## OFF

### 1NC – OFF

#### Their method is violent – Drop the debater for deterrence

#### **Pragmatism color-ignorance limits its explanatory power.**

Glaude No Date[Eddie S. Glaude- “In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America ” <https://press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/298248.html>] UT AI

Pragmatism is as native to American soil as sagebrush and buffalo grass. So is white supremacy. But classical pragmatists like Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey rarely took up the question of white supremacy in their philosophical writings. For them, race and racism remained marginal intellectual categories despite the long, looming shadow of slavery that framed their extraordinary lives. I am not convinced, however, that their failure to address white supremacy philosophically constitutes an unforgivable moral failing. Professional philosophy, after all, isn’t the first place one looks for courageous social advocacy. And James and Dewey did in fact demonstrate in their daily lives a commitment, however limited, to antiracist politics (Peirce is a different story). We need to recognize that American pragmatism emerged in the context of a nation committed to democracy and slavery, to ideas of equality and to the insidious ideology of Anglo-Saxonism. American pragmatism indeed reflects the haunting duality at the heart of this country: a simultaneous commitment to democratic ideals and undemocratic practices. To say then that pragmatism is native to American soil is to acknowledge that it carries with it all the possibilities and limitations that have defined our fragile experiment in democracy.

#### Settlerism DA – The embrace of fluid deliberation and cultural exchange effaces the fixity of indigenous communities and their connection to land – that leaves Natives open to appropriation.

Grande 2K (Sandy, Associate Prof of Education & Chair of Education Department @ Connecticut U, *American Indian Geographies of Identity and Power: At the Crossroads of Indígena and Mestizaje*, Harvard Educational Review, Winter 2000, 70.4, pg 467)//mm

