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#### Subjectivity is defined through self-reflection- the confrontation with disability leads to ego death in primary pity, which necessitates secondary pity in an attempt to exclude disability, which renders disability as ontologically dead.

#### **Their premise is that we should never try to understand the other through alteriority. Primary pity means we will always reduce people who are disabled as an object of pity.**

**Mollow 15**[Anna Mollow(Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar, UC Dissertation-Year Fellow, coeditor of Sex and Disability and the co-editor of DSM-CRIP). “The Disability Drive.” University of California at Berkeley. Pg 85-88. Spring 2015. Accessed 3/6/20. <https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf> //Recut Houston Memorial DX from BL]

Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; 74 such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman‟s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one‟s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers‟s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego‟s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person‟s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud‟s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body‟s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity‟s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else‟s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture‟s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people‟s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity‟s incursions, reinforces the ego‟s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud‟s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud‟s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual‟s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person‟s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability‟s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people‟s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism‟s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject‟s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject‟s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one‟s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud‟s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud‟s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I‟d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable.

**Levinas's emphasis on speech as the vector for communicating ethical thought is a form of communicative violence premised on exclusion of the disabled**

**Pierre 15** [Bracketed for crip to disabled. Joshua St. Pierre (BA in humanities from Briercrest College, Master of Arts in philosophy from the University of Alberta). “Cripping Communication: Speech, Disability, and Exclusion in Liberal Humanist and Posthumanist Discourse.” Communication Theory. Vol 25, Issue 3. Pages 330-348. 3/31/15. Accessed 8/29/20. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/comt.12054> // Houston Memorial DX]

