## 1.

#### Interp: debaters must not say that 1ar theory is drop the debater, no rvis, and comes first and say no 2n theory.

#### Violation: your underview.

#### Abuse story, 1ar theory is now a no risk issue AND The 1ar becomes invincible since I can’t check abuse with 2nr theory.

#### Strat Skew- Creates a 3-1 structural skew, I have to respond to it because I can’t generate offense on it and I can’t uplayer it, and I lose if I undercover it.

#### Substance education and Time skew- Allowing me 2n theory allows me to read this same shell, but in the 2nr only if you actually READ 1ar theory, making less theory debates, but you specifically force me to read it in the 1n pre-emptively since I can’t check 1ar abuse.

#### That o/ws, even if you weren’t gonna violate it, you forced me to read this shell, meaning that this argument comes first because 1. Its meta-theory, indicts your theory practices and 2. If I win your practice as a whole was unfair, then it justifies my abuse and poor coverage of other layers.

#### Fairness is a voter because it’s a competitive constraint on both sides

#### Education is a voter because it’s the only reason schools fund debate

#### Competing interps

#### 1] Reasonability is arbitrary

#### 2] It’s key to norming

#### 3] It collapses-since you use an offense defense paradigm to evaluate brightlines

#### DTD—DTA doesn’t make sense and it’s key to deterring abuse

#### No RVI

#### 1] Illogical- shouldn’t win for being fair---o/w becuz it’s a litmus test for argumentation

#### 2] Incentivizes theory baiting

#### 3] Chills debaters from going for theory

#### 4] Counter interp-with the brightline of 1 shell solves their offense since it means they don’t have to spend much time on theory

## 2.

### 1NC – Syllogism

#### We’re hijacking practical reason – AFC

#### The 1AC says that morality must begin from practical reason which is key to bindingness. We’ll concede this but their FW is missing an internal link to why this means that humans are agents and have practical reason.

#### They say that subjects are free which makes them rational agents but we will win that subjects are not free because they do not have control over their intentions.

#### Framing issue: Moral Culpability requires self-determination – you wouldn’t hold hurricane morally responsible for damages because it doesn’t have the capacity to decide to move otherwise. Prefer –

#### 1] Moral Language – Blaming someone assumes they had the ability to do otherwise – you wouldn’t hold a baby culpable for stealing. o/w linguistics convey meaning which means they form the basis of purpose.

#### 2] Law of dichotomies. – Moral actions exist in opposition to immoral actions, if there is only one course of action, then it can’t be moral it’d just be permissible.

#### 3] Morality is prescriptive not descriptive, if a subject is not the cause of their action then they can’t guided by moral principles.

#### Thus, the framework is the principle of alternative possibilities - if we prove that subjects have no alternative possible intentions then they don’t possess practical reason since they aren’t autonomous and thus decisional not agents.

#### Determinism is true and determines morality! – All actions can be causally attributed to antecedent actions – each action can be the cause of the next action. All occurrence and existence is thus theoretically predictable and pre-determined including intentions.

#### 1] Principle of sufficient reason – everything must have a reason, cause, or ground –hijacks their meta-ethic.

#### 2] Intentions correspond with brain states which follow causal chains. Err neg since you’re intuitively biased to believe that you are free.

Horne 1 1912 Herman Harrell Horne.(Herman Harrell Horne (1874-1946) taught philosophy and education at a number of prominent American universities, and published numerous books and articles. His best-known work, The Democratic Philosophy of Education (1932), was a critical analysis of John Dewey's educational theories.). “Free Will and Human Responsibility.” Macmillan Publishing Co. republished by California State University Long Beach Pg 1-2. 1940, Accessed 9/10/2020 https://web.csulb.edu/~cwallis/100/articles/arguments\_for\_determinism.html //Houston Memorial SC] Brackets men to human