The forces of identity appropriation, cultural encroachment, and corporate commodification pressure American Indian communities to employ essentialist tactics and construct relatively fixed notions of identity, and to render the concepts of fluidity and transgression highly problematic. It is evident from the examples above that the notion of fluid boundaries has never worked to the advantage of indigenous peoples: federal agencies have invoked the language of fluid or unstable identities as the rationale for dismantling the structures of tribal life and creating greater dependency on the U.S. government; Whitestream America has seized its message to declare open season on Indians, thereby appropriating Native lands, culture, spiritual practices, history, and literature; and Whitestream academics have now employed the language of postmodern fluidity to unwittingly transmute centuries of war between Indigenous peoples and their respective nation-slates into a genetic and cultural dialogue (Valle & Torres, 1995, p. 141). Thus, in spite of its aspirations to social justice, the notion of a new cultural democracy based on the ideal of mestizaje represents a rather ominous threat to American Indian communities. In addition, the undercurrent of fluidity and sense of displacedness that permeates, if not defines, mestizaje runs contrary to American Indian sensibilities of connection to place, land, and the Earth itself. Consider, for example, the following statement on the nature of critical subjectivity by Peter McLaren: The struggle for critical subjectivity is the struggle to occupy a space of hope — a liminal space, an intimation of the anti—structure, of what lives in the in-between tone of undecidedability — in which one can work toward a praxis of redemption. . . . A sense of atopy has always been with me, a resplendent placelessness, a feeling of living in germinal formlessness I cannot find words to express what this border identity means to mc. All I have are what Georgres Bastille (1988) calls mots glissants (slippery words). (1997, PP 1—4) MeLaren speaks passionately and directly about the crisis of modern society and the need for a “praxis of redemption.” As he perceives it, the very possibility of redemption is situated in our willingness not only to accept but to flourish in the “liminal spaces, border identities, and postcolonial hybridities that are inherent in postmodern life and subjectivity. In fact, MeLaren perceives the fostering of a resplendent placelessness” itself as the gateway to a more just, democratic society. While American Indian intellectuals also seek to embrace the notion of transcendent subjectivities, they seek a notion of transcendence that remains rooted in historical place and the sacred connection to land. Consider, for example, the following commentary by Deloria (1992) on the centrality of place and land in the construction of American Indian subjectivity: Recognizing the sacredness of lands on which previous generations have lived and died is the foundation of all other sentiment. Instead of denying this dimension of our emotional lives, we should be setting aside additional places that have transcendent meaning. Sacred sites that higher spiritual powers have chosen for manifestation enable us to focus our concerns on the specific form of our lives. . . . Sacred places are the foundation of all other beliefs and practices because they represent the presence of the sacred in our lives. They properly inform us that we are not larger than nature and that we have responsibilities to the rest of the natural world that transcend our own personal desires and wishes. This lesson must be learned by each generation. (pp. 278. 281) Gross misunderstanding of this connection between American Indian subjectivity and land, and, more importantly, between sovereignty and land has been the source of numerous injustices in Indian country. For instance, I believe there was little understanding on the part of government officials that passage of the Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978) would open a Pandora’s Box of discord over land, setting up an intractable conflict between property rights and religious freedom. American Indians, on the other hand, viewed the act as a invitation to return to their sacred sites, several of which were on government lands and were being damaged by commercial use. As a result, a flurry of lawsuits alleging mismanagement and destruction of sacred sites was filed by numerous tribes. Similarly, corporations, tourists, and even rock climbers filed suits accusing land managers of unlawfully restricting access to public places by implementing policies that violate the constitutional separation between church and state’. All of this is to point out that the critical project of mestizaje continues to operate on the same assumption made by the U.S. government in this instance, that in a democratic society, human subjectivity — and liberation for that matter — is conceived of as inherently rights- based as opposed to land-based. To be fair, I believe that both American Indian intellectuals and critical theorists share a similar vision — a time, place, and space free of the compulsions of Whitestream, global capitalism and the racism, sexism, classism, and xenophobia it engenders. But where critical scholars ground their vision in Western conceptions of democracy and justice that presume a “liberated self”, American Indian intellectuals ground their vision in conceptions of sovereignty that presume a sacred connection to place and land. Thus, to a large degree, the seemingly liberatory constructs of fluidity, mobility, and transgression are perceived not only as the language of’ critical subjectivity, but also as part of the fundamental lexicon of Western imperialism. Deloria (1999) writes: Although the loss of land must be seen as a political and economic disaster of the first magnitude, the real exile of the tribes occurred with the destruction of ceremonial life (associated with 11w loss of land) and the failure or inability of white Society to offer a sensible and cohesive alternative to the traditions which Indians remembered. People became disoriented with respect to the world in which they lived. They could not practice their old ways, and the new ways which they were expected to learn were in a constant state of change because they were not a cohesive view of the world but simply adjustments which whites were making to the technology they had invented. (p. 247). In summary, insofar as American Indian identities continue to he defined and shaped in interdependence with place. Thus transgressive mestizaje functions as a potentially homogenizing force that presumes the continued exile of tribal peoples and their enduring absorption into the American “democratic” Whitestream. The notion of mestizaje as absorption is particularly problematic for the Indigenous peoples of Central and South America, where the myth of the mestizaje (belief that the continent’s original cultures and inhabitants no longer exist) has been used for Centuries to force the integration of Indigenous communities into the national mestízo model (Van Cott, 1994). According to Rodolfo Savenhagen (1992), the myth of mestizaje has provided the ideological pretext for numerous South American governmental laws and policies expressly designed to strengthen the nation state through incorporation of all “non-national” (read indigenous”) elements into the mainstream. Thus, what Valle and Torres (1995) previously describe as the continent’s unfinished business of cultural hybridization (p. 141), Indigenous peoples view as the Continents’ long and bloody battle to absorb their existence into the master narrative of the mestizo. While critical scholars do construct a very different kind of democratic solidarity that disrupts the sociopolitical and economic hegemony of the dominant culture around a transformed notion of mestizaje (one committed to the destabilization of the isolationist narratives of nationalism and cultural chauvinism), I argue that any liberatory project that does not begin with a clear understanding of the difference of American Indianness will, in the end, work to undermine tribal life. Moreover, there is a potential danger that the ostensibly knew cultural democracy based upon the radical mestizaje will continue to mute tribal differences and erase distinctive Indian identities. Therefore, as the physical and metaphysical borders of the postmodern world become increasingly fluid, the desire of American Indian communities to protect geographic borders and employ essentialist tactics also increases. Though such tactics can be viewed by critical scholars as highly problematic, they are viewed by American Indian intellectuals as a last line of defense against the steady erosion of tribal culture, political sovereignty, Native resources, and Native lands. The tensions described above indicate the need for an Indigenous. revolutionary theory that maintains the distinctiveness of American Indians as tribal peoples of sovereign nations (border patrolling) and also encourages the building of coalitions and political solidarity (border crossing). In contrast to critical scholars McLaren and Kris Gutierrez (1997), who admonish educators to develop a concept of unity and difference as political mobilization rather than cultural authenticity, I urge American Indian intellectuals to develop a language that operates at the crossroads of unity and difference and defines this space in terms of political mobilization and cultural authenticity, thus expressing both the interdependence and distinctiveness of tribal peoples.