John Durham Peters has argued that “communication” is a modern invention, stirred by the late 19th century anxieties of isolation and longings for unmediated connection (2000). But while the elusive dream of forging minds together through signs and semantics may be an endemically modern problem, speech has long been a human problem. In particular, performing speech, like performing “the human,” is a risky affair with exclusionary consequences. Oral speech has occupied a dignified position within the humanist lineage, shaping central questions of what it means to be human, imbued with the power to persuade others, serve human affairs, and articulate truth; yet, this pedigree has come at a high cost: the exclusion of voices not deemed rational and intelligible. I propose bringing a disabled, or a crip, analysis to bear on speech communication within humanism and posthumanism. Focusing on the disabled speaker, I accordingly argue that the exclusion of nonnormative voices within liberal humanism results from a tension between the conception of speech as rational and universal, and its embodied particularity that erodes any claim to universality. As the sine qua non of rational human subjectivity, speech is an esteemed, yet volatile, performance that can easily go wrong. Rather than owning up to the necessarily embodied and unstable mediation of human identity, liberal humanism defers the tension immanent within speech by excluding nonnormative and disabled voices, judging them against what I term the “universal speaker,” in a Sisyphean attempt to shore up and contain the boundaries of the human. The ultimately futile movement to free rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principle mode of communication. Pursuing the stuttered trajectory of “rational discourse” in liberal humanism to its disembodied form of “information” in posthumanism, I suggest that speech is largely absent in posthumanist discourse not only because of the incongruity of speech with emerging models of information seemingly free from context, but perhaps more importantly because these discourses assume autoaffectivity and preclude [disabled]crip voices from analysis. Like its humanist predecessor, and contrary to much of its rhetoric, posthumanism shows signs of structural exclusion dependent on having the right sort of informational body: malleable and flexible. Tony Davis insists that “All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. . . . Their embrace suffocates those it does not ignore” (2008, p. 141). While this may ultimately place disabled voices within good company, it remains worrisome that the silencing itself has been largely underrepresented and untheorized. Even disciplines such as communication studies and disability studies, devoted to unearthing genealogies, articulating phenomenological structures, and exploring subaltern modes of existing together, have not paid enough attention to disabled speech. While these disciplines have had very little, if any, contact so far, they have much to offer each other. By bringing these two disciplines into dialogue and writing from disability, I propose that the disabled speaker is perhaps the cyborg par excellence, eschewing communicative purity, autonomy, and self-mastery. The disabled speaker can be employed to critique the latent ableism within humanist and posthumanist discourse, and communication theory more generally, while offering new modes of thinking about posthuman communication as an embodied activity based on noise, relationality, and reciprocity.1 Liberal humanism and speech Liberal humanism is a broad-based political and intellectual emergence within the Enlightenment, which gained full ascendency in the 19th and 20th centuries, valuing “open and undogmatic inquiry, freedom of the individual conscience” and aiming for a “respect for social justice, social and psychological utility, decency, [and] liberality” (Coates & White, 1970, p. 447). At its center, liberal humanism is a marriage between the long humanist tradition and liberal ideals: a dual commitment to “man” and “freedom.” However, in its effort to secure “man” as a completely autonomous being, liberal humanism must first transcend group differences and generalize attributes of humanity in a movement of essentialization. What defines a human in this tradition is accordingly not accidental attributes— for example race, gender, age—but the possession of rationality. The liberal subject, as Katherine Hayles has observed, identifies the self with the rational mind merely in possession of a body (1999, p. 4).This move is unquestionably overdetermined, yet can in large measure be traced back through Cartesian rationalism to the Discourse on the Method. Asserting the cogito, Descartes writes: from this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is solely to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this ‘I’— that is, the soul by which I am what I am—is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist (2009, p. 36, emphasis added). Distinct from the body and free from context, the existence of the rational “I” stands above the historical moment. While Descartes himself is not the brash dualist so often presumed, the methodological distinction between res extensa and res cogitans nevertheless sets the stage for the humanist erasure of embodiment that carries through into posthumanism. Compared to the axiomatically derived self-evidence of the rational self, the body is deemed epistemically untrustworthy, accidental, and historical. Transcribed through liberal humanism, this binary conceives the subject as an inner and universal rationality possessing an external and particular body. The liberal subject emerges as autonomous and unitary, yet as interior, in need of externalizing his/her social and political nature. It is here that speech takes on a significant, yet surprisingly underrepresented, role within liberal humanist discourse. In 1923, H. Wildon Carr, a former president of the Aristotelian Society, argued that the very idea of reason requires discourse because reason is an activity directed outwards. “The origin of speech,” said Carr, “is in the nature of human mentality. Reason in its human form would not and could not exist without speech” (1923–1924, p. 97). A similar position is taken up more recently by Frank E. X. Dance and Carl E. Larson who have contended that speech communication is a pedagogical initiation into humanity. “Speech communication,” they write, “functions so importantly in the life of a human being that the understanding and study of speech communication are at the very core of a liberal education” (1972, p. 6). Toeing the party line, Dance and Larson have maintained that speech communication has three functions: (a) linking the individual with his environment, (b) developing higher mental processes, and (c) regulating behavior (1972, p. 64). Speech is an enactment of reason and therefore of human identity, since “evolutionarily speaking, the hand is shaped by the labor in which it engages, man’s interiority simultaneously shapes and is shaped by speech communication” (1972, p. 71). For Carr, Dance, and Larson, then, speech is an extension of rationality, belonging not to the body, but to the articulation and formation of reason. The liberal humanist assessment of speech exemplified by Carr, Dance, and Larson relies on an ambiguity and slippage between the rational interior and embodied exterior. Speech is given in liberal humanism as a mode of rationality, yet the body is also needed for the enactment of speech. This duality raises troubling questions regarding the boundaries of reason and the self. Does speech modulate from a form of rationality to a conditional act as it passes through the lips? Where does the universal reason stop and contingent embodiment begin? While speech, mediating the threshold between the public and private and the universal and accidental, can be understood as the sine qua non of the liberal humanist subject, it simultaneously occupies an ambiguous position. This ambiguity translates as a fundamental instability in the rational self’s identity and boundary that can be detailed through the voice, chiastically hinging language and the body. The voice is dually constituted by the phonological and the phonetic: the meaning laden, immaterial aspect of the phoneme and its material, auditory support. While the existence of the phonological depends upon the phonetic (however short-lived its existence), the logic of phonocentrism permeating liberal humanism systematically obscures