The typical subjective science is psychology. The last fifty years of the, wonderful nineteenth century saw psychology, hitherto rational and introspective, invaded by the scientific methods of observation, experimentation, and explanation. Since the methods of science exclude freedom of the will, it is natural that most scientific psychologists today are, as psychologists at least, determinists. The lamented Professor James is a noted exception, but his psychology has been most criticized by his fellows just on the ground of his "unscientific" retention of freedom of the will. As illustrating the contemporary attitude toward freedom, the following somewhat contemptuous and evasive reference may be cited: "We may prate as much as we please about the freedom of the will, no one of us is wholly free from the effects of these two great influences [heredity and environment]. Meantime, each of us has all the freedom any brave, moral nature can wish, i.e., the freedom to do the best he can, firm in the belief that however puny his actual accomplishment there is no better than one's best."1 The question is not whether we are "wholly free" from these influences, but whether we are at all free. The psychological defenders of determinism refer to "the working hypothesis of psychology," viz., there is no mental state without a corresponding brain-state; that the brain-state is to be regarded as the explanation of the mental state since successive mental states have no quantitative measurable relations; that the brain-state is itself to be explained not by reference in turn to the mental state but by reference to the preceding brain-state. Thus the chain of physical causation is unbroken; it is self-explanatory; it also explains the mental series; but the mental series in turn explains nothing on the physical side. This working hypothesis does effectually exclude the conscious will from all efficaciousness. In favor of this hypothesis as a working basis for psychology, it is to be remarked that our modern knowledge of localization of brain functions, of the aphasias, of the insanities, is largely dependent upon it. Psychology also emphasizes our ignorance respecting the real relations of mind and brain, and emphasizes our inability to imagine just how attention could change a brain-state, though just such an effect is attributed to attention in some theories of free will. Psychology as a science of mind also has its presuppositions respecting law. If the mental region is to be understood, it also must have its laws. These laws must be without any exception, such as free will would imply. It is the business of psychology, as a science, to deny exceptions and dis cover laws. . . . One of these laws affects our present question intimately. It is the law of motive. It asserts there is no action of will without a motive and that the strongest motive determines the will. Action is always in accord with the strongest motive, and the motives are provided by the heredity or the environment, or both. How could one choose to follow the weaker of two motives? Psychologists are better aware than others of the sense of freedom revealed to introspection. Men[humans] often feel they are free to decide in either of two ways. Such a feeling, however, the psychologists do not consider as proof of the fact of freedom. The mind often cherishes false opinions concerning matters of fact; delusions are among the commonest mental phenomena. Schopenhauer, particularly, admitted that men felt at times they were free, while he denied they were really free. A straight staff appears bent, in a clear pool, and cannot be made to appear otherwise, despite the fact of its straightness and despite our knowledge of the fact. If we had never seen it out of the pool we should probably affirm it was crooked. So most people, judging by appearances, believe in freedom because they feel they are free. There is thus a possibility of general deception respecting this belief in freedom. This possibility is appreciated if we recall some hypnotic phenomena. A man may, though awake, under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion, give away some of his property; he may then sign a statement saying he did it of his own free will and accord; spectators know otherwise. . . .

#### Psychology - Neuroscience has demonstrated that our internal cognition is deterministic. Make them provide a counterstudy- you shouldn’t trust the word of a high-schooler about neuroscience.

**Butkus 15**[Matthew A. Butkus(Professor in the department of Philosophy at McNeese State University, PhD - Health Care Ethics Duquesne University, MA – Philosophy Duquesne University). “Free Will and Autonomous Medical Decision-Making.” Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics. Volume 3, Issue 1. Pg 113-114. March 2015. Accessed 4/4/20. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/89a4/924e0111035dbda63d61631a169c654a04fa.pdf> //Recut Houston Memorial DX from BHPE]