## ON

### Heg

#### Reject 1AR theory – 7-6 rebuttal time skew means I’m inevitably behind. 2AR collapse means they get 3 minutes of uncontested offense that we can’t respond to – o/w it’s a question of when the theory debate starts

#### Drop the argument on 1ar theory – There’s a 7-6 time skew after the 1NC – means the 2NR has to frontline the 2AR, respond to the 1AR, and extend offense in order to win which is impossible if you read theory in the 1ar.

#### Bidirectional interps bad – interps like ACC or straight ref bad are purely for strategic purposes b/c debaters just read them when rounds are hard – o/w – kills norming b/c we won’t have a clear set of rules under which to debate

#### Negating is harder –

#### Aff gets infinite prep time before the AC, frames the debate, and gets the 2AR to frame the judge’s ballot. Infinite prep o/w TS – they can script 1AR’s to perfection

#### Aff can be super abusive in the 1ar and judges are much more reluctant to vote on 2n theory because of the 6-3 time skew.

#### Reject stats – they just prove that people are bad at affirming

#### Disabled debaters get new 2nr responses to blippy 1nc tricks k2 Access and engagemetn

#### Hidden apriori voting issue –

1] Indexicals negate- we have proven an index under which the aff is false so vote neg since you can’t weigh between indexes

] Morally repugnant- it would justify individuals operating under the index that Nazism is true and that being a legit perspective

#### Presumption and Permissibility negate [A] to negate[[1]](#footnote-1) means to deny the truth of which means if the aff is false you vote neg [B] the aff has to prove an obligation which means lack of that obligation negates

#### Unjust[[2]](#footnote-2) is “not morally right; not fair” and permissibility disproves the positive obligation

Presumption negates

### Contention

#### Doesn’t exist with outer space appropriation –

FRANKOWSKI 17 [Paweł FRANKOWSKI (Assistant Professor at the Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Jagiellonian University). “OUTER SPACE AND PRIVATE COMPANIES: CONSEQUENCES FOR GLOBAL SECURITY”. Politeja. No. 50/5, GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES (2017), pp. 131-148 (18 pages). Accessed 12/17/21. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26564288?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents> //Xu]

As mentioned earlier, when some space assets and services, like telecommunication services, from the very beginning of space exploration, have been in private hands, for other sector like space imagery or synchronizing services it was not an easy path. However, strategies geared towards more private involvement are intrinsically similar to strategies and justifications in other public services. John Donahue referring to the privatization of public services argues that the political choice between public and private services basically has two dimensions. The first concerns finance, and focuses on the questions whether or not individuals should pay for services individually, or maybe the same services should be provided by the state, with funds raised from taxation. Apart from financing, the second dimension focuses on performance, flexibility, and ability to adapt to changing circumstances. In general, this dimension should be analysed if services should be delivered from governmental level or provided by nonstate entity, with lesser attachment to procedures, red tape and managerial style of governing.4 Nevertheless, privatization of security and military services follows a slightly different logic, because after private companies acquired contracts to provide security services, provisions of such services will be still financed by public money. Therefore individuals’ rights, transferred to the state, who is main security provider, have been shifted back to private entities, able and willing to provide such services. Already it should be obvious that the main source of income for private space industry are public actors, and space companies hardly can find other clients. For example 66% of European space industry is coming from public sector,5 and only in 2015 European companies provided goods worth as much as 534 mln EUR for military customers EUR.6

Cosmology is not part of the topic –

#### A] its not about appropritaiont its about exploration

#### B] Negates – denies the right of private entities to

#### Appropriation is impossible – if its about taking shit from other people then that doesn’t exist because nobody owns anything in space

#### Truth-testing takes out the plan

### Hijack

#### The Multiple Worlds Interpretation is cosmological consensus and best explains the wave function.

Gribbin 20 [John Gribbin (described by the Spectator as “one of the finest and most prolific writers of popular science around,” is the author of, among other books, “In Search of Schrödinger’s Cat,” “The Universe: A Biography,” and “Six Impossible Things,” from which this article is excerpted. He is a Visiting Fellow in Astronomy at the University of Sussex, UK). “The Many-Worlds Theory, Explained”. The MIT Press. May 20, 2020. Accessed 12/11/21. <https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/the-many-worlds-theory/> //Xu]