the phonetic as the trace of embodiment. “Requiring the intervention of no determinate surface in the world, being produced in the world as pure auto-affection, [the voice],” explains Derrida, “is a signifying substance completely at our disposition. For the voice meets no obstacle to its emission in the world precisely because it is produced as pure auto-affection” (1973, p. 79). This dominant tradition understands the phonetic, embodied aspect of the voice to be utterly passive and invisible, and thus “the voice” comes from within, circumventing the body, and directly expresses interiority. Yet, tying the signifier to the body, the voice is not so easily divorced from its embodied source. Somewhat overstated by the dysfluent speaker, the phonetic aspect of the voice often does not self-effacingly recede once the phonological function has been dutifully carried out, but rather lingers and stretches, drawing attention to itself and threatening to subvert its linguistic purpose. The voice of one who has cerebral palsy, for example, is decidedly not at his/her complete disposition precisely because the body obtrudes its continuous emission into the world. The conception of the voice as pure auto-affection can be maintained only by abstracting speech from lived experience. I accordingly argue that the rational human materializes himself through the voice precariously; the slippage is manifested both phonetically and affectively. Mladen Dolar (2006) contends that even though the phonetic voice does not contribute to meaning and is therefore inconspicuous when the semantic operation of speech is “properly” carried out, there is always something leftover, whether accent, individuality, or other tonal qualia. The role assigned to the remainder of the voice by Dolar is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, the remainder is an obstruction overcome when one becomes adjusted to a different accent, for example, and can focus simply upon the intended meaning. The voice in this regard is simply an impediment to the communicative operation of language. Yet on the other hand, Dolar notes that a voice devoid of any remainder would conflate with mechanical iterability and thus lose its human characteristic: Paradoxically, it is the mechanical voice which confronts us with the object voice, its disturbing and uncanny nature, whereas the human touch helps us keep it at bay. The obstacle it appears to present actually enhances the sense-making effect; the seeming distraction contributes to the better fulfillment of the goal (2006, p. 22). The phonetic side effect of the voice enables its recognizability and identification as a human voice. Implicit here is the narrow phonetic line sheltering the human voice in between the mechanical and noise—between merely iterating signifiers and chaotic distraction. At far ends of the spectrum, voices of intellectually disabled people are often read as subhuman at best, while voices with no inflection can be read as eerily mechanical or computerized. Depicting the former phenomenon, a vitriolic letter was recently sent to the caretaker of an autistic boy, in which the anonymous author complained, “You selfishly put your kid outside every day and let him be nothing but a nuisance and a problem to everyone else with that noise polluting whaling [sic] he constantly makes! That noise he makes when he is outside is DREADFUL [sic] . . . It scares the hell out of my normal children! . . . Do the right thing and move or euthanize him!” (“Hateful Letter,” 2013). This instance is repugnant and likely not representative in degree. However, inasmuch as speech and reason are tightly correlated through the linguistic function of the voice, performing the voice in any way that strays beyond codified vocalic boundaries and unsettles the effortless production of meaning calls into question the rationality of the performer “behind” the voice. More moderately disabled voices, like the stuttering voice, are in this regard not outright rejected as a signifying voice like the voices of the (presumed) intellectually disabled. However, recognition can nevertheless be denied in degree. The failure to signify in a quotidian manner results in a desperate struggle for the disabled voice to maintain a uniform performance of reason if the speaker wishes to be afforded the privileges of full participation given to those deemed rational. Speaking as a rational human is a delicate performance that can easily go sideways. The knife-edge of human vocality is honed even finer by taking into account normalized vocal affectivity. Joshua Gunn (2010) has argued that the affective power of the voice is culturally policed because it is fundamentally public; the phonetic aspect of the voice generates “public feelings” that communicate on their own accord. Rhetorical training aims to tame this affective power to match, support, and enliven the semiotic character of the voice. However, citing the public anxiety around “uncontrolled speech” that transgresses vocal norms, Gunn points out how easily the affective force can go awry, so much that he claims “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Gunn references the grunting of female tennis players and the unintentional yelps of politicians; yet, it would be helpful here to widen his observation of uncontrolled speech to include such voices as those belonging to the transgendered and the disabled.These voices accentuate the volatile affective power of the voice and the tenuous hold we possess over our bodies. As I have argued elsewhere, “In failing to live up to the ideals set by liberal individualism and capitalism, [dysfluent voices] act as a reminder of the fragile mastery we have of our bodies and of the social downturn that quickly follows the failure to uphold and project this ideal of mastery.” (2012, p. 16). The anxiety-riddled demand for control in public speech arises precisely because the affective power of speech exists in a metastable relation to the body. Rational speech, dispassioned, and disembodied, may at any moment be ruptured and must thus be constantly surveilled and managed. Articulating and simultaneously threatening to occlude rational human identity, the voice thus bears the full weight of the humanist anxiety concerning borders and membership. The “proper” performance of speech is accordingly strongly patrolled within liberal humanist discourse. The universal speaker Iris Young casts the liberal subject in his/her political context, arguing for a conception of “universal citizenship.” In her assessment, the liberal subject transcends his/her self-interested particularity through public discussion and decision making by which private interests can agree on a common good (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen is therefore homogenized, as “citizenship is an expression of the universality of human life; it is a realm of rationality and freedom as opposed to the heteronomous realm of particular need, interest, and desire” (1989, p. 253). The universal citizen transcends differences threatening impartiality and equality by essentializing himself or herself and projecting that self into the politicized public sphere. If to be truly human in liberal humanist discourse is to exercise autonomous reason, and if speaking realizes oneself as a rational and social agent within the public sphere, then having a voice has direct bearing on the universal citizen—so much so that I believe it possible to conceive of what might be termed a “universal speaker.” Because speech plays a pivotal role in the realization of the self as a rational agent, then if one is to speak, he/she must speak in a way that defends the universality of autonomous reason against embodied and historical particularity. Furthermore, the universal speaker, like the universal citizen, must be marked by impartiality. As stated by Young, “impartial reason aims to adopt a point of view outside concrete situations of action, a transcendental ‘view from nowhere’ that carries the perspective, attributes, character, and interests of no particular subject or set of subjects” (1990, p. 100). From this façade of impartiality, it is only a small step to judge who does and does not speak impartially and thereby qualifies as rational and human. To speak as a truly rational agent requires that one speak from nowhere and everywhere, becoming an invisible medium for communication. The universal speaker is a powerful homogenizing trope, for it defines what type of speech production is natural, who gets the right to speak, what