**Psychology and neuroscience have demonstrated that consciousness, our day-today perception, our sense of self and identity, judgment, emotions, and intuitions are all predicated upon a number of causal cognitive elements that are outside our awareness— the bulk of our cognition is deterministic and preconscious. This determinism opens up avenues of undue influence into processes we normally assume to be under our control— it should be clear that this assumption is mistaken at best, inhuman and pernicious at worst.** We should not abandon ourselves to blind determinism, however—we possess the ability to reflect upon our motivations, and to engage in dialogic interaction with others, who may bring aspects of ourselves to the fore which would remain otherwise inaccessible. As a result, we can take back a measure of control, but only if we engage in honest dialectic and dialogue with others. In the context of patient autonomy and decision-making, the necessity of this dialogical process is especially evident—patients are already physically compromised, potentially in ways that can exert conscious and unconscious influence over their decision-making processes, above and beyond the normal potential sources of error found in heuristics and biases. Clinicians should be alert for such influences, recognizing that a medical illness can easily mask a deeper psychopathology. Affective disorders are very common, occur more in patients than in the general population, and tend to go unrecognized or dismissed as a normal reaction to their illness. The effect of these disorders, however, is quite pernicious. They fundamentally affect the efficacy of therapeutic interventions, morbidity and mortality, and rate of recovery—ignoring, dismissing, or failing to identify a comorbidity compromises the treatment of the obvious illness. By only treating the surface pathology, we potentially ignore the deeper wound. Many contemporary models of autonomy **suffer from similar shortcomings—while ethics seeks to inform itself of philosophical, legal, theological, and medical constructs, it all too easily ignores the psychological, an unfortunate irony in light of the fundamental connection between cognitive and clinical psychology and ethical ideals of autonomous choice.** Ethical theories that dismiss or fail to address psychological constructs are groundless; models derived from inhuman absolutes are so much fancy and fiction. What good is it to describe models of cognition that have little resemblance to how we actually think? The present autonomy model suggests that decision-making is a complex construct necessarily containing rational and emotional elements, intuitive judgments, and, as a result, potential sources of error. This seems to gel with day-to-day experience— **many decisions are made by gut instinct and intuition,** instead of a Cartesian rational process methodically and algorithmically exploring all possible influences, outcomes, and variables. **This deterministic model gels with the phenomenon of basing day-to-day decisions upon distal causes—early education and environment, role models, learned behaviors, etc.** This model suggests that as the severity of the outcomes increases to terminal, increasing reflection upon the causes and motivations of the decision is required—that a genuinely autonomous choice will explore the agent’s motivations, identifying and judging the appropriateness of each influence, determining if it is congruent with the value system adopted by the agent as a whole.

#### 3] Ethics can only exist in the absence of freedom – hijacks ideal theory since prescribing ethics requires determinism to be true.

**Horne 2** Herman Harrell Horne.(Herman Harrell Horne (1874-1946) taught philosophy and education at a number of prominent American universities, and published numerous books and articles. His best-known work, The Democratic Philosophy of Education (1932), was a critical analysis of John Dewey's educational theories.). “Free Will and Human Responsibility.” Macmillan Publishing Co. republished by California State University Long Beach Pg 1-2. 1940, Accessed 9/10/2020 <https://web.csulb.edu/~cwallis/100/articles/arguments_for_determinism.html> //Houston Memorial SC] Brackets change he to they.

The interests of ethics, of such matters as duty, obligation, conscience, reward, and blame, are peculiarly bound up with the doctrine of freedom, in the eyes of many. Yet there is also an argument from ethics for determinism. It runs as follows: a man's character determines his acts, he is responsible, for the act is his own; he committed it because, being the man he could not have done otherwise. **If** his **act were an effect of free will,** no **one** could count upon him, he **would be an irresponsible agent.** Just **because** he is **bound by** his character, he **is dependable**. If his acts are good, he is to be congratulated on his character, not praised overmuch; if his acts are bad, he is to be pitied for his character, not blamed overmuch. He is **rewarded, not because [they]** he **could have done otherwise, but as a tribute to the stability of his character and as a stimulus to continued right action.** He is **punished,** again **not because** he **need not have do**ne **wrong, but to help** him **do right next time.** All our **instruction, reproof, and correction of others presupposes they may be determined by such influences.** Thus, the whole outfit of ethical categories may be read in deterministic terms, and indeed are so read by many ethical thinkers and writers, begining with Socrates, who held that right ideas determine right conduct. Some practical teachers say, though believing in freedom for themselves, they must believe in determinism for their pupils. At any rate the theory of conduct, which ethics attempts, is not necessarily committed to the defense of freedom. . . .

### 1NC – Contention

#### 1] No alternative action means the aff is permissible – agents only have a genuine choice if there is more than one action we are able to perform, none of which exist under a deterministic model of the world. O/WsControl is illusory – a swimmer in a current can try to swim against it but whether they consent or not, they will always end up down-stream.

## 3.

#### Yes Act-Omission Distinction

#### 1] Infinite obligations – no act-omission means you’re culpable for every possible omission implying they’re immoral for debating instead of curing cancer which is untenable. Answering this means you negate – (a) The 1AC is suboptimal compared to some alternative (b) State action would be frozen b/c they wouldn’t be able to decide b/t alternatives so the plan wouldn’t pass and you vote on presumption.

#### 2] Trolley Problem – Omissions allow us to escape culpability in otherwise unavoidable situations like when someone pulls the lever to kill 1 instead of 2 – otherwise we’re always categorically wrong which makes morality inaccessible, only the distinction solves. O/ws on Bindingness, if an agent is permanently violating their ethical standard, they can’t take moral action.

#### Negate -- not reducing IPP is a legitimate moral action to avoid infinite culpability