Most quantum computer scientists prefer not to think about these implications. But there is one group of scientists who are used to thinking of even more than six impossible things before breakfast — the cosmologists. Some of them have espoused the Many Worlds Interpretation as the best way to explain the existence of the Universe itself. Their jumping-off point is the fact, noted by Schrödinger, that there is nothing in the equations referring to a collapse of the wave function. And they do mean the wave function; just one, which describes the entire world as a superposition of states — a Multiverse made up of a superposition of universes. The first version of Everett’s PhD thesis (later modified and shortened on the advice of Wheeler) was actually titled “The Theory of the Universal Wave Function.” And by “universal” he meant literally that, saying: Since the universal validity of the state function description is asserted, one can regard the state functions themselves as the fundamental entities, and one can even consider the state function of the whole universe. In this sense this theory can be called the theory of the “universal wave function,” since all of physics is presumed to follow from this function alone. … where for the present purpose “state function” is another name for “wave function.” “All of physics” means everything, including us — the “observers” in physics jargon. Cosmologists are excited by this, not because they are included in the wave function, but because this idea of a single, uncollapsed wave function is the only way in which the entire Universe can be described in quantum mechanical terms while still being compatible with the general theory of relativity. In the short version of his thesis published in 1957, Everett concluded that his formulation of quantum mechanics “may therefore prove a fruitful framework for the quantization of general relativity.” Although that dream has not yet been fulfilled, it has encouraged a great deal of work by cosmologists since the mid-1980s, when they latched on to the idea. But it does bring with it a lot of baggage. The universal wave function describes the position of every particle in the Universe at a particular moment in time. But it also describes every possible location of those particles at that instant. And it also describes every possible location of every particle at any other instant of time, although the number of possibilities is restricted by the quantum graininess of space and time. Out of this myriad of possible universes, there will be many versions in which stable stars and planets, and people to live on those planets, cannot exist. But there will be at least some universes resembling our own, more or less accurately, in the way often portrayed in science fiction stories. Or, indeed, in other fiction. Deutsch has pointed out that according to the MWI, any world described in a work of fiction, provided it obeys the laws of physics, really does exist somewhere in the Multiverse. There really is, for example, a “Wuthering Heights” world (but not a “Harry Potter” world). That isn’t the end of it. The single wave function describes all possible universes at all possible times. But it doesn’t say anything about changing from one state to another. Time does not flow. Sticking close to home, Everett’s parameter, called a state vector, includes a description of a world in which we exist, and all the records of that world’s history, from our memories, to fossils, to light reaching us from distant galaxies, exist. There will also be another universe exactly the same except that the “time step” has been advanced by, say, one second (or one hour, or one year). But there is no suggestion that any universe moves along from one time step to another. There will be a “me” in this second universe, described by the universal wave function, who has all the memories I have at the first instant, plus those corresponding to a further second (or hour, or year, or whatever). But it is impossible to say that these versions of “me” are the same person. Different time states can be ordered in terms of the events they describe, defining the difference between past and future, but they do not change from one state to another. All the states just exist. Time, in the way we are used to thinking of it, does not “flow” in Everett’s MWI.

#### Quantum Monism solves and is verifiable.

Päs 19 [Heinrich Päs (Professor of Theoretical Physics at TU Dortmund University). “Quantum Monism Could Save the Soul of Physics”. Scientific American. March 5, 2019. Accessed 12/10/21. <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/quantum-monism-could-save-the-soul-of-physics/> //Xu]

This is where “quantum monism,” as championed by Rutgers University philosopher Jonathan Schaffer, enters the stage. Schaffer has mused over the question of what the universe is made of. According to quantum monism, the fundamental layer of reality is not made of particles or strings but the universe itself—understood not as the sum of things making it up but rather as a single, entangled quantum state. Similar thoughts have been expressed earlier, for example by the physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. Taking quantum mechanics seriously predicts a unique, single quantum reality underlying the multiverse. The homogeneity and the tiny temperature fluctuations of the cosmic microwave background, which indicate that our observable universe can be traced back to a single quantum state, usually identified with the quantum field that fuels primordial inflation, support this view. Moreover, this conclusion extends to other multiverse concepts such as different laws of physics in the various valleys of the “string theory landscape” or other “baby universes” popping up in eternal cosmological inflation. Since entanglement is universal, it doesn’t stop at the boundary of our cosmic patch. Whatever multiverse you have, when you adopt quantum monism they are all part of an integrated whole. There always is a more fundamental layer of reality underlying the many universes within the multiverse, and that layer is unique.