speech needs to be taken seriously, and what speech gets to be heard at all. If one is to speak with agency or efficacy, one must speak in the right way; hence the burden within this tradition is to find and retain the “right voice.” In Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream, for example, Carl Elliott (2004) notes an anxiety in the struggle of transgendered people to match gendered vocal norms, the accent-reduction clinics in the American south, and the difficult adjustment of disabled speakers to voice synthesizers. At the heart of liberal humanism’s claim to universality and equality, an ugly structure of exclusion of those who are not “universal” shows itself, an exclusion that I argue results from the tension between (a) the desire to conceive of oral communication as rational/universal and (b) the embodied particularity of speech that threatens to undermine its universality. For while speech is peddled as a rational, universal, and nonspatial medium within liberal humanism, the particularity of embodied speech casts a threatening shadow over this claim. Returning to the example of the stuttering voice, Marc Shell argues that having the “right voice” is a necessary sign of membership to a particular group of persons. If you cannot speak, he wryly explains, you are likely not human. If you can somewhat speak you may be human, and if you cannot speak in my particular way, you do not belong to my tribe (2005, p. 50). For the stutterer, however, “all words are test words, passwords, or catchphrases whereby one gains or loses social acceptance or credibility. . . . The concern is not his inability to pronounce some word or phrase fast enough; it is one’s ability to say any word fluently in any language” (2005, p. 51). Shell is quite clearly stating the boundary conditions of the universal speaker. However, just as the vocal markers of ethnic boundaries are contingent, historical, and laden with colonial power, so can the supposed universality of rational human speech be unraveled. Disability studies convincingly challenge the pathologization of individual bodies by articulating the sociocultural structures of ableism that normalize and exclude certain forms of human variation.2 “Disability” is no more self-evident, natural, or stable a concept than “able-bodiedness”: Both are understood through disability studies as a function of contingent sociocultural anxieties and oppressions. Disability circumscribes the human by negation. Following in this vein, we might likewise fray the boundaries of the universal speaker by deterritorializing disabled speech. Consider again Gunn’s claim that “within speech is always a tacit threat of the loss of control” (2010, p. 189). Ubiquitous stutters and vocalic gaffes occur to everyone on a daily basis precisely because communication is fundamentally unstable: the act of carving out meaning from indeterminacy and noise as opposed to a pure and rational articulation of Being. The so-called disabled speech permeates all speech. The delimitation of the disabled speaker is thus necessarily arbitrary: the construction of a deviant and pathologized Other to prop up the universal speaker. More specifically, pathologization individuates “nonrational” speech production and thereby maintains and polices the public/private divide. Disabled speech is conceived as a private affair marked by particularity and embodiedness, while the rational speech of the universal citizen belongs to the public realm. Yet, resituating disability as a distinctly public structure of oppression unmasks “universality” as simply the norms of unmarked and dominant groups. What counts as a particular and impartial voice is a function of conglomerate sexist, classist, racist, and ableist determinations obscured by their dominant positions within society. Vocally passing as universal is a stacked game favoring those who discursively control the boundaries of rationality and the human. To transgress norms of unmarked dominant groups is to risk great social punishment and exclusion. To speak “in the wrong way” not only reveals the speaker to be connected to his/her body, particularity, and context, but also risks blurting out that the emperor is naked— the emperor speaks from a body. In rupturing the mythos of speech, the disabled speaker thus throws darkness within the humanist circle, threatening the ostensibly stable conditions of a generalized and “universal” identity and provoking violence in attempts to shore up the boundaries of the human. Excluding “hyperembodied voices” is thus a dogged mechanism of deferring the tension inherent in liberal humanist speech between universality and particularity, rational autonomy, and embodiment. The (failed) movement to free communication as rational discourse from the body entirely is reapproached through the posthumanist shift to text as the principal mode of communication. Cripping posthumanism There is no single bridge spanning humanism to posthumanism. There are certainly stories to tell about the antihumanism of the 1960s and 1970s, of feminism, cybernetics, Hans Moravec, late capitalism, and of the cascading death of God, man, and the author. Yet, as Donna Haraway duly reminds us, the cyborg is a bastard. Any attempt to pin down its origins is always already a fabrication, a sanitation, an attempt to tell a crooked story straight. Neil Badmington further muddies the water, adapting for posthumanism the Lyotardian-Derridean line that a system always contains the conditions for its critique. Rather than construing humanism and posthumanism as distinct entities in a linear, temporal relation, Badmington argues—akin to Lyotard’s reading of modernism and postmodernism— that “the writing of the posthumanist condition should . . . take the form of a critical practice that occurs inside humanism, consisting not of the wake but the working-through of humanist discourse” (2003, p. 22). Posthumanism has always ghosted humanism, and posthumanism is never a clean break (if it can be called a break at all) from humanism. Just as there is no single nor a complete shift from humanism to posthumanism, so are there many posthumanisms. My affinity toward posthumanism as a generative source for rethinking disabled speech does not extend to them all, insofar as some remain bedded with humanism more than others. For example, early cybernetics remained fixated on defining and maintaining borders of an autonomous and autopoietic subject. In a related vein, transhumanists hoist the banner of human progress with pride. Often conflated with posthumanism, transhumanism has wormed its way into the cultural imaginary with grand ameliorative visions of biotechnology improving the human condition through augmentation and newgenics. Transhumanism, as Cary Wolfe defines it, is simply an “intensification of humanism” (2009, p. xv), a technological extension of the dream of perfectibility that sees bodily limitations as a hurdle to transcend. Disabled speech (and disability more broadly) is accordingly irksome problem for transhumanists to fix, in time, through technology. The posthumanism I intend to redeploy takes its cue from Nayar, who defines what he terms critical posthumanism as “the radical decentering of the traditional sovereign, coherent and autonomous human in order to demonstrate how the human is always already evolving with, constituted by and constitutive of multiple forms of life and machines” (2014, p. 2). The posthuman under this reading cannot be understood in terms of a single locus or a unitary ontology of presence. Rather, he/she is dynamically coconstituted within ecological, technological, and informational networks—a congealing of “heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3). Subjectivity is an emergent feature of sympoietic systems (Haraway, 2014), necessarily constrained by and dispersed within the exchanges between systems and environments. “The Human” thus cedes its transcendental status long enjoyed within the Anthropocene. Yet, at the same time, in relinquishing this status, the (post)human no longer needs to frantically police the borders within which it (ostensibly) ruled autonomously. Rather, critical posthumanism recognizes that the borders of the human have always been porous. Owning up to our sympoietic constitution produces a vantage from which the ableist construction and policing of human borders, bodies, and communicative practices can be politicized and critiqued. With the cyborg bastard fully in mind, I suggest that the disabled body is useful in parsing a necessarily crooked and