pumping. The activity persisted in all six regions of the brain they monitored, and gradually declined over the course of the 30 seconds before disappearing. Although the team had predicted they’d find some activity, “we were surprised by the high levels,” George Mashour, a co-author, said in a press statement. “At near-death, many known electrical signatures of consciousness exceeded levels found in the waking state, suggesting that the brain is capable of well-organized electrical activity during the early stage of clinical death.” To see whether this activity was caused by something specific about cardiac arrest in particular—say, the experience of pain—they also suffocated other rats while measuring their brain activity. They found virtually the same patterns of data, indicating that the activity is inevitably generated by the brain in the final moments before it shuts down. In both cases, many characteristics of the brain activity correlated with the activity they’d measured earlier in the rats when they were fully conscious. The clear implication is that these rats may have been going through their own near-death experiences in the lab, just before dying. If these same patterns of brain activity occur in humans just after cardiac arrest—something that will be difficult to determine, given the problems of hooking up people to EEGs while they’re being resuscitated—it could go a long way toward explaining why humans have out-of-body experiences when they near death without the need to invoke souls or the afterlife. Just as the activity in our brains during the REM stages of sleep accounts for the experience of dreaming, this data could account for the sensation of continuing awareness after clinical death. Other researchers have previously speculated about physiological explanations for the other typical descriptions of near-death experiences. It’s been documented that when people faint, for example, the loss of blood flow to the brain can generate a narrowing of the field of vision—perhaps explaining the tunnel often described in their memories. The release of epinephrine and other chemicals in the brain during moments of stress, meanwhile, could account for the sense of euphoria.

1. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://www.google.com/search?q=resolved+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=resolved+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57.2078j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)