#### Independently negates under their fw –

#### 1] Textuality –

#### A] private[[3]](#footnote-3) describes “belonging to or for the use of one particular person or group of people only” but monism proves particularities and groups cannot exist

#### B] an entity[[4]](#footnote-4) is “independent, separate, or self-contained existence” but monism proves that neither of those things are true since we are all the same

#### C] appropriation[[5]](#footnote-5) is “the action of taking something for one's own use, typically without the owner's permission” but monism disproves the concept of “one” and “owner”

#### D] the rez specifies “entities” as plural systems which is incoherent since plurality is impossible.

#### Nothing is verifiable under a standard of falsifiability.

**Nickles**, Thomas. (Philosopher @ University of Nevada, Reno) "Falsifiability." New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. **2005**. , <https://elearning.shisu.edu.cn/pluginfile.php/35320/mod_resource/content/1/Falsifiability%20%28Introduction%29.pdf> ///AHS PB

**Falsifiable contrasts with verifiable. A claim is empirically verifiable if possible observation statements logically imply the truth of the claim. If actual observation statements do imply the claim, then it is verified. "This raven is black" verifies "There are black ravens."** During the 1930s the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle proposed verifiability both as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience and a criterion of meaning. Their idea was that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is verifiable in principle, and its meaning is given by its method of verification. For the logical empiricists, only empirically verifiable claims make genuine assertions about the world and are, in this broad sense, scientific. All other claims (metaphysical, religious, ethical, etc.) are cognitively meaningless. In his Logik der Forschung (1934; Logic of Scientific Discovery), Popper replied by rejecting the logical empiricists' concern with language and meaning and by noting that **verifiability as a criterion** of demarcation **excludes** scientific **law** claims and thus the core of science **itself. For** since **a law claim** is universal in scope (in simplest form, "All A's everywhere and everywhen are B's"), it **cannot possibly be verified: there are always actual or potential instances beyond those so far observed. Yet a** universal claim **can be falsified by a single negative instance. The first observed black swan refuted the claim "All swans are white."** (Law claims of statistical probabilistic forms are more problematic.) Based on this logical asymmetry of verification and falsification, Popper proposed falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience, although not as a criterion of meaning. According to Popper, nonscience includes pseudoscience (e.g., Freudian psychology and Marxism) and metaphysics, the one fraudulent, the other sometimes providing a valuable heuristic for science. Many deep scientific problems have their roots in metaphysics, but to be scientific, a claim must take an empirical risk. Moreover, **falsifiability**, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, **is a permanent status** for Popper. **No amount of successful testing can establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever remains conjectural. That all** scientific theories remain falsifiable entails fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future revision**. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge.**

A] more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways

B] Time and effort DA - real world policies require positive justification before being adopted

C] Turns fairness since you could just read a non-inherent aff and win off presumption. \

D] Negating is harder Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

Permissibility negates

A] permissibility can’t affirm since then anything would be ok which would justify racism – we should be safe and do nothing.

B] resolved in the resolution indicates they proactively did something, to negate that means that they aren’t resolved

C] Turn – we’d never be able to take actions because we’d be obligated to everything.

We aren’t presupposing truth but rather pointing out why it was false to begin with – if I say racism is bad I don’t mean racism is good

Cross-app our indexicals violent

#### Reject condo-logic and prefer modal logic – judgements are only true if they are qualified by necessity – or y’know, how regular logic works.

#### A] Reductio ad absurdum – they justify if condo-logic is true, then condo-logic is false – the conclusion contradicts the premise which means you should reject it. Modal logic o/ws because it doesn’t lead to backwards conclusions.

#### B] Topic Lit – Modal logic is what is used for philosophical arguments and moral obligations and preserves neg ground

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust

   [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.google.com/search?q=private+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=private+&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i57j69i60j69i61.1372j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.google.com/search?q=appropriation+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=approp&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i57j69i59l2j69i60l3.1632j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-5)