partial transition to posthuman communication. Interrogating the familial tradition of rhetoric from the perspective of disability, Jay Dolmage is here instructive: The body of history has been shaped to look like an idealized human body: proportional, inviolable, autonomous, upright, forward facing (white and masculine). But if you find the rhetorical body, you find tension, trial, and trouble. . . . [W]riting from bodies we would do history differently, not just be recognizing ‘other’ bodies, but also because our histories and rhetorics might more closely represent the difference and diversity of our bodies themselves (2014, p. 16). Reading posthumanism and posthuman communication through disability is accordingly a means of not only recognizing bodies that are often excluded in communication theory (relegated, e.g., to the insulated domain of speech-pathology) but also cripping communication itself. Like the stuttering body, there is perhaps much to gain from resisting the straight and most direct communicative and discursive path. Consider in this regard that for disability theorist Alison Kafer, the cyborg is appealing not in spite of but because of its “multiple, and often contradictory, deployments” (2013, p. 116). To look for and expect disability in posthumanism and communication theory is to invoke a heuristic of instability and indeterminacy that generates multiple meanings and relations. Conscious of the multivariate affinity and inconsonance between humanism and posthumanism, I wish to pull on a few threads to (a) appreciate the transition and reconstitution of the humanist logic excluding disabled speech within posthumanism and (b) redeploy posthumanism to imagine the disabled speaker otherwise. One thin place between humanism and posthumanism that provides an early historical reference point for the cripped movement to posthuman communication is the abstraction of “information” from context and the body by cybernetics and information theory. The work of cybernetic and informational theorists Norbert Wiener and Claude Shannon famously recast communication in terms of pattern/randomness rather than presence/absence. Within this paradigm, similar to within both structuralism and poststructuralism, information is not the one-to-one correlation of a signifier and signified, but, following Saussure, is rather the differentiation between arbitrary relations. By extracting information from the presence/absence binary, immateriality can be constructed on the basis of pattern/randomness. Hayles argues that because a universal informational code can be recognized as underwriting everything that exists, information and materiality can be conceived of as discrete entities, with information occupying the dominant role (1999, p. 11). In this configuration, information is differential insofar as the probabilities of a message alone determine its content. The “meaning” of a message is self-contained and its value is therefore unaffected by situation and context outside the closed information system. “Shannon and Wiener,” remarks Hayles, “wanted information to have a stable value as it moved from one context to another. If it was tied to meaning, it would potentially have to change values every time it was embedded in a new context, because context affects meaning” (1999, p. 53). As such, in “information,” the liberal humanist subject finds a release from the constraints of the body and the context of its production. In Hayles estimation, early cybernetics was thus a means to extend, not subvert, humanist conceptions of man as autopoietic, autonomous, and self-directed. This was accomplished by demonstrating that machines could function like a man and correspondingly that man is essentially an information-processing entity akin to intelligent machines (1999, p. 7). One might argue more specifically, in relation to communication theory, that the effort by Shannon and Weiner to distill information from context resonates with the liberal humanist desire to free rational discourse from the body. By disentangling information from materiality and context, cybernetics somewhat ironically remains tethered to humanist anxieties. Yet, it is worth noting that at the same historical moment, even poststructuralism, putatively motivated by a wariness of immediacy characteristic of humanism, blots out speech in favor of writing. While Derrida and his progeny favor writing inasmuch as speech ostensibly bypasses any impediment to self-presence, the fact that both cybernetics and poststructuralism converge in the erasure of speech is telling. That is, these divergent projects take as their starting point an idealized communicative body; an idealization that adopts the humanist assumption of vocal autoaffectivity. In an ironic twist, even Derrida effaces bodies in the effort to highlight the trace, the body. Working in the poststructuralist lineage, Haraway similarly brackets speech in her articulation of dirty, noisy, posthuman communication. “Cyborg politics,” she writes, “is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution.” (1990, p. 176).This support for the embodied disruption of communication is curiously prefaced by an insistence that “writing is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs” (1990, p. 176; my emphasis). For all her rhetoric of embodiment and insistence on the centrality of communication, Haraway seems not to consider speech as an intimate form of embodied communication that resists perfect translation. Hayles as well, setting her sights on theorists such as Wiener and Shannon, intends to reinstitute embodiment in posthumanism, yet never discusses speech as a creative source of noise in the evolution of material-informational systems. Even if interpreted as vestigial poststructuralist anxiety, this puzzling lacuna in posthumanist discourse around speech betrays an ableist presumption of self-presence and resonates with the exclusionary logic of the universal speaker. Yet, if one follows Dolmage in writing from bodies in their diversity, (post) humanism can be read against the grain. Thinking from the perspective of disability not only highlights the points of tension in the stuttered movement toward posthuman communication (as evidenced by both Haraway and Hayles) but also suggests new ways of thinking about speech as embodied and affective, and the relation between communication and the posthuman. Posthumanism and communication Reimagining the stuttering cyborg requires a more nuanced articulation of posthumanism’s relation with both disability and communication. Starting with the former, in decentering the human subject from its position as the transcendental explanans, posthumanism renders “ability” as an emergent aspect of human situatedness within politicized networks. Able-bodiedness is accordingly not an immanent feature of “the body” (as if it could be decoupled from its environment) but is a dynamic index of architectural, economic, industrial, biomedical, discursive, material, informational, affective, political, and sociocultural assemblages. More specifically, able-bodiedness identifies the congruence of these networks with putatively “normal” bodies. As Nayar helpfully points out, networks are inherently political, put in place, and optimized “for certain kinds of bodies to tap into and connect with—and this is what en-ables these bodies.” Bodies marked as disabled are accordingly, and conversely, those “that do not fit into available systems and institutionally created structures” (2014, p. 107). Put simply, disabled bodies are for Nayar those for which networks do not exist. While Nayar’s analysis is helpful, it is perhaps better to say that disabled bodies occupy subaltern networks, because deworlding (to put the phenomenon in Heideggerian parlance) is rarely, if ever, absolute.3 Disability is not a simple aggregate of network conditions, but is constituted in part by feedback loops. That is, disabled people—edged out of, or exploited by, dominant systems—regularly produce new networks that rewire connections between each other and their environments in politically subversive and generative ways. Disabled communities often supplant the neoliberal and meritocratic ideals of productivity, individualism, and self-sufficiency with an ethos of care, interdependency, and slowness. Cripping communication might likewise be understood as a criticoethical practice of reimagining the relations between informational bodies and systems, remapping disabled speech in ways that privilege noise, indeterminacy, affectivity, and sympoiesis.

**Outweighs -**

**(A) Case cross-apps assume that ethical norms can be ascribed onto the other, which this ev denies**

**(B) K is a prereq - communication cannot exist independent of broader structures that constrain who gets heard, which implicates their ethics.**

#### The alternative is unwavering pessimism – only a refusal of the world can disrupt the current notion of optimism –

**Selck**[Michael L Selck(B.S., Southern Illinois University – Carbondale). “Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn’t.” Southern Illinois University Carbondale. Jan 2016. Accessed 3/16/20. <https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1845&context=gs_rp> //Recut Houston Memorial DX]

The disabled are dying and with them dis/abled culture is being eradicated. In the time between formulating this project and its completion already too many disabled souls have been taken from this world, including pivotal disability studies influences for this research. I barely had enough time to mourn the loss of disability advocate and inspiration porn critic Stella Young before grieving the loss of disability studies exemplar Tobin Siebers. Attached to the grief I feel as a result of the fading disability studies community is the perpetual grief I harbor since my disabled Father’s suicide and in turn the grief concomitant to the claiming of a disabled identity. I choose to start out this project with grief because it communicates the tenor of this research; this is not the disability studies project of inspiration or utopia. My entry point to the disability studies dialogue is riddled with grief, anger, and pain and it is as such that this project plots a course of disability research that attempts to make a space free from the ideological constraints of optimism. The language surrounding dis/ability is highly political. Entire words, phrases, and identities are stretched between, in, and out of the nexus of dis/ability. The choice, for instance, to include a backslash in the word dis/ability represents for Goodley (2014) a desire to delineate and expand each of the categories in the face of global neoliberalism. My initial research inquired about the impact of dis/abled terms and phrases. I went to interrogate rhetoric like “special education”, “handicapable”, and one of the most glaringly overused insults in the American education system “retard”. The scholarship I was coming up with was plentiful but was for the most part located entirely outside of intercultural communication programs like the one I was attending. For the most part the few and far between intercultural communication projects about dis/ability I was able to locate were without modal complexity and didn’t bear semblance to so many of my own experiences. I was beginning to notice a layer of optimism that has been communicatively imprinted upon the negotiation of dis/abled identity. The angst started to manifest as I questioned if I was in the correct field or if dis/ability even was ‘cultural’. I felt a very real cultural erasure of dis/ability in academia and ultimately that glaring lack of consideration is what pushed me to performance studies. I first worked to close the apparent research gap by crafting a collaborative performance titled Under the Mantle (UTM), which put dis/ability, communication scholarship, and pessimist philosophy on stage. The larger purpose of this research report is to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability from communication studies by autoethnographically analyzing the crip-pessimist performance art project Under The Mantle. This research report will first detail the components of the theoretical work that was drawn on to create UTM. Next I offer a literature review to demonstrate the combination of optimism and neglect dis/ability has undergone in intercultural communication models. Following that section I mark my shift to performance methods as I explain how narrative autoethnography can illuminate cultural misconceptions regarding the dis/abled. In the last sections of this report I offer a textual analysis of the performance UTM and analyze three significant arguments of the instillation before concluding. Contextualizing Critical Dis/Ability Theory Often used interchangeably, critical disability theory (CDT) and critical disability studies (CDS) contest dis/ablism (Goodley, 2011, 2014; Devlin & Pothier, 2006; Hosking, 2008). There are several unique additions made to CDS with every new instantiation. Scholars in European countries and Canada attend to the theory, with United States academics often underrepresented. There are three concurrent themes of CDT that I will synthesize in this section with some dis/ability studies authors claiming there are as many as seven themes of CDT (Hosking, 2008). In the introduction to their edited collection of dis/ability essays, Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier (2006) present three themes of CDT as, first, to highlight the unequal status to which persons with disabilities are confined; second, to destabilize necessitarian assumptions that reinforce the marginalization of persons with disabilities; and third, to help generate the individual and collective practical agency of persons with disabilities in the struggles for recognition and redistribution. (p. 18, emphasis mine) Already the connections between the CDT and the critical communication paradigm are visible as each respectively forefronts notions of power, privilege, identity, and agency. Outlined in more detail, the first theme of CDT argues that there is systemic micro and macro level discrimination against bodies with disabilities. To some critical communication scholars, this theme might be obvious, but it seldom is when “the resulting exclusion of those who do not fit able-bodied norms may not be noticeable or even intelligible” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). As the bumper sticker on my laptop proudly disclaims, “Not all disabilities are visible,” which necessarily adds a level of nuance and complexity to the way that dis/ability studies attend to the prospect of discrimination and violence. Often times, “social organization according to able-bodied norms is just taken as natural, normal, inevitable, necessary, even progress” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). It might be true that the lack of collaborative work between critical communication studies and dis/ability studies is because neoliberalism is supremely effective at rebranding marginalized oppression as a marker of its progress. The implications of this assertion are dire but essential to the basis of crip-pessimism. Theoretical approaches based in pessimism and skepticism are often necessary to distinguish the instruments of self destruction that have been mistaken for those of self betterment.

#### Their notion of epistemological certainty projects ontological stigmas against what they perceive as disabled. The notion of self knowledge is negated by the disability drive. Thus the role of the ballot is to adopt epistemological disablement, which posits disability as constitutive to the subject.

**Mollow 15**[Anna Mollow(Ph.D. in 2015 from the University of California, Berkeley, Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Scholar, UC Dissertation-Year Fellow, coeditor of Sex and Disability and the co-editor of DSM-CRIP). “The Disability Drive.” University of California at Berkeley. Spring 2015. Accessed 4/30/20. <https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf> // Houston Memorial DX]

Ambivalent encounters with disability point to a possibility that is at the heart of psychoanalytic theory: our psyches may be set up in ways that make us innately disabled. Freud‟s theory of the death drive suggests that we are driven by a force that threatens our socially recognizable selves, but are at the same time prevented from fully perceiving this drivenness in ourselves. Always, it will be easier to allow that “someone else” may be under the sway of a self-undoing compulsion toward disability than to imagine ourselves as similarly driven. Yet our unwillingness indeed, perhaps, our structural inability to see ourselves as governed by the disability drive presents a major problem. A central argument of this dissertation will be that when individuals and social movements imagine themselves as not subject to the disability drive, their projects almost invariably have the effect of stigmatizing other abjected subjects, who come to be read as emblems of this disavowed and disabling compulsion. This thesis attempts to upset the impulse to overcome the disability drive. Rather than “putting the „ability‟ back in „disability,‟” the sexual model of disability underscores the disability that may inhere in subjectivity itself, regardless of whether a given individual or political movement identifies as “disabled” or “nondisabled.”17 How, then, might we begin to acknowledge our own determination by the drive? Any knowing of the drive that we might hope to achieve must, on account of the structural barriers that render the drive unthinkable, be an effort characterized by failure and incompletion—that is, we might say, by epistemological disablement. The term “epistemological disablement” will appear frequently in this dissertation, as I will argue that coming into close proximity with the disability drive produces states of cognitive and affective uncertainty, confusion, and incapacity that are akin to disability. In the works that I shall analyze, epistemological disablement will often be performed on a textual level, as theorists and narrators seem to lose control of what they want to say about disability. These moments of epistemological disablement are often disavowed by theorists and narrators and are instead projected onto disabled people. When this happens, disabled people‟s impairments are depicted as the result of an insufficiency of self-knowledge that is assumed not to determine nondisabled subjects. I will challenge these characterizations of disabled people not only by arguing for the value of “cripistemologies” (that is, ways of knowing that arise from disabled people‟s lived experiences) but also by using drive theory to undermine belief in the possibility of a transparent and wholly knowable self, whether disabled or nondisabled.18 My two-pronged approach to the issue of epistemological disablement may seem to present a paradox: on the one hand, I am asserting that disabled people‟s lived experiences generate important knowledge about disability; yet at the same time I am seeking to destabilize the very notion of self-knowledge. Let me be clear, then, that in undertaking this double endeavor I do not forward all-or-nothing claims either “for” or “against” the possibilities of selfknowledge. I will not assert that people cannot ever know anything reliable about themselves, but I will also not suggest that truth claims derived from personal knowledge about disability are infallible. Instead, this dissertation highlights the limits of complete self-knowledge for nondisabled and disabled subjects alike, while at the same time interrogating the social dynamics that give rise to imbalances in the distribution of epistemological authority to particular subjects on the basis of their perceived status as disabled or nondisabled.

#### The role of the ballot precludes your standard

#### 1. The standard speaks to offense leveraged under a normative framework and thus a normative conception of reality. No one consistently abides by normative ethics because we all have subjectivity. The Role of the ballot on the other hand, speak to the judge’s obligation as an individual in the round and thus preclude examination of normativity.

#### 2. Pessimism is an epistemic prerequisite to engagement in any other framing – we need to deconstruct the reality of our world first in order to understand it. Ontology precedes ethics as it frames the way we view other subjects

#### 3. Outweighs on magnitude – we’ve won an epistemology claim that proves that disabled people are excluded from all decisions calculus which means any other rob leads to erasure we can’t come back from

Reps come first –

1. It frames the way we approach topics and it shapes the way we interpret them, so it precedes reality – we wouldn’t have invaded Iraq if we didn’t think that Al Qaeda was based there. Discourse constitutes subjectivity as it frames how they approach the world

2. Proximity – it’s the only thing that happens in round, so in-round discourse is the only real takeaway we have from a debate round. Holding debaters accountable for their reps is key to accessibility which comes first because otherwise debaters leave if they feel like the space is violent. That also means they can’t sever out of their speech act.

## ON

### TT

#### Group

#### on a point - 1] there are other aspects tied to defending the resolution such as the framework you prove the obligation under, as well as the epistemology of the action taken by the resolution/the underlying assumptions of the statement of truth 2] destroys iterative testing of methods which kills critical education and ow their impact

#### on b point - 1] their example makes no sense since theres no relation but k links criticize some aspect of the 1ac which means its your burden to defed the reps of it 2] alternatives prove an opportunity cost to the plan which proves a disadvantage and a comparatively better alternative to said plan by attempting to solve for both impacts which means it is offensive and logically negates

### Underview

#### Disabled debaters get new 2nr responses k2 Access and engagemetn

#### Hidden apriori voting issue -

#### Presumption and Permissibility negate [A] to negate[[1]](#footnote-1) means to deny the truth of which means if the aff is false you vote neg [B] the aff has to prove an obligation which means lack of that obligation negates

#### Unjust[[2]](#footnote-2) is “not morally right; not fair” and permissibility disproves the positive obligation

Presumption negates

A] more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways

B] Time and effort DA - real world policies require positive justification before being adopted

C] Turns fairness since you could just read a non-inherent aff and win off presumption. \

D] 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

Permissibility negates

A] permissibility can’t affirm since then anything would be ok which would justify racism – we should be safe and do nothing.

B] resolved in the resolution indicates they proactively did something, to negate that means that they aren’t resolved

C] Turn – we’d never be able to take actions because we’d be obligated to everything.

## Heg

### Theory

#### NC theory first - 1] They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] We have more speeches to norm over it 3] It was introduced first so it comes lexically prior.

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology 3] 1st and last speech 4] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] New 1ar paradigms moot any 1NC theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested

## AFC

#### RVI 1AC Theory

#### [1] Not having an RVI incentivizes you to read a bunch of blippy underdeveloped spikes in the 1AC as well as a short 1ar shell solely as a time suck skewing my strategy. Strat skew key to equal access to the ballot.

#### [2] Infinite abuse: absent an RVI, the aff can read game over arguments like evaluate the theory debate after the 1ar putting the NC in a doublebind: either I answer them and waste time or concede them and auto lose.

#### [3] Under competing interps we should create the best norms for debate. RVIS encourage debaters to actually test issues, including the spikes you are trying to defend as good norms.

### Counterinterp

#### CI- The violation

#### 1] Negative testing- we should get to test the affirmative from multiple angles and sides that o/w’s since it’s the constitutive and inescapable role of the negative

#### 2] Phil Ed- Reading an alternative framework is key to clashing over core philosophical issues and learning the nuances of them. That outweighs A] Uniqueness- it’s the only thing unique to LD debate B] Time frame- philosophical knowledge helps us make ethical decisions in the future outside debate.

#### 3] Strategic Case Writing- Contesting your framework forces the aff to write the most strategic framework that they can leverage. Turns fairness offense since it means aff teams are able to win framing debates more efficiently

#### 4] Inclusion- Frameworks could be morally repugnant and justify horrible atrocities. We need to be able to contest their framework to hedge against ethical practices that impose psychic violence onto some debaters. That outweighs A] Pre-req- it’s an impact filter to other standards B] Performativity- you making arguments assumes your voice is included

#### 5] Real World- You will constantly be confronted by individuals with different views then your own. That outweighs on portability since debate is only pedagogically valuable if it’s skills can be exported.

### Skew

#### 1] Non-unique- all arguments skew time and strategy to some extent.

#### 2] Inevitable- Any argument that operates on a higher layer like 1ar theory would moot speech times

#### 3] Turn- reading turns to only your offense would moot the time you spent reading the FW

#### 4] Turn- our interp forces 1ar critical thinking and efficiency which is better since it lets them get faster for more abusive NC’s

### Ground

#### 1] Koorsgaard solves – revises theories to match new criticism. Empriically proven since koorsgaard changes kant to incorporate Mackie’s skepticism of objective truth.

### TJF

#### 1] No impact to it

#### A] doesn’t take out hijacks –

#### B] doesn’t take out permissibility

### Contention

#### On Indexicals

#### 1] Trigger permissibility- It would justify every action being permissible since people can act under their own index

#### 2] Indexicals negate- we have proven an index under which the aff is false so vote neg since you can’t weigh between indexes

#### 3] Debate solves- the unique process of debate allows us to criticize a framework without assuming a perspective i.e. I can respond to apriori knowledge being true without assuming that knowledge is experiential

#### 4] Morally repugnant- it would justify individuals operating under the index that Nazism is true and that being a legit perspective

#### Reject condo-logic and prefer modal logic – judgements are only true if they are qualified by necessity – or y’know, how regular logic works.

#### A] Reductio ad absurdum – they justify if condo-logic is true, then condo-logic is false – the conclusion contradicts the premise which means you should reject it. Modal logic o/ws because it doesn’t lead to backwards conclusions.

#### FW – ideal theory bad

#### Forgetting paradox – means you didn’t intend to break the promise

#### YES AOD – infinite obligations and results in action freeze means nothing is categorically unjust

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust

   [↑](#footnote-ref-2)